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SUMMARY
The purpose of the thesis is to set out and examine the existing rules of Scots 
Law upon the property aspect of the marriage relationship (Chapters 1 - 5), to 
study the property rules which obtain in other comparable legal systems 
(Chapter 6), and tentatively  to suggest, on the basis of the foregoing, tha t there 
may be an argument for a t least the consideration of a different, and more 
systematic, approach to the subject in Scotland, and to put forward (in 
Chapter 7) a new (and optional) system of property rules, which has been termed 
"Separation of Property with Concurrent Compensation of Gains."
Chapter 1 explains the historical background to the present law: thereafter 
property rights s tan te  matrimonio are described, beginning with the law of 
bankruptcy as it affects  husbands and wives (Chapter 2), diligence and litigation 
(Chapter 3), and the rules of aliment (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 deals with the 
subject of Property Rights on Divorce and Death.
The System of Separation of Property with Concurrent Compensation of Gains 
would provide for joint ownership of the matrimonial home and "family assets", 
and for joint and several liability for household debts. Otherwise there would be 
separation of property. The new feature of the system would be the monetary 
compensation made during marriage by the economically stronger spouse to the 
other, thereby, it is hoped, making possible the amassing of property by both 
spouses during marriage, and rendering simpler the division of property at 
divorce, and trea tm en t of property on death. New matrimonial remedies would 
require to be introduced, rules made as to contracting-in and contracting-out, 
and as to trea tm en t of property on divorce and death. Rights of third parties 
must be pro tec ted . The only (generally) unalterable rule would be the co- 
ownership of the matrimonial home.
There would be a great measure of choice, the aim being to be protective and 
efficient, but not officious, and to retain as much as possible of the freedom 
which is associated with a system of separation of property, while affording an 
opportunity to those who wish to do so to redress any imbalance which a system 
of separation may create .
Only brief reference  has been possible to Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum No. 57: Matrimonial Property, in view of the date of publication of 
the Memorandum end the date of submission of the thesis.

Intreduction
Before the series of legislative reforms initiated
in 1855 by *Dunlop's Act® (The Intestate Moveable1Succession Act® 1855 9 a statute \diich, inter alia,
aimed to eradicate unfairness to husbands rather than
to wives in the m a t te r  of succession to the husband's
estate)g m a r r ia g e ,  now so often referred to as a
partiiership, could be regarded justly as a partnership
so one«*sided in its benefits, in the financial aspectPat least, as to be leonine'" —» as Boi:*upuXo\isly as the 
lion in the fable did divide the prey and w ith  as much 
relish as ho devoured it, did th e  Victorian husband, 
upheld by Victorian thinking manifested and reflected 
in judicial utterances and in the absence of more 
enlightened legislation, direct his mind to the niceties 
of the nature of things heritable and moveable, in order 
that he might enjoy to the full the spoil of both, 
because marriage operated as a legal assignation to the 
husband of the wife's moveables, under deduction of 
certain items classified as falling within pareiphernalia 
or j;)eculiunr, categories closely defined and forming, in
the general case, no substantial exception, in  s iz e  or 
value,to the general assignation, and on marriage the 
husbaïxd obtained not only the jiis mariti, or right of 
property /
1 ,  18 and  19 V i e t ,  c .2 32 .  "L eo n in a  S o c ie ta s " s ~  a n  a rra n g e m e n t u n d e r  w hich  onepartner bears all the l o s s ,  while the other reaps all the benefit, and a situation w hich  was not recognised, i n  Roman Law o r  i n  Soots Law, as constituting partnership g .see Textbook of Roman Law ", W*W* Buckland, 3rd ed«, p,508; "Law of Partnership and Joint«Stock Companies", F*V/*Clark, Vol.1 p»46| Latin Maxims and Phrases, John Trayner, p#307**08g see modern discussion, "The Law of Partnership in Scotland",J* Bennett M i l l e r ,  pp*7*»13* The 'leonine* analogy is drawn by Murray, p#i #3* However, see Fraser's advocacy (I#75)1 ) of th e  practice of using the word to denote property fromwhich the jus m a r l t h a H ^ b e en excluded. This is atfurtfrnxt’tra.^ n^ jat^ ea. . n , t , . . .later use, since such exclusion of. the xus mariti was ‘chouglni at first n o t  competent*
2 #
p r o p e r ty  i n  h e r  m o v e a b le s , b u t  a l s o  th e  r i g h t  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  h e r  h e r i t a g e #  The v fife  came u n d e r  
t h e  o u r a to r y  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d , and  w h ile  t h e  c u r a to r y  
o f  a  m in o r i s  t e r m in a te d  a t  h i s  m a j o r i t y ,  " t h a t  o f  a  
m a r r ie d  woman c o n t in u e s  th ro u g h  t h e  m a r r ie d  l i f e * "
The a n a lo g y  w ith  p a r t n e r s h i p  may be fo l lo w e d  
w i th  p r o f i t  a  l i t t l e  way p e r h a p s ,  s in c e  r e f e r e n o e a  t o  
" s o c i e ty "  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  m a ir le d  s t a t e  a r e  fo u n d  i n  
many p l a c e s  i n  th e  e a r l i e r  w r i t e r s ,  th o u g h  th e y  a r e  a t  
p a in s  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  communion, i f  su c h  i t  be 
(a n d  in d e e d  i t  may b e  w e l l  t o  fo l lo w  th e  a d v ic e  o f  L ord  
F r a s e r  and  s p u m  t h e  w ords cpmmupj^o bonorxam* so  d o u b t f u l  
i s  t h e  h i s t o r y  an d  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h a t  p h r a s e  i n  o u r  
la w ^ )" # # , . * i s  n o t  t o  be u n d e rs to o d  a s  i f  a  r e a l  
p a r t n e r s h i p  w ere  t h e  o o nsequenoe  o f  i t ;  a s  i f  th e  
r i g h t s  o f  b o th  sp o u s e s  w ere  t h e  sam e, o r  a s  i f  t h e  w ife  
had  th e  same pow er w h ich  th e  husband  h a s  o v e r  th o s e  
goods w hich  a r e  s a i d  t o  f a l l  u n d e r  communion; ' t i e  much 
o th e rw is e  *#*# F o r  by h e r  m a r r ia g e ,  sh e  l o s e s  th e  
p r o p e r ty  o f  h e r  # 10l e  m oveable e s t a t e ;  i t  becom es 
im m e d ia te ly , v ;h o lly  and  e n t i r e l y ,  t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  h e r  
h u sb a n d ; he  a c q u i r e s  a l l  t h e  r i g h t s ,  and  may a lo n e  
e x e r c i s e  a l l  t h e  p o w e rs , w h ich  by law  b e lo n g  t o  th e  
p r o p r i e t o r s  o f  a n y th in g *  Henoe m a r r ia g e  i s  c a l l e d  a  
l e g a l  a s s ig n m e n t ,  made by a  w if e  t o  h e r  h u sb an d  o f  a l l  
h e r  m oveab le  e s t a t e *  F o r  i t  i s  by  th e  law  i t s e l f ,  
v e s te d  i n  him  w i th o u t  any  i n t i m a t i o n ,  d e l i v e r y  o r  
a p p re h e n s io n  /
1* F r a s e r  I ,  514^515 , i n  a  p a s s a g e  i n  w h ich  hed i s t i n g u i s h e d  b e tw een  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  c u r a to r y  o f  a  m in o r an d  t h a t  o f  a  m a r r ie d  woman* S ee  a l s o  51G*» 5 1 7 , upon  t h e  t r u e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  p o s i t io n #  2* "The te rm  communio bonorum  r e p r e s e n t s  no  p a t r im o n ia l  i n t e r e s t  c 3 F e l t i le r  W sb a n d  o r  w i f e ,  and  i s  q u i t e  oUt o f  p l a c e  i n  t h e  l e g a l  n o m e n o la tw e  o f  S c o t la n d ,  I t  h a s  g iv e n  r i s e  t o  many p r o f i t l e s s  l e g a l  a rg u m e n ts , and  
h a s  n o t  i n f r e q u e n t l y  l e d  t o  a  m is c a r r ia g e  o f  j u s t i c e , "  F r a s e r  1 ,6 4 6 ;  s e e  g e n e r a l l y  F r a s e r  C hapélX , 648*^678, upon  t h e  h i s t o r y  and  n a tu r e  o f  th e  comnmnio* See a l s o  M u rra y ,p p e lO '-H  *
a p p re h e n s io n  o f  p o s s e s s io n
PAgain, Erskine says~, almost in the tone of an
a p o lp g ia .  "By t h e  common r u l e s  o f  s o c i e t y ,  t h e  
a d m in i s t r a t io n ,# #  o u g h t t o  be  v e s te d  e q u a l ly  i n  t h e  
husb an d  and w i f e ,  who a r e  th e  two " s o o i i " #  B ut a s  
th e  w ife  i s  by n a tu r e  i t s e l f  p la c e d  u n d e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  h u sb a n d , t h e  h usband  h a th  by th e  law  o f  S c o t la n d  
t h e  s o l e  r i g h t  o f  a d m in i s t e r in g  th e  a o o le ty  ** g o o d s" , 
and  s u b s e q u e n t ly ,  i n  th e  same p a ra g r a p h ,  " T h is  a b s o lu te  
pow er i n  th e  hu sb an d  o v e r  t h e  m oveable e s t a t e  b e lo n g in g  
t o  th e  w i f e ,  may be  th o u g h t  i n o o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  n o t io n  
o f  t h e  communion o f  g o o d s; b u t  i t  c a n  be  no m a t t e r  o f  
w o n d er, t o  f i n d  s t r o n g  d e v ia t i o n s  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  o f  
m a n 'ia g e  from  th e  n a tu r e  o f  an  o r d in a r y  o o ^ ^ p a r tn e rsh ip ; 
s in o e  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n fe s s e d  s u p e r i o r i t y  o v e r  t h e  w ife  
m ust n e c e s s a r i l y  g iv e  t o  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  comm union, 
p r o p e r t i e s  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from  th o s e  w h ich  o b ta in  i n  t h e  
o r d in a r y  c o n t r a c t  of s o c i e t y , "
P e rh a p s  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  s h o u ld  be  abandoned  n o t io n s  
t h a t ,  i n  p o i n t s  o f  d i f f i c u l t y ,  r e c o u r s e  m ig h t be  had  t o  
th e  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  o f  p a r t n e r s h i p  f o r  a id #  The m a r i t a l  
p a r t n e r s h i p  t o  t h e  m id d le  o f  t h e  n in e t e e n th  c e n tu r y  ** and  
in d e e d  i n  some r e s p e c t s  t o  1920 was a  s t r a n g e  one#
The id e a  o f  m ale s u p e r i o r i t y  was d e e p ly  r o o te d ,  n o t  
o n ly  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  law  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  
t h a t  o f  s u c c e s s io n ,  and  p e rh a p s  i n  s u c c e s s io n  p r i n c i p a l l y *  
H ot u n t i l  t h è  B u c c e s s io n  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t , 1964"^, w ere  b low s 
s t r u c k  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a g a i n s t  th e  feu d a l-^ b a se d  d o c t r i n e  o f  
m ale  p r im o g e n i tu r e ,  w h ich  fa v o u re d  t h e  c la im  o f  th e  m ale 
f i r s t " * b o m  i n  m a t te r s  o f  i n t e s t a t e  h e r i t a b l e  s u c c e s s io n *
" S l . . ^ 3 L S S a i L S £ £ l S " .  s a i d  S i r  Thomas H ope, " M  
c e n s e t u r  dom inus omnium bonorum quae posaidet u x o r  de  
j u r e  /
1* C om m issary W a lla c e ;  4 ,  6 ,  2 0 6 , q u o te d  by  F r a s e r  I ,  665* 2* Brsk* I n s t*  1, 6, 15*3* 12 and  13 E l i z * 2 .  C*41*
ij u r e  n o s t r o ,  and  t h e r f o l r  may be dem m ced  t o  t h e  h o m e
f o r  h e r  o a u a " , (C *490)^ a n d , a g a ln ^ ,  "The h u sb an d  may 
a n n a ly ie  h i s  v /y fe 'a  goods and g e i r  w i th o u t  h e r  c o n s e n t  
and  sh e  a t  no tym e b e f o r  o r  a f t e r  h i s  d e c e la  may se e k  
r e a t l t u t i o n e , "  ( B a l ,  Pr# T i t ,  'm a t e r l s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  
h u sb an d  and  th e  w ife,®  o # 4 ) ,
"V l r  e a t  c a p u t  u x o r i a " m ig h t in d e e d  h av e  b een  th e  
maxim o f  th e  V ic to r i a n  la w y e r ,  o r  th e  h y p o th e s is  upon 
w h ich  h e  b a se d  h i s  t h in k i n g ,  th e  y a r d s t i c k  a g a i n s t  w hich  
he  m easu red  p o s s ib l e  re fo rm s  and  fo u n d  them  d i s t a s t e f u l .
Ample a u t h o r i t y  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  su c h  a n  a t t i t u d e  m&iy%be fo und  i n  th e  O ld and  Hew T e s ta m e n ts , S t a i r  q u o te d  
G e n e s i s t i l l : 1 6 , w here  th e  L o rd  God s a id  t o  E ve, 
th y  d e s i r e  s h a l l  be  t o  th y  h u sb a n d , and he s h a l l  r u l e  
o v e r  t h e e , "  and  i n  th e  w r i t i n g s  o f  S t ,P a u l  much a s s i s t a n c e  
m ig h t be  fo u n d  $ ,*  "W ives, su b m it y o u r s e lv e s  u n to  y o u r  
own h u sb a n d s , a s  u n to  t h e  Lord# F o r  t h e  h u sb an d  i s  t h e  
h e ad  o f  t h e  w ife  # ,# "  (E p h e s ia n s ,  v ,2 1 " 2 2 )
T h ere  abounded  a  c u r io u s  m ix tu re  o f ,  a t  w o r s t ,  m ale  
a r r o g a n c e ,  g re e d  and  o p p o r tu n is m , a n d , a t  b e s t ,  p a te r n a l i s m  
and  c h iv a l r y  a n  e x t r a o r d in a r y  d o u b le  s ta n d a r d  w hich  
r e s u l t e d  i n  a  d e n i a l  f o r  many y e a r s  t h a t  a  w ife  was l i a b l e  
t o  a l im e n t  h e r  h u sb an d  a l th o u g h  sh e  was i n  a  p o s i t i o n  to  
do s o ,  an d  h e  was in c a p a b le  o f  s u p p o r t in g  h im s e l f ^ ,  and
t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  was n o t  r e c t i f i e d  u n t i l  th e  p a s s in g
o f  t h e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1920^
( s # 4 ) ,  w h i le  a t  th e  same t im e  t h e r e  was e x p re s s e d  t h e  
o p in io n ^  t h a t ,  "To a l lo w  a  p a r t i t i o n  o f  pow er be tw een  
t h e  /
1# M ajo r P r a c t i c k s ,  I I ,  T i t .  1 7 , 1 3 .
2 .  H ope, I I ,  1 7 , 2 .
4% F Î n g z ie s  V #  F# 1 8 90 , 28 S .L #R #6.
5* 10 and  11 G eo .5 ,  c#64#6$ C olquhoun v .  C . (1 8 0 4 ) ,  Mor# A pp#1 ,; S e n tim e n t
q u o te d , and c a s e  d i s c u s s e d ,  by W alto n , %)p.190""191#I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i t  was d e c id e d  t h a t  a  w ife  c o u ld  n o t  com pel /
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the husband and the wife, and a liberty of r e s i s t a n c e
of the latter to the will of the fo rm e r  In the
r e g u l a t i o n  of the household, would induce p e r p e t u a l
discord, and prove destructive of domestic happiness,
and the best interests of society*#*# It is only
where the wife has suffered personal I n j u r y  that the
courts of law will interfere with the husband in the
regulation of his h o u seh o ld #  The more delicate,
though not less acute, sufferings of the mind corne
not within the cognisance of any earthly tribunal**'
(Of course, since the Introduction of c r u e l t y  as a
ground of divorce by the Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1936,
and particularly since the development in more recent1years of the concept of mental cruelty , this is no 
longer the case, even if it ever, in truth, was so,) 
Possibly the dichotomy between the two attitudes is 
not so striking as at first it appears, and la simply 
an example of the obverse in a small way of the saying, 
"No power without responsibility#**
In a description of the la\f of Scotland, and of 
England, down to the second half of the nineteenth 
century, there is an  'embarras de richesses* of 
quotations apt to exj)lain the situation in which a 
married woman of that era found herself* It might 
almost be thought that th e  lav/ was an inducement to the 
woman of independent mind and p r o p e r ty  to remain 
unmarried/
compel her husband to maintain h e r  in his house, he having provided a separate residence for her* Fraser II 869-872 also discusses the case ("the decision sustained to its utmost latitude the pow er of the husband, as the. dignior persona, of fixing the domicile of both spouses, and of deciding whether the wife shall reside with him or n o t# " )  and extracts from it the r u l e  that the proper course for a married woman to take in these circumstances is to seek adherence and aliment and, after the requisite period had elapsed, to sue for divorce on the ground of desertion*See "The Evolution of the doctrine of Matrimonial Cruelty"* (Grant v# Grant 1974 8*L,T*(Notes) 54),A*M«McLean, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, January, 1975, Vol*20* No*1* pp*26-27*
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u n m a r r ie d , a l th o u g h  I t  m uat be  a d m it te d  t h a t  f o r  th e  
p e n n i l e s s ,m a r r i a g e  m ig h t p r o v id e  a  b u t t r e s s  a g a i n s t  th e  
r e a l i t i e s  o f  l i f e  ( th o u g h ^  n o t  a lw a y s ) ,  and f u r t h e r  I t  
m ust be  a d m it te d  t h a t  f o r  th e  r i c h ,  t h e  d e v ic e  o f  th e  
m a r r l a g e - o o n t r a o t  was a v a i l a b l e ,  and  many a v a i l e d  
th e m s e lv e s  o f  t h e  a id  w hich  i t  o f f e r e d #  " I t  i s  
c o m p e te n t f o r  th e  p a r t i e s  t o  s e t t l e  by m a r r ia g e  c o n t r a c t  
t h e i r  s e v e r a l  r i g h t s  and  I n t e r e s t s ,  p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e y  
do n o t  a g re e  t o  c o n d i t i o n s  I n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  
c o n ju g a l  r e l a t i o n ,  a g a i n s t  t h e  p u b l ic  la w , o r  i n  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  m o ra ls "  s a i d  F r a s e r ,  and  c o n t in u e d ,  i n  
a m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  "H ence i t  I s  i l l e g a l  t o  c o n t r a c t ,  t h a t  
th e  h usband  s h a l l  be d iv e s te d  o f  h i s  r i g h t  a s  h ead  o f  
th e  f a m i ly ,  and  p la c e d  i n  s u b j e c t io n  t o  h i s  w ife# # # # "
I n  E n g la n d , t o o ,  th e  m a r r ie d  woman was u n d e r  
d i s a b i l i t y ,  s in c e  h e r  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  was m erged w ith  
t h a t  o f  h e r  husband#  She was s a id  t o  be  u n d e r  c o v e r t u r e ,  
and  sh e  a c te d  o n ly  u n d e r  t h e  c o v e r ,  o r  w in g ,^  o f  h e r  
husband#
F r a s e r ^ ,  who f i n d s  th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  S c o ts  and
E n g lis h  r u l e s  t o  be  t h e  same h e re  ( t h a t  i s ,  t h e
c o n s o l id a t i o n  o f  th e  w i f e 's  r i g h t s  and  d u t i e s  w ith  
th o s e  o f  t h e  h u sb an d ) e x p re s s e s  th e  S c o ts  p o s i t i o n  t h u s ; -  
"T h e /
1# F r # I ,  509 ( " * # # th e  w i f e ,  even  i n  t h e  r i c h e s t  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E u ro p e , i s  fo u n d  o f t e n  t o i l i n g  v o l u n t a r i l y  i n  t h e  b r i c k f i e l d  and  i n  h a rd  m e c h a n ic a l l a b o u r ,  t o  s e c u r e  a  l i v i n g  f o r  h e r  h o u s e h o ld " , c i t e d  a s  an  e x c e p t io n  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  t h a t  " i t  i s  o n ly  among t h e  b a rb a ro u s  
and t h e  sa v a g e "  t h a t  th e  w ife  w orks o u t  o f  d o o rs# )2# F r # I I ,  1334: e v en  when i t  was acknow ledged  t h a t  b o thr i g h t s  m ig h t be e x c lu d e d  ( s e e  i n f r a  p# 54 - 5 8 ) m a t te r s
w ere  n o t  made s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  w i l f s ^ o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  p o s i t i o n  a sf b m i l l a e  m ig h t be  g iv e n  u p , a s  F r a s e r 's  ru :In^^R e 1876 a s  i n  t h e  1846 e d i t i o n )  c l e a r l y  shows#A t 1 , 5 1 1 , F r a s e r  s a y s  "The husb an d  c a n n o t  ren o u n c e  h i s  r i g h t s  a s  p r in g e n s  f ^ m i l l a e # The h u sb an d  h a s  th e  c u s to d y  and  governm ent) o f^ R T s ^ c h ild re n , n o t  f o r  h i s  own g r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and d u ty ,  w h ich  i s  im posed  on him  f o r  t h e  w e l f a r e  o f  th e  p u b l i c ;  and  any  a g reem en t t o  t r a n s f e r  t h i s  d u ty  t o  th e  w ife  w ould  be  v o id "#
3# 1 Bl#Comm# o#15#4# F r # I ,  5 0 8 , 507#
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"The m a r r ia g e  o p e r a te s  I n  r e g a r d  t o  th e  w i f e ,  so  a s  t o  
s in k  h e r  p e r s o n  i n  t h e  eye  o f  law# The h u sb an d  and 
w ife  a r e  o n e ; and  t h e  u n i ty  o f  p e rs o n s  i s  so  c o m p le te , 
t h a t  th e  l e g a l  e x i s te n c e  o f  th e  w ife  i s  s a i d  t o  be  
su sp en d e d  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  i s  I n c o r p o r a te d  
w i th ,  and  c o n s o l id a te d  i n ,  t h a t  o f  th e  husband#  S uch , 
a t  a l l  e v e n t s ,  i s  th e  la n g u a g e  o f  o u r  l e g a l  w r i t e r s  and  
o u r  C o u r ts  o f  Law# The w ife  i s  w i th o u t  l e g a l  p e r s o n a ."
1I n  t h e  w ords o f  E r s k in e  , "The h u sb an d  a c q u i r e s  by  
t h e  m a r r ia g e  a  pow er o v e r  b o th  th e  p e r s o n  and  e s t a t e  o f  
th e  w ife #  H er p e r s o n  i s  i n  some s o r t  su n k  b y  t h e  
m a r r ia g e ,  so  t h a t  s h e  c a n n o t a c t  by o r  f o r  h e r s e l f :
And a s  f o r  h e r  e s t a t e ,  sh e  h a s  n o th in g  t h a t  c a n  be  t r u l y  
c a l l e d  h e r  own, w here  m a t t e r s  a r e  l e f t  t o  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  
o f  th e  la w ."
The P o s i t i o n  a t  Common Law
pL ord  F r a s e r ^  s a y s  t h a t ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  many l e g a l  
t r e a t i s e s ,  t h e r e  was c r e a t e d ,  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  
a  communion o f  a l l  t h e  m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  w h ich  th e  
sp o u s e s  p o s s e s s e d ,  b u t  c o n t in u e s  t h a t ,  th o u g h  " th e  c i v i l  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  e ac h  i n  t h e i r  m oveab les a r e  com m unicated  t o  
t h e  o t h e r " ,  y e t  "The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  common fu n d  
i s  n o t ,  a s  i n  o r d in a r y  p a r t n e r s h i p ,  g iv e n  t o  b o th  th e  
" s o c i i " :  b u t  t h e  h u sb an d  a lo n e ,  a s  th e  d l g n i o r  p e rs o n a
h a s  i t * "
T h is  i s  t h e  m ost f a v o u r a b le  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w hich  
c o u ld  be  p u t  on th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and  l e a d s  t o  a  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  tw in  r i g h t s  o f  j u s  m a r i t i  and  ju s
J u s  M a r i t i«#• ^ «ta «W* ««#'it!#
The ,jM  S â E Ü i  was a  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  o r  was 
a lm o s t  /
1» Ersîc» I n s t ,  1» 5 ,  1 9 , 2 ,  F r ,  X, 6 4 8 ,
a lm o s t  u n i v e r s a l l y  deemed t o  be  s o ,  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  
S t a i r ' s  v iew  t o  t h e  c o n tr a r y #  "A c co rd in g  t o  t h e  
n a tu r e  o f  s o c i e t y ,  t h e r e  i s  a  communion o f  goods 
b e tw ix t  t h e  m a r r ie d  p e r s o n s ;  w hich  s o c i e t y ,  h a v in g  
AO d e te r m in a te  p r o p o r t io n  i n  i t *  d o th  r e s o l v e  i n t o  an  
e q u a l i ty *  b u t  so  t h a t ,  th ro u g h  th e  h u s b a n d 's  e co n o m ic a l 
pow er o f  g o v e rn m e n t, t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d u r in g  th e  
m a r r ia g e  o f  t h e  w hole  i s  a lo n e  i n  t h e  h u sb a n d ; w hereby  
h e  h a v in g  th e  s o l e  and  u n a c c o u n ta b le  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  h i s  
pow er may r a t h e r  seem t o  be  a  pow er o f  p r o p e r t y ,  h a v in g  
in d e e d  a l l  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  p r o p e r ty  d u r in g  t h e  c o n ju g a l  
s o c i e t y ,  y e t  i s  no m ore th a n  i s  above e x p re s t^ # "  T h is  
s ta te m e n t  may h ave  c o n t r ib u te d  t o  t h e  c o n fu s io n  w h ich  
e x i s t e d  a s  t o  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  tw o r i g h t s *
F r a s e r ^  q u o te s  D l r l e t o n / ,  who s a y s  t h a t  " i t  i s  t h e  e s s e n c e  
o f  a  f e e  t o  h av e  pow er t o  d is p o n e " ,  and  re m a rk s  t h a t  i n  
B a i l i e  V* C la rk ^ \  th e  C o u rt e x p r e s s ly  l a i d  down a s  a  
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  " f u l l  p r o p e r ty  i s  n o th in g  m ore 
th a n  a  l i f e r e n t ,  w i th  a  pow er o f  d i s p o s a l  a t  p l e a s u r e . "
The j u s  m a r i t i  w as so m e th in g  " s e p a r a t e  and  s u p e r i o r ;  
i t s  p u rp o se  b e in g  t o  t r a n s f e r  th e  p r o p e r ty  from  one 
sp o u se  t o  th e  o th e r^ # "
A c co rd in g  t o  F r a s e r ,  " th e  j u s  m a r i t i ,  a s  so o n  a s  
t h e  m a r r ia g e  i s  s o le m n iz e d , o p e r a te s  a s  a  c o m p le te  
a s s i g n a t i o n  o r  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  m o veab les 
b e lo n g in g  t o  th e  w i f e ,  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  h u sb a n d , whose 
a b s o lu te  p r o p e r t y  th e y  t h e r e a f t e r  becom e^#" U n lik e  
o t h e r  a s s i g n a t i o n s ,  no i n t i m a t i o n  o r  s o le m n i ty  o f  any  
k in d  was r e q u i r e d ,  " th e  f& o t o f  b e in g  h u sb an d  c a l l i n g  
th e  r i g h t  i n t o  b e in g ,  and  p u b l i s h in g  i t  t o  t h e  w o r ld /* "
In d e e d ,  /
1# Stair 1, 4, 9#2 , Fr, I, 673*4*3* Doubts V *  Fee# p#141*4. 23rd Feb# 1809. F.C#5. Pr,I#677,6 # 1st ed# I, 346-7,7, I. 679, and authorities there cited*
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I n d e e d , g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  g r a n te d  by th e
woman a f t e r  t h e  b an n s  h ad  b e en  c a l l e d  o r  even  a f t e r  
b e t r o t h a l  o r  a g re e m e n t t o  m arry  b u t  b e f o r e  th e  
cerem ony to o k  p l a c e ,  m ig h t be  re d u c e d  a s  i n  f r a u d  o f  
t h e  o t h e r  c o n t r a c t o r  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e ,  on th e  g round  t h a t  
th e y  d e f e a te d  h i s  l e g i t i m a t e  e x p e c ta t io n s #  (A f i n e
m o r a l i ty  em erges from  t h e  d e c is io n s #  F ra a e r* #  b l u n t1a p p ro a c h  l a ,  "The f a c t  o f  th e  woman h a v in g  m eans may 
b e ,  and  g e n e r a l l y  i s ,  a n  im p o r ta n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  
man i n  e n t e r in g  i n t o  th e  m a r r ia g e ;"  He c i t e s  th e  
j u d i c i a l  i n d ig n a t io n  e n c o u n te re d  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  A u c h in le o k9V# W ill ia m a o n " , i n  w h ich  th e  woman had  l e f t  n o th in g  t o  
h e r  f u t u r e  h u sb an d  beyond h e r  own a e l f  ( " p a a t  s i x t y  y e a r s " )  
w h ic h , " th e  L o rd s  th o u g h t  a  v e ry  c h e a t* "  The conveyance  
o f  a  l i f e r e n t  t o  h e r  so n  was c h a l le n g e d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  by 
th e  h u sb an d  ev en  th o u g h  th e  b an n s had  n o t  b e e n  read #
T h ere  was c l e a r  e v id e n c e  o f  i n t e n t  t o  m arry#  N o rm a lly , 
h o w ev er, i t  w ould a p p e a r  t h a t  q u e s t io n s  te n d e d  t o  a r i s e  
w here t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  co m p la in e d  o f  h a d  ta k e n  p l a c e  " n o t  
o n ly  a f t e r  t r e a t y  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  b u t  a f t e r  t h e  b an n s h ave  
begun  t o  be p ro c la im e d # " )
The p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  t r e a t y  f o r  m a r r ia g e  th u s  
form ed t h e  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t s ,  and  
F r a s e r  d e v o te s  t im e ^  t o  th e  s u b je c t  o f  t h e  l a c k  o f  
v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  w om an's d e e d s  e x e c u te d  b e tw een  b e t r o t h a l  
end  m a r r ia g e  and  t o  t h e  r u l e s  and a u t h o r i t i e s  r e l a t i n g  
t h e r e t o ,  and  t o  B r s k i n e 's  v ie w ^ , from  w h ich  h e  d i s s e n t e d ,  
t h a t  p r o c la m a t io n  o f  b an n s i n  th e  b r i d e 's  c h u rc h  was 
n e c e s s a r y  ( p r o c la m a tio n  i n  t h e  b r id e g ro o m 's  c h u rc h  b e in g  
i n s u f f i c i e n t )  t o  I n t e r p o l  anyone n o t  h a v in g  p r i v a t e  
know ledge o f  th e  in te n d e d  u n io n  from  c o n t r a c t i n g  w ith  
t h e  woman. (M cDougal v# A i tk in ^ )  F r a s e r  com m ents^ t h a t ,  
" i n  /
1 .  I .  6 8 0 .
2 .  M, 6033 (1 6 6 7 )3 .  I .  6 8 0 -6 8 7 ,4 .  1 ,  6 ,  2 2 ,
5 . M, 6027 (1 6 2 3 ) 6» a t  I»  5 8 2 ,
1 0 .
" i n  8 0 far as it seems to imply that i f  there he no 
proclamation of banns, a wife is imtrammelled In regard 
to her p r o p e r ty ,  although she is u n d e r  an agreement or 
contract to marry, it erroneously limits the general 
rule of the right to challenge, on the gi-’ound of f r a u d ,  
to the special kind of c irc u m s ta n c e s  in w h ic h , in the 
particular cases* the challenge was made." To the 
extent that Erskine Intended to convey the view that a 
woman under c o n t r a c t  to marry, b u t n o t  yet married, 
might enter into onerous contracts, Fraser concurred*e.v«*swa»iw«c;iitey«stia *
with him, but cites as a good exposition of the principle
u n d e r  discussion, the English view as expressed in White1and Tudor's Leading Gases i n  E q u ity  , namely that " i f  a 
woman, during a t r e a t y  for marriage h o ld s  herself out to 
her intended husband as entitled to p r o p e r ty  which will 
become his upon the m a r r ia g e ,  and  then m akes a  s e t t l e m e n t  
of it without his knowledge o r  concurrence, actual fraud 
will be imputed to her, and the settlement will be set 
aside in a court of equity." Presumably (as F r a s e r  
suggests i n  r e l a t i o n  to Erskine's v ie w ), that opinion 
was intended to refer to the making of a gratuitous 
settlement, as it is difficult to argue against the 
making by the betrothed of an astute bargain ( o r  the 
payment of a due debt") during the betrothal period.
On marriage Ç, th e  h usband  became i ^ ^  owner
of his wife's moveable p r o p e r ty ;  he might sell or 
dispose of it at his pleasure, and. his creditors might 
attach it f o r  his debts. (Fraser v. Walker^.) The wife 
had no in;Onience i n  (or no legal right to influence) 
decisions upon the t r e a tm e n t  o r  disposal of anything 
falling under the jus mariti * In desertion as in 
cohabitation, "all she earns, all sh e  saves, becomes 
the property of the h u sb a n d , a n d , if he becomes bankrupt, 
passes /
1 .  V o l. i .  p . 3 3 4 .2 .  P r .  I .  6 8 7 .3 .  (1 8 7 2 ) 10 H
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1p a s s e s  t o  h i s  c r e d i t o r s  *"
A s t r i k i n g  exam ple o f  th e  I n j u s t i c e  o f  th e s e  r u l e s  
i s  fo u n d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  M iln e  v .  G a u ld 's  T rs# ^  w h e re , th e  
w ife  h a v in g  b e en  f a l s e l y  im p r is o n e d , sh e  c o u ld  n o t ,  a f t e r  
th e  d e a th  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d , r e c o v e r  s o la t iu m  b e c a u se  i t  was 
c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  t h e  c la im  f o r  damages f o r  t h e  u n w a rra n te d  
t r e a tm e n t  o f  t h e  w ife  v e s te d  i n  t h e  h u sb an d  j u r e  m a r i t i ,  
and  t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  h i s  e x e c u to r  *
The f i r s t  r i g h t  i n  t h e  o a t e g o r i s a t i o n ,  c o m p iled  by 
8 t a i r ^ ,  o f  t l :e  f o u r  r i g h t s  a r i s i n g  from  m a r r ia g e ,  was th e  
/
M u rray , p # 8 ,(1 8 4 1 ) 3D. 3 4 5 .
3 .  S e e , ho w ev er, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a c t i o n s  n o tp r i m a r i l y  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  p r o p e r ty  ( b u t  h a v in g  t o  t a k e  t h a t  form  by r e a s o n  o f  some r u l e  o f  law ) b u t  t r u l y  o o n c e rn e d , f o r  ex am p le , w ith  v i n d ic a t i o n  o f  c h a r a c t e r ,  m ig h t n o t  r e q u i r e  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and  m ig iit c o n s t i t u t e  r i g h t s  o f  th e  
w ife  in d e p e n d e n t o f  h e r  husband* S m ith  v# S to d d a r t  (1 8 5 0 ) 12 D ,1 1 8 5 ; F r . I . 5 7 4 -7 7 ; H orn v .  S a n d e rso n  and 
M uirhead  (1 8 7 2 ) 10 M acph .295 , i n  w h ich  th e  b a n k ru p t husb an d  was h e ld  by th e  L .P .  n o t  t o  h av e  l o s t  h i s  c h a r a c t e r  a s  h e r  a d m i n l s t r a t o r - i n - l a w .  H is  L o rd sh ip  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  t h e  w if e  was th e  p r o p e r  p u r s u e r ,  i n  v iew  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  b a n k ru p tc y , h i s  r e n u n c ia t i o n  o f  t h e  j u s, m a r i t i  ( th o u g h  ho w ould n o t  com m it h im s e l f  u p o n r E e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r ,  by th e  te rm s  o f  h i s  u n i v e r s a l  r e n u n c i a t i o n ,  t h e  h u sb an d  had  g iv e n  up a l l  c la im  t o  a q q u i r e n d a . and  i f  s o ,  w h e th e r  t h a t  w ould  in c lu d e  su c h  a n  a cW b n  a s  was h e re  p r e s e n te d )  and  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  was c o n c e rn e d  p u r e ly  w i th  a  c la im  f o r  
dam ages f o r  i n j u r i e s  s u f f e r e d  by t h e  w ife  a lo n e .  As r e g a r d s  t h e  o t h e r  h ead  o f  damage ( t h a t  t h e  h usband  had  s u f f e r e d  p a t r im o n ia l  l o s s  th ro u g h  l o s i n g  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w i f e ' s  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  h i s  b u s in e s s )  t h e  husband  c o u ld  n o t  s u e ,  b e in g  b a n k ru p t  and h i s  t r u s t e e  d e c l in i n g  t o  s im t h im s e l f  t o  t h e  a c t io n *  N e v e r th e le s s ,  no c u r a t o r  a d  l i t em was n e c e s s a r y  f o r  th e  w i f e ,  s i n c e  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  b a h k r u ^ c y ,  a s  above  s t a t e d ,  d id  n o t  p r e v e n t  him  from  g iv in g  h i s  c o n c u r re n c e  t o  th e  s u i t *  (He ^ms n o t  o n ly  e n t i t l e d ,  b u t  b o u n d , t o  a c t  i n  t h a t  c a p a c i t y . )  As t o  th e  e f f e c t  upon  th e  w i f e 's  pow ers t o  su e  h e r  own a c t i o n ,  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  r e n u n c ia t io n  o f  t h e  j u s  m a r i t i - ( F r # I  5 7 6 -7 7 ; M u rray , p . 8 ,  f o o tn o te  3 ;  L .P .^ s  r e ^ r K s  o r  q u e r i e s  i n  H o rn .)4# I, 4, 9#'
12*
j u s  m a r i t i  * " o r  o o n ju g a l  pow er o f  th e  h u sb an d  o v e r  t h e  
w ife "  ( i t  may be  s a i d  t h a t  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  w r i t i n g s ,  t h e  
U n e  b e tw een  J y s  r a a r i t i  and  j u s  M S i l l ^ a l i i s a i a *  w h ich  
i s  q u i t e  d i a t i n c t #  som etim es i s  n o t  d raw n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  ) ,  
" h e r  p e r s o n  and  g o o d s , and  th e r e w i th  by c o n se q u e n c e  t h e  
o b lig e m e n t f o r  h e r  d e b t s .
From th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  th e  two r i g h t s  f lo w ed  
th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  c o r r e c t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r ty  a s  
h e r i t a b l e  o r  m oveable* "V hat i s  c o n s id e r e d  m oveable 
p r o p e r ty  by t h e  law  o f  S c o t la n d  p e r t a i n s  t o  th e  h u sb an d  
jiq re  m a r i t i .  and  e v e r y th in g  h e r i t a b l e  r e m a in s ,  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  
th e  m a r r ia g e ,  t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  w ife ^ # "
Many ru les^^  w ere  d e v e lo p e d  t o  d e te rm in e  q u e s t io n s  
o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r ty  a s  h e r i t a g e  o r  m oveables*
The c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty ,  a s  h e r i t a b l e  o r  m o v eab le , 
was d e te rm in e d  a s  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e ,  o r  a s  a t  
t h e  d a te  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  i f  i t  came t o  t h e  w if e  d u r in g  
m a rr ia g e #  An i n t r i g u i n g  s i t u a t i o n  th u s  a r o s e  from  w h ich  
th e  in g e n io u s  w ife  m ig h t d e r iv e  b e n e f i t#  I f  th e  
p r o p e r ty  i n  q u e s t io n  a t  th e  t im e  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e  was a  
sum o f  m oney, i t  was h e ld  t h e r e f o r e  t o  b e  m o v ea b le , 
n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n te d  th e  s a l e  o f  a  h o u s e , 
and  i t  w ould  re m a in  th e  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d  even  
th o u g h  a f t e r  m a r r ia g e  h e  changed  i t s  c h a r a c t e r ,  by 
I n v e s t in g  i t  i n  t h e  p u rc h a s e  o f  lan d ^ #
T h u s, a l th o u g h  i t  sp ra n g  from  h e r i t a g e ,  and 
becam e /
1* C am pbell P a to n  (p*100) c o n s id e r s  t h a t  t h e  te rm s  w ere  
c o n fu s e d  by  S t a i r  and  E rs k in e  ( s e e  s u p r a ,  p# 8) s e e  a l s o  F r . I *  6 7 6 -6 7 8 .2# S t a i r  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  r i g h t s  a r i s i n g  from  
m a r r ia g e  w e re * -2* "H is  p o w er, and  th e  w i f e 's  s e c u r i t y ,  w hereby  d u r in g  t h e  m a r r ia g e  sh e  c a n n o t o b l ig e  h e r s e l f . "3* The h u s b a n d 's  o b lig e m e n t t o  e n t e r t a i n  t h e  w i f e ,  and  p r o v id e  f o r  h e r  a f t e r  h i s  d e a th #
4* H er i n t e r e s t  i n  h i s  goods and  m oveab le  e s t a t e  a t  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ."3* F r* I*  6 8 7 -8 , and  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h e r e  c i t e d .4 .  F r . I *  6 8 7 -7 4 1 .5* F r* I* 6 8 9 .
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beoaime h e r i t a g e ,  th e  p r o p e r ty  was r e g a rd e d  by  th e  law  
a s  m o v ea b le , a n d , by  th e  l e g a l  a s s i g n a t i o n  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  
a s  b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  husband*
The r e v e r s e  a p p lie d #  I f ,  a t  th e  d a t e  o f  t h e  
m a r r ia g e ,  t h e  w ife  h ad  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r t y ,  i t  w ould 
n o t  beoome t l ie  h u s b a n d 's  p r o p e r t y ,  ev en  i f  i t  was s o ld  
f o r  a  c a s h  p r i c e  t h e r e a f t e r  -  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  c a s e  td ie re  
t h e  w ife  a c t e d  i n  su c h  d i s r e g a r d  o f  h e r  own i n t e r e s t s  
a s  t o  c o n s e n t  t o  t h e  change  from  h e r i t a b l e  t o  m oveable  
e x p r e s s ly  " f o r  t h e  p u rp o se  o f  a l lo w in g  i t  t o  f a l l  u n d e r  
t h e  j i w  S a r i ü * '  •"
T ak in g  t h e  s im p le  v ie w , i t  w ould h a v e  seem ed 
a d v is a b le  f o r  a  woman c o n te m p la tin g  b e t r o t h a l  an d  
m atrim ony  t o  i n v e s t  h e r  money i n  l a n d ,  b e f o r e  t h e  t r e a t y  
f o r  m a r r ia g e  w as m ade, and  c e r t a i n l y  b e f o r e  t h e  b an n s 
w ere  p r o c la im e d , and  th e n ,  a t  a  s a f e  d i s t a n c e  a f t e r  t h e  
m a r r ia g e ,  s e l l  i t ,  and  sp e n d  o r  sa v e  h e r  own m oney, th u s  
sa fe g u a rd e d *
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  e x p e d ie n t  was e n c i r c l e d  by r u l e s  
and  p re s u m p tio n s  ( b e n e f i c i a l ,  i n  t h e  m a in , t o  t h e  vmman); 
i f ,  when sh e  m a r r ie d ,  t h e  w ife  owned h e r i t a g e ,  a n d , 
s t a n t e  m a tr im o n io , i t  was changed  t o  m oveab le  p r o p e r t y ,  
by s a l e  o r  o th e r w is e ,  c e r t a i n  i ) r i n c ip l e s  w ere  e v o lv e d  
t o  r e g u l a t e  th e  s i t u a t i o n ^ *
A c c o rd in g ly , w here  su c h  a  ch an g e  to o k  p l a c e  i n  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  a  p re s u m p tio n  a r o s e  t h a t  
t h i s  h ad  b e en  done i n  o r d e r  t o  r e i n v e s t  t h e  p r i c e  i n  
h e r i t a g e ,  and t h a t  i t  was n o t  th e  p a r t i e s '  I n t e n t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d  sh o u ld  a t t a c h  i t  j u r e  m a r i t i *  As h a s  
b e en  n o te d ,  su c h  a n  i n t e n t i o n ,  ho w ev er, ( o th e r w is e )  was 
i r r e v o c a b l e  /
1# Fr# ib ^ d ^ A t I ,  7 0 7 , he  w r i t e s * -  " a f t e r  t h i s  i n t e n t io n "  ( o f  t h ^ w i f e )  " h a s  once  b e en  u n e q u iv o c a l ly  e x p re s s e d ,  and  c a r r i e d  o u t  t o  e x e c u t io n ,  i t  c a n n o t  be r e t r a c t e d  so  
a s  t o  r e c a l l  t h e  p r o p e r ty ,  e x c e p t  u n d e r  th e  law  o f  d o n a t io  i n t e r  v iru m  e t  uxorem *" The i n t e n t i o n  c o u ld  be draw n from  f a c t s  and  c irc u m s ta n c e s  a s  w e l l  a s  from  
s ta te m e n t*2* F r* I*  703-709*
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irrevooa'ble, exempt uMer « 1 0 rules of »DaBâMaa&g-teteP
Fraser notes'^  t h a t  th e  presumption that tVie ch an g e  
waa m d e  I n  th e  o r d in a r y  o o u ra e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  th #  w ife * #  e s t a t e ,  and  made f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  
re lm re a tm e n t  I n  h e r i t a g e ,  was n o t  overcom e by  t h e  l a p s e  
o f  a  lo n g  p e r io d  o f  t im e ,  an d  t h a t  t h e  w if e  m ig h t s a f e l y  
a l lo w  h e r  h u sb an d  t o  u s e  f o r  h i e  own en d s t h e  p ro c e e d s  
o f  th e  a a l e  o f  h e r  h e r i t a g e  f o r  a  t im e ,  w i th o u t  l o a ln g  
t o  h i e  h e r  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r ty  th e r e in #  ( I t  l e
I n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  L o rd  P r a e e r ^  e u g g e a ta  t h a t  t h e  w ife  
c o u ld  n o t  re c o u p  e x p e n d i tu r e  o f  h e r  fu n d s#  made w i th  h e r  
c o n c u rre n c e #  fm^ th e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  fa m ily #  o r  ev en  made 
f o r  t h e  h u sb a n d ' a own a d v a n ta g e  w i th  h e r  p e rm is s io n #
He c i t e s  t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e  o f  H u tc h is o n  v# H$# T h is  
l a  o n ly  one o f  t h e  p a s s a g e s  i n  w hich  he  d i s p l a y s  a  
f o rw a r d - lo o k in g  and  e g a l i t a r i a n  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  , )  
F r a s e r  em p h aalaee  one o f  t h e  m oat d i f f i c u l t  a s p e c t s  o f  
t h e  law  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  m a r r ie d  p e rso n a #  no 
l e a s  now th a n  th e n #  when he  adds#  "The o n ly  d i f f i c u l t y  
w i l l  be  a s  t o  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  money# I f  t h i s  
d j . f f l c u l t y  be  rem oved , then , th e  law  h o ld s  t h e  W sb an d  
who a p p r o p r i a t e s  t h e  money r e c e iv e d  f o r  t h e  w i f e 's  
h e r i t a b l e  e s t a t e  t o  b e  p e r s o n a l l y  l i a b l e  f o r  i t  t o  h e r  
o r  h e r  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s #  I f  i t  c a n n o t be  i d e n t i f i e d #  
s h e  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  ra n k  a s  a  c r e d i t o r  on t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
e s t a t e # "
The d ev e lo p m e n t o f  t h i s  mode o f  r e a s o n in g ,  and  
th e  p r i n c i p l e s  b o m  th e re f ro m #  a r e  t h e  m ore la u d a b le  
When i t  i s  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  th e  law  h e r e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  
was c o n c e rn e d  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n #
t o  /
1 .  P r . i ,  7 0 7 j -  ®®®brief discussion Chapter b, p*654-660-01.generally,2# F r$ I#  7 0 6 #3 ,  A t I#  7 0 7 ,
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t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  w ife  from  h e r  own p ro b a b le  Ig n o ra n c e  o f  
t h e  law  (w h ic h , n o rm a lly ,  i t  w i l l  be  r e c a l l e d ,  nemlnem 
excusg^t when a d ju d g in g  t h e  wisdom o f  t h e  te rm s  o f  a  
c o n t r a c t ^ )  and  o f  p r o p e r ty  m anagem ent, and  t o  p r o t e c t  
h e r  a l s o  from  l e s s  th a n  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  a d v ic e  from  h e rghusband*#
I t  l8  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  w as p o s s ib l e  f o r  some b e n e f i t  
t o  t h e  w ife  t o  be o b ta in e d  th ro u g h  th e  j u d ic i o u s  
m anagem ent o f  h e r  e s t a t e  a f t e r  m a r r ia g e ,  by  h e r  o r  
p e rh a p s  by  h e r  f a t h e r  ( a l th o u g h  o f  c o u rs e  a l l  a c t s  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e g a r d in g  h e r i t a g e  r e q u i r e d  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s e n t ,  and* a s  f a r  a s  m oveab les was c o n c e rn e d , he  was 
b o th  ow ner and  a d m i n i s t r a t o r :  th e  f u n c t io n  o r  e x e r c i s e
o f  t h e  j u s  a d m i n l s t r a t i o n i s  was subm erged i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  
pow ers o f  o im e rs h ip )  o r  in d e e d  by an  e n l ig h te n e d  h u sband  
f o r  su c h  t h e r e  m ust h av e  b e e n , d e s p i t e  t h e  c o n d i t io n in g  
o f  V ic to r i a n  e d u c a t io n  and  so o i& l t h i n k i n g  -  w hich  w ould 
r e s u l t  i n  a  more f a v o u r a b le  s i t u a t i o n  f i n a n c i a l l y  f o r  
h e r ,  a l th o u g h  i t  m ust b e  a d m it te d  t h a t  su c h  e x p e d ie n ts  
w ould  commend th e m s e lv e s  m ore t o  th e  w e a lth y  m id d le  and 
la n d e d  u p p e r  c l a s s e s  who w ould  p ro b a b ly  i n  any  c a s e  
r e s o r t  t o  t h e  d e v ic e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t  t o  
c irc u m v e n t th e  law # H ow ever, t h a t  t h e  w if e  o f  more 
m o d e s t, o r  no r e s o u r c e s ,  w ould have  l e s s  r e a s o n  t o  
c irc u m v e n t t h e  law  r e n d e r s  a  d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h e  d e v ic e s  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  w e a lth y  no l e s s  i n t e r e s t i n g .
A w ife  w hose a d v i s e r s  w ere  c o n s id e r in g  su c h  p la n s  
had  t o  t a k e  c a r e  t o  e n s u re  t h a t  th e  ch an g e  i n  t h e  n a tu r e  
o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  to o k  p la c e  a f t e r  m a rr ia g e #  The 
b e n e v o le n t  p re s u m p tio n  w ould  be o f  no v a lu e  t o  h e r  i f  
t h a t  ch an g e  o c c u r r e d  b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e ,  a s  t h a t  w hich  was 
a t  /
1# W a lk e r , P r i n s # ! ,  579; but see 580 .
2# F r * I ,7 0 6 :  and  703 ("# # * a  c o n s id e r a b le  j e a lo u s y  h a sb e e n  f e l t  o f  th e  h u sb a n d , b e c a u se  th e  c h an g e  i s  one t o  h i s  a d v a n ta g e ,  and  t o  th e  w i f e 's  lo ss ,# "  Thus t h e r e  a r o s e  t h e  n eed  f o r  th e  r u l e s * )
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at the m a rr ia g e  moveable d id ,  of course, re m a in  moveable 
in the view of the la w . Again* if the wife's moveables 
were u t i l i s e d  to purchase h e r i t a g e *  after the marriage, 
that heritage fell to t h e  husband* because at the 
marriage* all moveable property became his* and* as has 
been seen, the criterion date for classification of 
property was the date of the marriage*
It is fo u n d  as a thread ru n n in g  th ro u g h  the cases 
that subjects deemed heritable aa between heir and <1executor were so classified as between husband and wife • 
In r e s p e c t  of p r o p e r ty  regarded as moveable by the law 
of Scotland* it might be said with confidence that it 
was presumed to b e lo n g  to the husband unless the jus 
mariti had been excluded^# However defective the law
as regards social policy and sexual e q u a l i ty *  its 
clarity was admirable. The Victorian lav/yer would be 
astonished to hear the doubts expressed today as to 
the ownership of a washing-machine bought under hire- 
purchase or its equivalent i n  terms of the Consumer 
C r e d i t  Act* 1974* for w hich  th e  deposit had been paid 
from  th e  wife's personal funds* and the instalments 
partly by the husband's earnings* and partly by the 
wife's savings from the housekeeping* or to encounter 
problems such as those posed by Professor Kahn-Freund
in the Josef unger Memorial I.ecture 1971* "Matrimonial%P r o p e r ty :  Where Do We Go From Here?"
Admittedly* a stumbling-block was m et with in 
relation to m oney, "which many lav;yers have ranked as 
a fungible" and "w hich  c a n n o t be so easily Identified 
as other moveables^#" The general rule was that 
moveables* in c lu d in g  or especially money, in the 
possession /
1 * There were exceptions to this rule (heritable bonds)* See Fr.I#686 (general rule) and 723 (exception).
2 . Fr#X.689l exclusion of jus mariti «• infra, p. 57 et seq. 3* See Chapter 7 g see Clive % WDZon pp*294-315#Contrast Fr#I#689 e t  seg#4* F r .I* 6 9 0 #
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possession of the spouses* belonged to the husband* 
unless t h e  ju s  m a r i t i  had b e en  excluded# however*«y5z!&Vî«'W'i> *
Lord Fraser notes Lord P i t f o u r ' s  opinion in Dods v#
Wood that the p re su m p tio n  was not " i n v i n c i b l e "  that* 
stante matririionio* a married woman who bought items* 
bought them with her husband's money, and he r e f e r s
galso to the b a n k ru p tc y  case of Boaz v# Loudon * i n
which money supplied’ to the w ife  of a b a n k ru p t  by 
he]? friends was held not to be attached by his ju a  
m a r i t i#  N e v e r th e le s s ,  it remains difficult to 
u n d e rs ta n d  how* i n  accordance with the common law 
r u l e s ,  a wife could have amassed much money to her 
separate use and in her separate ownership* except 
by v i r t u e  o f  the terms of a m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t ,  which 
themselves would regulate such matters# The defence 
was sustained that* since the husband was bankrupt* 
the money must have been advanced on the wife's credit 
alone and for her behoof* and did not fall under the
A m  Q âE l& l'
Generally* though* even where the character of 
the property was such as to be productive of difficulty* 
a wide yet detailed scheme of rules was available to 
d e to ]
I t  /
%help ermine the problem' #
1 .  H a i le s  12 (1 7 6 6 ) ,
2 .  (1 8 2 9 ) 7 8 ,5 5 5 ,3. See Fr,X#687*741 ("Heritable and Moveable") where Lord Fraser while denying his intention "to introduce here a treatise that would have any pretensions to be complete, on the law of heritable and moveable", presents a formidable catalogue o f  rules and authorities, completing his re v ie w  w ith  th e  opinion that uncuttrees do not fall to the husband, but 'thlrmlngs' may fall under a destination of moveables# (Breadalfoane's Trs# V, Pringle (1854) 16 D#359, where the price of thinnings was held to fall under the term, "the whole . free proceeds", used in a trust-settlement)# Of# (or 
' c o n t r a s t )  t h e  widow i n  r i g h t  o f  t e r c e  ( l i f e r e n t  o f  one third of t h e  husband's heritage) ( b e f o r e  the Succession (Scotland) A c t, 1964* w h ic h , by 8*10(1), abolished t e r o e  and courtesy), who was entitled to coal, limestone, and timber from the estate for necessary domestic uses, but was n o t  e n t i t l e d  to commence mineral w o rk in g s  for a p r o f i t #
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I t  l a  Im p o r ta n t  t o  n o te  t h a t  a  g u a rd  a g a i n s t  th e  
v i n d i c t i v e  u s e  by th e  h usband  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  p r o p e r ty  
was p ro v id e d  by t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d  c o u ld  
e f f e c t  no d eed  w h ich  i n j u r e d  h i s  w i f e 's  i n t e r e s t  and  
y e t  conveyed  no b e n e f i t  t o  h im s e l f ,  n o r  any  d e ed  w hich  
came i n t o  o p e r a t io n  a g a i n s t  h e r  o n ly  a t  h i s  d e a th ^ .  
W ith in  t h i s  f a r  b o u n d a ry , much damage m ig h t y e t  b e  done,
P a r a p h e r n a l i a**» w»«!* B-3 C}) «1.3 Ite»
D id  any  v a lu e  t o  th e  w ife  e x i s t  i n  t h e  e x c e p t io n s  
from  th e  h u s b a n d 's  o w n e r s h ip ,o f  p a raphe.n% ali a  and 
PÆÇHMM p r e v io u s ly  m en tio n ed ?
PF r a s e r  s a y s  t h a t  th e  n a tu r e  o f  p a r a p h e r n a l ia  
c a n n o t  be  u n d e rs to o d  p r o p e r ly  w ith o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
Roman law# % e  te rm  i s  ta k e n  from  t h é  G reek  "
" ,  e q u iv a le n t  t o  t h e  L a t in  " e x t r a  d o te m " . 
an d  m ean ing  th o s e  t h in g s  i^h lch  a r e  o v e r  end  above  th e  
dow ry , p r o p e r ty  d i s t i n c t  from  th e  dowry ( t h e  S o o ts
to c h e r )  t o  iiAiioh th e  w ife  i s  e n t i t l e d  and w h ich  re m a in s%h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ^ #
Ha /
1 ,  a * C ,H ,P a to n , p*100,2 ,  1 ,7 7 0 ,
3# M urray  (p # 2 /3  f o o tn o te  3 ;  s e a  g e n e r a l l y  M u rray , pp#1*4) d i r e c t s  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  c o n fu s in g  te rm in o lo g y  o f  dowry and  dower# The Roman "d g s"  s i g n i f i e d  th e  dow ry , I n  S c o t la n d  t h e  t o c h e r  (w h lcS  he n o te s  e ls e w h e re  p#88  * i s  a  w ord o f  C e l t i c  o r i g i n ) ,  b ro iig h t  by th e  w ife  t o  t h e  m a rr ia g e *  I t  seem s t h a t  a n o th e r  w ord h a v in g  t h e  same m eaning  was #
L a te r*  t h e  word "d o s"  c&me t o  be u n d e rs to o d  a s  e q u iv a le n t  t o  t h e  E n g l is h  w ord "d o w e r" , w h ich  a t  f i r s t  was p a r t  o f  th e  b r id e w p r ic e  p a id  t o  t h e  f a t h e r  and  " s e t t l e d  on  th e  d a u g h te r " ,  and  s u b s e q u e n t ly  i t  a p p e a rs  ( F r . I *259) was t h a t  sum g iv e n  by  th e  man t o  h i s  f u t u r e  w ife  a t  t h e  d o o r  o f  th e  chu rch#
I n  t h e  a r e  note<Reg# Maj# l i ,  C $18)( t h e  Roman m eaning  b e in g  t h e  se co n d  m ean ing  e x p la in e d ) ,  a n d , a s  f a r  a s  t h e  E n g l is h  m eaning  i s  c o n c e rn e d , th e  am ount o f  t h e  sum i s  q u a n t i f i e d /
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He w r i t e s  that* by Roman law, at m a r r ia g e ,  all the 
property of the wife was divided into two portions, one 
part (the *Oos* or Dowry) being given to the husb an d  
ad siistlnenda o n e ra  matrimonii (and t h i s  might consist 
either of moveable o r  immoveable estate) and *i;he other 
part* being the whole of the remainder* moveable or 
immoveable, fell to be called the paraphernal goods.
"Hao lege decernimus, ut vir in his rebus quas 
extra dotem mull or liabet* quas Graeoi parar/hema diount, 
nullam pxore prohibante habeat oommunioneitu neo aliouam
el neoessitatem imncnat
Although
quantified aa "one (roasonabill tierce)" (Fr.I#2590 footnote (b )  - Rag.Maj.ii, C*16, sec.1«}*
Fraser notes the similarity of ancient Hoots and English practice in this respect* and points to a statute of Alexander II (cap#22, sec#5) which provided ("for hir dowrie", the statute confusingly says, presumably meaning "for her 'Dos' (English meaning) or "for her dower") for a widow (married in church (Fr#X#259), but having received no "dowrie" at the church door) bhe third of all her husband's lands #
A connection has thus been drawn between Dower and Teroe (see Murray* p . 8 9 , footnote 1 ; of#  F r . 1 .2 5 9 ) .
Dee also Paton, p. 107* where is clearly described, the historical development of the financial arrangements made betw een  parties on marriage, and certain of the rules regarding th e  husband's "donatio ante nuptias" and "donatio propter n u p t ia s ^ lE c r i& e  w ife  are set forxh# it would a p p e a r  that its s a n c t io n  was similar to that of the English dower#
In short, it w ould  appear from Murray's research that while the d o w ^  was bestowed upon  the husband by the wife or Wfe's father* the dm/m? came to t h e  wife from  the husband through Hie'^ 'medium, of her father, and l a t e r ,  at the church d o o r ,  directly from the husband.1. Code V# XIV.8; quoted by If alt on, p*219? seeChap.XXIV, p p .2 1 9 -2 2 , "Paraphernalia and Pin-Money."
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A lth o u g h  S c o ts  law  a d o p te d  th e  w ord 'p a r a p h e r n a l i a *  # 
t h e r e  w as no s u b s t a n t i a l  e q u iv a le n c e  b e tw ee n  i t s  
m eaning  I n  Roman Law and  I t s  m eaning I n  S c o ts  law# I t  
e x i s t e d  I n  o u r  law  I n  an  a t t e n u a t e d  fo rm , an d  h e ld  
t o  enoom pass o n ly  t h o s e  t h in g s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  w ife  
p e r s o n a l l y ,  and  t o  l ie r  "w o rld "  -  h e r  c l o t h e s ,  f u r n i t u r e  
i n  w h ich  t o  k eep  th em , h e r  je w e ls  (p r o v id e d  t h a t  th e y  
w ere  n o t  f a m ily  h e ir lo o m s ^ )  an d  t r i n k e t s #  F r a s e r  d iv id e s  
p r o p e r ty  o f  t h i s  ty p e  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  » p r o p e r ty  
su a  n a tu r e  p a r a p h e r n a l  ( a a  above d e s c r i b e d ) ; p r o p e r ty  
g iv e n  b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e  by  t h e  man t o  th e  woman qua  
p a r a p h e r n a l i a , th o u g h  n o t  i n  i t s  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu r e  
p a r a p h e r n a l  ( b u t  r e q u i r i n g ,  i t  seem s, " a  c lo s e  a l l i a n c e  
t o  p a r a p h e r n a l i a  p r o p e r " ) ;  and  p r o p e r ty  n o t  p a ra p h e r n a l  
i n  c h a r a c t e r ,  b u t  g iv e n  qua su c h  by h u sb an d  t o  w ife  s t a n t e  
m a tr im o n io ^ *
N o n -p a ra p h e rn a l  goods made p a ra p h e r n a l  by  th e  g i f t
o f  /
1# E a r l  o f  Levon v# M ontgom ery 1 683 , M#5803# J e w e ls  o f  g r e a t  v a lu e  m ig h t h av e  b e en  in te n d e d  t o  be w orn 
by  a  w ife  vAien a  w i f e ,  and  th e n  t o  go t o  t h e  h e i r ,  a l th o u g h  su c h  i n t e n t  m ig h t be  u n sp o k e n , and  t h e r e f o r e  s h e  c o u ld  n o t  c la im  them  i f  sh e  h a d , by  h e r  c o n d u c t ( a d u l t e r y )  " d e f e a te d  t h e  m a r r ia g e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s " #  (Boyd v# Dimdas (u n re p # )  13 J u n e ,  1781# L o rd  D r e g h o m 's  S eas#  P a p e rs  v o l , 1 i i i #  N o#62. Adv#
L ib r*  D is c u s s e d  end  c i t e d  by F r . I , 7 7 3 ) ,  S ee  a l s o  t h e  s u g g e s t io n  i n  D ic k s  v#  M ass ie  M,5821 (1 6 9 5 ) t h a t  " a  m e rc h a n t o r  j e w e l l e r ' s  w ife  h a v in g  many w a tc h e s  o r  r i n g s ,  e t c ,  i n  h e r  p o s s e s s io n ,  o u g h t n o t  t o  make them  h e r ' s  o r  h e r  e x e c u to r s ,  b e c a u se  th e y  a r e  i n  su o h  o a s e s  d e s ig n e d  f o r  sa le .# "  N o n -h e ir lo o m  je w e ls  w ere  c l e a r l y  p a r a p h e r n a l  p ro p e r#  S ee  M is t r e s s  o f  G ray  v# The M a s te r  M .5802 (1 5 8 2 ) ,  i n  w h ich  th e  M a s te r  w as o r d e r e d  t o  r e t u r n  g o ld  c h a in s  an d  r i n g s  and
p p .1 0 2 -1 0 3 *  M u rray , p p .1 1 -1 3 ; I n  t h e s e  p a s s a g e s ,  t h e  a u th o r s  t r a c e  t h e  o r i g i n s  o f  some o f  t h e  r u l e s  w h ich  w ere  a p p l i e d ,  a s ,  f o r  e x am p le , t h e  German 'M orgengabe* (M orn ing  G i f t ) #  S ee  a l s o  B aro n  H um e's 
L e c tu r e s  (1 7 8 o -1 8 2 2 ) , V o l . l#  S t a i r  S o c i e ty  (5 )p p . 105 /106#
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o f  t h e  man t o  th e  woman b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e  to o k  upon 
th e m s e lv e s  th e  p a ra p h e z n a l  n a tu r e  o n ly  d u r in g  th e  
d o n o r 's  l l f e ^ ,  and  i f  t h e  woman r e - m a r r i e d ,  w ould 
n o t  be  8 0  p r o t e c t e d  from  th e  se co n d  h u s b a n d 's  j u s  
m a r i t i  u n ie s #  he  a l s o  made them  o v e r  t o  h e r  a s  
p a r a p h e r n a l '#
I t  w i l l  b e  n o te d  t h a t  je w e l#  (n o n -h e ir lo o m )  
a c q u i r e d  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e  w ere  in c lu d e d  a a  p a r a p h e r n a l i a ,  
and  o f  c o u rs e  t h e s e  m ig h t be  o f  g r e a t  v a lu e .  I f  th e  
c o n c e p t  o f  p a ra p h e m a lj .a  had  s u r v iv e d ,  a  m odem  h u sb an d  
m ig h t t h i n k  c a r e f u l l y  b e f o r e  g iv in g  h i s  w ife  v a lu a b le  
je w e ls  i f ,  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  d i s p u t e ,  th e y  w ere  n o t  t o  
be  r e g a rd e d  j u d i c i a l l y  a s  in v e s tm e n ts  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  
s e c u r i t y  o f  b o th  s p o u s e s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  f o r  t h e  p l e a s u r e ,  
and  a s  t h e  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y ,  o f  one*
The r u l e  was t h a t  th o s e  t h in g s  if^iich w ere  i n  t h e i r  
i n t r i n s i c  n a tu r e  p a r a p h e r n a l  c o u ld  n o t  be  a t t a c h e d  by  
h u sb an d  o r  h i s  c r e d i t o r s *  They w ere  t h e  w i f e ' s  a lo n e *
The o n ly  e x c e p t io n  t o  t h i s  was t h e  c a s e  i n  w h ich  
j e w e l le r y  (b y  n a tu r e  p a r a p h e r n a l )  was a  f a m i ly  h e ir lo o m  
and  g iv e n  t o  t h e  %\rife t o  b e  w orn by  h e r  o n ly  when sh e
œ  w ife»  ( s e e  sijjw ap p .  20 ) .
T h ese  o b j e c t s  f a l l i n g  i n t o  t h e  se co n d  c a te g o r y  -  
re s e m b lin g  p a r a p h e r n a l i a  and  g iv e n  by man t o  woman 
b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e  -  c o u ld  be a t t a c h e d  by t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
c r e d i t o r s ,  b u t  w ere  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  r e v o c a t io n  by th e  
h u sb a n d , a s  th e y  h a d  n o t  b e e n  made s t a n t e  m atrim o n io #
The t h i r d  c a te g o r y ,  c o m p ris in g  a r t i c l e s  g iv e n  by 
h u sb an d  t o  w if e  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e ,  and  b e in g  n o t  
n a tu r a  p a r a p h e r n a l  -  v /ere a t t a c h a b l e  by c r e d i t o r s ,  and  
r e v o c a b le  /
1 .  D ick s  V. M a a s ie , 1695 , M .5821,2# (P resum ab ly  a l s o  b e f o r e  m a rr ia g e  -  " u n le s s  he  s h a l l  i n  l i k e  m anner a p p r o p r i a t e  them  t o  h e r "  (E rs k # 1 , 6 ,  1 5 # ))#  I n  th e  w i f e 's  a d u l t e r y ,  t h e  p a r a p h e r n a l i a  w ould n o t  p a s s  t o  t h e  l o v e r ,  n o r  r e v e r t  t o  th e  h u sb an d  -  Young v# W rig h t (1 8 8 0 ) 7  R#760#
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r e v o c a b le  by  th e  husb an d  a s  a  d o n a t io  i n t e r  v iru ra  e t— a-ssmwmwek'twk» wmmm
uxorem, (such donations between husband and v/ife#»WWW4:SH?$W!Pt»l '
ivere rendered irrevocable, as far as the h u sb a n d , but 
not. In certain prescribed circumstances, as far as 
his creditors were concerned, by the Married Women's 
Property (Scotland) Act, 1920, S#5). Gould stante 
m a trim o n io  g i f t s  of "non-family h e ir lo o m "  jewellery 
(intrinsically paraphernal), though not subject to 
revocation as being not truly p a r a p h e r n a l ,  yet be 
revoked on the broader g ro u n d  o f  th e  revooability o f  
gifts inter coiijuges before 1920^? In view of the 
rule importing the irrevocability of donations inter 
virum et uxorem u n le s s  made within a year and a clay o f< e w w i‘iwaiw»w mnm m  «mwjiKMniwasawHW**
the donor* séquestration , and of the less strong 
presumption against donation between spouses^, there 
remains a risk to the husband i n  making suoh 'gifts', 
if his intention is investment r a t h e r  than outright 
d o n a tio n #
Fraser says that neither the creditors nor the 
husband could attach that which was ex sua natum«V.wnv
paraphernal, even if given by the husband to the wife 
during marriage^ ’^# Thus, i t  i s  clear that paraphernal 
gifts w ere  an e x c e p t io n  to the general rule and never 
were subject t o  t h e  claims of husband or creditors,
Walton (p*221) therefore w onders what effect the 
Act of 1920, 8,5 may be said to have upon h u s b a n d /w ife  
gifts which were at common law i r r e v o c a b le #  Would 
gifts of j e w e l le r y  within a year and a day of the donor's 
sequestration be safe from the claims of the donor's 
c r e d i t o r s ?
This /
1# See generally, Fr#I#T74, and authorities there cited# 2# M#W#P#(Sc,) A c t, 1920 (1 0  & 11 G 8 0 # 5 ,c # 6 4 ), 8 .5 #  B u tsee discussion i j i f r a  o f  interpretation difficulty#5# Bee Clive & V/ilson^^Chapter 10, and in particular pp#290-291#4# See generally, Fr#I#775, and authorities there cited#
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T h is  i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t io n #  I t  h a s  been  
s a i d  ( W a lto n , p . 176) t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l  e f f e c t  o f  th e  
1920 A ct was t o  s u p e rs e d e  and  rendêi» a u p e r f lu o u a  th e  
p r e v io u s  ( s t a t u t e )  la w , w h ile  n o t  e x p r e s s ly  r e p e a l in g  
i t *  C e r t a i n l y  t o  le a v e  so  p o t e n t i a l l y  l a r g e  a  lo o p h o le  
c a n n o t  h av e  b e en  th e  P a r l ia m e n ta r y  i n t e n t .  I t  i s  
s u g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e  p e re m p to ry  to n e  o f  t h e  e n a c tm e n t 
("D o n a ticm a  i n t e r  v iru m  e t  uxorem  s h a l l  b e  i r r e v o c a b l e  
by  th e  d o n o rs " )  to g e t ln e r  w i th  i t s  two p r o v i s o s  (o n e  
p r e s e r v in g  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  o ld  r u l e s  f o r  p r e - A c t  
d o n a t io n s ,  f o r  one y e a r  from  t h e  d a te  o f  t h e  A c t ,  and  
th e  o t h e r  a l lo w in g  r e v o c a t io n  by c r e d i t o r s  o f  g i f t s  made 
w i th in  a  y e a r  and  a  d ay  o f  t h e  d o n o r 's  s e q u e s t r a t i o n )  
t e n d  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  a d v e n t o f  a  nevf r u l e  o f  u n i v e r s a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  a l l  d o n a tio n s *  ( N e v e r th e le s s ,  t h e  w ord 
" a l l "  was n o t  u s e d ,  an d  p e rh a p s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  c o u ld  be 
fo u n d  i n  t h a t  a b se n c e  o f  w hat m ig h t h av e  b e e n  a  n o rm al 
word t o  h a v e  used#  F u r t h e r ,  W a lto n 's  q u e ry  i n  i t s e l f  
( a t  1950) i s  i n t e r e s t i n g ) #
P a r l ia m e n t  m ust be  p resum ed  t o  know t h e  p r i o r  la w , 
and  t o  h av e  known t h a t  c e r t a i n  d o n a tio n s  w ere  a t  common 
law  i r r e v o c a b l e  and  n o t  a t t a c h a b l e  by c r e d i t o r s .  
C r e d i t o r s '  r i g h t s  w ere a  s u b s id i a r y  p o i n t ,  a l b e i t  
im p o r ta n t ,  and  i t  i s  a  p i t y  t h a t  th e  A ct d id  n o t  d e a l  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i th  c r e d i t o r s '  r i g h t s  quoad p a r a p h e r n a l  
a f t e ]
The /
g i f t s  t e r  1920^#
1# The A ct o f  1920 i n  many w ays was n o t  w e l l  d r a f t e d ,  and  t h i s  i s  n o t  th e  o n ly  m a t t e r  w h ich  i t  l e a v e s  i n  
lim bo* O th e rs  a r e  t h e  t y p e  o f  c u r a t o r y  o f  t h e  husband  o f  a  m a r r ie d  fe m a le  m i n o f ^ p a t e m a l  o r  m a r i t a l ) ,  t h e  com petence  o f  t h e  e x c lu s io n  by  a n t e - n u p t i a l  m a r r ia g e -  c o n t r a c t  o f  t h e  ju s  m a^riti and  th e  g e n e r a l  sc o p e  o f  pow er o f  t h e  p o s t^ % ip t I a l  m a r r l a g e - c o n t r a c t ,  and  t h e  l a c k  o f  e x p la n a to r y  a m p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  w i f e 's  d u t i e s  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  h o u s e h o ld , o r  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  i t s  s u p p o r t ,  ivhere t h e  h usband  i s  n o t  in d ig e n t*
P e rh a p s  t h e  l a s t - m e n t io n e d  i s  n o t  a  d e f e c t  o f  g r m m a t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o r  an  e r r o r  o f  o m is s io n ,  b u t  a n  i n t e n t i o n a l  o m is s io n ,  a c c e p ta b le  p o s s ib l y  i n  192 0 , 
b u t  l e s s  s o ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  now* ( S e e ,  u pon  th e s e  p o i n t s ,  infra, pp* io9 - 1 1 2.
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The A ct h a s  n o t  m elded  th e  o ld  and  th e  new r u l e s  
w e l l  h e re #  A n o th e r  a s p e c t  o f  i t s  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i s  t h a t  
t h e  c r e d i t o r s '  oommon law  r i g h t  t o  a t t a c h  a  n o n - 
p a r a p h e r n a l  o r  g ^ m s ^ -p a ra p h e rn a l  p r e  o r  p o s t - m a r r ia g e  
g i f t  was u n l im i te d *  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  from  th e  
te rm s  o f  8*5 w h e th e r  th e  8 # 5 (a )  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  o ld  
r u l e s  f o r  a  y e a r  i s  t o  s i g n i f y  o n ly  t h e  r u l e s  r e g a r d in g  
r e v o c a t io n #  Were c r e d i t o r s '  r i g h t s  o u t  down im m e d ia te ly  
u n d e r  S # 5 (b ) o r  r e t a i n e d  i n  t h e i r  b ro a d e r  pow er f o r  a  
y e a r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p re -A o t d o n a tio n s  u n d e r  8#5 ( a ) ?  
O b v io u s ly  t h e  m ost im p o r ta n t  q u e s t io n ,  th o u g h , i s  
w h e th e r  th e  common law  r u l e  p r o h i b i t i n g  a t ta c h m e n t  by 
c r e d i t o r s  o f  th e  p a ra p h e r n a l  s u b je c t  o f  g i f t  h a s  o r  h a s  
n o t  b e en  l e f t  i n  b e in g  by  t h e  1920 Act#
One o f  t h e  l e a d in g  o a s e s  on p a r a p h e r n a l i a  i s  D ioks1V, M a ss ie  , w h ich  exam ines w i th  a  r e g a r d  t o  d e t a i l  w hich  
seem s e x t r a o r d in a r y  t o  a  more m odern way o f  t h in k i n g ,  
b u t  w hich  m ust h ave  b een  n e c e s s a r y  i n  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  
o f  th e  t im e ,  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t s  a s  p a ra p h e r n a l  
o r  n o t#  A m idst q u a in t  c o n c e s s io n s  (a n d  r e s t r i c t i o n s ) ,  
i t  i s  fo u n d  t h a t  w edd ing  p r e s e n t s  made t o  t h e  w if e  ( o t h e r  
th a n  by h e r  h u sb an d  and  ev en  i f  by  h e r  h u sb a n d , a c c o rd in g  
t o  Hume pp#1 0 5 /1 0 6 , i f  o f  o r d in a r y  h o u se h o ld  a r t i o l e s ,  
n o t  b e in g  p a r a p h e r n a l  o r  s i m i l a r  t o  p a r a p h e r n a l  i n  n a tu r e )  
u n l e s s  s t r i c t l y  p a r a p h e r n a l  i n  n a tu r e  d i d  n o t  q u a l i f y  a s  
p a r a p h e r n a l ia #  I t  a l s o  seem s re m a rk a b le  t o  a  l a t e rgg e n e r a t io n  t h a t  L ord  D eas e x e r c is e d  h i s  m ind t o  d e c id e  
w h e th e r  a  h u s b a n d 's  u s e  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  w a rd ro b e  f o r  
t h r e e  m onths w as s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a l t e r  t h e  l e g a l  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  th e  w ardrobe#  H is  o p in io n  was t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t*  
L u d ic ro u s  a s  su o h  a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  m in u ti a e  o f  th e  law  
m ig lit seem , i t  c a n n o t  be  d e n ie d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  a  
happy  m a r r ia g e  i n  t h a t  e r a  w ere much m ore c e r t a i n  a s  
t o /
1# 1 6 9 5 , M#5821#2# I n  Cameron v# McLean 1870 , 13 S#L#R# 278.^
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to the ownership of the various household goods than 
their modern counterparts* Therein might lie no true 
advantage, however, f o r  today division of household 
e f f e c t s  will he made in the event of marital u p s e t ^ , 
and a clear, but inequitable rule, i s  perhaps not a 
rule worthy of respect# Stante matrimonio, does the .. i,—tirnum*^ownership of the matrimonial assets matter?
Paraphernalia (such as it was) did not fall 
under the jus mariti• but Paton points out that the 
wife had not full power over it, f o r ,  despite Craig's 
views and early eighteenth century decisions to the 
contrary, she could not dispose of it inter vivosV iT."nw3HeMeHae«s3s
w i th o u t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t ,  th o u g h  i t  d id  p a s s  on 
h e r  d e a th  t o  h e r  l e g a t e e s  o r  n e x t  o f  k in #  W alton^  
c i t e s  th e  c a s e  o f  Young v .  W rig h t a s  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  
t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  a  w ife  c o u ld  t e s t  on h e r  
p a r a p h e r n a l i a • "Where th e  w ife  s u r v i v e s ,  t h e  
p a r a p h e r n a l  goods c o n tin u e  h e r  p r o p e r ty ,  an d  c a n n o t be 
a t t a c h e d  by th e  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i to r s #  I f  t h e  w ife  d ie  
f i r s t ,  th e y  go t o  h e r  c h i l d r e n  o r  h e r  o t h e r  n e x t  o f  k i n ^ " •
P ecu liu ra  /
1• See C h a p te r  4 (A lim e n t)  and  5 (D iv o rc e  and D e a th )#2* See C h a p te r  7 ,  w here  i t  i s  a rg u e d  t h a t  r u l e sc o n c e rn in g  o w n ersh ip  o f  goods s t a n t e  m a tr im o n io , are im p o r ta n t*
3* P a to n ,  p . 103*F r * I #805/806  a l s o  s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i te m s  w ere  p a r a p h e r n a l  e x c lu d e d  th e  ju s  m r i t i ,  b u t  n o t  th e  ju s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s , and  h e re  d i s c u s s e d  th e  w e ig h t o f th e  r e l e v a n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  «4 .  p* 221.
5 . (1 880 ) 7  R .760* The a rgum en t was c o n c e rn e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  w ith  th e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  th e  goods w ere  p a r a p h e r n a l ,  and  upon w h e th e r  t h e  m u tu a l s e t t l e m e n t  u n d e r  d i s c u s s io n  was g r a n te d  ob t u rp e m oausam* I f  t u r n i s  c a u sa  d idn o t  e x i s t ,  and  i f  -che goods w ere p a r a p h e r n a l  ( b o th  o f  w h ich  w ere a c c e p te d  by th e  Bench) t h e  w i f e 's  t e s ta m e n ta r y  c a p a c i ty  o v e r  p a r a p h e r n a l ia  seem s t o  have  b e e n  a llo w e d  w i th o u t  q u e s t io n *  L o rd  D e a s , a t  p . 7 6 3 , s a y s ,  "The a u n t  had  a r i g h t  t o  make t h a t  b e q u e s t  in d e p e n d e n t ly  a l t o g e t h e r  b o th  o f  h e r  h u sb an d  and o f  h e r  param our*  The je w e ls  d id  n o t  b e lo n g  e i t h e r  to  th e  h u sb an d  o r  t o  th e  param our*"6 .  E r s k in e ,  1 , 6 ,  41#
26*
Peculium
Another exception which curbed the scope of the
jus mariti was the peculium (a word the use of which
was advocated by Fraser as a useful generic term to
describe all the property of the wife excluded from
her husband's control^) or (in its particular sense)
"Lady's G own", which had its basis in an old custom,
fallen into desuetude (at least by the first (1846)
edition of Fraser), that when a married woman consented
to the sale by h e r  husband of property o v e r  which she
had a jointure (or in certain o th e r  circumstances - in2leases, and in sales of cattle , or of land of which 
th e  wife was a tercer^), the purchaser gave h e r  a 
present in money or goods, donated with the intention 
t h a t  she might buy therewith a gown, which, being 
clothing, was paraphernal: even though a gown was not
purchased, t h a t  money so given was treated in the same 
way as the paraphernal goods for which it might have 
been exchanged*
A/
1 * Fraser (1*791) remarks that "it would save considerable superfluity of language" if the term peculium were more widely adopted. He states that the EiSa^igmaOla of the Roman Law corresponded to the property from which the jus mariti was excluded in our law, and on the Continent T%ence we derived our law of husband and wife), it was given the name of peculium*
As to the use of the word peculium in its broader m ean ing , see Biggart v. City 6F Sîasgow Bank (1879)6 R.470, per L# Deas at p.474, where he quotes Erskine 1, 6, 25* With reference to that same case, Gondy ("A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy in Scotland" 4 th  edn* p*69) also uses peculium in that sense, to describe what was the wife^ own property (there bequeathed to her by her father exclusive of the husband's jus mariti and jus administrationis *)2* Fr*I*775; Paton, p*10j.3* Paton, p.103; Murray, p.13."jointure"*- property settled on a woman at marriage to be enjoyed after her husband's death, (Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary)*
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A c e r t a i n  am ount o f  c o n tr o v e r s y  s u r ro u n d e d  th e  
R^ ep u llu m o h o w ev er, some a u t h o r i t i e s  h o ld in g  i t  t o  be  
p a r a p h e r n a l  and  h e n c e  o u tw lth  t h e  g ra s p  o f  t h e  
h u s b a n d 'a  c r e d i to r s *  and  o th e r s  b e in g  o f  t h e  o p in io n  
t h a t  i t  was a  d o n a t io n  made* a t a w ^  î«ÊEJf®2aâ£* IS È S : 
v iru m  e t  uxorem , and  t h a t  th u s  i t  was r e v o c a b le  and  
a b le  t o  b e  a t t a c h e d  by  th o s e  c r e d i to r s *  The fo rm e r  
p r o b a b ly  was t h e  p r e f e r r e d  v ie w , though*  t h e  m a t t e r
b e in g  o f  no c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  t o  him* F r a s e r  d o e s  n o t1oommit h im s e l f  u pon  t h e  p o i n t  * C e r t a in l y  i t s  v a lu e  
t o  t h e  w ife  was v e ry  s m a ll  in d e e d  i f  i t  w as t o  b e  
re g a rd e d  m e re ly  a s  a  d o n a t io n  by th e  h u sb an d  m o rte
As F r a s e r  n o te s ^ *  t h e  l a t t e r  was th e
c o n c lu s io n  o f  K i lk e iT a n 's  r e p o rb  o f  D o u g la s  v# Kennedy # 
M urray  b e liev e s^ ^  t h e  pecu liu m *  "L ik e  p a r a p h e r n a l i a " ,  was 
" n o t  a t t a c h a b l e  by  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i to r s * "
Pin-M oney
P in -m o n ey , w h ich  was a  te rm  o f  E n g lis h  Law, m ean in g , 
i n  W a l to n 's  w ord8^ \ " p o c k e t-m o n e y " , was g iv e n  som etim es 
t o  a  w if e  f o r  t h e  p u rc h a s e  o f  c lo t h e s  and  o rn a m e n ts , 
e i t h e r  b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e  o r  p e r i o d i c a l l y  tha^ougiiout th e  
m a rr ia g e *
6W alto n  re m a rk s  t h a t  t h e r e  seem ed t o  be  no S c o ts  
a u t h o r i t y  on  th e  s u b j e c t ,  and  t h a t  tize c o u r t s  w ould 
p ro b a b ly  f o l lo w  E n g l i s h  j u d i c i a l  th in k in g  i n  a s c e r t a i n i n g  
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  su o h  a n  a l lo w a n c e .  The q u e s t io n  a r o s e  
th ro u g h  t h e  o c c a s io n a l  u s e  o f  th e  te rm  i n  S c o ts  m a r r ia g e -  
c o n t r a c t s #
I f  any  b i l l s  f o r  goods o f  t h a t  n a tu r e  iffere p a id  by 
th e  h u sb a n d , he  was e n t i t l e d  t o  d e d u c t t l i e  p r i c e  from  
s u c h /
1* See g e n e r a l l y  F r . I , 7 7 5 -7 7 6 ,2, Ibid. 7 7 6 ,
3 ,  CK & 19 (1 7 5 1 ) .4 ,  g . l 4 .5 ,  p . 2 2 1 .6* p p .221—222*
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su o h  a llo w a n ce #  I f  t h e  w ife  d id  n o t  d r e s s  a c c o rd in g  
t o  h e r  ( h i s )  s t a t i o n *  th e  h usband  m i ^ t  r e f u s e  t o  pay  
t h e  p in-m oney* a  r u l e  w h ich  m ig h t h e lp  t o  p r e c lu d e  h e r  
from  s a v in g  i t  o r  s p e n d in g  i t  t o  o th e r*  o r  b e t t e r ,  e f f e c t #  
( F r a s e r  and  P a to n "  u s e  t h e  w ords* " to  a p p ly  t o  h e r  
s e p a r a t e  e x p e n d i tu re " *  i n  d e s c r ib in g  p in -m o n e y , b u t  i t  
w ould  seem t h a t  " h e r  s e p a r a t e  e x p e n d i tu r e "  m u st be  r e a d  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n # )  The aim  was t h a t  th e  w ife*  
by th e  e le g a n c e  o f  h e r  a p p ea ra n c e*  s h o u ld  r e f l e c t  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  g e n e r o s i t y  and  p o s i t i o n  i n  l i f e *  ( " # # # th e r e  
i s  annexed  t o  a  w i f e ' s  p in  money an  im p lie d  d u ty  o f  
& P P iy i#â  i t  to w a rd s  h e r  p e r s o n a l  d re s s *  d e c o r a t io n *  and  
ornament"^" ) *
Upon t h e  d e a th  o f  th e  h u sb a n d , th e  w i f e ' s  c la im  
f o r  a r r e a r s  was l i m i t e d  t o  one y e a r 's  a r r e a r s  ( u n le s s  
e x c e p t io n a l ly ^ ) *  a n d  n o t  even  t o  th a t*  o r  t o  a n y th in g *  
i f  sh e  had  n o t  b een  i n  th e  h a b i t  o f  r e c e i v i n g  p in -m oney  
d u r in g  th e  c o u rs e  o f  t h e  m a rria g e #  The money* i f  g iven*  
was e a rm ark ed  f o r  t h e  w i f e ' s  p e r s o n a l  e x p e n se s  and was 
n o t  in te n d e d  t o  a c c u m u la te ;  t h e r e  was no q u e s t io n  o f  
any  e n t i t l e m e n t  o f  h e r  e x e c u to r s  t o  c la im  a r r e a r s  from  
t h e  husband* I n  c a s e s  o f  doub t*  r e c o u r s e  was h ad  t o  
E n g l i s h  a u t h o r i t y  # A t common law* h e r  c la im  was n o t  
t o  p in -m o n ey  b u t  t o  a lim e n t#  A r i g h t  t o  p in -m o n ey  
came i n t o  b e in g  by  s p e c i f i c  s t i p u l a t i o n  an d  a g reem en t i n  
t h e  m a r r ia g e - c o n t r a o t#
T hese  th e n  w ere  e x c e p t io n s  from  th e  h u s b a n d 's  
j u s  m a r i t i  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  ty p e s  o f  p r o p e r ty #  T h ere  w ere  
o t h e r  exam ples o f  e x c lu s io n  o f  h i s  pow ers* some a r i s i n g  
from  /
1# 1 .7 7 6  ( l a t e r  q u a l i f i e d  -  s e e  f o o tn o te  3 i n f r a , ) .
2 # p . 1 0 3  #
3 # P r# I#777#  w here  h e  c i t e s  J o d r e l l  v *  J ,  9  B e a v # 4 5 ;
1 5  L # J , G h # 1 7 ,  H o w e v e r *  t h e  m a t te r  w a s  s u b j e c t  to  th e  a g re e m e n t o f  t h e  p a r t i e s :  s e e  l i b e r a l  E n g l is hd e c is io n s *  Fr# i b i d ,
4 # R id o u t V ,  L e w i s “T l 7 3 8 )  * 1 A t k , 2 6 9  ( h a l t o n *  p # 2 2 2 ) *  
5 ,  S e e *  upon  Pin-M oney* F r # I , 776-778* and  W alto n ,p p ,2 2 1 -2 .
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from  ch an g e s  I n  h i s  s t a t u s ,  and  a n o th e r  a r o s e  from  th e  
d e c la r e d  n a t u r e ,  o r  f u n c t i o n ,  o f  th e  p ro p e r ty #  T h is  
was t h e  g r a n t  t o  th e  w ife  o f  a n  " a l im e n ta r y "  fund#
The A lim e n ta ry  P r o v i s io n«W IB* ÜW. «««* Î** «» w. W Wt »ra (tm »» ««nw «W
T h is  d e r o g a t io n  from  th e  e f f e c t i v e  pow er o f  th e  
j u s  m a r i t i  was t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  p r o v i s io n s  t r u l y  
a l im e n ta r y  i n  c h a r a c t e r  w ere  h e ld  n o t  t o  f a l l  t o  th e
h u sb an d  iJu re  m a£iÈ i»  i S M t S H l  SêSÊM S.»  t o  
e x c lu d e , w i th o u t  n e ed  f o r  e x p re s s  r e f e r e n c e ,  t h e  ju s  
m a r i t i  and  ju s  a d m in i s t r a t io n i s # ^
I t  was n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  suoh  a  p r o v i s i o n  be 
besto^m d  upon  th e  w if e  by a  s t r a n g e r :  t h e  husb an d
h im s e l f  c o u ld  do  so  ( o r  th e  w ife  h e r s e l f ) ,  so  lo n g  a s2 %t h e  p r o v i s i o n  was made a n t e - n u p t i a l l y  \  F r a s e r  n o te s "  
t h a t  to o  e n t h u s i a s t i c  u s e  o f  t h i s  d e v ic e ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
a n  e x o r b i t a n t  p r o v i s i o n ,  l o s t  f o r  th e  p r o v i s i o n  i t s  
a l im e n ta r y  n a tu r e  and  p r o t e c t i o n ,  quoad th e  e x c e s s ,  and  
t h a t  t h a t  e x c e s s  was a b le  t o  be  a t t a c h e d  by  th e  h u s b a n d 's  
c r e d i t o r s .  H ow ever, d e e d s  by  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  t h e  te rm s  
o f  w h ich  w ere  s a i d  n o t  o n ly  t o  be  a l im e n ta r y ,  b u t  t o  
e x c lu d e  th e  j u s  m a ;? i t i ,  w ere  g e n e r a l ly ^  s a f e  from  a t t a c k ,  
how ever g e n e ro u s  t h e i r  p r o v i s i o n s ,  th o u g h  t h a t  w ould  n o t  
be t h e  c a s e  w here  t h e  fu n d  was d e s c r ib e d  m e re ly  a s  
" a l im e n ta r y " .  I t  was o e r t e i n l y  th e  s a f e  r u l e ,  and was 
a t  l e a s t  h ig h ly  d e s i r a b l e ,  and  p e rh a p s  ev en  n e c e s s a r y ,  
t o  u se  t h e  v;ord " a l im e n ta r y "  i n  t h e  g i^an t, th o u g h  t h e r e  
w ere  o p in io n s  t h a t  th e  p r o v i s io n  d id  n o t  n e ed  so  t o  be 
d e s c r ib e d  on th e  f a c e  o f  t h e  g r a n t ,  b e c a u se  i t  was 
co m p e te n t t o  p ro v e  i t s  a l im e n ta r y  c h a r a c t e r  a l i u n d e  #
The fu n d , t o  be  p r o t e c t e d ,  had  t o  be  in te n d e d  f o r  th e  
w i f e 's  s u p p o r t  and  m a in te n a n c e , and t o  be o f  a  s i z e  
com m ensurate  w i th  t h e  s p o u s e s ' s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g .
The /
I*  F r . I . 764 ,g t s g g .2# i# /D g#
3 .  I b i d .4 .  O T s - 7 6 6 .
5 .  1 ,7 6 7 * 7 6 8 ,
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The deed conferring the benefit of the fund upon 
the woman would dictate her powers over it* The 
essence of an alimentary fund was that it should be non- 
assignable » but if the fee was in the wife, the 
restrictions on the use of the fund in its character 
as an alimentary fund would cease upon the dissolution 
of the marriage .
A beneficial rule was that, since the fund belonged
to the wife exclusive of the .lus mariti » savings
therefrom were accorded the same protection from the
husband as were savings from other property held
exclusive of the ,1us mariti# The savings retained
the alimentary character of the fund from which they 3*4sp ran g ^*  #
iasËâïïâJls„niÈili£2-S°E_w|:î®ls-âsSesWagtiai,Dgbts
Stante matrimonio, the wife was exempt from personal 
diligence for her ante-nuptial moveable debts, though 
such moveable estate as was excluded from the ambit of 
the jus mariti remained liable for such debts• Her 
liability to personal diligence arose once more upon 
the dissolution of the marriage# The husband was not 
responsible for the principal sums of her heritable 
debts /
1 * 1,764,2. Martin v# Bannatyne (1861) 23 D.705* Per L.J#Clerk Inglis, at p,709, .while I am disposed to read this as an alimentary provision with a view to the marriage relations, the moment these came to an end that alimentary provision came to an end also, and the lady became, as before, absolute and unlimited fiar of her own fortune." (in the circumstances of the case) and, earlier at p.7 0 9 , "it is possible that a fund may be alimentary for certain purposes, during a certain period, and in certain events, and yet lose its alimentary character in other circumstances #’ "This was her own fortune, which was settled for the purposes of the marriage, and as soon as these purposes were served or superseded, it was her own property as much as before."3* Pr.I.7ô9; 699.4. See generally, on alimentary provisions, Fr.I. 764-7691 see also Chapter ^, pp. 2 4 2-2 4 7.
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4d e b ts *  b u t  w ould b e  l l& b le  f o r  th o  i n t e r e s t  th e r e o n  #
A n te - n u p t i a l  d e b ts  w ere  th o s e  d e b ts  c o n t r a c t e d2.b e f o r e  t h e  p ro c la m a tio n  o f  b an n s # The hu ab an d  wae 
l i a b l e  i n  f u l l  f o r  h l a  w ife * 8  a n t e - n u p t i a l  m oveab le  
debts, "debta such t h a t  i f  they had been due t o  h e r ,  
th e y  w ould h av e  f a l l e n  u n d e r  th e  ^ua m a r i t i ^ "* and  
t h e s e  d e b ts  in c lu d e d  th e  a c c o u n ts  f o r  h e r  m a r r ia g e -  
o l o th e a ^ ,  l i a b i l i t i e s  f o r  dam ages^ , and  t h e  a l im e n t  o f  
the /
1 .  F r . I , 5 8 7 -8 8 .
2* I b i d ,  5 9 2 ,3* % to n *  p#101; Walton, p ,2 1 1 ,4, th o u g h  Fraser (X,590-591) and Walton ( p ,2 1 1 )  n o te  that auoh  a  d e b t  h a s  b e en  r e g a rd e d  a s  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  own d e b t ,  Jn rem yeraum  o f  him, and not as a debt i n  th e  n a tu r e  o f  an  a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t  o f  t h e  w i f e .  H ence , though t h e  h u s b a n d 's  liability for h i s  wife's a n t e -  n u p t i a l  d e b t  c e a s e d  upon th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  by  d e a th  ( o f  t h e  w i f e ;  on  th e  d e a th  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d , h i s  h e i r s  w ere  n o t  l i a b l e ,  th e  w ife  h e r s e l f  b e in g  l i a b l e  (Fr.I,594)) o r  divorce, "specially i f  t h e  d iv o rc e m e n t 
w as ded u ced  i n  d e f a u l t  o f  th e  w ife "  ( F r . I , 593 q u o t in g  K i l lo o h  V , M urray , 1612, #,5861,), h i s  liability on t h a t  h ead  c o n tin u e d  a f t e r  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e  , , .A l s to n  v, P h i l i p  1682 , M .6007 ,5 ,  T h is  c a n n o t be stated w ith o u t  qualification, (Fr.I.5 9 1 ) ;  M u rray , p . 22  (h u sb a n d  n o t  l i a b l e  f o r  w i f e 's  d e l i c t s  o r  
qu a s i - d e l i c t s , )  Fraser states that d e l i c t s  or quasi- i d e l l c t s  o f  t h e  w if e  co m m itted  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e  d I3 * n o t  
b r in g  upon  th e  h usband  l i a b i l i t y  t h e r e f o r ,  w h i le  r e s e r v i n g  his opinion on the q u e s t io n  o f  ante-nuptial w ro n g s ,Hume (pp*1p6-13B) also s t a t e s  that n e i t h e r  th e  husband  ( h i s  p e r s o n  o r  e s t a t e )  n o r  ev en  t h e  goods i n  comm union, "w h ich  a r e  i n  a m anner his f o r  the t im e "  was l i a b l e  f o r  " t h e  p a t r im o n ia l  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  t h e s e  h e r  d e l in q u e n c ie s " ,  "...a m a rr ie d  woman i s ,  and m ustbe n e a r ly  -  n o t  absolutely -  b u t  n e a r l y ,  i n  t h e  same c a s e  a s  a  s i n g l e  woman i n  r e g a r d  t o  o b l i g a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  e% d e l i c to "  ( b u t  s e e  f o o tn o te  1 ,  p ,1 3 7 ) .  H er own e s t a t e ,  E e rlta G Ie ™ b r m oveable  (a n d  ev en  h e r  p e r s o n ,  i f  
im p riso n m e n t was c o m p e te n t)  was l i a b l e  -  so  lo n g ,  Hume s u g g e s t s ,  c i t i n g  M ore, N o te s , % x i i ,y  25 a s  no i n t e r e s t  of t h e  h usband  was p r e ju d ic e d ;  i n  addition, he c i t e s  a n  i n s t a n c e  i n  w h ich  a d ju d i c a t io n  to o k  p la c e  on t h e  w i f e 's  h e r i t a g e ,  b u t  this was h e ld  i n  abeyance till dissolution of t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  i n  o r d e r  that " th e  r e n t s  and  p r o f i t s  w h ich  a r e  i n  communion ( th o u g h  t h e  e s t a t e  
i t s e l f  i s  not) shall come f r e e  and  e n t i r e  into his 
p o c k e t  i n  the m ea n tim e" , ( F r ie n d  v. S k e l to n  (1855)17 D .5 4 8 ; S c o t t  v .  B a i l l i e  19 F e b , 1790 M .6085, gyb  nom. Chalmers v, Douglas), S im i la r ly  i f  sh e  had no s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  th e  d e b t  a ro s e  and w as e x i g i b l e  on th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e .
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t h e  w i f e 's  i n d ig e n t  r e l a t i o n s  (nu m b erin g  among th o s eian y  I l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  w ife  . )
An im p o r ta n t  p o i n t  was t h a t ,  a t  common la w , th e s e  
l i a b i l i t i e s  c o n s e q u e n t ia l  upon  m a rr ia g e  a r o s e  ex l e g e » 
no m a t t e r  how l i t t l e  p r o p e r ty  had  p a s s e d  t o  t h e  h usband  
by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  m a rr ia g e s  in d e e d ,  ev en  i f  none had
p a e a e d , t h e  d u t l e #  came i n t o  b e in g  a ln c e  t h e  d e c i s io noi n  G ordon v .  D av idson^  t h a t ,  " th o u g h  th e  L o rd s  th o u g h t  
th e  d e f e n d e r 's  p o s i t i o n  v e ry  h a rd " ;  " y e t ,  ^ t^ , l e x  
s o r i p t a  e s t ,  t h e  same w as now tu r n e d  i n t o  a  f i x e d  known 
custom  and  law "#
The r u l e  t h a t  t h e  husb an d  was l i a b l e  s t a n t e  m a trim o n io  
f o r  h i s  w i f e 's  a n t e - n u p t i a l  m oveable d e b ts  w h e th e r  he  was 
l u o r a t u s  by t h e  m a r r ia g e  o r  n o t ,  and  t h a t  h i s  l i a b i l i t y  
c e a s e d  upon d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  m ust be  u n d e rs to o d  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i f  h e  h ad  b e en  l u c r a t u s  
by t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  any  su c h  d e b ts  o u ts ta n d in g  upon  th e  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  w ere r e p a y a b le  by  th e  
h u sb a n d , end  t h i s  n o t  so  much upon  th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  
g e n e r a l  r u l e s  d e s c r ib e d ,  b u t  r a t h e r  on th e  b a s i s  t h a t  
"h e  s h o u ld  h ave  no moi'^e o f  h i s  w i f e 's  m eans, j u r e  
m a r i t i ,  b u t  w ha t was f r e e  o f  d e b t.# * '^ "
E rs k in e ^  s e t s  f o r t h  th e  e x c e p t io n a l  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  
i n  w hich  th e  h u sb an d  w ould be l i a b l e  f o r  t h e s e  d e b ts  
a f t e r  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  one b e in g  th e  c a s e  
w here d i l i g e n c e  had  b e e n  c o m p le te d  by t h a t  d a te  a g a i n s t  
h i s  e s t a t e ;  a n d , s e c o n d , i f  th e  w i f e 's  c r e d i t o r s  had  
b een  u n a b le  t o  o b t a in  paym ent a f t e r  h e r  d e a t h ,  o u t  o f  
h e r  s h a re  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  g o o d s , a  l i a b i l i t y  " n o t  in d e e d
h e  h a th  e n r ic h e d  h im s e l f ,  o r  b een  a  g a i n e r ,  by th e  
m a r r ia g e  /
1# M u rray , p ,2 2 ;  W a lto n , p*211$ P a to n ,  p * 1 0 1 ,2 .  M .5789 (1 7 0 8 ) ,
3« F r ,I * 5 9 9  q u o t in g  Cunningham v ,  D alm ahoy, M,5870j(1 6 6 2 )#  s e e  a l s o  5 9 3 -4 ,4 .  1* 6 ,  1 7 .
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m a r r ia g e ;  " E q u ity  w ould  n o t  a l lo w  th e  h u sb a n d  t o  
p r o f i t  a t  t h e  e x p en se  o f  t h e  c r e d i to r s *  O nly  w hat 
was re g a rd e d  a s  o v e r  and  above a  m o d era te  t o c h e r  
( ju d g e d  a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  ra n k  and  f o r tu n e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s )  
was c o u n te d  a s  lu cru m  # However# even  i n  t h a t  c a s e .
a s  h i s  l i a b i l i t y  was s t i l l  o n ly  s u b s i d i a r i e ,  no a c t i o n  
c o u ld  l i e  a g a i n s t  h im , a s  h a v in g  b een  l u o r a t u s  by th e  
m a r r ia g e ,  by  h i s  d e c e a se d  w i f e 's  c r e d i t o r s ,  t i l l  t h e  
w i f e 's  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  t h e  p r im a ry  d e b t o r s ,  w ere  f i r s t  
d i s c u s s e d ,
PS t a i r ,  B ank ton  and  E rs k in e  a f f i r m e d  t h a t  th e s e  
r u l e s  upon th e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  p ro c e e d e d  from  t h a t  
phenom enon, e lu s iv e  t o  be  g ra s p e d  ( o r  p r o v e d ) ,  o f  th e  
communio bonorum , b u t  o t h e r  w r i t e r s  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  i t  
f lo w e d  from  t h e  f a c t  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l  s u b j e c t io n  o f  th e  
w ife#  I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t ,  even  i f  t h e  h usband  
denuded  h im s e l f  o f  h i s  tw in  r i g h t s ,  he  s t i l l  c o u ld  n o t  
r e n d e r  th e  w i f e 's  pqr s %  s u b j e c t  t o  d i l i g e n c e .  C ould  
p a r t  o f  th e  r a t i o n a l e  h ave  b e en  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
c r e d i t o r s ?  "By m a rry in g  h e r  he  w ith d raw s  h e r  p e rs o n
from  d i l i g e n c e ,  and  i t  i s  o n ly  r e a s o n a b le  t h a t  he  sh o u ld%s u b s t i t u t e  h i s  own "# Among th e  s u c c e s s f u l  p le a d in g s  
f o r  th e  p u r s u e r  i n  G ordon v ,  D a v id so n , s u p r a , was th e  
a rg u m e n t3-
"E st o  t h e r e  was some h a rd s h ip  i n  a  h u s b a n d 's  b e in g  
l i a b l e  f o r  h i s  w i f e 's  d e b t s ,  p u b l ic  u t i l i t y  m ust o v e r r u le  
i t ,  f o r  p r e v e n t in g  em bezzlem ent i n  p r e j u d i c e  o f  la w fu l  
c r e d i t o r s ,  and  s o p i t i n g  p l e a s  b e tw ix t  ]&&& and w i f e ; "  — 
"The h usband  c o v e r s  t h e  w ife  from  p e r s o n a l  e x e c u t io n ,  
and  t h e r e f o r e  h im s e l f  s h o u ld  an sw er f o r  h e r , "  F u r t h e r ,  
i t  was s a i d ,  "A g a in , man and w ife  a r e  u n d e rs to o d  t o  h av e  
e n te r e d  /
1 .  An o r d in a r y  t o c h e r  (a d  s u s t in e n d a  o n e ra  ( m a tr im o n i i ) )  
i s  n o t  l u c ^  -  B u r n ? k v T % e p e ? r R # 3 8 5 T ( l 6 g ^ ------2 .  1 , 4 ,  i 7 r ? r  1* 5 ,  9 2 ; 1 ,  6 ,  1 6 , r e s p e c t i v e l y ;s e e  c i t e d  a t  F r* I# 5 8 6 , f n , ( a ) ,
3 .  F r .I# 5 9 2 #
3 4 ,
e n te r e d  I n  a  s o c i e t y  o f  w e l l  and  w oe, l o s a  and  g a in ,  
w hioh  Im p lie s  an  o b llg e m e n t t o  r e l i e v e  one a n o th e r  o f  
t h e i r  d e b t s  and  b u rd e n s ;  and  i f  th e  h u sb an d  h a s  r i g h t  
j u r e m ai^iÿi t o  h i s  w i f e 's  m oveab les h e  m ust l ik e w i s e  
be  l i a b l e  t o  h e r  d e b t s ,  a o o o rd in g  t o  t h e  r u l e ,  o u ju s  
oommodum, e ju s  e t  inoommodum*"
I n  F o u n t a l n h a l l 's  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  c a s e ,  i s  fo und  -  
" th e  r e a s o n  i s ,  t h e  husband  by h i s  m a r r ia g e  h a s  r i g h t  
t o  a l l  t h e  w i f e ' s  m oveable g o o d s , e rg o  by a n a lo g y  o f  
law and Egg a t a t e  rationie, h© must pay all her m oveable 
d e b ts  I a n d , a .contrario smsu, as he has no right jure 
m a r i t i  t o  h e r  h e r i t a b l e  sum s, so  he o a n n o t be  s u b je c te d  
t o  h e r  h e r i t a b l e  d e b t ,  th o u g h  h e  i s  f r e e  o f  b o th  by th e  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a rr ia g e # "  -  " th e  law s o f  th e  s o v e r e ig n  
c o u r t s  o f  E urope h ave  now f ix e d  on t h i s ,  t h a t  th e  h usb an d  
becom es p e r s o n a l l y  l i a b l e  f o r  a l l  t h e  w i f e 's  m oveable 
d e b t s ,  G u d e lin  d e  j u r e  n o y is s im o , e t  l e s  cou tum es de 
P a r i s ,  p * 3 4 4 ,"
P a to n  commenta on  th e  p o s s ib l e  g ro u n d s  o f  th e  
w i f e 's  g e n e r a l  im m u n ity , ( t h e  e x c e p t io n s  b e in g  d e c r e e s  a d 
fa c tu m  m iaeatm idum  a n d  p u n ish m en t f o r  c r im e )  n o t in g  t h a t
som etim es i t  was a t t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  p o s s e s s io n  by th e  
h u sb an d  o f  h i s  w i f e ' s  m oveab le  p r o p e r ty ,  and  som etim es t o  
" t h e  s u p e r -e m in e n t  n a tu r e  o f  th e  c o n t r a c t  and  s t a t e  o f  
marriage -  £raeter f r a g i l l i a i s a  §sm&>  according t o  
S t a i r ^ # "  I n  h i s  c a p a c i ty  a s  e d i t o r  o f  B aro n  Hum e's 
L e c tu r e s ,  P a to n  w r i t e s  t h a t  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  a  m a r r ie d  
woman t o  c o n t r a c t  d e b ts  was a  d i s a b i l i t y ,  and  n o t  a  
p r i v i l e g e  o r  p r o te c t io n #  " I t  a ro s e  from  a b s o lu te  
d i s a b i l i t y  t o  b in d  h e r s e l f  p e r s o n a l ly  w i th  o r  w ith o u t  
c o n s e n t  and  n o t  from  any  p r i v i l e g e # "  Hume s t a t e s ^  
t h a t  /
i # p#ioi «
24  S x a i r  f  1 1 4  ^  22#
3# B aron  Hum e's L e c tu r e s ,  S t a i r  S o c i e ty ,  s u p r a ,  p#129 , f o o tn o te  6 ,  c i t i n g  F r fI* 5 2 0 -2 ;  E rsk ?  1 ,  6 , 1 9 , and  d i r e c t i n g  a t t e n t i o n  t o  B ig g a r t  v* C i ty  o f  G lasgow  Bank ( 1 8 7 9 ) ,  6 a ,470*
4* O p fC it* pp#129 /130*
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t h a t  t h e  d i s a b i l i t y  was in te n d e d  " to  p r o t e c t  h e r  from  
th e  i n f lu e n c e  and im p o rb u n lty  o f  th e  h u sb a n d , t o  keep  
h e r  f r e e  o f  t h e  b u s t l e  and  b u s in e s s  o f  t h e  w o r ld ,  w hich  
i s  n o t  h e r  s p h e r e ,"  A c co rd in g  t o  E r s k in e ^ ,  " h e r  p e r s o n ,  
w h i le  sh e  i s  v e s t l t a  v i r o ,  i s  f r e e  from  a l l  e x e c u t io n  
upon  d e b ts  c o n t r a c t e d  by h e r s e l f ;  w h ich , by  h e r  c o v e r t u r e ,  
sh e  becom es d i s a b le d  t o  pay*" The p a s s a g e  g o es  on t o  
sa y  t h a t  th e  h u sb a n d , "who I s  n o t  th e  p r o p e r  d e b to r , "  
w i l l  be  l i a b l e  t o  p e r s o n a l  d i l i g e n c e  a t  t h e  i n s t a n c e  o f  
t h e  w i f e ' s  c r e d i t o r s ,  th o u g h  th e  w ife  m ig h t be c o m p e lled  
t o  p e rfo rm  a c t s  ( s u c h  a s  t o  e n t e r  th e  h e i r s  o f  h e r  
v a s s a l s )  w hich  sh e  a lo n e  c o u ld  p e r fo rm .
I t  h a s  b e en  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  husband  was n o t  i n  g e n e r a l
l i a b l e  f o r  h i s  w i f e 's  h e r i t a b l e  d e b t s ,  th o u g h  he  was2l i a b l e  f o r  th e  i n t e r e s t  th e r e o n  , H ow ever, e x c e p t io n s
t o  t h a t  r u l e  e x i s t e d  i n  t h a t  th e  h usband  was l i a b l e
( f o r  h e r i t a b l e  d e b ts )  quantum  l u c r a t u s  by  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,
quo^d  t h e  s u r p lu s  o f  h e r  e s t a t e  w hich  he  r e c e i v e d ,  and
w h ich  was n o t  u se d  up i n  m e e tin g  th e  w i f e 's  p e r s o n a l
d e b t s ,  " f o r  e q u i ty  w i l l  n o t  a llo w  him t o  be e n r ic h e d
w ith  a n o t h e r 's  l o s s ,  by c u t t i n g  o f f  from  t h e  w i f e 's%c r e d i t o r s  t h e i r  o n ly  fu n d  o f  p a y m e n t^ " , a n d , m o reo v e r, 
t h e  h usband  w ould be l i a b l e  w here he  r e c e iv e d  a  (" lu m p ") 
co n v ey an ce  o f  a l l  h i s  w i f e 's  p r o p e r ty  p e r  a v e rs io n e m ,
" I n  o th e r  w o rd s , a  p e r s o n  who g e ts  a  u n i v e r s a l  r i g h t  
t o  a l l  t h e  e s t a t e s  b e lo n g in g  t o  a n o th e r ,  p e r  a v e rs io n e m , 
r e a l l y  a c q u i r e s  r i g h t  t o  no more th a n  t o  t h a t  s u r p lu s  
w hich  re m a in s  a f t e r  paym ent o f  a l l  d e b ts ^ * "
T h u s, /
1 ,  1 , 6 ,  19*2# F r* I* 5 8 7 -8 8  s u p r a g O sborn  v* Young M ,5785 (1696 )*3# F r* I ,5 9 7 *  w i f e 's  h e r i t a g e  had  f i r s t  t o  be  lo o k e dt o  f o r  paym ent o f  th e  d e b t ;  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  v a r io u s  a u t h o r i t i e s  w as , a s  h a s  b een  n o te d ,  t h a t  t h e  husband  w ould  n o t  be  c o n s id e re d  l u c r a t u s * u n le s s  t h e  t o c h e r  w hich  h e  r e o e lv e d  was s i z 'S i F l e ' i n  p r o p o r t io n  
t o  " th e  b u rd e n  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e ,"  i b i d ,  5 9 8 , B u rn e t  v« L e p e rs  su p ra * )
4 .  O p ,o i t * " 3 § ^
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Thus, w here  th e  husband, r e c e iv e d  all of hi# w i f e 's  
p r o p e r t y ,  h e  u n d e r to o k  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  o f  h e r  a n t e -
nuptial debts, heritable and moveable, and his liability 
d id  n o t  o e aa e  upon dissolution o f  t h e  marriage#
I t  l a  im p o r ta n t  to  rem em ber, h o w ev er, t h a t  i n  o t h e r  
o a e e a  w here  t h e r e  was no 'lump' o o n v ey an o e , t h e  w i f e 's  
separate(moveable)e8tato (for the principal aum# of 
h e r i t a b l e  d e b t  t h e  husb an d  was n o t  l i a b l e ) ,  su c h  a s  i t  
w a s , was a lw ay s  p r i m a r i l y  l i a b l e  ev en  d u r in g  t h e  
s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  m a rr ia g e #  The l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
husb an d -w as s u b ^ l d l q r l e# and h e  had  a  r i g h t  o f  r e l i e f
a g a i n s t  h i s  w i f e 's  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  -  n o r ,  d u r in g  marriage,i Po o u ld  h i s  c la im  p r e s c r i b e  "#
A lth o u g h  I t  I s  n o t  d e s i r a b l e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  
s t a t u t e s  t o  com e, a s  t h i s  m ig h t te n d  t o  d i s t o r t  t h e  
n a r r a t i v e  o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  law  b e f o r e  1 0 5 5 , and of 
t h e  aw ak en in g s o f  m ale  c o n s c ie n c e ,  and  fe m a le  i n d ig n a t io n ,  
I t  I s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  n o te  t h a t  u n d e r  th e  te rm s  o f  th e  
M a rr ie d  Women's Property { S c o tla n d )  A c t ,  1 8 7 7 ^ , s # 4 , t h e  
l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  h u sb an d  f o r  h i s  w i f e 's  a n t e - n u p t i a l  
d e b ts  was l i m i t e d ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  of m a r r ia g e s  c e l e b r a t e d  
on o r  a f t e r  1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  1878 (an d  now, by  th e  p a s s a g e  o f  
t im e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  a l l  m a r r ia g e s )  to t h e  v a lu e  o f  p r o p e r ty  
r e c e iv e d  by him  from, through or i n  r i g h t  o f  h e r  a t ,  b e fo r e  
o r  a f t e r  m arrl& ge# C l iv e  and W ilson  n o ta ^  t h a t  a  w ife  
I s  n o t  l i a b l e  f o r  h e r  h u sb a n d ' s  a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b ts #
The c a p a c i ty  o f  a  m a r r ie d  woman a t  common law  t o  
b in d  h e r s e l f  I n  c o n t r a c t ,  and  t o  i n c u r  d e b t s ,  a r e  
d i s c u s s e d  b r i e f l y  above. I t  m u st be
rem em bered t h a t ,  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  p r i v a t e  p a c t i o n ,  h e r  
o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  do so  was n o t  g re a t#  With r e g a r d  t o  
h e r  /
1# G ordon V# M a itla n d #  M ,11, 161 (1 7 5 7 ) .
2 .  See g e n e r a l l y ,  on  t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  F r , 1 * 5 8 6 -6 0 3 ; P a to n ,  p*101 and  p # 1 0 5 ; W a lto n , p p # 2 iO -2 1 2 ; M u rra y , p#22# 3# 40 an d  41 v l c t #  c# 29* S ee  C l iv e  and  W ilso n ,pp*265-66#
4 » p.2 6 6 ,
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her heritable estate, though the fee regained In her, 
sh e  r e q u i r e d  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t ,  e x e r c i s e d  u n d e r  h i e  
ju #  a d m l n l a t r e t l o n l s # to any tran&aotlon concerning it* 
Naturally her own heritage, during as before marriage# 
waa liable to meet any obligation ao incurred # with 
r e g a r d  t o  m o v e a b le s , the topic may be  8@en in f o u r  
a e p e o te  -  t h e  f i r s t ,  t h a t  e in o e  much o f  h e r  m oveable  
estate fell to her husband jur# mariti* and since ha 
h a d  f u l l  rights o f  p r o p e r ty  t h e r e i n ,  eo  much th e  lea# 
w&a her liability and h e r  pow er; second. I n  c e r t a i n  
e x c e p t io n a l  o irc u m a ta n o e a  a r i s i n g  by r e a s o n  o f  t h e  
perhaps temporary absence or change of atatus in the 
h u sb a n d , s h e  r e c e iv e d  pow er t o  t r a n s a c t ,  an d  u n d e r to o k  
c o n se q u e n t l i a b i l i t y  in h e r  (p e rh a p s  te m p o r a r i ly )  
s e p a r a t e  estate;^ t h i r d ,  t h e  w ife  m ig h t bind h e r  
h u sb an d  f o r  n e c e s s a r i e s  r e a s o n a b ly  s u i t a b l e  t o  t h e i r %way o f  l i f e .  I n  h e r  r o l e  a s  n r a e p o s l t a  r e b u s  d o m e s t lc l s  , 
and  f o u r t h ,  w here  b o th  r i g h t s  of h e r  h u sb an d  w ere  
e x c lu d e d , h e r  c a p a c i ty  t o  c o n t r a c t  was a s  fem e
The view was ta k e n  o r i g i n a l l y  t h a t  t h e  p i a r i t l  
was so  i n e x t r i c a b l y  a p a r t  of th e  husband's p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  i t  c p u ld  n o t  b e  re n o u n c e d  by him# The r e n u n c ia t i o n  
i t s e l f  f e l l  u n d e r  t h e  ^ u s  m a r i t i .  i t  was th o u g h t ,  "and  so  
d i s a p p e a r e d ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  b ro c a rd  vlnço v ln o en tem  
v in c o  t o  #" Any r e s e r v a t i o n ,  o r  r e n u n c ia t i o n  r e v e r t e d  
i n e v i t a b l y  t o  h im , " a s  w a te r  th ro w n  upon  a n  h ig h e r  
g ro u n d  d o th  e v e r  re tu rn "^ # "  To e x c lu d e  th e  h u s b a n d 's  
right#/
1# Hume, p p # 1 3 2 -1 3 5 ; d u r in g  h i s  d i s c o u r s e ,  h e  c i t e s  t h e  c a s e  o f  B l e l s  v .  K e ith  (1 6 6 5 ) M ,5987, "w here  t h e  w i f e 's  h e r i t a b l e  bond was fo u n d  n u l l  a s  t o  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  to  
p a y , and  good a s  t o  th e  w a r ra n t  t o  i n f e f t # "  R e fe re n c e , 
i&kSE a l i a »  t o  stair 1 ,  4 ,  16 and  F r a s e r  1 .8 0 9 -8 1 0 , an d  c a s e s  t h e r e  c i t e d ,
2# See P# 47 ; B aron  H um e's L e c tu r e s ,  p p ,1 3 1 -1 4 4 .
3 .  C f# t S Z p t e r  4 ,  pp. 438-439 and Chapter 3 , p. 227  e t  eeq .
4 * Murray* p*1S* ----
S t a i r ,  1 ,  4 ,  9#
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r i g h t ,  t h e  w ife  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o n v ey , b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e ,  th e
s u b j e c t s  w hich  o th e rw is e  w ould f a l l  u n d e r  t h e  ju s  m a r i t i ,  
t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  ,
H ow ever, i n  1 7 30 , i n  th e  c a s e  o f  W alker v .  H er?H u sb a n d 's  C r e d i t o r s " ,  i t  was d e c id e d  t h a t  i t  was co m p e ten t 
f o r  a  h u sb an d  t o  ren o u n c e  h i s  ju s  m a r i t i .  Thus* an 
o u td a te d  s i t u a t i o n  was im p ro v ed , b u t  F r a s e r  n o te s  t h a t ,  
s t r a n g e l y ,  ev en  b e f o r e  t h a t  d a t e ,  t h e  o ld  r u l e  d oes n o t  
seem a lw ay s  t o  h ave  b e en  u p h e ld  by  th e  d e c i s io n s *  Of 
t h e  e a r l i e r  w r i t e r s ,  o n ly  D i r le to n ^  had  th o u g h t  r e n u n c ia t i o n  
c o m p e te n t, and  M ackenzie  and  S t a i r  had  n o t  c o u n te n a n c e d  
su c h  a  v ie w . D e s p i te  th e  d e c i s io n s  o f  G o l l in g to n  v* C*^ -  
t h e  r u b r i c  o f  w h ic h , a s  F r q s e r  n o t e s ,  r a n ,  "A husb an d  
may ren o u n c e  h i s  j u s  m a r i t i ,  i n  so  f a r  a s  r e l a t e s  t o  
h i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  h i s  w i f e 's  m o v e a b le s ,"  and  i n  w hich  a  
d i s t i n c t i o n  was draw n b e tw een  th e  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  
w h ich  th e  m ore e n l ig h te n e d  c o n s id e r e d  n o t  o b l ig a t o r y  
upon  an  u n w i l l in g  and  l i b e r a l  h u sb a n d , and  th e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  h u sb an d  t o  r u l e  h i s  w ife  
and  f a m ily  and  t h e i r  a f f a i r s ,  w h ich , i n  1 6 6 7 , and  f o r  
many y e a r s  t h e r e a f t e r  ( t i l l  D a lry m p le 's  c a s e ,  and  
b ey o n d , so  f a r  a s  t h e  r o l e  o f  M AaSJa ia  jPm lM m e was 
c o n c e rn e d )  was deem ed r i g h t  a n d  p r o p e r ,  seem ly  and  
s u i t a b l e ,  i n  a l l  o a s e s ,  a  b u rd e n  and p r i v i l e g e  a lw ay s  t o
be s h o u ld e re d  and  n e v e r  t o  be c a s t  o f f  -  and  G re ig s  v*yW emyss'p t h e r e  h ad  b e en  c o n tr o v e r s y  and  c o n f l i c t i n g  
d e c i s i o n s ,  and  W a lk e r 's  c a s e  was th e  m ore w elcom e, 
t h e r e f o r e  /
1# The i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  was n e c e s s a r y :F r* I*781#  See e*g# S ta n d a rd  P r o p e r ty  In v e s tm e n t  Co# v, Cowe e tc #  (1 8 7 7 ) 4  R *695, p e r  L* G i f f o r d  a t  p * 7 0 3 , M urray  v# D a lry m p le  ( o r  D a irym p le  v# L o c k h a r t)  in f r a *  2# M, 5841 ; s e e  a l s o  D a lry m p le  v# L o c id ia r t  M*5842^"™~" 
(1 7 4 5 ) -  l u s  a d m i n l s t r a t io n i s #  j*  F r , i #  /8 1 - ^ ,4# D ir l#  V» JT ^  Ma r i t i #
5# M a c k e n z ie % n fn sS tu E e s  o f  th e  Law o f  S c o t la n d  1 , 6 ,5 0 ; S t a i r *  1* 4 , 9#6* M# 3828 (1 6 6 7 ) ;  s e e  F r# I#782*7 ,  M. 3832 (1 6 7 0 )#
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th e r e f o r e *
T h u s, by  1730# th e  " r e f i n e d  s u b t l e t y "  o f  S t a i r ' s  
a rg u m en t t h a t  " th e  v e ry  r i g h t  o f  th e  r e s e r v a t i o n "  ( t h a t  
l 8 ,  by t h e  h u sb a n d , o r  th e  sp o u se s  j o i n t l y ,  t o  th e  w if e )  
"beoom ea th e  h u s b a n d 's  j u r e  m q r i t l , and  m akes i t  e lu e o r y  
and  i n e f f e c t u a l ,  a s  a lw ay s  ru n n in g  b ack  upon  th e  h u sb an d  
h im s e l f ;  a s  w a te r  th ro w n  upon a n  h ig h e r  g ro u n d  d o th  
e v e r  r e t u r n " ,  w h ich  h a d ,  a s  i t s  b a s i s ,  t h e  v iew  t h a t  a  
w i f e ,  by  r e a s o n  o f  h e r  s e x  and  n a t u r e ,  w h ich  f o r  some 
u n e x p la in e d  r e a s o n  d id  n o t  a f f e c t  th e  s i n g l e  woman o r  
t h e  widow, was " a b s o lu te ly  In c a p a b le  o f  h o ld in g  any  r i g h t  
o f  p r o p e r t y ,  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d " , and  w h ich  had  
" r e g u la te d  e  s e r i e s  o f  d e c i s io n s "  had b e en  o u s te d ^ *  
T h e r e a f t e r  i t  was a c c e p te d  t h a t  a  husb an d  m ig h t re n o u n c e  
h i s  j u s  m a r i t i  a s  t o  t h e  w hole  o r  p a r t  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  
m o v eab les  and a s  t o  a c Q u is it&  o r  a c q u ire n d a  o r  b o th *
yooGB s i^ n & ta e  w ere  n e c e s s a r y ,  a s  lo n g  a s  th e  
i i^ te n t lo n  to  e x c lu d e  th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  
em erged c le a r ly ^ #  F r a s e r  n o te s ^  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  B e l l ' s  
v iew s t o  th e  c o n t r a r y ^ ,  th e  u s e  o f  t h e  p h r a s e  " e x c lu s iv e  
o f  th e  m a r i t i " was n o t  n e c e s s a r y ,  th o u g h , i n  d o u b t ,  
th e  p re s u m p tio n  was a g a i n s t  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d 's  
r i g h t*  T h u s, he  a d v o c a te s ^  t h a t ,  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  
f u r n i t u r e ,  an  in v e n to r y  be  made up o f  th o s e  p i e c e s  w hich  
a r e  t h e  w i f e 's  e x c lu s iv e  o f  t h e  m arj-^ # T h is  
e x p e d ie n t ,  a s  F r a s e r  h im s e l f  d e m o n s tra te s  by  th e  c i t a t i o n  
o f  c e r t a i n  i n s t a n c e s ,  was n o t  a lw ays s u c c e s s f u l^ ^  Hefyn o te s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  a n t e - n u p t i a l  and  p o s t ­
n u p t i a l  e x c lu s io n s  o f  t h e  ju s  m a r i t i#  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  
c a s e  /
1* F r# I# 7 8 1 , i n c o r p o r a t in g  th e  fam ous q u o ta t i o n  fromS t a i r ,  1 , 4 ,  9#2* D ick  V *  M cKenzie ( o r  W ils o n 's  T rs*  v *  w ' s  F a c to r )  (1868) 
7 Macph# 136#3# 1*784 .4 .  Prim# 1562*
5# 1*790 .6* 1*790; 7 9 3 -6 .7* 1*793; se e  a l s o  P a to n ,  p#102#
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c a s e ,  p re su m a b ly  b e c a u se  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  f r a u d  upon  
c r e d i t o r s ,  th e  husb an d  c o u ld  n o t  e x c lu d e  h i s  ju s  m a r i t i  
w i th o u t  "m aking a  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s i o n ,  when s o l v e n t ,  
t o  th e  w i f e ,  t o  come i n t o  e f f e c t  a f t e r  h i s  d e a th ;  quoad
th e  e x c e s s  above t h i s ,  i t  i s  r e v o c a b le  a s  a  d o n a t io n2S u b s e q u e n tly  i n  t h i s  p a s s a g e  ,  th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
h usband  so  t o  t r a n s f e r  p r o p e r ty  o f  h i s ,  s t a n t e  m a tr im o n io . 
t o  h i s  w i f e ,  on c e r t a i n  n a r r a t i v e s  (" b y  d e c l a r i n g  i t  to  
b e  a l im e n ta r y ;  o r  exem pt from  th e  j u s  m a r i t i ;  o r  n o t  
a s s ig n a b le  o r  a t t a c h a b l e  by c r e d i t o r s ^ " )  i s  n o ted *  The 
c o n c lu s io n  t o  be  draw n seem s t o  be  t h a t ,  by a n t e - n u p t i a l  
c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  w i f e ' s  own p r o p e r ty  m ig h t be s e c u re d  t o  
h e r ,  b u t  t h a t  c o n v ey an ces  by  husband  to  w ife  o f  th e  
h u s b a n d 's  f u r n i t u r e  ev en  b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e ',  and  c e r t a i n l y  
a f t e r  /
1# S ee  th e  im p o r ta n t  and  i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e  o f  S h e a r e r  v ,  C h r i s t i e  (1 842 ) 5 D .1 4 1 , n a r r a t e d  and d i s c u s s e d  by 
F r a s e r  a t  7 9 3 -7 9 3 ; and  a t  790#2 .  1 .7 9 6 .3 .  and  a u t h o r i t i e s  c i t e d  f o o tn o te  ( a )  p . 7 9 6 ,
4 .  Brown v .  F lem in g  (1850 ) 13 0 .3 7 3  ( a n t e - n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t ,  b u t  no e f f e c t i v e  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  even  th o u g h  
a n  in v e n to r y  h ad  b e en  e n d o rse d  on th e  m a r r ia g e - c o n t r a o t#  L #J.C ,H ope  a t  p#373 r e f u s e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t i t l e  from  p o s s e s s io n  b e c a u se  t h e  two w ere in s e p a r a b le  w here 
t h e  p u b l ic  was c o n c e rn e d , upon s u b s e q u e n t  p r o d u c t io nby th e  sp o u s e s  o f  a  l a t e n t  d e e d . Even on th e  a s su m p tio n  (w h ich  h i s  L o rd sh ip  d o u b te d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  some o f  t h e  c la u s e s  o f  t h e  d e ed ) t h a t  a  da p r a e s e n t i  convey ance  t o  th e  w ife  was in te n d e d ,  t h i s  c o u ld  n o F "G e^ach ieved  w here  th e  h u sb an d  o u tw a rd ly  rem a in ed  a s  much a  m a s te r  
o f  h i s  p r o p e r ty  a s  he  was b e f o r e .  Such a  p u r p o r te d  co n v ey an ce  c o u ld  n o t  b a r  th e  c la im s  o f  c r e d i t o r s  o r  r e s u l t  i n  a  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  th e  c la im  o f  th e  w ife  o v e r  t h a t  o f  th e  t r u s t e e  i n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  f o r  th e  c r e d i t o r s .
The c a s e  h i g h l i g h t s  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  p r o o f  o f  o w n e rsh ip  o f  f u r n i t u r e  and  l i k e  a r t i c l e s  h a v in g  by t h e i r  n a tu r e  no do cu m en ta ry  t i t l e ,  and  o f  th e  h a rd s h ip  a r i s i n g  t o  sp o u se  o r  c r e d i t o r  b e c a u se  o f  th e  n e c e s s a r i l y  " a r t i f i c i a l "  e le m e n t i n  i n t e r - s p o u s e  t r a n s f e r s  w here  e ac h  c o n t in u e s  t o  u s e  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  t r a n s f e r ,  w h ic h , i n  a d d i t i o n ,  moves n o t  a t  a l l  from  i t s  fo rm e r  p o s i t io n #  Would p u b l ic  n o t i c e  o f  change  o f  o w n e rsh ip  ( i f  su c h  w ere  p o s s ib l e )  h av e  a l t e r e d  th e  d e c i s io n ?  C am pbell v# S te w a r t  (1848 ) 10 0 ,1 2 8 0 ; from  th e  te rm s  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t ,  i t  c o u ld  be s e e n  t h a t  no r i g h t  o f  f e e  r e s id e d  i n  t h e  w i f e .
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1a f t e r  m a rr ia g e *  " th e  p o s s e s s io n  b e in g  u n c h a n g e d ,"  
c o u ld  n o t  p r e v a i l  a g a i n s t  th e  c r e d i to r s *  dem ands. 
F r a s e r  a l r e a d y  had  em p h a sise d  t h a t  a n t e - n u p t i a l  
a l im e n ta r y  p r o v i s io n s  by th e  h u sb a n d , n o tw i th s ta n d in g  
t h a t  th e  p r o p e r ty  i n  q u e s t io n  p a s s e d  o u t  o f  th e  hands 
o f  t h e  d o n o r , m ig h t be re d u c e d  by h i s  c r e d i t o r s  quoad 
exoessum ^#
P ro b a b ly  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  r u l e s  l i e s  more 
i n  t h e  g r e a t e r  w e ig h t g iv e n  t o  c r e d i to r s *  o la im s  and  
s e c u r i t y  (w h ich  i t  seem s t h e  c o u r t s  w ere  a lw ay s j e a lo u s  
t o  p r o t e c t ,  m in d f u l ,  p o s s ib ly  r i g h t l y ,  o f  th e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
t o  d e f r a u d  c r e d i t o r s  w hich  t h e  p r o p e r ty  r u l e s  a f f o r d e d :  
t h e  a r t i f i c i a l i t y  o f  th e  h u sb an d  * w ife  -  p r o p e r ty  
r e l a t i o n ,  th e n  a s  now, c o u ld  r e s u l t  i n  u n f a i r n e s s  t o  
sp o u se  o r  c r e d i t o r  and  a s  p e rm is s io n  was g iv e n  f o r  t h e  
a v o id a n c e  o f  th e  s u b s ta n t iv e  r u l e s  by p r i v a t e  p a c t io n ,
8 0  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  c o n fu s io n  in c r e a s e d )  t h a n  i n  th e  
sp o u ses*  i n t e r e s t s  o r  p r o p e r ty  r e l a t i o n s  i n t e r  se#
E x c lu s io n  o f  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  n eed  n o t  be  e x p r e s s .  
I n d e e d ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  S m ith  v* S m i th 's  T r u s te e s ^  made 
i t  c l e a r  t h a t  so  f l im s y  a  c lu e  t o  th e  h u s b a n d 's  t r u e  
i n t e n t  a s  an  e n t r y  i n  h i s  p r i v a t e  c a sh -b o o k  was a d e q u a te  
t o  j u s t i f y  r e t e n t i o n  by a  w ife  o f  w hat was th u s  p ro v ed  
t o  be h e r  own p r o p e r ty *  An i n f e r e n c e ,  from  f a c t s  and  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w e ll- fo u n d e d  
was som etim es t a k e n ,  ( I n  S m ith , ho w ev er, t h e  husband  
had  m a in ta in e d  a  m e t ic u lo u s  r e c o r d  o f  a l l  sums due  by 
him t o  h i s  w ife  (whom he had  m a r r ie d  w i th o u t  a  m a r r ia g e -  
c o n t r a c t )  and  t o  v a r io u s  members o f  h i s  f a m i ly .  The 
p r i n c i p a l  p ro b lem  was t h a t  s in c e  he h im s e l f  k e p t  th e  
c a s h -b o o k , t h e r e  h ad  b een  no d e l i v e r y  t o  t l ie  w i f e .  Was 
t h e r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t r a n s f e r  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  d o n a tio n ?  L ord  
Shand^ s t a t e s  t h a t ,  had  th e  w if e  had  t h e  book i n  h e r  
own /
1 .  X,  7 9 5 .
4 .  a t  p«
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own p o s s e s s io n ,  " t h e r e  o o u ld  have  b een  no q u e s t io n  
b e tw een  th e  p a r t i e s .  The n o te  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  
t h e  book i s  a  d i s t i n c t  acknow ledgem ent o f  d e b t ,  and 
i f  sh e  had  h ad  th e  book sh e  m ig h t have  p ro d u c e d  i t  
a s  c o n c lu s iv e  e v id e n c e  o f  h e r  r i g h t ,  No d o u b t t h a t  
d e b t  a r i s e s  by way o f  d o n a tio n  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
h u sb a n d , b u t  i t  i s  v e ry  n a t u r a l  t h a t  th e  h u sb a n d  sh o u ld  
t a k e  ifcMs vray o f  re n o u n c in g  h i s  J u s  i n a r i t i  an d  s e t t i n g  
a s i d e  h i s  w i f e 's  e s t a t e  f o r  h e r  own b e h o o f ,"  I n  t h e
r e s u l t ,  i t  was d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  deed  m ust be  h e ld  a s  
d e l i v e r e d ,  b e c a u se  t h e  husb an d  was t h e  n a t u r a l  and  
p r o p e r  c u s t o d i e r  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  d e e d s .  The f a c t s  o f  
t h e  f a m ily  s i t u a t i o n  r e n d e r  d i f f i c u l t  c o m p lia n c e  w i th ,  
o r  p r o o f  o f  c o m p lian c e  w i th ,  r e q u ir e m e n ts  a s  t o  d e l i v e r y ) .  
F u r t h e r ,  i t  was c o m p e te n t f o r  a  s t r a n g e r  t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
t o  e x c lu d e  th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  j u s  m a r i t i . 
when b in d in g  h im s e l f  t o  re p a y  money t o  th e  w i f e ,  o r  in  
a  co n v ey an ce  t o  h e r  o f  p r o p e r ty .
F o r  a  l i t t l e  t im e ,  d o u b t e x i s t e d  a s  t o  w h e th e r  
r e n u n c ia t i o n s  o f  t h e  ju s  m a r i t i  w ere e f f e c t u a l  quoad 
c r e d i t o r s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  w ith  r e g a r d  t o  a c q u ir e n d a  o f  t h e  
w i f e ^ ) ,  i t  b e in g  a rg u e d  t h a t  a  c r e d i t o r  w as e n t i t l e d  
t o  r e l y  on t h e  m a rr ia g e  h a v in g  c o n f e r r e d  upon  th e  
h u sb an d  th e  r i g h t s  i n  th e  no rm al c a s e  endowed upon  
him by t h e  la w , end  t h a t  a  c r e d i t o r  m ig h t j u s t i f i a b l y  
p resum e t h a t  t h e r e  h ad  b een  no d e r o g a t io n  th e r e f r o m , 
i n  t h e  same w ay, p e r h a p s ,  t h a t  th e  p u b l ic  may presum e 
t h a t ,  i n  m a t te r s  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  o r d in a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  a  company ( i t s  " in d o o r  m anagem ent") "om nia  r i t e  ac  
s o le m n i te r  a c t a " ,  ( " t h e  r u l e  i n  T u rq u a n d 's  c a s e "  -  
R oyal B r i t i s h  Bank v* T u rq u a n d » )
W hatever may h av e  b een  th e  m e r i t s  o f  t h i s  a rg u m en t 
i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  soon  becam e c l e a r  t h a t  th e  
r e n u n c ia t i o n  /
1 .  F r . I ,  7 9 1 .2 .  (1856) 6 E , & B. 3 27 .
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r e n u n c i a t i o n  o r  e x c lu s io n  v/as e f f e c t u a l  a g a i n s t  c r e d i t o r s  
( b o th  a s  r e g a r d s  a c q a ^ , i t a  an d  s a u i r e n t o )  and  t h a t  
w i th o u t  I n t im a t io n #  "No p a r t y  h a s  a  r i g h t  t o  assum e t h a t  
a  w if e  was m a r r ie d  w i th o u t  a  m a r r l a g e - o o n t r a o t ,  and  t h a t  
a l l  h e r  p r o p e r ty  m ust h ave  p a s s e d  t o  h e r  h u sb an d  by 
o p e r a t io n  o f  law* P a r t i e s  I n t e r e s t e d  m ust I n q u i r e  
w hat w ere t h e  a c t u a l  o o n d l t io n s  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e # "  ( p o r  
L .O .M aokenzle  i n  R o l lo  v* Ramsay #) H is  L o rd sh ip  i n  
t h a t  c a s e  a l s o  s t a t e d ,  "As t o  i n t i m a t i o n  -  i f  t h e  j u s  
m a r i t i  h ad  b een  e x p r e s s ly  e x c lu d e d , i n t i m a t i o n  o f  suoh 
e x c lu s io n  n e v e r  i s  h e ld  n e c e s s a r y ,  ev en  t o  b a r  th e  
d e b to r s  o f  t h e  w ife  from  p a y in g  t o  th e  h u sb a n d , f a r  
l e a s  t o  e x c lu d e  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d  from  t a k in g  
th e  w i f e 's  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e , "  I n  G r e e n h i l l  v* F o rd ^ , 
th e  r e p o r t e r  n o te s  -  "The c o u r t  w ere  u n a n im o u s ly  o f  
o p in io n ,  t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  o f  th e  m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a c t  
am ounted  t o  a n  e x c lu s io n  o f  t h e  j u s  m a r i t i  a s  t o  th e  
p r o p e r ty  o£ th e  a c g u tre n d a g "
o f  Husband»
M o reo v er, t h e  j u s  m a r i t i  m i^ h t be e x c lu d e d  
a u to m a t i c a l l y  and  i n v o l u n t a r i l y  by  r e a s o n  o f  a  change  
i n  th e  s t a t u s  o f  th e  h u sb a n d . T h is  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g ,  i n  
v iew  o f  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  th e  j u s  m a r i t^  w here  i t  had  n o t  
b e e n  e x c lu d e d  by a g re e m e n t o r  t h i r d  p a r t y  deed#  "So 
o m n ip o te n t a r e  th e  h u s b a n d 's  pow ers r e g a rd e d  by t h e  la w , 
and  8 0  s t r o n g l y  fo u n d ed  i s  t h e  m a r l t ^ # t h a t  i t  w ould 
n o t  be e x c lu d e d , a l th o u g h  th e  w ife  s h o u ld  be  In d u ce d  t o  
e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  by f r a u d u le n t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
a s  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c h a r a c t e r  o r  h i s  c ir c u m s ta n c e s ^ # "
I n  /
1# (1 8 3 2 ) 11 8# 132» The L # 0 # 's  judgm en t i s  p r i n t e d  a sa  n o te  i n  t h e  r e p o r t ,  and  p a r t  o f  i t  i s  q u o te d  by  M urray  a t  p# 21#2# (1 8 2 4 ) 3 8# 1 6 9 .3# F r . I ,  7 7 8 , w here i s  c i t e d  L is k  v .  L . M# 5865 and 5887 (1785 )#
4 4 #
I n  t h a t  oase*  a  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s ,  and  ev en  th e  husband  
h im a e l f ,  p r o f i t i n g  from  h la  own "c rim e "  ( a  r e s u l t  
s u r e l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  o f  o t h e r  p r i n c i p l e a  o f  law  
e ls e w h e re  so  p ro u d ly  h e ld  ) m ig h t h av e  a l l  t h e  r i g h t s  
w h ich  an y  h u sb a n d , o r  h i s  c r e d i t o r ,  m ig h t e n jo y  o v e r  
th e  w i f e 's  p ro p e r ty #
H ow ever, t h e  p re s u m p tio n  t h a t  a l l  t h e  w i f e ' s  
m oveab les a u to m a t i c a l l y  b e lo n g e d  t o  th e  husband  by 
v i r t u e  o f  th e  s i l e n t  a s s i g n a t i o n  m a r i t ! * w hich  h a s
b e e n  s e e n  t o  h av e  b e en  e s t a b l i s h e d  n o t  t o  b e  i r r e b u t t a b l e  
i f  t h e r e  was r e a s o n a b le  e v id e n c e  t o  i n d i c a t e  a  h u s b a n d 'spr e n u n c ia t i o n  o f  h i s  r i g h t s  o v e r  th e m " , was shown a l s o  
t o  be  a b le  t o  b e  overcom e i n  th e  c a s e  o f  t h e  b a n k ru p tc y  
o f  th e  h u sb an d  #
On t h e  o t h e r  hand* a  v o lu n ta r y  s e p a r a t i o n  d id  n o t  
a f f e c t  t h e  J u s  «!&&&» and  a o g u lZ B É â  o f  t h e  w ife  a f t e r  
th e  s e p a r a t i o n  s t i l l  f e l l  t o  th e  husb an d  j u r e  m a r i t i#  
In d e e d , ev en  a  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t io n  d id  n o t  denude th e  
husb an d  o f  h i s  m a r i t a l  r i g h t s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  
p ro p e r ty #  A l l  h e r  m oveable  p r o p e r ty  f e l l  t o  him  a s  i f  
th e y  c o h a b i te d  s t i l l ^ #  The r u l e  was b a se d  on th e  
l o g i c a l  g ro im d s t h a t ,  t o  a n  in n o c e n t  t h i r d  p a r t y ,  a  
c r e d i t o r ,  o r  th e  w o rld  a t  l a r g e ,  v o lu n ta r y  and  j u d i c i a lKs e p a r a t io n  lo o k  th e  same# A cco rd in g  t o  H u n te r  ,  a c t i o n s  
and  d e e d s  r e q u i r e d  t o  be  ju d g e d  by th e  n e c e s s i t y  o r  
e x p e d ie n c y  o f  a c t i n g  when th e  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  h u sb an d  
c o u ld  n o t  be  o b t a in e d ,  n o t  by th e  t e n o r  o f  a  d e c re e  
w h ich  d id  n o t ,  in v o lv e
a  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  o u r e t o r i a l  pow er*
S c o ts  /
1# Cf# e#g# I n  C ora  C r ip p e n  [1 9 1 1 ] E#108 ( I t  i s  n o ts u g g e s t e d r % ^  th e  c rim e  a g a i n s t  th e  w if e  was co m p a rab le )  2# See S m ith  v# S m i th 's  T r s . ,  su p ra#3# Boaz V# Loudon (1829 ) 7 8#5b5#4# The p o s i t i o n  was changed  by th e  C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  (S c# )Amendment A c t ,  1861, a*6 ( i n f r a # pp# 7 6-7 7, and see also s.5).5# H u n te r ,  L a n d lo rd  and  T e n a n t, 3 rd  edn# I ,  158 ; th ep a s s a g e  i s  c o n c e rn e d  m a in ly  w ith  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g l i t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o v e r  h i s  w i f e 's  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r t y .
4 5 .
S o o ts  law  h e re  was fo u n d  t o  be  i n  communion w ith  
E n g l i s h ,  a s  c a n  he s e e n  from  tw o E n g lis h  o a se #  * from  
w hich  I t  l a  c l e a r  t h a t ,  th o u g h  th e  huahand  an d  w ife  be  
d iv o r c e d  a  menaa a t  t h o r o  ( b e in g  e q u iv a le n t  t o  a  
S c o t t i s h  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n ,  no t r u e  d iv o r c e  b e in g  
found  i n  E n g la n d  t i l l  1 8 5 7 ^ ) , n e v e r th e l e s s  i f  a 
l e g a c y  was b e q u e a th e d  t o  th e  w i f e ,  th e  h u sb an d  a lo n e  
o o u ld  d i s c h a r g e  i t ;  " c o n s e q u e n t ly  t o  him  a lo n e  i t  l a  
p a y a b le ,"  and  the wife h ad  t o  r e l y  on h e r  h u s b a n d 'a  
g o o d w il l  and  o o n a o le n c e  f o r  i t a  d e l i v e r y  t o  h e r .
I t  s h o u ld  be n o te d  t h a t  t h e r e  waa s u p p o r t  f o r  
a  d i f f e r e n t  v iew  from  t h a t  ta k e n  by H u n te r^ , and  t h i s  
w as t h a t  j u d i c i a l  a e p a r a t io n  o p e r a te d  a s  a  s t r i p p i n g  
from  th e  h u sb an d  o f  h i s  c u r a t o r i a l  p o w er, an d  t h a t  th e  
d i s p e n s in g  w ith  h i#  c o n s e n t  was a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  
" so m e th in g  m ore th a n  m ere a c t u a l  n o n - c o h a b i ta t io n  o f  
t h e  s p o u s e s ,  an d  c o n s e q u e n t d i f f i c u l t y  o f  o b t a in in g  
t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n se n t^ # "
G e n e r a l ly ,  s a i d  F r a s e r ^ ,  i t  was f e l t  t h a t  a  w ife
i n  su c h  a  c a s e  o o u ld  a c t  w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t ,
yet Pothler's view was that her d e ed s  m ust be c o n f in e d  
t o  a c t s  o f  s im p le  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o r  m anagem ent and  t h a t
sh e  was n o t  e n t i t l e d  t o  a l i e n a t e  o r  b u rd e n  h e r
p r o p e r ty  /
1, Stephens v* Totty, E liz *  908 & M oore, 665, &
H o y ,  4 5 ; Green v, O tte  1 81m, and Stu, 2 5 0 , c i t e d  by Fraser i n  the 1846 e d i t i o n  b u t  n o t  i n  that o f  
1 8 7 6 .
2 .  M a tr im o n ia l  C auses A c t ,  1857* P r i o r  t o  t h a t  A c t, d iv o r c e  a  v in c u lo  matrimonii c o u ld  be obtained i n  England o n T ^ rR T l^ Ie rp ro I^ ^  l y  e x p e n s iv e  means o fa  Private A ct o f  P a r l ia m e n t*  See "A C e n tu ry  o f  Family Law 1857-1957" ( e d i t o r s ;  R,H,Ciraveson and P .R .C r a n e ) .  C h a p te r  1 3 , "M a trim o n ia l R e l i e f  i n  E n g l i s h  Law ",G.E.P. Davies, e s p e c i a l l y  pp*315-317,3* i* e #  t h a t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  rem a in e d  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  w i f e ' s  acts of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of her p r o p e r ty  a f t e r  j u d i c i a l  separation, See supra* fn * 5 , p # 4 4 .4* Fr.I, 431 (1st edn,),5 .  I ,  431 -432  ( 1 s t  e d n * ) .
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p r o p e r ty  w ith  d e b t  n o t  r e n d e r e d  n e o e s s a ry  f o r  h e r  
a l im e n t .  L ord  F r a s e r  reoommended a s  t h e  b e s t  an sw er 
t h a t ,  a e  t h i s  d o u b t e x i s t e d ,  a p p l i c a t i o n  s h o u ld  be made 
t o  t h e  o o u r t  t o  a u t h o r i s e  a  o u r a t o r  t o  o o n o u r w ith  th e  
w if e  i n  g r a n t in g  l e a s e s #  u p l i f t i n g  bonds# o r  i n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  m anagem ent o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e .
A d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  therefore, was made at this 
p o in t  between the incidents of t h e  husband's administrative 
and curatorial p o w er, and th e  (non) e f f e c t  upon p r o p e r ty  
falling u n d e r  the j u s  m a r i t i  of a decree of judicial 
s e p a r a t i o n .  The m a t t e r  was r e s o lv e d  by t h e  1861 A c t ,
8 .6  (w here  t h e  w ife  o b ta in e d  th e  d e c re e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n :  
w here th e  husb an d  was t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  p u rs u e r#  h i s  r i g h t s  
o v e r  h e r  p r o p e r ty  rem a in e d ) a n d , by s . 5 ,  t h e  same e f f e c t  
a t t e n d e d  t h e  g r a n t  t o  a w if e  o f  a  P r o p e r ty  P r o t e c t io n  
O rd e r .
Where t h e r e  o c c u r re d  t h e  c i v i l  d e a th  o f  th e  husb an d  
(for e x am p le , by outlawry o r  co n d em n atio n  to t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) ,  
h i s  curatorial pow er was a n n i h i l a t e d ^ , but t h e  position 
w ith  r e g a r d  t o  h i s  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r ty  o v e r  h i s  w i f e ' s  
m o v eab les  was l e s s  c l e a r ,  a l th o u g h  a  w ife  m ig h t h av e  b e en  
f o r g iv e n  f o r  v ie w in g  the distinction w ith  a cynical aye.
I n  th e  case of o u t la w ry ,  the p u n ish m en t ( i n  the pocket) 
was f o r f e i t u r e  o f  a l l  t h e  m oveab les o f  t h e  hu sb an d  t o  
the Grown u n d e r  th e  s i n g l e  escheat. Thus, t h e  husband's 
r i g h t  o f  j u s  m a r i t i  a l s o  w ould  be e x c lu d e d  d u r in g  h i s  
o u tla w ry #  and there was p u n ish m en t f o r  the w ife  too, as 
h e r  moveable p r o p e r ty ,  and th e  rents and p r o f i t s  t h e r e o f ,  
w ould p a s s ,  w i th  h i s  p r o p e r t y ,  t o  t h e  Crown.
T h is  c o n seq u e n ce  fo l lo w e d  upon e v e ry  c a s e  w here
k
b u t  /
pt h e  s i n g l e  e s c h e a t  came i n t o  e f f e c t  upon  c o n v ic t i o n  #
1 .  " A n n ih i la te d "  I s  u se d  by F r a s e r  I ,  780# i n  r e l a t i o nt o  o u tla w ry #  p e n a l  s e r v i t u d e  o r  co n d em n atio n  t o  c a p i t a l  p u n ish m en t b u t  p e rh a p s  " su sp en d e d "  is t h e  more a p p r o p r i a t e  word# a t  l e a s t  i n  c a s e s  i n  w hich  t h e  husband  c o u ld  r e g a in  h i s  l o s t  s t a t u s ,  f o r  th e n  t h e  l u s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s  a r o s e  once m ore; s e e  i n f r a #  p .  jy .
2. E xam ples: 2 Hume# 473# ( F r . I * 7 8 0 ) .
47.
b u t  t h e r e  was d o u b t a s  t o  t h e  outcom e ( a s  r e g a r d s  th e  
ju s  m a r i t i ) w here  t h e  h usband  was c o n v ic te d  o f  a  c rim e  
upon  w h ich  t h e  s i n g l e  e s c h e a t  d id  n o t  f a l l ^ .  F u r t h e r ,  
t h e  q u e s t io n  a r o s e  w h e th er#  i f  th e  c r im e  w ere  n o t  so  
s e r i o u s  a s  t o  im p o r t  l o s s  o f  s t a t u s  and  c i v i l  d e a th ,  
w ould t h e  w i f e ,  i n  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  a b se n c e  ( i n  p r i s o n ) ,  
b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  a c t ,  and  w ould  h e ,  on h i s  r e t u r n ,  be  
bound t o  r e c o g n is e  a c t s  done d u r in g  t h a t  p e r io d  w hich  
a f f e c t e d  h i s  p a t r im o n ia l  i n t e r e s t s ?
Once a g a in ,  r e s o r t  c o u ld  be had  t o  t h e  e x p e d ie n t  
o f  h a v in g  th e  c o u r t  a u t h o r i s e  th e  w i f e 's  a c t  o r  th e  
a p p o in tm e n t o f  a  o u r a t o r  t o  a c t  i n  t h e  I n t e r i m ,  b u t  
F r a s e r  fa v o u re d  th e  o p in io n  o f  P r o f e s s o r  More t h a t ,  i n  
th e  e a s e  o f  b a n ish m e n t ( a t  l e a s t )  ,  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
c u r a t o r i a l  pow er was i n  a b ey an ce  f o r  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  and  
once  r e t u r n e d ,  he  to o k  up th e  r e i n s  o f  g u b e r n a to r  a g a in ,  
b u t  t h a t  h e  o o u ld  n o t  im pugn th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  any  a c t s  
done by  h i s  w ife  d u r in g  h i s  a b s e n c e ^ . I t  d o e s  a p p e a r  
t h a t  when th e  h u sb an d  r e tu r n e d  from  p r i s o n  (a n d  i f  p r i s o n ,  
wiiy n o t  upon  la w fu l  r e t u r n  from  e x i l e ? )  h e  to o k  up th e  
r e i n s ,  w h ich  he  m ig h t be s a i d  t o  have  l e t  s l i p  i n  t h e  
i n t e r im  b e c a u se  o f  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  an d  th e  
p r o p e r ty  i t s e l f #  T h a t w ould seem t o  b e  t h e  n a t u r a l  
p r i v a t e  r e s u l t  o f  h i s  p u b l ic  r e - in s t a te m e n t#
I f  t h e  h u sb an d  becam e in s a n e ,  th e  r i g h t  o f%a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  te r m in a te d /#
The e f f e c t  o f  a n  e x c lu s io n  o r  r e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  
th e  ju s  m a r i t i  was t h a t  th e  w i f e 's  m oveable e s t a t e  
becam e, o r  re m a in e d , h e r  own p r o p e r ty ,  b u t ,  u n l e s s  
t h e r e  was a l s o  e x c lu s io n  o r  r e n u n c ia t i o n  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
j u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s ,  t h e  v i c t o r y  was no t r u e  v i c t o r y  f o r  
t h e  w i f e ,  n o r  o o u ld  sh e  be s a i d  t o  e n jo y  th e  e s s e n t i a l s  
o f  /
1 . F r .  I ,  7 8 0 -7 8 1 ,2 .  See g e n e r a l l y  F r . I ,  818-819 ,3 .  F r . I ,  8 1 9 , 5 4 8 ,
4 8 .
o f  o w n e rsh ip . The tw in  r i g h t s  o f  t l ie  h u sb an d  w ere  
d i s t i n c t  from  e a c h  o t h e r  and  s e v e ra b le #  th o u g h  i n  th e  
c a a e  o f  m oveable  p r o p e r ty  o v e r  w hich  th e  i u s  m a r i t i*' — »3rï«y:MB;S3a is u b s is te d *  th e  i u s  a d m in ia t r a t io n lB  o o u ld  n o t  be Been #
T h u s , u n l e s s  b o th  r i g h t s  w ere rem oved by a g re e m e n t, th e  
w ife  was n o t  u n f e t t e r e d  i n  h e r  c o n t r o l  o f  w h a t was h e r  
own, h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  b e in g  n e c e s s a r y  t o  any  a c t  
o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  a s  much i f i t h  r e g a r d  t o  h e r  m oveable 
p r o p e r ty  a s  i t  a lw ay s  h ad  b een  w ith  r e g a r d  t o  h e r  
h e r i t a g e ^ .
Ju 8  M a r i t i ;  J u s  A d m in is t r a t io n i sIf» 4?^. MS. *.<# 1.!» «13» er. «Î* e* «5» W. ÇR# «I» .*• *i*« «lip «*7» É?1 «i* «. *» *3» ^
The Jas ijaritl was a right of property? t h e  .jus 
administrationis, as its name suggests, was a right o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  w i f e ' s  e s t a t e ,  b o th  h e r i t a b l e  and  
m oveable# The tw o r i g h t s  w ere  d i a t i n c t ,  th o u g h  th e  
tei^ma w ere  c o n fu s e d  on o c c a s io n ^ #  As t o  t h e  l a t t e r ,  
P o u n t a i n h a l l 's  g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  (u s e d  i n  n a r r a t i n g  
th e  r e c l a i m e r 's  a rg u m e n t) -  t h a t  sh e  came u n d e r  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  " h e a d s h ip  and  g u b e m a t iv e  a d m i n i s t r a t io n "  -  
i s  c o n v e n ie n t  and  h a s  b e en  q u o te d  often^*^#
The /
1 .  F r . I ;  797s l a S lÈ )  P»2 .  See g e n e r a l l y ,  upon  e x c lu s io n  o f  t l ie  j u ^  m q ri'{:i* by r e a s o n  o f  a  ch an g e  o f  s t a t u s  i n  t h e  husBan{f^"n^r#I.778""781.3# T h is  p o i n t  i s  t a k e n  by F r a s e r  a t  I*  6 7 6 -7 7 ; s e e  a l s o  P a to n ,  p ,1 0 0 ;  H u n te r ,  L a n d lo rd  and  T e n a n t ,  1 ,1 5 7 , w here h e  c i t e s  a s  a n  I l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  o l d e r  a t t i t u d e  t o  th e  te r m s ,  S t a i r ,  1 ,  4 ,  9 ,  and  B r o d i e 's  n o te  th e r e o n ,( f o o tn o te  a ,  p .3 0 ,  4 th  e d n * ) ,4 .  See e . g .  M u rray , p . 7 ;  P a to n ,  p # 9 9 . The p h r a s e  i s  ta k e n  from  th e  c a s e  o f  G ordon v ,  C am p b e ll, D e c s , ! ! ,  p*220 .I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  P o u n ta in h a l l ,  i n  n a r r a t i n g  th e  r e c l a i m e r 's  a rg u m e n t, u s e d  a l s o  t h e  E n g l i s h  e x p r e s s io n ,  "femme c o v e r te "  ( s e e  M u rray , p . 4 ,  f n , 4 ) ,  and  th e  e x p r e s s io n  "v e s t i t a  y:( r ^ " * The s u b s ta n c e  o f  t h e  c a s e  c o n o e rn e d  t Æ T 3 a b i l I ï y " o f  a  h u sb an d  t o  m eet th e  h e r i t a b l e  d e b ts  o f  h i s  w i f e ,  i t  b e in g  d e c id e d  h e r e  t h a t  th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  th e  w i f e ' s  d e b ts  l a y  i n  t h e  n o t io n  o f  communion o f  p r o p e r t y ,  n o t  s im p ly  i n  th e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  husb an d  f o r  t h e  w ife  by re a s o n  o f  t h e  h e a d s h ip  w h ich  h e  assum ed on m a r r ia g e .  T h u s, t h e  h usband  %ms h e ld  l i a b l e  o n ly  f o r  t l i e  a n n u a l  r e n t s ,  n o t  f o r  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  sum s, o f  h i s  w i f e 's  h e r i t a b l e  d e b t s ,  su c h  a  s i t u a t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d in g  t o  t h e  r i g h t s  u n d e r  th e  "com m union", so  te rm e d .
4 9 ,
The j u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s  quoad m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  
a ro s e  o n ly  w here  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  had  b een  e x c lu d e d , s in c e*34a^3Mwe»fcuih,‘*s;.«». *
I f  t h e r e  had  b een  no su ch  e x c lu s io n  t h e  h u sb an d  
a d m in is te r e d  t h a t  p a r t  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  " p r o p e r ty "  a s  
p r o p r i e t o r  th e r e o f #  "When th e  j u s  m a r i t i  h a s  b e e n  b a r r e d ,  
he  m anages t h e  p r o p e r ty  a s  c a B A ^ J I ^ l a S a & . l a m W a S ,  
i n  v i r t u e  o f  h i a  r i g h t  o f  a d m in is t r a t io n #  F o r ,  
n o tw i th s ta n d in g ,  t h a t  th e  j u s  m p r i^ i  be e x p r e s s ly  
re n o u n c e d  o r  d e b a r r e d ,  t h i s  d o es n o t  e x c lu d e  th e  s e p a r a t e  
and  d i s t i n c t  r i g h t  o f  a d m in is t r a t io n ^ # "
T h u s, e v e ry  a c t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  w liioh c o n c e rn e d  
t h e  w i f e ' s  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  ( i n  t h i s  c o n te x t ,  h e r i t a g e  
was p r i n c i p a l l y  o o n o e m e d : su ch  %ms th e  n a tu r e  o f
p a r a p h e r n a l i a ,  l i t t l e  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  t h e r e o f  was n e c e s s a r y ,  
and  many w ives m ig h t n e v e r  e n jo y  p e c u liu m  o r  p in -m o n ey , 
th e  u s e s  t o  w h ich  th e  l a t t e r  a t  l e a s t  m ig h t b e  p u t  b e in g  
o irc u m s o r ib e d  i n  any  e v e n t)  r e q u i r e d  th e  h J is b a n d 's  c o n s e n t ,  
th o u g h  "he  was bound t o  e x e r c i s e  h i s  pow ers i n  h e r 2i n t e r e s t s  and  c o u ld  n o t  a r b i t r a r i l y  r e f u s e  h i s  c o n s e n t" # "
%M urray  s a y s^  t h a t  th e  w i f e 's  c i v i l '  c a p a c i ty  was 
su sp e n d e d  by th e  m a r r ia g e  and  t h a t  sh e  becam e p r a c t i c a l l y  
a  m in o r , n o t ,  h e  a d d s ,  by  re a s o n  o f  w an t o f  a  d i s p o s in g  
m in d , a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  m in o r , b u t  from  w an t o f  
d i s p o s in g  p o w er, a  m ethod o f  e x p re s s in g  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
w h ich  he  s a y s  i s  E n g l i s h ,  b u t  i s  e q u a l ly  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
S c o t la n d # /
1* F r . I ,  797#2# P a to n ,  p#104*
3# p # 1 3 , w here  t h e  a u th o r  c i t e s  L u sh , M a rr ie d  Women'sR ig h ts  and  L i a b i l i t i e s  (L ondon , 1 8 8 7 ) , p * 2 6 , and F r a s e r ,  I ,  517 (w here  L ord  F r a s e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  o f f i c e  i s  " c e r t a i n l y  ## . s u i  j^ e n e ^ s "  ( p a r t a k in g  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  b o th T lE u t ;o r " '3 ^ c u r a to r ) )  and  5 2 0 ; s e e  a l s o  P r # I ,  796 ("T h e  r i g h t  i s  one o f  a  p e c u l i a r  n a tu r e "  # ,#  and  s p r in g s  n o t  from  d e f e c t  o f  
c a p a c i t y .  L u t b e c a u se  " th e r e  i s  a  n e c e s s i t y ,  from  th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  t h a t  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  m anagem ent, and  c o n t r o l  sh o u ld  be i n  t h e  h an d s  o f  one o f  t h e  tw o p a r t i e s # "
50.
S c o tla n d #
Hence* i t  was n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a  w ife  t o  o b t a in  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  b e f o r e  " s u in g  d e b to r s *  d ra w in g  th e  
r e n t s  o f  h e r  h e r i t a g e ,  g r a n t in g  d is c h a rg e s *  e x e c u t in g  
d i s p o s i t i o n s #  I n  s h o r t ,  e v e ry  a c t  o f  m anagem ent o f  
t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  w i f e 's  p r o p e r ty ,  n o t  c a r r i e d  t o  h im s e l f ,  
i n  v i r t u e  o f  h i s  j u s  m a r i t i ,  m ust be  s a n c t io n e d  w ith  
h i s  c o n c u r re n c e  #" She c o u ld  n o t  su e  o r  b e  su e d  i n  
r e s p e o t  o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  w ith o u t  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o fph e r  husband* " t o  f o r t i f i e *  a s s i s t ,  and a u th o r i z e  h i r  #"
I t  can  be s e e n  t h a t  l i t t l e  sc o p e  was l e f t  t o  t h e  w ife  
f o r  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  i n i t i a t i v e  o r  f o r  in d e p e n d e n t  a c t i o n  
i n  m a t t e r s  c o n c e rn in g  h e r  own p ro p e r ty #
The h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  was n e c e s s a r y ,  b u t  i t  was 
n o t  a lw ay s s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b a r  r e d u c t io n #  I t  d id  n o t
o p e r a te  t o  rem edy ( o t h e r )  d e f e c t s #  As h ap p en ed  i n%G ibson  V, Scoon ,  t h e  p le a  o f  enorm l e s i o n  w ould  
o b t a i n ,  i n  s u i t a b l e  c irc u m s ta n c e s *  even  th o u g h  th e  
h u sb an d  was a  c o n s e n te r  t o  t h e  d e e d , and  th e  w ife  w ould 
be  e n t i t l e d  t o  h av e  th e  c o n t r a c t  re d u c e d  w i t h in  th e  
u t i l e #
I f  t h e  h u sb an d  was u n a b le  o r  u n w i l l in g  t o  g iv e  
h i s  c o n s e n t ,  i n  l i t i g a t i o n  by h i s  w ife  o r  t o  d e fe n d  i n  
a n  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  h e r*  t h e  C o u rt w ould a p p o in t  a  ourator'*^# 
r^u rray  p o i n t s  out'^  t h a t  th e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  law  o f  t h e  
h u sb an d  /
1# F r# I*  797#2# B a l f o u r ,  P r a c t i c k s ,  p # 9 3 .
3# 6 June*  1809* P#C#4# See M ackenzie  v .  M 's T rs#  (1878 ) 5 R #1027, i n  w h ichth e  m in o r husband* whose d o m ic i le  was E n g lish *  su ed  
w i th  h i s  m a jo r  w ife*  a s  a  o o n s e n te r  t o  t h e  a c t i o nand  f o r  h i s  own i n t e r e s t ,  and  i n  w h ich  t h e  C ourt*b e f o r e  d i s p o s in g  o f  th e  c ase *  a p p o in te d  a  c u r a t o r  ad  l l t e ^ ^  t o  c o n s id e r  th e  p ro c e e d in g s  (a n d  th e  te rm s  
01  a  p ro p o se d  d e ed ) i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u re  t h a t  no p r e j u d i c e  h ad  b e en  done t o  th e  w i f e ,  and  t h a t  a l l  h ad  b e en  " p r o p e r ly  c o n d u c te d  i n  h e r  i n t e r e s t # "
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husb an d  was a p p e n d a n t t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  h u sb an d  and 
w ife  and  n o t  t o  th e  p e rso n *  I n  th e  a b se n c e  o f  p r i v a t e  
ag reem en t#  th e  r u l e  d id  n o t  bend t o  m eet t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  
o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  case #  H is  exam ple i s  t h a t  a  m atu re  
woman ag ed  f i f t y #  on  m a rry in g  a  c a llo w  l a d  o f  tw e n ty  o n e , 
w ould  come u n d e r  h i s  c u r a t o r i a l  w ing ^p so  j u r e  and  l o s t  
im m e d ia te ly  h e r  r i g h t  t o  d e a l  u n f e t t e r e d  w i th  h e r  
p r o p e r t y .  I f  h e r  h usband  had  b een  m inor* h i s  own 
o u r a t o r  w ould have  had  t o  c o n c u r  i n  h i s  c o n c u r re n c e  w ith 1any  p ro p o se d  a c t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  c o n c e rn in g  h e r  e s t a t e  ,
W here t h e  ^lus m a r i t i  was ex c lu d ed #  b u t  th e  r i g h t  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was n o t#  a l th o u g h  e v e ry  a c t  o f  m anagem ent 
by  th e  w ife  h a d  t o  be  p e rfo rm ed  w ith  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  h e r  
husband# n e v e r t h e l e s s  sh e  was " e n t i t l e d  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  
a l l  h e r  p r o p e r ty  ( s h a l l )  b e  a p p l ie d  f o r  h e r  own b eh o o f^ # "  
I t  i s  c l e a r  th a t#  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  th e  
j u s  m a r i t i » h e  r e t a i n e d  th e  c h i e f  m anagem ent o f  h e r  e s t a t e ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  " h e r  s e c u r i t y  a g a i n s t  h i s  Im p ro v id en ce#  o r  
h i s  m is fo r tu n e #  was n o t  o om ple tc^"#  b u t  F r a s e r  n o te s  t h a t  
sh e  s t i l l  h a d 'a  rem edy , S in c e  h e r  husb an d  vms h e r  
m anager# sh e  m ig h t r e q u i r e  him  t o  f i n d  c a u t io n  f o r  h i s  
in t r o m is s io n s  and  c o u n se l#  w hich  w ould p ro v id e  a  
s a f e g u a r d  f o r  h e r  i f  any  m a la d m in is t r a t io n  on h i s  p a r t  
o c c u r r e d .
However# th e  h u sb an d  c o u ld  o n ly  c o n se n t*  and  c o u ld  
do no  more* He c o u ld  n o t  I n i t i a t e  an  a c t i o n ,  o r  su e  
w i th o u t  h e r  c o n s e n t^ .  E a r l i e r  j u d i c i a l  o p in io n  was 
t h a t  g e n e r a l l y  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t ,  i f  g iv e n  o n ly  a f t e r  
t h e  e v en t#  came to o  l a t e #  b u t  t h i s  v ie w , i n  th e  e ig h te e n th  
c e n tu r y  /
1 .  F r # I ,  517*2 ,  F r . I ,  7 9 7 ,3* F r . I ,  7 9 8 .4 .  B aton* p*104 ; ( s e e ,  f o r  an  e a r l y  exam ple o f  th e  r u l e ,  M e iv i l l  v# Dumbar 1566# M .5993)*
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1century# was r e v e r s e d  *
In this s p h e r e# as in others# a choice had to be 
made between an onerous and innocent third party, and 
a  person who granted or consented to a deed In ignorance 
o r  through fear, and until 1841, a wife who could 
establish that a deed had been extorted from her by her 
husband* vi et m etu , could have the deed reduced*
Judicial Ratification, «M «Mi KMi 4
Thereafter an expedient, first seen In Glen v#PDanieXston"# and seized upon im m e d ia te ly  by the 
legislature , was e v o lv e d , this being the device that 
the wife ratify the deed (being a deed relating to her 
ovm estate granted by her in f a v o u r  of a third party) 
in the absence of her husband (vital) before a judge 
(usually, latterly at any rate, a Justice of the Peace). 
The ratification formed a security to the third party, 
w h ic h , if adopted by him, safeguarded his position, and, 
if not adopted by him, had the result of allowing her to 
have the deed re d u c e d  if she could establish that force 
and fear had been imposed on her by her husband* (Erskine 
on the other hand,(1, 6, 34)seems to consider that after 
ratification, and extract thereof, the wife is "for ever 
cut off from her right of impeaching th e  deed r a t i f i e d "  
even though she has the clearest evidence of having been  
compelled to grant it). In other words, he does not take 
Fraser's "adoption" distinction# The lack of judicial 
ratification per se did not render the deed null, though,«JSi«*rïY*  ^ ^
as /
1.  ibM# I t  is not quite clear from B a to n 's  w r i t i n gw E eS ier he intends t h i s  comment to relate to the situation where both rights of the hu sb an d  re m a in e d , o r  o n ly  the jiis mariti but the strong inference of 
t h e  p a s s a g e  is that he means the statement to describe the g e n e r a l  position (both rights intact)* He remarks that the husband could dispense with t h e  wife's consent o n ly  where she refused it in connection with property falling under the jus 2# 6 Mar* 1841# 820* See generally Fr#I,819-823*3* Act 1841, 0*83*
a s  F r a s e r  com m enta, t h e  l a c k  w ould he a  u s e f u l  weapon
i n  t h e  w i f e ' s  a rm o u ry , I f  im p o r ta n t  I n t e r e s t s  o f  h e r s1h ad  b een  com prom ised by t h e  d e ed  *
I t  %ms fo und  t h a t  t h e  l e a n in g  was I n  f a v o u r  o f  
th e  w i f e ,  p a r t l y  b e c a u se  o f  " th e  f a v o u r s  b e s to w ed  on 
th e  s e x " ,  and  p a r t l y  b e c a u se  " th e  law  p resu m es t h a t  
d e e d s  m a n i f e s t ly  p r e j u d i c i a l  have  b een  I n v o lu n ta r y "  
(a n d  F r a s e r  n o te s  t h a t  B e l l ' s  o p in io n  was t h a t  w ant 
o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  r a i s e d  a  p re s u m p tio n  t h a t  t h e  d e ed s  
h ad  b een  e x e c u te d  u n d e r  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  in f lu e n c e ^ ) #
A d o p te d (? )  r a t i f i c a t i o n  b a r r e d  f o r  e v e r  any  p le a  
by th e  w i f e ,  no m a t te r  how s t r o n g  and  o o n v ln o in g  h e r  
t e s t im o n y ,  t h a t  sh e  a c te d  o r  gave h e r  c o n s e n t  u n d e r  
d u r e s s  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d , and  t h a t  a l th o u g h  th e  h usband  
had  p r o f i t e d  by th e  t r a n s a c t i o n ^ .  What th e n  was th e  
e f f e c t  o f  a  r a t i f i c a t i o n  i t s e l f  p u r p o r te d ly  e x to r t e d ?
E rs k in e  m a in ta in s ,  p e r s u a s iv e ly ^ ,  t h a t  t h e  law  
w i l l  n o t  a c c e p t  su c h  a  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t  an  o f f e r  t o  
p ro v e  t h a t  a  w ife  r a t i f i e d  ex  v l  a u t  m etu  o f  th e  
hu sb an d  was r e f u s e d  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  G ra n t v* - ,  (1642 ) 
and th e  t e n o r  o f  F r a s e r 's  d i s c u s s io n ^  o f  a u t h o r i t y  i s  
a g a i n s t  E r s k l n e 's  v ie w , A d o p ted (? ) r a t i f i c a t i o n  d id  
n o t  b a r  t h e  w ife  from  a t t a c k i n g  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  
p r i n c i p a l  d eed  on o t h e r  g ro u n d s sudh  a s  f r a u d  o r  
i n t i m i d a t i o n  /
1* S m ith  o r  Mayne v* McKeand, 4  Ju n e  1 8 3 5 , 7 J u r i s t ,  3 9 7 ; c i t e d  by F r a s e r  I ,  8 2 1 ,
2* P r i n ,  1613; F r a s e r  ib id #3 .  B rsk , 1 ,  6 ,  3 5 ,
4 #  E rsk#  1 ,  6 ,  3 4 ,
5 .  M ,16, 4 8 3 .6# F r . I ,  8 2 2 -3 .
5 4 #
i n t i m i d a t i o n  (o n  th e  p a r t  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  p re su m ab ly ^ )#
The C onveyanc ing  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t , 1 9 2 4 ^ , s# 2 0  p r o v id e s  
t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be  no o b j e c t i o n  t o  any  d e e d , r e l a t i n g  t o  
l a n d  o r  n o t ,  g r a n te d  o r  c o n c u r re d  i n  by a  m a r r ie d  woman, 
b e f o r e  o r  a f t e r  th e  commencement o f  t h e  A c t , t h a t  i t  
h ad  n o t  b een  j u d i c i a l l y  r a t i f i e d  by h e r ,  b u t  i n  a  s e n s e  
t h a t  had  a lw ay s  b e en  so# The d e v ic e  was one t o  
s a f e g u a r d  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  and  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t r a n s a c t i o n s
w i th  m a r r ie d  women# I t  was n e v e r  th e  c a s e  t h a t  an%u n r a t i f i e d  d eed  was n u l l^ #  The s e c t i o n  m e re ly  r e f l e c t s  
t h e  new p o s i t i o n  ( t h e  j u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s  h ad  b e en  
a b o l i s h e d  f o u r  y e a r s  b e fo r e  by  th e  M a rr ie d  Women's 
P r o p e r ty ^  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , s# 1 ) and  s e t s  " j u d i c i a l  
r a t i f i c a t i o n "  i n  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t iv e ^ *
As h appened  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  th e  ^ u s  m a r i t i .  t h e  
o l d e r  w r i t e r s  d e c l a r e d  th e m s e lv e s  t o  be  u n e q u iv o c a l ly  
o pposed  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e x c lu s io n  o r  r e n u n c ia t i o n  
o f  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  even  th o u g h  i t  m ig h t 
h a v e  b e en  a c c e p te d  t h a t  t h e  j u s  m a r i t i  c o u ld  be 
re n o u n c e d , " a  h u sb an d  may n o t  ren o u n c e  h i s  r i g h t  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  h e a d s h ip ,  and  m anagem ent; f o r  t h a t  
w ere  t o  un im sband  h im s e l f ,  and  ren o u n c e  th e  p r i v i l e g e  
g iv e n  /
1# F r a a e r ,  i b i d * T h ird  p a r t y  i n t i m i d a t i o n :  E r s k .  1 ,6 ,  3 5 , w Sere a l s o  h e  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  s u b j e c t  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  from  t h a t  o f  th e  r e v o c a b i l i t y  o f  d o n a t io n s  g r a n te d  f o r  lo v e  by  w ife  t o  husband# R a t i f i c a t i o n  
t h e r e ,  s a y s  E r s k in e ,  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e :  " t h e  law  o f  d o n a t io n s  b e tw een  husb an d  and w ife  w ould  t u r n  o u t  a  m ost h u r t f u l  one t o  th e  w i f e ,  vAiose d o n a t io n s  t o  th e  h u sb an d  m ig h t be  made i r r e v o c a b le  by h e r  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  w h ile  t h e  d o n a t io n s  by th e  husband  t o  h e r  w ould s ta n d  e x p o sed  t o  r e v o c a t io n  a l l  h i s  l i f e  lo n g * "S ee  now M.W.P# (8 c * )  A c t, 1920 , s # 5 ,2* 14 & 15 G eo. 5 ,  c#27*3# E rsk#  1 , 6 ,  3 6 .4# 10 & 11 Geo* 5 ,  C.64*
5# See g e n e r a l l y ,  upon  t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  E r s k in e  1 ,  6 ,
3 3 -3 o ; F r # I ,  8 1 9 -8 2 3 , ( " J u d i c i a l  R a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  D eeds by  W ives*")
5 5 .
4g iv e n  him by th e  law s o f  b o th  God and  n a tu r e  ;"  Even 
when r e n u n c ia t i o n  o f  th e  ju s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n l s  beoame 
a c c e p te d ,  i t  was n o t  c o m p e ten t f o r  th e  h u sb an d  so  t o  
denude  h im s e l f  o f  h i s  r i g h t s  a s  t o  abandon  h i s  r o l e  a s  
PM S P S m  f a m m ^ , a n d  so m e th in g  o f  th e  same a t t i t u d e  
b e  i t  r i g h t  o r  w rong p e r s i s t s  to d a y .
F r a s e r  /
1 .  D ic k so n  v ,  B r a id f o o t  1 7 0 5 , M. (w hence q u o ta t i o n  ta k e n )  1 0 ,3 9 6 ; C o l l in g to n  v# C# 1667 , M* 5828;D ick  V .  P i n k h i l l  1 7 0 9 ,M .5 9 9 9 .
I n v o c a t io n  o f  th e  d e i t y  was fo u n d  once  a g a in  t o  be a  u s e f u l  w eapon i n  th e  a rm oury  o f  a  p r i v i l e g e d  c l a s s  i n  d e fe n c e  o f  t h e i r  r i g h t s .
I n  C o l l i n g to n ,  t h e  o p in io n  i s  e x p re s s e d  w i th  f o r c e ,  
t h a t  any  a g re e m e n t t o  t a k e  " th e  pow er and  governm en t o f  t h e  f a m ily  from  th e  h usband  and s t a t i n g  i t  i n  t h e  w i f e ,  i s  c o n t r a  bonos m o re s , and  v o id ,  and  t h a t  th e  ju s  a s  i t  i s  p r o p e r ly  ta k e n  i n  o u r  la w , f o rtE e  S u sE a n d 's  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  w ife * s  m o v e a b le s , b e in g  re n o u n c e d , c a n n o t  be  u n d e rs to o d  t o  r e a c h  t o  th e  r e n u n c ia t i o n  o f  t h e  husband*8  pow er t o  r u l e  h i s  w ife  and  f a m i ly ,  and  to  a d m i n i s t r a t e  t h e  a l im e n t  t h e r e o f , "
S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  D ick  v ,  P i n k h i l l ,  i n  r e p l y  t o  an  e lo q u e n t ly  t o l d  t a l e  o f  woe by th e  d e f e n d e r  ( " s h e  
ack n o w led g es  sh e  h ad  made an  u n f o r tu n a t e  c h o ic e "  ( o f  h u s b a n d ) ,  "who i n  s i x t e e n  m onths t im e  h a s  d i s s i p a t e d  a  g r e a t  p a r t  o f  h e r  m eans and  l i v e l i h o o d ,  t o  h e r  u t t e r  r u i n  and  s t a r v i n g ,  w hat by h i s  c r e d i t o r s *  p o in d in g  and  a r r e s t i n g  a l l ,  and  w hat by h i s  own d ru n k e n n e ss  and  p r o d i g a l i t y ;  and  i f  he  g e t  th e  d i s p o s a l  o f  t h i s  s m a ll  r e s e r v e d  a l im e n t  o f  800 m e rk s , he  w i l l  r e d u c e  h e r  t o  a  c ak e  o f  b r e a d ; " )  i t  was s t a t e d  t h a t ,  "B o th  by t h e  law s o f  God and th e  l a n d ,  t h e  husband  wasand t o  d i v e s t  him  o f  t h a t  p o w er, a n a  i n v e s t  i t  i n  "che w ife  was a g a i n s t  th e  law s o f  n a t u r e ,  and  c o n tr a .b o n o s  m o re s ."  H ow ever, i n  t h a t  c a s e ,  t h e  q u e s ^ o n T o f  w E Io H " l^ r tn e r  sh o u ld  manage t h e  fu n d  i n  q u e s t io n  was r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  L ord P r e s t o n h a l l ,  t h e  R e p o r te r ,  w i th  th e  aim  o f  e x c lu d in g  m is a p p l i c a t i o n  and  sq u a n d e rin g #  The r e s u l t  o f  th e  
R e p o r te ra s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  i s  n o t  d i s c lo s e d  i n  M o rlso n , b u t  i t  i s  t o  be hoped t h a t  p e rh a p s  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  t h e r e  m ig h t h av e  overcom e t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d  was n o t  l e f t  i n  s o l e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n tr o l*
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4F r a s e r  n o te s  t h a t  even  # ie n  th e  n o t io n  o f  d iv in e
o r  p u b l ic  p o l i c y  p r o h i b i t i o n  was abandoned  ( a s  t o  th e
pow er o f  a d m in is te r in g  t h e  p r o p e r ty  a s  opposed  t o  t h e
r o l e  o f  h ead  o f  t h e  f a m i ly ) ,  t h e  o o u r t s  s t i l l  h e s i t a t e d
t o  g iv e  women th e  u n b r id le d  governm ent o f  t h e i r  ovm
a f f a i r s ,  d i s p l a y i n g  an  a t t i t u d e  u n d e rs ta n d a b le  i n  v iew
o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  fe m a le  e d u c a t io n ,  and  la o k  o f  o p p o r tu n i ty
t o  g a in  b u s in e s s  e x p e r ie n c e  ~ b u t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  la c k
o f  e d u c a t io n  an d  e x p e r ie n c e  a  l a c k  e q u a l ly  a f f e c t i n g
t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  u n m a rr ie d  woman and  th e  m a r r ie d  women
d u r in g  v id u i ty *  " t h o u ^  p e rh a p s  n e c e s s i t y  ( th ro u g h
a b se n c e  o f  "coverture") w ould teach them at l e a s t  some
d e g re e  o f  b u s in e s s  acum en"* I n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  j u d i c i a l
p r o c e e d in g s ,  and  d u r in g  th e  c o u rs e  o f  a n  explanation
o f  th e  re q u ire m e n t  t h a t  a m a rr ie d  woman, about to engage
i n  litigation, sh o u ld  have appointed to h e r  a curator
a d  l i t e m  i f  her h usband  could n o t  or w ould n o t  c o n c u r  i n
the action sh e  in te n d e d  to r a i s e ,  F r a s e r  quotes Pothler,
who stated that, "une femme mariée n’a pas la r a i s o n  plus
faible que l e s  f i l l e s  e t  les veuves, q u i n’out pas b e s o in
d ’ a u t o r i s a t i o n "  * The aim  was to e n s u re  t h a t  the w ife  ’ s
suit was managed competently, ("He is curator, not to the
wife, b u t  o f  th e  l i p ; " )  " n o t  so  much f o r  th e  wife a s  f o r
the absent husband" (and, h e n c e , for the other party t o
th e  a c t i o n ) ,  "If he" (the husband ) "be  not a p a r t y  t o
the p r o c e s s  at the i n s t a n c e  o f  or against the w if e ,  th e
other litigant i s  n o t  s a f e ;  and  i n  order to ensure su ch
safety, when the husband w i l l  not c o n c u r ,  the Courtpa p p o in t  a neutral person whose actings bind him #"
I n  Dalryraple v# Murray (1 7 4 5 )^ , the com petence  o f  
e x c lu s io n ,  n o t  o n ly  of the jua m a r i t i . but also of th e  
j u s  aclrainiatrationia, was accepted, though in that c a s e  
i t  /
1* F r * I ,  7 9 8 * 9 ,
2 .  F r . I ,  570*3* M*5842; K i lk e r r a n  v* "H usband and  W ife " , H o .V I I I ,
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I t  l 8  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  th e  e x c lu s io n  waa e f f e c t e d  by 
m eans o f  an  a n te * n u p t l a l  t r u s t  d e e d ,
iBy 1774 , (Annand v ,  C h e s a e ls  ) ,  I t  was w e l l  
r e c o g n is e d  t h a t  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  m ig h t e x c lu d e  by  th e  te rm s  
o f  a  d eed  a  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n l a t r a t i o n  a s  w e l l  
a s  h i s  j u s  m a r i t i ,  and  I t  was a rg u e d  f o r  th e  w ife  t h a t  
t h e  husb an d  h im a e l f  m ig h t so  ren o u n c e  h i s  " c u r a t o r i a l  
p o v /e r" , o r  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The l a t t e r  n o t io n  
seem s a t  l e a s t  t o  h a v e  b een  e n t e r t a i n e d  (a n d  p e rh a p sOa c c e p te d )  by  th e  L o rd  O rd in a ry  i n  G ordon v ,  G ordon^ * 
a l th o u g h  th e  r e p o r t  makes m e n tio n , i n  th e  m a in , o f  th e  
j u s  m a r i t i  * b u t  t h e  L ord  P r e s i d e n t  r e s e r v e d  h i s  o p in io n
and  r e f u s e d  t o  p ro n o u n ce  upon  th e  m a t te r  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r%c a se *  The c a s e  o f  W ilso n ’ s T r u s te e s  v« W ils o n 's  F a c to r  
was a n o th e r  i n s t a n c e  i n  w h ich  a  f a t h e r  by t r u s t - d e e d  
e x c lu d e d  h i s  s o n - i n - l a w 's  ( p o t e n t i a l )  j u s  m a r i t i  and  
r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  from  c e r t a i n  f u n d s ,  F r a s e r  i n  
1876 i s  a b le  t o  sa y ^  t h a t  " th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  once  th o u g h t  
t o  e x i s t  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  a r e  now e n t i r e l y  d is r e g a r d e d *
I t  i s  h e ld  now t o  b e  a s  o o m p eten t t o  e x c lu d e  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s  i t  i s  t o  e x c lu d e  t h e  
a a r i 'Ë i" »  he c i t e s  i a f e  Jk|La» th e  c a s e s  above 
m e n tio n e d , K egg ie  v ,  C h r is t ie " ^ ,  and  Gowan v* P u r s e l l  #
The l a t t e r  a p p e a rs  a l s o  t o  be  an  e x c lu s io n  (o f  w hat i s  
te rm e d  " t h e  m a r i t i " )  e f f e c t e d  by  a  p a r t y  o t h e r  th a n  
t h e  h u sb an d  o r  w ife*  P o s s ib ly  th e  b e a t  c a s e  i s  t h a t  
o f  K e g g ie , w here  i t  was c l e a r l y  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  " a  
h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  o f  a d m in i s t e r in g  h i s  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r t y ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  h i s  m a r i t i # m ig h t be  e f f e c t u a l l y  
r e n o u n c e d , and  t h a t ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i t  h ad  b e en  re n o u n c ed  
by t h e  te rm s  o f  th e  d e ed  o f  s e p a r a t io n "  (m ade by b o th  
p a r t i e s  /
1 ,  M.5844*2 * ( 1832) 11 8 *36 .
3* ( l8 6 6 )  7 Macph* 136*4 ,  F r * I ,  799*
5* 25 May, 1 8 15 , F .C .6 .  (1 8 2 2 ) 1 8*418 (1 s . (N .8 .) 390)
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p a r t i e s ) .  I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  v a lu e ,  s i n c e  th e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  and r i g h t  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t io n  i s  t a k e n ,  M u rra y 's  T r u s te e s  v#t iD a lrym p le  end  C olquhoun ( o r  Annand) v* C h e s s e ls  ,  a r e  
r e l i e d  u p o n , and  t h e  c o u r t  seem s to  h ave  b e e n  p re p a re d  
t o  t a k e  th e  f u r t h e r  s t e p  o f  c o u n te n a n c in g  su c h  e x c lu s io n ,
w here  i t  was made n e i t h e r  by a  t h i r d  p a r t y  n o r  th ro u g h2t h e  medium o f  a  t r u s t *  H ow ever, F r a s e r  i n s i s t s  t h a t  
t h e  r e n u n c ia t i o n  c a n n o t be  t o  su c h  an e x t e n t  a s  e n t i r e l y  
t o  t a k e  away from  th e  h u sb an d  " th e  r i g h t  t o  a c t  a s  head  
and  c h i e f  o f  h i s  h o u s e h o ld " .
The e x c lu s io n  n eed  n o t  b e  e x p re ss#  N e c e s s a ry  
im p l i c a t i o n  s u f f i c e d .
S in c e  f r e q u e n t ly  th e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  th e  t r u s t e r  o r  
o t h e r  I n t e r e s t e d  p e rs o n  was t o  g u a rd  a g a i n s t  th e  
p r o f l i g a c y  o f  th e  husband  o r  s o n - in - la w ,  i t  was p o s s ib l e  
t h a t  th e  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  m ig h t be  d i r e c t e d  t o  
be  e x c lu d e d  o n ly  i f  th e  l a t t e r  p a r t y  became i n s o l v e n t .
I t  can  be s e e n  from  th e  te rm s  o f  th e  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  
Annand v ,  C h e s s e ls  th e  m anner i n  w hich  th e  c la im s  o f  
th e  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s  m ig h t be  e x c lu d e d  e f f e c t i v e l y .
D uty  o f  W ife t o  C o n t r ib u te  t o  H ouseho ld  E x p en ses
The w i f e ' s  p o s i t i o n  a s  r e g a r d s  h e r  p r o p e r ty  was 
e q u iv a le n t  t o  t h a t  o f  an  u n m a rr ie d  woman, w here  b o th  
t h e  ju s  m a r i t i  and  ju s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s  w ere  e x c lu d e d , 
th o u g h  w i th in  th e  f a m ily  sh e  r e t a in e d  h e r  p o s i t i o n  
s u b o r d in a te  t o  t h e  h u sb a n d , and  i t  was c o n s id e r e d ,  q u i t e  
r i g h t l y ,  t h a t  th e  w i f e ,  o u t  o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  was 
bound t o  a l im e n t  h e r  husband  and f a m i ly ,  when h e  was 
u n a b le  t o  m a in ta in  th e  h o u s e h o ld , and t h a t  t h e r e  was "an  
o b l i g a t i o n  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  and  d u ty  on b o th  h u sb an d  and 
w ife  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t "  * p e rh a p s  even  when th e  h u s b a n d 's  
r e s o u r c e s  /
1# boidi su p ra , 2* i b i d . "
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1r e s o u r c e s  w ere  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  *
When d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  n a tu r e  and e f f e c t  o f  t h e  M a rr ie d  
Women's P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  F r a s e r  n o te s ^  t h a t ,
a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  mode I n  w h ich  th e  w ife  m ust em ploy h e r  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  E n g lis h  A ct o f  1870 p r o v id e s  i n  
9*4 t h a t ,  "A m a r r ie d  woman h a v in g  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  s h a l l  
b e  s u b j e c t  t o  a l l  su c h  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  
h e r  c h i l d r e n  a s  a  widow i s  now by law  s u b j e c t  t o  f o r  th e  
m a in te n a n c e  o f  h e r  c h i l d r e n ;  p ro v id e d  a lw ay s  t h a t  n o th in g  
i n  t h i s  A c t s h a l l  r e l i e v e  h e r  husband  from  a n y  l i a b i l i t y  
a t  p r e s e n t  im posed  upon  him by law  to  m a in ta in  h e r  
c h i l d r e n " ,  and  t h a t  a  s i m i l a r  p r o v i s io n  i s  fo u n d  i n  m ost 
o f  t h e  A m erican  C o d es, and  was j u s t  and  r e a s o n a b le ,  and  
h e  a s s e r t s  t h a t  h i s  v ie w , e x p re s s e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  a  w ife  
when sh e  h a s  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  o u g h t t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  
m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  common fa m ily  was t h e  s t r o n g e r ,  w hen, 
by th e  te rm s  o f  9*3 o f  th e  A ct o f  1 8 77 , sh e  was e n a b le d  
t o  e a r n  h e r  own l iv e l ih o o d *
T h is  b e in g  F r a s e r 's  o p in io n ,  i t  i s  i l l u m i n a t i n g  
t o  s e a r c h  o u t  th e  o p in io n  o f  a  l a t e r  w r i t e r ,  W alton  ,Kwho q u o te s  E r s k in e ^  a s  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  i t  i s  a  h u s b a n d 's  d u ty  a s  h ead  o f  t h e  f a m ily  t o  
d e f r a y  th e  e x p e n se s  o f  th e  h o u se h o ld , and  t o  m a in ta in  
and  e d u c a te  th e  c h i l d r e n  o f  th e  m a rr ia g e #  G u a rd e d ly , 
h e  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  d u ty  o f  a  w ife  w i th  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  
t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  h o u se h o ld  e x p en se s  ifd iile  h e r  husb an d  
was i n d ig e n t  had  n e v e r  b een  d e c id e d *  I t  w as c l e a r ,  
t h a t ,  w here  th e  f a t h e r  was d e a d , th e  m o th e r was r e q u i r e d  
t o  /
1* F r * I ,  8 0 0 ; s e e  now M#W#P# (S c* ) A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , s* 4 ;
C h a p te r  4 ,  "A lim e n t"  p* 392 e t  seq.2* 40 & 41 V ie t*  0*29*3# F r # I I ,  1517 ; s e e  a l s o  I ,  539*40 , 8 0 0 , 8 1 5 -1 6 , and  8 3 7 -9 , and  a u t h o r i t i e s  c o n s id e re d  and  c i t e d  th e r e in #4# C h a p te r  XXV, pp*223-4#
5* 1 , 6 ,  56*
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1t o  a l im e n t  t h e  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  , and  he  q u o te sgB a n k to n / * " I f  t h e  w ife  h a s  a  s u b je c t  e x c lu s iv e  o f  th e  
h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  sh e  m ust c o n t r i b u t e  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  
to w a rd s  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  t h e i r  common c h i l d r e n ,  and  
i n  d e f a u l t  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  sh e  i s  s im p ly  l i a b l e " .  W alton  
s a y s  t h a t  t h e r e  d id  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  be  any  c a s e  i n  w h ich  
t h e  w i f e ,  d u r in g  th e  h u s b a n d 's  lifig^ tim e* w as h e ld  bound 
t o  m a in ta in  t h e  c h i l d r e n  i f  he  was u n a b le  t o  do so*
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , su c h  an  o b l i g a t i o n ,  h e  was
bound t o  a d m it ,  h ad  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  some e m in e n t%a u t h o r i t i e s  * " b u t t h e  la n g u a g e  o f  t h e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t  /
1» Buchan v* B# 1666 M#411, and o a s e s  c i t e d  a t  p*223 
fn ,3 #  S ee  a l s o  'T h e  Y ounger C h i ld r e n  o f  B i s s e t  ( o f  L ess in d ru m ) v .  T h e i r  B r o t h e r ' ,  1748 , M*413, w here  t h e  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t  th e  m in o r c h i l d r e n  was l a i d  b o th  upon  th e  h e i r  and  th e  w idow , i n  p r o p o r t io n  t o  t h e i r  r e s o u rc e s #  Had th e  h e i r  "b ee n  p o s s e s s e d  o f  a n  o p u le n t  e s t a t e " ,  th e  w ho le  o b l i g a t i o n  m ig h t h ave  b een  p la c e d  upon h im , a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  h i s  f a th e r *  See C h a p te r  4  (A lim e n t)*
2# 1 ,  6 ,  15#3* v i% #, B a n k to n , 1 ,6 ,1 3 ;  S t a i r  1 , 5 , 7 ;  F r a s e r  ( P a r e n tand  C h i ld )  100 ( " b u t ,  f i r s t ,  c h i l d r e n  m ust a l im e n t  i n d ig e n t  r e l a t i o n s ;  th e n  th e  f a t h e r ;  th e n  f a i l i n g  th e  f a t h e r  by d e a th  o r  i n c a p a c i t y ,  o r  o th e r w is e ,  th e  m o th e r i s  n e x t  l i a b l e * " )  W alton  c i t e s  E rsk *  1 , 6 ,  56 
( r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  n o te  i n  N lo o ls o n 's  e d i t i o n ) #  The n o te  i n  N lc o ls o n 's  e d i t i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  E r s k in e ,  i n  h i s  P r i n c i p l e s ,  i l l ,  1 ,  4 ,  p la c e s  t h e  m o th e r 's  l i a b i l i t y  d i r e c t l y  a f t e r  t h a t  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  and  f o r e  t h e  g ra n d ­f a th e r *  The e d i t o r  c o n s id e r s  t h a t  " t h i s  seem s more c o n so n a n t t o  r e a s o n  th a n  t h a t  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  t e x t " ,  and  r e f e r s  t o  S t a i r ,  B enk ton  and  F r a s e r ,  b u t  t h e r e  ( i n  th e  t e x t )  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  p a t e r n a l  g r a n d f a th e r  and  o t h e r  m ale  a s c e n d a n ts  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  i s  s a i d  t o  come im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  th e  f a t h e r  and  b e f o r e  th e  m o th e r and h e r  a s c e n d a n ts *  M o re 's  N o te s , XXIX,
S ee  g e n e r a l l y  o a s e s  su b  nom ine " A lim e n t" , M o r is o n 's  D ic t io n a ry *  T h a t t h e  m o th e r comes n e x t  i n  l i n e  o f  l i a b i l i t y  t o  th e  f a t h e r  i s  s u p p o r te d  by m odem  w r i t e r s  e*g* G loag  and  H enderson  ( 7 th  ed#) p*683* See c a s e  t h e r e  c i t e d  -  Ewan v* H* & W# F e rg u so n  1932 s* c# 2 7 7 ; W alk e r, P r i n c i p l e s ,  1 ,315 . I t  seem s t h a t  t h e  m o th e r 's  l i a b i l i t y  comes b e fo r e  t h a t  o f  th e  p a t e r n a l  
g r a n d f a t h e r ,  w hose l i a b i l i t y  n e x t  a r i s e s #  The o r d e r  o f  l i a b i l i t y  i s  t h e r e  g iven*
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c o n s i s t e n t  %flth th e  v iew  t h a t  i t  I s  o n ly  a f t e r  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  d e a th  t h a t  th e  w i f e 's  l i a b i l i t y  e m e rg e s " .
He c o n c lu d e s  t h e  a rg u m en t w ith  h im s e l f  by  d e c id in g  
t h a t  " i t  w ould p r o b a b ly  b e  h e ld  t h a t  a  w ife  who i s  
a b le  t o  m a in ta in  h e r  c h i l d r e n  m ust do so  i f  h e r  
h u sb an d  i s  i n c a p a b le ,  s u b j e c t  t o  any  c la im  sh e  may 
h av e  a g a i n s t  him  f o r  r e l i e f , "  (Why sh e  s h o u ld  h ave  
su c h  a  c la im  i s  a p p a r e n t ly  so  s e l f - e v i d e n t  t h a t  no 
e x p la n a t io n  o r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  i t  i s  o f f e r e d .  T hus, 
th e  q u e s t io n  i s  b eg g ed  o f  t h e  e x i s te n c e  o r  e x t e n t  o f  
th e  w i f e 's  b a s i c  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t  th e  f a m ily  w h ile  h e r  
h u sb an d  i s  a l i v e ,  b u t  u n a b le  h im s e l f  t o  do s o ,  o r  a t  
l e a s t ,  a  d e n ia l  o f  th e  e x i s te n c e  o f  th e  d u ty  i s  n o t  
g iv e n  ( "^ny" c la im  sh e  may h av e  a g a i n s t  him  f o r  r e l i e f ) ,  
and  a  com m on-sense s o l u t i o n  w ith o u t  c i t a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
i s  s u p p l i e d .  L i a b i l i t y  t o  a l im e n t  th e  ( i n d i g e n t )  
h u sb an d  i s  n o t  d i s c u s s e d  e x p r e s s l y ) ,
W alto n  th e n  p o s e s  th e  q u e s t io n s  I n  w ha t d o es  th e  
w i f e ' s  l i a b i l i t y  c o n s i s t  i f  t h e  husband  i s  n o t  in d ig e n t?
H is  exam ple i s  t h a t  i f  th e  h usband  i s  a  c l e r k  w i th  &100 p .a ,  
and  h i s  w ife  h a s  a  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  o f  &1000 p . a . ,  i s  sh e  
e n t i t l e d  t o  a l lo w  h e r  incom e t o  a c c u m u la te ,  o r  t o  spend  
i t  e n t i r e l y  a s  s h e  c h o o s e s , w i th o u t  r e g a r d  t o  f a m ily  
e x p e n s e s ,  and  t o  l e a v e  h e r  husb an d  t o  s u p p o r t  h e r  and  
t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  e n t i r e l y  u n a id e d , o r  m ust sh e  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  d e f r a y  th e  common e x p e n s e s , i n  p r o p o r t io n  t o  h e r  
m eans?
1W a lto n 's  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  F r a s e r  i s  t h a t  th e  
w i f e 's  l i a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  i s  a  l e g a l  c o n seq u e n ce  
o f  r e c o g n i s in g  h e r  r i g h t  t o  h o ld  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  b u t  
t h a t  F r a s e r  d o e s  n o t  c o n s id e r  th e  p o i n t  t o  b e  d e c id e d ,  
and  W alton  a d d u c e s  t h e  c l e v e r  argum en t t i m t ,  " t h e r e  i s  
no l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n  upon  h e r  t o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  b u t  i f  sh e  
d o e s  c o n t r i b u t e  w lie th e r  o u t  o f  h e r  incom e o r  c a p i ta l ,  
sh e  /
1 .  I ,  8 5 7 .
ish e  d o e s  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  h e r  husband  h e r  d e b to r  t h e r e f o r  *' 
He sa y s  t h a t  no new l i a b i l i t y  was Im posed on  th e  w ife  
by th e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  A c ts ,  w h ich  c o n ta in e d  no 
e x p re s s  r e f e r e n c e  t o  f a m ily  e x p e n se s  and  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t h e r e to *  The A ct o f  1920 , s* 4 * " , he  c o n te n d s ,  im poses 
l i a b i l i t y  on a  w ife  t o  s u p p o r t  an  i n d ig e n t  h u sb a n d , b u t  
c o n ta in s  no c la u s e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  c h i l d r e n ,  
o r  a  n o n - in d ig e n t  husband*  L i a b i l i t y  t o  a l im e n t  th e  
( i n d ig e n t )  h u sb an d  a s  opposed  t o  m e e tin g  t h e  e x p e n se s  o f  
t h e  h o u s e h o ld , an d  th e  u p b r in g in g  o f  th e  c h i l d r e n  i s  n o t  
c o n s id e r e d  e x p r e s s ly  t i l l  th e  end o f  W a lto n 's  d i s c u s s i o n ,  
when he  s a y s  t h a t ,  u n t i l  1920 , i t  h a d  seem ed t h a t  th o u g h  
th e  w ife  was i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  s u p p o r t  h im , and  h e  was 
u n a b le  t o  s u p p o r t  h i m s e l f ,  y e t  sh e  was n o t  l i a b l e  t o  
a l im e n t  him^#
I n  /
H edderw ick  v* M o riso n , (1901) 4  F# 163* See C h a p te r  4  ( " A lim e n t" )  p*M*W*P* (8 c # )  A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , 8 * 4 :-  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a  hu sb an d  b e in g  u n a b le  t o  m a in ta in  h i m s e l f ,  h i s  w i f e ,  
i f  sh e  s h a l l  h av e  a s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  o r  h ave  a  s e p a r a t e  incom e more th a n  r e a s o n a b ly  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  h e r  own m a in te n a n c e , s h a l l  be  bound o u t o f  su c h  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  t o  p ro v id e  h e r  h usband  w ith  su c h  m a in te n a n c e  a s  h e  w ould  i n  s i m i l a r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  be  bound t o  p r o v id e  f o r  h e r ,  o r  o u t  o f  su ch  incom e t o  c o n t r i b u t e  su c h  sum o r  sums to w a rd s  su c h  m a in te n a n c e  a s  h e r  hu sb an d  w ould  i n  s i m i l a r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  be bound t o  c o n t r i b u t e  to w a rd s  h e r  m a in ten an ce*  See e#g* A d a ir  v* A* 1924 S*C* 798*W alto n , p * 2 2 4 , c i t i n g  F in g z ie s  v* F* 1 8 9 0 , 28  S*L*R*
6 ,  p e r  L .K y lla ch y #  F o r exam ple , i n  L * K y lla o h y 's  o p in io n  a t  p # 7 , h i s  L o rd sh ip  c o n s id e r s  t h e  " g e n e r a l  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  a  w ife  w ith  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  i s  l i a b l e  t o  a l im e n t  h e r  i n d ig e n t  husband  -  t h i s  i s  a  q u e s t io n  on  w h ic h , 8 0  f a r  a s  I  c a n  f i n d ,  t h e r e  I s  a n  a lm o s t  e n t i r e  a b se n c e  o f  a u th o r i ty #  F o r  any  d a t a  w hich  c a n  be  a p p e a le d  t o  a p p e a r  t o  me t o  r e l a t e  t o  a  som ewhat d i f f e r e n t  q u e s t io n ,  v i z * ,  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  a  w ife  w ith  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  e x p e n se s  o f  th e  h o u s e h o ld , e * g , ,  h e r  own a l im e n t  and t h a t  o f  h e r  and h e r  h u s b a n d 's  common c h i ld r e n * "  The q u e s t io n  had  t o  be  c o n s id e r e d  a s  o p e n , and i f  any  l i a b i l i t y  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  w i f e ,  i t  m ust r e s t  on c o n t r a c t  -  " t h a t  i s  t o  s a y  m ust r e s t  on so m e th in g  im p lie d  by law  i n  th e  c o n t r a c t  o f  m a rr ia g e " #  A t common la w , L *K y llachy  f e l t  /
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I n  E n g la n d , by th e  A c t, 1882 , 8 * 20 , a  w ife
w i th  h e r  o^m e s t a t e  waa bound t o  %)revent h e r  husband  
(ai\ud h e r  o M ld r e n  and g ra n d o h l ld re n )  from  becom ing 
c h a rg e a b le  t o  th e  p a r is h *  N e v e r th e le s s ,  a t  common 
law  i n  E n g la n d , no su c h  l i a b i l i t y  e x i s t e d ,  and  e x c e p t 
w here  s t a t u t e  h ad  I n te r v e n e d ,  a s  i t  h ad  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  
i n d ig e n t  h u s b a n d s , i f a l to n  th o u g h t  t h e  o l d e r  E n g lis h  
c a s e s  r e g a r d in g  (n o n ) l i a b i l i t y  o f  a  m a r r ie d  woman t o  
a l im e n t  h e r  r e l a t i o n s * ,  w ould be f o l lo w e d .
T h u s, i n  g e n e r a l ,  F r a s e r 's  v iew s upon t h i s  t o p i c  
seem much m ore e n l ig h te n e d  and  e g a l i t a r i a n  th a n  W a l to n 's ,  
th o u g h  advanced  so  ma% y e a r s  e a r l i e r *  N e v e r th e le s s ,  
o o n s id e r in g  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  m aking p o s s i b l e  th e  
e x c lu s io n  o f  t h e  tw o r i g h t s  was t o  s a v e  th e  w if e  from  
t h e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  f o l l y ,  g r e e d ,  
b a n k ru p tc y  o r  im p ro v id e n c e , F r a s e r  i s  l e s s  th a n  fo rw a rd -plo o k in g  ivhen he  s a y s  t h a t " ,  w h ile  t h i s  i s  a t t a i n e d ,  "an  
e v i l  i s  c a u se d  by g iv in g  th e  w ife  an  in d e p e n d e n t  and  
u n c o n t r o l l e d  pow er o v e r  h e r  e s t a t e ,  w h ich  o f t e n  i s  
p r o d u c t iv e  o f  f a m ily  q u a r r e l s " ,  and  t h e r e f o r e  recommends 
th e  i n t r o d u o t i o n  i n  th e  d eed  o f  a rra n g e m e n t o f  a  c la u s e  
p ix » h ib i t in g  t h e  w ife  from  a l i e n a t i n g  o r  a s s ig n in g  th e  
fu n d  from  vAiioh t h e  h u s b a n d 's  pow ers w ere  e x c lu d e d , and  
so le m n ly  /
f e l t  su c h  a  l i a b i l i t y  t o  be  im p o s s ib le  b e c a u se  " a p a r t  from  s p e c i a l  p a c t io n  ( s h e )  had  n o th in g  w h e rew ith  t o  a l im e n t  any  b o d y " , m:id a l t e r n a t i v e l y  t h e  te rm s  o f  any  
s p e c i a l  a g re e m e n t w ould r e g u l a t e  m a t te r s #  The M a rrie d  w om en's P r o p e r ty  A c ts  h ad  made no d i f f e r e n c e *  "F o r  th o s e  A c ts  c a r e f u l l y  e x p re s s  th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  w h ich  a r e  t o  f o l lo w  from  th e  ch an g es w h ich  th e y  in t r o d u c e ,  and  t h e  im p o s i t io n  o f  an y  new l i a b i l i t y  on th e  w ife  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  in d ig e n c e  i s  n o t  one o f  them *" ( t h a t  i s ,  n o t  u n t i l  1920)#1* e*g# Colem an v# Birm ingham  O v e rs e e rs  1881 6 Q*B#D*
615 (n o  l i a b i l i t y  upon a  woman d u r in g  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  l i f e t i m e  t o  a l im e n t  h e r  r^iz^ Ufi c h i l d r e n  th o u g h  a b le  t o  do s c ) *  The a rg u m en t q u ^ i& ^ s ta tu to ry  p r o v i s io n s  was c o n c e rn e d  p r in c ip a l l ^ T w I th  th e  M*W*P*Act, 1870 ,8*13 ( l i a b i l i t y  t o  s u p p o r t  c h i l d r ^ )  and  a l s o  w i th  
an  o ld  A ct o f  E l i z a b e th  I  -  ^ R T S iz .  c * 2 , s#7#2 .  F r . I ,  800*
64*
so le m n ly  d i r e c t s  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  u n p le a s a n tn e s s  o f  
f a m ily  q u a r r e l s  e n c o u n te re d  i n  Gordon v* G ordon , K eggie  
V #  C h r i s t i e ,  and  Gowan v .  P u r s e l l ,  s u p r a ,  w h ich  a re  
among th e  c a s e s  he  was p le a s e d  t o  c i t e  e a r l i e r  a s  
d e c i s io n s  w hich  b ro u g h t  th e  law  t o  th e  p o s i t i o n  i n  
w h ich  i t  c o u ld  he s a id  t h a t  th e  j u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s , 
a s  w e l l  a s  th e  .jus m a r i t i , m ig h t p r o p e r ly  be  e x c lu d e d  
from  th e  h u s b a n d 's  a m b it o f  p o w er. C ould  r e s t r i c t i o n  
i n  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  pow er w ith o u t  e q u iv a le n t  g a in  i n  th e  
w i f e 's  am ount t o  t r u e  p r o g r e s s ?
B e fo re  1860 , t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  w ife  c o u ld  be  i n  one 
o f  t h r e e  s i t u a t i o n s  a s  r e g a r d s  h e r  p ro p e r ty *  I f  n e i t h e r  
o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t s  had  b e en  e x c lu d e d  c o n v e n t io n a l ly ,  
th e y  w ould  s u b s i s t  f o r  h i s  l i f e t i m e , u n le s s  i n t e r r u p t e d  
by an  e v e n t  su ch  a s  b a n k ru p tc y  o r  c i v i l  d e a th ,  "and  even  
th o u g h  he  w ere on d e a th b e d , a  deed  by h i s  w i f e ,  w i th o u t4h i s  c o n c u r re n c e ,  w ould be n u l l  " •
The n e c e s s i t y  t o  o b ta in  th e  h u sb a n d ’ s  c o n s e n t  t o  
a c t s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  may n o t  have g iv e n  r i s e  t o  
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  e v e ry  c a s e ,  and  i n  c e r t a i n  m a r r ia g e s  may 
h ave  b een  a  f o r m a l i t y  o n ly ,  b u t  i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  to  
e sc a p e  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  i t  was assum ed g e n e r a l ly  
t h a t  th e  r e i n s  o f  governm ent w ould b e , and  s h o u ld  b e , 
i n  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  hands*  V a l id a t io n  o f  a  d eed  by 
s u b s e q u e n t r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e  husb an d  was i n  t im ePa c c e p te d  , a l th o u g h  t h i s  m ig h t n o t  ta k e  p la c e  a f t e r  th e
w i f e 's  d e a th ,  b e c a u se  a t  t h a t  p o in t  h i s  m a r i t a l  c u r a t o r i a l& 4pow er c e a s e d  # F r a s e r  n o te s  t h a t  in f o r m a l  e v id e n c e  o f5c o n s e n t  by th e  w ife ^  t o  a c t s  c o n c e rn in g  h e r  s e p a r a t e  
e s t a t e  /
1 .  F r . I ,  803s B row nlee v ,  W addell (1831) 10 S . 3 9 .2 .  Lady C ochran  v .  D uchess o f  H am iltonj, 1 6 9 8 , M.6001 ; c o n t r a s t  M e lv i l l  v« Dumbar 1555 , M .5993 and  Dumbar V. M e lv i l l e  M .6001. S u p ra , pp. 51-52.
3 .  B u l l io n s  V. Bayne M .6 T W T 1 7 9 3 ).4 .  I ,  8 0 9 .5 .  C h e sh ire  o r  W a lla c e  v .  Duke o f  P o r t l a n d ,  20 F e b .1830 , 2 J u r .  p .  2 5 9 .
Ô 5 ,
4e s t a t e ,  b u t  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  t o  
8uob a c t s ,  w ould b e  a c c e p ta b le *
A lth o u g h  th e  h u sb an d  p o s s e a a e d  th e  r i g h t  t o  
a d m in i s t e r  h l a  w i f e 's  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  h l a  r u l e  was 
n o t  w i th o u t  r e s t r i c t i o n s *  The c o n c e p ts  o f  p r o p e r ty  
and  o f  m anagem ent, i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  h e r  s e p a r a t e  
( p r i n c i p a l l y  h e r i t a b l e )  p r o p e r t y ,  w ere k e p t  d i s t i n c t ,  and  
th e  h u sb an d  c o u ld  n o t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s e l l  t h e  h e r i t a g e  
o r  b u rd e n  i t  w i th  lo n g - te rm  d e b t#  F r a s e r  sum m arises 
t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  s e n te n c e ,  "He c a n n o t do a n y th in g  
w h ich  w i l l  p e rm a n e n tly  a f f e c t  I t^ " #
When th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on h i s  pow ers o f  a c t i o n  a r e
c o n s id e r e d ,  t o g e t h e r  w ith  th e  h u s b a n d 's  d u ty  t o  a c t  i n
WwS w i f e 's  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s ,  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h i s  j u s
and  n o t  c a p r i c i o u s l y  o r  u n re a s o n a b ly  
t o  r e f u s e  h i s  c o n s e n t  t o  h e r  a c t i o n s ,  a  s i t u a t i o n
som ewhat l e s s  u n s a t i s f a o t o r y  th a n  w ould a p p e a r  a t
f i r s t ,  @me)?ges, a l th o u g h  i t  i s  u n d e n ia b le  t h a t  th e  
m a r r ie d  woman was " c r i b b 'd ,  c a b i n 'd  and c o n f in e d "  i n  
no s m a ll  m e a su re , and  I t  m ust be  rem em bered t h a t  n o t  
o n ly  w ould t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  t a k in g  a c t s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  
c o n c e rn in g  th e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r ty  l i e  w i th  t h e  h u sb an d  i n  
m ost o a s e s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t ,  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  w i f e ' s  
m oveable  e s t a t e  f a l l i n g  u n d e r  t h e  m a r i t i # th e  
h usband  beoame a b s o lu te  p r o p r i e t o r  t h e r e o f ,  and  m ig h t
u s e  h i s  new -found  w e a l th  a s  h i s  whim d i r e c te d #  I t%i s  t r u e  t h a t  P a to n  s u g g e s ts  ,  I n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  
j u s  m a r i t i ,  t h a t  th e  h u sb an d  "c o u ld  n o t  do an y  d eed  
w h ich  I n ju r e d  h i s  w i f e 's  i n t e r e s t  w i th o u t  an y  b e n e f i t  
t o  h im s e l f  o r  w h ich  to o k  e f f e c t  a g a i n s t  h e r  o n ly  a s  
a t  h i s  d e a W ,  b u t  i n  a  p r e v io u s  s e n te n c e  h e  seem s t o  
a c c e p t  t h e  n o t io n  t h a t  th e  h u sb an d  m ig h t " e v e n  s q u a n d e r  
h e r  /
1 • S ee  f a c t s  o f  R o b e r ts o n  o r  R en n ie  v .  R i t c h i e4 B e l l ’ s  App. 221»2 .  F r . I ,  811*3» P.100»
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her moveable property", and many instanoea are found 
of fbTtune-huntera and huabanda prodigal with their 
wives' money# Enjoyable squandering of hie wife's 
money would not, presumably, infringe the rule*
Moreover, the husband was proprietor o f  a ll subjects 
falling imder the m<^ rit^  * "and can therefore 
dispose of and use them  as he would any p r o p e r ty  he 
had acquired by g ift or purohase #.# i t  is  only when 
the jus mariti is  excluded that the right of administration 
begins to operate^"* Fraser distinguishes^ the 
husband's powers over the principal from those over 
the income of the w ife's separate heritable property#
It is  suggested that the combination of proprietorship 
( if  that word is  accurately used) and consequent lack 
of necessity t o  look to the wife's wishes in the disposal 
of those moveable», would tend to discourage the 
husband from observing too strictly , in relation t o  
subjects falling under the le^ai^i# the standard of 
care which, in Baton's view# was required of him* Even 
i f  that standard was required, i t  has been noted already 
that, w i th in  that vide or loose standard, much Injury 
might be done to what bad been -  and would become upon 
dissolution of the marriage ( if  anything remained) -  
the separate property of the woman* Within that 
standard, unwise or even "quasi-fraudulent" use of 
property (in the sense of irresponsible squandering 
of money: a man cannot defraud himself of w hat is  bis
own, and the wife's rights of property therein were 
suspended during the marriage* could such action (now) 
be said to be a  fraud against her reversionary interest 
or, in the less than honest phraseology of the time, 
against the fictional notion of the goods in communion?
At any rate, the conduct was regarded then as acceptable'^) 
was /
1* F r . I ,  797#2# I ,  811*3# See e*g* per L.Monorieff in Wight v# Brown (1849) 11 D#459, at p#467/8*- " I t  is  surely a fundamental rule in this matter, t h a t ,  during the subsistence of a marriage, t h e  husband has the entire command of a ll t h e  /
6"/ #
was p a rm i
Second, If the jus merit,^  was excluded, the wife's 
power over her o%m estate was greatez^ * %@ property 
In the moveables, as well as in the heritage, resided 
in the wife, but she oould not sue, without her husband's 
concurrence, for recovery of sums due to her (as, for 
example, rent) nor, without her husband's concurrence,
"grant leases or feus, or remove tenants, or alienate1her estate "* In other words, the f u n c t io n s  and
powers of the ..Jua isdijtoigtj-s^aall remainsd. However» 
even while the latter right stood# the exclusion of 
the jus mariti brought on# major advmnta&e# ond that 
was that the husband's creditors could not attach thegmoveable property^, any more than they could attach 
the separate heritage,of the wife. Moreover the
husband himself, being no longer proprietor of the 
property in question, could not dispose of i t  or make 
any arrangements concerning It which were not in 
accordance with hla wife's wishes*
Finally, where both rights were excluded or 
renounced, the wife beoame true and fu ll proiirietor 
of her own property, and might act in respect of i t  
"without his authority, and in opposition to his will^". 
She might "deal with her separate estate both heritable 
and /
the personal funds belonging to either spouse, and may dispose of them according to his own discretion*He may spend the whole of them, v/hich too oftenhappens, and neither the wife nor her executors canprevent this, or have any claim against other parties who may be affected thereby#" See also per Llldnlooh 
i n  Fraser v« Walker, i n g g g ,  pp. 72- 7 3 .1q Fr*I, 813* - "the wife Is entitled to enjoy her rents,fruits, and interests, when these are actuallyrecovered "but not to recover them (unless the jug administrationis is also excluded)*2, IBôSanÉ''*?^  , sqpra. and authorities citedFr#I, 813, footnote TojT* The consequences of the exclusion of one right highlight the difference between the rights,3* F r * I ,  8 1 4 ,
6 8 *
and  m oveable  a s  I f  th e  husb an d  d id  n o t  e x i s t  *
Onoe a g a in  i a  m et t h e  p e r p e tu a l  f e a r  o f  h a v in g
t r a v e l l e d  to o  f a r  to w a rd a  e q u a l i t y  w here m a r r ie dP " 3women w ere  c o n c e rn e d " , and  F r a a e r  ,  h a v in g  e x p la in e d
th e  p o s i t i o n  i n  d e t a i l ,  c a u t io u s ly  ad d s  t h a t ,  th o u g h
h e r  p r o p e r ty  1# th e n  h e r  own, y e t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a
d o u b t &G t o  h e r  pow era o v e r  i t ,  and  t h a t  t h e  h usban d
b e in g  s t i l l  t h e  r u l e r  and  h ead  o f  h i s  h o u s e h o ld , sh e
m uet n o t  u ae  h e r  p r o p e r ty  i n  su c h  a  way a s  t o  o v e r tu r n
t h i s  a u th o r i ty #  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  was p o s s ib l e ^  t h a t
t h e r e  was a  d u ty  upon  h e r  t o  u s e  some o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e
e s t a t e  f o r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  h o u s e h o ld , th o u g h
o b j e c t i o n  c o u ld  h a r d ly  be made t o  t h i s *
C o n t r a c tu a l  C a p a c ity  o f  M a rr ie d  Women
The g e n e r a l  common law  r u l e  was t h a t  a l l  p e r s o n a l  
o b l i g a t i o n s  g r a n te d  by  a  m a r r ie d  woman w ere ip s o  j u r e  
n u l l ,  an d  c o u ld  n o t  be  e n fo rc e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  w i f e 's  
p e r s o n  o r  e s t a t e  d u r in g  th e  s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e  
o r  a f t e r  i t s  d i s s o lu t io n ? *
W a lto n 's  /
1a M u rray , p ,2 1 *  A c c o rd in g ly  sh e  m ig h t su e  ( F r # I ,5 7 2 )  -  a n d , p re s u m a b ly , a l s o  b e  su ed  -  i n  h e r  own name w ith  
r e g a r d  t o  su c h  p ro p e r ty *  F r a s e r  th o u g h t  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  a p p o in t in g  a  cu r a t o r  ad  l i t e m  i n  su c h  a  c a s e  t o  be  o f d o u b t f u l  necessiïyT"™*"™™^2# I n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  t h e  a l l e g e d l y  g r e a t e r  pow er p o s s e s s e d  by m a r r ie d  women i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p a r a p h e r n a l i a ,  th a n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  h e r i t a g e ,  t h i s  a t t3 . tu d e  i s  s e e n  i n  
P r i n g l e s  v# I r v i n e  1 7 1 1 , M .5970 ( c i t e d ,  F r # I ,8 0 6 ) ,& c a s e  w h ich  had  d e c id e d  t h a t  a  w ife  was e n t i t l e d  t o  p le d g e  h e r  p a r a p h e r n a l  goods w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s e n t  b u t  w h ich  was c a r r i e d  by " a  sc r im p  p l u r a l i t y "  and  l a t e r  o v e r r u le d *  F r a s e r  rem a rk s  t h a t  i t  was s a i d  t h a t  %ome o f  t h e  L o rd s  m e r r i ly  s a i d ,  t h i s  was to o  g r e a t  a n  i n t e r l o c u t o r  i n  f a v o u r s  o f  women" and  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  was l a t e r  o v e r r u le d ,  s in c e  th e  h u sb an d  rem a in e d  h i s  w i f e ' s  c u r a t o r ,  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h a t  sh e  vms a b s o lu te  p r o i^ r i e to r  o f  h e r  p a r a p h e r n a l ia #  5 ,  F r# I ,8 1 5 #4* D is c u s s e d ,  s u p r a ,  pp. 58- 6 4 .5* F r* I ,5 2 0 *
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1W a lto n 's  summary o f  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  a  w ife  a t  
common law  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  h e r  p e r s o n a l  
o b l i g a t i o n s  was t h a t  su c h  a n  o b l ig a t io n  w ould  be 
s u s ta in e d  o n ly  i f  i t  was i n  rem versum  o f  t h e  w i f e ,  
o r  g r a n te d  v;hen th e  hu sb an d  was im p riso n e d  o r  o i v l l i t e r
am & m m , o r  was a n  o b l i g a t i o n  jgd fa o tiM  j r a e s ta n d u m s  
o r  made when th e  w if e  w as i n  t r a d e "  and  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
was i n  th e  c o u rs e  o f  h e r  t r a d e ,  o r  w here  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
w as i n  r e s p e c t  o f  n e c e s s a r i e s  f o r  h e r s e l f  and  h e r  
c h i ld r e n *  A g a in , when h e r  husb an d  v;as a b ro a d , o r  
th e y  w ere  l i v i n g  a p a r t  and  t h e  w ife  h ad  a g re e d  t o  
m a in ta in  h e r s e l f  o r  was a l im e n te d  by h e r  h u sb an d  o r  
t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  was b ro u g h t a b o u t  by  h e r  f a u l t  -  i n  
s h o r t ,  he  s a y s ,  " i n  e v e ry  c a s e  i n  ivhich  sh e  had  no 
m andate  t o  b in d  h e r  h u 8 b a n d w ,- th e  w i f e 's  o b l i g a t i o n  
w ould b e  e n fo i 'c e a b le *  M o reo v er, h e r  c o n t r a c t  m ig h t 
be  e n fo rc e d  a g a i n s t  h e r  w here  sh e  h ad  h e ld  h e r s e l f  
o u t  t o  be u n m a rr ie d  i n  c i r c im s ta n c e s  i n  w h ich  th e  
p e r s o n  w i th  whom sh e  had  c o n t r a c t e d  had  no r e a s o n a b le  
o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  a s c e r t a i n  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h a t  was t h e  
t r u e  /
1# p*196*2* I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a s  w ith  m in o rs  -  s e e ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  upon 
m in o rs  i n  t r a d e  O 'D o m ie ll v# B ro im ie s id e  C oa l Co#1954 8#G#554 p e r  L #0#M onorieff a t  p p .539-40  and  p e r  L #J*Œ *A itch lson  a t  pp#543 -44  -  t h e r e  i s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y : -  when was tl:ie f i r s t  v e n tu r e  i n t o  t r a d e ?  At w hat j u n c tu r e  c o u ld  sh e  be  s a i d  t o  b e  'e n g a g e d  i n  t r a d e '?Up t o  w hat p o i n t  was th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  n e c e s s a ry ?  (P a to n  a t  p@105 s a y s ,  " sh e  c o u ld  c o n t r a c t  v d t ^ t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  i n  h e r  s e p a r a t e  c o n c e rn s  o r  t r a d e  o r  e s t a t e ; "  r e n d e r in g  h e r  s e p a r a te  e s t a t e  l i a b l e ) .
See g e n e r a l l y ,  C h u rn s id e  v ,  C u r r ie  1789 , M.6082 i n  w h ic h , w here  a  m a r r ie d  woman had  e n te r e d  i n t o  t r a d e  t o  m a in ta in  h e r s e l f  and  h e r  f a n i l ly  upon  h e r  husband  
h a v in g  l e f t  t h e  c o u n tr y  ( t h e  h usband  h a v in g  become b a n k r u p t ) ,  sh e  was h e ld  s u b j e c t  t o  p e r s o n a l  d i l ig e n c e *  "To r e f u s e  t h e  o r d in a r y  l e g a l  o o m p u ls a to r ie s ,  i n  su c h  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  a s  t h e s e ,  w o u ld , i t  was o b se a ^ e d , i n  t h e  end p ro v e  h u r b f u l  t o  th e  women th e m s e lv e s ,  by p r e v e n t in g  them  from  g a in in g  a  l i v e l i h o o d  i n  t r a d e ,  a t  a  t im e  when t h e i r  h u sb a n d s  c o u ld  n o t  a f f o r d  them  any  s u p p o r t" *
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true situation *
In those o&sea (and in other# of statutory creation, 
later disouasod), lia b ility  arooe, sometime# ^er
property merely* and Bometimea alao por&onml diligence 
wa# permitted^*
These exceptions, or exemple#, are In addition to 
the largest exception to the rule* namely, that a married woman, whose husband'a jus mariti and ju# 
adminl#tr#ioni$ had been excluded by deed* had 
oa%)aolty to grant personal obligations, and would 
incur lia b ility  under them, but the lia b ility  attached 
only to her estate, and no personal lia b ility  would 
follm;^* It must also be re^ nmibei'ed that for ante­
nuptial heritable debts of the wife, her heritable estate wa# liable, and for mnte-nuptial moveable debts, 
any separate moveable estate which she retained after 
marriage was primarily liable"^#
Before leaving the oommon law to view the 
fundamental changea wrought upon It by the series of
l e g i s l a t i v e  /
1. Fr.I* 520.2. For general discussion# at length, see Fr*I@ 535-556, Bee generally, also, Paten, p#i05# During the course of hie discussion, he notes that personal diligence was oowetent in certain oases against a married women -  as where a decree factum 
m S S t e t o  ’P®  pad#  a g a i n s t  h e r ,  “I S e B T f T ï»  5 5 9 - 6 ) ,  and, at p. 101, wcmre he states that the law admits of personal diligence against her wliem she has been convicted of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment, (F r.I,545 , which deals with other punishments for crime, states that, for a fine* her husband is  not liable# though her mm separate estate may be, provided that the husband's interests were not prejudiced thereby; that personal diligence could not followfor non-payment# though she could be arrested as in âittSlÆaJI.Jimtl that ®fee fâlgîit, toe, compelled''to retmvi stolen property. Bee delictual liab ilityp# 3 1 , Fn. 5 .3* Murray* p#25, (unless the obligation wa# one f a c t w  p r s e s t a n d i# *  )4* %$ra# fCTTo^ eTlsegfKIsband's Liability for Wife's Ante-Nuptial Debts"#
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l e g i s l a t i v e  ch an g ea  b e g in n in g  i n  1855 , t h e  w ords o f  
L ord  K in lo c h  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  F r a s e r  v* W a lk e r^ , p ro v id e  
a n  a d m ira b le  summary o f  w hat h a s  b een  d is c u s s e d *
" I n  so  f a r  a s  th e  m ere p h ra s e  i s  c o n c e rn e d , t h e r e  
c a n  be  no d o u b t t h a t  a  communio boporum i s  r e c o g n is e d  
by o u r  law  a s  e x i s t i n g  be tw een  husband  and  w i f e ,  i n  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e i r  m u tu a l m oveable  p r o p e r ty  . . *  B ut *** we 
m ust n o t  be l e d  a s t r a y  by a  m ere p h r a s e ,  b u t  m ust 
c a r e f u l l y  i n q u i r e  i n t o  w hat t h e  p h ra s e  h a s  t r u l y  
s i g n i f i e d . "  T ak in g  h i s  L o r d s h ip 's  o p in io n  i n  a  
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r  from  t h a t  i n  w h ich  h e  p r e s e n te d  
i t ,  L ord  K in lo o h  c o n s id e re d  t h a t  t h e  p h r a s e  communio" 5B3M.s^niST»sni.aiSfet.*a»i*ïs.fl^
bonqrum m ig h t be  l e g i t i m a t e l y  em ployed o n ly  t o  d e n o te  
t h e  r i g h t s  w h ich  ( u n t i l  The I n t e s t a t e  M oveable S u c c e s s io n  
A c t? ,  1855 , 8 ,6 )  a t t e n d e d  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
m a r r ia g e  by  th e  d e a th  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t n e r  v i z * ,  t h e  r i g h t  
o f  th e  s u r v iv in g  w ife  t o  one h a l f  o f  th e  m oveab le  e s t a t e  
j u r e  r e l i c t a e * and  t h e  r i g h t  o f  th e  p r e d e c e a s in g  w ife  
t o  t r a n s m i t  t h a t  one h a l f  s h a r e  t o  h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o r  t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  c la im  su c h  s h a re  a f t e r  h e r  d e a th *
" I t  h a s  b e en  r e a s o n a b ly  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e  p h r a s e  came 
t o  be  em ployed a s  a  su p p o sed  p h i lo s o p h ic  e x p o n e n t o f  
th e  r i g h t s  a r i s i n g  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n ,  and  t h a t ,  so  f a r  
from  a  communio bonorum  g iv in g  r i s e  t o  th e  r i g h t s  
em erg ing  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n ,  i t  was th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e s e  
r i g h t s  w hich  b ro u g h t  th e  p h ra s e  communio bonorum i n t o  
u s e .  A t a l l  e v e n t s ,  n o th in g  e l s e  was e v e r  l e g a l l y  
com prehended u n d e r  t h a t  name e x c e p t th e  tw o r i g h t s  
r e f e r r e d  t o .  Communio bonorum i n  th e  law  o f  S c o t la n d  
means t h e s e  two r i g h t s ,  and  n o th in g  e l s e , "  He c o u ld  
n o t  c o n s id e r  t h e  i u s  r e l i c t a e  t o  be a n y th in g  o th e r  
th a n  a  w id o w 's  r i g h t  o v e r  a  c e r t a i n  p a r t  o f  h e r  d e c e a se d  
h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e *  The r i g h t  o f  th e  p r e d e c e a s in g  w ife  
t o  a  p a r t  o f  th e  " h u s b a n d 's "  e s t a t e ,  w h ich  l ik e w is e  
c o n ta in e d  /
1* (1 872 ) 10 Maoph. 8 3 7 , a t  p p .847-8*2 ,  18 V i e t .  0 ,2 3 .
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o o n ta i ï io d  th e  esseric®  o f  a  r i g h t  i n  communio,  " h a s  
W e n  unknown t o  t h e  law  s in c e  t h e  d a te  o f  t h e  s t a t u t e  
on  2 5 th  May 1 8 5 5 ."  The l u s  r e l i c t a e ,  w h ich  was th e  
tw in  e v id e n c e  o f  a  oommunion o f  goods i n  B o o ts  Law, 
was g iv e n  o n ly  t o  a  widow ( o f  w h ich  c a te g o r y  th e  
d iv o r c e d  p u r s u e r  was n o t  a  member: t h e r e  h a d  b e en  a
c o n jo in e d  a c t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e ,  and  d e c re e  h ad  b e en  
p ro n o u n ced  a g a i n s t  b o th  p a r t i e s )  and  t h e r e  was no  r u l e  
i n  o u r  law  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  upon d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  
m a r r ia g e ,  f o r  w h a te v e r  r e a s o n ,  e ac h  " p a r t n e r "  was 
e n t i t l e d  t o  one h a l f  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s *  (S h o u ld  t h e r e  
now be  su c h  a  r u l e ? )  The p u r s u e r  e r r e d  i n  t a k in g  th e  
w ords "communio bonorum " t o  mean a  t r u e  and  r e a l  
pa% »tnership*
A g a in , a t  p # 8 4 7 , L ord  K in lo c h  g iv e s  w ha t h a s  
become a  w ell-knoirm  and f o r c e f u l  d e n ia l  o f  t h e  e x i s te n c e4o f  t h e  communio b o n o i ^  i n  S c o ts  Law , and  a c l e a r  
e x p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  common law  upon t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  
sp o u s e s  s t a n t e  m a tr im o n ie s -
" P u rs u in g  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  i t  becom es o b v io u s  
t h a t  no su c h  t h in g  h a s  e v e r  b een  d e n o te d  by  th e  e x p re s s io n  
a s  a  p r o p e r  p a r t n e r s h i p  o r  s o c i e t y  b e tw een  th e  sp o u se s  
d u r in g  th e  s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  m arriag e *  E m p h a tic a l ly  
t h e  r e v e r s e  h a s  b een  a g a in  and a g a in  h e ld *  D u rin g  th e  
s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e  t h e  husb an d  i s  n o t  m ere ly  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r ,  he  i s  t h e  dom inus o r  a b s o lu te  p r o p r i e t o r  
o f  a l l  th e  m oveab le  e s t a t e  b e lo n g in g  t o  b o th  p a r t i e s *  
W h atev e r i s  t h e  w i f e 's  p a s s e s  t o  him by  an  Im p lie d  l e g a l  
a s s i g n a t i o n ,  an d  becom es h i s  a s  much a s  w h a t i s  p r i m a r i l y  
h i s  own* He c a n  d is p o s e  o f  i t  a t  p l e a s u r e  w i th o u t  any  
a c c o u n ta b i l i ty *  I t  i s  a l l  l i a b l e  f o r  h i s  d e b ts  t o  th e  
e x t e n t  o f  one s h i l l i n g ,  n o r  c an  sh e  w ith d raw  any  p a r t  
from  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  po w er, n o r  i n  any  way i n t e r f e r e  w ith  
h i s  a b s o lu te  p r o p r i e t a r y  r i g h t*  A l l  t h i s  i s  t r ^ t i  j m ? is * 
I t  /
1 ,  q u o te d  by M u rray , p#198,
73.
I t  I s  I n  v a i n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  eay  t l m t  d u r in g  th e  e u b e ls te n o e  
o f  t l i e  m a r r ia g e  a  a o o le ty  o r  p a r t n e r s h i p ,  o r  a n y th in g  
re a e m h lln g  I t ,  e x i s t a  b e tw een  th e  apouaea#  The w ife  l a  
d e s t i t u t e  o f  an y  r i g h t .  The w hole  b e lo n g s  t o  t h e  husband# 
To c a l l  an y  p a r t  o f  t h e  e f f e o t a  th e  w i f e ' s  own d u r in g  t h e  
a u b a la te n o e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  l a  a  l e g a l  a o le e la m ."
f(
2& g_m g:^atg_M 2V @ ablg_8ugsg8^
The movement f o r  re fo rm  began  I n  1 6 5 5 , when t h e r e  
wma p a a a e d  The I n t e s t a t e  M oveable S u o o e a a lo n  A c t ,  1855^, 
knoim  an  " D u n lo p 's  A c t" ,  h a v in g  b een  p i l o t e d  # k ro u g h  
P a r l ia m e n t  by  M urray  D un lop , M$P# f o r  G reenook^#
By e#6  o f  t h a t  A c t ,  t h e  r i g h t ,  t o  a  s h a r e  o f  t h e
goods " I n  oom m union",o f th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a  w ife
who had  p re d e o e a e e d  h e r  h u sb a n d , was a b o l i s h e d ,  " n o r
s h a l l  any  L egacy  o r  B e q u e s t o r  T e s ta m e n ta ry  D la p o s l t lo n
t h e r e o f  by  su c h  w ife  a f f e c t  o r  a t t a c h  t o  t h e  s a i d  Goods
o r  any  p o r t i o n  t h e r e o f " .  I n  c a s e s  w here  t h e  w ife  d ie d
a f t e r  t h e  d a te  o f  t h e  A ct ( 2 5 th  May, 1 6 5 5 ) ,  th e  o ld
r u l e  ( t h a t  h e r  r e p r e e e n t a t l v e a  w ere  e n t i t l e d  t o  a  one
h a l f  s h a r e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 'a  m oveable p r o p e r ty  ( o f  t h e
goods " i n  oommunion") a a  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  h e r  d e a th )
b e in g  a c c # t e d  s h o u ld  t h e  w ife  have  d ie d  b e f o r e  t h a t  3d a t e  (o r  one t h i r d  i f  t h e r e  were c h i l d r e n ) .
T h u s , a s  L o rd  K ln lo c h  e x p la in e d ^ ,  one  o f  th e  m ain 
l l n k a  w i th  a  t r u e  oommunion o f  pro% )orty (ow ned by b o th  
ep o u aee  b u t  m anaged d u r in g  t l i e l r  j o i n t  l i v e s  by o n e , 
an d  t h e r e f o r e ,  on th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  by 
t h e  d e a th  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t y  d e s t in e d  t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h a t  
p a r t y ' s  a id e  o f  th e  f a m i ly ,  o r  c h o ic e  o f  l e g a t e e s  -  
I n  o t h e r  w o rd s , becom ing s e p a r a t e  onoe m ore^) was 
b ro k e n  /
S ee  M u rray , p#44* f o o tn o te  1 .K ennedy v .  B e l l  (1 8 6 4 ) 2 Macph# 5 6 7 ; M u rray , p#44#
1* 18  V l o t .  C .2 5 .2 *
3 .  ,  ,4» Fraaer v# walker, s u p r a ,  p p .- 71-72.5 ,  S e e , upon  t h i s  a rg u m e n t, and  th e  e l a b o r a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  communio o o m p rlsed  t h r o e  p a r t n e r s  ( h u s b a n d w R o ^  and  c h i ld r e n )  F r . I ,  671 -2 #
7 4 *
broken by this Act, while the pseudo-characteristics 
or alleged characteristics or consequences of the 
communio (the husband's twin rights) continued in
force for some years, aa Clive and^ -lflls©» note^*
By s#7, it was provided that "where a Marriage 
shall be dissolved before the Lapse of a Tear and Day 
from its Date, by the Death of One of the Spouses, 
the whole Rights of the Survivor and of the 
Representatives of the Predeoeaser shall be the same 
as if the Marriage had subsisted for the Period aforesaid*"
2Murray remarks that although it appeared that 
the Act was intended to affect moveable estate only, 
the provision was so general in Its terms that it 
covered teroe. The result was that a widow would take 
terce whether or not the marriage had subsisted for 
the time previously prescribed, (that is, a year and 
a day) but, on the matter of equality of treatment 
between the sexes, he comments that the Act did not 
alter the prerequisite of courtesy, namely, that 
a live child should have been b o m  of the marriage*
(If such child had been born, a claim for courtesy 
arose, however short the marriage, and if not, no 
claim arose, however long the marriage#)^
S^e^S2SX®i-SigSSS-iS£2Sland2_Arj2|^mgnt_^ot§ji_186l-1§74 
There followed the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) 
Amendment Acts, 1S61^ and 1874'^ , and in his consideration
of them, Murray comments that the concept of the jus
a i m  /
1. P .2 8 7 .2. p.45. See also Fr.II, 1083.3# Fr.II, 1121 and authorities there cited. No suchrequirement applied to terce.4# 24 and 25 Vlot# 0 .8 6 .5. 37 and 38 Vlot. c*31.6. p.45# (though Murray says that the husband tookthe produce of his life's heritage as her administrator, "and the arrangement was probably reasonabTeTH**~"*~”  early times#" Re industrial, and natural, fruits of land (the latter when attached to, and when separated from, the soil; the former deemed moveable even when still attached to the soil) see Fr.I, 694-5.)
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m a r i t i  e n te r e d  th e  law  a t  a  t im e  when t h e  s c o p e  o f  
m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  a s  a  s o u rc e  o f  w e a l th  h ad  n o t  b een  
c o î# re h e n d e d  f u l l y ,  and  a t  a  tim e  when " w e a lth  
c o n s i s t e d  s o l e l y  i n  la n d * "  A w i f e '#  p a r a p h e r n a l ia  
and  p eo u liu m  im u ld  c o v e r  w i th  t h e i r  p r o t e c t i v e  c lo a k  
m o s t , o r  a l l ,  o f  t h e  w i f e 's  m o v ea b le s , and  th o u g h  
o p rp u s  o f  h e r  h e r i t a g e  was h e r s ,  and th e  f e e  
r e s id e d  i n  h e r ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n  a  b ro a d  s e n s e ,  " h e r  
p o s s e s s io n  was h i s  p o s s e s s io n " ,  and  h e  to o k  th e  f r u i t s  
o f  t h e  l a n d ,  j u r e  m a r i t i ,  a n d , i n  h i s  r o l e  a s  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r ,  m anaged th e  h e r i t a g e .  L a t e r ,  when 
th e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  o t h e r  fo rm s o f  w e a lth  beoame a p p a r e n t ,  
and  th e  f lo w  o f  re a d y  money in c r e a s e d ,  " th e  o n ly  form  
o f  in v e s tm e n t  known was th e  le n d in g  o f  i t  upon  th e  
s e c u r i t y  o f  l a n d ,"  and  th e  law  v iew ed  a l l  su c h  lo a n s  
a s  h e r i t a b l e  i n  n a t u r e ,  w i th  th e  im p o r ta n t  c o n seq u e n ce  
t h a t ,  i f  th e y  had  b e en  made by th e  w i f e ,  th e y  rem a in ed  
h e r  p r o p e r t y ,  a n d , i f  th e y  had  b een  made by  th e  h u sb a n d , 
th e y  w ere  n o t  l i a b l e  t o  t e r c e ,  " u n le s s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by 
in f o f tm e n t" #  S i m i l a r ly ,  M urray s a y s ,  "p erm an en t 
lo a n s  on  p e r s o n a l  s e c u r i t y  w ere  l ik e n e d  t o  l a n d ,  and 
bonds b e a r in g  i n t e r e s t  o r  h a v in g  t r a g S u s
becam e fe u d g  p e c u n ia e ,  and  i,vlien a  w ife  had  
su o h  in v e s tm e n ts  th e y  rem a in ed  h e r  own *"
T h u s, t h e  common law  a p p e a re d  t o  be a d a p t in g  
i t s e l f  w i th  re m a rk a b le  and a d m ira b le  f l e x i b i l i t y  and  
in g e n u i ty  t o  t h e  new s i t u a t i o n ,  b u t  th e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  
u p h e a v a l o f  e ig h t e e n th  and  n i n e t e e n th  c e n tu r y  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  and th e  g ro w th  o f  j o i n t - s t o c k  
c o m p a n ie s , o f  fo rm s o f  In v e s tm e n t so  n o v e l t h a t  th e  
o ld  r u l e s  c o u ld  n o t  bend  t o  com pass and accom m odate 
th em , and  w h ic h , a s  a  r e s u l t ,  became t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
j u r e  m a r i t i ,  r e v e a le d  a  l a c k  i n  th e  la w , a s  d id  th e  
c o n tin u e d  r e s o r t  o f  th e  u p p e r  and m id d le  c l a s s e s  t o  
t h e  /
P*46<
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it h e  m a r r l a g e - c o n t r a o t ,  t o  a l l e v i a t e  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  *
A repoi'^t was p u b l is h e d  by th e  Law Amendment 
S o c ie ty  on  th e  s t a t e  o f  th e  law ; th e  h i s t o r y  o f  
a t t e m p ts  t o  re fo rm  th e  law  t h e r e a f t e r ,  c u lm in a t in g ,  
f o r  S c o t la n d ,  i n  th e  C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  ( S c o t la n d )  
Amendment A c t , 1 8 6 1 , i a  d e s c r ib e d  by M u rra y " ,
The A c t ,  by 8 * 1 , ,  e n t i t l e d  a  d e s e r t e d  w ife  t o
o b ta in  a  P r o t e c t io n  O rd e r , and  th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  was 
t o  s a f e g u a r d  from  th e  h u sb a n d , h i s  a s s ig n e e s  o r  
c r e d i t o r s ,  t h e  w i f e 's  m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  o th e rw is e  
d e s t in e d  t o  f a l l  u n d e r  t h e  ju s  m q rit;l  * p r o v id e d  t h a t  
t h a t  p r o p e r ty  was a c q u i r e d ,  i n h e r i t e d ,  o r  e a rn e d  by  
h e r  a f t e r  t h e  d e s e r t i o n .
T h is  p r o t e c t i o n  d id  n o t  a r i s e  w here  th e  h u sb a n d , 
o r  o t h e r  p a r t y  c la im in g  th ro u g li  h im , had  o b ta in e d  
la w f u l  p o s s e s s io n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  i n  q u e s t io n  b e f o r e  
th e  " P r o t e c t io n  O rd e r"  p ro c e e d in g s  had  b e g u n , o r  
d i l i g e n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r o p e r ty  was w e l l  i n  hand  b e fo r e  
t h a t  d a te  ( s ,4 ) #  M a t te r s  w ould r e t u r n  t o  t h e  p re v io u s  
p o s i t i o n  ( b e f o r e  p r o t e c t i o n )  i f  c o h a b i t a t i o n  was 
re su m ed , e x c e p t  t h a t  th e  w ife  r e t a in e d  h e r  new -foun d  
pow ers o v e r  th e  p r o p e r ty  w hich  sh e  h ad  a c q u i r e d  i n  th e  
i n t e r i m ,  " p r o t e c t io n "  p e r io d  ( s , 3 ) .  The same r e s u l t  
fo l lo w e d  w here  t h e  p a r t i e s  resum ed c o h a b i t a t i o n  a f t e r  
j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  ( s # 6 ) ,  s u b j e c t  t o  any  o t h e r  w r i t t e n  
a g re e m e n t b e tw een  th em .
I t  was n o ta b le  t h a t ,  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  A ct sh o u ld  f o l lo w , th e  w ifp  s h o u ld  h ave  
o b ta in e d  th e  d e c re e  o f  s e p a r a t io n  ( s * 6 ) .  I n  t h a t  
c a s e  /
1 * See i n f r ^ ,  p* 104 w here t h e  w ife  h e ld  h e r  p r o p e r ty  e x c lu s iv e  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  j u s  ^ r i t i  a n d  ju s  
a d m in is t r e t io i tW  ( B ig g a r t  v ^ ^ i t y l S r G l a s g o w  *Banki n  t h a t  c a s e  th e  w ife  had  r e c e iv e d  th e  p r o p e r t y ,  w i th  w h ich  sh e  made th e  in v e s tm e n t ,  by  b e q u e s t  from  h e r  f a t h e r ,  w hich  b e q u e s t  e x c lu d e d  th e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t s ) *2, pp#46#48 .
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c a s e ,  and  I n  th e  c a s e  w here sh e  had  o b ta in e d  a  
P r o t e c t i o n  O rd e r  ( 8 , 5 ) ,  h e r  pow ers o v e r  a c q u ir e n d a  
w ere  th o s e  o f  t h e  u n m a rr ie d  woman, and  t h i s  in c lu d e d  
t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  h e r  i n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e  w ould d e v o lv e  
upon  h e r  own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  " a s  i f  h e r  h u sb an d  had  
b e e n  th e n  d ead "*  ( s ,6 $ )  *
The and  t h e r e f o r e ,
w ere  e x c lu d e d  from  t h e  a c o u ir^ n d a  o f  t h e  w i f e ,  upon 
t h e  g r a n t  o f  d e c r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  t o  h e r ,  o r  
upon  t h e  m aking an d  I n t im a t io n  o f  t h e  P r o t e c t i o n  O rder#  
(s* 6 s  8*5*# 8*5 e q u a te d  th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  a
P r o t e c t i o n  O rd e r  and  a  d e c r e e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  " i n  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  r i g h t s ,  and  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  th e  husband  
a n d  o f  t h e  w i f e ,  and  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  w i f e ' s  c a p a c i ty  
t o  su e  and  be  su e d " * )  D u rin g  th e  s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  
P r o t e c t i o n  O rd e r ,  and  d u r in g  s e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  w ife  
c o u ld  s u e  an d  b e  su ed  a s  f r e e l y  a s  c o u ld  an  u n m a rr ie d  
woman (s* 6 * )*
C o n v e rse ly  ( s * 6 * ) ,  t h e  husband  " s h a l l  n o t  be 
l i a b l e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  any  o b l i g a t i o n  o r  c o n t r a c t  sh e  
may have  e n te r e d  i n t o ,  o r  f o r  any  w ro n g fu l A c t o r  
O m iss io n  by h e r ,  o r  f o r  any  C o s ts  sh e  may i n c u r  a s  
P u r s u e r  o r  D e fe n d e r o f  any  A c t io n ,  a f t e r  th e  D a te  o f  
s u c h  D ecree  o f  S e p a r a t io n  and  d u r in g  th e  S u b s is te n c e  
t h e r e o f ;  p ro v id e d  t h a t  w here  upon any  su c h  S e p a r a t io n  
A lim e n t h a s  b e e n  d e c re e d  o r  o rd e re d  t o  be  p a id  t o  t h e  
W ife  and t h e  same s h a l l  n o t  be d u ly  p a id  by th e  
H usband , h e  s h a l l  be  l i a b l e  f o r  N e c e s s a r ie s  s u p p l ie d  
f o r  h e r  U se*"
S e c t io n  /
1* See i n f r a  C h a p te r  5 (2 )  (R ig h ts  on  D ea th )#  T h iss e c t ! I o n " ? k i l l  p r o v id e s  t h e  r u l e  upon s u c c e s s io n  t o  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e ,  a c q u i r e d  a f t e r  d e c re e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n ,  o f  a  m a r r ie d  woman h o ld in g  su c h  d e c re e *  The 
d e c e a s e d  w ife  m ust h av e  b e en  th e  p u r s u e r  i n  th e  l i t i g a t i o n ,  and  m ust h ave  d ie d  i n t e s t a t e ,  and  th e  
e s t a t e  i n  q u e s t io n  m ust have  b e en  a c q u i r e d  a f t e r  s e p a r a t io n *  The p r o v i s io n  i s  t h e r e f o r e  m ost s p e c i f i c ,  and  i s  a  " c u r io u s "  le g a c y  o f  a n  o l d e r  " m a tr im o n ia l  reg im e"  and i s  p e rh a p s  i n  n e ed  o f  amendment ( C l iv e  and  W ilso n  p p # 6 9 0 -1 )*
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S e c t io n  16 o o n ta in s  a  p r o v i s io n  w h ich  waa 
b e n e f i c i a l  ( th o u g h  th e  b e n e f i t  was more m o d est th a n  
t h e  p o m p o s ity  o f  la n g u a g e  a t  f i r s t  s u g g e s t s )  t o  
m a r r ie d  women g e n e r a l l y ,  and  n o t  s im p ly  t o  t h o s e ,  
d e s e r t e d  o r  i n  m a r r ia g e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  who h ad  ta k e n  
s t e p s  by  l i t i g a t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  p r o p e r ty  o r  
r e g u l a t e  t h e i r  p o s i t io n *  A cqu;lron%  o b ta in e d  by 
t h e  w ife *  by  m eans o f  s u c c e s s io n *  d o n a t io n ,  b e q u e s t ,
" o r  any  o t h e r  Means th a n  by th e  E x e ro is e  o f  h e r  
I n d u s t r y " ,  w as n o t  a b le  t o  b e  a t t a c h e d  by  t h e  h u sb a n d , 
o r  any  p e r s o n  c la im in g  th ro u g h  h im , a s  fo rm in g  p a r t  
o f  th e  c p m u n ip  ÿipnorui;* o r  a s  f a l l i n g  u n d e r  th e  
im â M . M l M i S S M f f l i i *  " e x q e p t on -the o n n d i t i o n1o f  m aking  th e r e f ro m  a  r e a s o n a b le  Pi"*ovision f o r  t h e  
S u p p o r t  and  M a in te n an c e  o f  th e  W ife , i f  e  C la im  t h e r e f o r  
be  made on  h e r  B e h a l f ; " .  A g a in , th e  r u l e  w as made 
s u b j e c t  t o  th e  h u s b a n d 's  n o t  h a v in g  o b ta in e d  p o s s e s s io n  
o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  o r  h i s  c r e d i t o r s '  n o t  h a v in g  e x e r c i s e d  
d i l i g e n c e  o v e r  i t  (o n c e  m ore t o  th e  p o i n t  o f  a r r e s tm e n t  
and  fu r th c o m in g , o r  p o in d in g  and s a l e )  b e f o r e  th e  
c la im  f o r  t h e  w ife  w as p u t  fo n /a r d *
The m anner o f  e x p r e s s io n  o f  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  
som ew hat g r a n d io s e ,  and  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  c l e a r *  An 
a f f i r m a t i v e  /
1* S ee  C la r k  v* C* (1 8 6 1 ) 6 R*723, p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r  L * P * In g lis  a t  p * 7 2 5 . T a y lo r  v ,  T . (1 8 7 1 ) 9  Maoph* 
893 (w h ich  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  o f  8*16 c o u ld  a p p ly  t o  p r o p e r ty  a c q u i r e d  b e f o r e  th e  p a s s in g  o f  t h e  A c t -  s e e  p e r  L * J* C le rk  M o n e re if f  a t  p*895)*  J a c k  v* F e rg u so n  (1 876 ) 5 R*624* F e rg u so n  v# F* (1 8 7 1 ) 10 M acph*54; som ner v# S*s* 
T r u s te e  (1 8 7 1 ) 9 M acph*594, p e r  Ls* Cowan and H eaves a t  p * 5 9 6 ; and  s e e  M u rray , p # 5 0 , f o o tn o te  3# 
See g e n e r a l l y  F r* I*  630-836* He comm ents (8 3 5 -6 )  t h a t  a  p r o v i s i o n  made u n d e r  S*16, th o u g h  made s t w t e  m a;^ im o n io  and  by  husbem d t o  w if e  ( i n  a  m anner o% s p e a k in g ) ,  was n o t  r e v o c a b le  n o r  rev o k ed  by h i s  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  u n l ik e  a  v o l u n ta r y ,  common law  d o n a t io n  ( F o r  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  d o n a t io n s  b e tw een  h u sb an d  and  w if e  -  a t  l e a s t  a t  common law  -  a s  t o  w ha t was o n ly  p a r a p h e r n a l ,  ( i r r e v o c a b l e  an d  n o n - a t t a c h a b l e )  s e e  s u p r a ,  pp* 21 -  22 e t  seq .
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a f f i r m a t i v e  s ta te m e n t*  su c h  a s  t h a t  th e  h u sb an d  w ould 
h a v e  r i g h t  t o  a o g u ire n d a  a8 d e f in e d ,  o n ly  upon  th e  
m ak ing  th e re f ro m  o f  a  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s io n  f o r  t h e  
w i f e ,  w ould  h av e  b e en  p r e f e r a b le *  F u r t h e r ,  i t  i s  
s u g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e  g ru d g in g  e le m e n t in t r o d u c e d  by 
t h e  a p p a r e n t  n e o e s e i ty  o f  th e  w ife  t o  c la im  th e  
p r o v i s io n  ( s e e  p h r a s in g  o f  A ct and  t e n o r  o f  o a s e s )  
c o u ld  h av e  b e en  e x c lu d e d  w i th  p r o f i t .  I n  o t h e r  
w o rd s , th e  w ife  was now e n t i t l e d  t o  a  r e a s o n a b le  
p r o v i s i o n  o u t  o f  a  d e f in e d  p a r t  o f  h e r  o^m p r o p e r ty  
b u t  o n ly  upon demand made b e f o r e  t h e  h u sb an d  to o k  
p o s s e s s io n  o f  th e  p r o p e r ty  o r  h i s  c r e d i t o r s  c o m p le te d  
d i l i g e n c e  o v e r  i t #
In 1870, the (English)
A q tf 1870 * was p a s s e d .  T h is  s e c u re d  f o r  m a r r ie d  
women t h e  s e p a r a t e  o w n ersh ip  o f  t h e i r  e a r n in g s  
( o b ta in e d  a f t e r  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  t h e  A c t)  from  
em ploym ent c a r r i e d  on s e p a r a t e l y  from  t h e  h u sb a n d , 
o r  a r i s i n g  from  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  l i t e r a r y ,  a r t i s t i c  o r  
s c i e n t i f i c  s k i l l ,  and  th e  In v e s tm e n t incom e from  th o s e  
e a rn in g s #
S im i la r  p r o v i s io n s  w ere  made c o n c e rn in g  d e p o s i t s  
i n  s a v in g s  banlcs, banlt s t o c k s ,  j o i n t  s to c k  company 
s h a r e s ,  and  b u i ld in g  o r  o th e r  s o c i e t y  s h a r e s ,  w hich  
t h e r e a f t e r  m ig h t be h e ld  i n  th e  w i f e 's  name a s  h e r  
s e p a r a t e  p ro p e r ty *  She m ig lit a l s o ,  u n d e r  t h e  te rm s  
o f  th e  A c t ,  e f f e c t  a  p o l i c y  o f  in s u r a n c e  o v e r  h e r  
own o r  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  l i f e  f o r  h e r  own u s e  and  b e n e f i t ,  
and  su e  i n  any  l i t i g a t i o n  c o n c e rn in g  h e r  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r ty  o r  w ages# The ( j u s t i f i a b l e )  o b v e r s e ,  a s  i t  
w e re , w as th e  rem oval from  th e  h u sb a n d , and  th e  
im p o s i t io n  on th e  w i f e ,  o f  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  w i f e 's  
a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t s ,  and th e  d u ty  t o  m a in ta in  h e r  
h u sb a n d , i f  sh e  was a b le  t o  do s o ,  and  i f  he  was 
u n a b le  /
1 ,  33 and 34 V lo t ,  0 .9 3 ,
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u n a b le  t o  m a in ta in  h im s e lf^  and  so  a l s o  t o  m a in ta in  
h e r  c h i l d r e n ,  ( th o u g h , upon c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  th e  
e t a t u t e  n o t  ( y e t )  g r a n d c h i ld r e n ,  Colem an v* Birm ingham  
O v e r s e e r s ,  su p ^ a  ) i n  th e  same way a s  l i a b i l i t y  t h e r e f o r  
f e l l  t o  a  widow* b u t  w ith  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  " n o th in g  
i n  t h i a  A ct s h a l l  r e l i e v e  h e r  husband  from  any  
l i a b i l i t y  a t  p r e s e n t  im posed  upon him by law  t o  
m a in ta in  h e r  c h i l d r e n , "
T h u s, t h e  re fo rm s  c o n t in u e d ,  and  w ith  them  grew  
a  r e a l i s a t i o n  th a t*  a s  th e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  m a r r ie d  women 
in c re a s e d *  so  m ust g r e a t e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f a l l  upon 
them * A re f in e m e n t  upon th e  1870 p r o v i s io n s  
c o n c e rn in g  l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  w ife  f o r  h e r  own a n t e - n u p t i a l  
d e b ts  and  a p p ly in g  a l s o  t o  t o r t i o u s  l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
w ife  o r  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  b re a c h  o f  c o n tr a c t*  i s  c o n ta in e d  
i n  th e  M a rr ie d  w om en's P r o p e r ty  A ct (1 8 7 0 ) Amendment 
A ct* 1874*9 p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  s , 5 ,  and im posed  on th e  
h u sb an d  l i a b i l i t y  g e n e r a l l y  w h e re , and  t o  t h e  e x te n t  
t o  w h ic h , a s s e t s  o f  th e  w ife  had  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  husband*
The C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  ( S c o t la n d )  Amendment A ct» 1874*^
J u s t i c e  f o r  t h e  l e s s  w e a lth y  was s c o u re d  by th e
g r a n t  t o  th e  s h r i e v a l  bench* o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  
d e te rm in e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  by  d e s e r t e d  w iv es  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  
o rd e r s *  and  t h e  r e c a l l  th e r e o f *  N e v e r th e le s s  even  
r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  S h e r i f f  c o u r t s  was e x p e n s iv e *  and 
p o s s ib l y  t h e  g ro w in g  s t a t u t o r y  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  w iv es  was 
d e n ie d  t o  many w iv e s  m ost i n  n eed  o f  i t *  To some 
e x t e n t ,  t h o s e  a b le  to  a v a i l  th e m se lv e s  o f  t h e  A c t 's
p r o v i s io n s  w ere  th o s e  whose p r o p e r ty  was l i k e l y  t o  be%p r o t e c t e d  by p r i v a t e  p a c t io n r *  O th e rw is e , muoh w ould 
depend  /
1* 37 and 38 V i e t ,  c .5 0 ,2* 37 and  38 V ie t*  c*31*3 ,  M a r r ie g e v c o n tr a o ts  w ere  a  d e v ic e  f o r  t h e  w e a l th y ,  and  j u d i c i a l  u t t e r a n c e s  r e f l e c t  t h i s  p o s i t io n *  An exam ple 
i s  fo u n d  p e r  L*De&8 i n  R u s t v* S m ith  (1 8 6 $ ) 3 Macph* 378 /
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depend on whether husband or wife was liable for the
legal expenses involved in obtaining relief under the"1Acts of 1861 or 1874 # It is to be noted that the 
Act of 1861 , 8 .6p  imposed on the successful wife 
pursuer, liability for her own "costs" in any action 
she might sue or defend, "after the Date of such 
Decree of Separation and during the Subsistence 
thereof." (Neither the Act of 1877 nor that of 1881^ 
absolved the husband of his liability to meet all the 
expenses of divorce at his instance, (or, presumably, 
at her instance) unless the wife had separate estate, 
which in this context was held to mean something more 
than possibly fluctuating wages. If the husband was 
unable to do so, an application for the admission of
him and his wife to the poor's roll was in order.)%In Milne v* Milne, there is an interesting sociological 
note in Lord Adam's opinions " - if we look above the 
labouring classes, where a wife may be capable of 
earning wages, ninety-nine married women out of a 
hundred have no separate estate of their own, and no 
power of earning it;".
The Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1877M  m  (tat M  W  W  H  • •  w  W  «»**■ W» m  V *  M* <w* «ni •»»«)•»>>*»*>!• •¥•■!» A  tw  «a. « >  in» «W
As England borrowed, in the sphere of matrimonial 
property law, from America, so did Scotland, in 1877, 
borrow from England in order to create the Married 
Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1877^. Murray 
remarks^ severely that this Act "is merely a clumsy 
adaptation /
378 at p*383§- "There was no antenuptial contract, which is not to be wondered at considering the position in life of the parties, the husband being at that time a journeyman copper, earning only about 14s, per week,",1. See generally Clive & Wilson pp.597-601 ; Article "Expenses in Divorce Cases", Frank Bat ■ 1974 S.L.T. 45.2 . discussed generally infra.3. (1885) 13 R.304, at ppTgOB/Og.4. 40 and 41 Viet, g,29.5. p.53.
8 2 , *
a d a p ta t i o n  " o f  p a r t s  o f  th e  Engll& h A cts#  and  t h a t  
t h e  B i l l s  o f  1857 o r  1869 ( t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  w h ich  he 
d e s c r ib e s )  w ere  t o  be  p r e f e r r e d  i n  any c a s e  t o  th e  
f i n a l  E n g l i s h  l e g i s l a t i o n  upon w hich  th e  S o o ts  A ct 
o f  1877 was m odelled*  F r a s e r  I s  ev en  m ore s c a th in g  
i n  h i s  o p in io n ^  * " I t  i s  t o  be r e g r e t t e d  t h a t  t h e  
G overnm ent o f  t h e  d ay  a c q u ie s c e d  i n  im p e r f e c t  a m a te u r  
l e g i s l a t i o n  l i k e  t h i s #  to u c h in g  a s  i t  d o e s  i n t e r e s t s  
8 0  d e l i c a t e  and  im p o r ta n t*  The A c t u n s e t t l e s  
e v e r y th in g ,  and  settles n o th in g * "  N e v e r th e le s s #  the 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  ch an g e  h ad  b e en  a c c e p te d ,  how ever d e f e c t i v e  
may h av e  b een  t h e  v e h ic l e  b e a r in g  i t #
The h u s b a n d 's  j u s  m a r i t i  and  j u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s  
w ere  ex c lu d ed #  u n d e r  t h i s  A c t, from  1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  1878 , 
from  th e  w ages and  e a r n in g s  o f  any  m a r r ie d  woman, 
a c q u i r e d  o r  g a in e d  by  h e r  i n  any em ploym ent, o c c u p a tio n  
o r  t r a d e  i n  w hich  sh e  was engaged  o r  i n  any  b u s in e s s  
c a r r i e d  on u n d e r  h e r  own nam e, and  a l s o  from  an y  money 
o r  p r o p e r ty  a c q u i r e d  by h e r  th ro u g h  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  
any  l i t e r a r y #  a r t i s t i c ,  o r  s c i e n t i f i c  s k i l l ,  "an d  su ch  
w ag es , e a r n in g s ,  m oney, o r  p r o p e r ty ,  and a l l  In v e s tm e n ts  
t h e r e o f #  s h a l l  b e  deemed t o  be  s e t t l e d  t o  h e r  s o le  and 
s e p a r a t e  u s e ,  and  h e r  r e c e i p t s  s h a l l  be  a  good d is c h a r g e  
f o r  su c h  w ages, e a r n in g s ,  m oney, o r  p r o p e r ty  and  
in v e s tm e n ts  th e r e o f » "  (8*3#)*
Thus# t h e r e  was e x te n d e d  th e r e b y  a  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  
a l l  m a r r ie d  women whose c ir c u m s ta n c e s  w ere  c o v e re d  by 
t h e  te rm s  o f  t h e  A ct* I t  c o m p le te s  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  
p ro v id e d  by  S#16 o f  th e  1861 A c t ,  w h ich  p r o t e c t e d  
a c q u ir e n d a  o f  th e  w ife  o b ta in e d  by "an y  o t h e r  Means 
t h a n  by  t h e  E x e r c is e  o f  h e r  own I n d u s t r y " *
S e c t io n  4  l i m i t e d  th e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  i n  any  
m a r r ia g e  t a k in g  p la c e  a f t e r  th e  A ct f o r  t h e  a n t e - n u p t i a l  
d e b ts  /
1* F r* I I#  1511*
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d e b ts  o f  h i s  w ife  t o  t h e  v a lu e  o f  any  p r o p e r ty  
( u n s p e c i f i e d  ae  t o  t y p e ,  and  h e n o e , a s  F r a s e r  n o t e s ,  
h e r i t a b l e  o r  m oveab le ) "w hich  he  s h a l l  h av e  r e c e iv e d  
from * th r o u g h ,  o r  I n  r i g h t  o f  h i s  w ife  a t ,  o r  b e f o r e ,  
o r  s u b s e q u e n t t o  t h e  m a rr ia g e " *  and  any  c o u r t  w h ich  
came t o  d e l i b e r a t e  upon  th e  i a s u e  o f  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
su c h  d e b t  s h o u ld  "h av e  pow er t o  d i r e c t  any  in q u i r y  
o r  p ro c e e d in g s  w h ich  i t  may th in k  p r o p e r  f o r  t h e  
p u rp o se  o f  a G o e r ta in ln g  th e  n a t u r e ,  amount# and  v a lu e  
o f  su c h  p ro p e r ty " #  T h is  i s  s t i l l  th e  r u l e  w hich  
g o v e rn s  a  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  h i s  w i f e ' s  a n te ­
n u p t i a l  d e b t s ,  th o u g h  th e  f re q u e n c y  w i th  w h ich  su c h  
q u e s t io n s  w i l l  a r i s e  o r  i n  w hich  th e  p r o v i s i o n  w i l l  
be  u s e f u l  c a n n o t  be  g re a t^ *  P r i o r  t o  t h e  com ing 
i n t o  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n ,  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  
iwas f o r  a l l  t h e  a n te - n u p t i& l  m oveable d e b ts  o f  th egw if e  # T h is  s t a t u t o r y  m o d i f ic a t io n  and  r e - s t a t e m e n t  
o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  ( a p p ro x im a tin g  t o  t h e  
E n g l i s h  p o s i t i o n  ms m o d if ie d  by t h e  M*w*P*Act (1870) 
Amendment A c t ,  1874^) d id  n o t  t a k e  from  t h e  p r im a ry  
l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  w i f e 's  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  ( i f  an y ) f o r  
t h e s e  d e b ts ^ #  The A ct o f  1877 was p r o d u c t iv e  o f  
many q u e r ie s ^ *
S e c t io n  /
1» See Clive and Wilson» pp.265-266,
! •  p *
5# F o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p o s s ib l e  p e r s o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  t o  d i l i g e n c e  f o r  t r a d e  d e b ts  o f  a l & * r l e 3  woman 
t r a d e r ,  and  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  a t  t h a t  d a te  (1 8 7 6 ) o f  r e n d e r in g  h e r  b a n k ru p t ,  s e e  F r # I I ,  1 3 1 8 -1 9 ; f o r  o t h e r  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  h e r  h y b rid #  " a d o le s c e n t " ,  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  b u s in e s s  w o r ld , s e e  M u rray , p ,3 7  ^77* ( d i s c h a r g e  by m a r r ie d  woman o f  o f f i c e  o f  t r u s t e e . )  Upon t h e  c h a n g in g  n a tu r e  (an d  p o t e n t i a l  s i z e )  o f  a  w i f e ' s  a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t s ,  s e e  M u rray , pp*58-60*  ( i n c l u d in g  th e  p r o p e r ty  c o n se q u e n c e s  f o r  t h e  sp o u se s  
w here th e  w ife  was a  c o n t r ib u to r y  o f  a  company w hich  became %fcimd u p ) .
See g e n e r a l l y  W alton# Ghap*XXII; d u r a t i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  -  F r # I I ,  1518: W alton# p # 2 iO ,
8 4 .
S e c t io n  5 p r e s e r v e d  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  m a r r ie d  women 
g e n e r a l ly  a s  t o  a o q u ire n d a  o b ta in e d  o t h e r  t h a n  by
e a rn in g s *  w h ich  h a d  b e en  c o n fe r r e d  by th e  A cte  o f  1861* 
and  1874'^.
The A ct wae a d m ira b le  i n  i t s  alm a* b u t  i n  i t s  
w o rd in g  a  d e te rm in e d  h u sb an d  o o u ld  f i n d  a r e a s  o f  d o u b t 
t o  be  e x p lo i te d *  F o r exam ple* tn e  S o o ts  A c t c o n f in e d  
i t s  b e n e f i t s  o^oad  b u a in e a a  p r o f i t a *  t o  "an y  b u a in e a a  
w h ich  sh e  c a r r i e a  on u n d e r  h e r  own nam e". The 
E n g l i s h  A ct u se d  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  te rm in o lo g y *  and 
endowed w i th  p r o t e o t i o n  w ages and e a r n in g s  a c q u i r e d  
o r  g a in e d  " i n  any  em ploym ent* o c c u p a t io n ,  o r  t r a d e  i n  
w h ich  sh e  i s  engaged  o r  w hich  sh e  c a r r i e s  on  s e p a r a t e l y  
A s m  ( S . 1 . ) .  As f a r  a s  w ages and
e a r n in g s  w ere  co n cern ed *  th e  l a t t e r  p h r a s e  was o m it te d  
from  t h e  S c o ts  Act* " th u s  le a v in g  room f o r  th e  
c o n s t r u c t io n *  t h a t  t h e  e a r n in g s  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  w ife  i f  
th e  t r a d e  b e  i n  h e r  own nam e, th o u g h  slie  end  h e r  husband  
be  l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r ;  and  ev en  i n  E n g lan d  su c h  w ould 
seem t o  be  t h e  law ^"*  G r i f f i t h  comments'^ t h a t  th e  
m ere f a c t  t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d  was l i v i n g  i n  t h e  h o u se  a t  
t h e  t im e  t h e  b u s in e s s  was b e in g  c a r r i e d  on  d i d  n o t  
d e p r iv e  t h e  w if e  o f  t h e  p r o t e o t i o n  o f  t h e  A ct* b u t  
t h a t  /
1 * The s t a t u t o r y  im provem en ts w ere  p re c e d e d  i n  some o a s e s  by a  s o f t e n in g  j u d i c i a l  t r e n d  o f  o p in io n  and  
a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  lo o k  b e h in d  th e  s t r i c t  ru le *  F o r  exam ple* i n  R u s t v* S m ith  su p ra*  p e r  h .D e a s ,  a g a in  a t  p»383* i s  fo u n d  th e  f o l lo w in g  s e n t im e n t : -  " I t  i s  no d o u b t t r u e  t h a t  th e  w hole p r o f i t s  o f  th e  g r o c e r y  b u s in e s s  b e lo n g ed *  i n  law* t o  t h e  husband* b u t  i t  d o e s  n o t  f o l lo w  t h a t  we a r e  n o t  t o  t a k e  i n t o  v iew  t h a t  t h e  s o u rc e  o f  t h e s e  p r o f i t s  was th e  I n d u s t r y  and  e x e r t i o n s  o f  t h e  w ife *  a s  a n  e q u i t a b l e  c o n s id e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  t h i s  co n v ey an ce  w as a  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s io n  f o r  th e  w i f e " ,  M urray* p * 3 4 . 
f o o tn o te  2* t a k e s  t h i s  p o in t*  and  a l s o  ( f o o tn o te  3) n o te s  t h e  v i s i b l e  t r a c e s  o f  th e  E n g l i s h  p a re n ta g e  o f  t h e  A c t i n  th e  p h r a s e ,  "deem ed t o  b e  s e t t l e d  t o  h e r  s o l e  and  s e p a r a t e  u se "*2 ,  M urray* p*36* q u o t in g  P r* I I*  1514#3# p*47-48* c i t i n g  L o v e l l  v# Mevfton 4  C#P#D, 12* p e rDenman* J*
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t h a t#  I f  t h e  s p o u s e s  l i v e d  i n  th e  same h o u s e , i t  
m ig h t b e  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  be c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  
was t r u l y  s e p a r a te *  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e  b u s in e s s  was 
c a r r i e d  on th e r e *  H ow ever, h e  f e l t  t h a t ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  
c o h a b i t a t i o n  was i r r e l e v a n t #  M urray a g r e e s  t h a t  t h i s  
r e s u l t  was in te n d e d  by th e  s t a t u t e ,  b u t  a d d s  t h a t ,
" b e f o r e  th e  w ife  c a n  c a r r y  on  su ch  a  t r a d e  sh e  m u s t, 
w h i le  l i v i n g  w ith  h e r  h u sb a n d , have  h i s  c o n s e n t^ " .
I t  m ig h t be  p o s s ib l e  t o  t a k e  i s s u e  w ith  M urray 
h e r e ,  and  t o  do t h i s  r e f e r e n c e  may be made w i th  p r o f i t  
t o  t h e  A m erican  a u t h o r i t y  c i t e d  by F r a s e r  i n  h i s  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  A c t o f  1877, w here  h e  s a y s  t h a t  
i n  e v e ry  S t a t e  e x c e p t  V i r g i n i a ,  th e  o ld  common law  a s  
t o  h u sb an d  and  w ife  h ad  b een  m o d if ie d  t o  a  g r e a t e r  
o r  l e s s  d e g r e e ,  and  th u s  p ro v id e d  a  r i c h  seam  o f  
d e c i s io n s  t o  b e  e x p lo r e d .
The A m erican  l e g i s l a t o r s ,  he  s a y s ,  p r o f i t e d  from  
e x p e r ie n c e  an d  i n  t h e  l a t e r  s t a t u t e s  r e f r a i n e d  from  
" th e  d a n g e ro u s  g e n e r a l i t y  and  lo o s e n e s s "  o f  t h e  e a r l i e r  
ones#  The w i f e ' s  p o w e rs , t h e  t im e  when sh e  m ig h t 
e x e r c i s e  them , t h e  m easu re  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  
and  h e r  own, and th e  r e q u i s i t e  p u b l ic  n o t i c e  o f  h e r  
in te n d e d  in d e p e n d e n t  a c t io n #  w ere d e f in e d  w ith  a n  
e x a c t i t u d e  s a d ly  la c k in g  i n  t h e  S c o ts  A ct#
pF r a s e r  n o t i c e s  t h a t  s#3  a t  once s u g g e s t s  a  
nim iber o f  q u e s t io n s ,  o f  w h ich  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  i s : -  
c a n  th e  w i f e ,  w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  and  a g a i n s t  
h i s  w is h e s ,  " h i r e  h e r s e l f  o u t  t o  la b o u r  i n  o r d e r  t o  
e a r n  w a g e s" , o r  open  a  shop  and  t a k e  th e  p r o f i t s  th e r e o f ?  
The A ct d e a l s  e x p r e s s ly  o n ly  w i th  th e  s e c o n d a ry  m a t te r  -  
h a v in g  e a rn e d  th e  w a g es , sh e  may u se  them  a s  sh e  w is h e s .
M igh t s h e ,  a g a i n s t  h i s  w i l l ,  d e v o te  h e r  w hole  t im e  
t o  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  an y  l i t e r a r y  a r t i s t i c  o r  s c i e n t i f i c  
s k i l l  /
1 #■ p  * 5 6  *2# G e n e ra l ly  F r . I I ,  1511-1516,
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s k i l l  w i th  w h ich  sh e  may h ave  b e en  endowed i n  o r d e r  
t o  e a rn  money and  p r o f i t s  w h ich  sh e  h e r s e l f  i s  t o  
e n jo y ,  and  w h ic h , a c c o rd in g  t o  som e^, sh e  n e e d  n o t  
a p p ly  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  hu sb an d  and  fa m ily ?  I f  
i t  was n o t  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e n t  t h a t  sh e  sh o u ld  be 
a b le  t o  do s o ,  how was h e r  hu sb an d  t o  c o n t r o l  h e r?
I f  sh e  a c t ,  a g a i n s t  h i s  w i l l ,  and  a c h ie v e  s u c c e s s  i n  
h e r  c h o se n  f i e l d  o f  p a id  e n d e a v o u r, was t h e  p r o f i t  
a r i s i n g  h e r s  a lo n e  o r  h e r s  a t  a l l ?  D id  h e r  
d is o b e d ie n c e  o f  t h e  w ish e s  o f  t h e  p a t e r  f a m i l i e s  d e b a r  
h e r  from  th e  a b s o lu te  u s e  t h e r e o f ,  a s  I f  s# 3  had  n e v e r  
b e en  e n a c te d ?  " I f  th e  h u sb an d  d o e s  n o t  c o n s e n t  t o  
h i s  w ife  becom ing a  t r a d e r ,  w i l l  any  b i l l s  sh e  g r a n t s ,  
o r  c o n t r a c t s  sh e  e n t e r s  i n t o ,  be  b in d in g  upon  anyone?" 
W hat a r e  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  whom sh e  h a s  th u s  
e m b ro ile d  i n  t h e  com plex  m a r i t a l  p r o p e r ty  r e l a t i o n s h i p ?
T hese  a r e  i n t r i g u i n g  q u e s t io n s ,  and  i t  i s  
i n t r i g u i n g  t o  s e e  t h a t  th e y  e x e r c i s e d  th e  m inds o f  
b o th  F r a s e r  and  M u rray , and  t r o u b le d  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
a p p a r e n t ly  n o t  a t  a l l *  The A ct l e f t  many m a t t e r s  t o  
c o n je c tu r e #
T h ere  a r o s e  q u e s t io n s  su c h  a s ,  " I s  sh e  h e r s e l f  
a lo n e  l i a b l e  f o r  t r a d e  d e b t s ,  o r  does h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
common law  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a  w i f e 's  d e b ts  c o n t in u e ,  
n o tw i t l i s ta n d ln g  t h a t  h e  r e c e iv e s  no p a r t  o f  th e  
p r o f i t s ? "  (P re su m ab ly  h i s  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  h e r  a n te ­
n u p t i a l  t r a d e ,  a s  Vfell a s  o t h e r ,  d e b t s ,  w ould  be 
r e g u la te d  by th e  te rm s  o f  th e  A ct o f  1 8 7 7 , s*4# w hich  
d o e s  n o t  d e f in e  m ore p r e c i s e l y  " a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b ts "  -  
o r  w ould  i t ?  A d m itte d ly , l i a b i l i t y  u n d e r  th e  1877 
A ct was l i m i t e d ,  b u t  i f  he  was h e ld  n o t  t o  b e  l i a b l e  
f o r  su c h  d e b ts  I n c u r r e d  a f t e r  m a r r ia g e ,  why s h o u ld  h e  
b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  u n d e r ta k e  any l i a b i l i t y  f o r  th o s e  
i n c u r r e d  b e f o r e  m a rr ia g e ?  Was th e  " b e n e f i t  r e c e iv e d  
from  /
1 # S u p r a # p. 58 e t  s e q .
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from  w ife "  c r i t e r i o n  t o  a p p ly  o n ly  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  e a s e ,  
and  n o t  i n  t h e  fo rm e r? )  I n  any  d i s c u s s io n  o f  p r o p e r ty  
and  o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw een  h u sb an d  and  w i f e ,  th e  
c o n c e p t and  la n g u a g e  o f  p a r t n e r s h i p  i s  n o t  f a r  d i s t a n t ,  
and  h e r e  once  m ore i n t e r  con ju& es w ould b e  a  p a r t n e r s h i p  
8 0  l e o n i n e ,  t h i s  t im e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  w i f e ,  t h a t  i t  
i s  o u tw ith  t h e  know ledge o f  w r i t e r s  on p a r tn e r s h ip #
Even on m ore o r th o d o x  p a r tn e r s h ip  t e r m s ,  w ould  
t h e r e  be  any  b a r r i e r  t o  a p a r t n e r s h i p  i n  t r a d e  b e tw een  
h u sb an d  and w ife ?  I t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  
c o m p e te n t , ev en  th o u g h  t h e  w ife  e n jo y e d  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  
from  w h ich  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was
e x c lu d e d ^  h e a v in g  a s id e  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  com petence2o f  p a r t n e r s h i p  b e tw een  s p o u s e s ,  c o u ld  s h e ,  a s k s  F r a s e r  , 
em ploy h e r  h u sb an d  a s  h e r  shopmen o r  com m erc ia l 
t r a v e l l e r  a t  vzeekly w ages? He a n sw e rs  h i s  own q u e s t io n  
i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e ^ ,  b u t  w arns t h a t ,  i f  sh e  d id  n o t  
c h o o se  t o  h av e  h e r  h u sb an d  a s  h e r  p a r t n e r ,  em ploym ent, 
e s p e c i a l l y  u n p a id  em ploym ent, o f  th e  h u sb a n d , m ig h t 
r a i s e  a  s u s p ic io n  t h a t  t h e  b u s in e s s  t r u l y  b e lo n g e d  t o  
t h e  husband#  M u rra y 's  v ie w ^ w a s  t h a t  th e  h u sb a n d , i f  
em ployed m e re ly  a s  a g e n t  o f  h i s  w ife  i n  h e r  b u s in e s s ,  
o r  i f  he  to o k  n o th in g  t o  do w ith  h e r  b u s i n e s s ,  i n c u r r e d  
no  l i a b i l i t y  i n  c o n n e c t io n  th e r e w i th  f o r  t r a d e  d e b ts  
o r  u n d e r  any  o t h e r  head# O nly i f  he w as h e r  p a r t n e r  
( p o s s ib l y  n o t  c o m p e te n t i n  S c o t la n d )  o r  p la y e d  su c h  a  
p a r t  i n  th e  b u s in e s s  a s  t o  make i t  t r u l y  h i s ,  n o t  h e r s ,  
d id  l i a b i l i t y  a r i s e #
I f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  t o  h i s  w i f e ' s  com m erc ia l 
a c t i v i t y  was n e c e s s a r y ,  how, th e  s t a t u t e  b e in g  s i l e n t ,  
was t h a t  c o n s e n t  t o  be  g iv e n  and  n o t i c e  t h e r e o f  t o  be 
p u b l is h e d  t o  t h e  w o rld ^ ?
T hese  /
1# M aoara v# W ilso n  (1848) 10 D#708; M u rray , p#77, 2# F r # I I ,  1511#
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T hese  s u b j e c t s  p ro v e d  f r u i t f u l  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  and  
argum ent*  and  M urray^# f o r  i n s t a n c o ,  a p p e a rs  t o  have  
re a c h e d  a  c o n c lu s io n  ( t h a t  t h e  w ages o f  a  w if e  em ployed 
i n  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  b u s in e s s  w ould be  p r o t e c t e d  by th e  
A c t)  w h ich  d o e s  n o t  a c c o rd  w i th  l a t e r  a u th o r i ty ^ *  
w h ich  was t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t ,  f o r  t h e  o p e r a t io n  o f  &*3 
o f  t h e  1877 A c t ,  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  " th e  w if e  m ust 
h a v e  some o t h e r  "em p lo y er"  th a n  th e  h u sb a n d , o r  th e  
" o c c u p a tio n  o r  t r a d e "  m ust n o t  be  s im p ly  th e  o c c u p a tio n  
o r  t r a d e  o f  h e r  h u sb an d  i f  i t  i s  t o  y i e l d  " e a r n in g s "  
i n  th e  s e n s e  o f  t h e  s e c t i o n , "  " I n  o t h e r  w o id s , I  h o ld  
t h a t  n o t  o n ly  m ust t h e  em ploym ent be u n d e r  some o th e r  
p e r s o n  th a n  h e r  h u sb a n d , b u t  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  o r  o c c u p a tio n  
m u st n o t  bo one  w h ich  i s  c a r r i e d  on j o i n t l y  o r  a lo n g  
w i th  h e r  h u sb a n d , b u t  m ust b e  e n t i r e l y  rem oved from  
h i s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and  c o n tr o l" *  ( p ^ r  L #A rdw all i n  
D ryden  v# M oGibbon, ^%up;ra#)
Upon t h e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  a  m a r r ie d  woman m ig h t 
s e t  up  i n  t r a d e  w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  and 
a g a i n s t  h i s  w is h e s , F r a s e r ^  lo o k e d  f o r  a i d  t o  A m erica , 
a n d  E n g la n d , f i n d in g  i n  j u d i c i a l  u t t e r a n c e s  i n  th e  
c a s e  o f  M a r t in  V, Robson (1 8 7 2 )^ , t h e  v iew  t h a t  i n  an  
o s t e n s i b l y  l i b e r a l i s i n g  s t a t u t e ,  g iv in g  th e  w ife  a n  
e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  h e r  own e a r n in g s ,  f r e e  from  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  "The p r a c t i c a l  en joym en t o f  t h i s  r i g h t  
p re s u p p o s e s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  h e r  own tim e*
The r i g h t  t o  t a k e  an d  p o s s e s s  th e  w ages o f  l a b o u r  m ust 
b e  accom pan ied  w i th  th e  r i g h t  t o  la b o u r#  I f  t h e  
h u sb an d  /
1 * p#5b,2* s e e  e$g# D ryden v* McGibbon 1907 s # c ,1 1 3 1 , w hich  c o n c e rn e d  t h e  p r o f i t s  o f  a n  h o t e l  b u s i n e s s ,  and  i n  w h ich  L #A rdw ali a t  p * 1 l4 2 , c o n c u r re d  w i th  L#P* R o b e r ts o n 's  o p in io n  i n  M cain ty  v# M cA lplne (1892) 19 R# 935 a t  p*940* C l iv e  & W ilso n , p*288#3* II, 1512,4# 16 A m erican  R# 578 (1 8 7 2 ) ( r e l a t i n g  t o  a n  A ct o ft h e  S t a t e  o f  I l l i n o i s ) #
8 9 ,
h u sb a n d  c a n  c o n t r o l ,  th e n  th e  s t a t u t e  h a s  c o n fe iT c d  
a  b a r r e n  r i g h t#  I f  th e  w if e  c a n  s t i l l  o n ly  a c q u i r e  
e a r n in g s  w i th  h i s  c o n s e n t ,  th e n  th e  s t a t u t e  was 
w h o lly  u n n e c e s s a r y ,  f o r  sh e  m ig h t h av e  done t h i s  
p r i o r  t o  i t s  e n a c tm e n t* "
The E n g l i s h  v iew  a s  e x p re s s e d  i n  A shw orth  v*iO utram  w as muoh m ore c o n v e n t io n a l  a n d  l e a s  e n l ig h t e n e d ,  
b e in g  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  i t  was n o t  c o m p e te n t f o r  a  
m a r r ie d  woman t o  s e t  up  i n  t r a d e  w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s e n t ,  b u t  t h a t ,  h a v in g  o b ta in e d  t h a t  c o n s e n t ,  th e  
p r o f i t s  and  t h e  s t o c k - i n - t r a d e  ( i f  o r i g i n a l l y  h e r  own) 
b e lo n g e d  t o  h e r^ *
A sh w o rth 's  c a s e  w as d i s t i n g u i s h e d  i n  t h a t  o f  
F e r g u s o n 's  T r u s te e  v« W i l l i s ,  N e lso n  & C o*^, i n  w hich  
L * P # In g ll8  s a i d ,  " .# #  i t  i s  t o  be o b se rv e d  t h a t  a l th o u g h  
a  w ife  may c a r r y  on a  s e p a r a t e  b u s in e s s  from  h e r  
h u sb a n d , i t  c l e a r l y  c a n n o t be c o n te n d e d  t h a t  sh e  may 
do so  w i th o u t  th e  c o n s e n t  o f  h e r  husband*  S u p p o s in g  
t h e  h u sb an d  i s  o f  o p in io n  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  th e  w i f e ' s  h e a l t h  o r  h e r  m o ra ls  t h a t  s h e  s h o u ld  
8#&age i u  &&y s e p a r a t e  t r a d e ,  i s  i t  t o  be  s a i d  t h a t  
t h e  c u r a t o r i a l  pow er o f  th e  h usband  i s  t o  be  a b o l i s h e d ,  
an d  t h a t  th e  w ife  i s  t o  be  a llo w e d  t o  do a s  sh e  d e s i r e s  
a g a i n s t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  w ish e s? "  Even M urray  re m a rk s^  
t h a t  th e  s ta te m e n t  o f  th e  law  i n  F e rg u so n  "seem s t o  be 
to o  b ro ad # "
The c a s e  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  f o r  i t s  own sak e#  I t  
r e v e a l s  th e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  I n f e r i o r i t y  o f  th e  w i f e 's  
p o s i t i o n  ev en  a f t e r  t h e  re fo rm in g  s t a t u t e s #  Where 
s p o u s e s  /
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s p o u s e s  had  b e en  m a r r ie d  I n  1872 w i th o u t  a  m a r r ia g e -  
c o n t r a c t ,  an d  w i th o u t  e x c lu s io n  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  
p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s ,  and  w here th e  w ife  b e f o r e  and  a f t e r  
m & rrlege  h ad  o a r r i e d  on t h e  b u s in e s s  o f  a  m i l l i n e r ' s  
s h o p , t h e  p r o f i t s  o f  w hich  s u p p l ie d  t h e  n e e d s  o f  th e  
h o u s e h o ld , t h e  w i f e ,  i t  seem s, b e in g  b e t t e r  e q u ip p e d  
by n a tu r e  f o r  a  b u s in e s s  l i f e  th a n  was h e r  h u sb a n d , 
i t  was h e ld  t h a t  w h i le  th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  1877 A ct 
was t o  p r o t e c t  th e  w i f e 's  e a r n in g s  i n  su c h  a  c a s e ,  
t h e  w i f e 's  c r e d i t o r s  ( o r  c r e d i t o r s  o f  th e  b u s in e s s )  
c o u ld  n o t  a t t a c h  s to c k  i n  t r a d e  w h ich  h a d  p a s s e d  to  
t h e  hu sb an d  j u r e  m a r i t i .  B o th  b e f o r e  and  a f t e r  th e  
A c t ,  t h e  b u s in e s s  i n  q u e s t io n  had  b e en  c a r r i e d  on iu n d e r  th e  w i f e 's  m aiden  name# L . P . I n g l l s  em p h asised  
t h a t  a t  common la w , "w here a  w ife  c a r r i e s  on  a  
b u s in e s s  i n  h e r  own nam e, i f  sh e  h a s  n o t  b e en  d e s e r t e d ,  
sh e  o a r r i e s  i t  on a s  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  a g e n t  and  th e  e f f e c t  
i s  t h a t  n o t  o n ly  i s  th e  s to c k  i n  t r a d e  h i s ,  b u t  a l s o  
th e  w hole e a r n in g s  p ro d u ce d  from  i t . "  When t h e  L ord  
P r e s i d e n t  came t o  c o n s id e r  8*3 o f  t h e  1877 A c t ,  he  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  th e  u s e  o f  t h e  w ord " p r o p e r ty "  ms b e in g  
s t r i c t l y  r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h e  q u a l i f y in g  w ords " a c q u i r e d  . . .  
th ro u g h  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  any  l i t e r a r y ,  a r t i s t i c  and  
s c i e n t i f i c  s k i l l . "  He f e l t  i t  im p o s s ib le  t o  c o n s t r u e  
t h e  s e c t i o n  w hich  i n  h i s  o p in io n ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a  
w i f e ' s  own b u s i n e s s ,  c o n c e rn e d  o n ly  t h e  " e a r n in g s "  
t h e r e f r o m , i n  su c h  a  way a s  t o  c o n s id e r  t h a t  th e  A ct 
e f f e c t e d  a  t r a n s f e r  o f  s t o c k - i n - t r a d e  ( " p r o p e r t y " ) 
from  husband  t o  w ife*  " I  am o f  o p in io n  t h a t  i t  i s  
im p o s s ib le  t o  r e a d  th e s e  w ords i n  any  m ore e x te n d e d  
s e n s e  th a n  a s  p r o t e c t i n g  w ages w h ich  th e  w ife  m ig h t 
e a r n  i n  em ploym ent, o r  th e  p e r i o d i c a l  p r o f i t s  irA ich 
m ig h t b e  e a rn e d  i n  t h e  c o n d u c t o f  b u s in e s s  c a r r i e d  on 
i n  h e r  own nmnej' S in c e  th e  m a r r ia g e ,  t h e  b u s in e s s  
h ad  b e lo n g e d  t o  t h e  husband# T h is  was t h e  c ru x  o f  
t h e  /
1* a t  p .2 6 6 /7 ,
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t h e  m a t t e r :  th ro u g h  in a d v e r te n c e ,  o r  Ig n o ra n c e *
p e r h a p s ,  t h e  s to c k  I n  t r a d e  a t  th e  d a te  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
h ad  p a s s e d  t o  t h e  h u sb a n d , and  th e  A c t, w h i le  p r o t e c t i n g  
e a r n in g s ,  d id  n o t  c o v e r t l y ,  a s  i t  w e re , rem ove th e  
h u s b a n d 's  ju a  m a r i t i  th e re f ro m  by t r a n s f e r r i n g  p r o p e r ty  
i p 6 0  j u r e  from  husb an d  t o  w ife*  Even i f  th e  s to c k  i nlsTïJ;'^+p3!r»sw»i3î5l »i>îio'4ft«-Aîï»V'.iyi
t r a d e  o r i g i n a l l y  b e lo n g e d  t o  th e  w ife  a n d , by a g re e m e n t, 
rem a in e d  h e r s  a f t e r  th e  m a r r ia g e ,  th e  A c t 's  p r o v i s io n s
w ere  s t i l l  r e q u i r e d  t o  s a fe g u a rd  h e r  b u s in e s s  e a rn in g s *1L e P e ln g l i s  n o te d  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  w o rd in g  be tw een  
th e  E n g l i s h ,  and  th e  S o o ts ,  A ct ( " I  am n o t  s u r p r i s e d  
t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  be  s o ,  b e c a u se  th e y  a r e  in te n d e d  t o  
a p p ly  t o  a  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  sy s te m  o f  j u r i s p r u d e n c e " )  
an d  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  t h e  E n g lis h  a u t h o r i t y  (A shw orth ) 
r e f e r r e d  t o  on th e  g ro u n d , i n t e r  a l i a *  t h a t  E n g lis h  
e q u i t a b l e  r u l e s  " w ith  w h ich  we have n o th in g  i n  common 
i n  S c o t la n d " ,  h ad  b e e n  a t  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  d e c is io n *pL ord  D e a s 'p  who d i s s e n t e d  from  th e  m a jo r i ty  o p in io n ,  
f e l t  t h a t  th e  a b se n c e  o f  e x p re s s  t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  w ife  
d id  n o t  p r e c lu d e  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  t h e r e  h ad  b een  
a  t a c i t  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  s to c k  i n  t r a d e  from  
h u sb an d  t o  w i f e ,  by r e a s o n  o f  t h e  c a r r y in g  on  o f  th e  
b u s in e s s  a f t e r  t h e  m a r r ia g e  " e x a c t ly  a# i t  h ad  b een  
c a r r i e d  on  by h e r  b e f o r e  i t ,  and  i n  h e r  m aiden  name***"
B 'ra se r  sum m arises t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  by  p o s in g  th e%q u e s t io n r  -  i f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  b e  r e q u i r e d ,  w hat 
was th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  th e  A ct?  He p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  
by th e  common law  o f  S c o t la n d ,  a  w ife  m ig h t c a r r y  on 
b u s in e s s  a s  a  t r a d e r  w ith  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c o n se n t#  She 
w ould a c t  i n  t h i s  c o n te x t  a s  h i s  a g e n t ,  b u t  i f  h e r  
h u sb an d  p e r m i t te d ^  h e r  t o  keep  w hat sh e  e a r n e d ,  
r e n u n c i a t i o n  /
1# pp*268/9#2# p*269*
3 . I I ,  p . 1513 .4* I t  m ust be  s a i d ,  how ever, t h a t ,  a f t e r  t h e  A c t, th ew ife  d id  n o t  n eed  t o  r e l y  upon h e r  h u s b a n d 's  g e n e r o s i ty ,  F r a s e r  h im s e l f  s a y s  t h a t  t h e  A ct m ig h t be  r e g a rd e d  a s  e n la r g in g  th e  w i f e ' s  pow ers t o  c o n t r a c t  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w ith  h e r  t r a d e ,  a l lo w in g  h e r  in d e p e n d e n c e  i n  l i t i g a t i o n  c o n c e rn in g  i t ,  and  p r o t e c t i n g  h e r  e a r n in g s  from  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i to r s *
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r e n o n c ia t i o n  o f  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  w ould be  p re su m ed , 
and  t h i s  ( r e n u n o ia t lo n )  was c o m p e ten t a t  common law#
I t  m ust be  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  some q u e s t io n s  w ere 
l e f t  an sw ered  u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ,  o r  n o t  an sw e red  a t  
a l l ,  ( n o t  ev en  e n v is a g e d ,  i t  seem s) by t h e  A c t ,  and 
t h a t  i n  co n seq u e n ce  many p o i n t s  o f  d i f f i c u l t y  a ro s e  
f o r  t h e  c o u r t s ,  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  and  a c a d e m ic s  *
A s tu d y  o f  t h e  l a t e  n in e t e e n th  c e n tu r y  l e g i s l a t i v e  
p r o y i s io n s  a s  t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a  iv ife  t o  h e r  w ages o r  
e a r n in g s  " a c q u i r e d  o r  g a in e d  i n  any  em ploym ent o r  
o c c u p a t io n  i n  w h ich  sh e  i s  e n g a g e d " , l e a d s  t o  t h e  
e n q u ir y  w h e th e r  sh e  c o u ld  p o s s ib l y  h av e  b e e n  e n t i t l e d  
t o  c la im  if^ges f o r  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  h e r  d u t i e s  a s  
w if e  and  m o th e r , and* w h ile  t h i s  t o p i c  b e lo n g s  p r o p e r ly  
t o  th e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  p r e s e n t  o r  f u t u r e  law * i t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o te  L o rd  F r a s e r 's  v iew s th e re o n *  a n d , 
i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  a l s o ,  h e  r e f e r s  t o  A m erican  a u t h o r i t y
He s t a t e s  t h a t  some* b u t  n o t  a l l ,  o f  t h e  A m erican  
C odes e x p r e s s ly  d e n ie d  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  su c h  a  r i g h t#
One %vhich d id  n o t  was t h a t  o f  Iow a (se c # 2 2 1 1 )*  w hich  
c o n ta in e d  a  c l a u s e  so  p o t e n t i a l l y  f r u i t f u l  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  
a s$  "A w if e  may r e c e iv e  t h e  w ages o f  h e r  p e r s o n a l  
l a b o u r  and  m a in ta in  an  a c t i o n  t h e r e f o r  i n  h e r  ovm nam e, 
and  h o ld  th e  same i n  h e r  own r i g h t " ,  T h is  gave  r i s e  
t o  i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e s ,  one  su ch  b e in g  M oW hirter v#
H a t to n  (1 8 7 5 )^*  i n  w h ich  th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e ,  d e l i v e r i n g  
t h e  ju d g em en t o f  t h e  Suprem e C o u rt o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  
Io w a , s a i d : -  " * ,#  I n  a  w o rd , sh e  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  th e  
w ages f o r  h e r  p e r s o n a l  l a b o u r  o r  s e r v i c e s  p e rfo rm e d  t o  
o t h e r s ;  b u t  h e r  h u sb an d  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  h e r  l a b o u r  
and  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  th o s e  d u t i e s  and  
o b l i g a t i o n s  w h ich  a r i s e  o u t  o f  th e  m a3nied  r e l a t i o n *
%'/e /
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We f e e l  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  L e g i s l a t u r e  d id  n o t  in te n d  
t o  r e l e a s e  and  d i s c h a r g e  th e  w ife  from  h e r  common law  
an d  s c r i p t u r a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  and  d u ty  t o  b e  a  " h e lp m e e t"  
t o  h e r  h usband"*  I n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  " p o s i t i v e  and  
e x p l i c i t  l e g i s l a t i o n " ,  he  c o u ld  n o t  c o n te m p la te  t h a t  
su c h  a  c o n s t r u c t io n  c o u ld  be  p u t  upon t h e  s t a t u t e  a s  
t o  g iv e  t o  t h e  w if e  " a  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  th e  
h u sb a n d  f o r  any  d o m e s tic  s e r v i c e  o r  a s s i s t a n c e  r e n d e re d  
by h e r  a s  h i s  w ife " *  I f  t h a t  i m p l i c a t i o n  c o u ld  be 
t a k e n ,  " F o r  h e r  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t l ie  c a re *  n u r t u r e  and 
t r a i n i n g  o f  h i s  c h i l d r e n ,  sh e  c o u l i  b r in g  h e r  a c t i o n  
f o r  co m p en sa tio n *  She w ould be u n d e r  no  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  s u p e r in te n d  o r  lo o k  a f t e r  any  o f  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  
h o u s e h o ld  u n le s s  h e r  h u sb an d  p a id  h e r  w ages f o r  so  
d o in g "*
T h a t t h i s  v iew  was ta k e n  i n  1875 i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  
i n  t h e  l e a s t :  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  v e ry  n o t io n  was 
fo rm u la te d  i n  w ords ( s o  s i m i l a r  t o  th o s e  u s e d  i n  th e  
1975 "Wages f o r  H ousew ork" c a m p a ig n ), even  i f  t o  be 
r e j e c t e d ,  i s  re m a rk a b le *
T oday , i t  i s  a rg u e d  t h a t ,  i f  th e  w if e  w orks o u t s id e  
th e  hom e, and  d o e s  n o t  keep  h o u se  -  th o u g h  m o st su c h  
w iv e s  a t te m p t  t o  do b o th  -  i t  w i l l  b e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  p a id  
h e lp  t o  b e  o b ta in e d  f o r  t h e  m anagem ent o f  t h e  h o u s e . 
M o reo v er, i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  good o r d e r  o f  t h e  h o u se  
and  th e  e f f i c i e n t  ru n n in g  o f  t h e  h o u s e h o ld , e n a b l in g  
t h e  h usband  t o  c o n c e n t r a te  upon h i s  w ork o r  t o  f in d  on 
h i s  r e t u r n  a n  a tm o sp h e re  c o n d u c iv e  t o  o v e r t im e  w ork o r  
s tu d y  ( o r  r e l a x a t i o n ) ,  d ep en d s on  t h e  w i f e ,  and  i n  t h i s  
way sh e  i s  m aking  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  e a r n in g  o f  h i s  
s a l a r y ,  and  p ro v in g  h e r s e l f  t o  be a  w o rth y  and  w o rk in g  
p a r t n e r  o f  th e  hu sb an d  and  w ife  s a l a r y - e a r n i n g  
p a r t n e r s h i p ,  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  sh e  a l s o  w orks o u t s id e  t h e  
hom e, i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  t a x in g  r ô l e  s h e  f u l f i l s ,  
sh e  o u g h t t o  be e n t i t l e d  t o  p a r t  o f  t h e  s a l a r y  e a r n e d , 
an d  t h i s  n o t  s p r in g in g  from  p a t r o n i s i n g  h u sb a n d ly  
l a r g e s s e  /
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l a r g e s s e ,  ( " h o u s e k e e p in g " )  b u t  a s  o f  r i g h t#  T h is  
d o e s  n o t  d e t r a c t  i n  any  way from  h e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  
c a r r y  o u t  th o s e  d u t i e s ,  n o r  l e s s e n  t h e  d i s t a s t e  w i th
w hioh  m ost w ould v iew  th e  p l e a  i n  th e  A m erican  c a s e1o f  G ra n t v .  G reen  , w here  a n  u n s u c c e s s f u l  a c t i o n  was 
r a i s e d  by  a  w ife  a g a i n s t  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  o f  h e r  
d e c e a s e d  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e ,  f o r  o a r in g  f o r  t h e  h u sb an d  
d u r in g  h i s  i n s a n i ty #  (S he h a d , ho w ev er, b e e n  em ployed 
by  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  g u a rd ia n  t o  do s o , )
Even w i th o u t  h a v in g  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  vow s, 
i t  i s  t h e  b a s i c  and h o n e s t  and  b e s t  r e a c t i o n  t o  f e e l  
t h a t  e a c h  sp o u se  m ust o a re  f o r  th e  o t h e r ,  i n  s ic k n e s s  
and  h e a l t h ,  w i th  no t h o u ^ t  o f  rew ard  o r  c o m p e n sa tio n , 
b u t  t h a t  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  i n  th e  o r d in a r y  ru n n in g  o f  
t h e  h o u se h o ld  and  b r in g in g  up o f  th e  c h i l d r e n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
w here  t h e  w ife  i s  (p e rh a p s  t e m p o r a r i ly )  n o t  a  s a l a r y -  
e a r n e r ,  t h a t  sh e  s h o u ld  n o t  be  e n t i t l e d  t o  a  c e r t a i ngp r o p o r t io n  o f  h i s  incom e #
F r a s e r  a p p ro v e d  th e  v iew s r e v e a le d  i n  t h e  A m erican
c a s e s  ( t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  th e  w ife  w ould have  no c la im  u n d e r
t h a t  h e a d )*  and c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  th ^ y  w ould  be  a d o p te d
i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  t h e  1877 A c t ,  and  he  p o i n t s  o u t
f u r t h e r  t h a t  a  w ife  m ig h t w aive  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  th u s
a f f o r d e d  t o  t h e  w ages sh e  e a rn e d  from  s t r a n g e r s ,  a n d ,
h a v in g  a llo w e d  h e r  own and h e r  h u s b a n d 's  fu n d s  t o  be%I n te r m in g le d ,  s h e  c o u ld  n o t  r e c la im  w hat was h e rs ^ *
I t  i s  w o rth y  o f  n o t i c e  t h a t  F r a s e r  t a k e s  t im e ,  
a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  h i s  t r e a t i s e ^ ,  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  a  w ife  
m ig h t n o t  o n ly  i n v e s t  i n  s to c k s  and h e r i t a g e ,  b u t  a l s o  
i n  c o rp o r a  n io b i l i a ,  an d  th u s  i n  f u r n i t u r e ,  and  h en ce  a  
s i t u a t i o n  /
1# 41 Iowa R#88: 20 Am eric# R , 621 : F r . I I ,  1516 ,2# P a r t  o f  t l i a t  e n t i t l e m e n t  m ig h t be ea rm ark ed  f o r  d o m e s tic  e x p e n d i tu r e ,  aiid  p a r t  f o r  e x p e n d i tu r e  
e n t i r e l y  w i th in  h e r  own c h o ic e  and  d i s c r e t i o n #See g e n e r a l l y ,  i n f r a # C h a p te r  7 .3# He lo o k s  a g a in  to ^A m erican  a u t h o r i t y  h e re  -  v i z .Hawkins v .  P ro v id e n c e  Co. 20 A m eric# R* 354 (M a ss .)  4# I I ,  1517#
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situation might arise in which the whole of the 
household plenishings belonged to the wife, and were 
therefore not able to be attached by the husband's 
creditors* A situation where all the "consumer 
durables" of an establishment belong to the wife 
while used and enjoyed by the husband and the whole 
family tends to be thought of as a modern phenomenon* 
Indeed, much controversy results from the truth that, 
now, as then, that situation is rare* It is much 
more common for a wife (especially one who has not 
worked for any substantial period, or at all, outside 
the home) to have lived a hard-working life, contributing 
thus indirectly (or non-materially) to the prosperity 
of the home, and y e t  to have title to none of the 
assets (except in prospect, should she survive her 
husband, or - at present - become the successful 
pursuer in marital litigation)^*
Insurance PoliciesH* MI IM« HH Wk •«* KB MX W MW w
At Scots common law, a wife had an insurable 
interest in the life of her husband, as did he in her 
life, but in England no such insurable interest existed 
in either case until the Married Women's Property Act, 
1870, 8.10 of which enabled a married woman to effect 
a policy of insurance (assurance) upon her own life 
or her husband's life for her separate use* As farQas Scotland is concerned, Murray" reminds us t h a t  the 
insurance (assurance) of a wife's life by her husband 
stands on common law still, but a similar statutory 
provision to the English one was provided for Scotland 
by the Married Women's Policies of Assurance (Scotland) 
Act, 1880^ , by which " a  married woman may effect a 
policy of assurance, on her own life or on the life of 
her /
1 * See C h a p te r  5 ( 1 ) :  p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s  upon d iv o r c e ,  and  C h a p te r  4 (A lim e n t upon S e p a r a t io n ) .  See g e n e r a l l y .  C h a p te r  7* See now Div.(Sc.) Act, 1976, s .  5*2* p * 6 l*3* 43 & 44 V ie t*  C * 2 6 *  BU-t, as t o  Eng. common law  p o s i t i o n  on
in s u r a b le  i n t e r e s t  i n  l i f e  o f  s p o u s e ,  s e e  Reed v ,R o y a l  Exchangee 
Co. (1 795 )»  Peake Add. G a s .70; P e r s o n a l  A c c id e n t ,  L i f e  and Other  
I n s u r a n c e s ,  E.R. Hardy Ivamy (1973 )»  PP» 8 9 - 9 0 .
9 6 #
h e r  h u sb a n d , f o r  h e r  s e p a r a t e  u s e ;  and  th e  same and 
a l l  b e n e f i t  t h e r e o f .  I f  e x p re s s e d  t o  be  f o r  h e r  
s e p a r a t e  u s e ,  s h a l l ,  im m e d ia te ly  on  b e in g  so  e f f e c t e d ,  
v e s t  I n  h e r ,  and  s h a l l  b e  p a y a b le  t o  h e r  and  h e r  h e i r s ,  
e x e c u to r s  and  a s s i g n e e s ,  e x c lu d in g  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  and 
r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d , an d  s h a l l  be 
a s s ig n a b le  by h e r  e i t h e r  in ; t e r  v iv o s  o r  bSS M ê . fîâHSâ 
w i th o u t  c o n s e n t  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d ; and  th e  c o n t r a c t  i n  
su c h  p o l i c y  s h a l l  be  a s  v a l i d  and e f f e c t u a l  a s  i f  made 
w i th  a n  u n m a rr ie d  woman"# (a# 1 # )*  " T h is  p l a c e s  m a r r ie d  
women i n  t h e  same p o s i t i o n  a s  th e y  occupy  i n  r e g a r d  t o
e a r n in g s  u n d e r  th e  A ct o f  1877 , and  t o  t h i s  e x te n t  aim a r r ie d  woman i s  t r e a t e d  a s  a  feme s o le "  #
The p r o v i s io n s  o f  s#2  o f  t h i s  s h o r t  A c t a r e  w e l l  
known# They e n a b le  a  man t o  t a k e  o u t  a  p o l i c y  o f  
a s s u r a n c e  on h i s  own l i f e *  " e x p re s s e d  upon  t h e  f a c e  o f  
i t  t o  be f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w i f e ,  o r  o f  h i s  c h i l d r e n ,  
o r  o f  h i s  w ife  and  c h i l d r e n " ,  i n  su c h  a  way a s  t o  c r e a t e  
a  t r u s t  f o r  th em , th e  p o l ic y  v e s t i n g  i n  him o r  h i s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o r  t r u s t e e s  nom iim ted  i n  th e  p o l i c y  
o r  s u b s e q u e n t ly  by w r i t t e n  in t im a t io n  t o  th e  a s s u ra n c e  
o f f i c e ,  i n  t r u s t  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e s  s p e c i f i e d ,  and  w hich  
p o l i c y  " s h a l l  n o t  o th e rw is e  be l i a b l e  t o  t h e  d i l i g e n c e  
o f  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  o r  be r e v o c a b le  a s  a  d o n a t io n ,  o r  
r e d u c ib le  on  any  g round  o f  e x c e s s  o r  in s o lv e n c y " *
T h e re  i s  a n  im p o r ta n t  p r o v is o  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  
c r e d i t o r s  may c la im  rep ay m en t o f  th e  prem ium s p a id  
u n d e r  th e  p o l i c y ,  o u t  o f  th e  p ro c e e d s  t h e r e o f ,  i f  t h e  
l i f e  a s s u r e d  becom es b a n k ru p t  w i th in  two y e a r s  from  t h e  
d a te  on w h ich  th e  p o l i c y  was e f f e c t e d ,  o r  i f  i t  be  
shown t h a t  t h e  w hole  was e n te r e d  i n t o  w i th  i n t e n t  t o  
d e f r a u d  c r e d i t o r s # ^
The A ot d o e s  n o t  s p e c i f y  t h a t  d e l i v e r y  o f  th e  
p o l i c y  (n o rm a lly  n e c e s s a r y )  i s  e s s e n t i a l  h e re #  M u rra y 's  
c o n c lu s io n  /
1# M u rray , p#62#
2 .  See a l s o  as to  p o l i c i e s  o f  a s s u r a n c e .  Chapter 2 ,  pp. 2 1 0 -2 1 9 ,
9 7 ,
1c o n c lu s io n  i s  t h a t  t h e  a b se n c e  t h e r e o f  d o e s  n o t  
a f f e c t  th e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s *  r i g h t s  th e r e in *
The benefit of the trust thus created is not
w ith h o ld  from  th o s e  b o rn  a f t e r  th e  p o l i c y  h a s  been
e n te r e d  i n t o ,  en d  h a s  v e s te d  i n  th e  h u sb a n d , h i sP %r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o r  t r u s t e e s '*  ,
T h u s, a s  C l iv e  and  W ilso n  comment^*, a  s t e a d y  
in o r e a s o  was t a k in g  p la c e  i n  th e  ty p e s  o f  p r o p e r ty  
w h ich  a  m a r r ie d  woman c o u ld  c a l l  t r u l y  h e r  own, t h a t  
i s ,  p r o p e r ty  s a fe g u a rd e d  i n  th e  g e n e r a l  c a s e  from  
t h e  c la im s  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s  ( t h o u ^  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  from  h e r  own, f o r  t h a t  i s  th e  p r i c e  o f  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ) ,  and  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h ich  t h e  
iM i B iE iM  and  ° o«M  c o m p e te n tly
be o r  w ere  by  s t a t u t e  e x c lu d ed #  The n e x t  s t e p  was 
t h e  t o t a l  re m o v a l, by  s t a t u t e ,  o f  th e  j u s  m a r i t i*
The M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  (S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1 8 81 .• S i m « ^ ' 3 « tlMf .ra*«ra«r ;>#f ia IK#f t' . ta  c - ; # t T R P r s * « i » m « t f » #?<♦ ir^ t x f  o s S «:ï»fskx
The n e x t  y e a r  was p a s s e d  t h e  M a rrie d  w om en's 
P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t, 1881^* w h ich  r e c e iv e d  th e  
R o y a l A s se n t and  came i n t o  e f f e c t  on  1 8 th  J u l y ,  1881 ,
The d a te  i s  im p o r ta n t ,  a s  th e  A c t made c e r t a i n  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  /
1o P#65« ( i* e *  d e l i v e r y ,  a c t i v e  o r  c o n s t r u c t i v e , t oth e  t r u s t e e s  -  o r  t o  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  p re s u m a b ly ) .  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p#315 a l s o  s t a t e  t h a t  no d e l i v e r y  o r  i n t i m a t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o s p e c t iv e  b e n e f i c i a r y  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,2 ,  M u rray , p ,6 4 ,  c i t i n g  M cGregor v* MoG* 1 De G*F* and  
J* 6 3  and  I n  r e  S ey ton#  G eyton v* S a t t e r t h w a i t e  L.R*34 G h,D e511, S ee  p e r  N o r th , J ,  a t  p,513@ "The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  was a n  im m ed ia te  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t r u s t  w ould  n o t  p r e v e n t  t h e  c h i l d r e n  b o rn  s u b s e q u e n t ly  t o  i t s  d a t e ,  b u t  b e f o r e  th e  t r u s t  fu n d  came i n t o  e x is te n c e  t a k i n g  a s  j o i n t  t e n a n t s  w i th  th o s e  a l r e a d y  b o r n " .  (M cG regor e t c , ) .  I n  S e y to n , th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  d e a th s  o f  c h i l d r e n  a t  v a r io u s  d a te s  i s  a l s o  t a k e n  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,3 .  S ee  g e n e r a l l y ,  M u rray , p p ,6 1 -6 5 , and  p p , 195-7* ( a n n o ta t i o n s  on s t a t u t e ; *4* p * 2 8 8 ,
5* 44 and  45 V i o t ,  c ,2 1 .
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d i s t i n c t i o n s  i n  i t s  p r o v i s io n s  betw een  t h e  e f f e c t  i t  
was t o  h a v e  on  m a r r ia g e s  c o n t r a c t e d  b e f o r e ,  end  th o s e  
o o n tz 'a o te d  a f t e r ,  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  Aot*
N e i th e r  t h e  S c o ts  A c t n o r  i t s  E n g l i s h  e q u iv a le n t  
o f  1882 (w h ic h , b e in g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m ore f a r - r e a c h i n g ,  
was n o t  a  t r u e  e q u iv a le n t )  r e c e iv e d  a  f a v o u r a b le  
j u d i c i a l  r e c e p t io n ^ *  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  i n t r o d u c e d  
e x te n s iv e  c h a n g e s , t l ie  m ost in w o r ta n t  b e ir ig  th e  
a b o l i t i o n  ( f o r  th e  f u t u r e  and  u n le s s  r e t a i n e d  by 
m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a c t )  o f  t h e  m a i^ it i*
By 8 , 1 ( 1 ) ,  t h e  w i f e ' s  w hole m oveable  e s t a t e ,  
a c q u i r e d  b e fo r e  o r  a f t e r  m a r r ia g e ,  was t o  b e  v e s te d  i n  
t h e  w ife  a s  h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e , n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  th e  
m a r i t i .  p ro v id e d  t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d  was d o m ic i le d  
i n  S c o t la n d  a t  t h e  tim e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  and  th e  m a rr ia g e  
to o k  p la o e  a f t e r  th e  commencement o f  t h e  A ot# The 
same e s t a t e  was p r o t e c t e d  f u r t h e r  by  th e  p r o v i s i o n  (s*1  
( 3 ) )  t h a t ,  a s  lo n g  a s  th e  w ife * #  p r o p e r ty  s to o d  c l e a r l y  
i n  h e r  own name ( " e x c e p t  su c h  c o r p o r e a l  m o v eab le s  a s  
a r e  u s u a l l y  p o s s e s s e d  w i th o u t  a  w r i t t e n  o r  d o cu m en ta ry  
t i t l e " ) ,  i t  s h o u ld  n o t  be  s u b j e c t  t o  a r r e s t m e n t ,  o r  
o t h e r  d i l i g e n c e ,  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s *
An a d d i t i o n a l  b e n e f i t  was th e  w eak en in g  (b y  s#1 
( 2 ) )  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  th o u g h  
t h i s  was l i m i t e d  i n  e x te n t*  The w i f e 's  own r e c e i p t  
was t h e n c e f o r t h  t o  be  s u f f i c i e n t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  
incom e o f  p r o p e r ty  th u s  re n d e re d  s e p a r a t e ,  " b u t  t h e  
w ife  s h a l l  n o t  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  a s s ig n  t h e  p r o s p e c t iv e  
incom e t h e r e o f ,  o r ,  u n le s s  w ith  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t ,  
t o  d is p o s e  o f  su c h  e s t a t e " .  By s . 5 ,  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s e n t ,  o th e rw is e  n e c e s s a r y ,  t o  a  d e e d , m ig h t be 
d is p e n s e d  w i th  w here  th e  husb an d  h ad  d e s e r t e d  th e  w i f e ,  
o r  t h e  w ife  was l i v i n g  a p a r t  w i th  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c o n se n t*  
As f a r  a s  t h e  f r u i t s  o f  th e  w i f e 's  h e r i t a g e  w ere  
c o n c e rn e d , /
1# M u rra y , p*65 ( f o o t n o te  4 )
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c o n c e rn e d , s#2  p r o v id e s  th a t*  In  th e  e a s e  o f  m a r r ia g e s  
c o n t r a c t e d  a f t e r  th e  A c t ,  b o th  th e  ^ i ^ l t i  and th e  
ju 8  a d m i n i a t r a t i o n i#  o f  th e  husband  sh o u ld  be  e x c lu d ed *
Where money o r  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  w ife  h a d  b e en  
Immixed w i th  th e  h u s b a n d 's  fu n d s  -  w hich  m ust h av e  b een  
common, i n  v iew  o f  t h e  (tk ien ) m cx lem ity  o f  t h e  s t a t u t e s  
o f  r e fo rm , and  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  g e n e r a l l y  c o n t in u in g  
ju a  a d m in is t r a t io n j .8  -  t h e  i^rhole was t o  be  t r e a t e d ,  i n  
t h e  h u s b a n d 's  b a n k ru p tc y ,  a s  h i s  e s t a t e ,  t h e  w ife  
r a n k in g  m e re ly  a s  a  c r e d i t o r ,  and  a s  a  c r e d i t o r  whose 
c la im  was p o s tp o n e d  t o  t h a t  o f  o th e r  c r e d i t o r s  f o r  
v a lu e  i n  money o r  m oney 's  w orth*  (& * 1 (4 ))#
The A c t s t r e s s e s ,  a t  8 * 1 (5 ) and  s * 8 , t h a t  a n te ­
n u p t i a l  o r  p o s t - n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t s  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  made 
b e f o r e  o r  a f t e r  th e  d a te  o f  th e  A c t ,  re m a in e d  c o m p e te n t 
a n d , w here  p r e s e n t ,  p re -e m in e n t  *» r e g u l a t o r s  o f  th e  
p r o p e r ty  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  an  i n d iv i d u a l  m a rr ia g e #  (" B u t 
n e i t h e r  a n t e - n u p t i a l  n o r  p o s t - n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t s  a r e  t o  
h av e  m ore e x te n s iv e  p r iv i ] .e g e s  th a n  b e fo re ^ " * )*
Once a g a in ,  t h e r e  i s  fo u n d  a lm o s t  a  q^u i d  p r o  
f o r  t h e  A c t 's  b e n e f i t s ,  an d  o f  c o u rs e  t h i s  was ju s t*
By 8*6 an d  s # 7 ,  t h e  husband  an d  t h e  c h i l d r e n  a c q u ir e d  
t h e  r i g h t s  o f  ju s  r e l i c t !  ( n o t  so  named I n  t h e  A c t)  
and  l e g i t i m  r e s p e c t i v e l y  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  w ife  
and  m o th e r , t h e s e  b e in g  e q u iv a le n t  r i g h t s  t o  th o s e  
p r e v i o u s ly ,  an d  s t i l l ,  e n jo y e d  by w ife  and  c h i l d r e n  
i n  th e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  h u sb an d  and  f a th e r ^ #
T h ese  /
1* M u rray , p # 2 0 1 , f o o tn o te  1#2# S ee  C h a p te r  5 ( 1 ) ,  ( d iv o r c e )  and  (2 )  ( d e a th ) #  The 
te rm s  o f  t h e  A ct w ere  c o n s t r u e d  s t r i c t l y #  T hus, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t u t e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  o f  a  w ife  "who may d i e  d o m ic i le d  i n  S c o t la n d "  was h e ld  s u b s e q u e n t ly  t o  e x c lu d e  a  h u s b a n d 's  c la im  a s  p u r s u e r  f o r  J u s  r e l i c t !  i n  a  s u c c e s s f u l  d iv o r c e  a c t i o n  ag e in s^ '^ Æ T 'w IT e*  J u s  
R e l i c t a e ,  th e  w i f e 's  e q u iv a le n t  r i g h t ,  r e s t s  6n™^ common law  a n d , b e f o r e  1964 , was e x i g i b l e  by a n  in n o c e n t  p u r s u e r  w ife  on d iv o rc e *
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T hese  r i g h t #  a r o s e  w here  th e  d e a th  to o k  p la o e  
a f t e r  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  Aot# The d a te  o f  t t ie  m a r r ia g e ,  
n o t  m e n tio n e d  i n  th e  A ot i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ,  was 
h e l d ,  i n  Poe v* P a te r s o n ^ ,  n o t  t o  be  r e l e v a n t#
( D i f f e r e n t  p r o v i s i o n s ,  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  
( S c o t la n d )  Amendment A c t, 1 8 6 1 , s#6  and  s # 5 ,  e x i s t e d  
a n d  e x i s t  w here  th e  d e c e a se d  w ife  had  o b ta in e d  a 
d e c r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o r  a  p r o p e r ty  p r o t e c t i o n  
oiK ler^#) S in c e  h u sb a n d s  no lo n g e r ,  e x c e p t  by  p a c t io n ,  
w ere  t o  liave  r i g h t s  o f  p r o p e r ty  i n  t h e i r  w ives#  
m oveab le  e s t a t e  d u re  m a r i t i ,  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  t h e i r  
b e in g  l i a b l e ,  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  1877 A o t, s # 4 ,  f o r  
t h e i r  w ives* a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b ts  d e c re a s e d  a c c o rd in g ly *
I t  re m a in s  t o  c o n s id e r  th o s e  s e c t i o n s  (3  and  4 ) 
w h ich  r e l a t e  t o  m a r r ia g e s  c o n t r a c t e d  b e f o r e  1 8 th  J u l y ,
1881*
By 8*3# i t  i s  p ro v id e d  t h a t  t h e  new r u l e s  s u p p l ie d  
by  th e  A c t s h o u ld  not^ a p p ly  t o  t h o s e  m a r r ia g e s ,  i f  th e  
h u sb a n d , b e f o r e  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  A c t, h a d  "made a  
r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s io n  f o r  h i s  w ife  i n  th e  e v e n t  o f  h e r  
s u r v iv in g  h im " , and  t l ï i s  by i r r e v o c a b l e  d e e d  o r  deeds#
% e r e  h e  had  n o t  done s o ,  t h e  A c t 's  p r o v i s io n s  s h o u ld  
n o t  a p p ly  e x c e p t  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  th e  w i f e ' s  a c q u lre n d ^  
a f t e r  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  Aot* W ith  r e g a r d  t o  su c h  
p r o p e r t y ,  t l i e  h u s b a n d 's  j u s  m a r i t i  and  j u s  a d m i n l s t r a t i o n i s  
w ere  t o  be  e x c lu d e d  " t o  t h e  e x te n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
p r e s c r i b e d  by  th e  p r e c e d in g  s e c t i o n s  from  a l l  e s t a t e ,  
m oveab le  o r  h e r i t a b l e ,  and  incom e t h e r e o f " .
F u r th e rm o re , th o s e  p e r s o n s  m a r r ie d  b e f o r e  th e  
A c t wer^e e n a b le d  t o  t a k e  a d v a n ta g e  -  i f  a d v a n ta g e  th e y  
( o r  t h e  h u sb a n d ) c o n s id e r e d  i t  t o  be  -  o f  t h e  A c t 's  
p r o v i s io n s  by  d e c l a r a t i o n  by  m u tu a l d eed  ( r e g i s t e r e d  
and  /
1# (1 8 8 2 ) 10 R.35& ; s u b s e q u e n t ly  a f f i r m e d  by  H.LL .R .8  A p p .C a .6 7 8 . M urray , pp*74 /75#
2 # a m m #  pp* 76 ana 7 7 .
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and  p u b l i c i s e d  i n  th e  m anner p r e s c r i b e d ,  in c lu d in g  
a d v e r t is e m e n t  t h r i c e  i n  two l o c a l  n e w sp a p e rs , an  
i n t e r e s t i n g  s i d e l i g h t  on th e  im p o rta n c e  o f  l o c a l  
n o t i f i c a t i o n  -  t o  sh o p k e e p e rs  and o th e r  p o t e n t i a l  
c r e d i t o r s  -  o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  th e  p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s  
b e tw een  t h e  p a r t i e s )  t h a t  th e  w i f e 's  w hole  (m oveab le) 
e s t a t e ,  p ro v id e d  t h a t  i t  was c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
from  t h a t  o f  th e  h u sb a n d , sh o u ld  be s u b j e c t  t o  th e  
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  th e  Act* The o ld  r u l e s , o th e rw is e  
a p p l i c a b l e ,  w ere  t o  a p p ly  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  any  d e b t  
o r  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  th e  husb an d  c o n t r a c te d  b e fo r e  
r e g i s t r a t i o n  and  a d v e r t is e m e n t  o f  th e  deed*
The A ct a c h ie v e d  a  c o n s id e r a b le  m easu re  o f  reform *1M ost w r i t e r s , how ever , a r e  a t  p a in s  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  i t  
l e f t  t o  th e  h u s b a n d 's  ju s  a d m i n l s t r a t i o n i s  much o f  
i t s  p re v io u s  scope*  "The r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c u r a t o r i a l  pow er rem a in  a s  th e y  w e re , 
s a v e  a s  r e g a r d s  r e n t s  and  r e c e i p t s  f o r  incom e*”
ïheJarried_Woïïg2lg-S£2B2ESZ-^ ^
I n  1882 , t h e r e  was p a s s e d  f o r  E n g lan d  o n ly ,  th e  
M a rr ie d  Women’ s P r o p e r ty  A c t, 1882^ , " t o  c o n s o l id a te  
and  amend th e  A c ts  r e l a t i n g  t o  th e  P r o p e r ty  o f  M a rrie d  
Women", and r e p e a l i n g ,  by s# 2 2 , th e  M a rr ie d  Women's 
P r o p e r ty  A c t,  1870 , and  t h e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  
A c t, 1870 , Amendment A c t ,  1874 , u n d e r  t h e  p r o v is o  t h a t  
a c t s  done o r  r i g h t s  a c q u ir e d  w h ile  th o s e  A c ts  w ere  i n  
f o r c e ,  o r  r i g h t s  o r  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  p e rs o n s  m a r r ie d  
b e fo r e  th e  commencement o f  th e  A ct ( t o  su e  o r  be sued  
u n d e r  th e  te rm s  o f  th o s e  r e p e a le d  A c ts  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
"an y  d e b t ,  c o n t r a c t ,  w rong , o r  o th e r  m a t t e r  o r  th in g  
w h a ts o e v e r ,  f o r  o r  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h ich  any  su c h  r i g h t  
o r  l i a b i l i t y  s h a l l  h av e  a c c ru e d  t o  o r  a g a i n s t  su ch  
h u sb an d  /
1 * W alto n , pp*1 9 9 -2 0 0 5 M urray , p p .6 7 -6 8 ; s e e  
g e n e r a l l y  a l s o  P a to n ,  pp*104-105*2* 45 and  46 V ie t*  c*75*
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h u sb a n d  o r  b e f o r e  t h e  oommenoement o f  t h i s  A c t" )  
s h o u ld  n o t  be a f f e c t e d  by t h e  new Act*
T h is  was a  b o ld e r  p ie c e  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  th a n  had  
b e e n  p ro v id e d  f o r  S c o t la n d  i n  1881*
By s#1 o f  th e  1882 A c t ,  a n  E n g l is h  m a r r ie d  woman 
was r e n d e r e d  c a p a b le  o f  a c q u i r in g ,  h o ld in g  an d  d i s p o s in g  
by  w i l l  o r  o th e r w is e ,  o f  any  r e a l  o r  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r ty  
a s  h e r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  a s  i f  sh e  w ere  a  fem e s o l e ,  and  
m o reo v er o f  b in d in g  h e r s e l f  i n  c o n t r a c t  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  
su c h  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  and  o f  s u in g  an d  b e in g  s u e d , i n  
c o n t r a c t ,  t o r t  o r  o th e r w is e ,  a s  i f  sh e  w ere  a  feme s o l e ,  
b e in g  e n t i t l e d  t o  any  dam ages o r  c o s t s  aw arded  t o  h e r ,  
and  l i a b l e  f o r  an y  dam ages o r  c o s t s  aw arded  a g a i n s t  h e r#  
"E v ery  c o n t r a c t  e n te r e d  i n t o  by a  m a r r ie d  woman s h a l l  
b e  deemed t o  b e  a  c o n t r a c t  e n te r e d  i n t o  by h e r  w ith  
r e s p e c t  t o  and  t o  b in d  h e r  s e p a r a te  p r o p e r t y ,  u n le s s  
t h e  c o n t r a r y  b e  show n", ( s , 1 ( 3 ) , ) *
8uch  c o n t r a c t s  w ere  t o  b in d ,  n o t  o n ly  h e r  e x i s t i n g  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  b u t  h e r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  a c g u ire n d a  
( s # 1 { 4 ) ) ,  and  e v e ry  m a r r ie d  woman engaged  i n  t r a d e  
s e p a r a t e l y  from  h e r  h u sb an d  was t o  be  s u b j e c t ,  i n  th e  
same way a s  w ould a  fem e s o l e ,  t o  th e  b a n k ru p tc y  law s 
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  p ro p e r ty *  ( s # 1 ( 5 ) ) *
The b e n e f i t  o f  s*1 w as g iv e n  t o  a l l  m a r r ie d  women 
i n  E n g la n d , w h en ev er m a r r ie d  ( s i n c e  now here i n  t h a t  
s e c t i o n  i s  th e  p h r a s e  "a  m a r r ie d  woman" o r  " e v e ry  
m a r r ie d  vmman" q u a l i f i e d  by  d a te  o f  m a r r i a g e ) ,  th o u g h  
M urrey  s u g g e s ts ^  t h a t  women d o m ic ile d  i n  S c o t la n d  
m ig h t p r o f i t  t h e r e b y ,  i f  th e y  h e ld  p r o p e r ty  s i t u a t e d  
i n  E ngland*
By 8 * 2 , th o s e  women m a r r ie d  a f t e r  th e  commencement 
o f  t h e  A ct ( 1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  1883) had  r i g h t ,  a s  t h e i r  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r b y ,  t o  a l l  r e a l  and  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r ty  
b e lo n g in g  /
1* M u rray , p * 7 9 , c i t i n g  G r i f f i t h ,  p*147*
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b e lo n g in g  t o  them  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  n ta r r la g e ,  o r  a c q u i r e d  
b y  them  o r  d e v o lv in g  upon  them  a f t e r  m a r r ia g e .  I n c lu d in g  
w a g e s , e a r n in g s ,  money o r  p r o p e r ty  g a in e d  o r  a c q u i r e d  
I n  any  em ploym ent, t r a d e  o r  o c c u p a tio n  I n  w h ich  th e y  
w ere  engaged  o r  w h ich  th e y  c a r r i e d  on  s e p a r a t e l y  from  
t h e i r  h u s b a n d s , o r  by  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  any  l i t e r a r y *  
a r t i s t i c  o r  s c i e n t i f i c  s k i l l *  T hose a l r e a d y  m a r r ie d  
by  1 s t  Ja n u a ry *  1883* w ere  c a t e r e d  f o r  by  s#5* w hich  
s t a t e s  t h a t  th e y  s h o u ld  be  e n t i t l e d  t o  a l l  r e a l  and  
p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r ty  t h e i r  t i t l e  t o  w h ich  " w h e th e r  v e s te d  
o r  c o n tin g e n t*  and w h e th e r  i n  p o s s e s s io n *  r e v e r s i o n ,  
o r  re m a in d e r"  s h o u ld  a c c ru e  a f t e r  t h e  commencement o f  
t h e  A c t , in c lu d in g  w ag es , e a rn in g s *  money and  p r o p e r ty  
g a in e d  by  them  a s  above  d e s c r ib e d *  a s  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r ty *  Vfhere p r o p e r ty  was so  h e ld  a s  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r t y ,  t h e i r  pow ers and p o s i t i o n  i n  r e g a r d  t o  i t  
w ere  t o  b e  a s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  s * 1 .
S i m i l a r l y ,  u n d e r  t h e  h ead  o f  s e p a r a t e  p ro p e r ty *  
w ere  subsum ed bank  d e p o s i t s ,  company s to c k s  and  sh a re s *  
b u i ld i n g  s o c i e t y  s h a r e s  and  o t h e r  l i k e  i n t e r e s t s  a l r e a d y  
s ta n d in g  i n  ( s # 6 )  o r  to  be t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  ( s # 7 )  th e  
name o f  a  m a r r ie d  woman* " u n le s s  and u n t i l  t h e  c o n t r a r y  
b e  show n", and  g iv in g  h e r  s u f f i c i e n t  pa;^ima f b c i e  
e v id e n c e  t h a t  sh e  was e n t i t l e d  t o  r e c e i v e  and  t r a n s f e r  
them * an d  t o  r e c e i v e  t h e  d iv id e n d s  w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n c u r r e n c e ,  and  t h a t  sh e  was a l s o  o b l ig e d  t o  m eet any  
l i a b i l i t y  o r  i n d e m n i f i c a t io n  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  
e s t a t e ,  w h ich  " s h a l l  a lo n e  be  l i a b l e " *  C om panies h ad  
a  r i g h t  t o  r e f u s e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  a d m is s io n  t o  
m em bership  a s  s h a r e h o ld e r s  by m a r r ie d  women i f  t o  
a c c e p t  them  w ould c o n tr a v e n e  an  A ct o f  P a r l ia m e n t ,  
c h a r t e r ,  b y e - la w , a r t i c l e s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  o r  d eed  o f  
s e t t l e m e n t  r e g u l a t i n g  t h e  com pany, ( C o n t r a s t  t h e  
d i c t a t o r i a l  a n t i - " p r e j u d i c e "  o r  p r o - e q u a l i t y  p h i lo s o p h y  
o f  t h e  Sex D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  (Rem oval) A c t, 1 9 19 , The 
E q u a l P ay A o t, 1970 and t h e  Sex  D is c r im in a t io n  A c t ,  1975 , 
/
1 0 4 ,
in te r  a lia * )
T h ese  p r o v i s io n s  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  s s * 3 -6  o f  t h e  
( th e r e b y  r e p e a le d )  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  A c t, 1870#
The sam e r e s u l t s  fo l lo w e d  ( s # 8 )  qu p ^d  th e  e s t a t e ,  
r i g h t ,  t i t l e  o r  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  m a r r ie d  woman, w here 
t h e  in v e s tm e n t  was h e ld  i n  th e  name o f  t h e  h u sb an d  end  
w ife  j o i n t l y  w i th  an y  p e r s o n ( s )  o t h e r  th a n  t h e  husband#
The h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  was n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  
t r a n s f e r  o f  su c h  s to c k s  by  th e  w ife  w here  th e y  s to o d  
i n  h e r  name a lo n e ,  o r  i n  j o i n t  names a s  lo n g  a s  th e  
j o i n t  h o ld e r  w as n o t  t h e  husband#
H ow ever, w here  i t  o o u ld  be  shown t h a t  a  w if e  had  
u s e d  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  m oney, w i th o u t  h i s  c o n s e n t ,  t o  make 
su c h  in v e s tm e n t  ( s # 1 0 ) ,  t h e  c o u r t  was empowered (u p o n  
a n  a p p l i c a t i o n  u n d e r  s# 1 7 ) t o  have  th e  in v e s tm e n t  and 
d iv id e n d s  t r a n s f e r r e d  and  p a id  t o  th e  husband#  T h is  
s e c t i o n  a l s o  g u a rd s  a g a i n s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
f r a u d u l e n t  m isu se  o f  th e  p r o v i s io n s  o f  t h e  Aot# Where 
a n y  " g i f t "  %ms made by hu sb an d  t o  w i f e ,  and  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  th e  g i f t  rem a in e d  i n  t h e  pow er o f  t h e  h u sb a n d , o r  
in v e s tm e n t  was made i n  t h e  name o f  t h e  w if e  w i th  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  money i n  f r a u d  o f  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  "an y  moneys 
so  d e p o s i te d  o r  i n v e s te d  may be  fo l lo w e d  a s  i f  t h i s  A ot 
h ad  n o t  p a s s e d " ,  n o r  w ould suoh  a  " g i f t "  b e  v a l i d  
s t  t l
I n  /
1a g a i n s h e  o la im s  o f  c r e d i t o r s  #
Much o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e s e  p r o v i s io n s  l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  m u st p ro b a b ly  h ave  b e e n  s u p p l ie d  t o  m eet a  n e e d , v i s #  a  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i g h t s  and  
l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  w iv e s  who w ish ed  t o  t a k e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e  new way o f  h o ld in g  w e a l th  ( i n  company s h a r e s ) #No d o u b t ,  w iv e s ,  h u sb a n d s , and company o f f i c i a l s  and  a d v i s e r s  w ere a n x io u s  t o  know* Cf# g e n e r a l l y  B ig g a r t  
V# C i ty  o f  G lasgow  Bank (1879 ) 6  R#470, p e r  L # P # I n g l is ,  a t  p#481 * I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  none o f  th e  ju d g m en ts  a p p e a re d  t o  f i n d  t h e  s l i ^ t e s t  d i f f i c u l t y  o r  in c o m p e te n c e  i n  t h e  in v e s tm e n t  by  a  m a r r ie d  woman o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  fu n d s  i n  t h e  p u rc h a s e  o f  s h a r e s  i n  a  j o i n t  s to c k  company#S ee  p e r  L .D eas a t  p # 4 7 6 , " I  h av e  n o t  b e e n  a b le  t o  
d i s c o v e r  t h e  s l i g h t e s t  g round  f o r  h o ld in g  t h a t  sh e  c o u ld  n o t  p u rc h a s e  and  h o ld  s h a r e s  i n  a  b a n k in g  com pany, 
j u s t  a s  sh e  c o u ld  p u rc h a s e  and  h o ld  a n y  o t h e r  k in d  o f  
p r o p e r ty # "
1 0 5 ,
I n  8#11# I s  a  s l i g h t l y  a b b r e v ia te d  v e r s i o n  o f  8*11 
o f  t h e  M a rr ie d  Women*s P r o p e r ty  A o t, 1870# u pon  th e  
p o i n t  t h a t  a  m a r r ie d  woman m ig h t e f f e c t  a  p o l i c y  on 
h e r  own o r  h e r  hu&band*8 l i f e  f o r  h e r  s e p a r a t e  u se*
S e c t io n  12 p r o v id e s  f o r  women (m a r r ie d  b e f o r e  o r  
a f t e r  1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  188 5 # )th e  same c i v i l  re m e d ie s  a g a i n s t  
a l l  p e rso n s#  I n c lu d in g  h e r  husband# t o  p r o t e c t  h e r  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  a s  i f  sh e  w ere  a  fem e s o l e  ( e x c e p t  
t h a t  t h e r e  was t o  b e  no  in te r - s p o u s e  l i t i g a t i o n  i n  
t o r t ) ,  and  t h e  same " r e d r e s s  by way o f  c r im in a l  
p r o c e e d in g s "  a s  a  fem e s o le  a g a i n s t  a l l  p e rs o n s#  
I n c lu d in g  h e r  h u sb an d  ( e x c e p t  t h a t  c r im in a l  p ro c e e d in g s  
s h o u ld  n o t  be  b ro u g h t  by  w ife  a g a i n s t  h u sb an d  i f  th e y  
w ere  l i v i n g  to g e th e r #  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  any  p r o p e r ty  
c la im e d  by h e r - t h u s  p r e c lu d in g  p r o s e c u t io n s  f o r  t h e f t  
d u r in g  c o h a b i ta t io n #  I t  w ould seem -  n o r  w h i le  th e y  
w ere  l i v i n g  a p a r t#  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  any  a c t  done by  th e  
h u sb an d  w h ile  th e y  w ere  l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r  c o n c e rn in g  
p r o p e r ty  c la im e d  by  t h e  w ife  * th u s  p r e c lu d in g  
p r o s e c u t io n  a f t e r  t h e  c e s s a t i o n  o f  c o h a b i t a t i o n  f o r  
t h e f t  d u r in g  c o h a b i ta t io n ^ ?  -  " u n le s s  su c h  p r o p e r ty  
s h a l l  h av e  b e en  w ro n g fu l ly  ta k e n  by  th e  husband"
( n o t  by th e  w ife ?  T h is  was n o t  an  A ct t o  p r o t e c t  
t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  h usbands#  i t  seem s*) "when le a v in g  
o r  d e s e r t in g #  o r  a b o u t t o  le a v e  o r  d e s e r t#  h i s  w ife"* ) 
However /
1* L a te r  r u l e  -  C h a p te r  3* F o r  S c o t t i s h  p o s i t i o n ,  upon  t h e f t  b e tw ee n  sp o u ses#  s e e  H a rp e r  v^ A d a ir  
1 9 4 5  J*C$21 ( s e e  opinion o f  L*J*-& en*(N orm and): 
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  o l d e r  law  ( n o t  a lw ay s c l e a r )  and  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  t h e  1881 A ot s*1 s e p a r a t e d  t h e  
w i f e ' s  p r o p e r ty  from  t h a t  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d . M is a p p r o p r ia t io n  by e i t h e r  o f  th e  o t h e r ' s  p r o p e r ty  was t h e r e f o r e  t h e f t #  j u s t  as#  i n  H#M#Adv, v# k i lg o u r  (1 8 5 1 ) J ,S h a w , 5 0 1 # p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  w ife #  re n d e re d  s e p a r a t e  by m a r r ia g e - c o n t r a c t#  i f  m is a p p r o p r ia te d  by  th e  husband# was t h e f t  by  him* i n  d e l i c t #  s e e  Law Reform  (H usband and  W ife ) Act# 1962: s e eg e n e r a l l y  C l iv e  & W ilson# C h a p te r  13 (M is c e l la n e o u s  
L e g a l E f f e c t s  ( L i t i g a t i o n ) )  am i C h a p te r  3 h e re o f#
1 0 6 ,
However# I t  vms p ro v id e d  t h a t  e v id e n c e  I n  su c h  
l i t i g a t i o n  by  h usband  a g a i n s t  w ife  o r  v i c e  v e r s a  
s h o u ld  b e  co m peten t#  and  t l i a t  " I n  any  I n d ic tm e n t  o r  
o t h e r  p ro c e e d in g  u n d e r  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i t  s h a l l  be 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a l l e g e  su c h  p r o p e r ty  t o  be  h e r  p r o p e r ty ; "  
The t e c h n i c a l i t i e s  o f  th e  r a i s i n g  o f  q u e s t io n s  betv /een  
h u sb an d  and  w ife  a s  to  t i t l e  t o  o r  p o s s e s s io n  o f  
p r o p e r ty  a r e  c o n s id e r e d  i n  a# 17#
S e c t io n s  1 3 -1 5  a r e  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  t h e  ( E n g lis h )  
r u l e s  upon  l i a b i l i t y  o f  h u sb an d  and w ife  f o r  t h e  
a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b ts  o f  th e  w ife#  w h ich  may be  sum m arised  
a s  im p o s in g  a  p r im a ry  l i a b i l i t y  t h e r e f o r  on th e  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  ( a s  in c r e a s e d  i n  sc o p e  by t h e  1882 
A c t)  o f  t h e  w ife#  u n le s s  th e  sp o u se s  had  a g re e d  
o th e rw is e #  and  a  l i a b i l i t y  upon th e  h u sb an d  " to  t h e  
e x t e n t " ,  b u t  no f u r t h e r ,  " o f  a l l  p r o p e r ty  w h a tso e v e r  
b e lo n g in g  t o  h i s  w ife  vf^iich h e  s h a l l  h ave  a c q u i r e d  o r  
become e n t i t l e d  t o  from  o r  th ro u g h  h i s  w ife "  -  a  s i m i l a r  
p o s i t i o n  t o  t h a t  w h ich  o b ta in s  i n  S o o ts  law  -  " a f t e r  
d e d u c t in g  th e re f ro m  any  paym ents made by h im , and any  
sums f o r  w h ich  judgm en t may have  b e en  bona  f i d e  
r e c o v e re d  a g a i n s t  him  i n  any  p ro c e e d in g  a t  la w , i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  any  su c h  d e b t s ,  c o n t r a c t s ,  o r  w rongs f o r  
o r  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h ich  h i s  w ife  was l i a b l e  b e f o r e  h e r  
m a r r ia g e " .  As w i th  th e  e q u iv a le n t  S o o ts  p r o v i s i o n ,  
t h e r e  i s  pow er t o  any  c o u r t  a d ju d i c a t in g  upon  su c h  a n  
a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  th e  h u sb an d  f o r  any  su c h  d e b t  " t o  
d i r e c t  any  i n q u i r y  o r  p ro c e e d in g s  w hioh i t  may th in l :  
p r o p e r  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  o f  a s c e r t a i n i n g  t h e  n a t u r e ,  
am o u n t, o r  v a lu e  o f  su c h  p r o p e r ty " ,  ( s * l4 ) $  Hy s* 1 5 , 
i t  vras made c o m p e te n t f o r  a  p l a i n t i f f  t o  c o n jo in  
h u sb an d  and  w ife  a s  d e fe n d a n ts  i n  a n  a c t i o n  f o r  
paym ent o f  an  a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t  o r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
o t h e r  a n t e - n u p t i a l  o b l ig a t io n #  I f  th e  husbEm d, i n  
s o l e  o r  c o n jo in e d  a c t i o n ,  w as a b s o lv e d  from  l i a b i l i t y ,  
he  s h o u ld  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  th e  c o s t s  o f  h i s  d e f e n c e ,  and  
i f  t h e  h u sb a n d , i n  a  j o i n t  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  b o th  s p o u s e s ,  
w as /
1 0 7 ,
was fo u n d  l i a b l e  f o r  th e  w h o le , o r  p a r t#  o f  t h e  sum 
su e d  f o r ?  d e c r e e  e h o u ld  p a s s  t h e r e f o r  a g a i n s t  th e  
h u sb an d  p e r s o n a l l y ,  an d  a g a i n s t  t h e  w ife  a s  t o  h e r  
s e p a r a t e  p ro p e rk y #  F o r  any  re m a in in g  l i a b i l i t y ,  
judgm en t s h o u ld  p a s s  a g a i n s t  th e  w i f e 's  s e p a r a t e  
e s t a t e  o n ly .
F i n a l l y  upon  th e  m a t t e r  o f  l i t i g a t i o n ,  S#16 
made a  w if e  s u b je o t  t o  c r im in a l  p ro o e e d ln g s  by  h e r  
h u sb a n d  I f  sh e  h ad  b e e n  engaged  I n  any  a o t  I n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  p r o p e r ty  w h ic h . I f  done by  h e r  
husb an d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  h e r  p ro p e rk y , w ould  fo u n d  an  
a c t i o n  by  h e r  a g a i n s t  him*
A m a r r ie d  woman, a c t i n g  a s  t r u s t e e  o r  e x e c u t r i x ,  
was p ro v id e d  b y  s# 1 8  w ith  t h e  same po\^rers a s  a  fem e 
s o l e  t o  su e  oi* be  su e d  o r  t r a n s f e r  s to c k s  o r  o t h e r  
l i k e  I n t e r e s t s  w i th o u t  h e r  h u sb a n d , i n  c o n n e c t io n  
w i th  h e r  f u n c t io n s  i n  t h a t  o f f i c e #
The 1882 A ot ( s * 1 9 ) ,  e m p h a s is e s , a s  d o e s  i t s  
m ore t im id  S c o ts  c o u n te r p a r k , t h a t  a n t e - n u p t i a l  and  
p o s t - n u p t i a l  s e t t l e m e n t s  im re  n o t  t o  b e  a f f e c t e d  by 
i t s  p r o v i s io n s  ( th o u g h  t h e r e  ivere added  h e re  p e c u l i a r l y  
E n g l i s h  p r o v i s io n s  c o n c e rn in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  
a n t i c i p a t i o n ) .
I t  i s  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  t h e s e  A c ts  t o  b r i n g  w i th  
re fo rm *  an d  b e n e f i t ,  c o r re s p o n d in g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y *  
an d  8 ,2 0  im posed  on a  w ife  t h e  d u ty  t o  m a in ta in  h e r  
i n d ig e n t  h u sb a n d , i f  sh e  h ad  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  t o  do  s o ,  
i n  t h e  same way a s  a  hu sb an d  c o u ld  be r e n d e re d  l i a b l e  
f o r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  a  w ife  who h ad  become " c h a rg e a b le  
t o  a n y  u n io n  o r  p a r i s h " ,  S i m i l a r ly ,  by  8 ,2 1 ,  sh e  
w as r e n d e re d  l i a b l e  f o r  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  h e r  c h i l d r e n  
and  g ra n d c h j^ ld re n , b u t  t h i s  l i a b i l i t y  was n o t  t o  
r e l i e v e  t h e  husb an d  o f  any  l i a b i l i t y  t o  m a in ta in  h e r  
c h i l d r e n  and g ra n d c h ild re n #
I t  s h o u ld  b e  n o te d  th a t*  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e s  o f  th e
A ct /
1 0 8 ,
A c t ,  t h e  r i g h t s  and  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  a  m a r r ie d  woman
I n  r e s p e c t  o f  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  and  h e r  l i a b i l i t y  t o  
a  j u r i s d i c t i o n #  t r a n s m i t t e d  upon  h e r  d e a th  t o  h e r  
l e g a l  r e p r e a e n t a t i v e e  (8 * 2 3 ) ,
The O o o t t is h  P o s i t i o ntad fcr* *J^A *3«
I t  c an  be  s e e n  th a t#  by  1882# S c o tla n d #  w hich# 
t o  t h i s  p o i n t ,  h ad  k e p t  i n  s t e p  w i th  E n g lan d  -  o r  
p e rh a p s  h ad  b e e n  one s t e p  beh ind#  b u t  s t i l l  had  
fo l lo w e d  c l o s e l y  i n  t h e  f o o t s t e p s  o f  E n g l i s h  law  -  
h ad  f a l l e n  b e h in d  t o  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e g re e#
I n  S c o tla n d #  a f t e r  1881# th e  w i f e ' s  h e r i t a b l e  and  
m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  w ere  h e r  own: t h e  h u s b a n d 's
mÊBlBM&mlflm&m ana jg# srlli «ver tJie rents and 
p ro d u c e  o f  h e r  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r ty  had  b e en  e x c lu d e d  : 
t h e  m a r l t l  no lo n g e r  fo rm ed  p a r t  o f  t h e  law ^*
Y et# th o u g h  th e  w ife  m ig h t c o m p e te n tly  g r a n t  r e c e i p t s  
f o r  th e  incom e o f  h e r  m oveable  p ro p e r ty #  ( " a n d  t o  t h i s  
e x t e n t  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s h a l l  be 
e x c lu d e d " )  sh e  c o u ld  n o t  a s s ig n  p r o s p e c t iv e  incom e# 
n o r  d is p o s e  o f  su c h  m oveable  e s t a t e  w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n se n t#  Thus# w i th  t h e  s m a ll  e x c e p t io n  o f  r e c e i p t s  
f o r  incom e from  m oveable  p ro p e r ty #  and w ith  t h e  e x c e p t io n  
o f  t h e  r e n t s  and  p ro d u c e  o f  h e r i t a b l e  p ro p e r ty #  th e  j u s  
a d m i n i s t r a t l o n l s  rem ained#  The sp e e d  o f  re fo rm  had  
b e e n  l a t t e r l y  much g r e a t e r  i n  E ngland# a n d  i t  w as n o t  
u n t i l  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  
( S c o t la n d )  A ct# 1920^ ( s , 1 )  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s  was a b o l i s h e d  ("w h o lly "#  a s  t h e  A c t 
s a y s  /
1* MoW*P* (S c* ) Act# 1881# 8*2# M urray (p # 8 3 )n o te st h e  r e s t r i c t e d  m eaning o f  t h e  w ords " a s  h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e "  I n  t h e  A c t o f  1881 ( c o n t r a s t  E n g l i s h  A ct o f  1882): o n ly  th e  j u s  m a r i t i*  n o t  t h e  j u s
2* A ct 0 % 1881# 8*1(1)% s e e  a l s o  8 * 1 (2 ) r e  j u sa d m in iG tr& tio n is  o v e r  incom e o f  m oveab le  p r o p e r ty ,5* W n a n T T r S e o T I ^
1 0 9 *
e& ya,)*
ïllf JiEEltlIgSg9’i-gg2Rg£lX,llggtlSSJiL4g£#„.22l&.
The f i n a l  lo o s in g  from  bondage was e x p re s s e d  i n  
t h e  f o l lo w in g  t e n n s ; -
" A f te r  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  t h i s  A ct t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  h e r i t a b l e  
o%~ a io v e a b le , o f  a  m a in e d  woman s h a l l  n o t  bo s n b je o t  
t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  h e r  %mabaM, and  t h a t  
r i g h t  I s  h e re b y  # i o l l y  m bo llahed#  and  a  m a r r ie d  woman 
s h a l l #  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  h e r  e s t a t e ,  h av e  t h e  same pow ers 
o f  d i s p o s a l  a s  i f  sh e  w ere  im m a rr le d ;  a n d  a n y  d e ed  o r  
w r i t i n g  e x e c u te d  b y  h e r  w i th  r e f e r e n c e  t o  h e r  h e r i t a b l e  
e s t a t e  i n  S c o t la n d  o r  t o  h e r  m oveable  e s t a t e  s h a l l  be  
a s  v a l i d  a n d  e f f e o t i m l  a s  i f  e x e c u te d  by  h e r  w i th  
c o n s e n t  o f  h e r  h u sb an d  a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  law  
a n d  p r a c t i c e # "  ( a ,1 ) #
A d d i t io n a l  p r o v i s io n s  w ere  # a t  a  fe m a le  m in o r 
s h e l l  come u n d e r  t h e  c u r a to r y  o f  h e r  h u sb an d  u n t i l  
s h e  r e a c h e s  m a jo r i t y  u n l e s s  h e r  h usband  a l s o  i s  m in o r , 
o r  s u b j e c t  t o  some l e g a l  i n c a p a c i t y ,  i n  w h io h  c a s e  
h e r  f a th e r ^  o r  otbex* c u r a t o r ,  w i l l  be  e n t i t l e d  t o  
c o n t in u e  t o  a c t  i n  t h e  c a p a c i ty  o f  c u r a t o r  u n t i l  h e r  
m a jo r i ty #  o r  u n t i l  h e r  h u sb an d  becom es c a p a b le  t o  a c t#
F u l l  c o n t r a c t u a l  c a p a c i t y ,  and  pow er t o  s u e ,  and  
l i a b i l i t y  t o  b e  s u e d ,  and  c o n se q u e n t e x c lu s io n  o f  an y  
l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  h u sb an d  f o r  h e r  c o n t r a c t s  o r  o b l ig a t io n s ,  
i n c u r r e d  by  h e r  on  h e r  own b e h a l f ,  i s  p r o v id e d  by  6 * 3 ( 1 ) ,  
b u t  t h e  h u sb an d  w hose w ife  was l i v i n g  a p a r t  fro m  him 
o r  who h a d  d e s e r t e d  h i s  t f i f e  was n o t  r e l i e v e d  o f  an y  
d u ty  w h ich  h e  m ig h t h a v e  " i n  acco%'danoe w i th  t h e  p r e s e n t  
la w " , f o r  paym ent o f  goods en d  f u r n i s h i n g s  s u p p l i e d  t o  
t h e  /
1# M*W#F*(Sc*) A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , s#2* S ee  now th e  co ­e x te n s iv e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  m o th e r t o  t h a t  o f f i c e :rsiri^ îS: '% ss'îM*»**-”- **p .  111 (Fn.  2 )
110,
t h e  w ife  f o r  h e r s e l f  o r  h e r  c h i l d r e n ,  th o u g h  t h e  
m a r r ie d  woman so  o o n t r a o t in g  i s  deem ed, i n  te rm s  o f  
8 * 3 (2 )*  t o  he  b in d in g  h e r  own e s t a t e  t h e r e f o r  a s  i f  
sh e  was u n m arried *
F o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e ,  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  to  m a in ta in  an  
i n d ig e n t  h u sb an d  was p la c e d  upon t h e  w ife  h a v in g  
s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  o r  h a v in g  a  s e p a r a t e  incom e m ore th a n  
r e a s o n a b ly  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  h e r  own n e e d s  and  m a in te n a n c e ^ ;^
S e c t io n  5 c o n c e rn s  d o n a tio n s  i n t e r  v iru m  e t  uxorem  
w h ich  th e n c e fo rw a rd  w ould  be i r r e v o c a b l e ,  u n le s s  th e  
d o n o r , w i th in  a  y e a r  and a  d ay  o f  t h e  c o m p le t io n  o f  th e  
d o n a t io n ,  was s e q u e s t r a te d *  I n  t h a t  e v e n t ,  i t  became 
r e v o c a b le  a t  th e  i n s t a n c e  o f  th e  c r e d i t o r s *  One y e a r 's  
g ra c e  u n d e r  th e  o ld  r u l e s  was a llo w e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
d o n a t io n s  made b e f o r e  th e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  A ct* I t  
m a t te r e d  n o t  t h a t  th e  d o n o r was n o t  d o m ic i le d  i n  
S c o t la n d  i f  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  th e  d o n a t io n ,  b e in g  
s i t u a t e d  i n  S c o t la n d ,  was a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  law  o f  
S c o t la n d ,  h e r i t a b l e  a s  b e tw een  husband  and w ife  ( s * 7 ( 2 ) ) ,
G e n e r a l ly ,  h o w ev er, t h e  A ot a p p l i e s  w here  th e  
hu sb an d  i s  d o m ic i le d  i n  S c o t la n d ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  th e  
p r o v i s io n s  o f  s*1 a p p ly  t o  t h e  h e r i t a g e ,  i f  s i t u a t e d  
i n  S c o t la n d ,  o f  th e  w if e ,e v e n  th o u g h  th e  h u sb an d  i s  
n o t  d o m ic i le d  i n  S c o tla n d *
Once a g a in ,  th e  r e g u l a t i n g  pow er o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e -  
c o n t r a c t  ( a n t e - n u p t i a l )  i s  em phasised*  The te rm s  o f  
su c h  ( a n t e - n u p t i a l )  m a r r l a g e - o o n t r a c t s ,  made b e fo r e  
o r  a f t e r  th e  A c t, may c o m p e te n tly  r u l e  s u b j e c t  i n  t h i s  
A ct how ever t o  t h e  o v e r - r i d i n g  a u t h o r i t y  o f  s#1 i n  
a b o l i s h in g  th e  j u s  a â m l ^ j t r g t l o i U g .  The q u e s t io n  
m ust th e n  be  a s k e d ; -  i n  v iew  o f  th e  w o rd s , "an d  a  
m a r r ie d  woman s h a l l ,  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  h e r  e s t a t e ,  h ave  
th e  same pow ers o f  d i s p o s a l  a s  i f  sh e  w ere  u n m a r r ie d ;" ,  
w h ich  /
1* See common law  a s p e c t ,  d i s c u s s e d  s u p r a * p* 5 8 , e t  seg . 
2 , S*4#
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w hich# from  t h e i r  g ra m m a tic a l j u x t a p o s i t i o n  w i th  t h e  
p r e c e d in g  p h ra se #  w ould te n d  t o  a u g g e e t t h a t  t h e  due 
e d m l n l e t r a t l o n l a  (o n ly )  wae r e f e r r e d  to #  b u t  w hioh i n  
th e m e l v o s  s e e #  t o  im p ly  t h a t  t h e  j u s  m aid.%  c a n  no 
lo n g e r  h a v e  a p p l l o a t l o n  by  r e a s o n  o f  I t s  r e t e n t i o n  
I n  a  m arrim g o -G o n tra o t#  l a  i t  now Im o m p e te n t  t o  
p r o v id e  by a n t e - n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t  f o r  th e  h u sb an d  t o  
en,1oy the ju g . g r l W  Hay ggglaKBÈW, raarrlage- 
oontraets {not mentioned) competently ignore s,1?
Wie guide has
b e e n  s a i d  t o  be  o f  limited application •*■,
A lth o u g h  n e i t h e r  r i g h t s  now form  p a r t  o f  o u r  
s u b s t a n t i v e  law# th e  1881 A ot s a v e s  freed o m  o f  c o n t r a c t  
h e re #  and  t h e  1920 A ct d o e s  n o t  p r e c lu d e  I n  e x p re s s  
te rm s  the operation of the Jw s s a c U l  privately- 
made a rra n g e m e n ts#  However t h a t  may b o ,fe w  w iv es  
w ou ld  g iv e  t h e i r  c o n s e n t  t o  a  r e t u r n  t o  a  m a r i t a l  
p r o p e r ty  /
1# D# M# W alker# S c o t t i s h  L e g a l System # 4 th  edn* p #^52 # ( " C o n s t r u c t io n  o r  ' I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o fL é g i s l a t i o n # " )2# T h is  I s  n o t  t h e  o n ly  r e s p e c t  i n  w h ic h 'th e  d ra f ts m e n  o f  t h e  1920 A c t c o u ld  be  c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  b e in g  l e s s  th a n  e x p l i c i t  i n  c o n v ey in g  t h e i r  m eaning# F o r  In s ta n c e #  t h e  o f  h u s b a n d 's  c u r a t o r y  o f  th em in o r  w ife  i s  no^Tmade c le a r #  I s  i t  t h e  ,s u lh u s b a n d ly  c u r a t o r y  p r e v io u s ly  d l s c u % e d  rEhouBK w ith o u t  I t s  a cc o u tre m e n t#  t h e  a # i $ i i # r # t i p n l 8 )  o r  i s  i t  t o  b e  a s s i m i l a t e d  t oa  f a t h e r ?  Does i t  re d u o e  th e  m in o r w if e  p o s t  1920 t o  h e r  p ro  1920 r e s t r i c t e d  c o n t r a c t u a l  a b i l i t y  w ife#  o r  i s  h e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  be  re g a rd e d  s im p ly  a s  t h a t  o f  a  "n o rm a l"  m inor?I f  t h e  c u r a to r y  i s 'm a r i t a l #  c o u ld  I t  be  ren o u n ced ?  W hat i s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  f o r i s f a m i l i a t i o n ?  S in c e  by -a® same A c t, the j u g  is aholishad,
( t h u s  p l a c in g  a i l  women i n  t h e  p o a ic io n  o l  th o s e  who h ad  b e en  f o r t u n a t e  i n  p re v io u s  y e a r s  i n  h a v in g  th e  
h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t s  e x c lu d e d  by  m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t ) # t h e  l a t t e r #  and  s im p le r#  s u g g e s t io n  p e rh a p s  s h o u ld  b e  fa v o u re d #(S e e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h e s e  p o i n t s :  C l iv e  & W ilson# pp#247-50# S o u th  A f r ic a n  p o s i t i o n :  s e e  H ablo#p f1 0 4 # ) ft
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p r o p e r t y  s i t u a t i o n  so  l a b o r i o u s l y  changed  f o r  t h e i r1b e h o o f  .
A f t e r  1920 , t h e r e f o r e #  a  m a r r ie d  woman may 
" e x e c u te  any  d e ed  o r  t r a n s f e r  w ith o u t  h i s  c o n se n t#  
may a s s ig n  th e  p r o s p e c t iv e  incom e o f  h e r  e s t a t e ,  
b u rd e n  o r  a l i e n a t e  t h e  c a p i t a l  o r  c o r p u s * g r a n t  
l e a s e s #  e l e c t  a s  b e tw een  c o n v e n t io n a l  and  l e g a l
p r o v is io n s #  an d  su e  and  d e fe n d  a c t io n s  i n  h e r  oi /^n2name ms f r e e l y  a s  i f  sh e  w ere  n o t  m a r r ie d
The c o r o l l a r y  was# o f  c o u rse #  t h a t  sh e  l o s t  h e r  
p r i v i l e g e  o f  im m unity  from  p e r s o n a l  d i l ig e n c e *
W alton  n o te s ^  t h a t  t h i s  Act# u n l ik e  t h a t  o f  1881# 
made no d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  t h e  e f f e c t  w hioh i t  h ad  on 
m a r r ia g e s  w hich  to o k  p la c e  b e fo re #  and  upon  th o s e  
w h ich  to o k  p la c e  a f t e r #  i t s  d a te #  and  th u s  a p p l i e d  t o  
a l l  m a r r ie d  women# and  a l s o  comments t h a t#  th o u g h  i t  
d id  n o t  r e p e a l  any  o f  t h e  s t a t u t e s  p r e v io u s ly  c o n s id e re d #  
" i t s  p r o v i s io n s  h av e  th e  e f f e c t  o f  s u p e r s e d in g  them  
o r  r e n d e r in g  them  s u p e r f lu o u s # "
By 1920# th e  m a r r ie d  woman h ad  " e n t i r e  and  s o lo  
c o n t r o l  and  pow er o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  and  d i s p o s a l  o f  
h e r  e s t a t e s  h e r i t a b l e  and  m oveable# f r e e  o f  an y  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  from  h e r  h u sband^"*  H er s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r ty  -  i f  sh e  h a d  such# and  p ro v id e d  t h a t  she  
c o u ld  p ro v e  i t  -  was h e r  own# f r e e  o f  th e  j u s  m a r ia i  
and  j u s  a # l # s # a t l o n | Æ ,
A t t h i s  p o i n t  i s  re a c h e d  th e  end o f  th e  f i r s t  
e p is o d e  /
1# T h is  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  th a t#  i n  a  new m a r i t a l  p r o p e r ty  rég im e#  th e  d e v ic e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t  m ig h t n o t  b e  u s e f u l*2# p a r t  o f  W a lto n 's  summary# P 4 I 9 5 - 6 * o f  t h e  p o s t -  1920 p o s i t i o n .
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4 .  W a lto n , I b i d ,
115,
e p is o d e  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  th e  s u b je c t#  F o r  th o s e  
who h a d .a rg u e d  f o r  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  o f  a  m a r r ie d  
woman# and  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e r e i n  l a y  j u s t i c e #  th e  
v i c t o r y  was won#
I f  m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a c ta  be  e x c lu d e d  from  th e  
d i s c u s s io n  (a n d  a s  th e y  w ere  n e v e r  common e x c e p t  
among th e  w e a lth y  t o  o iro u m v e n t t h a t  w h ich  th e y  d id  
n o t  f a v o u r  i n  t h e  s u b s ta n t iv e  m a r i t a l  p r o p e r ty  law# 
so  th e y  h av e  become l e s s  common s t i l l  th ro u g h  th e  
la o k  o f  n eed  f o r  them  t o  a v o id  th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  
t h e  g e n e r a l  law )#  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  m a r r ie d  woman# 
i n  s o c i a l  and  l e g a l  te r m s ,  had  changed  o u t  o f  a l l  
r e c o g n i t io n #
I n  t h e  y e a r s  w h ich  h ave  fo llo w ed #  t h e r e  have  
b e e n  o t h e r  c h an g e s  a f f e c t i n g  m a r i t a l  p r o p e r ty  i n d i r e c t l y  
o r  d i r e o t l y \  b u t  i t  was n o t  u n t i l  1964 t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n  
b eg an  t o  encom pass th e  new n o t io n  t h a t  t h e  s t r i c t  
r u l e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p ro p e r ty #  once h a i l e d  a s  a  
p a n a c e a  t o  c u r e  t h e  i n j u s t i c e s  a f f e c t i n g  th e  m a r r ie d  
woman# m ig h t n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  a  j u s t  r e g u l a t i o n  
o f  p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s  b e tw een  m a r r ie d  p e rs o n s#  T here  
was p a s s e d  t h e  M a rr ie d  w om en's P r o p e r ty  A c t,  1964^#
I n  i t s e l f  th e  s t a t u t e  was a  m odest im provem ent 
( s e c u r in g  f o r  a  w ife  a n  e q u a l  s h a r e  w ith  h e r  husb an d  
i n  any  money o r  pa roperty  d e r iv e d  from  an y  a llo w a n c e  
made by  t h e  h u sb an d  t o  m eet t h e  e x p e n se s  o f  ru n n in g  
t h e  home; i n  o t h e r  w ords s a v in g s  made by  th e  w ife  
th e re f ro m  no lo n g e r  w ere  t o  b e  r e g a rd e d  a s  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
p r o p e r ty #  and  i n  s t r i c t  law  r e t u r n a b le  t o  h im ^) b u t  i t  
h a s  /
1# o*g# C hanges i n  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  p a r t i e s  upon  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  by  d e a th  o r  d iv o rc e #  D iv o rc e  (8 c# ) Aot# 1958 ( s e e  p r o p e r ty  c o n se q u e n c e s  on i n s a n i t y  s#2# i n s e r t e d  by  s#7  o f  S u c c e s s io n  (S o#) A c t ,  1 9 6 4 ); S u c c e s s io n  (5 c # )  A ct# 1964 ( i i ^ r a  C h a p te r  5 (1 )  and  { 2 } ) «  S e e  now  D i v o r c e  ( S c , )  9 7 6 ,  s s . 5 - 8 ,
2* 15 a n d  14 Eli% #2# c#19#5# S a v in g s  had  b e en  f i r m ly  re g a rd e d  a s  b e lo n g in g  t ot h e  h u sb an d  -  C f# e# g * H o d d ln o tt v# H$ [1 9 4 9 Î2  K#B#4p6;Preston v .  P , 1950 d .C ,2 5 3 ,
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h a s  m arked t l i e  b e g in n in g  o f  a  new e r a  o f  t h in k in g  
o n  th e  s u b je c t#  w hioh  c a n  be  s e e n  an d  s tu d ie d #  i n  
s t a t u t o r y  f o r m ,in  E ngland#  th o u g h  n o t  so  y e t  i n  
S c o tla n d #  p e rh a p s  b eo au ae  p r o p e r ty  ch an g es  a n t e r i o r  
t o  change  i n  th e  G u b a ta n tlv e  r u l e s  o f  d iv o r c e  ( o r  
a n t e r i o r  t o  a  f i x e d  d e te r m in a t io n  ng% t o  h av e  th o s e  
r u l e s  ch an g ed )w as th o u g lu t in a p p r o p r i a t e  and  p re m a tu re #  
T h e re  h av e  b e en  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  ch an g es  i n  th in k in g #  
em bodied i n  s t a t u t e  f o r  b o th  c o u n tr ie s #  how ever^#
T h ro u g h o u t t h e  re m a in d e r  o f  th e  d ia c u a s io n #  i t  
i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  c e r t a i n  q u e s t io n s  s h o u ld  be b o rn e  
i n  mind# and  be p o se d  f o r  c o n s id e r a t i o n  b e s id e  th e  
e x i s t i n g  r u le s *
S h o u ld  t h e  " c o n t r ib u t io n "  f a c t o r  ( i n  c a s h  o r  k in d )  
e n t e r  i n t o  q u e s t io n s  o f  p r o p e r ty  betvfeen  sp o u ses#  o r  
s h o u ld  th e  o ld#  s t r i c t  r u l e s  o f  o w n ersh ip  rem a in ?  I f  
'g u i l t *  an d  'in n o c e n c e *  i n  m a tr im o n ia l  m a t t e r s  a r e  
e x c is e d #  t e c h n i c a l l y  a t  l e a s t #  from  o u r  l a w ^ i s  th e  
c o n c e p t  o f  "need"  a f t e r  d iv o r c e  r e l e v a n t  o r  c an  a  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  b e  fo u n d  by  a p p ly in g  t h e  o ld  
r u l e s  a s  t o  p ro p e r ty #  and  ig n o r in g  th e  l a c k  o f  
o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  th e  n o n -e a rn in g  p a r t n e r  ^ ^ ^ n te  
m a tr im o n ip  t o  a c q u i r e  p r o p e r ty ?  I s  i t  r e a s o n a b le  t o  
b e g in  a  d i s c u s s io n  on th e  b a s i s  t h a t  e a c h  sp o u se  h a s  
a n  e q u a l  c a p a c i ty  o r  o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  a o q u ir e  p r o p e r ty ?
I f  t h a t  b a s i s  was n o t  r e a s o n a b le  p e rh a p s  t e n  y e a r s  
ago# i s  i t  r e a s o n a b le  now# a m id s t  th e  f a s h io n a b le  t a l k  
o f  " r ô le - a h a r in g " #  th e  im proved  b ia rth  c o n t r o l  m easures#  
and  th e  a p p a r e n t  r e lu c ta n c e  o f  some women t o  r e a r  t h e i r  
own c l i i ld r e n ?  F o r  an  in c r e a s in g  num ber o f  women, 
a l s o  /
1# c*g# Sax D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  (R em oval) A ct# 1919:E q u a l Pay Act# 1970; Sex D is c r im in a t io n  Aot# 1975# an d  s e t t i n g  up  o f  E q u a l O p p o r tu n i t i e s  Com m ission th e r e b y  a u th o r is e d #  (Cf## on a  w id e r  c a n v a s , th e  h i s t o r y  o f  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  f r a n c h i s e  t o  a l l  women ( a s  t o  a l l  men) o v e r  th e  ag e  o f  e ig h te e n * )*2. However, see now acceptance of "irretrievablebreakdown" as sole ground of divorce in Scotland, as from January 1, 1977 - Divorce (Sc.) Act, 1976, s.1. It may be that the time is now right for a thorough consideration of the subject of matrimonial property in Scotland.
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a l s o #  i t  l a  n e c e s s i ty #  a n d  n o t  s t y l e #  w h i o h  d i c t a t e s  
w ork o u t s id e  t h e  home d u r in g  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ' s  p r e ­
s c h o o l  y e a r s *  How a r e  th e  c o u r t s  t o  a d ju d g e  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  e f f e c t s  o f  m a r r i a g e s  e n te r e d  i n t o  when 
su c h  m odem  n o t io n s  w ere  unheard, o f#  an d  when o th e r  
econom ic c o n d i t io n s  r e q u i r e d  th e  r e t i r e m e n t  o f  women 
from  th e  em ploym ent m a rk e t upon m a rr ia g e ?  How may 
th e  ( f i n a n c i a l )  f u t u r e  o f  c h i l d r e n  b e s t  b e  s a fe g u a rd e d  
i n  m a r i t a l  d i f f i c u l t y ?  I s  t h e r e  n eed  f o r  a  "F a m ily  
C o u r t "  i n  S c o t l a n d * ^ ?  I s  t h e r e  room f o r  a  c o n c e p t  o f  
" f a m ily  p ro p e r ty " #  h e ld  f o r  b e h o o f o f  b o th  p a r t i e s  and  
any  c h i l d r e n  b o m  t o  them  o r  a d o p te d  by  them# i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  w h ich  t h e  sp o u s e s  and  m a jo r  u n m a rr ie d  c h i l d r e n  have  
l i m i t e d  pow ers o f  d i s p o s a l  i n t e r  v iv o s  and ^ o r t i s  c a u sa ?  
I s  th e  n o t io n  o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  sp o u se s  
and  i t s  u n d o u b ted  b e n e f i t s  o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  an d  freedom  
o f  a c t i o n  c o m p a tib le  w i th  a  new rég im e  o f  t h a t  ty p e ?
%Vhat c r i t e r i a  s h o u ld  b e  a d o p te d  t o  d e te rm in e  
q u e s t io n s  o f  t h e  o w n e rsh ip  o f  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home 
and  o t h e r  a s s e t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  do j u s t i c e  b e tim e n  th e  
s p o u s e s ?
I s  c h an g e  o f  an y  k in d  n e c e s s a r y  o r  d e s i r a b l e ?  
l a  th e  p r e s e n t  system # p r o v id in g  f o r  s e p a r a t e  p ro p e r ty #  
o f  any  r e l e v a n c e  u n t i l  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  m a r i t a l  
d i s c o r d ?  I f  n o t ,  t h e n  a r e  n o t  i t s  f a u l t s #  i f  any# 
m o d if ie d  by j u d i c i a l  a rra n g e m e n ts  upon s e p a r a t i o n  and 
d iv o r c e ?  I s  n o t  an y  sy s te m  o f  i ^ e s  o f  m a r i t a l  
p r o p e r ty  acad em ic  u n le s s  a n d  u n t i l  su c h  e v e n t  o c c u rs ?
A re t h e  a r ra n g e m e n ts  o r  r e s u l t s  c o n s e q u e n t upon d e a th #  
t e s t a t e  o r  i n t e s t a t e #  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t n e r  a d e q u a te ?
R u le s  o f  o w n e rsh ip  o f  p r o p e r t y  s t q n t e  m a trim o n io
c a n  /
1# A D is c u s s io n  o f  'F a m ily  C o u r t s ' i s  t o  b e  fo u n d  I n  "The J o u r n a l  o f  th e  Law S o c ie ty  o f  S c o t la n d " ,  J a n u a r y ,  1976 , Volume 2 1 #  M o « 1 #  ( e t  s e e # )  p . 1 2 #  by  R onald  W* P h i l l i p s *  '
1 1 6 *
1c a n  b e  s t a t e d  w i th  r e a s o n a b le  o r  m o d era te  c e r t a i n t y  ,
I f  t h a t  I s  n o t  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  I n  te rm e , b u t  t h i s  
c a n n o t  be  e n ld  t o  b e  a  w e l l-o h a rk e d  a r e a  o f  law# w h ich  
l a  n o t  a u a rp r ls ln g  i n  v iew  o f  t h e  n o n - l i t l g i o u e  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  a  happy  m a rr ia g e *  S h o u ld  t h i s  b ra n c h  o f  th e  law  
re m a in  a e  i t  i s ,  o r  w ould  t h e r e  b e  a d v a n ta g e  i n  a  r e ­
f o r m u la t io n  o r  r e - a t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  r u l e s #  t h a t  t h e  
r i g h t s  o f  p a r t i e s  be  e i t h e r  ch an g ed  fu n d a m e n ta lly #  o r  
be  u n d e rs to o d  m ore c l e a r l y ?
I n  t h e  know ledge o f  t h e  f i c t i t i o u s  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  
conm unlo bonorum# c o u ld  t h e  te rm  a r i s e  a g a in  t o  s i g n i f y  
a  t r u e  form  o f  communion? I f  t h e r e  I s  m e r i t  i n  t h i s  
s u g g e s t io n ,  l a  t h e r e  a l s o  m e r i t  i n  t h e  m o d i f i c a t io n  
t h e r e o f  t o  a l lo w  sc o p e  f o r  a  c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t io n  o f  
p r i v a t e #  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  o f  e ach  sp o u se  w i t h in  a  
m a rr ia g e ?
T hese  a r e  im p o r ta n t  and  t o p i c a l  q u e s t io n s #  b u t  
i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  th e y  c a n n o t be a n sw e red  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
w i th o u t  t h e  s e t t i n g  o u t  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  t h e  
r u l e s  p r e s e n t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  S c o ts  Law upon  th e  
v a r io u s  a s p e c t s  o f  m a r r ia g e  and  i t s  d i s s o l u t i o n  w hich  
Im p inge  upon q u e s t io n s  o f  o w n ersh ip  o f  p r o p e r ty  
b e tw een  sp o u ses*
1* S ee  O liv e  end  W ilson# C h a p te r  10 ( " P r o p e r ty " )  
pp*289-321*  ("T h e  p r e s e n t  law  i s  e a s y  t o  s t a t e  b u t  d i f f i c u l . t  t o  a p p ly " )*
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AFFEGTH HHHMHDH AHD WIVHH
1 1 7 ,
H i s t o r i c a l  I n t r o d u c t io n
The s t a t u s  o f  th e  m a r r ie d  woman a t  common la w ,
and  th e  s in k in g  o f  h e r  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  i n  t h a t  o f1h e r  h u sb a n d , h a s  b een  s tu d i e d  and n o te d  , b u t  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  t h e  s u b je c t  
o f  b a n k ru p tc y , t o  make a  b r i e f  s ta te m e n t  o f  t h e  w i f e 's  
p o s i t i o n  b e f o r e  th e  commencement o f  th e  s tre a m  o f  
re fo rm in g  l e g i s l a t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p te r  1*
S in c e  m a r r ie d  women "had  no pow er t o  i n c u r  
o b l i g a t i o n s  w ith o u t  th e  s a n c t io n  o f  t h e i r  h u sb a n d s ,
(a n d )  b a n k ru p tc y  c o n s e q u e n t ly  c o u ld  n o t  be c o n s t i t u t e d  
a g a i n s t  them  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  su c h  o b l i g a t i o n s .  B ut
th o u g h  t h i s  was th e  r u l e ,  many e x c e p tio n s  w ere  e n g r a f t e d2on i t  #" T hese e x c e p tio n s  Goudy c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  f i v e
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  a l r e a d y  f a m i l i a r ,
%He s t a t e s  t h a t  w here  th e  w ife  h ad  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  
sh e  c o u ld ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  r e n d e r  i t  l i a b l e  f o r  o b l ig a t io n s  
e n te r e d  i n t o  by h e r ,  a n d , i n  r e s p e c t  o f  su c h  d e b t s ,  sh e  
m ig h t be  made n o to u r  b a n k ru p t#
I n  t h e  w e ll-k n o w n  c a s e  o f  B ig g a r t  v .  C i ty  o f  
G lasgow  B ank^\ th e  w ife  had  p u rc h a se d  s h a r e s  i n  th e  
C i ty  o f  G lasgow  B ank, u s in g  money b e q u e a th e d  t o  h e r  
by  h e r  f a t h e r  e x c lu s iv e  o f  th e  j u s  m a r i t i  end  ju s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n l s  o f  h e r  husband# H er name was 
e n te r e d  i n  t h e  s h a r e  r e g i s t e r  o f  th e  Bank* A f t e r  
t h e  n o to r io u s  f a l l  o f  th e  B ank, b o th  sh e  an d  h e r  
hu sb an d  w ere  p la c e d  on th e  l i s t  o f  c o n t r i b u to r i e s *
I t  was d e c id e d ,  w ith  l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  t h a t  Mrs# 
B i g g a r t 's  name s to o d  r i g h t l y  on th e  r e g i s t e r  and  t h e  
l i s t  o f  c o n t r i b u t o r i e s ,  a s  sh e  was th e  e x c lu s iv e  
p r o p r i e t o r  /
1 ,  See g e n e r a l l y .  C h a p te r  1 ,  pp#1-72*2# *A T r e a t i s e  on th e  Law o f  B an k ru p tcy  i n  S c o t la n d * , 
H enry Goudy ( 4 th  e d n # ) , p#68*
i \  T W 9 )!* 6 ® R .4 7 0 ,
1 1 8 ,
p r o p r i e t o r  ( o r  p r o p r i e t r i x )  o f  th e  s h a r e s  (w h ioh  h ad  
b e e n  c o n v e r te d  s u b s e q u e n t ly  i n t o  s to c k )#  H er h u s b a n d 's  
name was e x c is e d  from  th e  l i s t  o f  c o n t r i b u t o r i e s #
The f a c t  t h a t  h e  had  s ig n e d  c e r t a i n  w r i t i n g s  p e r t a i n i n g  
t o  t h e  s h a r e s  w as o f  no c o n seq u en ce  ( h i s  c o n s e n t  b e in g  
n o t  n e c e s s a ry #  b u t#  i f  g iv en #  n o t  p r o d u c t iv e  o f  any  
a l t e r a t i o n  i n  o w n e rsh ip  o r  l i a b i l i t y ) ,  n o r  was t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t s  o f  p r o p e r ty  
and  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d id  n o t  a p p e a r  on th e  f a c e  o f  th e  
w r i t i n g s  v e s t i n g  th e  p r o p e r ty  i n  M rs, B i g g a r t ,  "What 
i s  n e c e s s a r y  i s  t h a t  we sh o u ld  b e  a b le  c l e a r l y  t o  t r a c e
t h a t  th e  p u rc h a s e  o f  t h a t  p r o p e r ty  was iv ith  h e r  own1s e p a r a t e  e s ta te * # *  "#
A g a in , w here  t h e  w ife  was c a r r y in g  on a  t r a d e  o r  
b u s in e s s  by  h e r s e l f ,  o r  was engaged  i n  co m m erc ia l 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  w h ich  h e r  husband  was n o t  i n t e r e s t e d ,  sh ePc o u ld  be r e n d e re d  b a i ik m p t ’ .
I n  /
1 ,  Ib id #  p e r  L# Deas a t  p*477#2 ,  U E u rn s id e  v* C u r r ie  1789# M*6082, (T h is  i s  th e  c a s e
i n  w h ich  i t  was s a i d  t h a t ,  i n  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i n  w h ich  a  w ife  e n te r e d  i n t o  t r a d e  upon th e  d e p a r tu r e  from  th e  c o u n try  o f  h e r  b a n k ru p t h u sb a n d , t h e  w ife  m ust be  s u b j e c t  t o  d i l ig e n c e #  "To r e f u s e  t h e  o r d in a r y  l e g a l  c o m p u ls a to r iê s ,  i n  su ch  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  a s  th e s e "-  t h e  husb an d  b e in g  a b ro a d  and th e  w if e  h a v in g  c o n t r a c te d  th e  d e b t  i n  h e r  own name -  "w o u ld , i t  was o b s e rv e d , i n  th e  end p ro v e  h u r t f u l  t o  t h e  women th e m s e lv e s ,  by  p r e v e n t in g  them  from  g a in in g  a  l i v e l ih o o d  i n  t r a d e ,  a t  a  t im e  when t h e i r  h u sb an d s  c o u ld  n o t  a f f o r d  
them  an y  s u p p o r t" #  T h a t s e n t im e n t ,  th o u g h  o l d ,c o n ta in s  l e s s o n s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ,  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o fp o s s ib l e  new r u l e s  c o n c e rn in g  h o u se h o ld  d e b ts  o r  s p o u s e - c r e d i t o r  r e l a t i o n s  g e n e r a l l y ,  and  spouses#  r i g h t s  t o  a d m in i s t e r  t h e i r  own, and  common p r o p e r ty ,i f  th e  n o t io n  o f  common p r o p e r ty ,  i n  any  o f  i t s  fo rm s ( s e e  C h a p te r  6 ) ,  i s  e v e r  a d o p te d  i n  t h i s  c o u n try  ( s e e  C h a p te r  7 )# )  The c a s e  o f  C h u m s id e  was r e g a rd e d  a s  s e t t i n g  th e  law  on t h i s  p o i n t  -  s e e  o p in io n s  i n  Orme V* D i f f o r s  (1833 ) 12 S#149*See Goudy, p*G8 and  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h e r e  c i t e d ;
C h a p te r  1 ,  pp*68-70# ( " C o n t r a c tu a l  C a p a c ity  6T M a rrie d  Women")#
1 1 9 ,
I n  o a s e s  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  o u t la w r y ,  c o n v lo t io n ,  
o r  g e n e r a l  I n o a p a o l ty  f o r  o r  d e p r i v a t i o n  o f  o i v l l  
r i g h t s  ( a s  by  h a v in g  th e  s t a t u s  o f  a l i e n  enemy and  
p o s s ib l y  and  p ro b a b ly  ( th o u g h  n o t ,  a o o o rd in g  t o  Goudy^, 
a b s o l u t e l y  c e r t a i n l y )  i n s a n i t y ) ,  a  w ife  was n o t  immune 
from  b a n k ru p tc y  p r o c e e d in g s ,  n o r  vms sh e  immune i f  sh e  
had  o b ta in e d  a  d e c r e e  o f  s e p a r a t io n  o r  a  p r o t e c t i o n  
o r d e r  u n d e r  t h e  C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  ( S c o t la n d )  AmendmentpA ot ,  o r  w here  th e  d e b t  w hioh sh e  h ad  i n c u r r e d  was 
i n  rem  versum  o f  h e r ^ ,  o r  had  o b ta in e d  c r e d i t  by 
h a v in g  h e ld  h e r s e l f  o u t ,  f r a u d u l e n t l y ,  a s  u n m arried #
T hese  f o u r  e x c e p t io n s  la s t - m e n t io n e d  h a v in g  b e en  
s e t  o u t ,  i t  m ust be  s a i d  t h a t ,  a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  
t h e  rem edy o r  s a n c t io n  was o n ly  o f  u s e  i f  t h e  w ife  had  
s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e #  I t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  n a t u r a l l y  depended  
upon  h e r  p o s s e s s io n  o f  su c h  p ro p e r ty #
I n  G ray v* W y lie^ , t h e  w i f e ,  w h ile  l i v i n g  a p a r t  
from  h e r  h u sb a n d , had  em ployed a  law  a g e n t  t o  a c t ' on 
h e r  b e h a l f ,  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  o b ta in in g  a  d e c l a r a t o r  o f  
m a r r ia g e  and  le g i t im a c y  o f  a  c h i ld #  She w as s u c c e s s f u l ,  
and  h e r  h u sb an d  was o rd e re d  t o  pay  c e r t a i n  sums 
annum t o  h i s  w if e  and  c h i ld #  T hese  sums h e  f a i l e d  t o  
p a y , and  h e  r e f u s e d  a l s o  t o  pay  h i s  w i f e ' s  a c c o u n t  t o  
h e r  a g e n t#  The w ife  i t  seem ed had  u se d  i n h i b i t i o n  
a g a i n s t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  p r o p e r ty  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o v e r  th e  
a r r e a r s  /
1# p$68 ( c i t i n g  E rsk#  1 .6 * 2 7  on th e  g e n e r a l  p o i n t :
"W here th e  h u sb an d  i s ,  from  f u r i o s i t y ,  o r  o t h e r  d i s a b i l i t y ,  r e n d e re d  in c a p a b le  o f  i n t e r p o s i n g  h i s  c o n s e n t  a s  c u r a t o r ,  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  t h e  c a s e  may s u p p o r t  a  d e ed  g r a n te d  by th e  w if e  a lo n e ,  a f f e c t i n g  h e r  h e r i t a g e ,  i f  i t  b e  r a t i o n a l " ;  c i t i n g  a l s o  B ankt*  1#5#67 ; B old  V* M ontgom erie 1729 M*6002)#2* 24 & 25 V ie t#  c * 8 6 , a s* 5  & 6#3# Goudy r e f e r s  t o  B e l l ,  P r i n * § l 6 l 2 ,  ivhich c o n ta in s  
a  g o o d , b r i e f  summary o f  t h e  e x c e p t io n a l  c a s e s  i n  w h ic h , a t  t h a t  d a t e ,  a  w ife  m ig h t b in d  h e r  otm  e s t a t e  ( th o u g h  n o t  h e r  p e r s o n ) .G ray v# W ylie (1840) 2 b*1205*
4 .
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a r r e a r s  w hioh  h e  owed h e r*  The a g e n t  was h e ld  e n t i t l e d
t o  su e  th e  w ife  f o r  h i#  a cc o u n t*  She h ad  i n s t r u c t e d  
him  when sh e  was l i v i n g  a p a r t ,  and  by h i a  e f f o r t s  a  
s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  h ad  b e en  c r e a t e d  f o r  h e r*  w h ich  was 
l i a b l e  i n  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  h i s  c la im *
As a lw ay s  t h e n ,  how ever, a l l  p e r s o n a l  d i l i g e n c eiwas su sp en d e d  d u r in g  t h e  m a r r ia g e  * N o rm a lly , w here 
t h e  w ife  was s u c c e s s f u l  i n  su c h  l i t i g a t i o n  an d  h a d  no 
e s t a t e ,  " h e r  a g e n t  lo o k s  t o  t h e  h u sb an d  f o r  paym ent 
o f  h i s  account""#" I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  th o u g h , "U n d o u b ted ly  
t h e  h usband  o f  th e  d e fe n d e r  was l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e b t ,
b u t  paym ent c a n n o t  be  r e c o v e r e d  from  him* I n  th e s e
c i r c u m s ta n c e s , t h e  sum p u rsu e d  f o r  h a v in g  b e e n  i n  remV — «iïKïiï-f»-
versum  o f  th e  d e f e n d e r ,  I  t h in k  th e  L o rd  O rd in a ry  h a s  
r i g h t l y  h e ld  t h a t  any  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  o f  h e r s  i s  l i a b l e  
f o r  i t / ; "
Goudy n o te s ^  t h a t  b e f o r e  th e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  
M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  A o t, 1882^ , th e  E n g l i s h  C o u rts  
h a d  h e ld  t h a t ,  th o u g h  a  w ife  h ad  e s t a t e  o f  h e r  own, 
and  h ad  in c u r r e d  p o s t - n u p t i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  s h e  was n o t
l i a b l e  t o  be made b a n k ru p t ,  and  t h i s  i n  a  c a s e  i n  1879^ ,7  St h e  same y e a r  a s  t h a t  o f  B ig g a r t  and  W ls h a r t  , and  th e
o t h e r  " F a l l  o f  t h e  C i ty  o f  G lasgow  Bank" o a s e s  c o n ta in e d
i n  6 R e t t i e .
Goudy^ a l s o  n o te s  t h a t ,  b e fo r e  th e  l i m i t a t i o n  
p la c e d  upon  a  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  h i s  w i f e ' s  a n te ­
n u p t i a l  /
1 # i f  ev en  th e n ,  I n  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  c a s e ,  i ta r o s e  a t  a l l :  s e e  p e r  L , G i l l i e s ;  c o n t r a s t  L*M ack en z ie , b o th  a t  p*1209 ,2* p e r  L# M ackenzie  a t  p*1209#3* p e r  L ftP.Hope, iM d *4 a p * 70 *
5* s e e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  8 ,1 ( 5 ) *  Goudy n o te s  t h a t  t h i s  e x te n d e d  t o  w iv es  g e n e r a l l y  th e  custom  o f  t h e  C i ty  o f  London*6 ,  J o n e s ,  1879 , 12 Ch*D, 484*7* su p ra *8* T?W g> 6 a* 823*9* ib id *
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n u p t i a l  d e b ts  by th e  M a rr ie d  wom en's P r o p e r ty  (S c o t la n d )  
Aotp 1877& 8*4* i t  W8G p o s s ib l e  f o r  an  u n f o r tu n a t e  
h u sb an d  t o  be  re n d e re d  b a n k ru p t  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  an  
o b l ig a t io n  u n d e r ta k e n  by h i s  w ife  w h ile  sh e  was s t i l l  
u n m arried *  She h e r s e l f  was n o t  a n sw e ra b le  t h e r e f o r #
A f t e r  1877 , how ever* th e  m a r r ie d  woman m ig h t be 
re n d e re d  b a n k ru p t  on t h a t  a cc o u n t*  i f  sh e  had  s e p a r a t e  
p i-'operty#  Thus* i n  W i s h a r t \  th e  C i ty  o f  G lasgow  
Bank h a v in g  s to p p e d  paym ent two w eeks a f t e r  th e  p a r t i e s *  
m arria g e *  and  th e  h usband  f i n d in g  h im s e l f  upon  th e  
l i s t  o f  c o n t r i b u to r i e s *  a s  husband* i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e
l i a b i l i t y  w hich th e  l i q u i d a t o r s  " sa y  a t t a c h e s  t o  him2b e c a u se  o f  th e  s h a r e s  h e ld  by h i s  w ife  " ,  t h e  l a t t e r  
o f f e r e d  " t o  s u r r e n d e r  a l l  t h a t  he  g o t*  a s  a  c o n d i t io n  
o f  h i s  b e in g  d is c h a r g e d  from  l i a b i l i t y # " ^  T h is  
s o l u t i o n  th e  L o rd  P r e s i d e n t  a p p ro v ed  ( " , , # i t  a p p e a rs  
to  me t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  Mr* W is h a r t  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  be 
r e l i e v e d  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  d e b t  o f  h i s  w ife  
upon  s u r r e n d e r in g  any  sum o f  money o r  o t h e r  v a lu a b le  
c o n s id e r a t i o n  w hioh he o b ta in e d  upon th e  o c c a s io n  o f  
t h e  m a r r ia g e ^ ^ ) ,  b e in g  o f  th e  o p in io n  t h a t  th e  w ife  
h a d  /
1 ,  ,§ta&ra*2* p e r~ E a P # ( In g ll8 )  a t  p « 8 2 5 . H is L o rd sh ip  d id  n o t  e l a b o r a t e  upon  w h e th e r  th e  l i q u i d a t o r s  p la c e d  t h i s  l i a b i l i t y  upon t h e  husband  by r e a s o n  o f  t h e  ju s  
% r i %  ( th e  w ife  and h e r  f a t h e r  h a v in g  in v e s te S  i n  lE E eoank  b e f o r e  th e  w i f e 's  m a rr ia g e *  t h e r e  h a v in g  b e en  no m a r r la g e - c o n t r a c t*  and  th e  o r i g i n  o f  th e  p r o p e r ty  n o t  b e in g  su ch  a s  t o  r e c e iv e  p r o t e c t i o n  from  th e  h u s b a n d 's  g ra s p  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  1877 Act*Ge3, w hioh c o n c e rn e d  money o r  p r o p e r ty  o b ta in e d  th ro u g h  th e  w i f e 's  own w ork and e f f o r t s *  a n d  in v e s tm e n ts  t h e r e o f )  o r  on th e  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a n te ­n u p t i a l  d e b ts  o r  bo th*The h u s b a n d 's  c a s e  was based*  quoad a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t*  on th e  A ot o f  1877* i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h ich  he was s u c c e s s f u l*  a n d , second*  t h a t  h i s  w i f e 's  r i g h t  a s  f i a r  i n  t h e  s to c k  d id  n o t  em erge u n t i l  t h e  d e a th  o f  
h e r  f a th e r *  who h ad  th e  l i f e r e n t ,  and  t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  h i s  w ife  was n o t  a  p a r t n e r  i n  t h e  bank  ( u n s u c c e s s f u l ) *  3* L o P o In g l is ,  ib id *4# a t  p@828*
122.
h a d  become a  p a r t n e r  i n  t h e  b a n k , and  t h a t  t h i s  was a nia n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t  * albeit perhaps not p re & ta b le  till 
the bank o r  it® creditors called upon th e  p a r tn e r®  
t h e r e o f  t o  discharge t h e i r  obligation#
Though m atte r®  w ere  chang ing*  and  i t  c o u ld  be 
said t h a t  a w ife*  i n  v iew  o f  the i n c r e a s in g  p o t e n t i a l  
sc o p e  o f  h e r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty ,  was b o th  m ore immune 
from  a t t a c k  by  h e r  hu sb an d '®  c re d i to r®  an d  lea®  
immune to attack by h e r  own, c e r t a i n  anom alie®  
p e r s i s t e d  -  f o r  exam ple* ev en  where she  was a s e p a r a t e  
t r a d e r ,  u n t i l  t h e  1861 A c t, s a #5 and 6 ( i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  s e p a r a t i o n  and  p r o t e c t i o n  o r d e r s :  and  s e e  a l s o
8 * 1 6 ) , " th e  goods b e lo n g in g  to h e r  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  
su c h  b u s in e s s  none th e  l e s s  f e l l  u n d e r  t h e  j u s  m a r i t i  
and  w ere  a t t a c h a b l e  by  h e r  husband's c r e d i t o r s ^ " * and 
t h e  " s t o c k - i n - t r a d e "  e x c e p tio n  ( F e r g u s o n 's ^  T r u s te e  v# 
Willis, N e lso n  ^  Co# (1883) 11 E#261) to the b e n e f i c i a l  
e f f e c t  o f  th e  1877 A ct has b e e n  n c te d ^ *
O f c o u r s e ,  t h e  common law  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  a l l  
m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  c f  th e  w ife  ( i n  th e  a b se n c e  of ' 
private a g re em e n t and w ith  certain m in o r e x c e p tio n s '* )  
p a s s e d  to t h e  h u sb an d  jiare B E l t à »  and  c o u ld  be 
attached by  t h e  h u sb a n d ' ® c re d i to r ®  f o r  his d e b ts  and 
i n  hi® s e q u e s t r a t io n #  T h a t which was h e r  own by 
p r i v a t e  p a c t io n  c o u ld  n o t  be  a t t a c h e d  by  them#
I t  /
1 * The L ord  President d i s l i k e d  th e  term # "How, I do 
n o t  know t h a t  " a n t e n u p t i a l  d e b t"  i s  a  v e ry  happy e x p r e s s io n ,  I am n o t  aw are  t h a t  it h a s  b e en  u se d  b e f o r e  this time i n  any Act o f  P a r l ia m e n t  o r  byany law-witer, but I t h in k  it c a n  a d m it of o n ly  one m eaning* I t  means debts contracted by the wife 
b e f o r e  m a r r ia g s ;  ###" (p # 6 2 7 ) . The e x p r e s s io n  a p p e a rs  t o  h ave  b e en  u se d  f r e e l y  by L o rd  F r a s e r ,  h o w ev er, i n  'H usband  and W if e '#2# Ooudy, p ,2 8 8 #3# F#v.¥#H#& Co, (1883) 11 R .2 6 1 .4, See Goudy, ibid. See Chapter 1, s u p r a ,  pp#89-91*3# See g e n e r a l l y  C h a p te r  1*
123,
I t  1® I n t e r e s t i n g  t o  e e e  t h a t  Goudy^ l i k e n s  t h e  
w i f e 's  r i g h t  t o  a  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s io n  from  h e r  own 
e s t a t e  b e f o r e  i t  became sw allow ed  up  i n  t h e  h u s b a n d 'a  
p r o p e r ty  m m i'it,! ^ # to " th e  w i f e ' s  e q u i ty  t o  a  
settlement" o f  English la w . The w i f e 's  claim under 
t h e  1861 A ot f o r  su ch  p r o v i s io n  was n o t  c o m p e te n t i f  
h e r  h u sb an d  h ad  o b ta in e d  p o s s e s s io n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  
i n  q u e s t io n ,  o r  i f  h i s  c r e d i t o r  had  " a t t a c h e d  th e  
P r o p e r ty  by  D ecree  o f  A d ju d ic a t io n  o r  A r r e s tm e n t ,  and  
fo llo w e d  up t h e  s a i d  A rre s tm e n t by o b ta in in g  th e r e o n  
D e cre e  c f  F u rth c o m in g , o r  h a s  p o in d e d  an d  c a r r i e d  
th ro u g h  and r e p o r t e d  a s a l e  t h e r e o f "  (s*15^).
The ro a d  t o  t h e  s e p a r a t io n  o f  s p o u s e s ' p r o p e r ty  
h a s  b e e n  f o l lo w e d , and  th e  g row th  o f  a  w i f e ' s  
c o r re s p o n d in g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  n o ted ^ *  Wlien s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  a  w i f e 's  m oveab le  p r o p e r ty  e v e n tu a l ly  becam e g e n e r a l  
by  th e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t la n d )  A o t, 1 881^ , 
s o  much m ore l i k e l y  became t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a  
w ife  m ig h t be  r e n d e re d  b a n k ru p t  -  i n  r e s p e c t  c f  t h a t  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty #  I n  an  u n e x c e p tio n a b le  and  l o g i c a l  
m an n er, a s  s a n c t i o n  was g iv e n  t o  g r e a t e r  freed o m  and  
r i g h t s  /
1 ,  p # 2 8 7 ,2 ,  g iv e n  t o  h e r  by th e  C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  ( S c o t la n d )  Amendment A c t ,  1861 , S*16, d is c u s s e d  s u p r a  a t  
C h a p te r  1 p p ,7 8 -7 9  at w hich  p o in t  the m anner of t h e  A c t 's  e x p r e s s io n  i s  c r i t i c i s e d *5# AS t o  t h e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  t h e s e  c la u s e s  o f  th e  
p r o v i s i o n ,  s e e  P r* I#  832/33#  Goudy, p*287*4* See g e n e r a l l y  C h a p te r  1$ s e e  a l s o  G oudy, p p ,6 8 -  
7 0 ;  286-289*5* 44 & 45 V io t*  0 * 2 1 , s * 1 (1 )  -  th o u g h , e q u a l ly ,  by8 * 1 (3 ) su c h  p r o p e r ty  a s  c l e a r l y  a p p e a re d  t o  be  h e r  own was p r o t e c t e d  from  the h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s *  H ow ever, w here  fu n d s  w ere  im m ix ^ ,  o r  w here  t h e  w ife  was t h e  l e n d e r  o f  fu n d s  t o  t h e  h u sb a n d , u n d e r  
8 * 1 (4 ) ,  sh e  ra n k e d  m e re ly  a s  a  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r  t h e r e f o r  ( s e e  su p r ^  C h a p te r  1 pp* 9 8 -9 9 )  and  t h i s  i s  s t i l l  th e  c a s e  -  i n f r a # pp* 1 2 8-1 4 3, and  pp.,1 5 5-1 5 9,
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r i g h t s  I n  p r o p e r ty  t o  m a r r ie d  women, ao  a l s o  I n o re a a e d  
t h e  concomitant* and  p r o p e r ,  answerability# Thus,
Goudy 1® a b le  t o  aay^ t h a t  "A m a rr ie d  woman may now -  
bo  made n o to u r  b a n k ru p t  l i k e  an y  o r d in a r y  d e b to r " ,  an d  
t o  a f f i r m  t h a t  "The B an k ru p to y  A o t, 1915 , m akes no  e x o e p tlo n a  
o r  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  so that e v e ry  p e rs o n  who i s  l i a b l e  
for d e b t  may be c o n s t i t u t e d  n o to u r  b a n k ru p t2! I,#
The /
1, p#70 ( 4 th  edn# -  at 1914)#2# I b i d , ,  p#$8  (S ee  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  t h i s  d é c l a r a t i o n  
T n lZ h a p te r  v n K " P e rso n s  L ia b le  t o  N o to u r  B a n k ru p tc y " )  w h ich  f o l lo w s  th e  s e n te n o e  q u o te d ) . 'The p r o c e s s  of s e q u e s t r a t i o n  {which i s  one  o f  th e  
p a th s  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  n o to u r  b a n k ru p tc y :  Bankruptcy (S c # )  A c t ,  1 9 1 3 , s*5# By s#7 t h e r e o f ,  "N o to u r b a n k ru p tc y  s h a l l  be h e ld  t o  commence fromth e  time when Its s e v e r a l  r e q u i s i t e s  c o n c u r ,  #*#Gow, p p #625-626) i s  a p p l i c a b l e ,  i n  q u a l i f y i n g  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  ( s e e  as#  11-13), to the " e s t a t e s  o f  any  p e r s o n  subject to t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  the Supreme C o u r ts  o f  S c o t la n d  ##*# The e s t a t e  o f  a  p a r t n e r s h i p ,  o r  o f  a  c o r p o r a te  b o d y , su c h  a s  a  r o y a l  b u rg h , may b e  s e q u e s t r a t e d ,  b u t  t h e  p r o c e s s  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  
t o  a  company r e g i s t e r e d  u n d e r  t h e  C om panies A cts#  
n o r  t o  a n  u n in c o r p o r a te d  a s s o c i a t i o n " ,  (Gcw, p#629) n o r  p ro b a b ly  (Gloag and  H e n d e rso n , " I n t r o d u c t io n  t o  t h e  Law of S c o tla n d "  7 t h  edm#, 1 9 6 8 , p#T20) " to  any  body established by private Act o f  P a r l ia m e n t" #(T he exam ple  t h e r e  g iv e n ,  and  a l s o  by  Goudy p*72 i s  that o f  a r a i lw a y  company)#The r e f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  A ot ( a s #6 an d  11) t o  n o to u r  b a n k ru p tc y  an d  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o f  a  "com pany", " s h a l l  in c lu d e  b o d ie s  c o r p o r a t e ,  p o l i t i c ,  o r  c o l l e g i a t e ,  and  p a r t n e r s h i p s ;  " p a r t n e r  c f  a  company" s h a l l  in c lu d e  th e  members o f  su c h  b o d ie s ;  " d e b to r " ,  " b a n k r u p t" , and  " c r e d i t o r "  s h a l l  a p p ly  t o  com pan ies a s  v /e l l  a s  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and  s h a l l  in c lu d e  a l i e n s ; "  (B a n k ru p tc y  (8 c # )  A c t ,  1 9 1 3 , 9*2 )*H ow ever, a  c o m p a riso n  o f  t h e  c a s e s ,  c o n ta in e d  i n  t h e  
sam e v o lu m e ,o f  S ta n d a rd  P r o p e r ty  In v e s tm e n t  Go#Ltd# v# D unb lane  H y d ro p a th ic  ao*L td*  (1 8 8 4 ) 12 H #328, and  C la rk  V* H in d o , M iln e  & Co# i b i # # 3 4 7 , p ro d u c e s  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  a  company in c o r p o r a te d  u n d e r  t h e  C om panies A c ts  may b e  r e n d e re d  n o to u r  b a n k ru p t (H in d e ) b u t  c a n n o t  be s e q u e s t r a t e d  (D u n b lan e  H ydro#) The w in d in g -u p  o f  a  company ( t h e  ' l i q u i d a t i o n '  t h e r e o f )  "m ust take place a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  o f  t h e  C om panies Acts e x c lu s iv e ly "  ( p e r  L#8hand r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  D unb lane  /
1 2 5 ,
T e c te i a a l  and  P r o c e d u r a l
M en tio n  s h o u ld  be  made o f  th o s e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  
I m p o r ta n t ,  o o n s o l id a t ln g  and  s t i l l  c u r r e n t  A o t o f  
1 9 1 3 ^ ,  ^ i l o h  f o r  m ore th a n  e l x t y  year®  ha® g o v e rn e d  
Soot® la%v on  t h e  s u b j e c t ^ ,  w h ich  r e a d i l y  p r e a e n t  
th e m s e lv e s  a s  a f f e c t i n g  th e  r l g h t e  o f  a p o u sea  from  a  
p r o c e d u r a l  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p o i n t  o f  vievf -  th o u g h  
in d e e d  t h e s e  o s t e n s i b l y  p r o c e d u r a l  m e a su re s  may h av e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  r e p e r o u s s io n s  i n  p r o p e r ty  m a t t e r s ,  and  
sù o h  a  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  oim s more p ro b a b ly  t o  e a s e  o f  
t r e a tm e n t  and  o o n v e n ie n o e  o f  o l a s s l f i o a t i o n  th a n  t o  
fu n d a m e n ta l d i f f e r o n o e  i n  g en u s  o f  r u l e  -  b e f o r e  th e  
commencement o f  & more g e n e r a l  s tu d y  o f  t h e  r i g h t s  
i n  p r o p e r ty  o f  b a n k ru p t ,  s p o u s e ,  end  c r e d i t o r ,  and  
t h e  p ro b lem s w h ich  a r i s e  when one sp o u se  a  o r e d i t o r  
o f  th e  o th e r#
On t h i s  t o p i c , C l iv e  and  W ilso n  comment t h a t  
"The g e n e r a l  r u l e  I s  t h a t  t h e  law  g o v e rn in g  b a n k ru p tc y  
p r o c e d u r e s  g iv e s  no s p e c i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  sp o u se  
a s  such#  To t h i s  r u l e  t h e r e  a r e  tw o e x c e p tio n s ^ # "
The se c o n d  e x c e p t io n  w h ich  th e  a ù th o r s  n o te  i s  t h e  
m a t t e r  /
D unblane  Hydro# i n  H inde  a t  p . 353#)"A com pany, a l th o u g h  i t  may b e  made n o to u r  b a n k ru p t ,  w i th  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  e f f e c t s  on d i l i g e n c e  and  s e c u r i t i e s  f o r  p r i o r  d e b ts *  c a n n o t be  s e q u e s t r a te d #  
Once in c o r p o r a te d  i t  c a m io t a s  a  l e g a l  e n t i t y  be e x t in g u is h e d  u n le s s  rem oved from  t h e  r e g i s t e r  a s  d e f u n c t  o r  l i q u i d a t e d  by th e  s t a t u t o r y  m a c h in e ry  o f  w in d in g  up#" Gow, p*&09#3 & 4  Geo#V, c#20* (commencement 1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  1914; t h e  r u l e  and  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p r o v i s io n s  -  ss#  192 and  
177#)I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  s t a t u t e  i s  now a g e in g ;  any  new B a n k ru p tc y  A ct w i l l  p o s s ib l y  a t te m p t  t o  a c h ie v e  some d e g re e  o f  raoD rochem qp^ w ith  E n g la n d , w h ich  i n  t u r n  w i l l  a i d  'E a m o n fsa -E lo n ' w i th  th e  E#B#C* U nifo rm  Law
A c t ,  1976.
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1 2 6 *
m a t t e r  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  b a n k r u p t 's  
8P0U8&*
By as*  86 and  87 o f  th e  A c t, t h e  w if e  o f  a  
b a n k ru p t  may be  c o m p e lle d  t o  an sw er on o a th  a l l  la w fu l  
q u e s t io n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  b a n k r u p t ,  t h e  
r u l e s  o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ,  i t  a p p e a r s ,  h a v in g  no p l a c e ,  
b e c a u se  "The e x a m in a tio n  ##* b e in g  a  m ere s t a t u t o r y  
i n q u i r y  *#* i s  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  th e  s t r i c t  r u l e s  o f  
e v id e n c e ^ * "
The f i r s t  e x c e p t io n  c o n c e rn s  th e  d i s a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  w if e  t o  v o te  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t r u s t e e  o r  
c o m m issio n e rs#  " * ,#  th e  w ife  o f  t h e  b a n k ru p t  and  
an y  /
1# Goudy, p # 2 3 6 , c i t i n g  S&wers v# B & lg a rn ie  (1 8 5 8 )
21 D* 1 5 3 , i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  " c o n f i d e n t i a l  co m m u n ica tio n s b e tw een  a  b a n k ru p t and  h i s  w i f e " ,  C l iv e  and  W ilson  a l s o  r e f e r  t o  t h i s  c a s e ,  m aking r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
o p in io n  o f  L *0*K in loch  i n  h i s  N ote  t h e r e  r e p o r t e d  ( a t  p ,1 5 4 )  w hioh was t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t o  e x c lu d e  su c h  e v id e n o e  w ould be  t o  n e u t r a l i z e  i t s  d e t e c t i v e  f o r c e ,  " i n  t h e  v e ry  c a s e s  i n  w hioh i t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  s e r v ic e a b le " #  See a l s o  p e r  L o rd s Cowan and  B enholm e, 
who l a i d  s t r e s s ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  upon th e  e v i d e n t i a l  s p e c i a l t i e s ,  and p a r t i c u l a r  p u r p o s e s ,  o f  b a n k ru p tc y  
p ro c e e d in g s  and  in v e s t i g a t i o n s #
The e x a m in a tio n  a u th o r i s e d  by  s#86  i s  o f  " th e  
b a n k r u p t 's  w ife  and  f a m i ly ,  c l e r k s ,  s e r v a n t s ,  f a c t o r s ,  law  a g e n ts  an d  o th e r s  ###"* One o f  t l t e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  th e  1913 A ct i s  i t s  g e n e r a l  s i l e n c e  upon  q u e s t io n s  in v o lv in g  e q u a l i t y  o f  t r e a tm e n t  o f  h u sb an d  and w ife *  T h u s, n o th in g  i s  s a i d  t h e r e  a b o u t e x a m iîia tlo n  o f  a  b a h l t r u p t 's  husband*  No d o u b t ,  a t  t h a t  d a t e ,  t h e r e  w ere  fe w e r  m a r r ie d  fe m a le  b a n k r u p ts ,  a lth o u g h ?  h a s  b een  s e e n ,  t h a t  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  i n  1913 was no c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  t e r m s ,  ( s u p r a # p * i 2 3 ) ,  G liv o  and  W ilso n  ( p . 342) s o y , "Z ltE o u g h  t h e r e  i s  no  s p e c i f i o  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  
b a n k r u p t 's  h u sb a n d , t h e r e  c a n  be l i t t l e  d o u b t t h a t  h e  w ould be  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  te rm  " f a m i ly " " ,  and  t h i s  seem s a  m ost s e n s i b l e  v ie w . C o n t r a s t  th e  n o n - a p p l io a t io n  t o  h u sb an d s  o f  b a n k ru p t  w iv es  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r o v i s io n s  o f  a#60# ( C l iv e  and  W ilso n , p # 5 4 i ,  jy i f r q # p * i2 8 )*
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any  t r u s t e e  f o r  h e r  s h a l l  n o t  he e n t i t l e d  t o  v o te  I n  
t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t r u s t e e  o r  o o m m lse io n er# , h u t  i n  a l l  
o t h e r  r e e p e o ta  suoh  p e rs o n  may b e  ra n k e d  &e a  o r e d i t o r  *" 
Any p a r t i o l p a t l o n  by t h e  w ife  i n  t h i s  p ro c e d u re  i® 
b a r r e d ,  "W here you a r e  rem oving  th é  t r u s t e e ,  you a r e  
t a k in g  th e  f i r & t  o f  two a te p a  f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  & 
t r u s t e e #  T h e re fo re  t h e  d i s a b i l i t y  a t t a o h l n g  i n  term® 
t o  t h e  w i f e 's  v o t in g  f o r  th e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  t r u s t e e  
a p p l i e s  Tfdith e q u a l  f o r c e  t o  h e r  v o t in g  f o r  t h e  rem o v a l 
o f  t h e  t r u s t e e  # 1 0  Ima b een  a p p o in te d ^ * "  C l iv e  and  
W lleon  /
1 ,  $ ,6 0 ,
2$ MaoNaught v# S le v w r lg h t  1928 8 ,C # 6 8 7 , p e r  L .O rm ld a le  a t  p , 6 9 0 .  I n  t h a t  G&$e, i t  was d e c id e d  t h a t  a  w ife%fa$ n o t  e n t i t l e d  t o  v o te  f o r  t h e  rem o v a l o f  th e. t r u s t e e , b e c a u s e  t o  do so  was t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  I n  e f f e c ti n  t h e  p ro c e d u re  t o  e l e c t  a  new t r u s t e e .  The i n t e r ­a c t i o n  o f  s e c t i o n s  o f  th e  B an k ru p tc y  A ot h e re  I n  q u e s t io n  was b e tife e n  $ $ ,6 0  and  71 : s e e  d e c i s i o n  t o  t h e  o p p o s i te  e f f e c t  upon th e  I n t e r - a o t i c n  o f  $ $ ,3 4  
and  6 0 ,  MacNaught v .  S ie v w r ig h t  1927 8 ,0 ,2 8 5 ,  ,i ^ r a . p * i 5 0 ,  and  O liv e  and  W ilso n , p p * 3 4 l-3 4 2 #C liv e  and  W ilso n  (p»342) i n c l i n e  t o  a  s c e p t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  h e r e ,  t a k in g  th e  v iew  t h a t  "The r e a l  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  d e c i s io n  seem s t o  have  b een  a  c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  a b s u rd  c o n se q u e n c e s  w hich  c o u ld  f o l lo w  i n  & s m a ll  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i f  t h e  iv ife  c o u ld  v o te  f o r  rem ova l b u t  n o t  a p p o in tm e n t o f  a  t r u s t e e " .  T h is  may be s o ,  b u t ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , i f ,  f o r  some r e a s o n  (w h ich  seem s t o  a r i s e  nq i^  p e rh a p s  from  th e  w i f e 's  r ô l e  a s  
w i f e ,  b u t  rather""T rom  h e r  m em bership o f  t h a t  l e a s t -  fa v o u re d  c a te g o r y ,  t h e  c l a s s  o f  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r s  ( s e e  "The S c o t t i s h  B a n k ru p tc y  M anual" J,B #W ardhaugh 
5 th  e d n , 1955 , p ,1 7 ,  f o o tn o te  37 w h e re , h o w ev er, W ardhaugh m e n tio n s , i n  h i s  l i s t  o f  n o n - e n t l t l e d  p e r s o n s ,  t h e  w i f e ,  and  th e  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s e n te n c e s  a s  th o u g h  t r e a t i n g  o f  t h e  w ife  w ife  ( a s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e )  r a t h e r  th a n  q^a  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r .T h is  may be a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  % e  s p e c i a l  t r e a tm e n t  o f  w iv e s  and th o s e  a c q u i r in g  d e b ts  a f t e r  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o th e r w is e  th a n  th ro u g h  s u c c e s s io n  o r  m a r r ia g e ,  by 
8 , 6 0  o f  t h e  A c t ,  w h e rea s  th e  d i s e n t i t l e m e n t  o f  p o s tp o n e d  o r  e d i t o r s  g e n e r a l l y  a p p e a rs  t o  r e s t  on th e  common la w , (B ee r e a s o n s  i n  S h e r i f f ' s  n o t e ,  R .S c o t t  Cram & Co , * 8  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  (1 9 0 9 ) 23fkkL ,R ev# 238 a t  p ,2 4 0 )a  i t  i s  f a i r  t o  s a y ,  th o u g h , t h a t  t h i s  may be  
m ere c o in c id e n c e  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t r e a tm e n t  from  w hich  no c o n c lu s io n  a s  t o  th e o r y  o r  r e a s o n in g  s h o u ld  be  
draw n /
1 2 8 ,
W ils o n , n o t in g  t h a t  t h e  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  A c t 1889 "doe® 
p r o v id e  t h a t  word® Im p o r tin g  th e  fe m in in e  g e n d e r  
s h a l l  I n c lu d e  m a le a * , rem ark^ t h a t  t h i s  r u l e  doea  n o t  
u p p ly  t o  t h e  h u sb an d  o f  a  b a n k ru p t  woman#
The o r d e r  o f  r a n k in g  l a  f a m i l i a r * -  t h e  o r d e r  l a  
f i r s t ,  p y e fe rp n l^ la l  ( s e c u r e d ,  o r  p r i v i l e g e d )  c la im ® , 
th e n  o r d in a r y  c la im s  and  c o n t in g e n t  c la lm a #  and 
t h e r e a f t e r  o n ly  a r e  e n t e r t a i n e d  t h e  D oa^noa^d  c la im s  
( I f  an y  sums r e m a in ) .  A l l  p r l o r - r a n k l t i g  claims m ust 
be  m et I n  f u l l  b e f o r e  t h e  c la im s  o f  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r s  
c a n  be  c o n s id e r e d ,  b u t  I t  d o es  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  
w i l l  r a n k  on th e  fu n d  b e f o r e  t h e  o r d in a r y  c r e d i t o r s  
for t h e i r  I n t e r e s t ^ #
SM-ll«SâfE:IMs:aS-SS§,S2alg2l_®OaESaS£g&âE
The l e n d e r  o f  money t o  a  p a r t n e r s h i p  upon  i n t e r e s t  
v a r y in g  w i th  p r o f i t s ^  o r  I n  r e t u r n  f o r  a  s h a r e  o f  t h e  
p r o f i t s  ( c 0 i%)are Cgngg, s u p r a ) ,  t h e  s e l l e r  o f  g o o d w ill  
t o  a  p a r t n e r s h i p  I n  c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  a  s h a r e  I n  th e  
p r o f i t s ^  and  th e  married woman f  o r  fu n d s  l e n t  o r  
e n t r u s t e d  /
d raw n -  a n d . I n  a n y  c a s e ,  w hat I s  I t  b u t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w h ich  p la c e s  t h e  w l f e - o r e d l t o r  I n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r s ?  The nub I s *  w h a t I s  th e  r e a s o n in g  o r  p h i lo s o p h y  b e h in d  that?) t h e  w ife  l a  t o  be e x c lu d e d  from  the e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e r e  seem s t o  be  no r e a s o n  ( b o th  I n  t h e  m eaning  o f  " j u s t i f i c a t i o n "  and  of " p o in t" )  f o r  h e r  to participate ev en  on t h e  p e r ip h e r y  o f  t h e  p ro c e s s #  M o reo v er, b e f o r e  a  new t r u s t e e  c a n  be e l e c t e d  a  fo rm e r  one m ust b e  d e p o se d , and  to t h a t  e x t e n t  t h e  w ife  M  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  I n  th e  p ro c e s s #  Similarly, tcTthat ( l i m i t e d )  e x t e n t ,  t h e  " p o in t"  o f  h e r  v o te  w ould have t o  be  a d m i t te d ,  and  a c c o r d in g ly  t h e  m eaning  o f  t h e  word " re a s o n "  as u se d  i n  th e  above a rgum en t w ould r e q u i r e  t o  be r e s t r i c t e d  to that o f  " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " ,1# pf34l. Contrast sa#86/67 supra#2# Goudy, p#331 ( t e x t ,  with f o o tn o te  ( d ) ) #  Onr a n k in g ,  s e e  g e n e r a l l y  Goudy, p p # 3 3 0 -3 3 1 , W ardhaugh, pp#43-44#3# P a r t n e r s h i p  A c t, 1890, s#3# See "The Law of P a r t n e r s h i p  i n  S c o t la n d " ,  J#  B e n n e tt  M i l l e r ,
PP#93-96#
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entrusted to her husband or Immixei with her husband’s4 Pfüada # are WardhaMgh*6 examplea the postponed 
creditor. He oemtlawee^  ^ %A married woman ia , 
however# entitled to the benefit of any eeourity 
received by her from her husband for the loan 
(Commercial Bank v, Wllaon# 1909* 1 S*L*T$ 873),* and 
furthermore* w@n the principle that a firm la & 
separate peraone^ .** apart from the constituent partnera 
thereof* *& loan to m firm in which the credltor#a 
hueband la only one of the partner#" (& Gltuation 
which might arl#e fairly frequently and 1# by no mean# 
fanciful) "1# not a loan to her husband in the aenae 
of the Act of 1SS1# and 1# poatGoned In the ranking 
on the firm*# eatate (nor apparently on the huaband*# 
estate either* in respect of the deficiency)# (lumaden 
V, Sym (1912) 28 S#C,R# 168; Engliah caee, Re Tuff 
(1887) 19 88# referred to#)* Wardhaugh goes
on to #ay that the form of the transaction w ill be 
important# A loan might be made directly to the 
firm* or to the husband who thereupon lend# the money 
to the firm* but in either case surely# the wife 
ahould be adviaed to be cautious * might #he not* if  
8he escaped classification as the lender of money to 
her husband, or an entruster of money to him or of 
having immixed her funds with his# nevertheless find 
herself to be a postponed creditor by classification  
as a lender of money to a partnership? In the latter 
case, though* she would be the postponed creditor of 
the firm while in the former the postponed creditor 
of an individual partner, (The disadvantages under 
which /
1, Married women*# Property (Scotland) Act* 1881*8,1(4),2, p,44# See also Ooudy* p#331* who* with reference to postponed creditors* state# that "Two such classes of creditors" (being those mentioned in the text above) "are known to the law,"
5«
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which the *private* creditor laboura are diseuQaed 
briefly, infra*)* On the other hand, she would enter 
that o&tegory only If ehe lent upon interest varying 
with profit or in return for a h^ar^  of the profits in 
oiroumatanoos whioh might suggest that she herself was 
a partner* A straightforward loan to her hu#band*8 
firm would not, then, appear to pleo# her in any 
position lower than that of an ordinary creditor, of 
the firm, provided presumably that the loan was made 
to the partnership, and not through the medium of the 
husband (unless possibly the medium speedily despatched 
the money to the ultimate recipient, this being the 
most convenient arrangement in the circumstances?) 
since the latter situation might cause entanglement 
with the provisions of the 1881 Act i f  the husband 
delayed to transfer the funds# This may be a 
simplistic view. There are two points to note;
that the court is  more likely to look to the 
substaneo than to the form of the transaction, and 
e^cqpd* that, the husband being a partner in the firm, 
and being therefore "an agent of the firm and his 
other partners for the purpose of the business of the 
partnership*" ( s .3, Partnership Act, 1890), having, 
le t i t  be supposed, no restriction upon his general 
authority to act in matters concerning the business 
of the partnership and the "carrying on in the usual 
way business of the kind carried on by the firm of 
which he is  a member", the use of the husband as a 
medium (even a tardy medium) in the transfer of loan 
funds to the firm would not alter the character of 
the wife as a lender to the firm i f  that, in essence 
or in substance, was the nature of her advance#
I t  l a  th o u g h t  t h a t  t h a t  i s  th e  b e t t e r  o p in io n ;  
th o u g h  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o t h e r s  m ig h t l e a d  them  t o  
a rg u e  t h a t  t h e  p l a c in g  o f  t h e  w ife* #  money i n  t h e  
husband*#  bank  a c c o u n t am ounted t o  an  im m ix tu re  o f  
fu n d s  /
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fu n d s  o r  a  p u r e ly  i n te r ^ s p o u s e  lo an #  a n d /o r  t h a t  t h e  
h u sb an d  h a d  no a u t h o r i t y  t o  a c c e p t  and  h a n d le  t h e  
l o a n ,  s u r e l y  t h e  o l t& t lo n  o f  0*5 by  th e  w if e  w ould  be  
a  a u f f l o l e n t  a n sw e r f o r  h e r ,  u n le a a  o f  c o u rs e  ehe  knew 
t h a t  h e r  hueband  h a d  no su c h  a u t h o r i t y  I f  In d e e d  he  
d id  n o t ,  o r  d id  n o t  know o r  b e l i e v e  h e r  h u sb an d  t o  be 
a  p a r t n e r ?
On the other hand, a loan by wife to hu&band made, 
for example, with the aim of allowing him to make his 
capital contribution to the firm, would aeem to be, In 
Its nature, a peraonal loan to the husband, though It 
w ill oome to represent part of the capital of the firm.
It is  suggested that the firm is  not concerned with 
the private financial arrangements as a result of which 
a partner is  enabled to make or *top«up* his capital 
contribution^*
These thoughts tend to suggest that to lay great 
stress on the form of the transaction under consideration 
may be lll*edvised* Neither benefit nor form appears 
to be a good guide* a ll depends on whether the loan was 
to the firm or to the individual partner personally, 
Wardhaugh himself merely states, without explanation, 
that the form of the transaction w ill be "important", 
and in his next sentence envisages both direct loan 
to the firm* and loan through the husband to the firm,- 
his sentence construction rendering i t  impossible to 
judge whether he considered the methods to be equally 
competent /
«•s9iww»fyf;#«»K*ewwew?t*1* Cf# Miller, pp*256-263 (in the context of arrangements as to capital contribution before the partnership is  formed) and (in relation to third party loans to existing partners) pp*256-258* "The firm is in fact a creditor in the partner*8 obligation to contribute the property and a creditor is  not bound to inquire as to the means by which his debtor has put himself in a position to discharge his obligation," (p*257) (where the partner is  obliged to make such contribution and obtains the wherewithal on his own credit from a third party).
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competent and desirable* or whether i t  was the 
distinction between them which was "important",
"Subject to any agreement between the partners, 
every partnerehip ie dissolved aa regards a ll the 
partners by the death or bankruptcy of any partner^#" 
Normally, therefore, on the bankruptcy of the husband 
partner* the firm w ill be disBOlved, and, in the 
situation envisaged, the wife w ill rank as & postponed 
creditor of her husband (who himself "may be a creditor 
of the firm in some respects and a debtor of the firm 
in others^", besides standing also perhaps in the 
relation of debtor or creditor to other individual 
partners thereof^) on such estate as remains for the 
satisfaction of the claims of his postponed creditors#
The claim of his ordinary creditors is  as against his 
estate tapt^ tale as i t  stood in the bankrupt (see
Qoudy* p*582), " ,,#the creditors of the firm rank
on the firm*# estate to the exclusion of the creditors 
o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t n e r ^ " ,  i n  the firm's sequestration.
Ocudy^  writes that the partner is  cautioner for
t h e  /
1, Partnership Act, 1890, s,55(1)# See *Partnershlp* d,B*Mlller, pp*446-450# Professor Miller at p*448 emphasises that* because of the separate 'porsona* of the firm in Scotland, " -  & firm may be sequestrated while the individual partners remain solvent*Conversely one or more of the partners may be sequestrated While the firm Itse lf remains solvent#"I t  may be, of course# that i t  happens that the firm* end a ll its  partners* are sequestrated#(For a discussion of the consequences of each of these three possibilities^ see Miller* pp#554-5SS)*2 # Miller, p*5&2 (and i f  a debtor to the firm* the firm* or* i f  sequestrated* its  trustee* w ill rank as his ordinary creditor* "And the ranking in the latter case in no way affects the right of the company*8 creditors through their trustee to claim in addition directly against the private estate of the partner ae cautioner for the company's debts#" (Goudy, p#578)* 5# Gloag and Henderson* p*277, citing in the 6th edn#(at p#259) Clark, Partnership* p*755, and in the 7th edn# (at p#277) Goudy* Bankruptcy* pp#578-9#4# 9*578,
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the firm's debts and that "The trustee on the joint 
estate, In ranking on a partner*# estate for debts 
due by such partner to the firm on capital aooount, 
ia noting rather ae the ingatherer of the firm's 
estate than as a creditor representing the other 
partners# His right ao to rank is  of great importance 
to the company creditors, as i t  increases the divisible 
fund of the company#" Further  ^ he says;- "Creditors 
of a bankrupt or insolvent firm are entitled to be 
ranked on the firm's estate for the fu ll amount of 
their debts, to the entire exclusion of the separate 
creditors of the partners# They are further entitled  
to be ranked on the separate estates of the partners 
for the balance le ft unpaid after exhausting the funds 
of the company* pëssu with the separate creditors 
of the partners#
The above rule of ranking is  different from what 
prevails in England###"*
If It is  the case that the firm is  bankrupt and 
the partners# or some of them, are solvent* "no difficulty  
of ranking arises# The partners are liable to 
creditors jointly and severally, as co-obllgents for 
the whole debts# but in relation to each other they 
stand in the position of co-cautioners# and entitled  
to relief# so far as they pay in excess of their 
respective proportions# Accordingly# i f  one solvent 
partner pay the whole debts# he may claim against the 
several estate# of the other partners# for their 
respective proportions, just && in the ordinary oase 
of co-cautioners^#"
The lender-wife is  in an unenviable position 




she can only be a postponed creditor of an individual 1partner *
The query which this reasoning takes as its 
starting point is as follows2 i f  a wife lends to a 
partner who is her h u sb a n d , and it is agreed that the 
loan in the circumstances is not a lo a n  to th e  
partnership, is there any authority to suggest that 
she can be regarded'as an ordinary creditor of an 
individual partner, if that partner is her husband?
Is Wardhaugh to foe u n d e rs to o d  as suggesting that there 
are three possibilities - first  ^that the w ife  is an 
ordinary creditor of the firm, second, that the wife 
is an ordinary creditor of an individual p a r t n e r ,  who 
happens to be her husband, and, third, that the wife 
is a postponed creditor of her h u sb a n d , who happens 
to foe a partner?
Wardhaugh states that a loan to a partnership 
of which (only) one of the partners is the husband of 
the l e n d e r  "is not a loan to h e r  husband i n  the sense 
of the Act of 1881, and is not postponed in the ranking 
on the firm's estate (nor apparently on the husband's 
estate either. In respect of the deficiency)*" The 
oases cited by the author, in support of this view 
(and of the view in parenthesis?), are those of Lumsden 
V* Sym*^ , and the English case Re T u ff^  therein r e f e r r e d  
t o :  Ldmsden bears only upon the p r im a ry  p o i n t  that a
m a r r i e d ,woman who lends money to a p a r t n e r s h i p  of w hich  
her husband is a partner Is not (necessarily? always? 
unless in exceptional circumstances displaying a t r u e  
i n t e n t  o n ly  t o  lend to the husband p e r s o n a l l y ? ) to foe 
taken as "lending" w i th in  the meaning, and with th e  
consequences of the 1881 Act, s*1(4).
Where /
i. See infrai - 4MWi*Wifcy*e»af>i«£?3l2 * p #44«
3 .  (1 9 1 2 ) 28 S .C .R . ( o r  So.Law Review ) 168 .
4 .  (1 887 ) 19 Q .B .D . 8 8 .
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Where a wife made such a loan# and upon the 
question arising whether the provisions of the 1861 Act 
applied# Sheriff Orphoot In sald^* "I am of
opinion that they do not* It is  to he kept In view 
that the claim la made upon the eatatea of a firm of 
which the appellant's husband Is only one of the 
partners, and i t  is  a claim for money lent to the 
firm* and not to the husband. In our law a firm is  
a separate and distinct persona, i t  may consist of 
many partners, and i  d# not think that If the wife of 
one of the partners lends money to the firm It can be 
said that she has lent It to her husband In the sense 
of the provisions of the Act of 1881$ I am fortified  
In this opinion by the faot that the same view has 
been taken In England
From the English case, there Is to be elicited  
perhaps a certain guidance on the secondary point which 
forms the substance of the query*
There, (the primary point having been decided as 
i t  was in lumsden), Gave* J, gives an Inkling of the 
basis of the reasoning behind the specially unfavourable 
rules governing the treatment of inter-spouse loan*
When the legislature, he says, gave married women a 
property in their own earnings and power over them,
"it had to consider the case of what was to happen i f  
the wife lent such money to her husband for the purpose 
of his trade or business; and —  it  identified the 
wife with the husband to this extent —  that i f  she 
chose to make use of this power which was given to her 
and to soy that the money was hers and must be treated 
as & loan to her husband, then that she, at a ll events, 
should be identified with him to such an extent that 
she should not be able to claim a dividend until the 
other /
1 * at pp* 169/170*
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1Other creditors had received 20a* in the pound *" 
(Henoe, the ground here adduced for the lea# good 
claim of a wife in her husband's bankruptcy in 
respect of Inter-spouse loan is  that of identification  
of her with him,)#
However, where the husband was in business with 
another person or other persons, the matter, in the 
opinion of Cave, J,, was different^* I think,
therefore, that where there is m loan by the wife of 
a trader to the firm of which her husband is a member^, 
that /
1 # at p#9 0 #2» The fact that this judicial distinction was drawn here is  a ll the more significant in the English context, since English law# neither at common law nor under the Partnership Act, 1890 (8*4(1): contrast Scotland, s#4(2)i see the saving of the rules of common law and equity, a*46), recognises the separate personality of the firm# (See Miller, p#1 and footnote 3 and also pp#l4-16# The firm in Scotland is most frequently referred to as a "quasi-person" « a description which has certain merits,' out is  perhaps not entirely a happy one# (p*l6)# Consider Miller, pp#448-449 upon the significance and purpose of 8,47(2) of the Partnership Act, 1890, which Professor Miller writes, "appears to be to conserve the special treatment accorded by Scots law to the firm and its partners in cases of bankruptcy -  a treatment which is  necessitated because of the fact ' ‘ that the firm in Scotland is  regarded as a person distinct from the individual members ••«* The most significant aspect of the Scots law on this subject relates to the ranking of creditors on the sequestrated estates and is  derived from the doctrine of the separate persona of the firm and the accessory obligation'“oF'tKe individual partners as cautioners or co-obligants in the debts of the firm,"
8*47(2)%- "Nothing in this Act shall alter the rules of the law of sootland relating to the banlwuptoy of a firm or of the individual partners thereof*" (Neither does the Act of 1913 appear to have made any substantial change therein, but see Miller, pp#160-561, and pp*577-582)#
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that she may prove in respect of such a loan* The
circumstances of the two cases are entirely different.
In the one case a woman lends to her husband, and to
him only, he being the sole trader, and she will share
with him in the whole of the benefits which will arise
from the success of his trading* In the other, instead
of being the sole trader he is one of a firm, one, it
may be, of two or three, or it may be of ten or twelve,
and it is obvious that her interest is totally different
from what it was before* Before, she and her husband
were together interested in the whole of the profits to
be derived from the trade. In the case I have put
her interest may become a comparatively minute one.
She, no doubt, is interested in the success of her
husband, and to that extent she will benefit by his
success, but instead of having with her husband the
whole of the profits of the trading venture, she,
with her husband, will only enjoy that portion which1 pthe husband may be entitled to derive from the firm
Having differentiated between the case of a loan 
to the husband as sole trader and a loan to the 
husband as a partner, Cave, J* then says, in a 
partnership circumstance, "the question which I shall 
have to ask myself in each case will be, whether there 
was really a loan to the husband in order that he 
might do what he pleased with it, contributing it to 
the firm or not as he thought proper, or whether it was 
a /
1. pp.90-91.2* Whether or not the judicial trust in the certaintyof the sharing by the wife of the profits of thehusband's sole trading was, or is, well-founded,the philosophy is  clear* The concept of benefitor profit appears here as a variant on the identification theory above noted. Certainly the provisions of the Partnership Act, 1890, s.3 appear to rest on a similar basis. See Miller, p.94: such a lender or seller "has to some extent Involved himself in the fortunes of the business.*."*
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a loan by the wife to the firm? In this present 
case I am of opinion that this was a loan by the 
wife to the firm, and that she is entitled to prove 
for it against the joint estate of the firm'^ . "
This approach seems to suggest that, in loan to 
partnership, the loan may be "partnership-oriented" 
or "husband-oriented", and that the lender will be 
treated as ordinary firm creditor, or postponed 
creditor of husband accordingly, (which simply is a 
re-formulation in different terms of the preliminary 
questions is this truly in substance a loan to the 
firm, or a loan to the husband personally?), and that 
where the wife lends to the husband (the latter being 
a sole trader) for business purposes, there is nothing 
which should distinguish this from any (purely domestic) 
inter-spouse loan, unless, of course, the circumstances 
are such (compare the tone of the opinion of Cave, J, 
on this point, supra#pp.i$5-7 , though he does not appear 
to have follovfod the point to this extent) that, 
despite the terms of s,2(3)(d) of the 1890 Act, the 
spouses are held nevertheless to be partners of each 
other, which brings a new dimension to the question.
(As a partner, the distribution on dissolution would 
be governed by s#44 (and see general liability - s,9 
and s.4(2)) and her position and risk (if necessary, 
unlimited liability after the liability of the firm) 
would be indistinguishable from that of any other 
partner. The advantages of this position vis-à-vis 
other situations postulated would depend entirely on 
the circumstances of the case).
2Walton's comment , made with reference to the 
ease of Laidlaw v# L*s. Trustee (1881) 10 R* 374, 
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made advanoea to her husband for hla bualneaa# waa 
held entitled to rank in hi# aequeatratlon ae an 
ordinary creditor* In this ease# which was subsequent 
to the Act of 1801# i t  was said that donation# by her 
for this purpose would have been revocable"# is  
misleading in its  brevity; this was a ease where a 
husband was a sole trader and in which he received for 
hia buaineaa# money from his wife in oiroumatanoea in 
which i t  was clear that she had not made a g ift to him 
thereof# The wife was held entitled to rank as hie 
ordinary creditor therefor# and there is  no mention in 
the report of the terms of the Married Women's Property 
(Scotland) Act# 1801# a*1(4) (which came into operation 
on 18th July# 1061# the date of the decision being 
DeoemWr 16# 1082# though i t  appears that the loan was 
granted some time before the date of the Act) nor 
(except in the argument of the trustee, in reclaiming against 
-the L.o.'s interlocutor# where i t  ie reported that he 
took the view that the himband and wife were joint 
adventurers and that the money was advanced for the 
wife's os well as for the husband's uae) of the 
pceaibility that the wife wae the husband'a partner*
Unleaa other indication# are awry* thia decision 
must surely be explicable only on the grounds of the 
nen-retroapective character of the 1881 Act* Of 
course, conjugal finances are usually ac inter-twined 
that a domeatlc loan could facilitate indirectly a 
buaineae arrangement (which inter-relation primarily 
in other aspects (especially that of the power to 
amace 'consumer durables') lie s  at the heart of the 
argument againat separation of property) and ao perhape 
i t  le right that a ll solely Inter-epouee loans should 
be treated in the same way* Whether that way 
(generally preferential to (other) creditors at the 
expenae of the apouae) ia the beet and fairest which 
can /
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i  Pcan be devised is a matter for discussion * *.
It does appear that there are but two forms of 
loan by the wife to the partner-husband, and that if 
the loan is truly for the husband's benefit alone, 
then an inter-spouse loan with all its disadvantages 
from the wife's standpoint has been constituted. 
(Moreover, the loan must still be proved^ ). If a 
loan to the partnership has been constituted, however, 
the wife cannot regard her ship as in calm waters, 
but here the hidden rocks hold no especial danger for 
married women, but for any unwary creditor.
It seems to come to this, then, that a personal 
loan by a wife to her partner husband, even though 
for purposes connected with his business and even 
though the subject of the loan may find its way into 
the coffers of the firm, renders her a postponed 
personal creditor of her husband in his bankruptcy, 
in terms of the 1881 Act* So too would a personal 
loan to her sole trader husband for use in his business 
(but see below). There appears to be no case (in 
the context of loans ordinary debtor-creditor relations 
w ill apply in an inter-spouse sale, however, or other 
"onerously incurred non-alimentary debts"^) in which 
the wife may attain the status of ordinary creditor of 
her husband.
On the other hand, for what is  truly a loan to 
the firm, the wife will rank as an ordinary creditor 
of the firm# If her loan is made on interest varying 
with profit, or in exchange for a share of profit, she 
will rank^ as a postponed creditor of the firm (or 
joint /
1 * Chapter 7 (and of. other systems - Chapter 6 ).2# As to treatment of "lender-husband", upon whichthere seems to be little guidance, see infra, p.# 149, footnote 4.3. infra, p*i45 et seq.4. CÏIve and Wilson, pp*340-34l.3. Partnership Act, 1890, 3.3,
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joint adventure) and if In d e e d  the circumstances reveal 
that she has, in fact, become a partner or joint 
adventurer with her husband, then, as in her position 
as f i r m  creditor, all se x  bias or "married woman 
specialty" disappears, and her rights and liabilities 
are governed by the same rules of statute and common 
law (so far as not inconsistent therewith (1890  Act, 
8 ,4 6 ) )  as g o v e rn  any  other partner.
This at least w ould seem t o  be the broad rule.
As with all instances in the sphere of partnership, 
the facta and circumstances o f  each c a s e  would require 
scrutiny. Prima facie> at any rate, it is not thought 
that in the g e n e r a l  case (private debtor-ereditor 
husband-wife partner relations apart) the terms of 
8,1(4) o f  the 1881 Act (entrusting o r  'immixing') 
would affect in any way t h e  wife’s position as a 
partner i n  a firm (b e in g  a separate persona from  the 
partners thereof) which happened to include her 
husband as a partner. Similarly, even joint adventure 
in Scotland carries with it the notion of limited legal 
personality - but to dwell further on these complexities 
would be out of place in this d i s c u s s i o n ,
(a m a rr ie d  woman c a n , o f  course, be an  ordinary
creditor of an individual partner who is not her%husband, while not being a creditor of the firm- ,
I t  1É th e  fact o f  marriage - f o r  whatever reason (and 
the r e a s o n  has not been explained very satisfactorily 
on grounds of identification or interest in profits) - 
which has set aside the normal commercial and property 
relations here).
W here /
1 « though see Miller, pp,26l«3 as t o  commencement of such joint adventure,2 ,  M i l l e r ,  p ,5 6 2 ,  l i n e  5 0 ,5, The rules reveal the inferior position of such a creditor to that of a creditor of t h e  firm - see supra pp. 132-3 and infra p., 1 4 2.
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Where b o th  the firm and the partners thereof are 
b a n k ru p t#  " th e  entire assets of th e  firm are available 
to meet the claims of the creditors of the firm, and 
until those creditors have received payment in full, 
the creditors of the individual partners a r e  excluded 
from any c la im  upon the f i r m 's  assets in respect of 
the bankrupt p a r t n e r ' s  share and interest in them\"
On the assumption that in the circumstances of the 
p a r t i c u l a r  case, the wife is not the l e n d e r  o f  money 
to the partnership @ b u t  rather to an individual partner 
( h e r  husband), the trend o f  argument suggests strongly 
that she can be regarded o n ly  as a postponed creditor 
o f  the husband.
All Wardhaugh appears to say ("**. on the principle 
that a f i rm  is a separate p e r s o n a , a lo a n  t o  a f i rm  in 
which the c r e d i t o r ' s  husband is only one of the partners 
is not a loan to her husband in the sense o f  th e  Act 
of 1881, and is not postponed in the ranking on the 
f i r m 's  estate (nor apparently on t h e  husband's estate 
e i t h e r ,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  d e f i c i e n c y ^ ) " ) ,  i s  that, 
s h o u ld  th e  fu n d s  o f  the p a r tn e r s h ip  be insufficient 
to m eet the claim of this particular f i r m  c r e d i t o r  
( th e  w i f e ) ,  sh e  may rank as an o r d in a r y ,  and not as 
a p o s tp o n e d , creditor on her h u s b a n d 's  estate* In 
that c a s e ,  however, t h e  h u sb a n d, having met t h e  amount 
due ( i n  a situation i n  which th e  firm was s e q u e s t r a t e d  
w h ile  th e  partners or some o f  them  rem a in ed  solvent), 
would be e n t i t l e d  to claim relief from the other 
p a r t n e r s ,  that entitlement, in the case of insolvent 
p a r t n e r s , being a right "to ra n k  on t h e  e s t a t e s  o f  the 
p a r t n e r s  who a r e  insolvent f o r  the proportion due from 
those p a r t n e r s  in relief of the payment that (they) 
have /
1 . M i l l e r ,  p.365 and s e e  following sentences therein^ See a l s o  Goudy, pp.379-581*2* p . 44*
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have
The conclusion seems to be that where the 
circumstances of the loan are such as to permit the 
raising of questions as to whether the Married Women's 
P r o p e r ty  (Scotland) Act, 1881, s*1(4) applies, the 
l e n d e r  wife has guided her ship into dangerous waters* 
It can be seen that th e  best and safest course is t o  
attempt always t o  ensure that t h e  loan is regarded as 
a loan to the p a r t n e r s h i p  (not at a rate of interest 
v a ry in g  with t h e  p r o f i t s #  nor o a r r y in g  i n  exchange a 
share of the profits), and not as an inter-spouse 
loan. I t  i s  suggested that too much significance 
should not be read into Wardhaugh*s sentence concerning 
the form of th e  transaction*
An i n t e r e s t i n g  and  fairly recent case impinging 
upon the subject of spouses* rights of property in 
r e l a t i o ]  
w hich  /
%a ion to partnership i s  that of Adam v. Adam , in
1* Miller, p . 355*2 . This discussion c o n c e rn in g  the rights of a lender- wife has in v o lv e d  a v e ry  brief outline o f  a v e ry  complex subject. See Miller, Chapter X I I I ,  "The Firm and The Partners i n  B a n k ru p tc y ", and Chapter X, "Dissolution and Expulsion", pp*445-431 (wherein is to be fo u n d  a c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  s.47(2) of the Partnership Act 1890 noted supra, footnote )* See also pp.294-295; from wHTcK^much help has b een  derived, and Goudy, C h a p te r  XLVI,"R ank ing  on Company and Partners* E s t a t e s " ;  F.¥.Clark, "A Treatise on the Law of Partnership and Joint-Stock Com panies A cco rd in g  to,the Law of Scotland", (1868), Chapter IX, " B a n k ru p tc y " ; Goudy, C h a p te r  XLVI, "Ranking on Company and Partners* Estates."3* 1 9 6 2  S.L.T.332 (See Miller, p.383). Another recentcase (Amour v, Laarmonth 1972 S.L.T.150) demonstrates that a question may arise the o th e r  way about from that which is discussed in this part o f  the t e x t .  T h e re , action was raised by the trustees for t h e  creditors for whom a trust d eed  had  been signed by all the partners of a f i m  of stockbrokers against the wife of one of those partners, seeking declarator that an ante-nuptial payment by one of those partners to his fiancee was a gratuitous alienation to a conjunct person and void in terms of th e  Act 1621, c.18. The claim was unsuccessful -
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w hich  th e  h u sb an d  and  w ife  w ere j o i n t  a d v e n tu r e r a  
and  w here  t h e  w ife  a v e r r e d  t h a t  th e  h e r i t a g e  was 
h e r  p ro p e r ty ,th o L # i  I t  s to o d  i n  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  name 
a s  t h e  b u s in e s s  was t h a t  o f  a  p u b l i c  h o u se  and th e  
l lo e n o e  was t o  be  h e ld  by th e  husband* The p r i n c i p a l  
p o i n t  c o n c e rn e d  t h e  mode o f  p ro o f  o f  th e  w i f e 's  
av erm en ts*  I t  im s d e c id e d  t h a t  ehe  s h o u ld  be 
l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  d e f e n d e r 's  w r i t  o r  o a th *  The 
d e f e n d e r 's  a rgum en t t h a t  t h e  c irc u m s ta n c e #  o f  th e  
c a s e  f e l l  w i th in  th e  sc o p e  o f  th e  A ct IG9 6 ,  0*25» 
s in c e  e s s e n t i a l l y  I t  tvaa an  i n s t a n c e  o f  th e  s e e k in g  
o f  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t r u s t ,  was s u c c e s s f u l ,  and  th e  
p u r s u e r 's  a rg u m e n ts  t h a t  t h r e e  s p e c i a l t i e s  -  rm m ely, 
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  h usband  and w ife  ( h e r e  n o t  o p e r a t in g ,  
a s  i t  t r a n s p i r e d ,  t o  s e t  a s id e  a  g e n e r a l  r u l e  o f  law ) 
th e  j o i n t  a d v e n tu re  a s p e c t  and  th e  te rm s  o f  P*A#1890,
8*20 -  a v o id e d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  A c t ,  f a i l e d *
H ence t h i s  i s  n o t  a  c a s e  o f  I n t e r - s p o u s e  lo a n  i n  
p a r t n e r s h i p ;  r a t h e r  i s  i t  a  w a rn in g  o f  t h e  d a n g e rs  
in h e r e n t  i n  t h e  d e p r i v a t i o n  o r  y i e l d i n g  up o f  th e  
s im p le  b ad g es  o f  p r o p e r ty  i n  a  sy s tem  w h ich  c l i n g s  
t o  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p ro p e r ty *
iThe w ife  may v o te  and  ra n k  f o r  a  d iv id e n d ,  b u t ,  
l i k e  a l l  o t h e r  c r e d i t o r s  w ish in g  t o  t a k e  p a r t  i n  t h e  
s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  sh e  m ust p ro d u c e  a n  o a th  a s  t o  t h e  
d e b t ,  and  th e  a c c o u n t and  v o u c h e rs  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p ro v e  
i t^ *  S uch  e v id e n c e  may be im p o s s ib le  t o  o b t a i n ,  and  
u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  e x p e c t ,  i n  a  d o m e s tic  a rra n g e m e n t*
H ow ever, a *46, w hich  contW .na p r o v i s io n s  to  
r e g u l a t e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w here t h e s e  a r e  n o t  i n  th e  
c r e d i t o r ' s  p o s s e s s io n ,  sp e a k s  o f  th e  g r a n t  o f  an  
o a th  by  t h e  c r e d i t o r  t o  e x p la in  t h e  c a u se  o f  t h e  
f a i l u r e  /
1* S ee  Goudy, p * 5 2 5 , t e x t  and  f o o tn o te  ( g ) ;  m ean ings o f  " ra n k in g " *2* B a n k ru p tc y  ( S c , )  A c t, 1915 , 88*45*47#
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f a i l u r e  t o  p r o d u c e  v o u o h e rs , and  t h e i r  l o c a t i o n ;
"w h ich  o a th  s h a l l  e n t i t l e  him  t o  h a v e  a  d iv id e n d  s e t  
a p a r t  t i l l  a  r e a s o n a b le  t im e  be  a f f o r d e d  f o r  p r o d u o t io n  
th e r e o f #  _gr. o therw im e e s t a b l i # h l n ^  h i e  d e b t
# o q o r d l n ^  t f , l a w  $"
I n  t h e  e a s e  o f  A g n e w ^ #  a  w i f e  w a s  r e f u s e d  a  
r a n k i n g  on  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  s e q u e s t r a t e d  e s t a t e s  f o r  
money w h i c h  s h e  c la im e d  h ad  b een  lo a n e d  by  h e r  t o  
h e r  husband#  and  f o r  w h i c h  s h e  had  no g r e a t e r  p r o o f  
th a n  1 . 0 * 1 1 . * s  g r a n t e d  by  him  t o  h e r#  The S h e r i f f ' s  
N ote# a n n e x e d  t o  t h e  r e p o r t#  s t a t e s #  "The t r u s t e e  w a s  
u n d o u b te d ly  r i g h t  a t  t h e  t im e  i n  i s s u i n g  t h e  d e l iv e r a n c e  
i n  q u e s t io n *  H e  had  b e f o r e  h i m  a n  a f f i d a v i t  fo u n d ed  
o n  t h e  I# 0 ,U ,* 8  g r a n t e d  by t h e  b a n k r u p t  t o  h i s  w i f e ,  
and  i t  was e x p r e s s ly  a d m itte d #  i n  a n sw e r t o  h i s  c a l l #  
t h a t  sh e  h a d  no f u r t h e r  v o u c h e rs  t o  p ro d u ce#  H e  had  
t h e r e f o r e  no a l t e r n a t i v e  b u t  t o  r e f u s e  a  r a n k i n g  and  
l e a v e  h e r  t o  p ro v e  h e r  c la im  u n d e r  a n  a p p e a l ,  a s  sh e  
h a s  p ro c e e d e d  t o  do#" T h is  i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  i n s i g h t  
i n t o  t h e  p ro c e d u re  t h e r e  ad o p te d *  However i t  m ust be  
n o te d  t h a t  t h e  p r o o f  o r  a rg u m en t was c o n c e rn e d  t o  a  
l a r g e  e x te n t  w i th  t h e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  t h e  w i f e ' s  
money w h ich  was t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  lo a n  ( a c q u i r e d  
p a r t l y  by  i n h e r i t a n c e  and  p a r t l y  from  h e r  m o th e r i n  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i n  w h ich  th e  S h e r i f f  c o u l d  r e g a r d  i t  
a s  " e a r n in g s " )  was t h e  w i f e ' s  own s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  
o f  w h i c h  t o  d is p o s e  (w h ic h , u n d e r  t h e  M a rrie d  Women's 
P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c ts ,  1877 a n d  1 8 8 1  i t  w a a  d e c id e d  
t o  b e )  and  n o t  w h e th e r  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w ore t r u l y  
lo a n s *  ( A  p a r a l l e l  to - d a y  w ith  th e  fo rm e r  q u e s t io n  
w o u l d  be th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w h e th e r ,  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n o e a ,  
t h e  p r o p e r ty  " lo a n e d "  was th e  h u s b a n d 's  o r  t h e  w i f e ' s ,  
b u t  t h e  p r im a ry  m a t t e r  o f  p r o o f  o f  i n t e r - s p o u s e  lo a n  
m i g h t  /
1 t  em p h asis  added*2 ,  1 8 9 4 , 10 8 c* l* R e v ie w , 106*
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m ig h t c a u s e  g r e a t e r  d i f f i c u l t y ) #
L oans o f  money i n  ex o eee  o f  &100 S o o ta  (&8*55) 
" u n l e s s  a d m it te d  v f lth o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o en  he p ro v e d  
t o  h av e  b e en  made and  t o  be  r e s t ln g - o w ln g  o n ly  by 
th e  d e b t o r 's  w r i t  o r  h i a  a d m la a lo n  on o a th #  The 
r e q u i s i t e  vn^lt may b e  a  fo rm a l p e r a o n a l  b o n d , a  
h o lo g ra p h  IOÜ, a  l e t t e r ,  o n t r l e e  I n  t h e  d e b t o r 's  
b u e ln e a s  b o o k s , o r  a l m l l a r  acknow ledgem ent#  I t  may 
be  t h e  w r i t  o f  a n  a u th o r i z e d  a g e n t#  A oheqi^e I n  t h e  
d e b t o r 's  f a v o u r ,  e n d o rs e d  by h im , d o e s  n o t  by  I t s e l f  
I n s t r u c t  lo a n  and  t h e  c r e d i t o r  may n o t  p ro v e  by  p a r o le  
t h e  o irc u m a ta n o e e  i n  w h ich  th e  ch eq u e  wae g r a n te d  b u t  
an  e n d o rs e d  ch eq u e  may p ro v e  advanoea  i n  a  o o n t ln u in g  
a c c o u n t#  A w r i t i n g  a d m i t t in g  r e c e i p t  o f  money d o e s  
n o t  p ro v e  p r e s e n t  in d e b te d n e s e  t o  rep a y *  P r o o f  by  
w r i t  o r  o a th  Ime b e e n  h e ld  a p p l i c a b l e  o n ly  w here  t h e  
lo a n  i a  a n  i s o l a t e d  t r a n s a c t i o n  and i f  t h e  lo a n  lo  
a l l e g e d  t o  be  one i n c i d e n t  i n  a  a e r l e e  o f  t r a n c a c t i o n a  
b e tw een  p a r t i e s  any  e v id e n c e  w h ich  i s  n a t u r a l  p r o o f  i n  
t h e  c iro u m a ta n c e e  may be  a d m it te d  #*# i f  i t  i e  a l l e g e d ,  
a s  i t  may b e ,  i n  d e fe n c e  t o  a  c la im  f o r  rep ay m en t 
t h a t  t h e  money was a  g i f t  t h e  mode o f  p r o o f  may n o t  
b e  r e e t r l o t e d  b u t  t h e  on u s i e  on  t h e  d e f e n d e r  *## I n  
b a n ltru p to y  w r i t  d a te d  a f t e r  t h e  commencement o f  
s é q u e s t r a t i o n  and  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  b a n k r u p t 's  o a th  
a r e  b o th  in c o m p e te n t,  th o u g h  a n  aolm ow ledgem ent g r a n te d  
when t h e  d e b to r  waa i n e o l v e n t  o r  w i th in  s i x t y  d a y s  o f  
n o to u r  b a n k ru p tc y  m a y  s u f f i c e ^
I t  i s  t h e  d u ty  o f  th e  t r u s t e e  t o  a d ju d i c a t e  u p o n  
c la im s  a n d , i f  s a t i s f i e d ,  a d m it them  t o  a  d iv id e n d #  
Goudy e x p l a i n s ^  t h a t  t h r e e  c o u r e o s  a r e  open  t o  him  -  
t o  /
1# W a lk e r , P r in s #  I I  pp*1537-1558# 2# pp#523-526*
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t o  a d m it t h e  c la im ,  t o  r e j e c t  i t  (w i th  r e a a o n a ) ,  o r  t o  
r e q u i r e  f u r t h e r  e v id e n o e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  i t #  "Where a  
c la im  i o  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  i h a t r u c t e d  and  t h e  t i 'u a t e e  
r e q u i r e a  f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  i t ,  h e  may 
p ro n o u n ce  a  fo rm a l d e l iv e r a n c e  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t #  Ho 
h a s  t h e  pow er o f  ex am in in g  th e  b a n k ru p t ,  t h e  c r e d i t o r ,  
o r  a%%y o t h e r  p a r t y  on  o a th  r e s p e c t in g  th e  c la im ;  and  
a s  t h e  pow er i s  g iv e n  h im , ao  i s  i t  h i e  d u ty  t o  t a k e  
su c h  e v id e n c e  mm may be  a v a i l a b l e  #*#. I t  l a  a l s o  th e  
t r u s t e e ' s  d u ty ,  w here h e  th in k a  f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e  
n e c e s s a r y ,  t o  c a l l  p a r t i e s  b e f o r e  h im , an d  n o t  le a v e  
t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  l e a d in g  e v id e n c e  e n t i r e l y  t o  t h e  
c r e d i t o r  c o n ce rn ed #  As a  r u l e ,  t h e  t r u s t e e  s h o u ld  c a l l  
f o r  f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e  w h e rev e r h e  h a s  r e a s o n  t o  t h in k  
t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t o r ' s  c la im  i s  bong :pidq.  a l th o u g h  g c  f a c i e  
i t  may b e  d o u b t f u l ly  vouch($d, and  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  i t #  b e in g  e s t a b l i s h e d  by  l e g a l  e v id e n c e ^ # "  
p h r a s e  " su c h  e v id e n c e  a s  may b e  a v a i l a b l e "  a p p e a rs  
t h e r e f o r e  s u b s e q u e n t ly  t o  be  c u t  down t o  mean " su c hpl e ^ ^ l  e v id e n c e  a s  may be a v a i l a b l e  #"
I n  th e  c a s e  o f  L a t t a ^ ,  a l s o ,  th e  same S h e r i f f  
(A# E r s k in e  M urray) i n  h i s  n o te  appended  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  
s t a t e d  t h a t ,  "T h ere  b e in g  no e n t r i e s  i n  t h e  books o f  L a t t a  
& Co# b e a r in g  on  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  c la im ,  t h e  re s p o n d e n t  
c o u ld  n o t  w e l l  do  o t h e w i s e  th a n  le a v e  i t  a s  h e  h a s  
done f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n  C o u rt"#  I n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  a  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  vouched  d e b t  t h e  p ro c e d u re  a t  l e a s t  b e fo r e  
1 9 1 3 ^  seem s t h e r e f o r e  t o  h av e  b een  f o r  t h e  t r u s t e e  t o  
r e f u s e  /
1# p#%25# , S ee  &# ( S o ,)  A c t ,  1913 , s# 1 2 3 .2# Cf# s . 46 ("###  o r  f o r  o th e rw is e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  h i s  d e b t  a c c o rd in g  t o  la w ;" )3# 1 8 94 , 10 8c#L#R eview , 232#4# F o r  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  p o s t-1 9 1 3  p r o c e d u r e ,  s e e  Goudy pp#323"326# A ppeal a g a i n s t  any  d e l iv e r a n c e  o f  th e  t r u s t e e  o r  co m m iss io n e rs  o r  c r e d i t o r s '  r e s o l u t i o n s ,  t o  t h e  L ord  O rd in a ry  o r  th e  S h e r i f f  i s  a u th o r i s e d  by  t h e  1913 A c t, s # l6 3 .  Gaudy i b i d  s a y s : -  "W here /
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r e f u s e  a  r a n k in g  t o  any  o r  e d i t  o r  i n  t h a t  p o s i t i o n ,  
i n c lu d in g  a  w i f e ,  and  le a v e  th e  l a t t e r  t o  go t o  oouirt
t o  a p p e a l  a g a i n s t  t h e  t r u s t e e ' s  d e c is io n #
I n  t h a t  o a a e , t h e  S h e r i f f  a a i d ,  "As t o  t h e  law  o f  
th e  m a t t e r ,  t h e  e a s e  o f  W ill ia m a , r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  th e  
i n t e r l o c u t o r  o f  2 6 th  F e b ru a ry  l a s t ,  and  s t i l l  m ore 
that o f  Laidlaw. 16th D ecem ber, 1882, 10 R# 3 7 4 , go t o  
show t h a t  i n  o iro u m s ta n o e s  l i k e  th e  p r e s e n t ,  w here  th e  
money i s  h e ld  t o  h ave  b een  t r a n s f e r r e d  by lo a n  o r
d o n a t io n ,  t h e  w ife  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  ra n k  a s  r e g a r d s  th e
p r i n c i p a l  sum i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  b a n k ru p tc y , 
th o u g h  n o t  a s  r e g a r d s  i n t e r e s t # "
( I n  L a id la w  v* L a id la w 's  Tr u s t e e ,  a t  p p .3 7 6 -3 7 7 , 
t h e  L ord  P r e s id e n t  ( I n g l i s )  had  s a i d ,  " . . . a n d  t h e r e  
can  bo no d o u b t t h a t  h e  " ( t h e  hu sb an d ) " g o t  i t  e i t h e r  
a s  a  lo a n  o r  a s  a  d o n a t io n  from  h i s  w i f e .  I t  i s  no 
m a t te r  w hioh i s  t h e  t r u e  s t a t e  o f  th e  c a s e ,  a s  e i t h e r  
w ould a f f o r d  a  good g round  o f  c la im # " ) .  By th e  
M a rr ie d  %Vomen's P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t, 1 9 2 0 , s * 5 , 
h o w ev er, d o n a t io n s  b e tw een  husband  and  w ife  w ere  
r e n d e re d  i r r e v o c a b l e ,  u n l e s s  made w i th in  a  y e a r  and  a  
day  o f  t h e  d o n o r 's  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  when th e y  may be 
re d u c e d  /
"W here th e  t r u s t e e  h a s  n o t  c e l l e d  f o r  f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e ,  t h e  C o u r t ,  on a p p e a l ,  may do s o ,  by r e m i t t i n g  b a ck  t o  t h e  t r u s t e e  e i t h e r  t o  c a l l  f o r  p ro d u o t io n  o f  f u r t h e r  v o u c h e rs  o r  t o  t a k e  p r o o f  a t  l a r g e ,  o r  by o r d e r in g  p r o o f  t o  p ro c e e d  b e fo r e  i t s e l f #  But it w i l l  a d o p t t h e  l a s t  o f  th e s e  c o u r s e s  o n ly  i n  s p e c i a l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  a s  p r o o f  ca n  be  ta k e n  more e a s i l y  and c h e a p ly  by  th e  t r u s t e e #  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , o a s e s  com etim es 
o c c u r  i n  w h ich  t h e  f a o t s  i n  d i s p u te  a r e  so  in v o lv e d  o r  com plex  t h a t  t h e  t r u s t e e ' s  p ru d e n t  
c o u rs e  may be t o  r e j e c t  t h e  c la im , so  that the f a c t s  may be e lu c id a t e d  by p r o o f  i n  a n  a p p e a l . "Thus* i n  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  su ch  a s  th o s e  l a s t - m e n t io n e d ,  t h e  p r a c t i c e  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  h ave  c h a n g e d .
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4re d u c e d  a t  t h e  I n s ta n c e  o f  c r e d i t o r #  * T h u s , I t  
w i l l  m a t t e r  v e ry  im ch now w h e th e r  a  p a a a ln g  o f  money 
b e tw een  sp o u se s  am ounta t o  a  lo a n  ( f o r  w h ich  t h e  
l e n d e r  w ife  may^ r a n k  an  a  p o s tp o n e d  e r e d l t o r ) ,  o r  
a  g i f t *  w h ich  may b e  r e d u c e d ,  b u t  o n ly  b y , o r  on 
b e h a l f  o f ,  and  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f ,  t h e  o r o d l t o r a ,  and  
o a n n o t s u b s e q u e n t ly  be  re v o k e d , o r  fo u n d  a  o la lm  b y , 
t h e  d o n o r ap o u ae  -  u n l e s s  p e rh a p s  th e  l a t t e r  l a  a la o  
a  c r e d i t o r  o f  t h e  d o n ee  apouae* T h is  r a l a e a  tw o 
I n t c r e a t i n g  p o in ta  -  f i r s t .  w h e th e r  a  a p o u ae  i n  t h e  
c a p a c i ty  o f  c r e d i t o r  c a n  tr iu m p h  o v e r  t h e  s p e c l a l t l e a  
im posed  on h e r  (him ^T) th ro u g h  i d e n t i t y  a a  a  a p o u a e , 
and  s e c o n d * w h e th e r  i t  i a  th e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  " l e n d e r -  
h u sb an d "  a la o #  th o u g h  n o t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  m en tio n ed  by  
th e  1881 A c t ,  c a n  a t t a i n  a  s t a t u e  no h ig h e r  th a n  t h a t  
o f  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r  i n  h i s  w i f e 'a  e e t a t e ^ ?
A /
1* S u p ra .  C h a p te r  1 ,  p*110* See i n t e r e s t i n g  a n n u i ty  p ro b le m , C l iv e  & W ilso n  pp*340-341* See a l s o  o p .o i t*  PP#332-337*2* C l iv e  & W ilao n , p*339# p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h i #  i s  th e  w i f e ' s  b e s t  p o s i t i o n :  ehe  h a s  no c la im  a t  a l l  i ft h e  b e en  u se d  f o r  h o u se h o ld  e x p e n d i tu r e  ( t ow h ich  sh e  w i l l  be  p resum ed  t o  have  c o n s e n te d  o r  o f  w hioh sh e  w i l l  be  th o u g h t  t o  h av e  g iv e n  t o  h e r  huaband  a s  a n  ( i r r e v o c a b l e )  d o n a tio n * )  They n o te  t h a t  t h e  onus l i e s  on  th e  w ife  t o  show t h a t  h e r  fu n d s  ( o rincom e a t  l e a s t )  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  n olt f o r  h o u se h o ld  b u t
f o r  h u sb an d  b e n e f i t*  ***3# S ee  se co n d  q u e s t io n  p o s tu la te d #4* C f* s u n r a .  f o o tn o te   ^ # T h ere  a p p e a rs  t o  be  a  d e a r tho f  a u t h o r i t y  on t h i s  p o i n t ,  b u t  i n  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  t h i n g s ,  a n d  i n  v iew  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  p r im a ry  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t ,  t h e  'h o u s e h o ld  e x p e n d i tu r e ' r u l e  w ould s u r e l y  a p p ly  t o  b a r  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  c la im  t o  be h i s  t / i f e ' s  (p o s tp o n e d ?  o r d in a r y ? )  c r e d i t o r  ev en  more s t r o n g l y  -  and  much m ore 
f r e q u e n t ly  -  th a n  v ic e  v e r s a* ( s e e  C l iv e  & W ilso n , P # 3 3 9 , f o o tn o te  7 5 l # n ^ r  d e b ts  w h ich  do n o t  come w i t h in  t h e  sc o p e  o f  s * 1 (4 )  o f  t h e  1881 A ct# a  sp o u se  w i l l  b e  a n  o r d in a r y  c r e d i t o r  o f  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  ( i n  C l iv e  & Wilson"^ a  exam ple a t  p # 3 4 0 , f o r  t h e  u n p a id  b a la n c e  o f  a n  i n t e r - s p o u s e  s a le #  t h e  a u th o r s  i n  C h a p te r  11 (" C o m p e ti t io n  Batvfeen S pouse  and  C r e d i t o r s " )  make no r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  s# 1 (4 )  t o  th e  le n d e r -h u s b a n d  b u t  i t  i s  p e rh a p s  n o t  to o  much t o  s a y  /
150%
A v o te  t h a t  th e  e s t a t e  b e  wound up  u n d e r  a  Deed
o f  A rrangem en t ( a #34) may be  c a r r i e d  o u t ,  a t  th e  m e e tin g  
f o r  e l e o t l o n  o f  t h e  t r u s t e e  I n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o r  a t  a  
a u b a e q u e n t m e e tin g  o a l l e d  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e ,  by t h e  v o te  
o f  a  m a jo r i t y  i n  num ber end  t h r e e - f o u r t h #  i n  v a lu e  o f  
o r e d l t o r s  p r e s e n t  i n  p e r s o n  o r  r e p r e s e n te d ,  and  th e  
b a n k r u p t 's  w ife  l a  n o t  d e b a r re d  from  v o tin g #
I n  S le v w r lg h t ,  t h e  I n t e r - a o t l o n  o f  a e o t lo n s  34 
and  60  w ere  o o n a ld e re d ,  and  i t  was d e c id e d  th a t #  d e s p i t e  
t h e  f a o t  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  a p p ro v a l  o f  t h e  
r e s o l u t i o n  t o  have  t h e  e a t a t e  wound up u n d e r  a  d eed  o f  
a rra n g e m e n t waa t h a t  th e  a p p o in tm e n t o f  a  t r u s t e e  was 
u n n e o e a s a ry , n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  p a r t l o i p a t i o n  by th e  
w ife  i n  t h e  fo rm e r  v o te  was n o t  e q u iv a le n t  t o  t h e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by h e r  i n  t h e  v o t e . f o r  th e  a p p o in tm e n t 
tru 8 t<
" I n  /
po f  a  s t e e  o r  eom m ieG ioners" ,
a a y  t h a t  t h e  i n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  s e n te n c e  a t  p # 3 4 0 , b e g in n in g ,  " S u b je c t  t o  t h e  r u l e s  o f  s e c t i o n  1 (4 )# ,* "  i s  t h a t  h u sb an d s to o  may be in c lu d e d  i n  i t s  am b it#  Suoh a  o o n c lu a io n  w ould  b o ,m o re o v e r , d e s i r a b l e  on  th e  g ro u n d s  o f  u n i f o r m i ty  an d  e q u a l i t y  ( o f  d is a d v a n ta g e *  some r a t i o n a l e  m ust l i e  a t  t h e  r o o t  o f  t h e  u n fa v o u ra b le  tr8a tm en t).on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , 
a r e  t h e r e  any  I n d i c a t i o n s  t o  s u p p o r t  i t ?  (C f# C l iv e  & W ilao n , p * 3 4 l ,  f o o tn o te  9 2 , w ith  r e g a r d  t o  8*60 o f  t h e  B a n k ru p tc y  (S o#) A c t, 1913: c o n t r a s t  sG #86/87i b i d # p # 3 4 2 .)  I t  seem s t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  n o t ,  and  th e  aim  o f  t h e  A o t, b e in g  a  p r o v i s io n  d r a f t e d  w ith  w iv es  i n  m ind ,appears t o  h av e  b een  d i r e c t e d  h e r e  a g a in s F  i n t e r - s p o u s e  c o l l u s i o n  a g a i n s t  c r e d i t o r s ,  s in c e  p r e v io u s ly  few  w iv e s  h ad  any s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  w i th  w hioh t o  endow t h e i r  h u sb an d s way o f  l o a n ,  e n t r u s t i n g ,  o r  im m ix tu re*  The r e v e r s e  r o u te  was u s e d  b u t  n o t  w i th  g r e a t  a u o c e s s ,  and  was v iew ed  w ith  s u s p ic io n .
l^as i t  th o u g h t  p e rh a p s  n o t  t o  b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  l e g i s l a t e  f o r  t h a t  c a s e ?
1* 1927 8*0*285#2 ,  C o n t r a s t  MacNaufght v ,  S ie v w r ig h t  1928 8*0*687 s u p r a ,  p#*^Bee O liv e  & W ilso n , p p *341-342*
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" I n  my o p in io n ,  a  r e s o l u t i o n  b ro u g h t up a t  a  m e e tin g
f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  t r u s t e e  t h a t  t h e  e s t a t e  o u g h t t o
be wound up u n d e r  a  deed  o f  a rra n g e m e n t i s  a  q u e s t io n
d i s t i n c t  fro m , and  p r e l im in a r y  t o ,  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  who
may o r  may n o t  be e l e c t e d  a s  t r u s t e e ,  a n d , a c c o r d in g ly ,
i t  i s  one upon w hich  th e  w ife  i s  p e r f e c t l y  e n t i t l e d  t o  1v o te  •"
W ith  r e f e r e n c e  t o  s* 6 0 , th e  L ord  P r e s i d e n t  (C ly d e ) 
com m ented, "A c co rd in g  t o  t h a t  s e c t i o n  th e  w ife  o f  th e  
b a n k ru p t  i s  n o t  e n t i t l e d  t o  v o te  " i n  th e  e l e c t i o n  o f  
t r u s t e e  o r  c o m m iss io n e rs , b u t  i n  a l l  o th e r  r e s p e c t s  
su c h  p e rs o n  may be ra n k e d  a s  a  c r e d i t o r , "  She may, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  be  ra n k e d  a s  a  c r e d i t o r  f o r  v o t in g  p u rp o se s  
i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s  w ith  t h e  s i n g l e  e x c e p t io n  w hioh th e  
s t a t u t e  m akes. I t  may be t h a t  th e  b a n k r u p t 's  w ife  i s  
n o t  u n l i k e l y  t o  c a s t  h e r  v o te  w ith  o th e r  m o tiv e s  -  
p o s s ib ly  -  th a n  th o s e  o f  a  m ere c r e d i t o r ;  b u t  th e  
s t a t u t e  f r a n k l y  c o n te m p la te s  t h a t ,  e x c e p t  i n  th e  e l e c t i o n  
o f  t r u s t e e  and  c o m m iss io n e rs , sh e  h a s  th e  same r i g h t  t o  
v o te  a s  any  o t h e r  c r e d i t o r , "
P resu m ab ly  a l s o ,  t h e  s p o u s e , p ro v id e d  h i s / h e r  c la im  
i s  f i x e d ,  n o t  c o n t in g e n t ,  and i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  v o u ch ed , 
i s  a s  e n t i t l e d  a s  any o t h e r  f i x e d  c r e d i t o r  t o  p e t i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  o th e r  s p o u s e , a l th o u g h  i t  
i s  a  r i g h t  w h ich  s u r e l y  a  sp o u se  w ould be  l o a t h e  t o  
i s e ^
As /
%e x e r c i  *
1* p e r  L* B la c k b u rn , a t  p . 2 8 8 ,
2 ,  a t  p * 2 8 7 ,3* 8 ,1 2 : -  " P e t i t i o n s  f o r  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  may be a t  th ei n s t a n c e  o r  w ith  t h e  c o n c u rre n c e  o f  any  one o r  more c r e d i t o r s  whose d e b t  o r  d e b ts  t o g e t h e r  am ount to  n o t  l e s s  th a n  f i f t y  p o u n d s , w h e th e r  su c h  d e b ts  a r e  l i q u i d  o r  i l l i q u i d ,  p ro v id e d  th e y  a r e  n o t  c o n t in g e n t ."
(a s  amended by I n s o lv e n c y  A ct ,  1976, gched .  1 (£2C0) ) .
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As w e l l  as in  the case of inter-apouae sa le , a  
w ife  r a n k s  a s  an  ordinary creditor f o r  the a l im e n t  o f  
her i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  f a t h e r e d  by  the bankrupt u n til  
t h e  c h i l d  atta ins the age of thirteen^, ^ " P r i m a r i l y ,  
i t  i s  the c h i l d ' s  c la im ;  but as th e  mother i s  bound 
t o  m a in ta in  th e  c h i l d ,  sh e  h a s  a  c la im  a g a i n s t  th e  
f a t h e r  for c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  w h e th e r  th e  c la im  i s  th e  
c la im  o f  th e  child  or t h e  c la im  of th e  m o th e r , i t  i s  
t h e  c la im  o f  a  c r e d i t o r ;  and  a c c o r d in g ly  I  am o f  
opinion that the m o th e r i s  en titled  to rank on t h e  
bankrupt esta te  o f  th e  admitted f a t h e r  of h e r  ille g it im a te  
o h i l d ^ " , but n o t  for " f u t u r e  aliment d e c e m e d  f o r  in  
a s e p a r a t i o n  an d  aliment, th is  being In c a p a b le  of
. . . . I  - J . .  «j»
v a l u a t i o n ,  n o r  f o r  an a l im e n ta r y  annuity^," The claim  
f o r  the c h i l d ' s  aliment la  a contingent olaim^.
Im m ix tu re  /
1. Downs V #  ¥ i laop's T r ,  (1886) 13 R*1101, But see "Scottish Law Com m ission Memo N o ,22 "A lim e n t and Financial P r o v i s i o n " : 2,118, where t h e  c la im  o f  th e  ille g it im a te  c h i l d  f o r  aliment i n  I t s  p a r e n t 's  b a n k ru p tc y , i t  i s  sta ted , has become " s u s p e c t  in  v iew  o f  t h e  c h a n g e s  made by t h e  I l l e g i t i m a t e  C h i ld r e n  (Scotland) Act 1930" (and s e e  r e a s o n in g  -  f o o tn o te  27), M o reo v er, one o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n s  of t h e  Com m ission (2 ,16 -  P r o p o s i t i o n  6s se e  also  2,19) i s  that "The a l im e n ta r y  obligation  betw een  parent an d  illeg it im a te  c h i l d  should be the seme as that b e tw een  parent and 
l e g i t i m a t e  c h i ld "  and a c c o r d in g ly ,  " I f  t h i s  i s  accepted, t h e r e  w i l l  be no g round  for an y  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  relation  to  bankruptcy," (2 ,118),2 , ib id ., p e r  L# Shand, at pp, 1102-1103,3# W a lk e r , Prins* XX 2078, and  c a s e s  t h e r e  c ite d . See in fra , pp4 , Downs, s u p r a : Goudy, p,181 (see generally, Goudy,
p p .  18 0 - f § 1 7  '^what d e b ts  are c o n t i n g e n t " ) : s e etreatment of c o n t in g e n t  d e b ts  -  B a n k ru p tc y  (Sc,)Act, 1 9 1 3 , 8 , 4 9 , ( V a lu a t io n  of c la im  d e p e n d in gon a contingency,).
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Immixture of Funds: Inter-Spouse Loans
In terms of the Married Women's Property (Scotland) 
Act, 1881, 8*1(4), "Any money, or other estate of the 
wife, lent or entrusted to the husband, or iramixed 
with his funds, shall be t r e a t e d  as assets of the 
husband's estate in bankruptcy, under reservation of 
the wife's claim to a dividend as a creditor for the 
value of such money or other estate after but not 
before the claims of the other creditors of the 
husband for valuable consideration in money or money’s 
worth have been satisfied."
This provision applies to all marriages contracted
after the passing of the Act, which must now include
all marriages at present subsisting , and this, therefore,
is the rule which founds the categorisation of such2claims by wives as those of postponed creditors .
Our law of bankruptcy thus places a spouse creditor 
firmly behind all other types of creditor in terms of 
strength of claimas opposed to formal entitlements 
such /
1, For the transitional provisions and the option open to those married before 1881 to choose to submit to property regulation by the Act, see supra, Chapter 1,pp.1 0 0 -1 0 1 .2. See Walker, Prins. IX, p.2078.
5. Compare and contrast continental and other attitudesto bankruptcy and debt as they affect spouses* (See generally Chapter 6 , and Chapter ?.) Ingeneral, the approaches adopted by other systems appear to have been less blunt and more detailed, but it is true to say that, in previous discussion, attention has been paid to the "creditor v* spouses" side of the triangle of relationships involved - that is, to the plain issues of creditors' rights against spouses, and spouses' rights inter se in the matter of debt (the "external" and "TnternaT" a s p e c t s  alone) - and that in any form of community system, the rules, in general,and in this context, a r e  bound to be more complex thanth o s e  found in a sy s tem  which proclaims and upholdsthe barren (? - see Chapter 7) virtues of separation of property.Nevertheless /
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8uoh a s  v o t in g  r l g h t e  and a b i l i t y  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  In  
p r o o e d u r e ,  T h le  means t h a t  th e  d e te r m in a t io n  t o  
a d h e re  t o  t h e  s t r i c t  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  h a s  
b e n t  b e f o r e  th e  s p e c i a l t i e s  (an d  a r e  n o t  t h o s e .  I n  
t r u t h ,  p r o p e r ty  s p e c i a l t i e s ^ ? )  o f  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
m a rr ia g e *
I t  l 8  c l e a r  t h a t ,  by v i r t u e  o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  
m a r r ia g e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and  c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n
o f  " im m ix tu re*  o f  fu n d s  I s  l i k e l y  t o  be  p r o d u c t iv e  o fpd i s p u t e  and  d i f f i c u l t y  ,  b ecau se*  p rim a  f a o l e * i n  
p r a c t i c a l  te rm s  a t  l e a s t ,  'im m ix tu re*  I s  so  o f t e n  th e  
c a s e ,  and  y e t  it is obvious that a w ife  w ould wish to 
show t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r ty  I n  q u e s t io n  was I n  f a c t  h e r s ,  
a n d , ev en  i f  a p p a r e n t ly  "immlxed* I n  f a c t ,  was n o t  
*lmmlxed* I n  law#
C l iv e  and  W ilso n , com m enting on 8 s # 1 (5 )^  and 
1 ( 4 ) ,  /
N e v e r th e l e s s ,  t h e  c la im  o f  t h e  " s p o u s e - o r e d l to r "  i s  I n e v i t a b l y  l lh k e d  w i th  th o s e  s u b j e c t s  and  I s  d e a l t  w i th  i n  that t r e a tm e n t ,  o f t e n  p o s s ib ly  at the end o f  th e  com m unity when so  much " b a la n c in g "  i s  d o n e : i t  l 6  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  s e p a r a t io n  sy s te m  w h ich  th ro w s  i t  i n t o  h ig h  r e l i e f  a n d , i n  so  d o in g ,  m ig h t be  s a i d  t o  d e m o n s tra te  I t s  own in a d e q u a c y  t o  m eet satisfactorily e v e ry  c o n tin g e n c y *1# As t h e  g r e a t e r  num ber o f  s p e c i a l t i e s  a r e  fo u n d , o r  g ru d g in g ly  o r  im p l i e d ly ,  r e c o g n is e d  by th e  la w , so  much th e  more d o u b t is th ro w n  upon  the virtues and  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  th e  s e p a r a t io n  system #2* Cf# Agnew 1094, 10 So* Law Review, 106 ; Latta,1094, 10 Be* Law Review* 232I R o b e r ts o n *s Tr* v  
]R. 1900 8  8#L,T# 101 ; (1901 )mmrie'aÆmr -3* s7 T (3 )* *  "E x c e p t a s  h e r e i n a f t e r  p r o v id e d ,  t h e  w ifem oveab le  estate shall n o t  be  s u b j e c t  t o  a r r e s tm e n t ,  o r  o t h e r  d i l i g e n c e  o f  t h e  la w , f o r  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  d e b t s ,  p ro v id e d  t h a t  t h e  s a i d  e s t a t e  ( e x c e p t  su c h  c o r p o r e a l  m oveab les a s  a r e  u s u a l ly  p o s s e s s e d  w i th o u t  a  w r i t t e n  o r  d o cu m en ta ry  t i t l e )  i s  I n v e s t e d ,  p l a c e d ,  
o r  s e c u re d  i n  th e  name o f  th e  w ife  h e r s e l f ,  o r  I n  su c h  te rm s  a s  s h a l l  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  same from  th e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  husband*"
*8
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1 ( 4 ) #  rem ark^ t h a t ,  " I t  m ig h t be  th o u g h t  t h a t  th e s e  
s u b s e c t io n s  w ould n o t  n o rm a lly  a p p ly  t o  f u r n i t u r e  
and  o t h e r  c o r p o r e a l  m oveab les  o f  th e  w i f e :  th e y
a r e  e x p r e s s ly  e x c lu d e d  from  s u b s e c t io n  ( 3 ) an d  i n  
t h e  o r d in a r y  o a se  a r e  u n l i k e l y  to  b e  " l e n t  o r  
e n t r u s t e d  t o  t h e  h u sb a n d , o r  immixed w i th  h i s  fb n d s  
f o r  p u rp o s e s  o f  s u b s e c t io n  4#" " T h ere u p o n , th e y  s e t  
a g a i n s t  t h i s  o p in io n  th e  c a s e  o f  A nderson  s u p r a * w h ic h , 
h o w ev er, a f t e r  d i s c u s s i o n ,  th e y  c o n s id e r  to  be  s p e c i a l ,  
and  " p ro b a b ly  b e s t  r e g a rd e d  a#  tu r n in g  on t h e  l a c k  o f  
bona f i d e s  i n  th e  t r a n s a c t io n ^ * ^ # "
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  R o b e r ts o n , s u p r ^ . w hich  c o n c e rn e d  
a l s o  t h e  p o i n t s  o f  d o n a tio n s  r e v o c a b le  by  th e  h u s b a n d 's  
t r u s t e e ^ ,  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  t r u s t e e  t o  re d u c e  a l i e n a t i o n s  
w h ich  w ere  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a  c o n ju n c t  and c o n f id e n t  p e r s o n / ,  
and  t h e  f u r t h e r  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  'Im m ix tu re*  o f  f u r n i t u r e ^ ,  
n e v e r th e l e s s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  w ife  there is 
em p h asised  a  m ost im p o r ta n t  p o i n t ,  and  t h a t  i s  t h a t  
t h e  s p o u s e s ' f u n d s ,  i t  seem s, may bo d i s e n ta n g le d  * and  
th o s e  o f  t h e  sp o u se  who s u b s e q u e n t ly  m a in ta in s  h i s / h e r  
s o lv e n c y  th u s  p r o t e c te d  ~ a t  any  p o i n t  b e f o r e  
s e q u e s t r a t io n #  "A t th e  d a te  o f  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  
t h e r e  was no In m ix in g , and  I  ta k e  i t  t h a t  th e  p r o v i s io n  
o f  t h e  A ot m ust r e f e r  t o  t h e  d a te  o f  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  
an d  d o es  n o t  o th e rw is e  a p p ly .  I f  & w i f e ' s  money be 
m ixed w ith  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  and th e y  f o r e s e e  th e  im pen d ing  
b a n k ru p tc y  o f  th e  hu sb an d  I  s e e  n o th in g  a t  common law  
o r  i n  th e  B a#  
w ith d ra w in g  /
n k ru p tcy  S t a t u t e '  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  w ife
1 ,  p . 3 3 8 .
2 # ibid,3 ,  s e e  f u r t h e r  c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  A nderson^ i n f r a , p p , 177- 179 .
4 ,  Bee C h a p te r  1 ,  pp#29"30 and  p p # 3 9 * 4 l, C l iv e  and  
W ils o n , p p .352-557#5# Act 1621, 0 ,1 8  -  infra, p. I89 et seq.
6 , I n f r a # p. 162 et seTmH s e e  C h a p te r  1# pp*59-41*7* liîng that o jT îë S E , p re su m a b ly ; Bankruptcy (Sc,) A c t ,  1856 (1 9  & 2 0  V io t .  0 .7 9 )#
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w ith d ra w in g  h e r  money f o r  t h e  v e ry  p u rp o se  o f  a v o id in g  
th e  ooneequenoe  o f  I t â  b e in g  fo u n d  im m ixed w ith  h e r  
h u sb a n d *8. No o aoe  d e c id in g  t h a t  auoh a n  a o t  o o u ld  be 
o h a l le n g e d  was r e f e i r e d  t o  M o reo v er, t h a t  
a rgum en t was n o t  p le a d e d  (w h ich  l a  u n f o r t ^ a t e  from  
the p o i n t  o f  view o f  the strength of t h e  o p in io n  
q u o te d ) ,  and  t h e  p u r s u e r 's  c a s e ,  h e r e ,  t h e  L ord  
O rd in a ry  s a y s ,  " l a  r e s t e d  on  th e  a v e rm en t t h a t  th e  
paym ent o f  t h i s  money was a  re v o o a b le  d o n a t io n  o f
D onald  R o b e r t s o n 's  money t o  h i s  w i f e ,  w h ich  h a s  n o t?b e en  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  p o i n t  o f  f a c t * . "
On a p p e a l^ .  L ord  K in o a lm e y 's  judgm en t f o r  t h e  
d e fe n d e r  u p o n ^ th e  r e d u c t io n  o f  t h e  a s s i g n a t i o n  o f  a  
l e a s e  and  an  in s u r a n c e  p o l i c y ,  was r e v e r s e d  ( d i s s e n t i n g  
L ord  Y oung). The a s s i g n a t i o n  L ord  M o n c r ie f f  
c o n s id e r e d  t o  be  e i t h e r  a  g r a t u i t o u s  d o n a t io n  i n t e r^  e»wwwww#i6li
v iru m  e t  uxorem  made a t a n t e  m a tr im o n io , " o r ,  a s  I  t h i n k ,  
a  p u r e ly  c o l l u s i v e  a t t e m p t  by  t h e  m ale  d e f e n d e r  t o  p u t  
h i s  w hole e s t a t e  beyond  th e  r e a c h  o f  h i s  c r e d i t o r s  
w h i le  t r u l y  r e t a i n i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  i t .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e  
i t  la revocable and r e d u c i b l e ^ . "  The same c o n c lu s io n  
was re a c h e d  by  L ord  T ra y n e r^  ( th o u g h  th e  judgm en t im s 
on th e  g ro u n d  o f  gift): " I  t h in k  that p u rp o se "  ( o f
t h e  c o n v ey an ce ) "was t o  p u t  th e  e s t a t e  o f  R o b e r tso n  
beyond the r e a c h  o f  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  b u t  n o t  beyond th e  
r e a c h  o f  his own e n jo y m e n t."  I n  R o b e r ts o n  ( i n  the 
O u te r  H o u s e ) , L ord  K in c a im e y  w ould h ave  b e e n  i n c l i n e d  
t o  re d u c e  -  had  he  b een  a sk e d  t o  do so  -  t h e  
a s s i g n a t i o n  o f  f u r n i t u r e  t o  t h e  w i f e ,  i t  b e in g  " n e i t h e r  
i n v e n t o r i e d  n o r  i n  any  form  d e l i v e r e d " ,  w h i le  f a v o u r in g  
th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  o t h e r  tw o p a r t s  o f  th e  a s s i g n a t i o n .
I t  /
1* p e r  L# K in c a irn e y  at p.105* (S.L.T.)
I* 3 p .  3 5 9 .4 .  a t  p . 569#5 .  a t  p . 5 6 7 .
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It appears that, in the appeal, the pursuer 
withdrew his claim for delivery of the furniture, 
partly because its value was not great, and partly 
"looking to the evidence as to part of the furniture 
being the property of Mrs # Robertson", the defenders 
having deponed that many of the items of furniture 
were hers, "irrespective of the assignation"* 
Unfortunately, the report affords no detailed 
information concerning such averments (if any) as may 
have persuaded the trustee to abandon his claim on 
this head* Possibly the explanation is that he foresaw 
success in the other two branches of the claim (the 
lease and the insurance policy) and was satisfied*
In any event, it does not appear that the 
ultimate result detracts from the Lord Ordinary's 
remarks upon time-sequence though it emphasises the 
obiter nature thereof* A disentangling of spouses* 
assets before (or even in contemplation of ) the 
bankruptcy of one is easily distinguishable - in theory, 
if not in practice, by reason of the confusion 
surrounding the financing of a common household - from 
an inter-spouse gift or a collusive attempt by spouses 
to place the property of that partner whose solvency 
seems in danger into the hands of the other, and so 
to place it outwith the reach of creditors.
Albeit obiter* and therefore never of more than 
persuasive authority (and voiced in the lower court, 
the decision of which was reversed on appeal, though 
not, of course, on that point) this is a most important 
interpretation of the 1881 Act. The message to 
spouses is clears where bankruptcy threatens, and so 
long /
1 * quoted supra, pp. 1 5 5-1 5 6.
2 * ibid*3* See D* M. Walker, Scottish Legal System ( 4th ed.) pp*392-394, ("Ratio and Obiter Dictum"*)•
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long as our p r e s e n t  system o f  separation o f  property 
continues, steps should be taken promptly to "u n sc ram b le"  
fu n d s  # This will n o t necessarily o b v ia te  dispute « 
indeed It might inspire claims o f  donations revocable 
by creditors# and of alienations by a p e rs o n  who# it 
might be argued# was t r u l y  insolvent, i n  favour of a 
c o n ju n c t  and c o n f id e n t  person (to bring the a rg u m en t 
w i th in  the sco p e  of t h e  A ct o f  1621 o»18) «• but, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  a  welcome e s o a p e - r o u te ,  and  a  v a l i d  
one (as it should b e ,  on grounds o f  e q u i t y ,  if we 
c l i n g  to th e  n o t io n  o f  separation) p ro v id e d  th e  property 
of e a c h  sp o u se  can be i d e n t i f i e d  clearly # Often the 
p r e c i s e  financial state of someone vergens ad Inop iam  
i s  known o n ly  t o  that p e r s o n ,  or to him and  h i s  wife 
(which, of c o u r s e ,  together with motive, o p p o r tu n i ty ,  
and  general c o n fu s io n  s u r ro u n d in g  title t o ,  and  the 
p re s e n c e  of joint p o s s e s s io n  and use of, the p r o p e r ty  
o f  each s p o u s e , i s  why so much s u s p ic io n ,  no d o u b t 
w e ll- fo u n d e d  i n  many cases, and so many r e s t r i c t i v e  
rules surround inter-spouse transactions before 
sequestration)#
By th e  M e r c a n t i le  Law Amendment ( S c o t la n d )  A c t,o %1856 ,  8*1 , it is p ro v id e d  that, "w here goods have 
b een  sold but t h e  same have n o t  been  delivered to th e  
p u r c h a s e r ,  and  have been  a llo w e d  to remain i n  the 
custody o f  th e  s e l l e r ,  i t  shall n o t  be c o m p e te n t t o  
any  c r e d i t o r  o f  such s e l l e r  a f t e r  the d a te  of such 
s a l e  t o  a t t a c h  su c h  goods a s  b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  s e l l e r  
by any diligence o r  p r o c e s s  of law, i n c lu d in g  
s e q u e s t r a t i o n  /
1. This is t h e  crux o f  the p ro b le m . I t  h a s  been  n o te d ,  h o w ev er, that a*1(3) makes an e x c e p t io n  from  i t s  " c l e a r  s e p a r a t e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n "  r u l e , o f  corporeal moveables u s u a l ly  p o s s e s s e d  w i th o u t  a w r i t t e n  o r  d o cum en ta ry  t i t l e  (though this may make c o n fu s io n  w orse  c o n fo u n d e d ) . See Ooudy, p . 2 8 9 ,2 ,  19 & 20 V io t ,  0 .6 0 .3# r e p e a le d  by Sale of Goods A c t, 1893, 8 .6 0 .
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sequestration, to the effect of preventing the 
purchaser or others in his right from enforcing 
delivery of the same, and the right of the purchaser 
to demand delivery of such goods shall, from and 
after the date of such sale, be attachable by or 
transferable to the creditors of the purchaser".
Lord Young in Anderson supra (Lord Trayner 
concurring) was of the opinion that an inter-spouse 
transaction even if possessed of "integrity", was not 
the type of transaction which properly came within 
the spirit of the A c t,  though it might come within 
its letter. Moreover, "In considering that Act we 
are in the region of fine distinctions. The cases 
on that Act and the considerations arising in them 
create fine distinctions^
pGoudy" explains that at one time "reputèd 
ownership", based on possession, consent of the owner, 
and repute of ownership, was regarded as sufficient 
to found the possessor's creditors* claims, against 
that property, but even at the time of the Fourth 
Edition of his work (1914), this was a doctrine much 
less favoured and more restricted.
Thus, though 3.1 of the 1856 Act^ stated that 
goods sold and left in the custody of the seller 
would not fall to the seller's trustee in bankruptcy, 
yet if the buyer allowed the seller so to use the 
goods as to suggest that he (the seller) owned them, 
it had been held that the plea of reputed ownership 
could arise* (This would not be so if "it could be 
shown that he held possession bona fide under a 
subordinate /
1. at p.687.2. pp.295-298.5* supra, pp., 1 5 8-1 5 9.
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subordinate t it le , such as lease or loan, from the
buyer *") GouoLy points out that this section was 
repealed by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893^, In terms 
of which there are rules to govern the rights of 
seller and buyer in the matter of transfer of 
property (and of risk, and of title^) but suggests 
that the same principles of reputed ownership would 
apply in cases under the 1893 Act where a buyer 
allows a seller to retain and use goods soldai The 
Sale of Goods Act, 1893, in s.61(1) states that "The 
rules in bankruptcy relating to contracts of sale 
shall continue to apply thereto, notwithstanding 
anything in this Adt contained", and in s*6l(2) 
that, "The rules of the common law, including the 
law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent 
with the express provisions of this Act •*. shall 
continue to apply to contracts for the sale of goods*" 
Further (s*51(5)), "Nothing in this Act shall prejudice 
or effect the landlord's right of hypothec or 
sequestration for rent in Scotland *" It might be 
that the doctrine would not apply where the item in 
question was of a type or class of object knoim, in 
many cases, to be hired rather than owned^*
When these principles came to be applied to the 
marital household, Goudy (at 1914) identifies five 
different /
1. p.296*2* s.60. (as also were repealed 88.2-5 of the 1856 Act).3. See 1893 Act, Part II: Transfer of Property as between Seller and Buyer, ss.16-20; Transfer of Title 88.21-26)*4. See 38.25(1) and (as amended by Consumer Credit Act, 1974, Sohed*4, para.4) 25(2); see also Factors Act. 1889 - as extended to Scotland by Factors (Scotland) Act, 1890, 38.2, 8, and (as amended by Consumer Credit Act, 1974, Sched. 4, para 2) 9*5. As to landlord's hypothec, see infra, p. lei et seq.
In  Mconsumer credit" transactions, see Consumer Credit Act, 1974, s.104.6. Goudy, p.297.
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1different situations which might exist # The first 
(where the fhmiti%re was the ante-nuptial property 
of the wife and the marriage took place before the 
date of the 1881 Act, in which case "the husband's 
trustee will take it as vested in the bankrupt jure 
iiia.riti# apart from" (meaning, "unless there is"?')
"any plea of reputed ownership" ) can have no 
application now, nor can Goudy*a second example 
which supposes a pre-1881 marriage, the furniture 
being the ante-nuptial property of the wife, but in 
this case having been "settled on her by antenuptial 
contract", and where "the doctrine of reputed 
ownership will not be applied in favour of the"
■ '(husband'a) "trustee"#
In /
1# ibid# at pp#297-293#2* Thecomplexities of this, fortunately obsolete, sentence are formidable# It would appear that the meaning is that the furniture belonged originally to the woman, and became the husband's .jure mariti on marriage# Since therefore i t  was tEe i^uSBana's property, there could be no question of the competency of the trustee's actings in taking it, "apart from any plea of reputed ownership", a proviso which perhaps means that the wife's use and enjoyment of what had been her own property might allow the doctrine of reputed ownership to arise - but to what effect? The discussion is  of the position of the husband's creditors, not the wife's; reputed ownership in the wife surely would not prevent the husband's creditors from attaching what was "truly" his# The doctrine was intended it might be thought to be helpful to, not to be restrictive, of creditors* (A competition between creditors of each spouse at that date (involving reference to the husband's marital property rights) would raise many d ifficu lties, now obsolete -  though it is very clear that problems as to ownership of property in dispute involving bankrupt, spouse, and creditor s t i l l  may arise#)The more likely meaning is  that the husband's trustee would take the property in any case -  as being thehusband's dure mmriti - without recourse to the doctrine of reputed ownership.
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In marriages before 1881, therefore, it would 
seem that household furniture belonging to the wife 
before marriage would be safe from the husband's 
creditors only i f  excluded by antenuptial contract 
from the husband’s jus mariti#
Similarly, the husband’s trustee would be
excluded i f  the settlement excluding the jus mariti 
had been executed postnuptially, provided it was 
made by a third party^*
It is clear that these examples are not of
practical guidance today*
The fourth instance envisaged is  that of a 
marriage to which the Married Women's Property 
(Scotland) Aot, 1881, applies, and where the 
furniture is  the w ife's, having been acquired by 
her either before or after marriage* In that case, 
"the trustee cannot claim i t ,  as the terms of that 
Act exclude the presumption ' of oimership in the 
husband^."
Here, however, there is  being discussed the 
question of ownership and the effect ( if  any, now, 
for a ll marriages now must postdate the date of 
coming into operation of the 1881 Act, and succession 
ramifioations, for example, of the pre-1881 law, must 
be few) of reputed ownerships* Cloudy is  not writing 
about immixture of funds and the effect and 
disentanglement thereof, which is  now so peculiarly 
the problem of bankruptcy when it occurs during 
marriage* It is  the nature of the married state 
that each spouse may use and enjoy (apparently as 
owner) /
1. Goudy, p.297, and see generally Chapter 1, pp.2* that is, the modern situation - and see Adam v. &182Ë& 0894) 21 R.676, where however W  problems brought by $#1(4) are clearly seen. No reference there was made to "reputed ownership." 3# See also Fr.II, 1344-45*
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owner) items of furniture and household equipment* 
no lass so now than in earlier times; at least the 
question of ownership is freed from complications 
such as that of the jus mariti* We may decide the 
matter by referring to our present crude teats, and 
it is precisely at this point that a consideration 
of the immixture of funds (perhaps to effect payment 
of the price of the item in question) may take place.
1Fraser , speaking, of moveables, recommends the 
preparation of an inventory of the moveables such as 
household furniture, which were the property of the 
wife and from which the jus mariti was to be excluded 
so as to bar the husband's creditors, and to overcome 
the (then current) presumption that all moveables 
belonged to the husband* He writes that if the 
property is identified, the exclusion, before marriage, 
by a third party or the wife, of the jug mariti. will 
prevent the husband's creditors from interfering with 
it^# However, "The case of Shearer v* Christie^ shows" 
"that the jps mariti with regard to moveable property, 
can only be excluded by antenuptial contract, or at 
least (where the husband renounces) only with regard 
to moveables acquired (during marriage) subsequent to 
the renunciation of it, end even then it may be 
revoked as being a donation^*"
It clearly was impossible for a husband "even in 
an antenuptial contract, and still less by deeds
executed stante matrimonio." to secure to his wife 
furniture which belonged to him, and the possession 
of /
1* I, 790 (but see contra where the property is the husband'8,11, lÿpM%3T.V. Loudoun (1855) 17 D.998.3, ( ie # T # .1 3 2 ! t4* Fr* ibid; see Chapter 1, pp.37-43, especially pp.40-42. (The case of Smith's Tra. there quoteddid not involve the olaimTor^""''^"^ '
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of remained unohanged, safe from the olalma of
creditors^, Neither, as ha# been aeon, oould a 
husband poatnuptlally competently convey to her an 
"alimentary" fund, or a "eeparato" fund or a fund 
not aeelgnable nor attachable by creditors, even 
thcugli the property therein purported to pass to 
the vfife^, nor could he retain iflthln his own 
pmmr and management the property of both spouses, 
on a provision that his m ilM  and 
gdminl.st:ratiopis # should fa ll away in the event of 
his insolvency, with consequent benefits in the wife's 
estate as against creditors^*
The point Which now arises is  whether the 
principles embodied in these rules would have any 
effect today i f  the practice of drawing up marriage- 
contracts (to "contract out" perhaps of a statutory 
system of community of property) became common once 
more, and i f  a similar aim of protecting part of 
the funds of one party were sought by a re-o&sting 
of such provisions in modem language. Probably 
within any new statutory norm for matrimonial 
property, a new code of debt end bankruptcy rules as 
tliey affect the relationship, and rights and duties, 
existing between spouses and third party and spouse 
creditors, would be necessary, and what would be 
required for the dissenters would be guidance upon 
the extent to which 'contracting-out' thereof was to 
be competent, and then* within the sphere of separation 
of property elected in the fir st instance by those 
persons (assuming that such choice was allowable), (new?) 
rules /
1 . Pr.I, 795.2# Fr.I, 795-796, and see Chapter 1, pp*29-30 ( 'The Alimentary Provision')# As to position in the modem context, see Clive & Wilson, p.340, lines 11-17, and pp.340-341 *3# Bell's Com. 1 ,638^39 (which see generally on this subject.)
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rules ecmoeming Immixture of property, and the need 
(or not) for, and effioaoy of, Inventoi i^ea listing  
the separate property of each, would be drawn up#
The question of mmerehlp of household furniture 
Is a large issue, though, and one ready for reform#
It ml^it be that no "oontraotlng-out" of the new 
provlsiooe In this sphere would be permitted^*
Fifth, where the furniture was the antenuptial 
property of the husband, and, by antenuptial eontraot,
was settled on the wife, Goudy noted that, aooordlngPto several pre-1681 oaaea*, the doctrine applied in 
suitable olroumatanoea (to the effect of allowing the 
husband's trustee to attach the furniture}#
By reason of the change effected by the 1881 Aot 
in the "presumption an to ownership", Goudy doubted  ^
whether /
1 # of# generally Chapters 6 (foreign systems) and 7 (possible reform)#2# as examples of whloh he cites Shearer v# Christie (18^ 2^) 5 D#132, Bro^ m v. FleminjS^ TWo) 13 
a n d  refers t o  C a i S l î i ï l  v# gtmSrt (1848) 1 0  D # 1 2 8 0 ,  commenting, "Æe ''I'naorsing àn inventory of the articles on the maiTiage contract was held in these eases to be immaterial", p .298, fn*(b)* In these cases, concerning furniture,the trustee's claim triumphed, i t  being held, in Brown# that there had been no effectual inter-spouse transfer and, in Campbell, 
t h a t  the wife had not truly enjoyed the TeerEereof # These are examples of a type of marriage-oontract provision which L.J.Clerk Hope in Loudoun described (at p.1000) as "stated to have been very"commonly used in Glasgow about the years 1846-47, when a number of mercantile failures had taken place, because they held that they were truly attempts, by appearing to give the wife an interest, to protect the husband's property, of which he was allowed the fu ll enjoyment and possession, against attack by his creditors."(see also per L.J.Clerk Hope in Brown at p.375: " ...I  own, after the decision in June ,**11141, in the case Campbell# I am surprised to see this form of deed 
c o n l ï n u ® H " T n  Glasgow, where i t  la said to be common#") The inventory, therefore, was by no means a secure protection#3# p.298.
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whether, even In relation to pre-1881 marriages, the 
decisions of more modern days would uphold the doctrine, 
which, therefore would appear, in his opinion, in 
relation to husbands and wives, to be of l i t t le  or no 
account*
The doctrine of reputed ownership owed nothing to 
notions of contribution in cash or kind, but all to 
poasession* As such, it might still be a useful 
concept (though of greater us© to creditors than to 
spouses, surely?), its effect, as Professor Walker 
states, being "to bar the true owner from asserting 
his right of ownership against the creditors^*" He 
comments that some fraud or gross fault by the true 
owner, "whereby false credit has been given" would pbe necessary to sustain the plea of reputed ownership , 
but, "In modern practice the doctrine la not important 
because ownership and possession are now so frequently 
separated that persons dealing with a possessor are 
not warranted merely by his possession in believing 
that he is  the owner thereof, and there must be other 
factors present before the owner will be held barred 
from vindicating his property from a creditor of the 
possessor. Mere possession does not Confer even 
apparent authority to dispose of the property, and 
does not preclude the owner from vindicating his 
property from one who has dealt with the possessor^." 
Oloag and Henderson^ also state that "Owing to changes 
in the law this doctrine Is no longer of much importance," 
and cite the case of Robertsons v* McIntyre^, a case 
involving /
1* Prins* II, 1547*2, Goudy speaks of the 'Consent, express or implied, of the true owner’, p*293*3 *  Walker, ibid: see, of course. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s*"23: Factors (8c*) Act, 1890, ss*S and 9*4* p#499#5* (1882) 9 R.772.
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Involving an inter-family (brother /  sisters) sale,
which, in the oiroumatanoes, was held truly to have 
occurred and to have been bona ^ide, and In which 
the Lord Juatioe-Clerk (Moncrieff) remarked, "The 
doctrine of reputed ownership, to which repeated 
reference was made during the discussion, has been 
paid l it t le  attention to of late years, and is  no 
longer of much importance."
It would appear, therefore, that, nowadays, 
where bankruptcy takes place during a marriage, and 
there is dispute about the fate of household furniture, 
the approach is first of a ll to attempt to categorise 
the items into those belonging to the bankrupt spouse 
and those belonging to the solvent spouse (according 
to our present rules, and, i t  would seem,without 
reference to the doctrine of reputed ownership), 
bearing in mind throughout however, that " - if a wife 
lends or intrusts her moveables to her husband, or 
allows her funds to be mixed with his, his trustee 
will take them, with the result that the wife w ill
have no claim until the claims of onerous creditorspof the husband have been satisfied Perhaps 
circumstances wliioh earlier might have resulted in 
the coming into operation of the doctrine of reputed 
ownership (with an effect which in the particular 
case /
1 « at p.776.2» Goudy, P.29B. There seems to be no reason tosuppose that a husband who lends to his wife, or, on her bankruptcy, is found to have immixed his funds with her, should be treated, by analogy, as being a creditor only of the postponed category. But see 
su p ra , p . a 4 9 , f o o tn o te  4 . Contra# the doctrine of reputed ownership, its  benefits 'an3 disadvantages do not appear to have been confined to one sex (though Goudy'8 treatment (pp#297-298) seems to view the matter from the standpoint of the husband's trustee -  possibly because the bankruptcy of the male was - and, despite the advent of women into business, probably s t i l l  is - a more common occurrence.)
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case favoured the trustee, and the creditors of the 
husband) might now be held to amount to an "intrusting" 
by wife to husband (with the effect, again, of 
favouring the husband's trustee and creditors )* If 
both husband and wife contribute to the purchase of 
a case of wine, does this item fall to the trustee 
on the husband's banlcruptcy (leaving the wife a 
perhaps worthless last ranking) as being a product of 
the immixture of their f u n d s T h i s  is unlikely to 
be a question of survival, of course; the bankrupt may 
be given an allowance and possibly an additional 
allowance , and is entitled to "the necessary wearing 
apparel" of himself, his wife, and family^, but that 
is small comfort if items which the wife considered 
but could not prove to be hers, or to the purchase 
price of which she had contributed (especially if the 
notion of contribution in kind is given wholehearted 
recognition,which recognition, however, would be 
accompanied probably by a new and comprehensive 
property régime which would include debt and 
bankruptcy rules), are gone with the trustee^*
The result is unsatisfactory, unpredictable, 
unrealistic, outmoded, inaccurate and inequitable•
The treatment of debt and bankruptcy in marriage is 
ripe for reform* As it stands, it displays the 
shortcomings and fictions of a system of separation 
(unless /
1 * See terms of M.W.P* (So.) Act, 1881, s.1(3) and 1(4).2* B*(Sc.) Act, 1913, s.74; Goudy, pp*359-360; and seeClive & Wilson* p.340 « 'beneficiura competentiae*•   -3# ibid., 8.91 (Oath); Goudy, p*371 (in footnote 'TFTs noted that, "in England the bankrupt is permitted to retain household apparel and bedding, and the tools of his trade to the aggregate value of £20* See 46 & 47 Viet. c*52. s.44(2}.») See generally Goudy, pp.364-371. (The Rights ofProperty of the Bankrupt.)*4. See infra, p . 181 e t  seq  her position where the landTorcT"under the landlord's hypothec attaches and sells property belonging to the wife.
169.
( u n le s s  painstaking records and inventories are kept, 
t h a t  is, u n le s s  separation in theory m atch es separation 
in practice"*) and the keeping of such is an 
unattractive task, both in p u rp o se  and in implementation - 
\fhether t h e  marriage subsists u n d e r  a separation or a 
community sy s tem  of marital p r o p e r ty :  moreover, even
if that were done on a sufficiently wide scale to 
support the practical feasibility of a rule which 
favoured those meticulous in keeping such records, 
in a system which was one of separation of property, 
the basic unfairnesses of economics, biology and 
opportunity rem ain#
pHowever, it seems that if the wife takes 
furniture which belonged to her b e fo r e  marriage to 
the marital home, this action does not constitute a 
loan or the entrusting of it to her husband, nor an 
immixing of it with his funds#
In the case of Adam (1894), the marriage had 
taken place in 1885 , and t h e  defender (the husband's 
trustee in bankruptcy) admitted that the property 
in /
1, though, if 'reputed ownership* is no longer an applicable doctrine, use by both is not a factor which has any relevance. "The fact o f  joint use does not raise a presumption of joint ownership." (Clive & Wilson, p.294) - though see landlord's hypothec, infra » p.isi. In Young v. Loudoun#(1855)17 D.99B, rmnierk (Hope), upoiTthe argument that ostensible ownership of furniture might raise a constructive property inT^PaT“p#1001, said,
"But if I am right in the remark that presumed ownership is not the overruling consideration, what distinction can be drawn between one kind of moveables and another? No doubt, in general talk, one may be more apt to say of furniture than of other moveables, that it is likely to be the husband's; but no such distinction is known in the law of moveables, or of husband and wife."2. Adam v. A.'s Tr. (1894) 21 R.676.
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1% q u e s t io n  bad  b e en  p u ro b a a e d  by  t h e  w ife  b e fo r e  
m a rria g e *  The f u r n i t u r e  n a t u r a l l y  was t o  be  fo u n d  
I n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  borne ( a s  was t b e  h u a b a W a  
f u r n i t u r e ) ,  an d  th e  q u e s t io n  %me w h e th e r  p r e s e n c e  i n  
th e  same p la c e  (an d  u a e  by th e  aame p e r s o n s  -  t h a t  l a ,  
by t h e  husband  a e  w e l l  a a  by th e  w ife )  am ounted  t o  
'e n t r u s t i n g '  o r  'im m ix tu r e ' o f  fu nds#  The S h e r i f f -  
S u b s t i t u t e  fo u n d  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t ,  an d  t h a t  t h e  w i f e 'a  
p r o p e r ty  w as " c a p a b le  o f  b e in g  i d e n t i f i e d  and  
d ia t in g u im h e d  from  th e  e s t a t e  o f  th e  h usband#"
On a p p e a l ,  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e  
e x c e p t io n s  o f  im m ix in g , le n d in g  and  e n t r u s t i n g  a p p l ie d  
t o  money and  n o t  t o  c o r p o r e a l  m oveables#
L o rd  Young n o te d  t h a t  th e  d e f e n d e r 's  ( a p p e l l a n t 's )  
c a s e  r e s t e d  upon  Im m ixbure , r a t h e r  th a n  on le n d in g  o r  
e n t r u s t i n g #  S in c e  i t  was a d m it te d  t h a t  the f u r n i t u r e  
had  b e en  b o u g h t b y  th e  w if e  b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e ,  and  
s in c e  t h a t  p r o p e r ty  was c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  ( a  m a t t e r  
w h ic h , i n  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  t h i n g s ,  i s  m ore l i k e l y  t o  b e  
s o  th a n  i n  th e  c a s e  w here th e  p r o p e r ty  was b o u g h t by 
the wife p o s t n u p t i a l l y  a l l e g e d l y  o u t  o f  h e r  own 
r e s o u r c e s ) ,  h e  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  " t h e r e  was no Im m ixing 
i n  t h i s  o& se, a t  l e a s t  no  im m ixing  t h a t  w as n o t
c a p a b le  o f  im m ed ia te  s e p a r a t i o n  o r  u n m ix in g '- "_1«
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d . L o rd  Young d id  n o t  t h i n k  i t  
"impof 
h e r  /
pp o s s ib le  " t h a t  a  w ife  m ig h t l e n d  o r  e n t r u s t
1# at p #678#2# m aking r e f e r e n c e  t o  h i s  own j u d i c i a l  opinion i n  A n d e rs o n 's  T r s # ( a t  p#667 t h e r e o f )  ( i n f r a ) t o  ^ E E F '^ î îe o T ^ m t  in t e r - s p o u s e  ' e n t r u s ï l n ^  o f  f u r n i t u r e  was q u i t e  p o s s i b l e ,  and  m ust be  ta k e n  t o  h a v e  happened  i n  t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h a t  c a s e :  
s a l e  was r u l e d  out by  th e  bench  b e c a u se  o f  a lackf i d e s # S ee  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p#338  i»)here th e  oasie IS  1 3 Isc u sse d , d e c id e d  t o  be  s p e c i a l ,  and  by i n f e r e n c e  p ro b a b ly  n o t  d e t r a c t i n g  from  the v iew  that 8 8 * 1 (3 ) and  (4) a p p ly  n o rm a lly  o n ly  t o  fu n d s  and  n o t  t o  o t h e r  c o r p o r e a l  m oveab les -  a n d  s e ei n f r a  /
1 7 1
her ovm furniture to her husband. Hence, the 
inference i s  that his Lordship d id  not here approve 
the proposition that s.1(4) of the 1881 Act was 
intended to apply o n ly  to "money, or its equivalent." 
"But where a woman who is in possession o f  furniture 
marries a man who has no furniture at all, o r  very 
little, and brings i t  into his house, o r  i t  may be 
i n t o  her c m  house, I do not think that she thereby 
lends or entrusts it to her husband within the sense 
of section 1, subsection 4, of the statute •"
The Lord Justice-Clerk (Macdonald) observed,
" I f  we decided this case in favour of th e  defender,
I do not t h i n k  that there could ever be a case in 
which a wife's furniture when brought into her 
husband's house could be prevented from becoming hispp r o p e r ty " * "  Clive and Wilson, while noting that%the same judge, in Anderson , was p re p a r e d  to accept 
the notion of "entrusting" of furniture, appear to 
adopt a similar approach to that taken by the Lord 
J u s t i c e  /
infra.P» 1.72-3L#Young, in Adam, at p.679, e^îained Anderson's distinguishing feature as follows I -  " I  think the case of Anderson was a very special one, and I do not t h in k  t h a t  i t  was decided on any ground of Immixing ... I was of opinion that the transaction was not i n  bona fide. But th e  case t h e r e  was not one of im m ix in g ; the case was that even  if there had been a valid sale the wife had lent or entrusted the furniture to h e r  husband". Gan it be that the inference of "lending or entrusting" or "immixing" is more likely to be made when there is a breath of mala f l d e s  or expediency in th e  air?
The sum of L.Young's views as expressed in these two cases seems to,be that lending, entrusting, and immixing of corporeal moveables of the wife to tHe^ h u sb an d  o r  with his "funds" ( th e  word used by the Act, in 8.1(4)) was within the contemplation of the Act.1. at p.679*2. at p.679*3* a t  p.686.
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Juatioe-CIerk i n  Adams "T h e re  is no r e a s o n  why a 
matrimonial home should n o t  be f u r n i s h e d  with the 
wife's f u r n i t u r e .  I f  the wife owns the f u r n i t u r e  
i n  the f i r s t  place it could hardly be argued that sh e  
had " e n t r u s t e d "  it to the husband merely by  allowing
it to be u se d  i n  th e  matrimonial home 1 .2« « • n
The hypothesis u se d  i n  Adam s c a r c e l y  r e f l e c t s  
the practical situation today, e x c e p t  p e rh a p s  In 
se co n d  marriages or m a r r ia g e s  later i n  life, when 
th e  p a r t i e s  h ave  had o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  am ass furniture,
Basic furnishings are likely to be p u rc h a s e d  by 
b o th  p a r t i e s  b e fo r e  m a r r ia g e  -  and  s e p a r a t e l y ,  o r  
j o i n t l y ,  t h e r e a f t e r  -  o u t  o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  earned 
by e a c h  o f  them  o r  donated by third p a r t i e s  to 
e i t h e r  o r  both. One may f u r n i s h  th e  hom e, while 
t h e  o t h e r  makes the deposit for t h e  purchase o f  th e  
home. T h ere  are In n u m e ra b le  v a r i a t i o n s .  How can  
the p l a i n  r u l e s  o f  o w n e rs h ip , upon which r e s t  many 
o t h e r  legal c o n se q u e n c e s , i n c l u d in g ,  a s  h a s  b een  
s e e n ,  p r i o r i t y  of ranking i n  b a n k ru p tc y , m eet 
satisfactorily so many p e rm u ta t io n s  of f a c t s ?
M o reo v er, th e  p o s i t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  l e s s  clear-cut, 
for it w i l l  o f t e n  be  t h e  case that t i t l e  t o  t h e  house 
w i l l  be  h e ld  in j o i n t  nam es^ . N e v e r th e le s s ,  w here  
the /
1 ,  p,333. The remainder o f  th e  s e n te n c e  (",,,andt h e  fact t h a t  the f u r n i t u r e  i s  d e r iv e d  from the h u sb a n d  s h o u ld  not, logically, make any d i f f e r e n c e * " )  m ust surely be a reference to a bona f i d e  inter- apouae transaction ( o f  sale, preaumably>^since 
d o n a tio n s  and gratuitous alienations hold d a n g e r s ) ,2# Similarly, it has been s a i d  that ' l e n d in g *  o r  'intrusting* i n  th e  sense of the Act o f  1881 i s  something d i f f e r e n t  from m e re ly  s o  placing t h e  p r o p e r ty  that it may be  c o n v e n ie n t ly  u s e d  or shared by b o th  sp o u ses*3* Since i t  i s  l e n d in g ,  im m ixing  o r  entrusting w hloh s h o u ld  be avoided, it is th e  joint u s e  with t h e  h u sb an d  o f  th e  m a tr im o n ia l  home (See Wardhaugh's understanding of the c a s e )  rather than t h e  ownership (of. p.177, para.3) thereof /
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t h e  facts s u i t ,  (a n d  now w here  t h e  d i s p u te  may be
a s  to one item o f  furniture) M a m , though decided 
i n  /
t h e r e o f  w hich  m a t t e r s ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  m ix in g  o f  w i f e ’ s  w ith  husband's f u r n i t u r e  might r a i s e  th e  i s s u e .  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d . I f  a w ife  brings 
f u r n i t u r e  to h e r  husband* s  il2H§2* sh e  n o t  ♦lending, o r  entrusting* that rumlture to him?The p ro b lem  i s  one of construction of the s e n te n c e  i n  t h e  Act# M ention  is made o f  "m oney, or o t h e r  e s t a t e " ,  b u t  also o f  "im m ixed w ith  h i s  funds»*Now, C l iv e  à  W ilson  ( p . 338) sa y  that " f u r n i t u r e  and  o th e r  corporeal m o v eab les"  are " e x p r e s s ly  e x c lu d e d  from  s u b s e c t io n  ( 3 )  and  in the ordinary case are unlikely to be " l e n t  or entrusted t o  t h e  h u sb a n d , o r  immixed w ith  h i s  fu n d s " i could i t  n o t  be how ever that, thougtiTStlxtur© may h av e  b een  intended to r e f e r  o n ly  t o  m oney, " o t h e r  estate of the w ife "  (which, in the a b se n c e  o f  d e f i n i t i o n ,  w ould surely in c lu d e  corporeal m oveab les a s  w e l l  as, for 
e x am p le , n e g o t i a b l e  in s t r u m e n ts  and su c h  i te m s  a s  more c l o s e l y  r e p r e s e n t  money: t h e r e  i s  no
i d e n t i f i a b l e  g enus arising from  th e  e n u m e ra tio n  o f  s e v e r a l  litEeilema - Walker, Be. Legal S y stem , p#317 ’statutory Interpretation* Eiuedem Generis R u le ; on the o t h e r  h a n d , consider { E e r u l e ,Wosoitur Soclis -  y e t  i n  t r u t h  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  Wl333Sr^SamTHe s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the insertion i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  or the b r e a d th  o f  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  i f  other e s t a t e  o f  all k in d s ,  is n o t  in te n d e d  
t o  be in c lu d e d .  Sed a m s m ,  t t e t  b a s i s ,  w hat i s  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n i f  a n y x o  th e  w i f e ’ s  h e r i t a g e ,  which however p re su m ab ly  i s  l e s s  u s u a l ly  l e n t  or e n t r u s t e d ,  and  c o u ld  hardly be im m ixed with his fu n d s ? )  is capable of b e in g  l e n t  o r  e n t r u s t e d  t o  the husband  so  a s  to b r in g  t h e  p r o v i s io n  i n t o  operation? (The opinions both o f  t h e  S h e r i f f -  Substitute and o f  t h e  Sheriff-Principal i n  Allan 
V ,  wishart (1889 ) 6  Sh*Gt*Hep*185 a r e  o p p o s e o t o  the noïToE that a,1 (4 )  was in te n d e d  to a p p ly  also to corporeal m o v eab les  but t h e  t e n o r  is that such a construction, i n  view o f  the common u s e  o f  m o v eab les  i n  a household,  w ould be against the 
p o l i c y  o f  th e  A o t: t h e  p o i n t  i s  n o t  ta k e n  t h a t" u s e "  may be  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from  lo a n ,  e n t r u s t i n g  and im m ix in g . The practical result in the 
m a jo r i t y  o f  o a s e s  w ould be the same -  the f u r n i t u r e  w ould be safe from t h e  husband’s creditors.
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ii n  1894, seem s to r e p r e s e n t  th e  c u r r e n t  rule •
There were two n e c e s s a r y  atepplng-stones, ho w ev er, 
on  t h e  r o u te  t o  t h a t  r e s u l t ,  and  the& e a r e ,  f l r a t ,  
a b i l i t y  t o  t r a c e  th e  a o u rc e  o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  ( a b o u t  
w h ic h , i n  Adam, there was no a rg u m e n t) , and, se c o n d # 
a b i l i t y  t o  u s e  t h a t  know ledge t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  e p c u s e e , an d  h e n ce  t o  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  th e  p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  husb an d  from  t h a t  
o f  t h e  w i f e .  T oday , i f  t h e  an sw er t o  t h e  f i r s t  
query is fo r th c o m in g , t h e  se co n d  will u s u a l ly  be  
e a s i l y  ( i f  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  e q u i t a b ly )  a n sw e re d , b u t  
th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  p r o o f  i n  e f f e c t i n g  ev en  t h i s  
rough j u s t i c e  sh o u ld  not be u n d e r e s t im a te d .
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  N a t io n a l  Bank 
o f  S c o t la n d  L td ,  v* Cowan^, a  w ife  c la im e d  a g a i n s t  
h e r  h u sb a n d ’ s  t r u s t e e  i n  b a n k ru p tc y  p a r t  o f  th e  sums 
r e p r e s e n te d  by  tw o d e p o s i t - r e c e l p t s ,  "w hich  b o re  th e  
t e r m s ,  "R e c e iv e d  from  Jo h n  and  B e ts y  Cowan, C a ld e r ,  
C o a tb r id g e ,  p a y a b le  to e i t h e r  or t h e  s u r v i v o r " * She 
a v e r r e d  t h a t  £70 o f  t h e  c o n te n ts  o f  th e  d e p o s i t -  
r e c e i p t s  w as h e r  own m oney, owned a t  m a r r ia g e ,  and 
t h a t  other fu n d s  t h e r e i n  had b een  d o n a t io n s  t o  h e r  
by h e r  husband#  H er c la im  %ms t o  £70 o n ly ,  s in c e  
sh e  a d m it te d  t h a t  h e r  h u sb a n d ’ s  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  had  
rev o k e d  th e  d o n a tio n s  -  ( b e in g  p re -1 9 2 0  law)# With 
c o n s id e r a b le  /
1# The m s u l t  a c c o rd s  w ith  th e  v iew  t h a t  s« 1 (4 )  o f  th e  iBSTTct d o es  n o t  a p p ly  to c o r p o r e a l  m o v e a b le s , 
b u t  w h e th e r  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  c a s e  c a n  b e  s t a t e d  s ob r o a d ly  and  withôïïtrefereîioe t o  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
f a c t s  t h e r e  p r e s e n t , i s  d o u b t f u l .  W'ardhaugh, for e x am p le , m e re ly  states (p*79) that, "The t r a n s f e r  o f  f u r n i t u r e  b e lo n g in g  t o  th e  w ife  t o  a  house 
o c c u p ie d  by h e r  and  h e r  husband  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h a t  i t  i s  " l e n t  o r  e n t r u s t e d "  i n  th e  s e n s e  o f  t h e  M#W#P#Act," and L ord  Young, a f t e r  a l l ,  at p#678 s a i d ,  " I  h a v e  s a i d  t h e r e  was no im m ixing  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a t  l e a s t  no Im m ixing t h a t  was n o t  c a p a b le  o f  
im m e d ia te  s e p a r a t i o n  o r  u n m ix in g "# S ee  .P.17Q#
2 .  (1 8 9 3 ) 21 R, 4#
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G o n s id e ra b le  I n g e n u i ty ,  sh e  a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e  d o n a t io n s ,  
w h i le  th e y  s to o d ,  w ere  g o o d ,a n d  thu@ , i f  t h e  aum o f  
£70 h ad  b e e n  im m ixed w i th  any  o th e r  f u n d s ,  th e y  h ad  
b e e n  im m ixed w ith  h e r  own*
The t r u s t e e  c o n te n d e d  t h a t  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n ,  
u n d e r  w h ich  th e  huaband  o o u ld  have w ithdrairm  t h e  
money from  t h e  bank  a t  any  t im e ,  made i t  q u i t e  c l e a r  
t h a t  th e  £70 c la im e d  had  n o t  b een  k e p t  s e p a r a t e  from
t h e  h u a b a n d ’B p r o p e r ty *  %^ith th e  l a t t e r  v iew  L ord  
Young c o n c u rre d ^ #  T h is  i s  a  s a l u t a r y  le a a o n  o f  th e  
d a n g e r  o f  im m ix tu re  o f  fu n d s  i n  j o i n t  bank  ao o o u n ta  
(fro m  th e  wife's standpoint, e s p e c i a l l y  -  if i t  is 
c o r r e c t  that the 1881 A c t, 8 * 1 (4 ) a p p l i e s  o n ly  t o
t h e  l e n d e r - w i f e ) ,  and o f  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f2"u n m ix in g "  a t  a  dat®  b e f o r e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  , t h e  l a t t e r
p r o c e s s  b e in g  a t t e n d e d ,  8 0  a s  t o  m in im ise  f u t u r e  
d i s p u t e ,  w i th  a s  much e v id e n c e  o f  s o u rc e  o f  fu n d s  and  
t r a n s p a r e n t  h o n e s ty  o f  d i v i s i o n  a s  i s  p o s s i b l e  i n  th e  
c irc u m s ta n c e s *
T h is ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  a n  exam ple o f  w hat i s  p ro b a b ly  
th e  m ost common s i t u a t i o n  i n  vAiioh a  w i f e ' s  money may 
b e  im m ixed w ith  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  funds#  Y e t,  " J o i n t  
p r o p e r ty  i s  n o t ,  h o w ev er, n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  by 
a  bank  a c c o u n t  i n  j o i n t  nam es, and  on w h ich  e i t h e r  
may d ra w , a s  su c h  may be  m e re ly  a  c o n v e n ie n t  a r ra n g e m e n t''# "  
I n  /
1* "Now, c a n  i t  b e  s a i d  t h a t  th e  w ife  h e re  h a s  k e p t  t h e  p r o p e r ty  w hich  s h e  s a id  sh e  had  a t  th e  d a te  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  uiim ixed up  w ith  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e ,  when sh e  h a s  p u t  th e  money a lo n g  w ith  o t h e r  money w h ich  a d m i t te d ly  p a s s e s  t o  th e  h u s b a n d 's  t r u s t e e  on  two d e p o s i t - r e o e i p t a ,  w hich  b e a r  that t h e  money was r e c e iv e d  from  h e r  an d  h e r  h u sb a n d , and  t o  be  p a y a b le  t o  e i t h e r  o r  th e  s u r v iv o r ? "  p e r  L#Young a t  p#6#2# o f*  R o b e r ts o n ,  p e r  L .K in c a lm e y ,  s u p r a * pp* i 55- ] ^ 6 .3* W alker^' 'K i n s # I ,  p*2G2, c i t i n g  M a rsh a l v* C ru tw e ll  
(1 6 7 9 ) L.R* 20 Bq* 528*
176.
4I n  Marshal v. Crutwell , a husband changed his bank 
account from his own nam e, t o  hie own and his w i f e ’ s  
nam es, directing the bank to a llo w  his wife t o  
operate thereon; Sums w ere draw n out by the w if e ,  
on  the instructions of the husband, and u se d  to meet 
household e x p e n s e s ;  The intention of th e  husband 
in creating t h e  new account was not explained to t h e  
wife, but it was understood g e n e r a l ly  by t h e  bank 
m anager that th e  balance i n  the account s h o u ld  belong 
t o  the s u r v iv o r  o f  them# The w ife , b e in g  th e  s u r v i v o r , 
claimed t h e  balance i n  th e  account, but failed because,
" I  come to t h e  c o n c lu s io n  that i t  was not In te n d e d  t o  
be a p r o v i s i o n  f o r  the wife, tout s im p ly  a mode o f  
c o n v e n ie n t ly  m anaging th e  t e s t a t o r ’ s  affairs, and that 
it l e a v e s  th e  money t h e r e f o r e  s t i l l  h i s  p r o p e r ty ^ » "
This i s  an  old c a s e ,  and  an  English o n e , and 
s p e c i a l  i n  i t s  facts, tout o b v io u s ly  t h e  ratio could 
still a p p ly  i n  s u i t a b l e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  It will be 
m ore common f o r  the m odern j o i n t  bank a c c o u n t to 
im p o r t  j o i n t  p r o p e r t y ,  how ever* I n  th e  c a s e  o f  
I n  r e  Figgis, Deed*, t h e  English p re s u m p tio n  o f  
a d v an cem en t^ , with regard t o  fu n d s  i n  a j o i n t  bank 
account /
1. a s  footnote 3, p.175*2# p e r  S i r  d.Jessel, M.E., at p.331.
3 ,  [1 9 6 9 ] 1 C h .1 2 3 .4. t h e  p re s u m p tio n  o f  advancem en t and  r e s u l t i n g  trusts- akin to gift or b e n e f i t  -  s e e  Chapter 6 (England) and " P r i n c i p l e s  o f  F am ily  Law", S.M.Cretney (1974) pp. 153-157, w here i t  is p o in te d  out that, s in c e  P e t t i t * the s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  presumption that " . . . i f  h u sb an d  makes a  payment for or puts p r o p e r ty  into the name o f  a w if e ,  he  in te n d s  to make an advancem en t t o  
h e r"  ( a  q u o ta t io n  from  th e  judgm en t o f  L # E v ersh ed ,M .R. i n  S i l v e r  v .  8 . [ 1 9 5 8 ]  1 A ll  E .R .5 2 3  ,  a t  p .5 2 5 ,  n o te d  toy C re tn e y )  has l e s s e n e d  greatly* See e . g .  Boydell v* G i l l e s p i e  (1970) 216 E.G.1505 (conveyance o f  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  husband  and w ife  i n  joint nam es: 
s u b s e q u e n t a s s i g n a t i o n  by h usband  of all his p r o p e r ty  to t r u s t e e s ,  who t h e r e a f t e r  s u c c e s s f u l l y  claimed a one half s h a r e  of the s a l e  p r i c e  of the p r o p e r t i e s ,  t h e  e x p re s s  te rm s  o f  the conveyance  h a v in g  excluded any r e s u l t i n g  t r u s t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  w i f e ) .
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a c c o u n t ,  was n o t  r e b u t t e d  by th e  f a c t s .  T h e re , 
M egarry  J .  a p p e a rs  t o  c o n s id e r  t h a t  th e  p re s u m p tio n  
o f  advancem ent d oes a p p ly  t o  a  j o i n t  bank a c c o u n t ,  
th o u g h  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  may 
r e n d e r  i t  i n a p p l i c a b l e .  Much i s  made o f  t h e  q u e s t io n  
w h e th e r  th e  w ife  knew o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f ,  and i n  
f a c t  o p e ra te d  r e g u l a r l y ,  t h e  a c c o u n t .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o n v e n ie n c e  m ig h t be  one f a c t o r  w hich  
p rom p ted  th e  husband  t o  open a  j o i n t  a c c o u n t ,  " . . . d o e s  
n o t  mean th e  husband  had  no th o u g h t  o f  th e  a c c o u n t 
fo rm in g  a  p r o v i s io n  f o r  h i s  w ife  i f  he w ere  t o  be 
k ille d " * "  ( i n  W orld War I ) . M oreover, even  a n  a c c o u n t 
opened  i n i t i a l l y  f o r  c o n v e n ie n c e , c o u ld  change  i t s  
c h a r a c t e r  o v e r  th e  y e a r s .  I n  th e  r e s u l t ,  t h e  b a la n c e  
i n  th e  a c c o u n t was h e ld  t o  f a l l  i n t o  th e  w i f e 's  e s t a t e  
( f o r  h e r  d e a th  fo llo w e d  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  w i t h in ,  on th e  
m ethod o f  c o m p u ta tio n  a d o p te d  -  w h ich  i s  a n o th e r  f a c e t  
o f  th e  c a s e  -  t h r e e  m o n th s ) .
Such c a s e s  a s  t h e s e  r e v e a l  th e  e x te n t  t o  w h ich ,2e s p e c i a l l y  i n  E n g lan d  , r e l i a n c e  i s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t ,  was 
p la c e d  upon  i n t e n t i o n  i n  m a t te r s  o f  m a tr im o n ia l  
p r o p e r t y ,  and th e  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and  p o s s ib ly  th e  
i n j u s t i c e ,  b re d  th e r e b y .
The A ct o f  1881 , h o w ev er, d oes n o t  demand t h a t  
j o i n t  p r o p e r ty  be c o n s t i t u t e d ,  b u t  m e re ly  t h a t  th e  
w i f e 's  money o r  o th e r  e s t a t e  be l e n t  o r  e n t r u s t e d  to  
th e  h u sb a n d , o r  immixed w ith  h i s  f u n d s ,  b e f o r e  h e r  
r a n k in g  t h e r e f o r  be p o s tp o n e d .
%I n  A nderson  v .  A n d e rs o n 's  T rustee*^, w here 
f u r n i t u r e ,  o r i g i n a l l y  b e lo n g in g  t o  th e  h u sb a n d , was 
s o l d  t o  h i s  w ife  a  few  m onths b e fo r e  h i s  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
i n  /
1♦ a t  p . 1 4 5 .
2 .  See C h a p te r  6 ,  (E n g la n d ) and ch ap ter  7 , 
(v ie w s  o f  P r o f e s s o r  O tto  K ahn-Freund  ).3 .  ( 1 8 9 2 )  19 R .6 8 4 .
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in repayment of certain sums lent by h e r  to him (for 
which in his sequestration, therefore, she could have 
ranked only as a postponed creditor), and was retained 
in the house and used by the spouses as before, it was 
held that the trustee was entitled thereto, on the 
ground that, even assuming the transaction to be bona 
fide"* (about which there was doubt), it had been 
"intrusted" to the husband in the sense of the Act.pLord Young gives his view of the meaning of "entrusting 
to the husband" as being to permit him to fulfil his 
duty of providing for his wife and family a furnished 
home. Here, therefore, that masculine duty and 
feminine privilege would work rather to the 
disadvantage of the female; however, it seems that 
the provision for himself of a furnished home was a 
factor which did not escape the notice of the VLremainder of t h e  bench, and, as C liv e  and Wilson note , 
Lord Young also appears to have considered that there 
had b e en  no "honest lawful sale to the wife^.»
5Whether or not this case be taken to suggest that 
it is not impossible for a wife to 'entrust* furniture 
or other moveables t o  her husband in the sense of the 
Act of 1881, perhaps the practical conclusion to be 
drawn is that joint use thereof in the matrimonial 
home /
1. that is, that the narrative on whloh it was based was true: general "straightening-out"and disentanglement of property when sequestration threatens, appears (supra, pp. 155-158) to be permissible, (while gratuitous alienations and fraudulent preferences (q.v.infra), o f  course, are not).2. at p.687*3. p.338.4. at p.687.5. see Clive and Wilson, p.338, where t h e  case is studied closely and thought to turn on "the lack of bona fides in the transaction".
1 7 9 .
1home does not nooessarily am ount to " e n t r u s t i n g  " ,  and 
t h a t  I f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  eao h  oan  be  I d e n t i f i e d ,  I t  
G hould b e  s e p a r a te d  on  t h e  e e q u e a t r a t l o n  o f  o n e . I t  
l a  su g g e s te d *  I t  i s  hoped  n o t  o v e r - o p t l m l s t i o a l l y ,  
that to add t o  t h e  p ro b lem s o f  p r o o f  the disadvantages 
( t o  th e  w i f e ,  at l e a s t )  o f  th e  1881 Act - except 
p o s s ib l y  i n  a  o a se  w here  t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  s u g g e s t  
a n  " e n t r u s t i n g "  o y e r  and  above  t h a t  o f  j o i n t  u s e  ( f o r  
t h e  c a s e  a g a i n s t  t h e  A c t 's  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  m o v eab les  i s  
p e rh a p s  n o t  f u l l y  made o u t )  -  i s  n o t  s e n s ib le *  d e s i r a b l e ,  
o r  warranted.
%hej%ig5_a§_g«L9E§i5SEZ_SSeditor2
A c c o rd in g  /
1. Adam, m#r#s wardhaugh p.73 ( r e p e a te d  at p . 7 9 ) ;  s e e  a l s o  lnfr^ ,i>. I 84 ,  f o o tn o te  1 « Re the p o s i t i o n  b e fo r e  
1881, aHÎ“*aubsequottt t o  i t  (re^inforead by  a.1 ( 3 ) )  w h e re v e r  a.1(4) can  be  said t o  h ave  no application, 
s e e  F r . I *  7 9 0 , and  I I ,  1317* th e  l a t t e r  b e in g  q u o te d  in Mam by the S h e r i f f  ^ S u b s t i t u t e  * and  drawn on by 
h im ^T nT support o f  h i s  v iew  that, t h e  wife's f u r n i t u r e ,  th o u g h  i n  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  h o u se  a lo n g  w i th  h i s  f u r n i t u r e ,  b e in g ,  i n  h i s  o p in io n ,  n o t  lent or e n t r u s t e d  to him n o r  "im m ixed w ith  h i s  fu n d s"  i n  te rm s  o f  s . 1(4), t h e  p r o p e r ty  was t h e r e f o r e  her own* (a n d  s e e  also p e ri .V o u n g  at pp.6 7 8 - 9 ) "The In v e s tm e n ts  i n  w hich  the w if e  may p u t  h e r  e a rn in g s *  may be f u r n i t u r e  o r  any  o t h e r  c o rp o ra  m o b i l i a , a s  w e l l  as stocks o r  h e r i t a g e ;  an d  th u s*  a l th o u g h  t h e  two sp o u s e s  be  l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  w hole  o f  t h e  p l e n i s h in g s  -  a p p a r e n t ly  h i s  -  maybe th e  w i f e 's  p r o p e r t y ,  and cannot b e  ta k e n  by th e  
h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s . "  ( 1 3 1 7 ) -T h a t s e n te n c e  i s  c o n ta in e d  i n  t h e  S u p p lem en t ( I )  t o  t h e  w ork (1876  e d . ) ,  c o n c e rn in g  th e  M .w .P .(S G .) A c t, 1 8 7 7 . Fraser notes t h e  absence i n  th e  Scottish Act o f  a  s a v in g  p r o v i s i o n ,  su c h  a s  was c o n ta in e d  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  M .W .P.Act* 1870 , t o  f r u s t r a t e  fraudulent schemes t o  p la c e  the husband's money i n  t h e  wife's 
name t o  d e f e a t  c r e d i t o r s '  c la im s ,  b u t  rem arks*  " I t  i s  th o u g h t  that t h i s  law  would be fo l lo w e d  i n  S c o t la n d ,  a l t l i o u ^  t t i e r e  i s  no su c h  e x p re s s  p r o v i s io n  i n  t h e  
S c o t t i s h  S t a t u t e . "2. that i s *  in a d d i t i o n  to h e r  c la im *  a l r e a d y  n o te d ,  f o r  t h e  a l im e n t  o f  h e r  i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  u n t i l  t h e  l a t t e r  a t t a i n s  th e  a g e  o f  t h i r t e e n  -  su p ra *  p . 152 , W alker* P r l n s . I I ,  2 0 7 3 . G e n e r a l ly ,  f o r  a l im e n t ,  o t h e r  /
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1A eo o rd ln g  t o  W ardhaugh , I f  " th e  b a n k ru p t  h a s  
s o ld  c o r p o r e a l  m oveab les b e lo n g in g  t o  th e  w ife  a s  
s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  sh e  l a  e n t i t l e d  t o  ra n k  f o r  t h e  
p r i c e  a lo n g  w i th  h i s  o t h e r  c r e d i to r s ^ # "  F u r t h e r ,  
i f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  s t o o k - l n - t r a d e  h a s  b e e n  en h an ced  
I n  v a lu e  by  h e r  e x e r t i o n s ^ ,  sh e  c a n  c la im  on  h la  
a e q u e a t r a t e d  e s t a t e  f o r  t h e  am ount o f  auoh 
enhancem en t (w h ich  i t  m ig h t be  th o u g h t  may be  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  v a l u e ) ,  i n  company w i th  h e r  hum band 'e  o t h e r  
créditera^#
On /
O th e r  th a n  f o r  a r r e a r s  u n d e r  d e c r e e ,  t h e  w ife  i s  p o s tp o n e d  -  C l iv e  & W ilso n , pp#339-^340, i p f ^ a .  p p . 
2 2 0 -2 2 4 * For l e g a l  and  p r i o r  r i g h t s ,  tHelHfe o r  h u sb an d  " ra n k s "  on  th e  n e t  e s t a t e  -  s e e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  h e r  h y b r id  p o s i t i o n ,  n o t  q u i t e  c r e d i t o r  and  n o t  
q u i t e  h e i r ,  C h a p te r  3 ( 2 ) .1. p*75. See a l s o  C l iv e  end W ilso n , p.340, footnote 87#2 .  c i t i n g  M ontgom ery v .  H a r t  (1843 ) 7  D .1 0 8 1 .3# a s ,  f o r  ex am p le , i f  sh e  i s  a c t i n g  a s  h i s  c a s h i e r ,  
s e o r e t a i y ,  o r  shop  a s s i s t a n t ?4 .  W ardhaugh i b i d .  c i t e s  L .S hand  i n  F e r g u s o n 's  T rs#  v ,  W i l l i s ,  H e T s o n a  C o. (1 8 8 3 ) 11 R .261 a t  p .2 7 2 ,  w here  h e  s a i d  a "The c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  w ife  w i l l  h ave  a  c la im  a g a i n s t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e  i f  th e y  c a n  shew t h a t  th e  s to c k  i n  t r a d e  has b een  en h an ced  by th e  w i f e ' s  e x e r t io n s  and  t h a t  t h e  hu sb an d  h a s  b e e n  b e n e f i t e d  by  th e  acquisition of stock from  tim e  to t im e  w h ich  was a c q u i r e d  f o r  him an d  became h i s  p r o p e r t y " .  The c a s e  was c o n c e rn e d , i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  h o w ev er, w i th  t h e  1877 A c t, s . 3  (earnings) ( a u t h o r i t y  
d i s c u s s e d  g e n e r a l l y ,  C h a p te r  1 ) ,_ ^  and  th es e n te n c e  u n d e r  d i s c u s s io n  i s  an  e l a b o r a t i o n  upon  L .S h a n d 's  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  (p re su m a b ly  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  
p re -1 8 8 1  m a r r ia g e s  g e n e r a l l y ) ,  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  o f  a  businessw om an  s h o u ld  n o t  assum e t h a t  t h e  s to c k  i n  t r a d e  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  e a r n in g s  w ere  h e r s .  T h u s, h e  s a y s ,  so  t o  a c t  "w ould e x c lu d e  th e  v iew  t h a t  th e  w ife  o f t e n  acta a s  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  a g e n t  i n  c a r r y in g  on a  b u s in e s s " ,  and  t h i s  i s  t h e  c o n te x t  i n  w h ich  th e  
s e n te n c e  above q u o te d  was u t t e r e d .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  t h e  o p in io n  i s  p h ra s e d  in te rm s  w h ich  s u g g e s t  a g e n e r a l  r u l e  and  i t  may be t l m t ,  th o u g h  th e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  law  w hich  p rom p ted  i t s  e x p r e s s io n  h a s  lo n g  s i n c e  c h a n g e d , t h a t  p r i n c i p l e  r e m a in s ,  how ever i n f r e q u e n t l y  c a l l e d  upon  o r  g lim psed*
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1On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , W&rdhaugh n o te s  t h a t  s a v in g #  
made by  a  w ife  from  th e  " h o u se k e e p in g "  money p ro v id e d  
by h e r  h u sb an d  w ere  r e g a rd e d  ( fo rm e r ly ^ )  a s  b e lo n g in g  
t o  t h e  h u sb an d  (a n d  hen o e  h i s  o r e d l t o r s )  a s  t o o .  I n  
t h e  a b se n c e  o f  an y  o t h e r  a g re e m e n t, w ere  s a v in g s  made 
from  h o u se k e e p in g  c o n t r l b u t l o n a  made by  c h i l d r e n  
l i v i n g  a t  hom e^. Now t h a t  su c h  s a v in g s  a r e  ta k e n  t o  
b e  t h e  j o i n t  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s ,  may th e  h u s b a n d 's  
t r u s t e e  a t t a c h  them  a s  b e in g  " w i f e 's  money Immixed 
w i th  h u s b a n d 's " ,  f o r  w hich  sh e  w i l l  h av e  m e re ly  a  
p o s tp o n e d  ra n k in g ?  The A c t i n  te rm s^  sp e a k s  o f  th e  
money o r  t h e  p r o p e r ty  r e p r e s e n t i n g  i t ,  a s  b e lo n g in g  
t o  t h e  h u sb an d  and  w ife  i n  e q u a l  s h a r e s  " I n  t h e  
a b se n c e  o f  a g re em e n t t o  th e  o o n t r a r y :  p e rh a p s  w here  
t W  p r o p e r ty  o f  e a c h  i s  r e a d i l y  a s c e r t a i n a b l e ,  and  
d i v i s i o n  e a s i l y  m ade, t h e  " im m ix tu re "  r u l e  -  w h ic h , 
o f  c o u r s e ,  I s  m n e g a t io n  o f  t h e  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  t h a t  
w e l l '- i n t e n t lo n e d  b u t  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  and  s h o r t - s i g h t e d  
A c t o f  1964 -  w ould  n o t  a p p ly *
A lso  i n  W ardhaugh 'a  Mammal i s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f' Kc r e d i t o r s '  s e c u r i t i e s  and  p r e f e r e n c e s '^ ,  i n  w h ic h , 
s p e a k in g  o f  t h e  l a n d l o r d 's  h y p o th e c ^  f o r  r e n t  o v e r  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  and  u rb a n  s u b j e c t s ,  t h e  a u th o r  s a y s ^  
t l i a t  t h a t  h y p o th e c  r e l a t i n g  t o  u rb a n  s u b j e c t s  and  
c o v e r in g  i n v e c ta  a t  i l l a l ; a  w i l l  convey  g e n e r a l l y  
" th e  f u r n i t u r e  an d  p l e n i s h i n g  o r  s t o c k - i n - t r a d e  w hich  
t o  a l l  a p p e a ra n c e  i s  t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  t e n a n t  
(H u n te r  on  W n d lo rd  and  T e n a n t,  v o l . i i ,  p * 3 7 4 ) , Bin c lu d in g  p r o p e r ty  u n d e r  c o n t r a c t  o f  h i r e - p u r c h a s e  
toy /
1 .  p . 7 5 .2 .  b e f o r e  th e  M.Vi.P.Aot» 1964 » q .v .C h a p te r  1 ,  p p .1 1 3 -1 1 4 .3 .  S m ith  V .  S . 1933 S .C .7 0 1 ,4 .  8 .1 .
5» p . 77 e t  a e q .6 .  (b e in g  a  r i g h t  .in s a o u r l t y  w i th o u t  n eed  o f  p o s s e s s io n )  See g e n e r a l l y .  W a lk e r, P r i a s . XI 1 5 9 3 -1 6 0 1 .
7 .  p .7 9 .8 .  o f .  now Consum er C r e d i t  A c t, 1974 , s . 1 0 4 .
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by  th e  b a n k ru p t  # .* "#
Thus* t h e r e  a r l e e #  a n  i n t r i g u i n g  G itu a t io n #  
A c co rd in g  t o  th e  1881 A o t, @ #1(3), th e  w ife * #  
m oveab le  e s t a t e  l a  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  d i l i g e n c e  f o r  
t h e  d e b ts  o f  t h e  husband#  Thus i f  i t  i e  c l e a r  
(fro m  w h a te v e r  source@ 8 * 1 (3 ) makes am e x c e p t io n  
t o  t h e  " t i t l e  i n  name of the w ife  o r  i n  such terms 
a s  shoif i t  c l e a r l y  t o  be  h e r  p r o p e r ty "  r u l e  f o r  
such c o r p o r e a l  m oveab les as are u s u a l ly  p o s s e s s e d  
w i th o u t  a  wi*itt@n o r  d o cu m en ta ry  t i t l e )  t h a t  th e  
f u r n i t u r e  i n  th e  b a n k r u p t 's  h o u se  is t h e  w i f e ' s ,  
h i s  ( g e n e r a l )  c r e d i t o r s  c a n n o t a t t a c h  i t  ( a  r u l e  
e n a b l in g  many & d o o r  t o  b e  s h u t  a g a i n s t  many a  
S h e r i f f  O f f ic e r *  a n d  one t e n d in g  t o  c o n firm  t h a t  
e i t h e r  b e c a u se  j o i n t  u s e  d o e s  n o t  am ount t o  
' e n t r u s t i n g ' , o r  t h a t  s#1(4) of t h e  1881 A ct d o e s  
n o t  a p p ly  t o  f u r n i t u r e  % t h e  w i f e 's  lE U m itu re  i n  
h e r  h u s b a n d 's  h o u se  o r  i n  t h e i r  jolmtly-ownod h o u se  
i s  s a f e  from  h i s  g e n e r a l  c r e d i t o r s ) #  b u t  t h e r e  
a p p e a rs  t o  be  one  p r i v i l e g e d  c r e d i to r #  who l a  t h e  
l a n d lo r d  o f  th e  b a n ltru p t sp o u se#  b e c a u se  t h a t  
f u r n i t u r e #  i f  a p p e a r in g  t o  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  b a n k ru p t 
te n a n t#  w i l l  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  l a n d l o r d 's  h y p o th ec#  
I t  h a s  b e e n  s e e n  th a t#  i n  o u r  law# a  r i g h t  o f  
p r o p e r ty  c a n n o t a r i s e  -  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  
c o n te x t  -  from  p o s s e s s io n #  b u t  i t  i s  o b v io u s  t h a t  
e v en  s h a re d  p o s s e s s io n  c a n  e a s i l y  g iv e  a n  im p resG io n  
o f  o w n e rsh ip  (an d  r a i s e  i n  t h e  p o s s e s s o r ^  p e rh a p s  
e v e n  a  b e l i e f  o f  o w n e rsh ip )  and  now here m ore so  th a n  
i n  /
1# S ee  C l iv e  and  W ilson# p*338# and  d is c u s s io n #
2), c o n fu s io n  i n  th e  m inds o f  many a s  t ot h e i r  r i g h t s  i n  " m a tr im o n ia l"  p r o p e r ty #  ( P r o f e s s o r  O tto  Ka^m -Freund* C h a p te rs  6 and 7 )#  i f  su c h  a  #@nu^ o f  p r o p e r ty  in d e e d  e x i s t s  -  i n  o u r  p r e s e n t  system # i t  i s  a  m is le a d in g  m isnom er#
183,
i n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home #
1W erdhaugh e t a t e s  t h a t  I f  f u r n i t u r e  w h ich  th e  
w if e  c a n  p ro v e  t o  b e  h e r  own. i s  s o ld  by  t h e  l a n d l o r d ,  
and  sh e  h a s  r e c e iv e d  an  a s s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a n d l o r d 's  
r i g h t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  b a n k r u p t ,  t h e n  " sh e  w i l l  b e  
e n t i t l e d  t o  a  p r e f e r e n o e  i n  r e a p e o t  t h e r e o f  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  any  f u r n i t u r e  b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  b a n k ru p t  
s u b j e c t  t o  th e  h y p o th e c  w h ich  h a s  n o t  b e e n  s o ld  by 
t h e  l a n d l o r d  o r ,  i f  s o l d ,  o f  any  p a r t  o f  th e  p ro c e e d e  
o f  eu ch  re m a in in g  a f t e r  a a t i a f a o t i o n  o f  t h e  r e n t  
o e o u re d , and  t o  a n  o r d in a r y  r a n k in g  f o r  an y  b a la n c e  
o f  h e r  c la im " *  I t  c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  l a n d l o r d 's  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i s  re m a rk a b ly  s t r o n g  v i s - à - v i s  
o t h e r  c r e d i t o r s ,  an d  v i s - à - v i s  t h e  w i f e ,  w ho, i t  
w ould  a p p e a r ,  m ust a c t  q u ic k ly  and  arm  h e r s e l f  w i th  
p r o o f  o f  h e r  o iv n ersh ip  o f  t h e  p r o p e r ty  c a r r i e d  o f f ,  
o r  a tte m i^ te d  t o  be  c a r r i e d  o f f ,  by  th e  la n d lo r d #  
P re su m a b ly  sh e  may s to p  a  s a l e  o f  h e r  own p r o p e r ty  
on  p r o d u c t io n  o f  p r o o f  o f  o ^ m ersh ip  a t  an y  p o i n t  
b e f o r e  s a l e ;  t h e r e a f t e r ,  i t  seem s h e r  c la im  i s ,  qu a  
c r e d i t o r ,  and  n o t  qua  o im e r , t o  a  p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a n k in g  
w M oh h o w ev er, thouggi " p r e f e r e n t i a l " ,  i s  p o s tp o n e d  
t o  th e  l a n d l o r d 's  c lM m  f o r  r e n t#
W ard im ugh 's w o rd in g  i s  p e rh a p s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  c l e a r ;  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  a l l  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  ( o f  t h e  w if e )  h a s  
b e e n  s o ld  i n  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  l a n d l o r d 's  c la im ,  
i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  th e  w if e  r a n k s  a f t e r  t h e  l a n d l o r d ,  
f o r  t h e  s e n te n c e  seem s t o  b e a r  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  t h a t ,  
i f  t h e  w ho le  m ass o f  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  d id  n o t  n eed  t o  be  
s o ld  t o  m ee t t h e  d e b t ,  t h e  w ife  i s  e n t i t l e d ,  b e f o r e  
any  p e r s o n  ( o t h e r  th a n  t h e  l a n d lo r d  w hose c la im , 
hy p o t h e s i . h a s  b een  s a t i s f i e d )  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e  ( i f  t h e  l a n d l o r d 's  h y p o th e c  i s  
u t i l i s e d  /
1 ,  W ardhaugh, i b i d #
u t i l i s e d ,  i t  i s  p e rh a p s  a  r e a s o n a b le  a s su m p tio n  t h a t  
t h e  d e b to r  may h av e  o t l i e r  c r e d i t o r s  a l s o  a n d  in d e e d  
W ardhaug ii's  d i s c u s s io n  i s  o f  t l ie  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  v a r io u s  
c r e d i t o r s  o f  à  b a n k ru p t , and  i n  t h i s  c o n te x t  o f  th e  
l a n d l o r d ,  t h e  b a n k ru p t  and  t h e  b a n k r u p t 's  sp o u se )#  
t o  c la im  w hat i s  h e r  own# S i m i l a r l y ,  o u t  o f  th e  
b a la n c e  o f  t h e  p ro c e e d s#  i f  a l l  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  was 
s o ld  o r  i f  a  b a la n c e  rem a in e d  a f t e r  s a l e  o f  o n ly  
p a r t  th e r e o f #  a f t e r  paym ent o f  th e  r e n t#  s h e  i s  
e n t i t l e d  t o  a  f i r s t  ( o r  ' p r e f e r e n t i a l ' )  c la im #  b u t  
i f  t h e  fu n d s  a r e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m eet h e r  c la im  f o r  
t h e  v a lu e  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t s  so ld #  sh e  w i l l  r a n k  o n ly  
a s  a n  o r d in a r y  c r e d i t o r  (b u t#  a t  l e a s t *  i t  w ould  ap p ea r#  
n o t  a s  a  p o s tp o n e d  c r e d i t o r  u n d e r  th e  1881 A ct# f o r  
OE hVDothe s i .  sh e  h a s  p ro v e d  th e  f u r n i t u r e  t o  be  h e r  
ovm# an d  th e  a rg u m en t ad v an ced  e a r l i e r  w as t h a t  a  
f a i , r  d e g re e  o f  " e n t r u s t i h g ^ "  o f  f u r n i t u r e  v/ould be  
r e q u i r e d  /
1* T h is  s u g g e s te d  g u id e  may be o f  l i t t l e  u s e  i n
p r a c t i c e *  i t  seem s c l e a r  t h a t  j o i n t  u s e  d o es  n o t  am ount t o  " e n t r u s t i n g "  -  w hat more c o u ld  a  w ife  do t o  " e n t r u s t "  h e r  f u r n i t u r e  t o  h e r  husband?  P e rh a p s  i f  i t  c o u ld  be  p ro v e d  t h a t  sh e  h ad  g iv e n  him  o a^ t e  b la n c h e  t o  s e l l  o r  pawn i t #  sh e  m ig h t be  heldT Eb Emm e n t r u s t e d  i t  t o  him* (3ontr a * i n  t h a t  c a se *  sh e  m ig h t be  h e ld  t o  h av e  made % ^ o n a t io n  t o  him  o f  i t #  and  d o n a tio n s #  i n t e r  v iru m  e t  uxorem  a r e  now rendered Irrevocable by tEeTaohwl^ouee* (M,W*P.(8o#) A ct# 1920# 8 * 5 ) .  S im i la r ly #  i f  she  h ad  made su ch  a n  a g re e m e n t w i th  him  i n  o r d e r  (e v e n  Im p lie d ly )  t o  h e lp  him  m eet h o u se h o ld  ex p en ses#  sh e  h a s  no o la im  a t  a l l  a s  a  c r e d i to r #  (S ee  C l iv e  & W ilson# p*339)#  C e r ta in ly *  th o u g h , t h e  i s s u e  i s ,  a s  i t  w e re , " a t  one rem o v e" , when th e  s u b j e c t s  in v o lv e d  s i 's  c o r p o r e a l  m o v ea b le s , r a t h e r  th a n  money ("M o reo v er 
t h e r e  h a s  b een  h e ld  t o  be  a  p re s u m p tio n  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  u s e  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  fu n d s  ( a t  l e a s t  i f  th e y  a r e  o f  an  incom e n a tu r e )  h a s  b een  f o r  f a m ily  ex p en ses*  i f  t h e  w ife  a v e r s  t h a t  he  h a s  u se d  them  t o  s w e l l  h i s  own e s t a t e  t h e  b u rd e n  o f  p ro o f  i s  on h e r " .  C l iv e  & %'filson# i ^ d # ) #  b u t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  th e  same# WardhauÆ m akes no s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  8 * 1 (4 ) on h i s  s ta te m e n t  th a t#  f o r  t h e  b a la n c e ,  th e  
w if e  r a n k s  a s  a n  o r d in a r y  c r e d i t o r ,  b u t  t h e  n e x t  s e n te n c e  /
185,
required b e fo r e  th e  placing of her furniture in the 
m a tr im o n ia l  home brought 0*1(4) i n t o  operation if 
indeed it be accepted that 0*1(4) may a p p ly  to 
furniture) on the remainder of h e r  bankrupt (or# 
of course# possibly solvent) husband'a estate*
The fact of cohabitation in the (rented) 
m a tr im o n ia l  home# and the joint use of property 
which is separately owned# thus p la c e s  t h e  spouse 
of a tenant who l a  b a n k ru p t ,  veygena ad
or g e n e r a l ly  a reluctant payer# in a potentially 
d is a d v a n ta g e o u s  p o s i t i o n .  Would any p e rs o n  living 
with a debtor t e n a n t  and allowing him t o  give the 
appearance of owning what he do es not own# ru n  the 
same r l j  
c o v e r  /
1 pi s k  * ? The rule is that# "Hypothec d o es  not
s e n te n c e  o f  t h e  p a ra g ra p h  re a d s#  "The t r a n s f e r  o ffurniture belonging to th e  w ife  to a house.-occupied by h e r  and  h e r  husband does n o t  necessarily mean that it is " l e n t  o r  entrusted" in th e  s e n s e  o f  th e  M.W*P*Aat", w hich  from  i t s  position in t h e  m id s t  of h i s  discussion upon hy p o th ec#  m ust be his an sw e r to t h e  un sp o k en  query#See Bell v# Andrews (1885) 12 R.961# a c a s e  which c o n c e rn e d  th e  right ( o r  n o t#  a s  it was decided) of a landlord to attach by h i s  h y p o th e c  a p ia n o  belonging to th e  daughter o f  th e  d e f a u l t i n g  tenant* Leaving aside th e  q u e s t io n  o f  the nature of a p ia n o  a s  " f u r n i t u r e " # i t  i s  interesting that the judicial o p in io n  s t r e s s e d  that th e  piano could not be  kept by the m inor d a u g h te r  i n  any other place than in h e r  f a t h e r ' s  house# The same i s  true i n  t h e  case o f  a w ife  -  or# at l e a s t #  the o n ly  s e n s i b l e  place f o r  the k e e p in g  o f  h e r  f u r n i t u r e , is i n  th e  m a tr im o n ia l  home -  b u t  th e  marital r e l a t i o n s h i p  and f in a n c e s  may c lo u d  the i s s u e .  Here# the daughter h ad  r e c e iv e d  the p ia n o  a s  a gift from  her g randm other#  and  i t  was u n d e n ia b ly  h e r s .  S im i la r ly #  the p r o p e r ty  o f  a "stranger" may be d i s t in g u i s h e d  w ith  much g r e a t e r  ease from  the p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  t e n a n t  th a n  may the w i f e 's  p r o p e r ty .The L#P* ( I n g l i s )  a t  p.962# said "The law of h y p o th e c  p ro c e e d e d  upon the footing that m oveab les i n  th e  h o u se  of a tenant are p resu m ab ly  his p r o p e r t y .
A lth o u g h  the right o f  p r o p e r ty  i n  these may be in a n o th e r ,  t h e r e  are certain oases i n  which they w i l l  nevertheless /
1 8 6 .
c o v e r  /
n e v e r t h e l e s s  f a l l  u n d e r  th e  hypothec", (The exam ple h e re  g iv e n  i s  t h a t  o f  h i r e d  f u r n i t u r e ) # .*"But the ratio does n o t  always apply' t o  single articles# No case has yet been decided to t h e  effect t h a t  a single a r t i c l e  belonging to a t h i r d  party, and  n o t  h i r e d ,  falls u n d e r  th e  h y p o th e c " . Surely m ore th a n  one i te m ,  i f  timeously p ro v e d  n o t  to "Belong t o  th e  t e n a n t ,  would e sc a p e  th e  
h y p o th e c ?L ord  Mure at p#963 ascribed t h e  basis of th e  tacit h y p o th e c  claim ( a n  e x c e p tio n  t o  t h e  r u l e  
t h a t  "a  man c a n n o t  p le d g e  p r o p e r ty  w h ich  i s  n o t  hia own") as r e s t i n g  on "a  p re s u m p tio n  o f  the consent of th e  real Owner by th e  possession v o l u n t a r i l y  g iv e n ,  and th e  title of such possession as implying su c h  c o n s e n t"  ( b o th  quotations t a k e n  by him from  the judgm ent o f  L .M o n c r le f f  i n  Jaffray v* G a r r ic k  (1 8 3 6 ; 15 s . 4 5 ) ,  w hich  i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  ech o  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  r e p u te d  o w n e rsh ip .2. Sec "The Law o f  Landlord and Tenant in Scotland", G#C,H.Paton.î g e n e r a l ly  C h a p te r  " L a n d lo r d 'sEight, o f  H y p o th e c " , and  in particular, pp#202-206 t h e r e o f ,  ("T he  p r o p e r ty  of c h i l d r e n  o f  th e  t e n a n t ,  o f, h i s  guests, o f  M s  servants and o f  h i s  lodgers i s  excluded i n  accordance w ith  th e  g e n e r a l  rule*I n  any e v e n t ,  such p r o p e r ty  is n o t  n o rm a lly  part o f  t h e  o r d in a r y  p l e n i s h i n g ,  but comprises specific p e r s o n a l  i te m s "  (w M oh p e rh a p s  e x p la in s  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  above t o  a  " s i n g l e  article")*"If, of 
c o u r s e ,  f u r n i t u r e  m a t e r i a l l y  different and more various i s  b ro u g h t in by a lodger, it may be h e ld  t h a t  h e  i s  r e a l l y  a  s u b te n a n t"  ("T he  goods o f  a  s u b te n a n t  a r e  in c lu d e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  h i s  own r e n t  #*#"* f o o tn o te  47) "and i f  most or th e  m a jo r  part o f  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  i s  owned by a third p a r t y ,  su c h  a s  a lodger, th e n  th e  h y p o th ec  may apply t o  i t ,  if i t  is, f o r  ex am p le , given t o  th e  t e n a n t  t o  enable him t o  furnish a b o a rd in g  h o u s e , th o u g h  it w ould n o t  a p p ly  i f  th e  lo d g e r  h a s  ta k e n  th e  f u r n i t u r e  there for hia own c o n v e n ie n c e . A p a r t  from  such instances-, ho w ev er, the right o f  h y p o th e c  has b een  h e ld  t o  e x te n d  t o  p r o p e r ty  o f  which' th e  tenant i s  n o t  ow ner and  w hich  d o e s  not b e lo n g  t o  someone i n  th e  house, on  th e  th e o r y  o f  p resum ed c o n s e n t  o f  th e  owner, e v id e n c e d  by  h ia  giving p o s s e s s io n  t o  t h e  t e n a n t ,  a th e o r y  w h ich  h a s  b een  a t t a c k e d  by Rankine a s  " u n s a t i s f a c to r y "  b u t  a s  one t o  be fo l lo w e d  " w ith o u t  too c lo s e  a scrutiny i n t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s . " " )  (T h e re  f o l lo w s  a d i s c u s s io n  o f  articles h i r e d ) «
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c o v e r  goods n o t  b e lo n g in g  t o  th e  t e n a n t ,  su c h  a s  
those of one of his family, o r  o f  m lo d g e r  ##* " ,  
which w ould include b o th  th e  w ife  and the lodger#
"The t r u e  o w n e r 's  rem edy i n  t h e s e  o a e e s  i s  t o  a p p e a r  
before t h e  Sheriff and claim to h av e  them  w ith d raw n  
from  th e  s e q u e s t r a t io n ^ # "  The w i f e 's  c la im  may be 
m ore d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h ,  how ever#
W here th e  s u b je o ts  l e t  come u n d e r  t lm  H o u s e le t t in g  
and  R a tin g  A oty 1911 , t h e  h y p o th e c  d o e s  n o t  o o v e r  
b e d d in g  m a t e r i a l ,  o r  t o o l s ,  u se d  by  th e  o o o u p ie r  o r  
an y  member o f  h i s  f a m ily  f o r  h i s  l i v e l i h o o d ,  o r  
f u r n i t u r e  and  p l e n i s h in g  t o  t h e  v a lu e  o f  ^10  s e l e c t e d  
by  t h e  o o o u p ie r^ #
The m odem  s i t u a t i o n  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e , t h a t  "Property 
g e n u in e ly  b e lo n g in g  t o  th e  b a n k r u p t 's  sp o u se  I s  n o t  
a f f e c t e d  by  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t io n ^ # "  D o n a tio n s  i n t e r  
v iru m  et uxorem  a r e  r e v o c a b le  by th e  d o n o r 's  c r e d i t o r s  
i f  made w i th in  a  y e a r  and  a day  o f  t h e  d o n o r 's  
s e q u e s tra t io n " '^ ,  an d  p o l i c i e s  o f  l i f e  a s s u ra n o e  ta k e n  
o u t  by a  husb an d  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w i f e  and  
f a m ily  a r e  o u tw lth  the grasp of t h e  h u s b a n d 's  t r u s t e e ,  
u n l e s s  th e y  w ere  made w i t h in  two y e a r s  o f  th e  
b a n k ru p tc y  o f  th e  l i f e  a s s u r e d ,  o r  u n le s s  the policy 
w as e f f e c t e d  with I n t e n t  t o  d e f ra u d  c r e d i t o r s ^ ,  in 
w h ich  c a s e  t h e  o r e d i t c r s  may se e k  rep ay m en t o f  t h e  
prem ium s /
1# W a lk e r , P r l n s . I I ,  1594#2# i b i d # 1425#ipK d# A s i m i l a r  p r o h i b i t i o n  a p p e a rs  t o  e x i s t  g e n e r a l l y  a t  common law i n  r e s p e c t  of th e  tenant's m oney, c l o t h e s ,  and t o o l s ,  -  1425 ,
4# W alk e r« B r i n s * 'I I ,  2073#5# M#W.#F#(Sc#)Aott 1920, 8# 5 (b )#  q*v# C h a p te r  1, p ,1 1 0 *  See g e n e r a l l y  G liv e  & W ilso n , p p # 3 3 2 -5 3 7 , 
6 ,  M a rr ie d  Women's P o l i c i e s  o f  A ssu ra n ce  (8 c # )  A c t ,  1880# q ,v #  Chapter 1, pp,95-97; and  s e e  P r o f e s s o r  W a lk e r 's  e x a m p le s , I I ,  2 0 7 3 , f o o tn o te  4#
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prem ium s p a id *  from  the trustee o f  the policy, out 
o f  t h e  p ro c e e d s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y ,  f o r  th e  s & tih f& c tio n  
o f  t h e i r  c la im s .
1Goudy comments i n  t h e  f o l lo w in g  te r m s * - "Though 
t h e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r ty  l a  th u s  p r o t e c t e d , "  (b y  t h e  M.W.P# 
(Se#) A c t, 1881) " h e r  m oveab le  estate w i l l  he  l i a b l e  
to he t a k e n  by t h e  husband'a t r u s t e e ,  If it be n o t  
invested, p la c e d ,  o r  s e c u re d  i n  the w i f e 's  own nam e, 
o r  I n  su c h  te rm s  a s  s h a l l  c l e a r l y  d i a t i n g u i s h  i t  from  
t h e  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e ,  e x c e p t  I n  th e  c a s e  o f  much 
c o r p o r e a l  m oveab les am a r e  u s u a l ly  p o s s e s s e d  w i th o u t  
a w r i t t e n  o r  do cu m en ta ry  t i t l e . "  (a.1(3))# "T h is  
p r o v i s io n  I s  in te n d e d  t o  p r e v e n t  f i c t i t i o u s  claims 
by a  w ife  upon  p r o p e r ty  w h ich  t r u l y  b e lo n g s  t o  th e  
h u sb a n d , so  a s  t o  d e f r a u d  his c r e d i t o r s .  And any 
money o r  o th e r  e s t a t e  l e n t ^  by t h e  w ife  t o  th e  
h u sb an d  o r  Immlxed w ith  h i s  fU nds w i l l  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  
h i s  upon  h i s  b a n k ru p tc y , u n d e r  r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  th e  
w i f e 's  c la im  f o r  th e  v a lu e  t h e r e o f  a a  a  c r e d i t o r  
p o s tp o n e d  t o  h i s  o t h e r  c r e d i t o r s  f o r  v a lu a b le  
consideration i n  money o r  m o n ey 's  w o r th ."  (s.1(4))* 
"An a s s ig n e e  o f  t h e  w ife  h a s  no h ig h e r  r i g h t  th a n  
sh e  h e r s e l f ^ . "
J .  J .  Gow, i n  "The M e r c a n t i le  and  I n d u s t r i a l  Law 
o f  S c o t la n d ^ " ,  g iv e s  a  b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  g e n e r a l  
p o s i t i o n  /
1 .  p .2 8 8 #2 .  T hough, I f  l e n t  on s e c u r i t y ,  t h e  w ife  I s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  -  C om m ercial Bank v .  W ilso n  1909* 1 8 .L .T .  273$3 .  F o r  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  Goudy c i t e s  th e  c a s e  o f  C o ch ran e  v .  L a m e n t's  T r .  (1 8 9 1 ) 18 R . 4 5 1 , See a l s o  C l iv e  & W ilson* pp .338*339#4 .  (1 9 6 4 ) C h a p te r  12 (Law o f  B a n k ru p tc y ) p * 6 l6  ^  s e c .
S ee  a l s o  Goudy* 'T h e  Law o f  B a n k ru p tc y ',  I n t r o d u c t io n  
( p p .1 -1 1 )#
1 8 9 ,
p o s i t i o n  a t  common la w , o f  a  b a n k ru p t#  As l a  w e l l  
known, t h e r e  waa t h e n ,  and  p ro b a b ly  alvm ya m ia t  b e ,  
tW u g h  now adays t o  à  much m ore r e s t r i c t e d  and  r e g u la te d  
e x t e n t ,  a n  u n d ig n i f i e d  r a c e  o f  d i l ig e n c e #  -  a  
" s c ra m b le "  f o r  auoh fü t:da  a s  th e  d e b to r  p o s a e a a e d .  I n  
e a r l i e r  d a y s ,  t o o ,  t h e r e  e x i s t e d  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  
p e r p e tu a l  im p riao n m en t o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t ,  a  f a c t o r  w h ich  
m ig h t w e l l  lo a d  h im , by  mean# o f  a  c e a a io  bpnorum . 
t o  c ed e  h i a  a f f e c t a  t o  h i a  c r e d i t o r # ,  and  i n  t h i a  
way p r o t e c t  h i a  p h y s i c a l  freed o m  b u t  a t  t h e  aame t im e  
f e t t e r  h i a  s p i r i t u a l  fre e d o m . In d e e d  ho m ig h t be  
' s e l l i n g  h ia  a o u l ' , f o r  th e  e x p e d ie n t  o f  t h e  ' g q a q iq ' 
d i d  n o t  a f f o r d  him  h i e  d ie c h a r g e ,  an d  " l e f t  t h e  
d e b to r  d e s t i t u t e  w i th  l i t t l e  hope o f  e v e r  g e t t i n g  
once  m ore on t o  h ia  f i n a n c i a l  f e o t^  # " "Aa alwaysor e p r e a a io n  b e g a t  e v a s io n  *" D e b to rs  b eg an  t o  d is p o s e  
o f  t h e i r  a s s e t s  g r a t u i t o u s l y ,  o r  i n  t r u s t ,  t o  f r i e n d s  
a n d  r e l a t i v e s *  M o reo v er, th e y  m ig h t g iv e  a  f r a u d u le n t  
p r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  fa v o u re d  c r e d i t o r .  Among c r e d i t o r s ,  
a t  t h a t  d a t e ,  th e  r a c e  was to  th e  s w i f t e s t ,  w i th  few  
r u l e s  o r  h a n d ic a p s#  The common law  " d id  fro w n  upon
th e  e v a s io n s  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  and  f r a u d u l e n t%p r e f e r e n o e s  b u t ,  a p p a r e n t l y ,  n o t  s e v e r e ly  e n o u g h ^ ."
T h e r e f o r e ,  by t h e  A ct 1621 , o # 1 8 , an  a t t a c k  was 
made on  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  by i n s o l v e n t  d e b to r s  
t o  th o s e  n e a r  t o  them  i n  b lo o d  o r  f r i e n d s h i p ,  a n d , 
a f t e r  d i l i g e n c e  h ad  b een  s e t  i n  m o tio n  by  any  c r e d i t o r ,  
on  v o lu n ta r y  a l i e n a t i o n s  b y  t h e  d e b to r  t o  a n y o n e , b u t  
Gow s a y s  t h a t  t h i s  m easu re  d id  n o t  e l im in a te  f r a u d u l e n t  
p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  c r e d i t o r s ,  a n d , by th e  A ct 1 6 96 , c . 5 ,  
a l l  a l i e n a t i o n s  made by a  bankrup;^^ ,  w i th in
s i x t y  /
1# gow m #pi$,. P .616.2* Gow i b i d #
4# a e e u o w ,  pp#624-6291- W ardhaugh, p p * 6 -7 ; W alk e r, P r i n s .  I I  2048-2053#
190.
s i x t y  d a y s  p r i o r  t h e r e t o  o r  a t  any  t im e  t h e r e a f t e r ,  
w ere  deemed f r a u d u l e n t  and  t o  b e  o f  no e f f e c t #  He 
n o te s  t h a t  b o t h  A c t s  re m a in  I n  fo rc e #  Gow'a v i e w ,  
h o w ev er, i s  t h a t  t h e  common law  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  
o f  t h e  r a c e  o f  d i l i g e n c e s  -  n am ely , t h a t ,  " t h e  d e * 1 1  
to o k  t h e  h ln 'm o s t  * -  w a s  n o t  g r e a t l y  c h a n g e d  by t h e s e  
A c t s #
B y  t h e  A c t  1 2  G eo .5 , c * 7 2 ,  a n  a t t e m p t  w a s  m a d e  
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  r a c e ,  b u t  th e  c o n c e p t  t h e r e  In t ro d u c e d  
t o  t h i s  end  o f  co n v ey in g  th e  p r o p e r ty  t o  a n  in d e p e n d e n t 
I n te r m e d ia r y  ( f a c t o r  o r  t r u s t e e )  f o r  th e  r e c o v e r y  and 
m anagem ent and  t h e r e a f t e r  f o r  th e  e q u a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
t h e r e o f ,  b r o u g h t  i n  by t h e  A c t  l a s t - m e n t io n e d  i n  1 7  
t o  a p p l y  t o  t h e  m oveable e s t a t e  o f  t r a d i n g  d e b t o r s ,  
was n o t  a d o p te d  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m oveable  and 
h e r i t a b l e  e s t a t e s  o f  a l l  d e b to r s , " id ie th e r  a l i v e  o r“*"*** pd e a d , an d  w h e th e r  en g ag ed  i n  t r a d e  o r  n o t  " ,  u n t i l  
th e  B an k ru p tcy  A c t, 1856^#
Oow sa y s  t h a t  t h e  D e b to rs  (B o o tla n d )  A c t,  1880^ 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  ( t h a t  ■ i s ,  e x c e p t  f o r  non-paym en t o f  
a l im e n t  ,  and  g e n e r a l l y  f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  im p lem en t a  
d e c re e  ^  fac tu m  p ra e s ta n d u m ) a b o l i s h e d  im p riso n m e n t 
f o r  d e b t ,  a n d  th u s  " r e n d e re d  im p r a c t i c a l  th e  common law  
p r o c e s s  o f  'o e s s i o  bonorum *. b u t  c r e a t e d  a  s t a t u t o r y  
"c e s s i o * ."  w h ich  w a s  rem oved i n  1913 , by t h e  B an k ru p tcy  
( S c o t l a n d )  A ct o f  t h a t  y e a r ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  w hich  t h e r e  
was s u b s t i t u t e d  a  summary s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  th e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i n t r o d u c e d  by t h e  1 8 5 6  A c t.
P o t e n t i a l l y  u n f a i r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a r e  th o s e  w h e r e  
a  d e b to r ,  know ing h im s e l f  t o  be I n s o lv e n t^ ,  g iv e s  away 
fu n d s  /
1 #  Gow, p . 6 2 8 #2 ,  Oow, p .617#
3 .  19 and 20 V i e t .  o .7 9 .
4 #  4 3  and  4 4  V i o t .  c # 3 4 .5 .  S e e  C h a p te r  4 ,  p p .
S e e  G o w , p . 618 ; W a r d h a u g h ,  p # 1 ;  W a l k e r ,  P r l n s . I I ,  2 0 4 3 -2 0 4 8 .6#
1 9 1 .
fu n d s  w h ich  p r o p e r ly  o u g h t t o  be  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  
d i v i s i o n  among h i a  c r e d i to r s *  o r  f a v o u r s  o ne  c r e d i t o r  
a s  a g m ln a t a n o th e r#
A c h a l le n g e  on e i t h e r  head  may b e  made a t  common 
la w . p r o v id e d ,  i n t e r  a l i a #  t h a t  a t  th e  m a t e r i a l  t im e  
t h e  d e b to r  waa in e o lv e n t  # M oreover# u n d e r  t h e  A ct 
1621# 0 *1 8 ,  c h a l le n g e  may be  made o f  g r a t u i t o u s  
a l i e n a t i o n s  ( t h e  b u rd e n  o f  p r o o f  l y in g  on  t h e  c h a l l e n g e r  
b e in g  som ewhat l e s s  t M n  t h a t  im posed  a t  common law ^) 
an d  a l a o  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a l i e n a t i o n s  made a f t e r  t h e  
c h a l le n g in g  c r e d i t o r  h ad  commenced d i l i g e n c e  " o f  su ch  
a  k in d  t h a t  when c o m p le te d  i t  w ould a t t a c h  o r  b e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  a t t a c h  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  a l i e n a t i o n * "
Such a n  a l i e n a t i o n  w ould be v o id  a g a i n s t  su c h  a  c r e d i t o r ,  
Oow re m a rk s  how ever^  t h a t  "The p r a c t i c a l  u t i l i t y  o f  
t h i s  e n a c tm e n t h a s  b een  i n  s u b s ta n c e  d e s t r o y e d  by  t h e  
em ergence  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  n o to u r  b a n k ru p tc y  c o n s t i t u t e d  
by  in s o lv e n c y  c o u p le d  w i th  d i l i g e n c e " ,  R e fe re n o e  i s  
made t o  Gcudy^ w here  i t  i s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  ( s e c o n d )  
b ra n c h  o f  t h e  A ct o f  1621 was e n a c te d  when t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  b a n k ru p tc y  law  w ere  l i t t l e  u n d e rs to o d  end  t h a t  i t s  
e f f e c t  was " p r e j u d i c i a l #  r a t h e r  th a n  o th e rw is e #  t o  th e  
e q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b a n k ru p t  e s t a t e s #  I t  te n d e d  
t o  e n c o u ra g e  c o m p e t i t io n  o f  d i l i g e n c e s  among c r e d i t o r s  
b y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  r i g h t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  i n  su c h  a s  w ere  
f i r s t  i n  th e  ra c e *  Now# how ever# t h a t  t h e  e x p i r y  
o f  a  c h a rg e  -  c o n c u r r in g  w ith  in s o lv e n c y  -  c o n s t i t u t e s  
n o to u r  b a n k ru p tc y ^ #  i t  h a s  become o f  l i t t l e  p r a o t i o a l  
im p o rta n c e #  and  i t  i s  r a r e l y  now t h a t  a  c r e d i t o r  c a n  
/
1. Se® Gow, p p .6 1 8 -6 2 4 ; Goudy, C h a p te r s  I I I  -  V I | W a lk e r , Prlns.II. p p .2 0 4 4 -2 0 4 8 , 2 0 4 9 -2 0 5 3 ; \s’a,rdhav»gh (T a b le )  p p .1 - 5 ;  and  aae g e n e r a l l y .  B o l l ,  Goœms.II 1 3 4 -2 3 2 ,2 .  See i n f r a ,  j . i9 5 .
3 .  p .6 2 "C — "4 .  p . 9 7 .5 .  B a n k ru p tc y  ( s c , )  A c t , 1913» 8 ,5 »
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g a in  any  b e n e f i t  from  a  c h a l le n g e  u n d e r  i t s  p ro v ia lo n s^  
U nder t h e  A c t  1 6 9 6 *  c # 5 *  a s  w e l l  a s  a t  c o m m o n  l a w *  
c h a l le n g e  may b e  made o f  f r a u d u le n t  p r e f e r e n o e a ^ .
"The o h a l le n g e  e x te n d s  t o  a l i e n a t i o n s  o f  e v e ry  
k in d  o f  r i g h t  t h a t  c an  be  made a v a i l a b l e  i n  any  way 
by o r e d i t o r a ; ^ ; "
The o n u s *  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  " e i
 # i s
upon  him  who o h a lle n g e e *  The b u rd e n  o f  p r o o f  t o  be  
d i s c h a r g e d  a t  common law  i s  th r e e f o ld *  F i r s t #  t h a t%th e  a l i e n a t i o n  was non o n e ro u e  ; Second# t h a t  t h e
d e b to r  i a  i n s o l v e n t  and  w&e @o a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  a l i e n a t i o n ;  
a n d . T h ir d ,  t h a t  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  w a s  m a d e  t o  t h e  
p r e j u d i c e  o f  la w fu l  c r e d i t o r s * .
The d e b to r  b e in g  i n s o l v e n t ,  an im us f r a u d a n d i  i s  
n o t  n e c e s s a ry #  A p re s u m p tio n  o f  f r a u d ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  
o f  b re a c h  o f  t r u & t ,  l a  c r e a t e d  by th e  f o r c e  o f  th e  
common la w , w h ich  l a  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s e t  a s id e  t h e  
g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  w ith o u t  p r o o f  o f  a c t u a l  i n t e n t  
t o  d e f ra u d  on th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  d e b to r ^ ."
"The A ct" (1 6 2 1 , 0 .1 8 )  " d e c l a r e s  t h a t  a l l  
a l i e n a t i o n s  made by a  d e b to r  o f  any  o f  h i s  l a n d s  e t c # . , ,
'ia,.aa2.j2s«aHaoi™or-£Sî£M®a
. t e k - , a n d J i © o g a ^ L « ^ ^  and  w i th o u t  a  j u s t  p r i s e  
r e a l l y  p a y e d , th e  same b e in g  done a f t e r  th e  c o n t r a c t i n g  
o f  /
1 ,  B e e  W a r d h a u g h ,  T a b le ,  p p .4 - 5 ;  w ith  r e f e r e n c e  t o
G r a tu i to u s  A l i e n a t io n s  s e e  W ardhaugh T a b le ,  p p .2 -3»  I n  b o th  o a s e s ,  r e d u c t io n  u n d e r  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  A c t an d  a t  common law  i s  com pared and  c o n t r a s t e d .2* a o u d y , p # 2 3 .
3 *  T hus, "An a l i e n a t i o n  f o r  a d e q u a t e  money o r  m on ey 's  w o rth  i s  u n im p e a c h a b le " , ( s e e  Goudy, p . 25)4 ,  See G o w ,  p p . , 6 1 9 - 6 2 0  -  th e  t h r e e f o l d  b u rd e n  o f  p r o o f ,  5# G oudy, p*24* S ee  a l s o  Oow, p#620*6 ,  e m p h asis  added*
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o f  la w fu l  d e b ts  from  t r u e  c r e d i t o r s '  s h a l l  be  n u l l1when c h a l le n g e d  by  th e  c r e d i t o r s  I n ju r e d
I n t e n t  t o  d e f r a u d  may b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  by  w r i t
o r  o a th  o f  th e  r e c e i v e r  o f  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  t o  th e
e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e r e  was no o n e ro u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  
t h e  t r a n s f e r *  I n  sum, a t  common la w , t h e r e  m ust be
p r o o f  o f  n o n - o n e r o s l ty ,  o f  In s o lv e n c y  a t  t h e  d a te  o f
g r a n t in g  and  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  c h a l le n g e ,  a n d , I f  th e s e  
r e q u ir e m e n ts  a r e  m e t, f r a u d u le n t  i n t e n t  I s  presum ed*
u n d e r  s t a t u t e ,  i f  in s o lv e n c y  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  c h a l le n g e2b e  p ro v e d , a l l  o t h e r  n e c e s s a r y  p o i n t s  a r e  p re su m e d " . 
T h u s, th e  t a s k  o f  t h e  c h a l l e n g e r  i s  r a t h e r  e a s i e r  
u n d e r  s t a t u t e  th a n  u n d e r  common law* He m ust p ro v e  
t h a t  h e  h im s e l f  i s  a p r i o r  c r e d i t o r ,  t h a t  t h e  d e b to r  
a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  r a i s i n g  o f  th e  a c t i o n  was 
i n s o l v e n t ,  a n d  t h a t  th e  a l i e n a t i o n  was made t o  a  
c o n ju n c t  and  c o n f id e n t  p e rso n ^ #  I n  Gow'a d i s c u s s io n ^ ,  
h e  e x p la in s  t h a t  i f  t h e s e  t h r e e  p o i n t s  a r e  p ro v e d , 
t h e  f o l lo w in g  t h r e e  p o i n t s  -  n am ely , t h a t  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  
was made w ith o u t  t r u e ,  j u s t ,  an d  n e c e s s a r y  c a u s e ,  was 
made a t  a  t im e  when t h e  d e b to r  was i n s o l v e n t ,  and  was 
t o  t h e  p r e j u d i c e  o f  p r i o r  c r e d i t o r s  -  a r e  p resum ed  
( th o u g h  th e y  may be  r e b u t t e d  by  p r o o f  by t h e  d e b to r  
o f  h i a  s o lv e n c y  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  th e  a l i e n a t i o n  o r  o f  
t h e  t r u e ,  j u s t ,  and  n e c e s s a r y  o a u se  o f  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n ) ,  
a n d , w h i le  th e y  m ust b e  a v e r r e d ,  th e y  n e ed  n o t  
be  /
1* Goudy, p*43*
2# See W ardhaugh, T a b le ,  pp#2-3*3# C o n tra *  a t  common la w , any  p r i o r  o r  p o s t e r i o rc reS T E o r may c h a l le n g e ,iv h e re a s  u n d e r  t h e  A c t ,  o n ly  a  p r i o r  c r e d i t o r ,  o r  th e  t r u s t e e  i n  s e q u e s t r a t i o n ,  may c h a l le n g e ;  f u r t h e r  th e  A c t 's  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  a l i e n a t i o n  t o  'c o n ju n c t  and  c o n f id e n t  p e r s o n s ' ,  w h ile  a t  common law  a l i e n a t i o n s  t o  any  p e rs o n  o th e r  th a n  a  c r e d i t o r  may be a t t a c k e d ,
( W ardhaugh, p *3) #^4#.' pp*623-4*-:.
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1b e  p ro v e d  #
H ence , a l i e n a t i o n s  t o  " c o n ju n c t  and  c o n f id e n t  
p e rs o n s "  a r e  deemed w o rth y  o f  In a tm n t a u e p lc lo n *
Such p e rs o n a  a r e  t h o s e  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  b a n k ru p t  by 
t i e s  o f  b lo o d  o r  m a r r ia g e ,  ( c o n ju n c t  p e r s o n s ) , " o r  
I n  I n t im a te  f r i e n d s h i p  and  o o n f i d e n t i a l  oom m unloation  
w ith  t h e  b a n k ru p t"  ( o o n f ld e n t  p e r s o n s ) ,  Such "may 
b e  su p p o sed  t o  sy m p a th ise  %fith h i s  d i s t r e s s ,  and  t o  
be  i n c l i n e d  t o  a s s i s t  him  i n  h i s  sc h em e s;"  I n  th e  
body o f  t h e  A ct# t h e  w ords u se d  a r e  "an y  ccn iju n o t o r  
c o n f id e n t  p e rs o n "  and  i n  t h e  P ream b le  t h e s e  a r e  
d e t a i l e d  a s  "w ives*  c h i ld r e n *  k insm en and  a l l i e s *  
and  o t h e r  c o n f id e n t  and  in te r p o s e d  p e rs o n s ^ * "
"To s e c u r e  due i m p a r t i a l i t y  i n  a  w i tn e s s  and  i n  
a  ju d g e*  no one c an  b e  c a l l e d  upon  t o  a c t  i n  e i t h e r  
o f  t h e s e  c a p a c i t i e s  w here  h i s  n e a r  r e l a t i o n  I s  
c o n c e rn e d ;  and  a s  t h e  same a f f e c t i o n  w hich  i s  
p resum ed  t o  d ead en  th e  s e n s e  o f  j u s t i c e *  o r  l e a d  t o  
a  d e v ia t i o n  from  t r u th *  may b e  su p p o sed  c a p a b le  o f  
s e d u c in g  a  p e r s o n  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  d e v ic e s  f o r  s a v in g  
h i s  /
1# C l iv e  & W ilson* p ,3 3 0 *  n o te  how ever t h a t  " t h e r e  a r e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  ( f o r  exam ple* c a s h  p ay m en ts) w h ic h  a r e  n o t  c o v e re d  by  th e  te rm s  o f  t h e  A ct and  w h ich  m ust be  a t ta c k e d *  i f  a t  a l l ,  u n d e r  t h e  common la w " , (S ee  W alker* P r l n s . I I  2 0 4 5 -4 6 * ) N ote a l s o  C l iv e  & W ilson* p ,3 3 0 *  f o o tn o te  9 (d o u b t in g  w h e th e r  B e l l ' s  v iew  (a n d  a o u d y 's ) , t h a t  ev en  a t  common law  a  t r a n s a c t i o n  i n t e r  o o n ju n c to s  im p o r te d  a  p re s u m p tio n  o f  in so lv e n c y *  was a d e q u a te ly  s u b s t a n t i a t e d , )  ( " I n  a  c h a l le n g e  on  th e  common 
la w , in s o lv e n c y  (w h ich  i n  a  r e d u c t io n  u n d e r  th e  A c t i s  p resu m ed , and  m ust be  r e f u t e d  by  him  who s u p p o r t s  t h e  d e ed ) i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  by  p r o p e r  e v id e n c e #  B ut w here  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  b e tw ee n  th e  p a r t i e s  h a s  b e en  v e ry  c lo s e  and  i n t i m a t e ,  t h e  C o u rt h a s  r a i s e d  a  p re su m p tio n  t o  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th ro w in g  t h e  onus o ro b a n d i  o f  so lv e n c y  on th e  h o ld e r  o f  t h e  deed" %(!ômmtTÎÏTSZ?).2 .  B e l l ,  ConuB,II, 1 75 .
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h i s  friend, the C o u rt has in questions under this Act
a p p l i e d  the seme t e s t ^ ," Thus, in addition to those
p e rs o n a  a p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  P re a m b le , B e l l  l i s t s  b r o t h e r s ^ ,
s o n s - ln - l a w ^ ,  and  u n c le s ^ ,  and also step-sons'^  and
sisters or brothers-in-law^, Cousins w ere  a d o u b t f u l7case but uncle-in-law and nephew-in-law were held 
n o t  to be conjunct, "because uncle and nephew by 
affinity are not hindered to judge I n  one a n o t h e r 's  
cause by Act 13, Parliament 3, Charles
Goudy^ s t a t e s  t h a t  " I n te n d in g  sp o u s e s  e n te r in g  
I n t o  a  m a r r ia g e  o o n t r a o t  f a l l  w i th in  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  
d e f i n i t i o n ' ' °
C o n f id e n t  P e rs o n s
" I t  i s  n o t  e a s y  t o  d e f in e  w hat i n  law  i s  h e ld  a s  
a  c o n f id e n t  p e r s o n ,  n o r  l a  i t  s e t t l e d  by  any  e s t a b l i s h e d
test who a r e  In c lu d e d  u n d e r  this description. The
principle of t h e  r u l e  applies to e v e ry  situation of
i n t im a te  and confidential intercourse. I t  seem s to
com prehend p a r t n e r s  in trade, servants, factors,
confidential men of b u s in e s s ;  ,,,,To hold a p e rs o n  a s
oom prehended w i th in  t h e  d e s o r i p t i o n  o f  c o n f id e n t  i n
t h i s  Act of P a r l ia m e n t ,  has only t h e  e f f e c t  of throwingIPth e  onus p ro b a n d i on  th e  grantor ; and  no man ought 
to /
1 .  i b i d ,2 .  F in la w , 1 621 , M .895,3. G ibb V ,  L iv in g s to n  1766, M,909,4# T a p e r s i e 's  C re d s . 1 6 7 3 , M,900,
5 ,  Mercer v, D a lg a rn o  1695 , H,12563,6, Hume V ,  Smith 1673, M,899,7, L.Elifoank v, Adamson & C a l la n d e r  1812 , #,12569,8 ,  S i n c l a i r  v ,  D ick so n  1 6 7 9 , 1 6 80 , M.12562 .9# Whom s e e  also pp.45-46,10* McLay V* McQueen, (1899) I F , 804*11* See also generally C liv e  & Wilson, pp*330-331 w here i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  s e p a r a te d  sp o u s e s  w ould be 
c o n ju n c t  b u t  d iv o rc e d  sp o u se s  w ould n o t  be  c o n ju n c t  in te rm s  of t h e  Act*12# i n  e f f e c t  usually th e  grantee of t h e  a l i e n a t i o n ,  th e  h o ld e r  o f  t h e  d e e d , ( s e e  also p ,1 7 5 ,  l a s t  lino)*
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t o  a c c e p t  a  conveyance  w h ile  he s ta n d s  i n  a  c o n f i d e n t i a l  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  g r a n t e r ,  w i th o u t  b e in g  aw are  o f  th e  
j u s t i c e  an d  n e c e s s i t y  o f  p ro v in g  i t s  o n e ro u s  c a u se  
i f  c h a l le n g e d  by th e  g r a n t e r ' s  o r e d i to r G ^ i"
PW ardhaugh n o te s  t h a t  th e  c a s e  o f  in s u r e d  and
i n s u r e r  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  f a l l  i n t o  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  and%Goudy comments"^ t h a t  som etim es t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  
t h e  tw o c a t e g o r i e s  h a s  n o t  b e en  s t r i c t l y  a d h e re d  t o ,
"and  i t  h a s  b e en  th o u g h t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  h o ld  t h a t  th e  
g r a n te e  p a r to o k  o f  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  b o th .  Thus 
a  m an 's  pa ram o u r and b a s t a r d  c h i l d r e n  h av e  b e en  h e ld  
b o th  c o n ju n c t  and  c o n f id e n t  i n  relation to h im ^ ."
T h a t a param o u r s h o u ld  be regarded a s  c o n ju n c t  and 
c o n f id e n t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g .
The p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  f o r  th e  c r e d i t o r  f i r s t  
t o  p r o v e ,  i f  disputed, t h e  characteristic ( a s  c o n ju n c t  
a n d /o r  c o n f id e n t )  a v e r r e d ^ .  H aving  done s o ,  and  
h a v in g  shovm t h a t  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  to o k  p l a c e ,  t h a t  th e  
d e b to r  at the d a te  o f  the a c t i o n  was insolvent, and 
t h a t  h e  ( t h e  c r e d i t o r )  i s  a  p r i o r  c r e d i t o r ,  th e  
re m a in d e r  i s  p resu m ed , th o u g h  i t  may be  r e b u t t e d  by 
th e  d e fe n d e r  i n  th e  m anner d e s c r ib e d  by  Qow^*
yGow p o i n t s  o u t  th e  common law  d e f e c t  o f  th e  
heavy  /
1 .  B e l l ,  Comm. I I ,  1 7 5 .2. p.3, f n . 6 . ,  citing Todd v. Anglian I n s u r a n c e  Co. 1933 G .L .T . 274 (n o  c o n ju n c t  o r  c o n f i d e n t i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw een  i n s u r e r  and i n s u r e d ) .3 .  p # 4 6 .4. citing BalXantyn© v, D unlop F e b .1 7 , 1814 F.G.; c i t i n g  a l s o  C a rp h in  v .  C la p p e r to n  (1 8 6 7 ) 5 Maoph. 7 9 7 , w ith  r e g a r d  t o  f i a n c é  and  f i a n c é e .5 .  "The p r o o f  o f  t h i s  c o n f i d e n t i a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  o r  o f  a r e l a t i o n  o f  k in d r e d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b r in g  a p e rs o n  w i th in  th e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  c o n ju n c t ,  m ust of c o u rs e  
l i e  upon  t h e  c h a l le n g in g  c r e d i t o r .  I t  i s  th e  v e ry  g roundw ork  o f  h i s  c h a l le n g e  and  th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  
t h a t  p re s u m p tio n  o f  f r a u d  w hich  th e  h o ld e r  o f  t h e  d e ed  is bound, to o v erco m e,"  (Bell, i b i d . )6 .  pp.623-4; and s e e  s u p r a ,  p. 193*
7# a t  p . 6 2 3 .
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h eav y  onus which rests on the c h a l le n g e r  o f  t h e  d eed  
and comments that the Act 1621, c .1 8  lightened the 
b u rd e n  c o n s id e r a b ly ,  w here  th e  d e ed  h ad  b e e n  g r a n te d  
I n  f a v o u r  o f  a  member o f  a c e r t a i n  c a te g o r y  o f  
p e r s o n .  P re -e m in e n t  I n  t h a t  c a te g o r y ,  f o r  t h e  
p u rp o se  o f  thla discussion, a r e  s p o u s e s .
g22“ i®2
T h ere  I s  no d o u b t t h a t  th e  m ost Im p o r ta n t  c l a s s e s  
o f  p e r s o n ,  f o r  t h e s e  purposes, a r e  spouses, and 
in te n d in g  sp o u s e s  e n t e r in g  i n t o  a  m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t  -
for i t  has b een  decided"* t h a t  th e  latter alao a r e  
c o n ju n c t  p e r s o n s .
Now, th e  holder of the deed, to defeat th e  
c h a l le n g e  o f f e r e d ,  m ust show t h a t  th e  a l i e n a t i o n  was 
made f o r  t r u e ,  j u s t  and  n e o e a s a ry  c a u s e ,  o r  t h a t  th e
d e b to r  w as n o t  I n s o lv e n t  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  t h e  a l i e n a t io n ^ ,
%Goudy s u b d iv id e s  t h e  t o p i c  o f  " t r u e ,  j u s t  and  
n e c e s s a r y  c a u se "  i n t o  f o u r  h e a d s  -  a l i e n a t i o n s  f o r  
v a lu e  r e c e iv e d  i n  money o r  m oney 's  w o r th , a l i e n a t i o n s  
i n  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  p r i o r  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  a l i e n a t i o n s  i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  o b l i g a t i o n s  u n d e r ta k e n  o r  l i a b i l i t y  
in c u r r e d  i n  c o u n te r p a r t ,  an d  a l i e n a t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  n a t u r a l  o b l i g a t i o n s .  Of t h e s e ,  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  
i s  i n e x t r i c a b l y  e n ta n g le d  w ith  t h e  l a t t e r  two c a u s e s ,  
a s  th e y  im p in g e  by  t h e i r  n a tu r e  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
o f  h u sb an d  and w i f e ,  a n d /o r  t h a t  o f  p a r e n t  and  c h i l d .
N a t u r a l l y ,  a n  a l i e n a t i o n  f o r  f u l l  c o n s id e r a t i o n  
i s  n o t  s t r u c k  a t ,  n o r  i s  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  a n  
o b l i g a t i o n  /
1# MoLay V# McQueen (1899) 1 F*804»2* C l iv e  and W ilso n  ( p . 333) n o te  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  v a lu e  to c r e d i t o r s  of th e  M*w*P*(3e#) A c t, 1920 ,8 .5  i s  t h a t  " th e  d o n a tio n  can  be re v o k e d  ev en  i f  
t h e  d o n o r  i s  p ro v e d  t o  h av e  b e en  s o lv e n t  a t  t h e  time when i t  was m ade."3 .  p p .4 6 - 5 0 .
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o b l i g a t i o n  u n d e r ta k e n  d u r in g  so lv e n c y *
1Goudy s t a t e s  t h a t  "A t r u e ,  and  n e c e s s a r y
c a u s e  f o r  th e  a l i e n a t i o n  may c o n s i s t  i n  some o b l ig a t io n  
u n d e r ta k e n  o r  l i a b i l i t y  in c u r r e d  by th e  g r a n t e e " ,  and 
rem ark s  t h a t  d i s p u t e s  a b o u t t h i s  a r e  fo u n d  m a in ly  i n  
c o n n e c t io n  w ith  g r a n t s  made i n  m a r r ia g e  c o n t r a c t s ,  by  
t h e  sp o u s e s  i n ^ e r  s e , o r  by  t h e  p a r e n t s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  s p o u s e s ,  o r  by  th e  s p o u s e s  i n  f a v o u r  
o f  t h e  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  "T h ere  i s  no o o n tr& o t 
w hich  th e  law  r e g a r d s  a s  more o n e ro u s  th a n  a  m a r r ia g e -  
c o n t r a c t " , s a y s  Com m issary W a lla c e , and ad d s  that i t  
d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  o n e ro & ity  o f  an  a n t e - n u p t i a l  
m a r r ia g e  c o n t r a c t ,  t h a t  t h e  w hole money i s  p ro v id e d  
by  th e  husband, and none by th e  v/lfe, c i t i n g ,  inter ^  ^ “ #IWl*w<to#PWWwW
a l i a ,  th e  c a s e s  o f  L o c k h a r t  v ,  Dundas and  B la c k b u rn  v.
O l iv e r ^ ,
" M a rr ia g e , I t s e l f ,  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
c o n tr iv a n c e  b e tw een  th e  in te n d in g  sp o u s e s  i s  h e ld  t o  
b e  a  t r u e ,  j u s t ,  and  n e c e s s a r y  c a u s e  i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  
t h e  s t a t u t e  f o r  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  i n  t h e  a n t e n u p t i a l  
d e e d " ,  w r i t e s  Qoudy^. A c co rd in g  t o  W a lto n ^ , " M a rr ia g e  
i s  th e  h i g h e s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  known t o  th e  la w " , and  
th e  s ta n d a r d  o f  th e  A ct d id  n o t  change th e  n a tu r e  o f  
th e  o n e r c s i t y  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e  c o n s id e r a t io n *  P ro v id e d  
t h a t  t h e  a n t e n u p t i a l  a r ra n g e m e n ts  a r e  r e a s o n a b le  
and  s u i t a b l e  w ith  r e g a r d  t o  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s  /
1 * P # 4 /*2 ,  1 714 , M*956,5* 29  May 1816 , F.C*
4* p * 4 S *
5* P . 1 7 6 .
1 9 9 #
4p a r t i e s ,  and  n o t  e x o r b i t a n t  , and  no a u a p ic io n  o f  
f r a u d  ( a s  e v id e n c e d  by  th e  knoim  in s o lv e n c y  o f  th e
h u sb an d ) e x i s t s ,  m a rr ia g e  ( t h a t  i s ,  f o r th c o m in g , n o tp  ■55a n te c e d e n t ,  m a r r ia g e  ) w i l l  j u s t i f y  th e  p ro v is io n s -^ .
As f a r  a s  p r o v i s io n s  t o  th e  w ife  e r e  o o n o e rn e d , t h e s e
" a r e  /
1 .  C a rp h in  v .  C la p p e r to n  (1 8 6 7 ) 5 Macph* 7 9 7 ; M oLaohlan V . C am pbell (1 8 2 4 ) 3  s .1 9 2 ;  i t  was th o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  case of T h o ir s  v. Middleton 1729, M .984, i n  w hich  t h e r e  was s u s ta in e d  a  p r o v i s io n  made by th e  h u s b a n d 's  u n c l e ,  might be th e  o u t e r  l i m i t  of t h e  list o f  r e l a t i o n s  i n  th e  r e m o te r  d e g re e  w hose s e t t l e m e n t s  w ould  be u p h e ld  i n  t h i s  w ay.Bell (Com m #II.1 7 6 ) ,  making t h e  p o i n t  that, for a 
d e ed  t o  b e  o n e ro u s , i t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  th e  d e b to r  h im s e l f  s h a l l  h ave  r e c e iv e d  v a lu a b le  c o n s id m 'a f io n  t h e r e f o r ,  s a y s : -  " S o , on  o c c a s io n  o f  a  m a r r ia g e ,  p r o v i s io n s  w h ich  a  r e l a t i o n  o f  one o f  th e  p a r t i e s  s e t t l e s  by s e p a r a te  d e ed  o r  i n  t h e  m a r r ia g e  c o n t r a c t  on th e  o t h e r  p a r t y ,  o r  on t h e  c h i l d r e n ,  a r e  o n e ro u s  and  n o t  c h a l le n g e a b le  by  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  o f  th e  g r a n t e r ,  t h e  m a r r ia g e  b e in g  h e ld  a s  e n te r e d  i n t o  i n  c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s ;  and  t h i s  m ore e s p e c i a l l y  whei'c su c h  p r o v i s io n s  a r e  th e  c o u n te ip a r t s  o f  a  m u tu a l c o n t r a c t  by  w hich  o t h e r  r e c i p r o c a l  p r o v i s io n s  a r e  s e t t l e d . "  (C a se  o f  B lac k b u rn  v .  O liv e r  s u p r a , c i t e d  and 
d i s c u s s e d  b r i e f l y  a t  1 7 6 , fn # 5 # ) *%ut w here  t h e  sum o r  e s t a t e  s o  s e t t l e d  i s  p la c e d  e n t i r e l y  a t  t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  t h a t  p a r t y  by  whose r e l a t i o n  i t  i s  g iv e n  ( a s  i f ,  i n  a  conveyance  t o  a  so n  i n  h i s  m a r r ia g e  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  sum o r  s u b j e c t  b e  g iv e n  t o  him  and h i s  a s s i g n e e s ) , "  ( "H epburn v. L.strathraavan 1712, M.930".) " th e  alienation is h e ld  to be g r a t u i t o u s . "
2 .  s e e  p p . 205-207.3# F o r  o u r  p u iip o ses to d a y ,  t h i s  summary o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i s  p r o b a b ly  a d e q u a te .  ( S e e ,  f o r  ex am p le , s h o r t ,  c l e a r  p a ra g ra p h  i n  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p . 331 a n d , i n  t h e i r  " d o n a tio n "  a s p e c t ,  p # 3 3 3 ) . F o r  a  more d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n ,  r e f e r e n c e  m ig h t be  made t o  F r . I I  1 3 5 0  s e a , c r i t i c i s e d  by Ooudy, p . 26 e t  m o o ],80^ .  A lth o u g h  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a c t s  -  
a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t im e  a lm o s t  unknown -  t h e  "h u sb a n d / w i f e / c r e d i t o r "  t r i a n g l e  (w h ich  f o r  m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r ty  law  i s  a s  e t e r n a l  a  t r i a n g l e  a s  i s  t l ie  s p o u s e /s p o u s e /p a ra m o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  n o v e l i s t ) ,  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  e lo q u e n t ly  p r e s e n t  t h e  a rg u m en t f o r  t h e  c r e d i t o r  ( F r a s e r ) ,  end  f o r  th e  w ife  (G o u d y ).
2 0 0 ,
" a r e  th e  c o n d i t io n s  on w h ich  ehe hea  e n te r e d  i n to  
t h e  c o n t r a c t^
The " r e a s o n a b le  p r o v is io n "  r u l e  d oee  n o t  a p p ly  
u n le e e  t h e  s u h je o t s  a r e  p la c e d  o u tw lth  t h e  h u sband*#  
co n tro l^^  *  88 i t  h a s  b e en  a a id ^ ,  a  p r o v ia io n  t o  be 
s e c u r e  a g a i n s t  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  o r e d i t o r s ,  m ust be 
s e c u r e  a g a i n s t  h im a e lf#  The m ere I n s e r t i o n  i n  a  
d e ed  o f  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  h i a  incom e i s  a l im e n ta r y  
o r  n o n - a s s ig n a b le  c a n n o t  rem ove from  him  t h e Ro b l i g a t i o n  t o  a p p ly  h i s  fu n d #  t o  p ay  h i s  d e b ts  «
The same p r i n c i p l e s  o f  o n e r o s i ty  and  r e a s o n a b le n e s s  
o f  p r o v i s i o n  w ere  a p p l i e d  to  d e te rm in e  t h e  s a f e t y  from  
c r e d l t o r ^ a t t a c k  o f  a n t e - n u p t i a l  p r o v i s io n s  f o r  p o s s ib l e  
f u t u r e  i s s u e ,  "The c h i l d r e n 's  p r o v i s i o n s ,  h o w ev er, 
m ust be  so  e x p re s s e d  a s  t o  am ount t o  a  j u s  p r e d i t l #  
a s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from  a  m ere r i g h t  o f  s u c c e s s io n ^ ! "
S i m i l a r ly  t r e a t e d  w ere  p r o v i s io n s  by  th e  p a r e n t s  
o f  t h e  sp o u s e s  i n  a n  a n t e - n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t ,  th o u g h  
i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  Goudy s a y s ^ ,  "K now ledge, h o w ev er, on 
t h e  p a r t  o f  th e  s p o u s e s  o f  t h e  g r a n t o r 's  in s o lv e n c y  
a t  th e  d a te  o f  t h e  d e e d , may be  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b a r  
them  from  c la im in g  t h e  g r a n t  i n  t h e i r  f a v o u r  t o  any  
e x t e n t " .  H ow ever, w here  a  p u r e ly  i n t e r - s p o u s e  
c o n t r a c t  /
1* B e l l ,  i b i d #2# The A c t, 1920 , i n  in t r o d u c in g  th e  newr u l e  c o n c e rn in g  in te r ^ s p o u s e  d o n a t io n ,  e x p r e s s ly  (b y  s» 6 )  l e f t  t h e  common law  r u l e s  o f  a n t e - n u p t i a l  p r o v i s io n  i n  b e in g .  (W a lto n , p . 180 an d  C liv e  & W ilso n , p ,3 3 3 ) ,3* W alto n , p .1 7 8 .4# W a lto n , i b i d ,3* W a lto n , P .T 7 9 . Bee g e n e r a l l y  p p * 1 7 8 -1 8 0 , andc a s e s  t h e r e  c i t e d  and n a r r a t e d .
6# Goudy, p * 2 0 , and  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h e r e  c i t e d #  The same a p p l i e d  t o  p r o v i s io n s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  & w i f e ,  w h ich  w ere  i n  th e  n a tu r e  o f  r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s io n ,  ( F r » I I ,  1 3 5 6 ) . C o n t r a s t  a l lo w a b le  p o s t - n u p t i a l  p r o v i s io n s  ( i u f m ,  p .207) and s e e  C liv e  & W ilso n , p * 3 3 1 ,f n # ^ " a n d  p * 3 3 6 , " " R e a so n a b le  p r o v i s io n "  f o r  s p o u s e ,"
7 *  A t  p * 2 9 f  c i t i n g  W o o d  v .  R e i d  1 6 8 0 ,  M . 9 7 7 .
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1c o n t r a c t  w as ooncernad*  he w r i t e s  , " I n  none o f  t h e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  d o es  Im p o rta n c e  seem t o  h av e  b e en  a t t a c h e d  
t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  In s o lv e n c y  was known t o  t h e  fa v o u re d  
apouae  a t  th e  d a t e  o f  th e  a n t e n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t .  B ut 
u n d o u b te d ly  w here  a n y th in g  l i k e  d e l i b e r a t e  f r a u d ,  o r  
collusion b e tw een  th e  spouses, c a n  be  made o u t ,  the 
s e t t l e m e n t  w i l l  b e  l i a b l e  t o  be s e t  a s i d e " .  T hus,
Ooudy a p p e a r s  t o  c o n s id e r  t h a t  th e  t r e n d  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
i s  t h a t  t h e  r e c e i p t  by  a  f u t u r e  w ife  o f  a  p r o v i s io n
from  her f u t u r e  husband, whom sh e  knows to be  i n s o l v e n t ,pdoes n o t  am o u n t, ja^ r t o  f r a u d  ,  The r u l e s  h e r e ,  
t h e r e f o r e  /
1 « p«2B#2 ,  S ee  t h e  c a s e  o f  MoLay v ,  McQueen, s u n r a ,  w h ichd e m o n s tra te d  t h a t  I n te n d in g  sp o u s e s  came w i th in  th e  
c a te g o r y  of c o n ju n c t  and  c o n f id e n t  p e r s o n s ;  t h e r e ,  t h e  ( f u t u r e )  w i f e 's  n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  " f r a u d "  s a v e d  th e  d e e d . H ow ever, t h e  c a s e  d o e s  n o t  c l a r i f y  t h e  p o i n t  a t  i s s u e ,  b e c a u se  t h e  f u t u r e  w if e  was i g n o r a n t  o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  h e r  f i a n e é 's  f i n a n c e s ,  
"W hether i t  w ould i n v a l i d a t e  a  m a r r ia g e  s e t t l e m e n t  t h a t  a  w ife  knew t h a t ,  upon  an  e x a c t  b a la n c e  o f  h e r  
in te n d e d  h u s b a n d 's  a f f a i r s ,  he  was j u s t  s o lv e n t  and  no  m o re , we n eed  n o t  c o n s id e r ,  b e c a u se  i t  i s  n o t  p r o v e d , i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c a s e ,  t h a t  th e  w ife  knew a n y th in g  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  a f f a i r s ,  p e r  L ,M cLarena t  p # 6 1 i*  The h u s b a n d 's  s t a t e  o f  m ind i s  e s t im a te d  by  L,Adam a t  p ,8 0 9 * -  " I  do  n o t  th in k  t h e r e  i s  any  e v id e n c e  t h a t  th e  m a r r ia g e  was c o n t r a c t e d  by  McQueen f o r  t h e  p u rp o se  o f  d e f r a u d in g  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  b u t  I  
thin%( t h a t  h e  a v a i l e d  h im s e l f  o f  t h e  o p p o r tu n i ty  a f f o r d e d  by h i s  m a r r ia g e  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e f r a u d  them .I t  may b e  d o u b te d  w h e th e r  he  w ould o th e r w is e  h av e  b e en  s o  l i b e r a l  i n  p r o v id in g  f o r  h i s  w i f e .  B u t, on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no e v id e n c e  t h a t  s h e ,  b e fo r e  h e r  m a r r ia g e ,  knew a n y th in g  o f ,  o r  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n ,  th e  f r a u d " ,i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c i t a t i o n  o f  MoLay, Goudy r e f e r s  t o  t h e  o p in io n  o f  L ord  O rm idale  i n  W atson v .  G r a n t 's  T r s ,  (1 8 7 4 ) 1 R*882 a t  p p ,887-888  w here  h e  gave  an  exam ple  o f  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i n  w hich  he  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  a n  a n t e n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t  m ig h t be  re d u c e d :  "Suppose t h e  p u r s u e r  h ad  been  on th e  p o i n t  o f  c o m p le tin g  a  n e x u s  on t h i s  e s t a t e  f o r  paym ent o f  h i s  d e b t ,  t h a t  tR e r e  h ad  b e e n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  th e  in te n d e d  h u sb an d  and  w i f e ,  and  t h a t  th e y  had  b e so u g h t him  t o  a b s t a i n  from  p ro c e e d in g  t o  c o m p le te  h i s  nexu s ,  and  t h a t  h e  h a d  a g re e d  t o  do  so  on t h e  p ro m ise  ^By them  t h a t  h i s  d e b t  /
2 0 2 ,
t h e r e f o r e ,  a p p e a r  t o  be  I n d i c a t i v e  o f  a  c e r t a i n
attitude to the broader subject under discussion, which 
is at variance for Instance with F r a s e r 's  p h ilo so p h y ^ *
A t any rate, where the ante-nuptial provision f e l l  
within the r u l e ,  a s  generally agreed, the wife's claim 
t h e r e f o r  w as s u p e r i o r  to the claim of any ( o th e r )  
o r e d i to h ^ #
where the p r o v i s io n  was by a p a r e n t  i n  favour of 
t h e  I n te n d in g  s p o u s e s ,  a  now u n u su a l  m ethod o f  e x p la in in g  
the p o i n t  is u se d  by Goudy^ (during his d i s c u s s i o n  of 
gratuitous /
d e b t  w ould be paid before they did anything to 
a f f e c t  h i s  d e b t ,  b u t  t h a t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  t i #  p ro m is e , th e y  h a d  c o n s p ir e d  t o  e x e c u te  an  a n t e n u p t i a l  o o n t r a o t ,  w hereby  th e y  th o u g h t  th e  
p u r s u e r  m ig h t be out o u t  from  payment o f  his d e b t ,I  c o u ld  v e ry  %fell u n d e rs ta n d  t h a t  su c h  a  p a lp a b le  
e a s e  o f  f r a u d  m ig h t s u p p o r t  a  r e d u c t io n *  B ut no su c h  c a s e ,  o r  a n y th in g  l i k e  i t *  i s  h e re  a l le g e d * "  S om eth ing  m ore th a n  a b se n c e  o f  i n q u i r y  a b o u t  t h e  betrothed's d o u b t f u l  financial s i t u a t i o n ,  o r  even  
know ledge o f  h i s  in s o lv e n c y ,  i s  r e q u i r e d , t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  a l lo w  a n  in f e r e n c e  o f  f r a u d ,  i t  seem s# M a rr ia g e  i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  e n o u ^  t o  s u p p o r t  a  r e a s o n a b le  ante-nuptial p r o v i s i o n ,  i n  th e  a b se n c e  o f  f r a u d ,  i n  the s e n s e  o f  c o l l u s i v e  m a c h in a t io n  be tw een  th e  p r o s p e c t iv e  s p o u s e s .( i n  the r e c e n t  c a s e  o f  Armour v# Learmomth 1972 B#L*T*150, i t  was made clear that no a l l e g a t i o n  of p e r s o n a l  f r a u d  a g a i n s t  th e  d e f e n d e r ,  o r  o f  c o l l u s i o n  b e tw een  h e r  and h e r  h u sb an d  was made).1# D isp la y e d  at pp*1349-1350 (40 y e a r s  earlier).2* S ee  F r . I I ,  1335*3 .  p .2 9 .  B ut s e e  Wood v* R e id  jsu n ra .  T h e re , th ef a t h e r - i n - l a w  was generally r e p u te d  to be b a n k ru p t :  see L.McLaren'# O p in io n  i n  MCI,ay v* McQueen, supra* at p.811, t h a t : -  " I  do not t h in k  t h a t  a d e b to r  i s  t o  be  h e ld  i n s o l v e n t  either i n  th e  s e n s e  o f  the s t a t u t e  o f  1621 or i n  the o th e r  s e n s e  merely b e c a u s e , b e in g  s o l v e n t ,  h e  e n t e r s  upon obligations, o r  d i s p o s e s  o f  h i s  p r o p e r ty  f o r  o n e ro u s  c a u s e s ,  w hich  
w i l l  h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  d im in is h in g  h i s  e s t a t e ,  and  re d u c in g  it below t h e  p o i n t  o f  s o lv e n c y .  S o lv en cy  m ust a lw ay s  be e s t im a te d  as at t h e  moment when th e  d e ed  was e x e c u te d " .  G oudy 's  i l l u s t r a t i o n  p o s t u l a t e s  that situation* Goudy h i m s e l f , h o w ev er, ( th o u g h  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th e  o p in io n )  s t a t e s ,  a t  p * 3 2 , w i thr e f e r e n c e  t o  c h a l le n g e  a t  common law  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s ,  t h a t ,  " I f ,  a p a r t  from  th e  a l i e n a t i o n  c o m p la in e d  o f ,  t h e  d e b to r  w ould h av e  b e en  s o l v e n t ,  b u t  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  I t  be  t o  c r e a t e  in s o lv e n c y ,  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  w i l l  be  s e t  a s i d e " .
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g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  a t  oommon law ) when he  s a y s  
t h a t  th e  r u l e  a p p l i c a b l e  h e r e  1# I l l u s t r a t e d  by a  
t e x t  o f  th e  o l v l l  l a i f t -  I f  a  f a t h e r - i n - l a w  g iv e s  
h i s  s o n - in - la w  a  t o c h e r ,  th e r e b y  r e n d e r in g  h im s e l f  
I n s o l v e n t ,  t h e  s o n - in - la w  c a n n o t be  su e d  by th e  
I n s o lv e n t* #  c r e d i t o r s ,  u n l e s s  he  had  p a r t i c i p a t e d  
i n  t h e  f r a u d  a g a i n s t  them  ( f o r  su ch  i t  b e ,  i n t e n t i o n a l  
o r  n o t ,  an d  i t  m ust s u r e l y  be p resum ed  t h a t  th e  
f a t h e r - i n - l a w  was aw are  o f  h i s  circumstances: is I t
t o  b e  p resum ed  that th e  s o n - in - la w  was n o t? ) *  The 
so n m in -la w , e x p la in s  Goudy, l a  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a  
p u r c h a s e r  f o r  v a lu a b le  consideration as (it I s  said) 
h e  p ro b a b ly  w ould  n o t  h av e  m a r r ie d  w i th o u t  th e  to c h e r*  
H ow ever, a o o o rd ln g  t o  some a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i f  t h e  w ife  
sh o u ld  t h e r e a f t e r  o b t a in  t h e  t o c h e r ,  a s  upon  d iv o r c e ,  
t h e  f a t h e r ' s  c r e d i t o r s  may ta k e  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  h e r ,  
ev en  if sh e  d id  n o t  know o f  h e r  f a t h e r ' s  in s o lv e n c y  
when he  g r a n te d  th e  t o c h e r ,  b e c a u s e ,  a s  f a r  a s  sh e  
i s  c o n c e rn e d , t h e  t o c h e r  i s  g r a t u i t o u s  *
O b v io u s ly , t h e n ,  t h i s  exam ple i s  one b a se d  on 
c o u n te r p a r t*  I t  l a  odd i n  t h e  s e n s e ,  t h a t  i f  a  
w om an's f u t u r e  hu sb an d  m akes p r o v i s io n  f o r  h e r ,  and  
s h e  i s  i g n o r a n t  o f  any  q u e s t io n  o f  f r a u d ,  and  he 
becom es b a n k ru p t ,  h e r  p r o v i s io n  i s  s a f e  so  f a r  a s  i t  
i s  r e a s o n a b le ,  b u t  i f  t h e  p r o v i s io n  i s  made by  h e r  
f a t h e r ,  and  i s ,  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k in g ,  money from  h e r  s id e  
o f  t h e  f a m i ly ,  g iv e n ,  i n  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  n o t  t o  h e r ,  
b u t  t o  h e r  husb an d  t o  a i d  him  i n  h i s  s u p p o r t  o f  h e r  
( a n d ,  o f t e n ,  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  h i m s e l f ) ,  th e n  i f  s h e ,  by 
f o r c e  o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  comes i n t o  o w n e rsh ip  o f  i t ,  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  sh e  h e r s e l f  was in n o c e n t  c o n c e rn in g  any  
a rra n g e m e n t w h ich  m l ^ t  h av e  had  th e  e f f e c t  o f  d e f e a t i n g  
h e r  f a t h e r ' s  l e g i t i m a t e  c r e d i t o r s ,  sh e  may l o s e  th e  
p r o v i s io n  t o  th em , on t h e  in s o lv e n o y  o f  h e r  f a th e r *
The /
1* D lg*42* 8* 25* 1*
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The to o h e r  w ould th e n  b e  oeen  a s  a  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  
b e c a u se  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  was n o t  g iv e n  th e r e f o r *  The 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  g iv e n  by a  w ife  f o r  an  a n te * n u p t l a l  
p r o v i s i o n  was r e g a rd e d  a s  c l e a r  » i n  t h e s e  d a y s  o f  
n o m in a l e q u a l i t y  o f  jo b  o p p o r tu n i ty ,  and  no  g e n e r a l  
s h o r ta g e  o f  em ploym ent f o r  m a r r ie d  women, n o r  s t ig m a  
a t t a c h i n g  t o  t h e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  I t ,  w ould t h e  same 
v iew  today be ta k e n  a u to m a t ic a l ly ?  Much o f  the 
r e a s o n in g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  m ust r e s t  upon c o u n te r p a r t  
and  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,
1F o u r th  ,  p r e v i s io n s  may b e  s a f e  a g a i n s t  c h a l le n g e  
by c r e d i t o r s  I f  th e y  a r e  made p l e t a t l s  c a u s a  -  out of 
a f r a t e r n a l ,  f i l i a l ,  parental o r  m a r i t a l  s e n s e  of d u ty  
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  b u t  it re m a in s  I n  d o u b t how far 
su c h  a  n a t u r a l  o b l i g a t i o n  w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  a  t r u e ,  j u s t  
and  n e c e s s a r y  c a u se  I n  the s e n s e  o f  the s t a t u t e ,
*^ Thia k in d  of c o n s i d e r a t i o n  b e in g  I m p e r f e c t ,  I s  I n f e r i o r  
t o  th o s e  t h a t  have  b e e n  c o n s id e re d #  The l a t t e r  have  
b e en  seen to be based on the p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c o n t r a c t ; 
t h i s  a r i s e s  "ex  j u r e  n a tu ra e ^ # " "
E£SSSMgMaLSsJMSiSSSS£
I n t o  t h i s  c a te g o r y  ( ' p l e t a t l s  c a u s a *) may be p la c e d  
p o s t n u p t i a l  /
1# Goudy t r e a t s  c h a l le n g e  and  d e fe n c e  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  a t  common la w , u n d e r  th e  h e a d in g  o f  "w an t o f  o n e ro u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n " .  I n  f o u r  a s p e c t s  * v a lu e  I n  money o r  money*s w o r th , p r i o r  l e g a l  
o b l i g a t i o n ,  c o u n t e r p a r t ,  and  n a t u r a l  o b l ig a t io n #  A n te n u p t ia l  m a r r ia g e * G e tt le m e n ts  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  u n d e r  th e  t i t l e  o f  c o u n te r p a r t#  S ee  g e n e r a l l y  p p # 2 5 -3 2 , S u b s e q u e n tly  ( a t  p # 4 c ) ,  h e  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  s t a t u t e ' s  " t r u e ,  j u s t ,  and n e c e s s a r l e  causes and w ith o u t  a j u s t  p r i c e  r e a l l y  p ay ed "  h a s  b een  c o n s t r u e d  a s  m eaning  common law  c n e r o a l t y ,  and  t h a t  h e n ce  th e  same p r i n c i p l e s  a p p ly  t o  a l l e g e d  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n -  a t l o n s  at common law and  u n d e r  th e  A ct 1621, o#1S#2# Goudy, p#29#
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p o s t n u p t i a l  s e t t l e m e n ts  on w iv e s ,  a b o u t  w h ic h , b o th  a t  
common law  and  s t a t u t e ,  t h e  r u l e s  e r e  u n c le a r *  The 
e a r l y  te n d e n c y  w as t o  u p h o ld  su c h  p r o v i s io n s  so  f a r  a s  
r e a s o n a b le ,  b u t  t h e  o p p o s i te  v iew  l a t e r  g a in e d  g ro u n d  *
F r a s e r  e x p re s s e s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  t h e  tw o 
o a s e s  t h u s  :*  i n  e n t e r in g  i n t o  a n  a n t e n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t ,  
t h e  w ife  g iv e s  an  e q u iv a l e n t ,  "an d  th e  p r o v i s io n s  i n  
h e r  f a v o u r  a r e  r e g a rd e d  i n  th e  same l i g h t  a s  a n  o r d in a r y  
d e b t ,  u n l e s s  th e y  be  altogether e x o r b i t a n t ;  i n  w hich  
case t h e  C o u r t  w i l l  re d u c e  the excess* But in 
p o s t n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t s  th e  w if e  a p p e a rs  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  
p o s i t io n *  h a v in g  a l r e a d y  a l l i e d  h e r  own w ith  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  f o r t u n e s  a n d  re n d e re d  h e r s e l f  i n c a p a b le ,  i n  
c e r t a i n  c a s e s ,  o f  c la im in g  a s  an  o n e ro u s  c r e d i t o r  on 
h i s  b a n k ru p tc y #  The h u sb a n d  h a s  a l r e a d y  r e c e iv e d  th e  
v a lu a b le  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  -  m a rr ia g e *  -  and  th e  w ife  
g iv e s  him  n o th in g  when he  m akes t o  h e r  a  oonveyanoe 
b a se d  on i t  a s  a  c o n s id e r a t io n # *  s u b s e q u e n t ly ^ ,  he  
cites the ev en  b l u n t e r  s ta te m e n t  o f  L ord  M ackenzie  
i n  G u th r ie  v# Cowan or B e l l^ ,  w here  he  re m a rk e d , " a s  
t o  /
1 * p*30#2# F r , i f %  1 4 9 8 , Goudy (p * 3 1 ) s a y s  t h a t  th e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  g iv e n  by a  w ife  i n  su c h  a  c a s e  i s  n o t  t h e  m a r r ia g e  i t s e l f ,  n o r  th e  wife's contribution" of t o c h e r ,  nor h e r  r e n u n c i a t i o n  of h e r  legal p r o v i s i o n s ,  b u t  " I t  is p r o p e r ly  t h e  d e b i tum  n a tu r a e  on a  h u sb an d  t o  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  s u p p o r t  c T ^ E fs ^ w IT e ra f te r  h i s  d e a th ;  and  a s  su c h  i t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  i n  k in d  from  th e  c o n s id e r a t i o n  im p l ie d  i n  a  c o n t r a c t  o f  s a l e  o r  an  a n t e n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t#  B e in g  o f  t h i s  im p e r f e c t  c h a r a c te r *  t h e  q u e s t io n  comes t o  be%- I s  i t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  o n e ro u s  t o  
com pete  w i t h ,  o r  e x c lu d e ,  p r o p e r  c o n t r a c t  c r e d i t o r s ,  when t h e r e  i s  in s o lv e n c y  a t  th e  d a te  o f  th e  g r a n t?And i t  i s  th o u g h t  t h e  an sw er t o  t h i s  q u e s t io n  s h o u ld  b e  i n  t h e  n e g a t iv e " ,  (Goudy w as d i s c u s s i n g  h e re  th e  p o s t n u p t i a l  p r o v i s io n  made by a n  i n s o l v e n t  h u sb an d  t o  b e n e f i t  h i s  w ife  a f t e r  h i s  d e a t h ) ,3 ,  a t  1 1 .1 5 0 2 ,4# (1846) 9  0 ,1 2 4  at p ,1 2 8 .  S u b s e q u e n tly  (at p#130), h erem ark ed  upon  th e  i n j u s t i c e  t o  th e  f i r s t  f a m i ly  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  fo u n d  i n  t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  h e r e ;  " I  was 
n e v e r  much a  l o v e r  o f  that part of our la w . It i s  h a rd  t o  h o ld  ev en  an  a n t e n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t  good a s  
a g a i n s t  /
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to antenuptial contracts, a man buys a wife as he 
buys a h o r s e ;  he  must buy h e r  on conditions".
1Bell also distinguishes between antenuptial
and postnuptial provisions* In an antenuptial contract,
he  says, " th e  provisions to the wife make it an
essential condition of the marriage that she shall
not entirely follow the fortunes of her husband,but
be entitled to rely on those provisions; and the
provisions to t h e  children are t h e  conditions on
which alone those interested in their future existence
have consented to that contract from which they were 2to s p r in g  * I n  postnuptial contracts, t h e  wife and 
children are already wedded to th e  condition of their 
husband and father, and can take nothing a g a i n s t  h i s  
creditors, u n le s s  what he during his solvency can 
legally give away."
It seem s, therefore, that the "alliance of 
fortune" philosophy - the notion of "throwing in one's 
lot and taking the chance of financial good or evil"
(now l e s s  dependent entirely on the husband's efforts, 
of course) is deep-rooted^ •
In t h e  modern context, a clear difference e x i s t s  
in some jurisdictions today between what may be done 
antenuptially /
against c r e d i to r s *  But then, on looking at the d e c i s i o n s ,  I find it f i x e d  by a series rerum .iudicatarum* that the law of SootXanT"w IT ÎT support aposinupXIal provision to a moderate extent."1. Comm*I, 687.2* "Pre-natal" p r o v i s io n  f o r  possible future children - which regrettably might o f t e n  be a poor provision compared with their entitlement at common law (cf. e.g. t h e  parents* discharge o f  their prospective children's legitim - see Chapter g) - was often explained in terms of the "contract" from which alone they could sp r in g *  (See Clive ^ Wilson, p.343, fn.4).
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antenuptially and whet may be done postnuptimlly.Indeed It may be that "Gontreotln^ o^ut" of & ey&tem 
o f  oommunlty p r o p e r ty  may b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  o n ly  
a n te n u p t i a l l y ^ *  On t h e  o t h e r  hand* I t  may be  th & t 
t h e r e  l a  p e r f e c t  freed o m  t o  m o d ify  p r o p e r ty  r e l a t l o n apt o  a u l t  t h e  p a r t l e a  a t  a n y  p o i n t  d u r in g  th e  m a r r ia g e " .
T h a t w h ich  waa a t r u o k  a t  w i th  o e r t a l n t y  waa th e  
p o a t n u p t l a l  o o n t r a o t  w h ich  waa t o  b e n e f i t  t h e  w ife  
d u r in g  th e  e u b a la te n o e  o f  t h e  m&rrl&ge# Such  a n  
a rra n g e m e n t r e g a rd e d  aa  & don&tlon^^ e t
g g o reg i, and  henoe  wa# rev o o & b le  by t h e  g r a n t e r 'a  
a e q u e a t r a t l o n  ( a t  common l a w ) .  On th e  o t h e r  hand* a  
p o s t n u p t i a l  p r o v i s io n  w h ich  a  s o lv e n t  huaba&d g r a n te d ,  
t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  on  h i e  d e a th *  w as s a f e  i f  r e a s o n a b le  I n  
am ount# The d o u b t a ro s e *  t h e r e f o r #  I n  t h e  oane  o f  
th o s e  p r o v i s i o n s  made by a n  I n s o lv e n t  g r e n t e r  t o  t a k e  
e f f e o t  on  th e  t e r m in a t io n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  by t h e  l a t t e r ' a  
d e a t h ,  and  G a u d y 's  v ie w , a a  n o te d  * wa$ t h a t  t h e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  t h a t  o&ee w as i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u p p o r t  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  o r e d l t o r a 4 ,  & s i m i l a r  r e s u l t  
a t t e n d e d  /
1* C f .S o u th  A f r ic a  (C h a p te r  6 ) .2# la w  Gom m iaeion w#P»Mo,42 i n  i t s  ( a b o r t e d )  a u g g e a t io no f  F n g l ia h  im m u n i ty  o f  p r o p e r ty  (a o e  C h a p te r  7) fa v o u re d  t h i s  c o u r s e .3 .  8 ée  C l iv e  & W ilson* p . 330 a n d  332"333#
4 .  B ee g e n e r a l l y  Goudy* p p .29^31 an d  C l lv e  & V ilao n *p . 331 an d  fn * 2 2 .,  w here  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  t a o t i o a l  d i a t l n o t l o n  i s  draw n b e tw ee n  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  
a n d  r é v o c a b le  d o n a t io n  -  t h e  c r e d i t o r  w ould  o f t e n  ohooae  t o  a ttao l'c  t h e  t r a n s f e r  a a  a  r e v o c a b le  d o n a tio n *  " a s  t h i s  p re o lu d e d  t h e  d e fe n o e  o f  m olvonoy a t  t r a n s f e r . "  S ee  a l e e  t h e r e o n ,  p#336 ( a l i e n a t i o n / d o n a t i o n )  and  g e n e r a l ly *  pp.332 '^337* A t p # 3 3 6 , t h e  a u th o r s  n o teth e  la i f  o f  in te r ^ a p o u a e  d o n a tio n  d i f f e r s  from  
t h a t  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  I n  t h a t  " th e  fo rm e r  a f f o r d s  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  a  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  a  
apouao  t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  a f t e r  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ."  I f  ouoh a  p r o v i s io n  l a  i r r e v o c a b le *  made when th e  g r a n t o r  l a  s o lv e n t*  i s  ro aao n m b le  i n  am ount* an d  e x p ro e a e d  t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  o n ly  a t  t h e  d i e v o l u t io n  o f  th e  m a rr ia g e *  " I t  w i l l  n o t  be  r e v o c a b le  by c r e d i t o r s  
a s  /
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a t t e n d e d  p o s t n u p t i a l  p r o v i s io n s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  c h i ld r e n #
Of all t h e s e  p o i n t s , Bell makes a s u c c i n c t  and  1lucid summery *
T h e se , t h e n ,  a r e  t h e  r u l e s  i n  o u t l i n e  w h ich  
g o v e rn e d  th e  d e te r m in a t io n  o f  r i g h t s  b e tw een  th e  
g r a n t o r 's  c r e d i t o r s  an d  th e  g r a n t e r 's  w ife  i n  th e  
d a y s  when m a r r la g e - o o n t r a c t s  w ere common# I n  so  far 
a s  m a r r la g e - G o n tr a c ts  a r e  u se d  to d a y  -  w h ich  u s e  I s  
almost unknown^- I t  w ould appear that th e y  would 
s t i l l  apply, s u b j e c t  t o  th e  provisions on d o n a tio n s  
I n t r o d u c e d  by the 1920 Act^%
The /
aa a d o n a t io n  between husband and  wife, even  if s e q u e s t r a t i o n  f o l lo w s  w i th in  a  y e a r  and  a  day#"This c o n c lu s io n  m e e ts  that of Goudy (p#30) th o u g h  t h e  l a t t e r  a p p e a rs  t o  t r e a t  t h i s  s p e c ie s  o f  a rra n g e m e n t a s  com ing u n d e r  th e  h ead  o f  a l lo w a b le  p o s t - n u p t i a l  s e t t le m e n t#  W alton  (pp*177-178) entitles his d i s c u s s io n  t h e r e o f ,  "A R e aso n ab le  Provision was 
n o t  a  D o n a tio n  R ev o cab le# "  ( " I f  i t  w ere  e x c e s s iv e  I t  w ould o n ly  be re d u c e d  quoad ex ce ssu m " , p.178)#1 , Comm#I, 641-643#2# A p rim e  exam ple o f  i t s  u s e  I n  a  m odem , a n a lo g o u ss i t u a t i o n ,  i s  c i t e d  by C l iv e  & W ilso n , p.331 - Armour v# L earm onth  1972 8#L#T#150# See p e r  L# Cam eron, at p*154 " I f  a l i e n a t i o n  by  m eans o f  an  ante-nuptial m a rr ia g e  contract w ould be sa v e d  and outside the g r i p  o f  the s t a t u t e  and  t h a t  f o r  th e  r e a s o n s  t o  w hich  I  have  r e f e r r e d , "  ( t h e  o n e ro u s  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  i t s e l f  g iv e n  f o r  mar r l a g e - c o n t r a o t  p r o v i s io n s  ( s e e  p.133)) " I  do n o t  t h in k  t h a t  a cash provision to an In te n d e d  wife t o  m ee t t h e  p u rc lia s e  p r i c e  o f  a  h o u se  t o  be  a c q u i r e d  
by  h e r  and  t o  b e  In te n d e d  f o r  and  a c t u a l l y  o c c u p ie d  a s  the m a tr im o n ia l  home o f  the spouses, when thé p r o v i s io n  was admittedly u se d  f o r  that purpose, should be h e ld  to fall w i th in  the scope o f  the Act#The r e a s o n s  and p u rp o s e s  o f  th e  t r a n s a c t i o n  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  and  fundamentally t h e  same in b o th  oases and  I  t h e r e f o r e  t h in k  t h a t  th e  same l e g a l  c o n se q u e n c e s  s h o u ld  a l s o  fo llo w # "  (see p#153, t o  t h e  e f f e c t  that " t r u e ,  ju s t#  and necessary c a u s e s "  be read as d i s j u n c t i v e ) #3# 8 ee  C l iv e  & W ilso n , Chapter 12, "Marriage C o n tra c ts " #4# See Ifardhaugh, pp#76-77#
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The q u e s t io n  to  be  anaw ered  i s  w h e th e r  t h e s e ,  
o r  s i m i l a r ,  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  t o  b e  r e l i e d  upon  I n  
d e te i^ a in in g  sucti d i s p u t e s  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  r e v i v a l  o f
i n t e r e s t  i n  m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a c t s  on t h e  e m e r g e n c e ,
i f  such  e v e r  oomes a b o u t ,  o f  a  new sy s tem  o f1m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r ty  f o r  S c o tla n d  ,  o r  w h e th e r  an  
e n t i r e l y  new r é g i m e  o f  r u l e s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s  i s  t o  
b e  /
1# o r  ev en  i n  i t s  a b se n c e  -  s e e  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p p . 3 4 6 -3 4 9 . I t  c an  be s e e n  t h a t  o a s e s  r e v e a l in g  th e  ' t a n g l e d  web* o f  r i g h t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  h u sb a n d , w i f e ,  and c r e d i t o r  when th e  b a n k ru p tc y  o f  one o r  b o th  sp o u se s  o c c u rs  a r e  n o t  i n f r e q u e n t ;  m a t te r s  may be  c o m p lic a te d  f u r t h e r  by th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  b u s in e s s  o f  one s p o u s e , i n  w hich th e  o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a t e d  w i th o u t  com prehend ing  t h e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  h e r  a c t io n #  T h u s , i t  i s  r e p o r t e d  i n  th e  p r e s s  t h a t  a  w ife  s u c c e s s f u l l y  o b ta in e d  & d is c h a r g e  a t  London B a n k ru p tc y  C o u r t ,  h a v in g  b een  made b a n k ru p t  
i n  1975 w ith  d e b ts  e x c e e d in g  &16m, th o u g h  i t  seem ed u n l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  o r e d i t o r s  would be a b l e  t o  re c o u p  any  o f  t h e i r  f u n d s .  "H er husb an d  h ad  made h e r  a  d i r e c t o r  o f  h i s  b u i ld in g  company and sh e  had  " s ig n e d  g u a r a n te e s  a t  h i s  r e q u e s t  w i th o u t  know ing What i t  was a l l  a b o u t# " "  H er h u sb a n d , whose d e b ts  e x ce ed e d  &10m, had  n o t  a p p l i e d  f o r  d is c h a rg e #  A cco rd in g  t o  
The Tim es r e p o r t  ( 2 1 /7 /7 6 )  Mrs# G o d frey  s a i d  sh e  w ish e d  t o  be  f r e e d  f o r  h e r  ovm p e a c e  o f  m ind , and  Mr# R e g i s t r a r  Hunt was o f  th e  o p in io n  t h a t  no u s e f u l  p u rp o s e  w ould be s e rv e d  by k e e p in g  h e r  b a n k ru p t ,  th o u g h  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  ch an ce  o f  c r e d i t o r s  r e c e iv in g  a n y th in g #  She had n e v e r  been  i n  b u s in e s s  o n  h e r  own# 
When sh e  was made b a n k ru p t i n  F e b ru a ry ,  1973 , h e r  d e b ts  w e r e  e s t im a te d  a t  o v e r £ 1 6 m # ,  " w ith  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  £ 3 . 5m# ra n ld n g  f o r  d iv id e n d ."  H er c u r r e n t  
i n c o m e  was £1030  p . a #  w i t h  "sp asm o d ic"  a l im e n t  from  h e r  husb an d  from  whom she was s e p a r a te d  o f  £20 p e r  w eek f o r  s u p p o r t  o f  two te e n a g e  c h i ld r e n #  No f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  a t  p re s e n t#I t  w ould a p p e a r  from  th e s e  few  f a c t s  t h a t  th e  c a s e  
f e l l  u n d e r  th e  r u l e  ( o r  i t s  E n g lis h  e q u iv a le n t )  t h a t ,  i f  n o  d iv id e n d  o f  3 s# (2 3 p ) i n  th e  pound o r  s e c u r i t y  t h e r e f o r  i s  fo u n d , a d is c h a r g e  may y e t  be  g r a n te d  ( a t  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  tim e  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  
B a n k r u p t c y  ( S c . )  A c t, 1 9 1 3 »  8 ,1 4 3 )  i f  " f a i l u r e  t o  p a y  su c h  amount h a s ,  i n  th e  o p in io n  o f  th e  c o u r t ,  a r i s e n  from  c irc u m g ta n c e s  f o r  w hich th e  b a n k ru p t c a n n o t  j u s t l y  be  h e ld  r e s p o n s ib le #  The b u rd e n  i s  on  th e  b a n k ru p t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  a v e r  and p ro v e  t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  from  w h i c h  th e  f a i l u r e  t o  p a y  h a s  a r i s e n  and  why h e  c a n n o t j u s t l y  be h e ld  r e s p o n s i b l e , "  
( G o w  p . 6 4 6 ;  1913 A c t, 8 . 1 4 6 )  ( c f . S p a r k ,  1974 8#L#T* 
( S h . C t # ) 1 0 ) .  ( G l a s g o w  H e r a l d  2 1 / 7 / 7 6  -  G o d f r e y ) .
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be drawn up to cater for spouse-creditor-spouse- 
bankruptcy<î?debt cases, both in and out of community.^
Challenge of Deeds# #  * #  # #  M#  mm
In terms of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1913,
8,8, "Deeds made void by this Act, and all alienations 
of property by a party insolvent or notour bankrupt, 
which are voidable by statute or at common law, may 
be set aside either by way of action or exception, 
and a decree setting aside the deed by exception shall 
have the like effect, as to the party objecting to 
the deed, as if such decree were given in an action at 
his instances and this section shall apply as well in 
the Sheriff Court as in the Court of Session,"
Challenge may be by creditor, or by the trustee
on the sequestrated estate. In the latter case (s,9),
the trustee, "whether representing prior creditors or
not, shall, under this Act, be entitled to set aside
any such deed or alienation for behoof of the whole
body of creditors, and in so doing shall be entitled
to the benefit of any presumption which would have
been competent to any creditor," "When action is
raised by a creditor, it concludes merely to have
the deed set aside; when by a trustee in a sequestration,
etc,, it usually concludes also for restitution of2,3the subject, or count and reckoning "
Policies of Assurance
The common law position with regard to the 
provision by husband to wife of assurance on his life 
was that such an antenuptial provision was effectual 
"at least to the effect of making the premium during
the /
1, See Chapter 7,2, Goudy, p,35.3* cf* Armour v, Learraonth 1972 S,L,T, 150
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t h e  h u e b a n d 'a  l i f e  a  d e b t  c la im a b le  on th e  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  a n  a n n u ity #  eo t h a t  a  d iv id e n d  may be  draw n f o r  
i t #  B ut no a e o u r i ty  c an  be g iv e n  f o r  th e  r e g u l a r  
paym ent o f  th e  premium# u n le a e  t h e  O b l ig a t io n  be 
f o r t i f i e d  by  h e r i t a b l e  bond o r  o t h e r  a e o u r i ty #  I f  
a  p o l i c y  w ere opened  i n  name o f  th e  w ife  and  c h i ld r e n #  
and  th e  p rem iim  r e g u l a r l y  p a id  u n d e r  su c h  a n t e n u p t i a l  
c o n t r a c t#  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  in s u r a n c e  w ould  c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  b e  dem andab le  by  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  a& p a r t  o f  th e  
h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e ;  w h i le  a  c la im  w ould l i e  f o r  th e  
f u t u r e  prem ium a a t  t h e  i n s t a n c e  o f  t h e  w ife ^ # "
T heae r u l e s  w ere o v e r ta k e n  by  th e  M a rrie d  Women## 
P o l i c i e #  o f  A 68uranoe ( S c o t la n d )  Act# 1 8 8 0 ^ .
A cco rd in g  t o  #$2 th e r e o f #  "A p o l ic y  o f  a a a u ra n o e  
e f f e c t e d  by any  m a r r ie d  man on h i#  own l i f e ,  and  
e x p re s s e d  upon th e  f a c e  o f  i t  t o  be f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  
o f  h i s  w i f e ,  o r  o f  h i#  c h i ld r e n #  o r  o f  h i#  w ife  and  
c h i ld r e n #  s h a l l#  t o g e t h e r  w i th  a l l  b e n e f i t  th e r e o f #  
b e  deem ed a  t r u s t  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i e  w ife  f o r  
h e r  s e p a r a t e  u s e ,  o r  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  c h i ld r e n #  
o r  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w ife  and  c h i ld r e n "  -  and  
su c h  a  p o l i c y  i s  d e c l a r e d  t o  v e s t  i n  t h e  husband  and 
h i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  t r u s t  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e s  so  
e x p re a se d #  o r  i n  any  n o m in a ted  t r u s t e e #  and  n o t  t o  
form  p a r t  o f  h i s  e s t a t e #  o r  t o  be l i a b l e  t o  th e  
d i l i g e n c e  o f  h i s  c r e d i to r s #  o r  t o  be r e v o c a b le  a# 
a  d o n a tio n #  o r  r e d u c ib le  on any  g ro u n d  o f  e x c e s s  o r  
in so lv e n c y #
However# i f  i t  b e  p ro v e d  " t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  was 
e f f e c t e d  /
1# B e ll#  Comm# I#  639* See a l s o  C h a p te r  1# p#95*2* o f  w hich# s e e  d i s c u s s io n  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  dev e lo p m en t o f  t?ie p r e s e n t  r u l e s  o f  m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r ty  (C h a p te r  1# pp*9 5 -9 7 )*S ee a l s o  W alton# C h a p te r  XXVI and  C l iv e  and  W ilson  PP#315-321#
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e f f e c t e d  and  th e  prem ium s th e r e o n  p a id  w ith  I n t e n t  
t o  d e f r a u d  c r e d i t o r s ,  o r  i f  th e  p e rs o n  upon  whose 
l i f e  t h e  p o l i c y  I s  e f f e c t e d  s h a l l  be made b a n k ru p t  
w i th in  tw o y e a r s  from  th e  d a te  o f  such  p o l i c y .  I t  
s h a l l  b e  c o m p e te n t t o  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  t o  c la im  rep ay m en t 
o f  t h e  prem ium s so  p a id  from  th e  t r u s t e e  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  
o u t  o f  th e  p ro c e e d s  th e r e o f ^ # "  ( I t  may be  t h a t  
s u s p ic io n s  w ould be a ro u s e d  i f  th e  a n n u a l e x p e n d i tu r e  
on prem ium s was in o r d in a te *  I t  h a s  b een  s a i d  t h a t  
th e  s i z e  o f  prem iums m ust be  r e a s o n a b le  i n  te rm s  o f  
th e  t o t a l  y e a r ly  e x p e n d i tu r e  )*"#
I n  G h r y s t a l 's  T r u s te e  v* C h r y s ta l^ ,  a  husband  
e f f e c t e d  a n  "endowment bond" w ith  a  l i f e  a s s u r a n c e  
s o c i e t y ,  th e  p r i n c i p a l  sum w ith  i n t e r e s t  and  p r o f i t s  
t o  be p a y a b le  t o  him on t h e  e la p s e  o f  tw e n ty  y e a r s ,  
b u t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  h i s  d e a th  b e f o r e  e x p iry  o f  t h e  
te%%, t h e  seme t o  be p a id  t o  h i s  w idow , whom f a i l i n g ,  
t o  h i s  e x e c u to rs *  I n  t h e  e v e n ts  %vhich h a p p en e d , th e  
h u sb an d  d ie d  w i th in  t h e  tw e n ty  y e a r  p e r i o d ,  s u r v iv e d  
by  h i s  w i f e ,  and  th e  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e  t h e r e a f t e r  was 
s e q u e s t r a t e d .
I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  th e  C o u rt d e c id e d  t h a t  
t h e  p o l i c y  e f f e c t e d  was " e x p re s s e d  upon th e  f a c e  o f  
i t  t o  be  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w i f e " ,  a s  th e  s t a t u t e  
s p e c i f i e s  /
1 ,  8 ,2  ( c o n t in u e d ) ,  S ee  g e n e r a l l y  S te w a r t  v* Hodge1 9 0 1 , 8  8 * L ,T , 4 3 6 ,2 ,  th o u g h  p e rh a p s  a  s in g l e  premium p o l ic y  w i l l  be m ore s u s p i c i o u s ,  I c f r ^ % m i l y  Law ", B ,l„ J o h n s o n  2nd e d ,  p ,1 l 6  " P ro b a b le  I n t e n t  to  d e f r a u d  c r e d i t o r s  c o u ld  be i n f e r r e d  i f  t h a t  was t h e  n e c e s s a r y  o r  p ro b a b le  r e s u l t  o f  e f f e c t i n g  th e  p o l i c y ,  a s  f o r  exam ple i f  a  man who was much in d e b te d ,  o r  who was a b o u t t o  em bark on a  h a z a rd o u s  s p e c u l a t i o n ,  w ere  t o  u s e  a  c o n s id e r a b le  p a r t  o f  
h i s  o s s e t s  i n  t a k i n g  o u t  a s in g l e  prem ium  p o l i c y  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w ife  end c h i l d r e n , "  P,M , B rom ley , F am ily  Law, 4 th  e d n , p ,3 7 2 ,  fn*15*3 ,  1912 8 ,C ,  1003 ,
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s p e c i f i e s  ( 8 # 2 ) ,  and t h a t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  c la im  o f
th e  w ife  tr iu m p h e d  o v e r  th o s e  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s *
1A c co rd in g  t o  L ord J o h n s to n  ,  "The s t a t u t e  d o es  
n o t  sa y  t h a t  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  w ife  m ust be  a b s o lu te  
an d  v o id  o f  c o n tin g e n c y , so  a s  to  l e a v e  n o b b in g  i n  
th e  husband*  I t  i s  r e c o g n is e d  t^ m t h e r  i n t e r e s t  
may be  c lo g g e d  w ith  th e  c o n tin g e n c y  o f  h e r  s u rv iv a n c e  
o f  h e r  h u sb a n d , and t h a t  s h o u ld  sh e  n o t  do  s o ,  h i s  
r a d i o a l  r i g h t  may r e s u l t  The A ct d e c l a r e s  th e  
p o l i c y  t o g e t h e r  w ith  a l l  b e n e f i t  t h e r e o f  t o  be deem ed 
a  t r u s t  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  w ife  f o r  h e r  s e p a r a t e  
u s e ,  ***; and t o  be  n o t  o th e r w is e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  c o n t r o l  o r  t o  form  p a r t  o f  h i s  e s t a t e *  I  
c a n n o t r e a d  th e  s t a t u t e  a s  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  
m ust be  i n  fa v o u r  o f  t h e  w ife  u n c o n d i t i o n a l ly  t o  
a d m it o f  i t ,  " t o g e t h e r  w ith  a l l  b e n e f i t  t h e r e o f " ,  
b e in g  deem ed a  t r u s t  f o r  tW  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  w ife*  I  
r e a d  th e  e n a c tm e n t a s  p r o v id in g  t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  and 
a l l  b e n e f i t  t h e r e o f  s h a l l  be  deemed a  t r u s t  f o r  th e
b e n e f i t  o f  th e  w ife  f o r  h e r  i n t e r e s t ,  a s  t h a t  i n t e r e s tPi s  d e f in e d  o r  e x p re s s e d  i n  th e  p o l ic y * * "
A t 1912 , b e f o r e  th e  com ing i n t o  o p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  
1920 A ct r e n d e r in g  d o n a tio n s  , ln te £  v iru m  e t  uxorem  
ir r w o o a b X e  /
1 .  i M d .  a t  p . 1008 .
G e n try  th e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  h a s  v e s te d  i n  t h e  th e n  i t  w i l l  form  p a r t  o f  h e r  e s t a t e  onh e r  d e a th  even  i f  sh e  p re d e c e a s e s  h e r  h u sb an d  -  t h a t  i s ,  on i t s  m a tu r i ty  on h e r  h u s b a n d 's  d e a th  o r  on i t s  e a r l i e r  surrender, h e r  e s t a t e  w i l l  r e c e iv e  the sums d u e , s u b j e c t  p o s s ib l y  t o  a  c la im  b y  th e  h u sb a n d ' e x e c u to r s  f o r  rep ay m en t o u t  o f  t h e  p r o c e e d s ,  o f  t h e  prem ium s p a id  s in c e  th e  w i f e 's  d e a th *  (G lo ag  and  H en d erso n  p p * 6 7 0 -6 7 1 ; C l iv e  & W ilso n  pp#319«» 320* )Of c o u rs e  i f ,  a s  i n  C h r y s ta l  (w h ere  th e  w ife  d id  
s u r v iv e  h e r  h u sb an d ) th e  w i f e 's  r i g h t  w as c o n t in g e n t  upon  h e r  s u rv iv a n c e  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d , t h e s e  r u l e s  w ould h ave  no a p p l i c a t io n *  I f  sh e  p r e d e c e a s e d ,  sh e  w ould l o s e  a l l  c la im  to  b e n e f i t  from  th e  p o l ic y #  ( C l iv e  & W ilso n , p*320)*
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I r r e v o c a b le  by  th e  d o n o r .  L ord  J o h n s to n  p o i n t s  o u t  
t h e  s p e c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a f f o r d e d  by t h e  1880 A ct t o  
su c h  "h u sb an d  to  w ife "  p r o v le io n e  -  th e  p o l i o y ,  
im m e d ia te ly  on i t s  b e in g  e f f e c t e d  v e s t s  i n  th e  
h u sb an d  and i s  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  h i s  c o n t r o l ,  n o r  d o es  
i t  fo rm  p a r t  o f  h i s  e s t a t e ,  n o r  i s  i t  l i a b l e  t o  th e  
d i l i g e n c e  o f  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  n o r  r e v o c a b le  a s  a  
d o n a t io n ,  n o r  r e d u c ib le  on  any  g round  o f  e x o e sa  o r  
in s o lv e n c y ,  "An argum en t was m a in ta in e d  by  Mr* 
C h r y s t a l 's  t r u s t e e  a s  to  w h e th e r , h a v in g  r e g a r d  t o  
h i s  m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a o t ,  th e  e f f e c t i n g  o f  th e  p o l ic y  
i n  q u e s t io n  was n o t  i n  e x c e s s  o f  a  r e a s o n a b le  
p r o v i s io n  and r e v o c a b le  a s  a  g r a t u i t o u s  d o n a t io n  and 
was re v o k e d  by  h i s  in s o lv e n c y ,  .o b j e c t i o n
i s  j u s t  one a m i  n e t  th e  s t a t u t e  e% press3v
p r o t e c t s  th e  w i f e .  The p o i n t  i s ,  I  t h i n k ,  beyond 
a rg u m en t ,**
L ord  M ackenzie  r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  co m p arab le  
E n g lis h  p r o v i s io n # ,  and  to  th e  o a s e s  o f  H o l t  v ,9 ' >5E v e r a l l * ,  and S e y to n  v# S a tte r th w a ite " '^  a s  h a v in g  
d e c id e d  t h a t  " th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  r e s u l t i n g  t r u s t  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  d id  n o t  
e x c lu d e  t h e  o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  A ct^#"
The o p in io n  o f  th e  L ord  P r e s id e n t  (D u n ed in ) was 
i n  a g re em e n t w i th  th e s e  s e n t im e n ts  b u t  w i th  l e s s  
e n th u s ia s m , b e in g  sw ayed from  th e  o r ig i .n a l  p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  p o l ic y  was n o t  n rim a  ^ ^ c ie  one f o r  th e  
b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  w i f e ,  by th e  s t r e n g th  o f  t h e  a rg u m en ts  
t o  th e  c o n t r a r y ,  a n d , i n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  se em s, b e in g  
m o tiv a te d  by  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  o f  h u m an ity  and good s e n s e :  
" I  f e e l  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  A ot i s  an e n a b l in g  s t a t u t e ,  and 
th e  /
1 .  p . 1 0 0 9 (em p h a sis  a d d e d ) .?.. 2  e s .D .2 6 6 .
3 .  34 C h.D . 511 .4 .  a t  p . 1011»
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t h e  c l a s s  o f  in s u r a n c e  w hich  i s  h e re  d i s c l o s e d ,  seem s1t o  be  a  v e ry  s e n s i b l e  one ,#*  " ,  Had i t  n o t  b een  
f o r  th e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  A c t ,  h e  n o t e s ,  " t h i s  money 
w o u ld , u n d o u b te d ly , b e lo n g  t o  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s , "
A w idow er h a s  b een  h e ld  t o  f a l l  w i th in  th e om eaning  o f  "any  m a r r ie d  m an", a s  u se d  i n  t h e  A ct ,  
an d  i t  h a s  b een  d e c id e d ^  t h a t  w here a  h u sb an d  becom es 
u n w i l l in g  o r  u n a b le  t o  k eep  up th e  p ay m en ts  on a  
p o l i c y  u n d e r  th e  A c t, i t  may be s u r r e n d e r e d  a t  any  
tim e  by  th e  t r u s t e e  (who w i l l  u s u a l ly  be  th e  h u sb a n d , 
t h o u ^  " th e  p e r a o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  t r u s t e e  h a s  n o th in g  t o  
do w ith  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  th e  c l a u s e ,  i t  i s  m e re ly  a  
c o n v e n ie n t  a rra n g e m e n t^ " )  w ith  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  w if eK( t h e  b e n e f i c i a r y )  o r  ev en  by  th e  t r u s t e e  a lo n e  w i th o u t  
c o n s e n t  o f  th e  w i f e ,  u n l e s s  th e  I n s u ra n c e  company 
"h ad  n o t i c e  o f  a n y  c o n te m p la te d  b re a c h  o f  t r u s t e e "
The p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  th e  sum o b ta in e d  may th e n  b e  
Ml by
I n  /
7s e iz e d  th e  husband  i s  n o t  a lw ay s  f a c e d  s q u a r e ly  ,
1 ,  a t  p . 1011 ,2 ,  K e n n ed y 's  T rs*  v ,  S h a rp e  (1 8 9 5 ) 23 R*146#3m Schumann e t c ,  v ,  S c o t t i s h  W idow 's Fund S o c ie ty  (1 8 8 6 ) 15 a ,6 7 8 .  S ee  W alto n , p . 2 2 7 ,4 .  Schum ann, p e r  L*P. I n g l i s  a t  p # 6 8 1 ,
9» p e r  LmShand a t  p ,6 8 5 ,6 ,  i b i d ,  p e r  L*Shand,
7 ,  S e T w a l to n ,  p ,2 2 7 ;  L *8 to rm onth  D a i l in g  i n  D o n a ld ,  i n f r ^ , a t  p p « 2 0 1 /2 , w i th  r e f e r e n c e  t o  Schumann^ n o te s  t h a t  t h e r e ,  no means w a s , o r  p ro b a b ly  c o u ld  b e ,  ta k e n  to  p r e v e n t  such  a  r e s u l t ,  b u t  c o n s id e r s  
t h a t  i t  w as c l e a r  t h e r e  " t h a t  t h e  C o u rt r e f u s e d  t o  r e g a r d  a s  i n  c o n te m p la t io n  th e  b re a c h  o f  t r u s t  w hich  w ould h ave  b een  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  husb an d  u s in g  th e  money f o r  h i s  own p u r p o s e s ,"  I f  th e  f u t u r e  u s e  o f  t h e  redeem ed sum c a n n o t be  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  w i f e ,  th e n  th e  b e n e f i t  t o  w ife  by  husbandM  r e v o c a b le :  c o n t r a .  I f  th e  k e e p in g  up o f  prem ium sh a s  become an  e x p e n s iv e  lu x u ry  t o  th e  f a m i ly ,  sh o u ld  n o t  t h e  w i f e ' s  p r o v i s i o n  be tra n s m u te d  t o  augm ent t h e  f a m ily  r e s o u r c e s ?  (Sc*Law Comm#Memo*No,22 recom m ends t h e  p l a c in g  o f  a  f u l l y  r e c i p r o c a l  d u ty  o f  a l im e n t  on h u sb an d  and  w ife  -  P a r a ,2 , 1 5 , ) .  I s  n o t  t a l k  o f  " b re a c h  o f  t r u s t "  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  e x c e p t  i n  /
2 1 6 .
I n  the c a s e  of The Scottish Life A ssu ra n ce  Go. v. 
Jo h n  Donald Ltd^#, a policy effected under the Act by 
a husband for the benefit of his w if e  had b e en  assigned 
subsequently by him w ith  her (apparent) consent (though 
the wife's evidence was that she had no knowledge of 
what sh e  had signed)» and the widow on his death 
disputed the validity of this* It was decided that 
th e  /
i n  a case of premeditated 'f r a u d u l e n t' calculation by a husband (though such, of c o u r s e ,  might In d e e d  be found)?H ow ever, C l iv e  and W11son  ( p . 3 1 8 ) , w it h  r e f e r e n c eto th e  cases of Donald and Schumann, affirm that, "The p ro c e e d s  o f  s u r r e n d e r  w i l l  c o n t in u e  t o  be  subject to the t r u s t  f o r  the wife's b e n e f i t . "  The position there s e t  forth appears to be that the husband may s u r r e n d e r  th e  policy, b u t  the trust p u rp o s e s  will rem a in  good. See per L.Adarn i n  Schumann, at p.683s- " I t  i s  th e  policy itself and all b e n e f i t  thereof w hich is to be h e ld  in  
t r u s t  for the wife. That i n d i c a t e s  v e ry  clearly that she is to have th e  whole b e n e f i c i a l  interest i n  it, and if that i s  s o ,  I can  see no reason why she, h a v in g  the s o l e  beneficial interest, may not deal with it as she thinks proper. What is to be done with the proceeds I do not know; they may be required f o r  im m ed ia te  s u p p o r t ,  o r  they may be i n v e s te d  by the husband. I cannot t e l l  w hat it may be thought r i g h t  to do w ith  them, but I see no r e a s o n  t o  su p p o se  t h a t  th e  w ife  i s  d i s a b le d  from  uplifting them." (As t o  d i s c h a r g e  now by  w i f e ,
®®® t i r f r a . )  .Murray vpp«62/63 and  fn.1) w r i t e s , "W hether the trust rem a in s  i n  th e  h u sb a n d, or i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  o t h e r  t r u s t e e s ,  it creates an i n t e r e s t  in the b e n e f i c i a r y  w hich  i s  indefeasible, so  far as thehusband i s  c o n c e rn e d . The w ife  or children, a s  the case may be, may, how ever, s u r r e n d e r  the policy, and deal w ith  the p r o c e e d s ."  S i m i la r ly  (Clive),"A p u r p o r te d  assignation by  the husband alone, as t r u s t e e  o f  a policy for h i s  wife's benefit, w ould hardly be accepted by creditors or o th e r  t h i r d  parties, but in any ©vent w ould be ineffective so f a r  a s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the t r u s t ,  t h e  mere terms of the policy being s u f f i c i e n t  to alert t h e  assignee as to the trust's existence."(1 9 0 1 ) 9 8 .L .T .  200*
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1the t r u s t  c r e a te d  In h e r  favour by th e  policy could 
n o t  be  d is c h a r g e d  by h e r  s t a n t e  was
n o te d  that a d i s t i n c t i o n  was drawn by L ord  Kyllaohy 
b e tw een  su ch  a c t i o n  and  s u r r e n d e r  o f  th e  p o l i c y ,  w hich
" in d eed , m ight be q u i t e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  i t s
p r o t e c t i o n , "  (L o rd  S to rm o n th  D a r l in g  i n  D onald  
explained Schumann's result of p la c in g  th e  p o l ic y  
fu n d s  " a t  th e  m ercy o f  th e  husband" by r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  C o u r t 's  apparent r e f u s a l  to recognise the possibility 
o f  su ch  b re a c h  o f  t r u s t  by  th e  h usband  ( a s  n o te d  j^ n fra ) 
and  a l s o  b e c a u se  o f  " th e  p e c u l i a r  n a tu r e  o f  a  p o l ic y  
o f  in s u r a n c e  w hich  a  h u sb an d  may be u n w i l l in g  o r  
u n a b le  t o  keep  u p , and t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  w hich  m ig h t 
t h e r e f o r e  be a l t o g e t h e r  l o s t ,  I f  s u r r e n d e r  w ere  n o t  
allow ed^^, " )
C l iv e  and  M ils o n , how ever e x p la in  t h a t  "T h ere  
i s  now n o th in g  t o  p r e v e n t  a  m a r r ie d  woman from  
dealing as she l i k e s  w ith  h e r  interest i n  th e  trust 
created by the Act
A s u c c i n c t  exposition o f  the 1880 A ct is given by 
Lord Stormonth Darling, i n  Donald, as fo l lo w s ^ * -  "A 
p o l i c y  o f  a s s u r a n c e  e f f e c t e d  by a  m a r r ie d  man u n d e r  
the second s e c t i o n  o f  the Act o f  1880 h a s  c e r t a i n  
high p r i v i l e g e s #  I f  expressed upon t h e  face of i t  
(as this policy is) to be for the b e n e f i t  of his 
w ife  and c h i l d r e n ,  i t  i s  deemed a  t r u s t  f o r  h e r  o r  
t h e i r  b e n e f i t .  It im m e d ia te ly  vesta i n  him and h i s  
legal representatives, or i n  any t r u s t e e ,  d u ly  
n o m in a ted  /
1# See th e  w o rd in g  o f  8 ,2 #2# See also Barras v* Scottish Widow's Fund and L if e  Assurance Society (1900) 2 F .1 0 9 4 .3# I n  B a r r a s  a b o v e ,  ( l ,  O.-'s o p in io n  r e p o r te d  a t  p . 1 0 9 6 . )4# a t  pp.201-202# (cf. L. Shand i n  Schumann at p.683). 5 , at p#318, making r e f e r e n c e  to the im p o r ta n t  1950 cas© of Be1th's Tra. v .  B. 1950 S.C#66'•6* at p#200#
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nominated, for the trust purposes so e x p re s s e d ;  it 
is not otherwise subject to the husband's control; 
it does not fom part of his estate; it is not liable 
to the diligence of his creditors; it is not revocable 
as a donation; and it is not reducible on the grounds 
of excess or insolvency. In these two latter particulars, 
its privileges are higher than those of a policy 
effected by a husband at common law and assigned to 
trustees for the benefit of his wife* In short, it'iis a postnuptial provision of peculiar sanctity
The Act of 1880 (s.1) speaks of policies effected 
by a married woman on her husband's life (or her own 
life) for h e r  separate use, and in s.2, of assurance 
by the husband of his own life for the benefit of his 
wife and/or children* It is s#2, however, which 
confers the special benefits, and only to policies 
f a l l i n g  w i th in  i t s  a m b i t • The aim w hich  s .1  s e t  o u t  
t o  s e r v e  was a c h ie v e d  f o r  a l l  c a s e s  by the M a rr ie d
Women's P r o p e r ty  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t, 1920 , s . 1 ^ .
%A c co rd in g  to  Murray*^, th e  a s s u ra n c e  o f  th e  w i f e 's  
l i f e  by  th e  husband  s t i l l  s ta n d s  on common la w ^ .
What was t o  be th e  r u l e  w here t h e  p r o v i s io n  was made by 
a  w ife  on h e r  own l i f e  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  h e r  husb an d ?
The 1880 A ct i s  a n o th e r  example o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  th e  
s i l e n c e  o f  w h ich  on c e r t a i n  p o i n t s  d e n o te s  an  e a r l i e r  
and  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  e r a .  The e x t r a o r d in a r y  -  b u t  
b e n e f i c i a l  /
1• Of th e  " r e a s o n a b le  p r o v is io n "  ( t a k in g  e f f e c t  ond e a th )  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  C l iv e  and  W ilson  ( p .336) w r i t e ,"The d o c t r i n e  o f  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s io n  h a s  b een  a p p l ie d  t o  a  provision by way o f  an  in s u r a n c e  p o l ic y  andc o u ld  s t i l l  be u s e f u l  i n  t h i s  context i n  t h e  c a s eo f  a  p o l i c y  n o t  f a l l i n g  u n d e r  th e  M a rr ie d  Women's P o l i c i e s  o f  A ssu ra n c e  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t , 1 8 8 0 " .2* W alto n , p.225s p.195*3. p.61 (C h a p te r  1, p.95)4. S e e , f o r  e q u iv a le n t  E n g l i s h  r u l e ,  t h a t  a  h u sb an d  h a s  
a n  i n s u r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  h i s  w i f e 's  l i f e  ( a  p o i n t  lo n g  i n  d o u b t i n  E n g lis h  law ) G r i f f i t h s  v .  F lem ing  [1909] 1 K.B.805*
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b e n e f i c i a l  -  a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  I s  t h a t  th e  E n g lis h4
M a r r i e d  Women's P r o p e r ty  A c t, 1882 , s$11 , d id
encom pass th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  d e s i r e ,  w ith  th e
r e s u l t  t h a t  p o l i c i e s  to  t h i s  end have  b e en  ta k e n  o u t?u n d e r  th e  E n g l is h  A ct"#
- u n t i l  1 9 8 0 ,
O t h e r w i s e ,  p resu m ab ly  /  s u c h  a  p r o v i s i o n ,  m a d e  
b y  w i f e  f o r  b e n e f i t  o f  h u sb a n d , w o u l d  be c o n s i d e r e d  
a n  i n t e r - s p o u s e  d o n a tio n  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  A ct o f  1 9 2 0 ^ ,  
o f  w hich W a l t o n  p o i n t s  o u t^  t h a t  th e s e  " l i k e  o t h e r  
g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s ,  may o f  c o u rs e  b e  a t t a c k e d  by 
c r e d i t o r s  i f  t h e y  a r e  s t r u c k  a t  by t h e  A c t  1 6 2 1 ,  c # 1 8 #  
The e f f e c t  o f  th e  A ot o f  1920 was n o t  to  c o n f e r  any  
s p e c i a l  p r i v i l e g e s  on  su c h  d o n a t io n s ,  b u t  m e re ly  a f t e r  
t h e  l a p s e  o f  a  y e a r  and day  t o  p u t  them upon  th e  same 
f o o t in g  a s  o t h e r  g r a t u i to u s  g i f t s ^ , "
I n t e r  /
1 # See C h a p t e r  1 ,  p . 1 05 ,
2 .  S e e  C liv e  and W ilso n , p*3 1 7 , fn# 75#5* and t h e r e f o r e  i r r e v o c a b l e ;  c o u ld  I t  t h e n  bes u r r e n d e r e d  by th e  w i f e ,  on c o n d i t io n  t h a t  t h e  p ro c e e d s  vfore t o  be  a p p l i e d  t o  Wie h u s b a n d 'sb e n e f i t ?  Cf* p o s i t i o n  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  th e  1880A c t ,  s u p r a ,  pp..2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ., f n .  7 . T here  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a  p re s u m p tio n  a g a i n s t  d o n a t io n ,  w hich  a p p l i e s  -  b u t  n o t  so  s t r o n g ly  -  b e tw een  sp o u s e s  ( C l iv e  & W ilso n , 
p p * 2 9 0 - 2 9 1 ;  W a l t o n ,  p # 1 8 1 ) ,  T h e  l a o k  o f  s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s io n  f o r  t h i s  ty p e  o f  in s u r a n c e  a rra n g e m e n t (b y  w ife  f o r  h u sb an d ) i n  th e  1880 A ct may be  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  v iew  t h a t  s h e  had  no g e n e r a l  
l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n  ( S e e  C h a p te r  1 ,  p p # 5 8 - 6 4 , e s p . p . 6 2 , f n . 3 , s o  t o  p ro v id e  f o r  h im , n o r ,  p r o b a b ly ,  th e  means t o  do so# Cf* W alton  p * 1 7 S  ( " A  R e a s o n a b l e  P r o v i s i o n  
was n o t  a  D o n a tio n  R e v o c a b le " ) ; -  "And a l th o u g h  a  w ife  i s  n o t  p e rh a p s  u n d e r  a  n a t u r a l  o b l i g a t i o n  to  p ro v id e  f o r  h e r  h u sb a n d , y e t  i t  can  h a r d ly  be d o u b te d  t h a t  a  p o s t - n u p t i a l  s e t t l e m e n t  by h e r  o f  h e r  e s t a t e  f o r  b e h o o f o f  h e r  h usband  and c h i l d r e n  w ould h a v e  been  i n  m ost c i r c u m a t a n o e s  s e c u r e  a g a i n s t  r e v o c a t i o n " .
4 b p # 1 8 D ,
5 .  C o n t r a s t ,  t h e r e w i th ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  " h ig h  p r i v i l e g e s "  o f  th e  1880 Aot#
6 . But s e e  now M arried Women's P o l i c i e s  o f  A ssurance ( S c o t la n d )  Amendment A c t ,  I 9 8 O, w hich  e x te n d s  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  s . 2 o f  the  1880  Act t o  p o l i c i e s  tak en  out by m arried  women or unm arried  
p e r so n s  and e x p r e s s e d  upon the f a c e  o f  them to  be f o r  the  b e n e f i t  o f  spouse  or c h i ld r e n  ( s . l ) .  See a l s o  s s ,  2 and 5 .
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A l l  i n t e r - s p o u s e  t r a n s f e r s  p o t e n t i a l l y  d a n g e ro u s  
o r  p r e j u d i o i a l  t o  c r e d i t o r a  o a n n o t be subsum ed u n d e r  
t h e  h e a d in g a  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s ,  l i f e  a s s u ra n c e  
p r o v i s i o n s ,  m a r r ia g e - o o n t r a o t  p r o v i s io n s  (now r a r e )  o r  
d o n a tio n s ^ #  "The s& p a ra te  p r o p e r ty  sy s tem  g iv e s  
sp o u s e s  c o n s id e r a b le  freedom  t o  t r a n s f e r  p r o p e r ty
bet%foen th e m s e lv e s  to  th e  p r e j u d i c e  o f  t h e i r  c r e d i t o r s , "pcomment C l iv e  and  W ilso n  ,  who t h e r e a f t e r  p o i n t  o u t  
t h a t ,  q u i t e  a p a r t  from  th e  above s p e c i a l t i e s ,  a  
c r e d i t o r  may be a b le  t o  a t t a c k  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a  t r a n s f e r  
on th e  g ro u n d  t h a t  i t  i s  "shem o r  s im u la t e " ,  o r  on 
th e  g ro u n d  t h a t ,  i n  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  o a s e ,  th e  mode o f  
t r a n s f e r  was i n e f f e c t i v e  t o  t r a n s f e r  th e  p r o p e r t y ,  o r  
p e rh a p s  on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r o r  i s  n o t  
d iv e s te d  f u l l y  o f  th e  p r o p e r ty  " t r a n s f e r r e d " ,  & p r i n c i p l e  
w hich  " a p p l i e s  t o  r e v o c a b le  t r a n s f e r s ^ . "
A lim en t«M «I?»
A o oord ing  t o  W alto n ^ , a  v r ife , f o r  h e r  m a in ten a n o e  
d u r in g  c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  m ust ra n k  a lw ays a f t e r  t h e  
h u sb a n d ' s  ( o t h e r )  c r e d i t o r s ,  "#*# th e  husband  c a n n o t 
r e s i s t  a n  a c t i o n  f o r  a  la w fu l  d e b t  on th e  g round  t h a t  
he  m ust m a in ta in  h i s  w i f e " ,  and  he  a l s o  s t a t e s  t h a t
" T h e  w ife  h a s  no c la im  f o r  a l i m e n t  a g a i n s t  h e r  h u sb a n d ' s5 6 7b e n ltru p t e s t a t e ,  e x c e p t  u n d e r  a  m r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  " '  ,
T h is  p h i lo s o p h y , i f  a d h e re d  t o  th ro u g h o u t  th e  
c h an g e s  n e c e s s i t a t e d  by an  a d o p tio n  o f  some fo rm  o f  
oom m unity o f  p r o p e r t y ,  i f  t h a t  w ere c o n te m p la te d , 
w ould  /
1 ,  A s  t o  d o n a t io n s , s e e  C l iv e  & W i l s o n  p p * 332-337 (" R e v o c a b le  D o n a tio n s  be tw een  Husband and W ife" ) and  W a lto n , C h a p te r  X V III .2 ,  p .3 2 9 .
3 ,  0 £ . ^ »  pp»329-530»
5» p»156»5 .  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p p .339-3407 .  S ee  Memo» N o.2 2 : 2 .1 1 8 ,
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vouM  W v e  fa :> " re a c h in g  e f f e c t s .  I n  an y  new schem e,
t h e  r e s p e c t iv e  r i g h t s  o f  th e  fa m ily  u n i t ,  and t h i r d
p a r t y  c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  f a m ily  u n i t ,  o r  o f  one member
t h e r e o f ,  w ould r e q u i r e  c a r e f u l  th o u g h t  and  c l e a r  1t r e a tm e n t  ,
8ucli /
1 ,  S ee  g e n e r a l l y ,  new th o u g h ts  on th e  s p e c i f i c ,  b u t  r e l a t e d  t o p ic  o f  a l im e n t ,  S c o t t i s h  Law C om m ission Memorandum, No#22, 'A lim e n t and F in a n c ia l  P r o v i s i o n ' ,  d i s c u s s e d  i n f r a .Finer C om m ittee Report, "O n e -P a re n t F a m il ie s "  (1974) Cmnd* 5 6 2 9 .I t  i s  n o te d  a l s o  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a t  p r e s e n t  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  by th e  S c o t t i s h  Law Com m ission a  R e p o rt on  B an k ru p tcy  v h lo h  w i l l  c o n s id e r  i n t e r  a l i a  "P rob lem s o f  th e  r a n k in g  o f  th e  c la im is" o F  mi a l im e n ta r y  d e p e n d a n t on  th e  d e b t o r 's  b a n k ru p tc y " .  (Memo* N o * 2 2 s  1 * 3 8 ) *  M em o *  H o * 2 2  i t s e l f  makes c e r t a i n  recom m endations p e r t i n e n t  t o  t h i s  d ic s u s s io n *  T h ese  may be  s tu d i e d  a t  3*92 -  3 .9 5  (a n d  s e e  
S u m m a r y  -  Vbl#1 -  85)#A t 3 .9 2 ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  i n  t l ie  u n l ik e l y  e v e n t  o f  a  paym ent on d iv o r c e  b e in g  o rd e re d  from  a  p a r t y  who s h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  becom es b a n k ru p t ,  t h a t  paym ent c o u ld  n o t  be r e g a rd e d  a s  c h a l le n g e a b le  and  r e d u c ib le  a s  a  g r a t u i to u s  a l i e n a t i o n  a t  common law  
( q . v .  g e n e r a l l y  s u p r a )# I t  i s  a rg u e dt h a t  t h e  paym ent i s  n e i t h e r  v o lu n ta r y  n o r  g r a t u i t o u s  i n  th o s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  T h ere  i s  t h e  f u r t h e r  p rob lem  -  e n c o u n te re d  i n  L ea rm o n th , su n ra #  -  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r ,  b e in g  a  c a s h  p ay m en t, w bulE  n o t  be c h a l le n g e a b le  u n d e r  th e  A ct 1621 , o ,1 8 .  As t o  a n  o r d e r  f o r  p r o p e r ty  t r a n s f e r ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t l i a t  p a r t i e s  on th e  p o in t  c f  b o in g  d iv o rc e d  from  e a c h  o t h e r  m ig h t n o t  be t r e a t e d  a s  'c o n j u n c t '  o r  'c o n f i d e n t '  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  each  o t h e r  and  t h a t  a  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s io n  o r d e r  on d iv o r c e  m ig h t n o t  bo r e g a r d e d  a s  a  t r a n s f e r  l a c k in g  t r u e ,  j u s t  and  n e c e s s a r y  c a u se s*  The o r d e r ( s ) ,  t h u s ,  m ig h t n o t  be open  t o  c h a l le n g e  e i t h e r  a t  common law  o r  s t a t u t e ,  "The m a t t e r ,  h o w ev er, s h o u ld  n o t  be l e f t  i n  d o u b t ."  (3 * 9 3 ) s i m i l a r l y ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  su c h  t r a n s f e r s  w ould  n o t  be c h a l le n g e a b le  a s  f r a u d u l e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s *
P u b l ic  o p in io n  i s  so u g h t on  ih e  q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  
p r o p e r  p r i o r i t y  o f  a  sp o u se  and Üie c r e d i t o r s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  spouse*  I t  i s  n o te d  t h a t  l e g a l  r i g h t s  a r e  e x ig i b l e  o u t  o f  th e  ^ t  e s t a t e  and t h a t  a  d iv o r c e  t r a n s f e r  i n  E ng lanS  (M a tr im o n ia l C auses A c t, 1 9 7 3 , 8 .3 9 )  may be s e t  a s id e  by t h e  t r u s t e e  i n  b a n k ru p tc y  /
2 2 2 ,
Such  a  p o s i t i o n  a p p e a rs  t o  be an  exam ple o f  th e
" p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  good o r  bad  f o r tu n e "  a t t i t u d e ,  ia l r e a d y  n o te d  * t o  c o n ju g a l  f i n a n c e s ,  w h ic h , i n  
c o n t r a s t  w i th  th o s e  n o t io n s  w hich u n d e r l i e  t h e  th e o iy  
o f  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p r o p e r ty  g e n e r a l l y ,  t e n d s  t o  a r i s e  
i n  /
b a n k ru p to y  o f  th e  t r a n s f e r o r .  The C o m m iss io n 's  P r o p o s i t i o n  85 (3 # 9 4 ) i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  ~ "a  t r a n s f e r  o f  p r o p e r ty  be tw een  sp o u se s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  immune from  c h a l le n g e  a s  a g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  a t  common law  by r e a s o n  o n ly  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t v t h e  t r a n s f e r  h a s  b een  made by u n d e r  an  order* o f  th e  c o u r t  on d iv o r c e ,  b u t  th e  B an k ru p tcy  A ct 1621 (u n d e r  w hich  a l i e n a t i o n s  t o  " c o n ju n c t  and c o n f id e n t  p e rs o n s "  a r e  p resum ed  i n  c e r t a i n  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  t o  be  g r a t u i t o u s l y  made by  an  in s o lv e n t )  sh o u ld  n o t  a p p ly  t o  su c h  a  t r a n s f e r . "  "The e f f e c t  w ould be t h a t  c r e d i t o r s  c o u ld  re d u c e  a  t r a n s f e r  o f  p r o p e r ty  i f  th e y  c o u ld  p ro v e  t h a t  th e  t r a n s f e r o r - s p o u s e  was 
i n s o l v e n t  and  t h a t  ( a p a r t  from  th e  c o u r t  o r d e r )  t h e  t r a n s f e r  was g r a t u i t o u s  a t  th e  t im e  i t  was m ade. B u t th e y  w ould  n o t  be a id e d  by  p re s u m p tio n s  w hich w ould be a r t i f i c i a l  and  u n r e a l i s t l o  i n  th e  n o rm a l, n o n - c o l lu s iv e  d iv o r c e  s i t u a t i o n " .  (3 .9 4 )
I t  oan  b e  s e e n  t h a t  th e  d i s c u s s io n  i n  t h e s e  p a ra g ra p h s  i s  l im i t e d  t o  th e  e f f e c t  o f  b a n k ru p tc y  on p e o u n ia ry  and p r o p e r ty  o r d e r s  on d iv o r c e .("N o rm a lly  a n  in s o lv e n t  sp o u se  o r  a sp o u se  v e rg in g  on b a n k ru p to y  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  a  d lv o ro e  a c t io n  w ould n o t  be  o rd e re d  t o  p a y  a  c a p i t a l  sum o r  t o  t r a n s f e r  p r o p e r ty  on d iv o r o e .  He w ould be a b le  t o  d e m o n s tra te  t h a t  h i s  m eans w ere  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t .  I t  i s  c o n c e iv a b le ,  ho w ev er, t h a t  th ro u g h  I n a d v e r te n c e  o r  o o l lu a iv e  a g re e m e n t b e tw een  th e  s p o u s e s ,  a  
c a p i t a l  paym ent o r  p r o p e r ty  t r a n s f e r  o o u ld  be o r d e r e d ."  ( 3 . 9 2 ) ) #Where th e  p a y e r  becom es in s o lv e n t  a f t e r  th e  c o u r t  o r d e r  b u t  b e f o r e  im p lem en tin g  t h e  c a p i t a l  paym ent o r  p r o p e r ty  t r a n s f e r  t h e r e i n  c o n ta in e d ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  " th e  p a y ee  sh o u ld  be  a b le  t o  ra n k  a s  a n  o r d in a r y  c r e d i t o r  f o r  an y  o u ts ta n d in g  am ounts due  b u t  u n p a id #  T h is  vm uld be th e  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n  an d  we make no s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  change# The q u e s t io n  o f  r a n k in g  f o r  f u t u r e  I n s ta lm e n ts  o f  p e r i o d i c a l  a llo w a n c e  i s  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  w hich  a r i s e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  f u t u r e  a l im e n t  and we t h in k  i t  i s  b e s t  d e a l t  w i th  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  b a n k ru p tc y  law  r e f o r m " . ( 3 .9 5 )  On th e s e  and o th e r  s u g g e s t io n s  made i n  th e  Memorandum, and  m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r ty  law  re fo rm  g e n e r a l l y ,  s e e  C h a p te r  7 .See s u p r a , and Cha|>ter 1 .
S ee a l s o  Memo N o ,2 2 , 3 * 9 4 .
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4in those (exceptional) aspects of the separation
system which display the characteristics of community 
of property*
It is clear that a husband cannot set aside
funds for the future maintenanoe of his wife secure2from the claims of creditors , and it has been seen 
that the wife cannot rank simply qua wife for aliment 
(future or arrears)^. Where she holds decree of 
separation and aliment, she may rank for arrears but 
not for prospective future payments^, and Clive and 
Wilson /
1• being, chiefly, the rules concerning aliment stante matrimonio, and on separation, financial provision oîFHxvorcé, and rules of testate and Intestate succession favouring the surviving spouse and family*2. Walton, pp*180-181; C liv e  & Wilson, p*332, p#340(contrast the discussion of the problems to creditors posed by the non-alimentary annuity, pp.340-341); contra# consider the reasonable, non fraudulent, ante-nuptial provision, and the postnuptial provision to take effect on dissolution of the marriage, supra 
p p .3* Clive and Wilson, pp*339-340* See Chapter 4*
4. ibid* p.340; Walker, Prlns.11,2078* Memo*Ho.22s ’2.lf8 suggests that the reason for the spouse's i n a b i l i t y  to rank for future payments under decree is not so much the traditional v iew  that such a claim is Incapable of valuation, but rather that "of its nature the claim cannot compete with the claims of ordinary creditors", (anterior explanation therein contained) The paragraph continues, "A countervailing advantage is e n jo y e d  by the alimentary creditor in that the bankrupt's discharge does not affect his liability for future aliment."("Marjoribanks v* Amos (183l) 10 s*79"), and concludes, " *•* there is an unsatisfactory element of uncertainty about the law on alimentary claims in bankruptcy although the more recent cases seem to conform to principle and commonsense* Wethink that, if clarification is required here, it should be dealt with in the context of the law of bankruptcy rather than the law of aliment."
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W ilso n  d o u b t w h e th e r  sh e  w ould su o o eed  I n  an  a t te m p t  
t o  o la im  paym anta  due u n d e r  an  a l im e n ta r y  a llo w a n ce ^ *  
I n  t r u t h .  I n  t im e  o f  a t r e a a ,  t h e  d e f e c t i v e  n a tu r e  o f  
a l im e n t  (fro m  t h e  w i f e ' s  s ta n d p o in t )  i s  c l e a r l y  
e v id e n t  $ I n  no n -em erg en o y . I t s  p re s e n c e  may ïm rd ly  
b e  n o t ic e d  ( th o u g h  i t s  ab aen ce  w ould  q u ic k ly  be 
a p p a r e n t )  e x c e p t  perkiape i n  th e  t a n g i b l e  form  o f  
t h e  "h o u se k e e p in g  a l lo w a n c e " ,  w hich  i t a e l f  i a  a n o th e r  
to p io ^ *
T h is  f o l lo w s  from  p ag e  2 2 3 , fn * 2 ; su c h  a n  a l lo w a n c e , Bay C l iv e  an d  W ilso n  a t  p#340. I f  n o t  t o  be r e g a rd e d  a s  a  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  ( th o u g h  s e e  
a t  p*332 t h e  o p in io n  e x p re s s e d  t h a t  paym ents o f  a l im e n t  due  u n d e r  common la w , se p a Æ E lo n  a g re e m e n t o r  d e c r e e  c o u ld  n o t  be r e g a rd e d  a s  
g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s )  o r  a  d o n a tio n  p o s s ib ly  r e v o c a b le  by  c r e d i t o r s ,  m igh t be  c o n s id e r e d  t o  be a  d e v ic e  i n  f r a u d  o f  c r e d i to r s #
See C h a p te r  3 ( 'p r a e p o s l t u r a '% p p , 227-237  ) ;  s e e  g e n e r a l l y  C W p te rs  4  (A lim e n t)  an d  %
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DILIGENCE AMD LITIGATION
A n o th e r  a s p e c t  o f  # ie  r o lo t lo n o h lp  o f  h u sb an d  and 
wife i n  p r o p e r ty  m a t t e r s ,  and  one which c a n  be o f  great 
Im p o r ta n c e , ia  that of th e  right of action  available to  
a  wife against h e r  husband, o r  to  a husband against h is  
w ife .
I t  M b b een  seen t h a t  in  t h e  p a s t  l i t ig a t io n  by o r  
a g a i n s t  a  m a r r ie d  woman r e q u i r e d  th e  c o n c u rro n o e  o f  th e  
h u sb an d  o r  t h e  c ita tio n  o f  t h e  husband f o r  h i s  i n t e r e s t ^ *
H av ing  s t a t e d  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  p o s i t i o n ,  B rsk in e ^  
s t e r n l y  s e t s  out the s u b s ta n t iv e  aspect -  "Yet a w ife  i s  
n o t  t o  be  a u th o r i s e d  t o  su e  h e r  h u sb a n d , e x c e p t  i n  
n e c e s s a r y  o r  u r g e n t  c a s e s ,  ex#gr#, i f  h e  b e  ' v e rg e n s  ad
Cr o s s ,  1 6  l e v ,  1704 , M # 6 0 5 0 )  [ i f a o p h o r s o n ,  I S
Ja n *  1773# M*6052, where th e  husband  was " o b o e ra tu s "  
and  " la t ita ts " ] or i f  he h a s  w i l f u l l y  d i v e r t e d  from  o r  
th row n  o f f  h i s  w i f e :  Lady F o u l l s  21 Dec* 1626# K #6158," 
H ow ever, he  a d d s ,  " P ro c e s s  I s  s u s ta in e d  a t  t h e  s u i t  o f  
th e  w i f e ,  t h o u ^  no c u r a t o r  b e  a u t h o r i s e d ,  w here  s h e  
s u e s  h e r  husband#  a f t e r  s e p a r a t i o n ,  f o r  paym ent o f  a  
y e a r l y  aim  w M ch h e  h ad  a g re e d  to  g iv e  h e r  I n  name o f  
a lim o n y ; E * A rg y ll 7 Nov* 1695# M ,6054; f o r  i f  h e r  
p e rs o n  be i n  t h a t  c a s e  so  f a r  r e c o v e re d  from  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  povm r, t h a t  sh e  l a  e n a b l e  o f  e n jo y in g  th e  
p r o p e r ty  o f  a n  E ü.im entary  p r o v i s i o n ,  sh e  m ust a l s o  be 
c a p a b le  o f  h o ld in g  p l e a  f o r  th e  r e c o v e r y  c f  t h a t  p r o v i s i o n ,"
The t e x t  s t a t e s  t h a t  a  w ife  may u s e  c a p t io n  a g a i n s t  
h e r  h u sb an d  f o r  t h e  a r r e a r s  o f  a  s e p a r a t e  a l im e n t  due 
t o  h e r*  M a o la c h la n  25 May, 1 8 0 9 , F*G *, b u t  t h a t  i t  
w ould  a p p e a r#  from  a  c a s e  a b r id g e d  i n  t h e  F o l io  
D ic t io n a r y ,  t h a t  " o n c e , t h e  L o rd s  gave  t h e i r  o p in io n  
t h a t  no  action  n o r  m  d iligence can p ro c e e d  b e tw ix t  man 
and w ife  i ^ l l e  t);xe m a r r ia g e  s u b s i s t s "  1 F o l .D i o t ,  p . 40 6 ; 
H a m ilto n , 11 J a n ,  1625# H ow ever, i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  in  the
t e x t  t h a t  th e  /
1* E rsk#  1*6*21 , 
2* ib id #
226*
t h e  a b r id g e d  r e p o r t  when com pared w ith  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
one ( D u r lo ,  p * 1 5 5 , M*6048) waa s t a t e d  to o  b r o a d ly ,  and  
a t  an y  r a t e  r e f e r e n c e  i a  made t o  a  c o n t r a r y  d e o ia io n  
p ro n o u n ced  aoon  a f t e r w e r d e ;  Lady O le n b e r v le ,  13 J u ly  
1 6 5 8 , M .6053,
I t  l a  p o in te d  o u t t lm t  a  h u sb a n d , on  ahow lng c a u s e ,  
may o b ta in  a  c a p t io n  on  l e t t e r s  o f  law burrovm  a g a i n s t  
h l a  %vife* Thom son, 7  M arch , 1815# F*C, ( s e e  a l s o  C o ld e r  
24 Feb* 1 8 4 1 , 5 D*615) and t h a t  (F r*  1*467) a  w ife  may 
a l s o  o b t a in  law burrow a a g a i n s t  h e r  husband#  A 
d la o u a s lo n  on  l ^ l a  s u b j e c t  w i l l  alvm ya t u r n  t o  d i l i g e n c e ,  
i t s  e f f e c t l v e n e s a ,  p r o c e d u r a l  modes o f  p e rfo rm a n c e , and 
oom potence a g a i n s t  m a r r ie d  womm#
D iL ia m c E
Aocm ?ding t o  J#  Graham S t e w a r t 's  T r e a t i s e  on th e  
Law o f  D i l ig e n c e  (1 8 9 8 )^ , w here  t h e  d e b to r  was a  m a r r ie d  
woman, t h e  C harge  w ould b e  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  h e r  and  
a g a i n s t  h e r  h u sb an d  a s  h e r  c u r a t o r  and a d m i n l s t r a t o r - i n -  
law  (M u ir V* Hood 1 8 4 5 , 7  D*1009) and  h e  a d d s  t l m t  i t  
made no  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  sh e  was u n d e r  age#
% i l e  a d v is in g  t h a t  t h a t  was t h e  p r u d e n t  c o u r s e ,  
t h e  a u th o r  d o u b te d  w h e th e r  I t  was n e c e s s a r y  t o  c h a rg e  
t h e  husband  w here th e  w ife  h ad  o b ta in e d  a  d e c r e e  o f  
s e p a r a t i o n ,  o r  an  o r d e r  o f  p r o te c t io n #  o r  w here  t h e  
o b l ig a t io n  w as a  t r a d e  o b l i g a t i o n ,  c o n t r a c t e d  when th e  
h u sb an d  %ms a b ro a d ,  c i v i l l y  d ead  o r  i n s a n e ,  o r  c o n t r a c t e d  
w ith  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  b u s in e s s  c a r r i e d  on  i n  t h e  name o f  
t h e  w i f e ,  " o r  i s  an  o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  n e c e s s a r i e s  when 
l i v i n g  s e p a r a t e  from  th e  hushand  o r  i s  .lm_rera_v@_rgm, 
or sMlLaM a^aÇeiSâaSS» for damages H - i t i lS S a  "•
On th e  o th e r  h a n d , %Aiere a  m a r r ie d  woman w as th e  
c r e d i t o r  i n  th e  m a t t e r ,  th e  c h a rg e  was t o  ru n  a t  h e r  
i n s t a n c e  w i th  th e  c o n c u rre n o e  o f  h e r  h u sb a n d , and 
dem anding  /
1 ,  p * 2 9 5 ,^ #
2 2 7 ,
dem aW lng  t h a t  t h e  d e b t  b e  p a id  t o  h e r  * By th e  same 
t o k m ,  tl%e h u e b a n d 's  c o n a m t  wee n o t  m o e a s e r y  w here  
th e  d e b t  wee one f o r  w hich  sh e  h a d  a  t i t l e  t o  s u e  
w ith o u t  h ie  G o m u r r e m e ,  # a  i n  o a a e s  %#$ere h i e  ',ju% 
and  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  w e re  e x o lW W  o r .r.-n»Bs»it»rtfe*«4 «*.«■*as #ie author explaim, if the matter related to
d  when t h e  huabmnd wan I n s a n e ,  a b ro a d ,  
o i v i l l y  d e a d  o r  o th e r w is e  in o e p a o i ta te d ' '*
T h u s , g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k in g , t h e  c h a rg e  r e q u i r e d  th e  
husb an d * a  o o n o u r re n o e , b u t  t h e  suW equm at o o n o u rre n c e  o f  
a  %>usband, o b ta in e d  I n  a  a u a p e n a lo n  o f  tkie d i l i g e n c e ,  
w ould c u re  t h e  d a fe o t^ #  ^
A gain# I t  w as p o a m lb le  f o r  a  w lfe ^  t o  u s e  
I n h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  a  d e b to r  w ith o u t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n c u rre n o a  I f  sh e  was s e p a r a t e d  from  him# The 
u s e f u ln e s s  o f  I n h i b i t i o n  ms a  remedy/ a g a i n s t  m a r r ie d  
%mmen# m u st h a v e  in c r e a s e d  p r c g r o s s l v o l y ,  m e a su r in g  I t s  
t r e a d  w i th  h e r  I n c r e a s in g  In d e p m d e n c e  g r a n te d  by  t h e  
M a rr ie d  w om en's P ro p e r ty  A cts*
The means by  w h ich  a  husb an d  t e r m in a t e s  f o r m a l ly  
h ie  w i f e ' s  i s  by  l e t t e r s  o f  in h ib i t io n #
b e in g  I n  t h i s  o m ^ te x t a  w r i t  I n  % e  m m e o f  th e  s o v e re ig n  
Inhibiting traders from dealing with her without her 
h u s b a n d 's  s p e c i a l  a u 'th o r l t ^  and  I n h i b i t i n g  h e r  fro ra  
liokcurrlng d e b ts  t o  h i s  p r e ju d i c e  o r  s e l l i n g #  o r  a t  
t o  s e l l #  o r  o th e r w is e  d e a l  wlt&i h i s  p ro p e r ty ^ #  ^
I n v o lv e s  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  a
p e t i t i o n  t o  t h e  O u te r  Mouse 
t h e  /
th e  G o u rt o f  s e s s io n
d-ig'
1* Graham S te w a r t#  p#307# c i t i n g  Vflght v# Dewar 1B27*5 8 .5 4 9  (N .E .5 1 6 } .
2* IM d #  and  c a s e s  t h e r s
3« i S S *4# S l ï % l l a n  V# B^onkliouse 1824 g s  23 (H #E #16).5# I n h i b i t i o n  " I s  a  rem edy c m ^ p e te n t t o  e v e ry  h usbandw hose w ife  d i s c o v e r s  a n  I n c l i n a t i o n  to  l i v e  beyond h i s  f o r tu n e " *  B rak# 1*6*26*
6. Boubts have been e x p re s s e d  a b o u t th e  law g o v e rn in gi n h i b i t i o n s  o f  w iv e s ,  on th e  g rounds t h a t  i t  i s  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  and t h a t  th e  p ro c e d u re  i s  complex and e x p e n s iv e  (and c a p a b le  o f  b e in g  u sed  v i n d i c t i v e l y  a g a i n s t  th e  w ife  -  1 0 . 8 ) ,  S .L .C . C o n s u l t a t i v e  Memo No. 54» 10 .19*
2 2 8 .
t h e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  t h e r e o f  I n  th e  G e n e ra l R e g i s t e r  o f  
I n h i b i t i o n s  an #  A d jM d lo a tio n a#  T h e r e a f te r #  th e  
gEag& g& ltur& , t h e  w i f e 's  pow ers ms th e  p a r t y  c h a rg e d  
o r  e n t r u s t e d  w i th  t h e  ru n n in g  o f  th e  h o u se h o ld  
:giefgo1:ll8 d o m ^ s t io ia ) fsiwl tfirbli ibkie jLiW)u%rdL%ig: <&f cledbl;*; 
I n c i d e n t a l  t h e r e to #  i s  te r m in a te d  i n  a  q u e s t io n  w ith  
eirerrsrcHBa*# wiwGr&twMp (way&niiSEMcüb 'Bkte isaicdLKyg stf IWnulG (sMbegp 
o r  I g n o r a n t  o f  i t ^ #
TPtie *%u8l%EH%d tAien JLa; ]Ljba1)3U& dfoir tiiiB iwrjljpGf*ia 
]p%a%?G3%ë%g*9i8 cxf Iskwalb asatuipe# eotoegpl; tdsj&t: Isjla; <)l)3.:&asert%L()ri 
ipyao&ajLns# lakkille ihdLgs <3urt3f 1:0 EkllKaemit anaTb&iasMbE;, Ike asupgpCLy 
]no9(&8i5*&BrK%i<a8# *%;$ dkwas iodic; Tfil:e*e; ilasgkldLGicl aaapGMnKssr i n  e a s e  
o f  n e c e s s i t y  t o  p le d g e  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t  f o r  such* 
However th e  h u sb an d  i s  n o t  l i a b l e  t h e r e f o r  i f  t h e  w ife  
i s  i n  d e s e r t io n #  o r*  i f  l i v i n g  a p a r t  w ith  due cau se #  
sh e  h a s  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e #  o r  i f *  i n  th e  o iro u m stm n o e s*
Gdoe laa %»e<3<&lTW%L*;g; ei iBt*arj%L{;jLGw%1: ia:L]UGNfGiKW343f^ * l:n 
w ords# d e s p i t e  I n h i b i t i o n #  th e  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t ‘d* i n  
q u a l i f y in g  c i r c u m s ta n c e s # rem ain s#
The m aæ SS& È M m  stem s from # o r  r e f l e c t s ,  t h e  
u s u a l  f a m ily  s i t u a t i o n *  I n  w h ich  e v e ry d a y  h o u se h o ld  
p u rc h a s e s  a r e  made b y  t h e  w ife^V  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
Debenhmm v* M ellon?#  L o rd  B la c k b u rn  re m a rk e d , * I  t h in k  
t h a t  /
1* Topham v* M a r s h a l l ,  1 8 08 , M# w in h lb itio n M  App,Mo*2* A no ther*  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e ,  m ethod o f  t e r m in a t in g  th e  _ j r a e p 0 8 l ti%ra i s  by  a d v e r t is e m e n t  # b u t  **a h usband  i s  K E b m f ï t l H  t o  a d v e r t i s e  u n l e s s  he  h a d  bona f i d e  g ro u n d  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  th e  w ife  in te i& e d  " to  "p led g e  h i s  c r e d i t s  V ic k e r s  v* V# 1966 8#L ,T* (M o tes) 69*' W a lk e r , P r i n s ,  2nd ed« p»259* Such a d v e r t is e m e n t  s e c u re #  t h e  d e s i r e d  e f f e c t  o n ly  i f  i t  i s  p ro v e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s u p p l i e r  h ad  n o t i c e  t h e r e o f *  S p e c ia l  n o t i c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  may b e  g iv e n  to  a  p a r t i c u l a r  trad esm an *
2 ,  o f*  S t a r  s t o r e s  L td*  v* J o s s *  [1 9 5 5 ] C ,L ,Y * 3 2 8 8 ,3* S ee  C h a p te r  4*
4* S in c e  sh e  *1# fo rm ed  by  n a tu r e  f o r  th e  m anagem ent w i th in  d o o rs "  *  E rsk#  1 * 6 ,2 6 , i n  a  p a s s a g e  w hich  d i s c u s s e s  th e  w if e  a s  p r a e p q s i t a  n e & o t i is  and  a s  p r a e p o s i t a  n e g o t i i s  d o m es tic ;5 ,  b ’T p fro a s 'i '' ■
2 2 9 ,
t h a t  when h u sb an d  and  w ife  a r e  living t o g e t h e r ,  it is 
open  t o  t h e  husband to p r o v e .  If he can, the fact 
t h a t  th e  a u t h o r i t y  doe#  n o t  e x i s t ,  i t  b e in g  a  q u e s t io n  
f o r  th e  jury w h e th e r  a b o m  f i d e  authority did or did 
n o t  e x i s t*  T h is  i s  n o t  a  c a s e  o f  w ith d ra w in g  a u t h o r i t y  
once  g iv en *  The q u e s t io n  i s  w h e th e r  th e  P l a i n t i f f s  
who had  n e v e r  d e a l t  w i th  th e  h usband  b e f o r e  w ere  e n t i t l e d  
t o  assum e t h a t  t h e r e  w as su c h  a n  a u t h o r i t y  t o  t h e  w ife  
im p lie d  i n  th e  m ere f a c t  t h a t  th e  w ife  was l i v i n g  w i th  
h e r  h u sb a n d ; and  I  t h in k  th e  law  i s  n o t  so * "  I f  t h i s  
be  t r u e ,  much o f  t h e  a c c e p te d  body o f  r u l e s  c o n c e rn in g  
th e  p r a e p o s l t u r a  l o s e s  i t s  fo u n d a tio n #  As C l iv e  and 
W ilso n  p o i n t  o u t^ ,  how c an  p r i v a t e  p r o h i b i t i o n  -  o r ,  
h e r e ,  private a g re em e n t that the wife's a u t h o r i t y ,  
im p lie d  by law, s h a l l  n o t  b e g in  to a r i s e  a f f e c t  an 
a g e n t 's  o s t e n s i b l e  o r  p resum ed  a u t h o r i t y ,  b e s to w ed  by 
th e  law  upon  t h e  d o m e s tic  m anager?
The c o n c lu s io n  w hidh Dr* C liv e  d raw s i s  t h a t ,  i n  
S c o t la n d ,  p r i v a t e  p r o h i b i t i o n  may n o t  a f f e c t  t h i r d  
p a r t i e s *  The m a t te r  m ust be  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  agency* I f ,  a t  t h e  tim e  o f  c o n t r a c t i n g ,  
th e  w ife  a p p e a re d  t o  t h e  t r a d e r  a s  an  a g e n t  ( w i f e )  
a c t i n g  w i t h in  h e r  o s t e n s i b l e  a u t h o r i t y  *  end  n o t  a s  a  
p r i n c i p a l  a c t i n g  on h e r  own b e h a l f ,  i n  w h ich  c a s e  
p re su m ab ly  th e  h usband  w ould be  bound o n ly  i f  h i s  w ife  
h ad  a c te d  w i t h in  h e r  a c t u a l  a u t h o r i t y  and  th e  s u p p l i e r  
e l e c t e d  t o  su e  t h e  h u sb an d  upon h i s  em ergence  a s  
p r i n c i p a l  o r  if he  c h o se  t o  ratify h e r  actings^ th e n  
th e  h usband  m ust be  b o u n d , and  Dr# C l iv e  i n  c o n seq u en ce  
s u b m its  t h a t  " i t  i s  no d e fe n c e  f o r  a h u sb a n d , when su ed  
on a c o n t r a c t  w i th in  the sc o p e  o f  M s  w i f e 's  praepositura# 
t o  show that sh e  was p ro v id e d  w ith  am a d e q u a te  a llo w a n c e ? * "  
S t r i c t l y  /
1 .  p .2 6 l  and  a t  pp ,253~ 4*2* See Gow, The M e r c a n t i le  and  I n d u s t r i a l  Law o f  S c o t la n d ,  pp*520*521 , and  p*923 e t  seq*
3* p * 2 5 4 , c o n c lu d in g  t h a t w a l t o n ' s  v iew  ( a t  p*201) i sw ro n g . See B rs k , 1 * 6 ,2 6 . i n f r a *
230,
S t r i c t l y ,  th e  a u t h o r i t y  w h ich  i s  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  
p resum ed  a u t h o r i t y  w h ich  may p e rh a p s  f o r  t h i s  p u rp o se  
he r e g a rd e d  a s  a  c a te g o r y  w i th in  t h e  genus o f  o s t e n s i b l e  
a u th o r i ty *  I t  i s  a ls o  spoken  o f  a s  'im p l i e d  a u t h o r i t y  
a r i s i n g  from  c o h a b i t a t i o n '* The s p e c i a l  r u l e s  
g o v e rn in g  th e  p r a e p o s i tu r a  mean t h a t  p u b l ic  n o t i c e  o f  
w ith d ra w a l o f  a u t h o r i t y  o p e r a te s  t o  rem ove th e  a u t h o r i t y  
a s  r e g a r d s  a l l  t r a d e r s ;  c e r t a i n l y ,  i n  th e  a b se n c e  o f  
p u b l ic  n o t i c e ,  o r  p r i v a t e  n o t i c e  t o  th e  t r a d e r  c o n c e rn e d , 
a c t in g s  w i th in  th e  sco p e  o f  th e  p r a e p o s i t u r a  w ould 
a p p e a r  a lw ay s t o  b in d  th e  husband* W hether 'a d e q u a te  
a l lo w a n c e ' c a n  be  a  good d e fe n c e  t o  an  a c t i o n  by  a t r a d e r  
upon a c o n t r a c t  e n te r e d  i n t o  by th e  w ife  u n d e r  h e r  
im p lie d  ag en cy  t o  p le d g e  h e r  h u sb a n d ’ s  c r e d i t  i n  c a s e  
o f  n e c e s s i t y ^  i s  l e s s  c l e a r .  D r, C l i v e 's  r e a s o n in g  
sh o u ld  a p p ly  e q u a l ly  t o  t h a t  e a s e  (**[T]he q u e s t io n  i s  
n o t  w h e th e r  th e  w ife  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  assum e t h a t  sh e  
h a s  a u t h o r i t y  b u t  w h e th e r  th e  t r a d e r  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  
assum e t h a t  sh e  h a s  a u th o r i ty *  The h u s b a n d 's  
l i a b i l i t y  d o e s  n o t  depend  on th e  w i f e 's  a c t u a l  a u t h o r i t y  
b u t  on h e r  o s t e n s i b l e  o r  a p p a re n t  a u t h o r i t y * " ) ^ ,  b u t  
su c h  a d e fe n c e  a p p e a rs  t o  have  b een  a c c e p te d ^ ,  and  h e re  
t h e  an sw er seem s t o  be  t h a t  th e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  
a r i s e s  u n d e r  th e  h ead  o f  reco m p en se . H is  l i a b i l i t y  
a r i s e s ,  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  (S c o t la n d )  
A c t, 1920 , 8 * 3 ( 2 ) ,  " i f  he  s h a l l  be l i a b l e  t h e r e f o r  i n  
a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  t h e  p r e s e n t  la w " . H ence , i n  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i n  w h ich  he i s  n o t  bound t o  a l im e n t  h i s  
w i f e ,  he  owes no d u ty  t o  recom pense th o s e  who have 
s u p p l ie d  h e r  w ith  goods o f  t h a t  'n e c e s s a r y ' n a t u r e .
T hese  d i s t i n c t i o n s  r e f l e c t  o n ly  p a r t  o f  th e  
c o n fu s in g  and  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  n a tu r e ^ o f  th e  t r e a tm e n t  o f  
t h i s  /
1 .  See W alk e r, P r i n s ,  (2nd e d . )  p p * 7 1 1 * 7 l6 ; s e e  a l s o  Gow, p p .5 1 7 -5 2 0 ,
2 .  W alk e r, i b i d * p*253*3 . C l iv e  & U l s o n ,  p . 254*4 .  S t a r  S to r e s  L td ,  v .  J o s s ,  s u p r a : and  s e e  W alk e r, p . 258*5 .  See S .L .C .  C o n s u l t a t iv e  MemoraraCto ' t o .  54 (March 1982; 'Some O b so le te  and D i s c r i m i n a t o r y  Rules i n  th e  Lav o f  Husband and W i f e ' ,  1 0 .1 .  - 1 0 . 2 2 .  ( f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  and p r o v i s i o n a l  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  th e  p r a e p o s i t u r a  be a b o l i s h e d  and l i a b i l i t yl e f t  to  th e  g e n e r a l  l a w ) .
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t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  th e  f i n a n c i a l  management o f  a  m a r r ia g e .
The u n d e r ly in g  p h ilo s o p h y  o f  th e  p r a e p o s i t u r a  i s  a l s o ,  
i t  i s  s u b m it te d ,  o u td a te d *  S u r e ly ,a  c l e a r e r ,  more 
e q u i t a b l e  and  more c o n s i s t e n t  body o f  r u l e s  c an  be 
d e v is e d ^ ?
pA c c o rd in g  t o  E rs k in e  , t h e  w i f e ,  a s  p r a e p o s i t a  
re b u s  d o m e s t i c i s , " h a th  pow er t o  p u rc h a s e  w h a te v e r  i s  
p r o p e r  f o r  th e  f a m i ly ;  and  th e  husband  i s  l i a b l e  f o r  
th e  p r i c e ,  even  th o u g h  w hat was p u rc h a s e d  may have  b een  
a p p l ie d  t o  o t h e r  u s e s ,  o r  th o u g h  he  may h av e  g iv e n  th e  
w ife  a sum o f  money a l i u n d e , s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  th e  f a m i ly -  
e x p e n s e ; , • * " ,
"W hatever i s  p ro p e r "  m ust be i n t e r p r e t e d  w i th  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  m eans, i f  h i s  i s  th e  s o l e  
incom e ( i f  i t  i s  n o t ,  a s  i s  o f t e n  th e  c a s e  to d a y ,  th e  
w ife  may u s e  h e r  own fu n d s  t o  m eet th e  c o s t  o f  th e  
m anagem ent o f  th e  h o u se h o ld , o r  p a r t  t h e r e o f ,  i n  w hich  
c a s e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  sh e  w ould be  l im i t e d  i n  h e r  p u rc h a s e s  
o n ly  by th e  l e n g th  o f  h e r  own p u r s e ) a n d  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  e q u iv a le n t  t o  th e  w i f e 's  own d e s i r e s  o r  
id e a s  a s  t o  w hat i s  p r o p e r .  F o r  goods and  s e r v i c e s  
w h ich  a r e  n o t  "no rm al h o u se h o ld  n e c e s s a r i e s "  ( a c c o rd in g  
t o  th e  s ta n d a r d s  o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  h o u se h o ld  i n  
q u e s t io n ) ,  t h e  husband  w i l l  n o t  be l i a b l e  u n d e r  e i t h e r  
th e  " im p l ie d  ag en cy  o f  n e c e s s i t y "  o r  th e  "ag en cy  presum ed 
from  c o h a b i t a t io n "  .  L i a b i l i t y  w i l l  a r i s e  o n ly  i f  
th e  w ife  h ad  r e c e iv e d  e x p re s s  a u t h o r i t y  from  th e  husband  
t o  /
1 ,  See C h a p te r  6 ( s o l u t i o n s  fo und  by o t h e r  sy s te m s)  and C h a p te r  7 ( p o s s ib l e  f u t u r e  d e v e lo p m e n ts ) ,2 , 1 ,6 ,26 .3 ,  The d o c t r i n e  o f  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  w ould  have  no a p p l i c a t i o n  so  lo n g  a s  i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  sh e  was p le d g in g  h e r  own c r e d i t  -  o f ,  M ,¥ ,P ,( S o ,)  A c t, 1920, 
3 , 3 ( 1 ) ,  and  s e e  s . 3 (2 )  ( i n f r a , p# 235) ,  C f , w ife  c o n t r a c t i n g  o s t e n s i b ly  a s  p r i n c i p a l ,  s u p r a ,4 .  T e rm in o lo g y  a d o p te d  i n  W alk e r, P r in s ," T S H  e d . )  p p . 
2 5 8 -9 ,
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t o  I n o u r  t h e  d e b t#  The ooua o f  p ro v in g  t h a t  t h e  
G übjeetG  i n  q u e s t io n  a r e  B a e o e a a a r le a "  i n  v ie w  o f  th e  
i l f e - a t y l e  a d o p te d  by  th e  h o w eeh o ld , % le$ o n  t h e  c r e d i to r ^ #  
I f  t h e  w ife *  b y  p r i v a t e ,  d o m ee tio  a r ra n g e m e n t,  h a a  
u n d e r ta k e n  r e e p o n o i b i i i t y  f o r  p a r t  o r  a i l  o f  t h e  o o a t  o f  
ru n n in g  th e  h o u s e h o ld ,  i t  w ould aeem t h a t ,  i n  th e  e v e n t  
o f  n o n -paym en t b y  h e r*  t h e  huabaiid'a l i a b i l i t y  qtJioad the 
creditors* m u st r e m a in . As be tw een  the s p o u s e s ,  the 
e n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a g re e m e n t i s  a m a t t e r  o f  s p é c u l a t i o n .  
E ven s u p p o s in g  t h a t  th e  c o u r t  w ere  t o  e n t e r t a i n  th e  
n o t io n  o f  a  c o n t r a c t i n g - o u t  ( i n  e f f e c t )  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  
a l i m e n t ,  c o u ld  su c h  a n  a g re e m e n t b e  r e g a r d e d  a s
t o  h a v e  b in d in g  q o n t r a o t u a l  fo rce , a s  o p p o se d  t o  a  m ere 
in f o r m a l ,  f l e x i b l e ,  d o m e s tic  a rra n g e m e n t f o r  t h e  
c o n v e n ie n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s ^ #  a n d  hew w o u ld  p r o o f  b e  
e s t a b l i s h e d ?  P re su m a b ly  su c h  w ould be  h e ld  a n  
innom in& te an d  u n u s u a l  c o n t r a s t ? .  I t  may w e l l  b e  
, i& m t, w h i le  a  €M #t#in  econom ic in d e p e n d e n c e  c f
h u sb a n d  a n d  w i f e  i s  d e s i r a b l e *  s e p a r a t i o n  a s  r e g a r d s  
h o u se h o ld  d e b ts  i s ,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  a t  l e a s t ,  "o n  th e  
s u r f a c e  /
1* P h & llip e o n  v# H & yter (1 8 7 0 ) L*R, 6  G *P*38, S ee  p e r  W i l l e s , J ,  a t  p*4& *- "W hat th e  law  d o e s  i n f e r  I s ,  t h a t  t h e  w i f e  b a a  a u t h o r i t y  t o  c o n t r a c t  f o r  t h i n g s  t h a t  a r e  r e a l l y  n e c e s s a r y  and  s u i t a b l e  t o  t h e  s t y l e  i n  Which th e  h u sb a n d  c h o o se s  t o  l i v e ,  i n  s c  f a r  a s  t h e  a r t i c l e s  f a l l  f a i r l y  w i t h in  th e  d o m e s tic  d e p a r tm e n t  whiCh i s  o r d i n a r i l y  c o n f id e d  t o  th e  m anagem ent o f  t h e  w ife *  And i t  i s  in cu m b en t on  th e  tra d e sm a n  who r e l i e s  upon  t h e  goods com ing w i t h in  t h a t  d e s c r i p t i o n  t o  p ro v e  a f f i r m a t i v e l y  t h a t  th e y  do  s o ,  The b u r th e n  o f  p r o o f  l i e s  on  h im  * $ , I t  i s  n o t  en o u g h , w here t h e  b u r th e n  o f  
p r o o f  l i e s  on  th e  p l a i n t i f f ,  f o r  him  t o  p ro v e  f a c t s  w hich  a r e  e q u a l ly  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  o r  t h e  n e g a t iv e  o f  th e  p r e p o s i t i o n  s o u g h t  t o  be  made o u t , "Cf# generally supply o f  wnecess&rie&w t o  minora, pupils, a n d  inca& aoea  -  S a le  o f  Goods A c t ,  1 8 9 3 , s , 2 ,  e*g*BasbTvT IBman [1 9 0 8 ] 2  K ,D *1,2* S t a i r  1*10 ,13#  " I n  t h e  a c t  c f  c o n t r a c t i n g ,  i t  m u st b e  o f  purp& se t o  o b l ig e *  e i t h e r  r e a l l y  o r  p r e s u m p tiv e ly ,  
and  s o  m u st b e  s e r i o u s ,  s o  t h a t  w h a t i s  e x p re s s e d  i n  j e s t  o r  s c o r n  m akes n o  c o n t r a c t# "
3# E r s k ,  4 * 2 ,2 0  * # , , i n  v e r b a l  a g re em e n ts*  i n  w h ich  t h ea r t i c l e s  t o  b e  f u l f i l l e d  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a r i s e  from  th e  n a tu r e  o f  a n y  known c o n t r a c t ,  b u t  
depend  e n t i r e l y  on  th e  im p o r t  o f  t h e  w crde  u t t e r e d  by th e  p a r t i e s ,  inatten tive h e a r e r s  m ay, e i t h e r  by  
m is p la c in g /
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surface" only* She who pays the gas hill does not 
necessarily fill the petrol tank*
Though the recent trend is for the wife to remain
in employment during the early years of marriage, she
is l e s s  likely than i s  the husband to be consistently
and continuously a salary-earner, and a third party
must be entitled to look to someone of substance when1he supplies goods necessary for t h e  family # On the 
other hand, in modern c ir c u m s ta n c e s ,  the cases in which 
a third party "allows necessaries to the family on the 
credit of the husband", unless perhaps for household 
repair bills, must be rare* At least as far as food 
is concerned, the grocer is being replaced by the 
supermarket, and the husband is likely often to be 
present in person at t h e  check-out point where payment 
is made in cash*
In any case, the notion that the husband does pay, 
and must pay, all necessary household expenses, is 
perhaps a little unrealistic* Dr. Clive suggests^ that 
an approach analogous to the partner's joint and 
several liability for partnership debts might yield a 
better solution th a n  that afforded by the present 
reliance on the rules of agency.
If /
misplacing what was spoken, or by mistaking its true meaning, be apt to change the obligation into something quite different from what the debtor intended": an opinion which might describe well the circumstances surrounding many a domestic arrangement* Cf. Fisher v. F. 1952 S.C. 347*Proof by writ or oath would be required. Production of the former would be unlikely, and the latter extremely so if the matter had  come to court. See generally Gloag on Contract pp*320-321.1, It is generally thought desirable that, in any system, matrimonial property relations, to an outsider ( a creditor, a stranger to the marriage) should appear reasonably straightforward. See "Comparative Law of Matrimonial Property" (1972) ed* Albert Klra3f y.2* at p.262* See Chapter 7*
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I f  t h e  p r a e p o s i t u r a  i s  v fithd raw n , b i l l s  o n ly  f o r
what la n e c e a a a ry  must be m et by t h e  husband %  unless 
p re su m a b ly  he I s  barred by a o q u le se e n o e  o r  ratification 
from disclaiming liability for some Item  or items not 
falling within that d e s c r ip t io n #  It I s  ev en  possible 
that c o n t in u e d  acquiescence i n  his w i f e 's  ag en cy  i n  
d o m e s tic  m a t t e r s  m ig h t b r in g  a b o u t a  r e v i v a l  o f  th e  
I n h i b i t e d  praepositura* but t h i s  i s  by  no means olear^#
The d o c t r i n e  o f  t h e  p r a e p o s i tu r a  i s  n o t  c o n f in e d  t o  
wives s t h e  p re s u m p tio n  of ag en cy  may a r i s e  also w here 
a  s i s t e r #  d a u g h te r  o r  h o u se k e e p e r  (p re s u m a b ly  o f  e i t h e r  
sex, and  o f  an y  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  o r  n o n e , t o  the breadwinner 
a n d  o w e r  o f  $ h e  e s ta b l is h m e n t )  i s  e n t r u s t e d  w i th  th e  
managomont o f  t h e  h o u s e h o ld ^ .
The w i f e ' s  p o s i t i o n  a s  
i s  p resum ed  "iiA iile s h e  re m a in s  i n  f a m ily  w i th  h e r  
h u sb an d "  3 the w id e r  p r a e p o s i t u r a  n o te d  by  E r s k in e  may 
b e  c o n s t i t u t e d  " e i t h e r  e x p r e s s ly ,  by a  w r i t t e n  com m ission  
o r  f a o t o r y ,  o r  t a c i t l y ,  when th e  w ife  h a s  b e e n  i n  u s e ,  
f o r  a  t r a c e  o f  t im e  t o g e t h e r ,  w i th o u t  a  fo rm a l  m an d a te , 
t o  a c t  f o r  h e r  h u sb a n d , ^ jh i le  he  e i t h e r  a p p ro v e s  o f  h e r  
m anagem ent by  f u l f i l l i n g  h e r  d e e d s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t ,  b e in g  
i n  t h e  know ledge t h e r e o f ,  c o n n iv e s  a t  o r  a c q u ie s c e s  i n  
i t  /
1 * and  p re su m ab ly  not o v e r  an d  above a l im e n t ,  or an  a l l w a n c e  d u ly  p a id *  C f .  C o n ju g a l R ig h ts  ( S c . )  Amendment A c t 1 8 6 1 , s . 6  an d  s e e  S t a r  S to r e s  L td .  v .  J o s s  ( 1 9 5 5 ) .  I n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  a n  a d e q u a te  a l lo w a n c e ,  and  i f  t h e  w ife  h a s  i i ; s u f f i a i e n t  m eans o f  h e r  own f o r  h e r  m a in te n a n c e , t h e  h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  to a l im e n t  ( i f  o th e rw is e  t h e  w ife  i s  e n t i t l e d  thereto) means t h a t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  may lo o k  t o  him  f o r  paym ent -  s e e  t h e  te rm s  o f  M.lV.P# ( s c . )  A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , s . 3 ( 2 ) .2 .  K er V# G ibson  (1 7 0 9 ) FI.6 0 2 3 s s e e  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p#2 6 0 .  i n h i b i t i o n  i s  norm ally "taken o f f"  by vo lu n ta ry  d isch a rg e  by t h e - c r e d i t o r  or by Court order (Graham S tew art ,p . 5 6 7 ) .
5 . See e . g .  Hamilton v ,  F o r r e s te r  (1 8 2 5 )  3 S . 572 .
225,
I t #  D lr l#  3 1 9  W ilso n  (D ie t#  p #6021 )#^"  Many o a s e s  
I n  %Ailoh i t  may a p p e a r  t h a t  one sp o u se  h a s  o r  m uat 
u n d e r ta k e  liability on the c o n t r a e t s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  a r e  to 
b e  e x p la in e d  i n  t a m e  o f  agenoy  and  m andate^#  The 
f i r s t  p r i n o i p l e ,  o f  c o u rse *  u n d e r  o u r  p r e s e n t  r u le s *  i s  
t h a t  n e i t h e r  sp o u se  in o u re  l i a b i l i t y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
c o n t r a c t a  e n te r e d  i n t o  by t l ie  o th e r^ *
I n  S a n d ila n d a  v* M e rc e r^ , irjhere t h e  w ife*  b e fo r e  
m a rr ia g e *  h a d  r e t a i n e d  f o r  h e r s e l f  a n  a l im e n ta r y  
l i f e r e n t  s a f e  from  t h e  j u a  m a r i t^ # and  w here  i t  a p p e a re d  
th a t *  a f t e r  t h e  m a rr ia g e *  sh e  and  h e r  h u sb an d  had  
g r a n te d  a  b i l l  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  lo a n s  made f o r  a l im e n t  o f  
t h e  fa m ily *  t h e  c r e d i t o r  was h e ld  n o t  t o  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  
a t t a c h  th o s e  fu n d s  o f  t h e  w ife  i n  rep ay m en t th e r e o f #
Such  a  d e b t  w as th o u g h t  i n d u b i t a b ly  t o  b e  a  d e b t  
f o r  ifjhioh ^ e  h u a b a M  ( a lo n e )  m ust b e  l i a b l e #  l o r d  
C r i n g l e t i e ^  e t a t e s  th a t*  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  law  o f  S o o tla n d  
w as c o n ce rn e d *  "Any d e b t  c o n t r a c t e d  a f t e r  m a r r ia g e  f o r  
t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  t h e  fa m ily *  i s  u n d o u b te d ly  th e  d e b t  
o f  t h e  h u sb an d ?* "
The general r u l e  that o b l ig a n ta  to a  b i l l  a r e  
a lw ay s  l i a b l e  a i n g u l l  in ao lid u m ^  had thus b een  waived, 
and favour t o  th e  w ife  displayed, and  p r e j u d i c e  done 
p e rh a p s  to t h e  creditor, who, in o r d in a r y  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  
c o u ld  h av e  c h o se n  w h ich  eo-obligant h e  should pursue, 
w ith o u t  /
1# E rsk #  1#6#26#2# o r  l i a b i l i t y  t o  a lim e n t#  S ee  G liv e  & W ilso n , pp#251"*2#3 ,  B m  M * ¥ # P #  (Sc#) A c t, 1 9 2 0 ,  8 * 5 (1 ) (n o  l i a b i l i t y  upon h u sb an d  f o r  w i f e ' s  c o n t r a c t s  o r  d e b t s )  # As Dr* C l iv e  p o i n t s  o u t#  and  a s  i s  e x p la in e d  i%3 C h a p te r  1 ,  a t  p p # 8 2 "8 5 , m e  o n ly  re m a in in g  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i n  i /^ lo ha h u sb an d  may in c u r  gua/ husband l i a b i l i t y  f o r  his 
w i f e 's  c o n t r a c t s  is i n ^ r e l a t i o n  t o  a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t s ,  i n  te rm s  o f  M#¥#P# (8 0 ,>  A c t, 1 8 7 7 , a#4#4 .  (1 8 3 3 ) 11 8 * 6 6 5 .5# a t  p#668*6# See a l s o  s i m i l a r l y .  W alker v# Home (1 8 2 7 ) 6  8*204#See how ever joint a l im e n ta r y  fu n d  -  L* E u th v en  v# P u l f o r d  & S ons 1909 S#C#951, % n fra .  pp# 240- 2/11,
7# B e l l ' s  P r i n s ,  8 eo#6 l#
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without charging the others,  l e a v in g  them  t o  settle 
m a t te r s  am ongst th e m se lv e s  am b e s t  t h e y  m ig h t ,  a s  i n  
any  other case of j o i n t  and s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y #  Whether 
t h e  o r e d i t o r  w ould  have  o hoaen  t o  a u e , and  do  d i l i g e n c e  
upon , t h e  w i f e ,  h ad  eu ch  a  c o u rs e  b e en  open  t o  
him, w ould h av e  b e e n , of c o u r s e ,  a  m a t t e r  of assessment 
f o r  him  i n  e a c h  c a s e ,  b u t  h e r e  i s  s e e n  a n o th e r  exam ple 
of the somewhat l o p - s id e d  j u s t i c e ,  an d  strange sense 
o f  p r o p r i e t y  and  t h e  f i t n e s s  o f  things, w hich  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  l e g a l  en d  o t h e r  a t t i t u d e s  t o  women i n  
the n in e t e e n th  century*
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  u se  t o  which t h e  loan was t o  be  put - 
f o r  the a l im e n t  of the family ** weighed w ith  t h e  courts 
t h e r e  w as t h e n ,  and  re m a in s  today, a d e e p - r o o te d  f e e l i n g  
that t h e r e  is a n  obligation p r im a r i l y  ( o r  s o l e l y )  on the 
h u sb an d  to p r o v id e  what i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  and  t h i s  feeling, 
which h a s  always some e n d u r in g  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  on 
biological and  psychological g ro u n d s , had a much 
greater econom ic justification i n  the n i n e t e e n t h  century 
th a n  it h a s  today, when the m a rr ie d  woman has am ple 
opportunity a t  some p o i n t  at least during her m a rr ie d  
l i f e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  if s h e  and  h e r  h u sb an d  b o th  so  
d e s i r e ,  to t h e  aliment o f  the family. A d m itte d ly , 
th e s e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  w ere  hot w id e ly  available, for 
r e a s o n s  o f  the n a t i o n a l  econom ic s i t u a t i o n ,  t i l l  t h e  
m id d le  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n tu r y ,  and could be  said n o t  
t o  h av e  b e e n  widely and f u l l y  utilised till the m id 
1960*#, when it becam e m ore common and a c c e p ta b le  for a 
b r i d e  to c o n t in u e  t o  work after marriage* It may be 
that the t r e n d  i n  t h e  fourth quarter o f  the twentieth 
c e n tu r y ,  will b e  towards a greater and m ore p e rm a n e n t, 
or at, l e a s t  lo n g e r - te r m ,  s o u rc e  o f  female working 
p o w er, th o u g h  %m may n e v e r  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  I n to r - w a r  
p o s i t i o n  when t h e r e  was a p o o l of u n m a rr ie d  women who 
s u p p l i e d  an  Im p o r ta n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  vm rk f o r c e ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  /
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4particularly in the teaching end nursing profeeeiona ,
The em ploym ent p o s i t i o n  n a t i o n a l l y ,  l a ,  h o iv ev e r, 
so m e th in g  o f  a n  u n k n o w  f a c to r #
A d ju d io a t io n  e n a b le s  a  o r e d i t o r  t o  a t t a c h  t h e  
h e r i t a b l e  e s t a t e  o f  h i s  d e b to r ,  " e i t h e r  i n  paym ent o r  
i n  s e o u r i t y  o f  a  d e b t ,  o r  i n  Im p lm e n t  o f  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  oonvey  t h e  s u b j e c t s  a d ju d g e d ." ^
In Graham Stewart's wards^, a s  a m a r r ie d  woman 
could n o t  g r a n t  a  v a l i d  p e r s o n a l  obligation, adjudication 
c o u ld  n o t  proceed on a  b i l l ,  bond o r  o t h e r  personal 
o b l i g a t i o n  g r a n te d  by  h e r ,  "An a d ju d i c a t io n  c a n n o t 
p ro c e e d  on a  p e r s o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  by  a  w i f e ;  and  a l th o u g h  
a n  h e r i t a b l e  bond by  a  \ f l f e  i s  a  good s e c u r i t y  t o  a f f e c t  
h e r  e s t a t e ,  an adjudication c a n n o t be  l e d  on  i t ;  f o r  
t h a t  d i l i g e n c e ,  w here  i t  p ro c e e d s  on a n  h e r i t a b l e  bond , 
r e s t s  o n  t h e  p e r s o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  w h ich  i s  n u l l  when 
g r a n te d  by  a  m a r r ie d  wom an?." I n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s ,  w here  
t h e  w i f e ' s  p e r s o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  w as v a l id #  a d ju d i c a t io n  
c o u ld  /
1 .  T hese  c h a n g e s  may r e q u i r e  ch an g e s  i n  l e g a l  d u tyw i t h in  m a rr ia g e #  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  l i m i t e d  n a tu r e  o f  the wife's obligation to a l im e n t  t h e  hu sb an d  
( 8 o . )  A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , a #4) may r e q u i r e  t o  be  a l t e r e d  and  f u l l  r e c i p r o c i t y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  a l im e n t  im posed* See 8 c .  Law C om m ission Memo. Mo.22 (A lim e n t and F i n a n c i a l  P r o v is io n )  2 .1 2  -  2 .1 3 .  and  com m entary t i ie r e o n  i n  Memorandum by  F a c u l ty  o f  Law, U n iv e r s i ty  o f  G lasgow , pp.3-6.2# Graham S te w a r t ,  p # 5 7 8 , where the a u th o r  n o te s  that s i n c e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  was made e q u iv a le n t  t o  d e c re e  o f  
a d ju d i c a t i o n  by  t h e  B an k ru p tc y  ( 8 c . )  A c t ,  1 8 56 , s . 107 (1 9  & 20 V ie t#  0*79) ( " a n d  when t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i s  d a te d  w i th in  a  y e a r  and  a d a y  o f  a n y  e f f e c t u a l  a d j u d i c a t i o n ,  t h e  e s t a t e  s h a l l  b e  d is p o s e d  o f  u n d e r  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  A c t" ) ,  t h e  rem edy h a s  b een  r e s o r t e d  t o  l e s s  f r e q u e n t ly #  (T he A ct of 1856 was r e p e a le d  i n  its entirety by th e  B a n k ru p tc y  (B e .)  A c t, 1 9 1 3 ) .3 .  p .5 9 5 ,  c i t i n g  M enxies v .  G i l l e s p i e  1 7 6 1 , M .3974 and B e l l ,  Comm. 1 .776#
4# B e l l ,  i b i d ,  and  s e e  f o o tn o te  3 to that t e x t #
2 3 8 ,
could corûpetently follow but it was thought wise* 
nevertheless, first to constitute the debt against 
the married woman"^ #
Decree of adjudication will attach "all 
subordinate rights competent to the debtor relating 
to the principal subject" where, in addition to the 
description of the subjects adjudged, the words, "and 
all right and interest therein" are used^* The 
decision in Colder v* Steele^ is ,  therefore, at odds 
with this rule* An adjudication had taken place of 
lands apparently belonging to a husband with a ll his 
right, t it le  and interest therein* When it transpired 
that the lands belonged to the wife. It was decided 
that the adjudication did not attach the husband's 
iBariti in the rents* Graham Stewart^, narrating 
the case, takes the view that the ratio seems to have 
been that the jus mariti will not be attached, unless 
it is  expressly adjudged, but he notioes that this is  
contrary /
1* At p.3 9 6 , when considering the exceptions to thegeneral rule that a married woman could not grant a Mil, (absence of husband and engagement in trade; estate from which the ,.jug maiPi^i and jus gdtoinistrationis had been excluSedi ' separate eitaWalEwïïgetion in r@m versum), the author says, "But in every case Ti^iT¥aîer to proceed by action that it may be shown that the bill fa lls  under one of the exceptions to the rule*"(At p*596, he adds, "The personal obligation of a married woman is not intrinsically null, but only ope exoeptionisi and as there are various grounds on wKion the exception can be elided, the negative prescription will cut off the right to challenge its validity, so that an adjudication led thereupon will be unchallengeable after the expiry of forty years.")2* Graham Stewart, p#590, and authorities there cited.3* 19 November, 1818, F.C*4* p .5 9 1 #
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c o n t r a r y  t o  th e  c a s e ,  p r e v io u s ly  m e n tio n e d , o f  
M enzies v* G i l l e s p i e ' s  C re d ito rs '* #
A rrg g tm en t_ A n a_ P o in d in g
pW earing  a p p a r e l  i s  n o t  p o in d a b le  -  and  i n  su c h  
m ig h t have  r e s id e d  much o f  a  wom an's w e a l th  -  n o r  
may j o i n t  p r o p e r ty  ( o f  moment to d a y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  
v iew  o f  th e  p r e v a le n c e  o f  j o i n t  bank  a c c o u n ts )  be 
a r r e s t e d  f o r  t h e  d e b t  o f  one o f  th e  j o i n t  o v a ie rs , b u t  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  " a n o th e r  p e rs o n  h a s  a  p e r s o n a l  c la im  t o  
a  s h a re  i n  t h e  v a lu e  o f  th e  a r t i c l e s  w i l l  n o t  exem pt 
th o s e  a r t i c l e s  from  a  p o in d in g ." ^
As /
1 « 1 7 6 1 , M.5 9 7 4  ( t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  an  " a d ju d ic a t io no f  a  w i f e 's  la n d s  p ro c e e d in g  on a  p e r s o n a l  o b l ig a t io n  c o n ta in e d  i n  an  h e r i t a b l e  bond g r a n te d  by  h e r  and h e r  h u sb a n d , i s  n u l l ,  so  f a r  a s  i t  a d ju d g e s  t h e  l a n d s ;  b u t  i s  e f f e c t u a l  t o  c a r r y  th e  h u s b a n d 's  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  r e n t s . "  (m a rg in a l  n o te  t o  r e p o r t ) ) .2* "So f a r  a s  n o t  e x tr a v a g a n t  f o r  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  d e b to r . "  Graham S te w a r t ,  p . 3 4 5 , and  c a s e s  t h e r e  c i t e d  ( f o o tn o te  1 1 ) .3 .  i b i d .  p . 3 4 6 . G f. L earm ont v .  D a r l in g to n  (1 8 4 9 ) 11 
57ÏÏS4. See th e  e a s e  o f  F lem ing  v .  Tw addle (1828)7 S .9 2 , w here  i t  was h e ld  in c o m p e te n t f o r  th e  c r e d i t o r  o f  an  i n d iv i d u a l  t o  p o in d  p r o p e r ty  a l l e g e d  t o  b e lo n g  
t o  t h e  d e b to r  j o i n t l y  w i th  a n o th e r  p a r ty *  * * a t a l l  e v e n t s ,  t h e  c h a r g e r 's  p l e a  r e s t s  on t h i s  b e in g  
j o i n t  p r o p e r ty  and  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  sh e  c a n n o t p o in d  i t  f o r  t h e  d e b t  o f  a n  I n d iv id u a l"  p e r  L .G i l l i e s  a t  p . 9 6 .  See a l s o  Byng & Anr. ( L u c a s 's  T rs* )  v* C am pbell & S c o t t  (1 8 9 4 ) 21 E .IO 9 6  p e r  L .K in n e a r  a t  p .  1104 -  "A t t h e  t im e  th e  a r r e s tm e n ts  w ere  u se d  th e  m oveable  p l a n t  and  m ac h in e ry  i n  q u e s t io n  w ere  n o t  th e  p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  common d e b to r ,  b u t  w ere  th e  j o i n t  p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  common d e b to r  and th e  a r r e s t e e ;  and  t h e r e f o r e  w hat i s  p ro p o se d  i s  t o  c a r r y  o f f  and  s e l l  a s  f o r  t h e  d e b t  o f  th e  common d e b to r  p r o p e r ty  w hich  i s  n o t  h i s  e x c lu s iv e  p r o p e r ty  a t  a l l ,  b u t  i s  th e  j o i n t  p r o p e r ty  o f  h im s e l f  and  o f  h i s  t e n a n t .  T h a t a p p e a rs  t o  me t o  be  p l a i n l y ,  and  on t h e  f a c e  o f  i t ,  q u i t e  u n t e n a b le ."  and  p e r  L .O .K in c a im e y  ( o p in io n  r e p o r t e d  p p .1098-1101 : a t  p p .1093 -99 ) -  " I  do n o t  t h in k  t h a t  i t  can  be a s s e r t e d  a s  an  a b s t r a c t  and  
g e n e r a l  p r o p o s i t io n  t h a t  i t  i s  c o m p e te n t f o r  th e  c r e d i t o r  o f  one o f  two j o i n t  ow ners o f  m oveable  p r o p e r ty  /
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property to arrest the subjects of that joint p r o p e r t y ,  or ev en  the interests o f  his debtor in that p r o p e r t y ,  and t o  bring it to s a l e  by  m eans of a fu r th c o m in g #  It I s  true that it has been held c o m p e te n t t o  arrest shares i n  a joint stock company -  Sinclair v* Staples, Jan# 27, 1860 , 22 D#6O0# But i n  that case the shares of the common debtor could 
b e  brought to a  sale without affecting the interests o f  t h e  o t h e r  s h a r e h o ld e r s  *" Mention was made ofFleming v# Twaddle and t h e  o p in io n  was that, i n  t h a t  case, it was incompetent to poind Joint property; "and it must, I think, b e  equally in c o m p e te n t  t o  arrest it and f o l lo w  out t h e  a r r e s tm e n t  by  a Hirthcoming and sa le**  H ow ever, the provisions o f  th e  M#¥#P* (sc*) Act, 1881 ( s e e  C h a p te r  2) m ust be borne in mind# a1(3)s- e x c e p t  a s  h e r e i n a f t e r  p r o v id e d ,  the wife's m oveable  estate s h a l l  n o t  be  subject to arrestment, or other diligence of t h e  law, f o r  th e  h u s b a n d 's  d e b t s ,  p ro v id e d  that t h e  said e s t a t e  ( e x c e p t  such c o r p o r e a l  m o v eab les  a s  are 
u s u a l ly  p o s s e s s e d  without a w r i t t e n  o r  documentary t i t l e )  i s  i n v e s t e d ,  p l a c e d ,  o r  s e c u re d  in the name o f  t h e  w if e  h e r s e l f ,  o r  i n  su c h  te rm s  a s  s h a l l  clearly distinguish t h e  same from  t h e  estate o f  t h e  husband# s i ( 4 ) Any m oney, o r  o t h e r  e s t a t e  o f  the w if e ,  lent o r  e n t r u s t e d  to the h u sb a n d , o r  im m ixed with his funds, shall be  treated as a s s e t s  o f  the husband's estate in bankruptcy, under reservation of the wife's claim t o  a dividend a s  a creditor for the value o f  su c h  money o r  o t h e r  estate after but n o t  before t h e  c la im s  o f  the o t h e r  creditors o f  the h u sb a n d  for v a lu a b le  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  I n  money o r  m o n ey 's  w o r th  h ave  b e en  satisfied# However, i n  i# Euthven v# Fulford & Sons 1909 S #0*951 w here  t h e  income o f  an  alimentary fu n d  h e ld  i n  t r u s t  was destined to a husband and w ife  " d u r in g  t h e i r  joint l i v e s  upon t h e i r  j o i n t  receipt" 
i t  was d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  fu n d  was i n d i v i s i b l e .  H ence , the w hole  fu n d  c o u ld  be arrested f o r  am a l im e n ta r y  debt i n c u r r e d  b y  t h e  husba%id L ord  E u th v e n , (T he sum was i n  r e s p e c t  of clothing for h im s e l f  and  his family) * Per I# ? *  D uned in  a t  954 -  "Now# i t  w as s a i d  t h a t  b e in g  joint, we o u g h t t o  r e c a l l  th e  a r r e s t m e n t ,  at least as r e g a r d s  o n e -h a lf#  I  am a f r a i d  I  c a n n o t  t a k e  t h a t  view # It seem s t o  me t h a t  when a n  a l im e n ta r y  fu n d  i s  d e s t in e d  j o i n t l y  t o  two people who a r e  s p o u s e s ,  and who are l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e r e  i s  no  s e v e ra n c e  o f  t h e  fu n d  i n t o  tw o m o i e t i e s ,  one of w hich  i s  ta k e n  by each; b u t  it i s  a joint fu n d  w hich  e i t h e r  o f  the s p o u s e s  may burden by  m eans o f  p r o p e r  a l im e n ta r y  d e b t s ,  and  o t h e r  a l im e n ta r y  debts of a p r o p e r  c h a r a c t e r  m ust just come in pari p a s s u  the one w ith  t h e  o th e r *  A c c o rd in g ly , I do not “ISnk™"*'**' that t h e  idea of it being a p r o p e r  debt of t h e  h u s b a n d 's  a lo n e  r e a l l y  a r i s e s #  To a  c e r t a i n  extent some o f  t h e s e  f u r n i s h i n g s  may h av e  b e en  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  the family* I t  i s  n o t  t h e  father who c lo t h e s  t h e  c h i l d r e n  m ere th a n  
t h e  /
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As f a r  a s  d i l i g e n c e  on  b i l l s  an d  n o te s  l a  oonoem ed#  
d i l i g e n c e  may p ro c e e d  #  t h e  I m ta n o e  o f  t h e  p ay ee  o r  
h i e  o rd e r#  e u h jo o t  t o  t h e  l o n g - s e t t l e d  p r l n o l p l e  t h a t#
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  t i t l e  o f  t h e  p e r s o n  p r e t e s t i n g  t h e  h i l l  
m u st a p p e a r  e x  ::j^ p^ Glo o f  t h e  b l l l %  Thus# I f  m b i l l
or note la pgiyable to bearer, or la blank Indoroed# 
there l a  no d ifficu lty about the hoMew*'a title#  but 
I f  "It be imdoreed apoolally# the peraen la whose name 
the b ill is  protected w et be ^  the Indomee -
The ohmin o f  iW o r a a t l o n a  muet preamt a eeriee of 
m m ea t e m l m t l n g  i n  t h e  h o ld e r '^ # "
T h e re fo re #  n o te s  Graham S te w a rt#  i f  à  h u sb an d  
a c q u i r e d  a  b i l l  p a y a b le  t o  h i e  %/lfe o r
o rd e r#  h e  o o u ld  n e t  p r o t e s t  i t  l a  h i e  # m  name# t o  
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  u s in g  summery d l l i g e m o *  . I t  w ould 
a e m ,  h e  w r i t e s ,  fm m  t h e  b p iu io n  o f  one o f  t h e  ju d g e s  
i n  S m ith  V . s a l t y ^  a  o a e e  bopeu # i e  p o in t#  # a t ,  h ad  
th e  huebmnd b e a n  a b le  t o  p ro d u c e  t o  t h e  n o t a r y  e v ld o u e e  
o f  h i$  r i g h t  t o  t h e  b i l l #  a n d  a  e u i t a h l e  m ate  t o  th is  
e f f e c t  h a d  becm i n a e r t e d  I n  t h e  in s t r u m e n t  o f  p r o - te a t ,  
th e  d i l i g e a o e  w ould h av e  h e m  good# b u t  t h e  a u t h o r 's  
a d v lo e  i s  t h a t  i t  w ou ld  b e  b e t t e r  n o t  t o  r e l y  on  t h i s  
view # a in o e  t h e  s t a t u t e s  l i m i t  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  aummary 
d i l i g e m e  t o  t h e  d ra w e r ,  p a y e e  o r  iu d o ra e e #  and- h i e  
e d v io e  i a  t o  h a v e  t h e  d e b t  o o n a t i t u t e d  i n  t h e  o r d in a r y  
wmy /
i^ wwsWflmww
t h e  motl%e%* i n  a  f a m ily  i n  o iro m m ta n o o e  a i m i l a r  t o  t h e y  b o th  c l o t h e  them  o u t  o f  t h e  a l im e n ta r y  fund#  AO G ordingly# I  oaxm ot s e e  a n y  r e a s o n  f o r  i n t e r f e r i n g  w i #  t h e  e r r a a W e n ta  upon  t l m t  p o i n t ;,# # "  B u t 0 0 0  W a m o n t  v* D a r l in g to n  ( f u r n i t u r e  f a m i n g  p a r t  o f  t h e  po«m unio ' 'wno.rum  d u r in g  t h e  m a r r ia g e  wee fo u n d  p o l m w l e  i n  %*eapeot o f  o  d e b t  o f  a  eon# a f t e r  t h e  d e a th  o f  t h e  husband#  
t h e  f u r n i t u r e  h a v in g  rem a in e d  i n  t h e  w id o w 's  p o s a e a e io n  an d  i n  % 'eapeot o f  ivhioh s h e  h a d  u n d o u b te d ly  a n  
i n t e r e s t #  D iv is io n  h a d  n o t  th e n  t a k e n  p le e e #  an d  ( p e r  L# Medwyn a t  p#W 7) "She h a s  m e re ly  a  p e rm o n a l o la im  f o r  h e r  e lm re#  She h a s  n e t  a n  i n t o r a a t  i n  e v e ry  one  - a r t i c l e  o f  f u r n i t u r e # " )1# A c t ,  1 5 $ 1 , o#2D$ Graham $ tew sn %  p#366#2# Graimm atêwa%*t# i b i d .3# (1 8 2 9 ) 7  a # a m #
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w ay, by  a c t i o n ,  w hore t h e  h o ld e r  wao n o t  jgg ^ h o le  th e  
p a y ee  I n  t h e  b i l l *
\M e m  a  b i l l  was granted t o  a married woman, it 
w as a d v is a b le  onoe m ore , h e  s a y s ,^  t o  s t a t e  th e  
a o n o u rre n o e  o f  t h é  h u sb a n d , a lth o u g h  I t  w as " s u f f l o l e n t  
t o  e x te n d  t h e  I n s t r u m e n t  o f  p r o t e s t  i n  name o f  t h e  w i f e " ,  
"B u t t h e  o h a rg e  s h o u ld  be  by  h e r  w ith  c o n s e n t  o f  h e r  
h u sb an d * " As n o te d ,  a  c h a rg e  a t  h e r  ovm I n s t a n c e  w ould 
b e  su s p e n d e d , a l th o u g h  t h e  h u sb an d  c o u ld  th e n  a p p e a r  
and  g iv e  h i s  c o n o u rre n o e *
Alimentgary PraviaioiiB
i t e tu m ln g  t o  S a n d ila n d s  v# M e ro e r^ , an d  a l im e n ta r y  
p r o v i s i o n s ,  it w as, and  p ro b a b ly  i s ,  thought, legally 
a n d  p o p u l a r l y ,  t h a t  m a in te n a n c e  o f  t h e  h o u se h o ld  i s  t h e  
d u ty  o f  t h e  husband#
As a  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s ,  i f  a  w ife  h ad  b e e n  g iv e n  a n  
a l im e n ta r y  p r o v i s i o n  by  a  t h i r d  p a r t y ^ ,  o r  i f  su o h  a  
p r o v i s io n  h a d  b e en  o o n s t i t u t e d  o v e r  her m m  p r o p e r ty  
by  a n t e n u p t i a l  o o n t r a o t^ ,  i t  o o u ld  n o t  b e  a t t a c h e d  f o r  
d e b ts  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  family m ain ten an o e^ *
The p r o v i s io n s  o f  t h e  A c t o f  1881 d id  n o t  a p p ly  i n  
t h e  o a s e  o f  m a r r ia g e s  b e f o r e  t h e  A c t ,  a s  h a s  b e en  s e e n ,  
w here  t h e  h u sb a n d , b e f o r e  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  t h e  A o t, had  
made by  i r r e v o c a b l e  d e ed  a  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  h i s  
w if e  i n  the e v e n t  o f  h e r  surviving him# In o t h e r  p r o -  
A c t m a r r ia g e s ,  t h e  m a r i t i  e x c lu d e d  fro m  aoou iren^^a . 
Thus# i n  t h e  o a s e  o f  F e r g u s o n 's  T rs*  v ,  W i l l i s ,  N e lso n  & 
O o#,^  a n  ex am p le , p r e v io u s ly  n o te d ,  o f  t h e  way i n  wM ch 
t h e  /
1* Graham S te w a r t ,  p*388*
2# (1 8 3 3 ) 11 8*665* S m m .  pp* 235-2 3 7 .3* Woat-Hisbet v* MorïitSn, 1627, 1*10368#4* Sandilands, above#
5* S ee  Graham S te w a r t ,  p # 9 8 , fn # 2 ;  c o n t r a s t  S o o t t i s h  Lav; C om m ission , Memo#No*22, P r o p o s i t io n  2* r e o i p r o c a l  d u ty  o f  a l im e n t  by  sp o u ses*
6 , (1883) 11 R.2 6 I (Chapter 1, pp.89 et seq.)
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the law might operate to work Iniquity where married 
women were concerned, stock-in-trade originally 
belonging to the wife and transferred to the husband 
jure mariti# but employed by her in a business carried 
on in her own name, was attachable by the husband's 
creditors'* «
The position was that if the husband himself 
made the provision during the marriage, and the jus 
mariti was not excluded by deed or by statute, his 
creditors /
1 # See also Morrison v# Tawae's Exec. (1 8 8 8 ) 16 R.247 in which the wife's earnings were immixed with the husband's, and she carried on the business of a washenmman in the matrimonial home, placing her own and her husband’s earnings in a common purse for household expenses, and what was saved therefrom in deposit-receipts, repayable "to either of them and to the survivor"# It was held (dies# L# Young) that, on the predecease of the husband, half of the deposited sums belonged to the widow in her own right, by virtue of the M#¥#P#(Sc#) Act, 
1 8 7 7 , 6 .3 .Per L#Young at p.254:- "I think the intention of the M#W#P#Aot was to prevent an ill-doing husband from interfering with the earnings of a well­doing industrious wife and taking them for his own purposes, as experience shewed had been often done. But the parties whose affairs are here in question I think shewed by their conduct that they were not acting on thé footing of the wife carrying on a separate business and earning a separate estate protected from her husband# The case of a wife living in family with her husband, and earning money by charing or serving in a shop, or the like, is  not prima facie a case for the application of the staluEeT'lHEIess, as was not the case here, the parties so act as to shew they intend such a case#" (See Chapter 1, pp.84 et sec.) "Here there was a common fund, made up of what the spouses earned and what the husband succeeded to# This money was put in bank, in the joint names indeed, but under a destination which, according to the law of Scotland, would make the husband the proprietor #... The husband supplied the house accommodation which they enjoyed together, and bore the expenses of the establishment, and was liable for every farthing of the debts of the household, and when the wife is put to shew that she has a claim for f175 she falls."
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o r e d i t o r a  w ould b e  a b le  t o  a t t a o h  I t  t o  t h e  f u l l  e x te n t*  
I f  t h e  ga,r;11;l h ad  boon e x c lu d e d . I t  w ould  n o t  
h av e  b e en  a t ta e h m b le  a t  a l l #  On t h e  m id d le  o e e e .
I f  t h e  p r o v i s io n  h ad  em anated  from  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  o r  
t h e  h u sb an d  tm d endowed h lo  w ife  th o rm if l th  b e fo r e  
m a r r ia g e ,  en d  I n  e a c h  o a e e  t h e  p r o v i s io n  w as d e c la r e d  
t o  be  a l im e n ta r y  b u t  t h e  m & rltl  w as n o t  e x c lu d e d , 
i t  w ould h av e  b e e n  a t t a c h a b l e  by h i s  c r e d i t o r s  o n ly  
s o  f a r  a s  I t  e x ce ed e d  a  r e a s o n a b le  p ro v is io n ^ #
S in c e  th e  J u s  ^ m r l t l  i s  now unknown, and  no  s u b s i s t i n g  
m a r r ia g e s  c a n  h av e  ta k e n  p la c e  b e fo r e  1 B th  J u l y ,  1 8 8 1 , 
su c h  a l im e n ta r y  p r o v i s io n s  may be a t t a c h e d  o n ly  by 
t h e  w i f e ' s  c r e d i t o r s ,  and  by  them  o n ly  i f  and  i n  so  
f a r  a s  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  e x ce ed  id w t  may b e  th o u g h t  
re a s o n a b le #
T h e re  i s  no  d o u b t t h a t  t h e  f o o tn o te  
m en tio n ed  r e g a r d in g  d e b ts  f o r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  c f  
t h e  f a m ily  i s  a  l i t t l e  c o n fu s in g ,  i n  t h a t  a n  a l im e n ta r y  
p r o v i s io n  g iv e n  by a  t h i r d  p a r t y  o r  c o n s t i t u t o d  by  
a n t e n u p t i a l  d eed  o v e r  t h e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r ty  i s  s a i d  n o t  
t o  h av e  b e en  a t t a c h a b l e  f o r  su c h  a  d e b t ,  and  y e t  i t  
m ig h t b e  t i io u g h t  t h a t ,  by  r e a s o n  o f  t h e  v e r y  n a tu r e  
o f  a n  a l im e n ta r y  p r o v i s i o n ,  i n  many c a s e s  i t  w ould be 
u se d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  j u s t  s u c h  a  d e b t*  I t  w ould seem 
t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t o r s  c f  t h e  w ife  may a lw a y s  a t t a c h  su c h  
a  p r o v i s io n  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h ich  i t  i s  u n re a so n a b le #  
i n  g e n e r a l ,  h o w ev er, t h e  fu n d , th o u g h  in te n d e d  f o r  
t h e  s u p p o r t  an d  m a in te n a n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t y  i n  w hose 
f a v o u r  i t  w as m ade, i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  m eet h o u se h o ld  
d e b ts #  T i l l  p r e s e n t  t im e s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  t h e  w ife  h a s  
b een  w e l l  p r o t e c t e d ,  i n  t h e o r y ,  from  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
c f  t h a t  n a tu re #  The p u rp o se  o f  su c h  a  p r o v i s i o n  i s  
c f  c o u r s e  t h e  s o t t i n g  a p a r t  c f  a  fu n d  f o r  th e  s p e c i a l  
u s e  o f  t h e  p a r t y  f a v o u r e d ,  and  " i s  from  i t s  n a tu r e  
p e r s o n a l  /
1» Orabara S t e w a r t ,  pp,9?~9Q i2 .  p .9 8 ,  fn ,2k . (p .242)
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p e r s o n a l  t o  him  o r  h e r  and  n o t  a s s ig n a b le  n o r  
a t t a o h a b le  by  o r a d l t o r s .  Such p r o v i s io n s  a r e  s a i d  
I n b a e r e r e  o s s lb u s ^ . "  Though I n f r e q u e n t ly  e n c o u n te re d , 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  a n  a rra n g e m e n t o f  t h i s  k in d  
a r e  n o t  I n o o n s ld e r a b le  and  sh o u ld  n o t  be  o v e rlo o k ed #  
T h e re  I s  an e x c e p t io n  t o  t h e  r u l e  that n o -o n e  can 
c r e a t e  an  a l im e n ta r y  p r o v i s io n  I n  f a v o u r  of h im s e lf  
I n  t h a t  "a %mman in contemplation o f  marriage may
convey  h e r  p r o p e r ty  M  S S ay lE g ïË â  by
antenuptial marriage-contract to trustees so  a s  t o  
r e t a i n  the enjoyment t h e r e o f ,  and may y e t  exclude the 
d i l i g e n c e  of h e r  c r e d i t o r s  by  declaring the p r o v i s io n s  
i n  h e r  own f a v o u r  a l im e n ta ry ^ # "  The a im , o f  c o u r s e ,  
was t o  k eep  th e  e s t a t e  o u t  o f  t h e  h ands o f  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  c r e d i t o r s ,  b u t  on th e  h u s b a n d 's  d e a th  I t  
was thought t h a t  " th e  a l im e n ta r y  character of th e  
wife's provision would c e a s e "  a l th o u g h  th e  t r u s t  
m ig h t b e  k e p t  Up " f o r  o t h e r  m a tr im o n ia l  p u rp o se s^ # "
On th e  w h o le , t h e r e f o r e #  th e  c l a s s i c  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  " a l im e n ta r y " ,  o f t e n  fo u n d  I n  d e e d s  -  " n o t  
a r r e s t a b l e  n o r  a s s ig n a b le  n o r  s u b j e c t  t o  h e r  d e b ts  
o r  d e e d s  o r t h e  d i l i g e n c e  o f  h e r  c r e d i t o r s "  -  m ig h t 
b e  o p t i m i s t i c ,  s i n c e ,  b e s id e s  q u e s t io n s  o f  e x o r b i t a n t  
p r o v i s i o n ,  t h e  a l im e n ta r y  fu n d  j;S , i t  seem s, a t t a c h a b l e  
f o r  th e  a l im e n ta r y  d e b t^ #
What /
1 .  Graham S te w a r t ,  p # 9 3 .2# ib id #  p.94 and  oases t h e r e  c i t e d #3# ^ e T f o o t n o t e  1 ,  p#94#4 .  à Æ f f l v e n  V ,,,„£ u p o rd  and .3Q ns 1909 S .C . 951*Per% #M cL aren  a t  p#934 -  "Tno o r d e r "  ( o f  p r e f e r e n c e  on a n  a l im e n ta r y  fu n d )  " i s  that t h e  a l im e n ta r y  fu n d  I s  t o  be  draw n on, in th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  f o r  the c u r r e n t  a l im e n ta r y  d e b t s ;  s e o o n d ly , f o r  a r r e a r s  o f  a l im e n ta r y  d e b t s ;  and t h i r d l y  ( th o u g h  I  do not t h in k  th e  p o i n t  h a s  e v e r  a r i s e n ) ,  i f  t h e r e  I s  any  b h la n o e  
o v e r  I suppose t h a t  I t  w ould go t o  the o r d in a r y  c r e d i t o r s # "  (P resum ab ly  t h i s  r e f l e c t s  th e  v iew  (Graham S te w a r t ,  p#103) that " I f  any  e x c e s s  rem a in s  a f t e r  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  a l im e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r s ,  t h i s  shows t h a t  t o  t h a t  e x te n t  the fu n d  was n o t  a l im e n ta r y ,  a s  it was n o t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  m a in te n a n c e " .)  T h u s , i n  L* M c L aren 's  /
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VOmt, t h e n ,  ^  a n  a l im e n ta r y  d e b t?  Graham 
S te w a r t  p o in ta  o u t  t h a t  I t  1@ n o t  t o  bo c o n fu s e d  w i th  
"sum s d e c c m e d  f o r  a i lm e n t"  (D e b to rs  ( S c o t la n d )  A ct# 
1B 80), f o r  w h ich  Im p riso n m en t I s  s t i l l  c o m p e te n t 
upon  f a i l u r e  t o  pay#^ "An a lim m ita in f d e b t  I s  a  
d e b t  f o r  t h e  n e c e s s a r i e s  o f  l i f e "  ( f o o d ,  c l o t h i n g ,  
l o d g in g ) ,  d e te rm in e d  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  r a n k  and  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e  d eb to $ ^ #  The a u th o r  then*^ 
n o te s  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h #  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k in g , a n  
a l im e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r  I s  "one  who h a s  e i t h e r  a c t u a l l y  
f u r n i s h e d  a r t i c l e s ,  f a l l i n g  im d e r  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  
o f  a l im e n t ,  o r  I s  v e s te d  w i th  th e  r i g h t  o f  p a r t i e s  
who h a v e  done s o , " ^  a  p a r t y  who h a s  ad v an ced  money 
I n  o r d e r  t i m t  a n o th e r  l a  a b l e  t o  su c h  a n  
a l im e n ta r y  d e b t ,  and  t o  s a t i s f y  a n  a l l f a e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r  
a s  /
M cL aren 'a  o p in io n .  I f  t h e r e  w ere no c u r r e n t  m iim e n ts ry  c r e d i t o r s ,  p a s t  a l im e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r s  m ig h t a r r e s t ,  u n l e s s  i t  was p le a d e d  t i t a t  a  sum o f  re a d y  money s h o u ld  b e  r e t a i n e d  f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  
e x p e n se s  o f  tW  f a m i ly :  I f  s o ,  t h a t  c la im  %^ouldp e rh a p s  "h av e  ta k e n  p re c e d e n c e  o v e r  a l l  o th e r s " *  t "F a m ily  e x p e n se s" ?  s e e  d i s c u s s io n  above.) . .
8 w " a I s o  Monypenny v* E# o f  Buchan (1 8 3 5 ) 13 8*1 1 1 2 , fo l lo w e d  i n  R uthven* T h ere  th e  d e c i s i o n  c o n c o m s  t h e  r a n k in g  o f  a l im e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r s  I n t ^ ;^  s q  and  t h e  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l im e n ta r y  c r e d H o r s *  The c o u r t  a c q u ie s c e d  i n  t h e  i n t e r l o c u t o r  o f  L .O .C o re h o u se , 
t o  xA loh h e  h ad  added  a  n o te  on r a n k in g  o f  a l im e n ta r y  c r é d i t e r a ,  b e g in n in g  -  " I t  I s  c l e a r ,  t^ m t a  fu n d  d e c la r e d  by  th e  d o n o r  t o  b e  a l im e n ta r y  i s  n o t  a t t a c h a b l e  by  c r e d i t o r s  w hose d e b t s  w ere  c o n t r a c t e d  b e f o r e  t h e  d o n a t io n ;  u n l e s s ,  p e r h a p s ,  i t  i s  o f  a n  u n re a s o n a b le  end  e x o r b i t a n t  am ount * * ,"  (O o m tra s t  c ls lm s  o f  p r i o r  a l im e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r s  a g a i n s t  t h e  a n n u i ty  o f  th e  c u r r e n t  te rm )*1 ,  1880 A c t ,  s # 4 ;  s e e  a l s o  t h a t  A c t c o n c e rn in g  th es a n c t io n  o f  im p riso n m en t f o r  non -paym en t o f  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  d e b ts  (m o s t ly  t o  t h e  R evenue o r  L o c a l 
A u t h o r i t i e s ) ,  a s  amended by  Grown P ro c e e d in g s  A c t, 1 9 4 7 , 8*49*
2* Graham a t e w a r t ,  p*103* Bee Monypenny v* E# o f  B uchan , ( t h e  s e r v i c e s  o f  a  gam ekeeper and  th e  p u rc h a se  W a n  arm y comm iasiom  f o r  t h e  a n n u i t a n t 's  so n  w ere  r e g a rd e d  a s  i te m s  o f  e x p e n d i tu r e  n ecensm ry  f o r  one e n jo y in g  th e  d e f e n d e r 's  s t y l e  o f  l i f e ) #
Æ â #4* p e rT L * 0 * F u lle r to n  i n  W ad d e ll v* ¥ * (1 8 3 6 )  15 8# 151 a t  P#153* (N o te )*
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a& above  d e f in e d *  end  who h a s  r e c e iv e d  I n  g e o u r l t y  
a n  a a e lg n a t lo n  o f  a n  a l im e n ta r y  fund* w i l l ,  so  
lo n g  a s  t h e  money h a s  a c t u a l l y  W en  a p p l i e d  i n  
e x t i n c t i o n  o f  th e s e  d e b ts *  h e  re g a rd e d  a l s o  a s  a n  
a l im e n ta r y  c r e d i t o r .  I f  t h e  mo3iey w as n o t  @o used*  
t h e  c r e d i to r *  th o u g h  e n t i t l e d  t o  th e  eum v i s - â - v l a  
t h e  d e b to r*  " c o u ld  n o t  com pete  w i th  them e who had  
a c t u a l l y  f u m ia h e d  a l im e n t " ,
"A lth o u g h  a l im e n ta r y  fu n d s*  a a l e r l e a  and  p e n s io n s  
a r e  n o t  a t t a e h e b l e  f o r  d e b t*  i t  l a  h e ld  t h a t  t h e  a r r e a r s  
o f  them  may bo a ttm o h e d ^ ,"  Hence* su c h  a r r e a r s  
may bo  a r r e e t e d  by o r d in a r y  o r e d l to r a *  " e x c e p t  s o  f a r  
0 8  th e y  e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  m oot a l im e n ta r y  d o b ta ^ ,"
T M ee  fu n d a  may a lw ays*  hm m ver*  bo a m % n ted  f o r  
a l l ip e n tp r v  d e b t s ,  i f  t h e  d e b ts  a r e  o o n t r a o te d  b e fo re *  
o r  d u r in g *  t h e  t e r n  t o  w h ich  t h e  Inoom e a t t a o h e d  
a p p l i e a ^ .  I t  I s  t h e r e f o r e  "no  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
d e b t  w as in o u r r a d  b e f o r e  t h e  in s t a lm e n t  o f  t w  
a l im e n ta r y  fu n d  w h ich  i s  a r r e s t e d  becam e d u e ^ ,"
I t  i n  n o te w o rth y  t h a t  i f  a  w ife  n ev ea  money
from  a n  a l im e n ta r y  p ro v is io n *  i t s  a l im e n ta r y  c h a r a c t e r  
i s  a l t e r e d  i n  a  q u e s t io n  w i th  # e  h u sb an d  and  
h i e  c r e d i t o r s .  I t  i s  n o t  open  t o  them  t o  a t t a c h  
ouch  m oney. T h is  i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  and  la a e fu l  p o in t#  in eupport of which Qmham Btemrt cites Lord Fraaer'a 
w ork on 'H usband  and  M ife ^ '»
1 ,  B e ll*  cm @ , 1 .1 2 7 ,2* Oratmm S te w a r t ,  p ,103#3 ,  Aa t o  r a n k in g ,  coo  Monypenny an d  R u th v en , ab o v e : Graham S te w a r t ,  p .1 0 2 .4* O loeg  and  H cnderaom , I n t r o d u c t io n  t o  t h e  Law o f  s c c t i a n d  ( 7 t h  M n .)  p ,7 0 4 .
5* F r*  H#& W, 1 ,  769 «» c i t i n g ,  i n  s u p p o r t ,  a t  p . 6 9 9 , D av id so n  v ,  D * (iS 6 7 ) 5 M acph .710 , I t  i s  I n t e r e a t i n g  t h a t  L .F r a e e r  c o n s id e r e d  t h e  S c o ts  c a s e  o f  Drummond V* R o llo o k  M#6152, 1 8UP.349 ( 1 6 3 4 ) ,  g iv in g  a a v in g a  from  a  % iouaekceplng a llo w a n c e  t o  th e  h u a b a n d , t o  be  c o n t r a r y  t o  ooamon aenBe aW  t o  t h e  B n g lia h  e q u i ty  d e c l a lo n  o f  B rooke v .  B* 25  Beav#542 ("U n d e r  t h e  o ld  la w /
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la tenus o£ the Married Women's Poliaies of 
A ssu ra n c e  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1 8 80 , o#1 ,  a  m a r r ie d  
woman might effect a polloy of aaauranoe on her own 
life or the life of her huaWnd for her separate use, 
end, if BO expreneed, the e%m in the policy end all 
benefit thereof vested in her aiiwl was payable to her 
h e i r # ,. oxeoutore end eaeigneea, "mmluelvo of the
r i g h t  o f  a d m l n i a t r e t l o n ."  ^ ropK ty^on iy j
W here th e  p o l i c y  i s  e f f e c t e d  by  a  a m r r le d  m en^, 
i t  m uet b e  e x p re e e e d  on t h e  f a c e  o f  i t  t o  be  f o r  t h e  
b e n e f i t  o f  h i e  w ife  a n d /o r  o h lM m m , I n  o r d e r  t o/ s p e c i a le e o u re  th e /a d v a n ta g e s  o o n f e r r W  by th e  A ct# I f  ao  e^ r^enaod, tho policy beeomea vested in her and/or 
th em , and  l a  no  lo n g e r  a u b je o t  t o  th e  h u a b a n d 'a  
c o n t r o l ^ ,  n o r  i@ i t  l i a b l e  t o  d l l l g e n o e  b y  h lo  
o r o d i t o r a ,  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  o a e e  o f  ixm olvem oy w i th in  
tw o y e a ra  o f  th e  d a t e  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  o r  i n  t h e  e a s e  o f  
f  r a u d ^ \  ^
By v i r t u e  o f  t h e  t r u s t  c r e a t e d  I n  th e a e  p o l i o i e a  
f o r  w if e  and  o h lM re n *  t h e  sum I n  t h e  p o l io y  waa n o t  
re g a rd e d  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  a a s u ra d #  A t 
one t im e ,  t h a t  sum w as exem pt from  a g g r e g a t io n  f o r  
B a ta ta  D u ty  p u r p o s e s ,  and  t h i s  rende%*ed t h e  p u rc h a s e  
o f  su c h  a  p o l i c y  a n  a t t r a c t i v e  p i 'o p o a i t lo n #
H ow ever, t h i s  e x em p tio n  w as rem oved by  t h e  
E ln e n o e  /
law of husband and wife a voluntary allowenoe made by a husband to WLs wife for her separate m o ln ten an o o  a p a r t  from  h im s e lf  woe h e r  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e " )  though in aooordame with Messenger v#C la r k e ,  5  ( a e e  m W e q u e n t ly  e ,g #  m M d in o ttV* :%# [1 W ] 2 and H.w.P.Aot, 1964#
P r e s to n  v# P . 1 9 5 0  8*C#253*)1* 43 an d  44 V lo t#  o#26# C h a p te r  1$ p p * 9 5 * * 9 6 ,a n d  2 , p p .210- 219 .2# Including a widower, for the benefit of hisc h i l d r e n  -  K e n n ed y 's  T ra*  v# S h a rp e  ( 1 8 9 5 ) 23 R#l46*3* The policy may be surrendered by the trustee with concent of the wife - Schmenn v# Scottish Widows Fuad  (1 8 8 6 ) 13 R .6 7 8 #
4 #  S # 2 #  O i s p t e r  1 ,  p p . 9 6 - 9 7 *
5 . See now a l s o  M arried Women's P o l i c i e s  o f  A ssurance  ( S c o t la n d )  
Amendment A c t ,  ( I 98O).
Flaawe Act, 196$, 9*30(1)# Section 3# was repm 
by the Finance Act, 1969# ecWdule 21# but the 
proviaione regarding the exemption of certain pelloiea 
were retained by the 1969 Act# e*40(2)(e)# with the 
reault that the## policies effeeted before 20/3/6&, 
remained exempt# provided that the agi 
of the pollGlea (or val%m of th« 
exceed &25#000# If tWt limit wee exceeded# relief 
was applied only to a fraction of the eum (i*e* 
&25,000 divided by the value# or aggregate values# of 
the poliGy(io8))^ Pollclea effected after that date 
wore not exempt from aggregation#
Capital Transfer Tax was in 
Fimnce Act# 1975, e#19* It is  a tax upon transfers 
of value# whether inter ylvoEn (made after 26th March# 
1974# as a "straight gift" or by meena of a aettlement), 
or on the occurrence of a death (after 12th March 1975)*
It has been seen #mt pollclea taken out before 
196$ enjc^ed certain benoflta, and these have been 
continued by the 1975 Act# a#22(7)* It would appear 
that# in the case of a pre-1969 policy# where tlio life  
aaaured %iao paid the premlume thereon by way of g ift 
"before the repeal of Rotate Duty and the life  aaaured 
then dies within seven yeare of the payment(a)# after 
the introduction of C*T*T# on death" (but before 12th 
March# 1983# when this relief ehall ceaae)# no C#T*T* 
w ill ariae in respect cf tlw proceede of the policy^* 
The premiums and the sum in the policy arc linked*
This la explained by Pinacn^#
No /
1* See Barry Pinaon# Revenue I 2* See generally 'Capital Trg (1977V* pp*12-16*
5* .1-b.lil»  * |>*141*4* Revenue Law (7th edn*)# pp#
(7th edn*) p*377* T a x ' JohB
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No such relief from C.T.T. is given> it would 
seem, to inter vivos payments of premiums made after 
the introduction of C .T .T .  ^but "[P]requently of 
course premium payments made after that time by way 
of gift will be fully exempted under one of the C .T .T . 
exemptions, e.g. the annual exemption" (that is, of 
transfers not^exceeding (at present) £3,000 by any 
one transferrin one tax year). Presumably, between 
strangers (in non-spouse oases), the sums in the 
policy will be a transfer of value on death, although, 
in such a case, it appears that if premiums are paid 
by the donee, the sum assured is. not regarded as 
forming part of the transferor’s (life assured’s) 
estate on death^.
As between spouses, however, there is no 
liability to C.T.T. on transfers inter vivos or on 
death^ (of the predecessor)* Hence, premiums on 
such a policy, whatever be their date and the date 
of the policy, will attract no tax, nor will the 
proceeds of the policy, when ultimately payable, and 
it would seem that this will be the case whether the 
p o l i c y  is one of life assurance simply, or a mortgage- 
linked endowment assurance, designed to enable the 
wife (usually) to pay off the debt to the Building 
Society on the occurrence of the death of the husband 
before the date of final discharge of the mortgage 
commitment, and often framed in the terms that it will 
mature at 25 years’ date or on the earlier death of 
the /
1. See 1975 Act, s.20 (Transfers and Chargeable Transfers. S.20(2) "... a transfer of value is any disposition made by a person ("the transferor") as a result of which the value of his estate immediately after the disposition is less than it would be but for the disposition; and the amount by which it is less is the value transferred by the transfer.")2, Coombes, pp,174-5.3» See Finance Act, 1975, Schedule 6 (Exempt Transfers),
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t h e  husband^#  A w idow er m ig h t a l s o  f i n d  d i f f i c u l t y  
I n  r e p a y in g  t h e  d e b t ,  h u t  e q u iv a le n t  p r o v i s io n s  I n  
h l a  f a v o u r  a p p e a r  t o  he  r a r e *  The s o l u t i o n  m ig h t he  
f o r  a n  a a a u ra n o e  p o l lo y  t o  he  ta k e n  o u t  on  t h e  l i f e  
o f  t h e  w ife #  t o  he  k e p t  up  hy  e i t h e r  p a r ty #  I f  I t  
happened  t h a t  a  j o i n t  endowment p o l lo y  w as n o t  
a o o e p ta h le  t o  t h e  In e u ra n o e  com pany. S uch  a p o l ic y  
w ould  s ta n d  on common law  I n  S c o tla n d ^ #
The ex em p tio n  from  C .T .T* I n  th e  c a s e  o f  m a r r ie d  
p e rs o n a  " l a  c o u n te rb a la n c e d  by t h e  rem o v a l o f  t h e  
s u r v iv in g  sp o u se  r e l i e f  on th e  seco n d  d e a th "  w hich  
l a t t e r  /
1. As to this type o f  p o l ic y #  see t h e  c a s e  o f  Ghrystal’s 
T rs*  V# G# 1912 B.C.1003» where a n  "endowment b o n d "# payable on the e x p ir y  o f  20 y e a r s  to Mr* Chrystal# o r  to hla wldov/ on h i s  d e a th  w i th in  t h a t  tim e#  was 
h e ld  t o  be  a policy " f o r  the b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  w ife "I n  te rm s  o f  th e  M.W.Folioles o f  A ssu ra n c e  (Sc.) Act# 1880# s#2# and  was p a y a b le  t h e r e f o r e  t o  t h e  widow I n  p r e f e r e n c e  t o  the c r e d i t o r s  on th e  d e a th  of Mr, C h r y s ta l  within 20 years and on t h e  séquestration o f  h i s  e s t a t e .  The L ord  P r e s id e n t  (D uned in )#  though he made no fo rm a l dissent# w as less convinced o f  t h e  point. "What s t r u c k  me a t  f i r s t  was that t h i s  p o l i c y  was c e r t a i n l y  f& o le  n o t  a  p o l lo yf o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  of t h e  w l f e T b u t  a policy for the b e n e f i t  of t h e  husb an d  h im s e lf#  b e c a u se  t h e  f i r s t  clause p r o v id e s  t h a t  I f  h e  l i v e s  t o  a certain age h e  will get a sum of money# and the p r o v i s io n  I n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  w ife  i s  o n ly  p u t  I n  t o  m eet t h e  o a se  o f  h i s  n o t  l i v i n g  t o  t h a t  a g e .But I  am sensible o f  t h e  strength of t h e  a rg u m e n ts  w h ich  y o u r  L o rd s h ip s  h ave  used*  I  f e e l  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  A ct I s  a n  e n a b l in g  s t a t u t e #  and  t h e  c l a s s  o f  insurance which i s  h e r e  d i s c lo s e d  seem s to be  a v e ry  s e n s i b l e  o n e . It p r o v id e s  for th e  w ife  if t h e  husband  I s  taken away by an e a r l y  d e a th #  and# on  th e  other hand# if he l i v e s  long enough# it p r o v id e s  him  w i th  a c o n s id e r a b le  sum of money o u t  o f  w h ich  h e  can make a p r o v i s io n  for h e r  a f t e r  h i s  d e a th * "Today# when mortgage com m itm ents arc o f t e n  i n  t h e  names o f  b o th  p a r t n e r s ,  a n d /o r  title to the h o u se  is In j o i n t  names# th e  purpoae o f  the endowment p o l ic y #  at least when l l n k e a E o  mortgage a rra n g em e n ts#  I s  c l e a r l y  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  w if e  ( a s  a l s o  f o r  t h e  h u sb an d ) # whether t h e  sum# i n  th e  e v e n t#  becom es 
p a y a b le  at 25 y e a r s '  d a te  o r  a t  an  earlier d a te *
2# C h a p te r  1# p . 95#
3 # Coombes# p.13*
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latter relief operated to prevent a double passing 
for Estate Duty purposes of the same property, 
provided that certain conditions (pre-eminently that 
the survivor should n o t  have been competent to 
dispose of the property) were fulfilled^*
The r e s u l t  seem s to be that the taking out o f  
these policies c a r r i e s  no particular advantage or 
disadvantage f o r  sp o u se s  from  th e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f
tax-saving. ' The importance of the Married Women’s 
Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act# 1380, lies, 
therefore, it would appear, in the confirmation of 
insurable interest and in the provisions affecting 
creditors^.
The taking out of such policies for the purpose 
of ensuring that sufficient resources will exist to 
meet tax liability remains valid, though now, since 
no liability will arise on the d e a th  of the predeoeaser, 
"it will be advisable" (instead) "to take out a policy 
on th e  joint lives, payable on the death of the 
survivor, for tax on the estimated estate then passing"^,
The Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act,
1881, s.1(5) provides that the wife’s (now separate) 
moveable estate shall not be subject to arrestment 
or other diligence of the husband’s creditors, if 
her moveable estate ("except such corporeal moveables 
as are usually possessed without a written or 
documentary title") is invested, placed, or secured in 
the name o f  t h e  wife herself, or in such terms as 
clearly distinguish it from the estate of the husband^.
The exception i s  important because considerable 
confusion /
1. See e.g. Pinson, ?th edn* pp.437-439*2 .  See C h a p te r  1 ,  p p .95-97*3* Coombes, pp.173-4.4. See National Bank v .  Cowan (1 8 9 3 ) 21 R .4  i n  which it was decided that money averred by the wife to have belonged to her at m a r r ia g e , had  n o t  been kept separate from her husband’s property.
253 ,
c o n fu s io n  s u r ro u n d s  m a t t e r s  o f  m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r ty  
i n  a happy  m a rr ia g e  ( i n  E ng land  and  S c o tla n d } ^  and 
many and  p o s s ib l y  v a lu a b le  a r e  t h e  o o r p o r o a i  
m oveab les " u s u a l ly  p o s s e s s e d  w i th o u t  a w r i t t e n  o r  
do cu m en ta ry  t i t l e " *  The p r o v i s i o n ,  w h i le  m ost 
c e r t a i n l y  f a i r ,  d o e s  e n a b le  a  h u sb a n d , when c h a rg e d  
by S h e r i f f  O f f i c e r ,  b l i t h e l y  t o  d e c l a r e  t h a t  a l l  
f u r n i t u r e  and  o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home w hich  
a r e  w o rth  p o in d in g  and  s a l e ,  b e lo n g  t o  h i s  w ife^ *
I f ,  h o w ev er, t h e  w if e  h a s  l e n t  o r  e n t r u s t e d  
money o r  o t h e r  estate to h e r  h u sb a n d , or i f  her 
p r o p e r ty  i n  some o t h e r  way h a s  become im m ixed with 
h i s  f u n d s ,  su c h  p r o p e r ty  falls to be treated as an 
a s s e t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e  i n  h i s  b a n k ru p tc y ,  and  
t h e  w i f e ,  i n  h e r  c la im , i s  p o s tp o n e d  t o  t h e  c la im s  
o f  o n e ro u s  c r e d i to r s ^ *
C i v i l  Im p riso n m en t
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s a n c t io n  o f  im p riso n m e n t ( f o r  
c i v i l  debt) m ust be  c o n s id e re d #  I t  is wall s e t t l e d  
t h a t  c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r i e s  w ere th e r e f r o m , and
t t ie s e  in c lu d e d  " p u p i l s ,  l u n a t i c s ,  m a r r ie d  women 
d u r in g  c o v e r t u r e ,  p e e r s ,  widows o f  p e e r s ,  a n d , d u r in g  
th e  s i t t i n g  o f  P a r l ia m e n t  and f o r  f o r t y  d a y s  b e fo r e  
and  a f t e r ,  Members o f  t h e  House o f  Commons **#"^ 
"# #* Im prisonm en t i s  Im p o s s ib le  a g a i n s t  c o r p o r a t io n sgo r  p u b l ic  co m p an ies  o r  p e rs o n s  abroad#""'^ To th e  
r u l e  t h a t  a m a r r ie d  woman c o u ld  n o t  b e  im p r iso n e d  
f o r  d e b t ,  Graham S te w a r t  n o te s  s e v e r a l  e x c e p tio n s *  
Im p riso n m en t /
1# T h is  arises m a in ly  from t h e  f a c t s ,  not t h e  law  on th e  s u b j e c t .  Dr# C l iv e  rem arks at p#294*As to Other systems, and inventories o f  property, see C h a p te r  6*2# As t o  C r e d i t o r s '  r i g h t s  u n d e r  o t h e r  sy s te m s  se e  
C h a p te r  6#3* M*W*P*(8c#} A c t, 1881 , 5 * 1 (4 )#  See g e n e r a l l yC h a p te r  2 (Bankruptcy).4# Graham Stewart, p#722#
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Imprisonment was competent on her obligation ad 
factum praestandum^.
However, i n  some cases, a wife might contract 
a valid personal obligation, b u t  imprisonment could 
not follow thereon. An example of this i s  that 
her personal obligation in rem versum will "warrant 
diligence against her separate estate, but not 
against her p e r s o n " ,  although after dissolution ofpthe marriage she might be imprisoned *
Similarly, if sh e  was living apart from  her 
husband, and was pledging h e r  own credit for 
necessaries, her non-payment provided a warrant f o r  
creditors using diligence upon her separate estate 
or upon her aliment^. Again, diligence might be 
used /
1* See Ersk* 1.6*19, where* having stated the (former) rule that " sh e  h a s  n o th in g  that can be truly called her own w here  matters are left to the disposition of the law", and consequently that h e r  husband could recover the person of his wife from all who would withhold it from him, and that her person, while she was 'vestita vlro* was f r e e  from  aii execution upon debt¥ contracted by h e r s e l f  which by her coverture she became disabled to pay (Gordon 11 Jan.1704 M.57S7) continues, "At the same time the husband, who is n o t  th e  p r o p e r  d e b to r ,  i s  liable to personal d i l i g e n c e  at the suit of h e r  creditors so long as the marriage subsists. But notwithstanding this power in the husband, execution may be used against a wife's person, to compel her to the performance of facts which are in her own power, and cannot be validly performed but by h e r s e l f ;  e.g. t o  enter the heirs of h e r  v a s s a l s ,  t o  receive adjudgers in lands holden of herself, o r  t o  e x h i b i t  writings in her own 'custody, upon letters of diligence, Stair, t.i; t.4,S 14."2. Graham Stewart, pp.722-3, c i t i n g  G ray v. Wylie (1840)2 D .1 2 0 5 .3. Graham Stewart, ibid*. where he takes issue with L ord  Fraser's view, and says that t h e  authorities cited by him at 1*553 do not s u p p o r t  h i s  statement that, in these circumstances (of d e b ts  for necessaries), diligence m ig h t be done against a wife's person ifthe husband was abroad, and affirms that diligence against the person was allowed o n ly  where the wife had entered into trade#Certainly, the oases cited appear to lack mention of /
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used upon her estate, but not upon her person, where 
payment of damages arising me delioto was sought^#
As above# she might be Imprisoned after the dissolution 
of the marriage*
Speaking of personal obligations of the wife, 
incurred during separation, where the husband had 
given his wife a sum for her separate maintenance, 
Erskine states that personal diligence could follow 
only after divorce# "since no wife can be subjected 
to personal diligence upon a civil cause, even after 
either legal or voluntary separation# till the 
marriage its e lf  be dissolved by divorce"^* However# 
as a result of the Conjugal Rights (Scotland)
Amendment Act# 1861, a wife holding a decree of 
separation /
of pursuit to imprisonment, and one at least (Hay V4 Corstorphin M.5956 (1663)) raised the issue of the absence of the husband for 20 years andhis reputed death, and contains the answer, "That by the space of 15 years the defender was keeper of à house, and lodged boarders prpprip nomine, there being diverse reports for W e  "ïïie“oï'"‘’Her husband's death, in which time the particulars libelled were furnished to her for the use and necessity of her family and boarders", the terms of which suggest perhaps at least some participation in "trade", on the part of the wife (widow),1# because, in the well-known phrase (ISrsk* 1*6*24), "marriage affords no indemnity to delinquents"* Erskine does suggest, however, that her person, though not her estate, was "under the power of the law, so as she may be banished, imprisoned# or even punished capitally upon a criminal trial;Those wishing to use diligence against her estate (except such heritable estate as was not subject to the jus mariti) required to await the conclusion of the marriegeT^but the case cited (Murray M»6079 (1724))seems to support the view that a civil decree (as opposed (perhaps) to a criminal decree) could not affect, during marriage, the person ^  the estate (except for estate exempt from th~jus mariti) of the wife. This view is taken also by Fraser (1, 557*8), Possibly Erskine's statement quoad imprisonment may have been intended to relate only to criminal proceedings.2* Ersk* 1.6*25*
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separation or a protection order, end while living 
apart from her husband, might contract, sue, and be 
sued as i f  unmarried. Consequently, as a result of 
an obligation entered into by her in such a situation, 
she might be imprisoned* "Therefore a wife, under 
either of these decrees, may open a shop and trade; 
she may grant bills and transact all kinds of 
business, just as if she were unmarried; and of 
course diligence may be done against her person and 
her estate for payment of debts, incurred by her after
the decree of separation and the order of protection1 ,,#
In the circumstances previously mentioned of
the absence abroad, c iv il death or insanity of her
husband, where a wife had entered into trade, diligence
might be used on her person or her estate to enforce
her business obligations and as from the coming into
effect of the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act,
1077, which endowed a wife with implied power to
engage in business, the wife would be subject to the
same sanctions as noted above, even though the husband pwas present *
"The wife ' s coverture affords no protection to 
her as to crimes; and both spouses, or either of them, 
may be tried as principals, or as actors, art and part 
#**. A crime committed by the wife must be expiated 
by punishment endured by herself; never by the 
husband# Where the sentence condemns her to banishment, 
imprisonment, or corporal pains, it may be carried into 
effect against her during marriage" It appears 
that, for non-payment of a fine, during the subsistence 
of the marriage, her person could not be attached, 
though she might be arrested as in meditatione fugae^ *^
The /
1. Fr. 1, 555,2, See generally Graham Stewart, pp*722-5, andauthorities there cited*5, Fr* 1, 557.4* ibid*. 545#
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The present day situ ation  is  that diligence  
against the person for c iv i l  debt, whatever the 
sex or status# i s  very rarely indeed found in  
practice^# The matter i s  governed by the Debtors 
(Scotland) Act 1880^ ("An Act to abolish Imprisonment 
for Debt, and to provide for the better Punishment 
of Fraudulent Debtors in  Scotland; and for other 
purposes*"), which applies to Scotland only, and by 
the Crovai Proceedings Act, 1947^, of which s s .41-51 
apply to Scotland.
By s . 4 of the Act of 1880, i t  i s  provided that 
no person sh a ll be apprehended or imprisoned on 
account of any c iv i l  debt except ( 1 ) taxes, fin es  
or penalties due to Her Majesty, and rates and 
assessments law fully imposed or to be imposed: and 
(2) sums decerned for aliment* Where imprisonment 
i s  competent thereunder, the period of imprisonment 
sh a ll not exceed twelve months*
However, the Act warns that nothing in  i t  
contained "shall a ffec t or prevent the apprehension 
or imprisonment of any person under a warrant granted 
against him as being in  meditatione fugae* or under 
any decree or obligation ad factum praestandum*
S*49 of the Act of 1947 i s  concerned with the 
application to Scotland of s*26 of that Act, and 
i t  provides that s*26 sh a ll have e ffe c t  as i f  for  
subsection (2) was substituted the follow ing:- 
"(2) The exception in  respect of taxes contained in  
section  four of the Debtors.(Scotland) Act, 1880 
(43 and 44 Viet* c.34) from the enactment therein  
contained abolishing imprisonment for debt sh a ll apply 
only in  respect of death duties and purchase tax."
Thus, for Scotland, s.26 (Execution by the Crown) 
reads /
1. Sea Chapter 4*2. 43 and 44 V iet. c*34.3. 10 and 11 Geo.6 cap.44.
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reads as fo llow s:-
8 . 2 6 ( 1 ) * -  Subject to the provisions of th is  Act, any 
order made in  favour of the Grown against any person 
in  any c iv i l  proceedings to  which the Crown i s  a 
party may be enforced in  the same manner as an order 
made in  an action between subjects; and s . 26(2) w ill  
be in^^hd above terras.
In e f fe c t , therefore, the fin a l sanction of 
imprisonment i s  competent only in cases of fa ilu re  
in  payment of aliment, purchase tax^ or death duties 
due, or fa ilu re  to  implement an obligation ^  factum 
praestandum» and, in  addition, apprehension may be 
made of any person against whom, as being in  meditatione 
fugae. a warrant has been granted,
pAlthough, since 1920 , a wife has had a duty to  
aliment her husband i f  he i s  unable to maintain 
him self and i f  she has a separate esta te , or separate 
income more than reasonably su ffic ien t for  her o\m  
maintenance^, there cannot be many instances of 
translation  of that duty into a decree against her, 
and fewer s t i l l  -  or none -  of imprisonment of a 
wife /
1* now replaced by Value Added Tax -  see Finance Act, 1972, 8,58.2 . M.¥.P*(Sc.) Act, 1920, 8 ,4 .3. Do the words "reasonably su ffic ien t . . ."  qualify  only "separate income", or also "separate estate"?I t  seems commonly to be assumed that the w ife 's  obligation arises only i f  she has resources more than adequate for her own maintenance. In 1920, a w ife 's  income was lik e ly  to be produced by her separate ca p ita l. Today, income i s  l ik e ly  to be provided, or investment income to  be augmented, by income from employment. In any case, the d istin ction  made in  the Act, by reason of such changes, and because the universal rule now i s  that of complete (a t le a s t  notional) separation of property between spouses, i s  now inappropriate and unnecessary. The general meaning of the section i s  c lear , and, inany particular instance, an award of aliment would not be made against a wife whose property situ ation  generally did not merit i t ,  and in  respect of which the prospects of enforcement were poor. . See generally  Chapter 4 , See Sc.Law Commission Memo.No,22 -  Needs and Resources, 2,92 ^  seq. .
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wife for non-payment thereof, but in  terms of the 1880 
Act, s ,4 ,  she would seem equally to be lia b le  
p oten tia lly  to that punishment* It i s  ind icative of 
how deeply entrenched are attitudes in  th is  sphere 
that the idea s t i l l  at present seems bizarre* (In 
1876, Lord Fraser wrote "If a wife obtain decree 
against her husband, she may imprison him thereon; 
and i f  he escape from prison, she has a claim of 
damages against h is keepers, by whose negligence he 
escaped •«•*
Holding a decree for aliment, she may arrest 
him in  meditatione fugae; and in such circumstances, 
i t  would not be relevant to offer to  take her abroad 
with him* She may inhibit him, and adjudge and arrest 
h is property* But a wife cannot arrest upon a 
decree obtained for aliment, unless there be arrears, 
or unless the husband be yergens ad inopiam") As far  
as the parent/child relationship i s  concerned, i t  i s  
to  h is father primarily (a t present) that a legitim ate  
child  i s  en titled  to look for aliment^*
A married woman may now charge and be charged 
alone /
1, 578-9* Arrears of aliment cannot normally be recovered unless due under agreement or court decree. Lord Fraser expresses the view that, though decree had not been obtained, i f  the action  had been raised, and the husband admitted that aliment was payable, "the wife may arrest him as in  meditatione fugae *" See now interim aliment>enïïent'e"IIte*"-“"“Shapter 4, and Scottish  Law iommis'sTon Memo. No.22* 2*176; see also Propn*33 (ab olition  of d istin ction  between actions for  Interim aliment and actions for permanent alim ent), and Faculty response, 2*212, and Propn.55 (that in terest should no longer run on arrears of aliment) - see Memo. No.22. 2.190-192*2. Fr. P* & Ch. 100; Walker, Prins* (2nd ed.) p .315: as to illeg it im a te  children see Walker, pp.323- 325* See recommendation to assim ilate position  of illeg itim a te  to legitim ate children, and of the mother's l ia b i l i t y  to aliment to that of the father, and related subjects, contained in  Sc.Law Commission Memo* No., 2 2 . Propositions 6 and 14 and comments in  response by Faculty of Law, University of Glasgow (see generally Chapter 4 -  Aliment)•
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alone without the addition of her husband's name, 
since she is sui juris.
In all other forms of diligence - arrestment,and 
subsequent furthcoming, poinding, and subsequent sale, 
adjudication, inhibition^, poinding of the ground, 
maills and duties, sequestration for rent, and 
sequestration proper - the remedies available 
thereunder are open for use by or against a married 
woman i n  t h e  same way as by  o r  against any other 
person sui■juris » It is perfectly clear that 
husband and wife may stand to each other not only 
in the relation of landlord and tenant^ but also in 
the general character of creditor and debtor, and 
may sue and be sued, for repayment accordingly^.
Husband and wife may sue each other i n  contract, and 
in delict^, and either may be found guilty of crime 
against the other* T hese rules are a r e s u l t  of a 
strict application of the theory of s e p a r a t i o n  of 
property, and are justified according to t h a t  rationale,
An over-simple approach may be unfair to third 
party creditors, however, in v iew  of the joint 
enjoyment of property which marriage entails, and the 
difficulties of proof of ownership, and the rights 
of such persons against property of spouses is a 
subject which has received detailed consideration in 
other systems^.
The husband's jus mariti encompassed any right 
of action in delict which th e  wife might have against 
a ny /
1 # See, in relation to praepositura. p. 227 e t  supra.2* M i l l a r  V* M* 1940 8 . 5 7 ' # , ---------3. Aitken v. A, 1954 8.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 6 0 . See SheriffBryden's discussion of the effect of the M.¥*P,Acts on inter-spouse litigation* See further, i n f r a * p . 2 7 0  e t  s e q .4* Taw Reform (Husband and Wife) Act, 1962, s*2,5. See Chapter 6,
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ahy  t h i r d  p a r t y .  I n  t h e  many a rg u m en ts  o f  In tim a c y  
o f  r e l a t i o n a h i p  and  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  f a m i ly  harm ony 
u a ed  a g a i n s t  th o s e  who a d v o o a te d  t h a t  h u sb an d  and  
w ife  s h o u ld  h e  a b le  t o  sue each o t h e r  I n  delict, th e  
p r o t a g o n ie t a  o o u ld  h av e  s t a t e d  w i th  t r u t h  t h a t  th e  
b a s i e  and re& eon f o r  t h e  r u l e  no  lo n g e r  o b ta in e d ,  
B lnoe b e fo r e  1 6 8 1 , a  h u sb an d  d u re  m a r i t i  to o k  o v e r  
a l l  t h e  w i f e ' s  r l g h t a  a g a i n s t  an y o n e , and  t h e r e f o r e  
sh e  c o u ld  n o t  h a v e  any  r i g h t s  a g a i n s t  h im , beo au ae  
th e y  vm uld v e s t  i n  h im , and  any  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  i n  
d e l i c t  o r  on  any  o t h e r  g ro u n d  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  w ife  
a g a i n s t  t h e  hu sb an d  w ould  be e x t in g u is h e d  o o n fu a lo n e .  
an d  t h a t ,  i n  v iew  o f  t h e  w i f e 's  I n c r e a s in g  
I n d e g ^ d e n c e  i n  s t e t u s  end  p r o p e r ty ,  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be  
freedom  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  b e tw een  them# B e fo re  t h a t  
d a t e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  m a jo r i ty  o f  o a s e s ,  ( t h a t  I s ,  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  A ct o f  1661) ev en  i f  sh e  h ad  r i g h t  
an d  ( t h a t  w h ic h  was d e n ie d  h e r )  t i t l e  t o  s u e ,  any  
money r e c o v e r a b le  by  th e  w ife  from  th e  h u sb an d  w ould  
become im m e d ia te ly  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  p r o p e r t y ,  and  th e n  
i t  was im p o s s ib le  t o  b re a k  o u t o f  t h e  e n c i r c l i n g  
c h a in s  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  p r o t e c t i v e n e s s  o r  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t #  " I n  t h e s e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  t h e  law  w ould  
n o t  g iv e  a  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  w hich  c o u ld  h a v e  no 
»e:
/
1u s f u l  r e s u l t "  # The c o n v e rse  was t r u e  a ls o #  I n
1 ,  Young V# Y# (1 9 0 5 ) 5 P#550 , p e r  L .M cL aren  a t  p#531# N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  c o u r t  was unanim ous i n  h o ld in g  t h a t  a  w i f e 's  a c t i o n  f o r  dam ages a g a i n s t  h e r  hu sb an d  
f o r  s l a n d e r  w as in co m p e te n t#  " I t  i s  one t h in g  f o r  t h e  law  t o  r e c o g n is e  th e  s e p a r a t e  i n t e r e s t s  and  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  w ife  i n  t h e i r  e n jo y m e n t, b u t  i t  i s  q u i t e  
a n o th e r  thing to reverse th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  o l d e r  la w  and  t o  s u s t a i n  a  p e r s o n a l  a c t i o n  by  a  w ife  a g a i n s t  a  h u sb a n d , o r  b y  a husb an d  a g a i n s t  a  w i f e ,  h a v in g  no r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  w i f e 's  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty "  p e r  L#M cLaren, i b i d # Of* W y n n -P ar:^ , J # ,  C u r t i s  v# % filcox [1 9 4 8 ] 2 K#B#475, upon M#W#P#Act, 1882 , s# 1 2 . T h ere  also a p u r e ly  p e r s o n a l  c la im  su c h  a s  f o r  dam ages f o r  l i b e l  o r  s l a n d e r  o r  a s s a u l t  %vas u se d  t o  e x e m p lify  t h e  ty p e  o f  a c t i o n  o u tw ith  t h e  a m b it o f  8*12* A t p # 4 8 1 , W ynn-P arry , J#  e x p re s s e d  t h e  v iew  
t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  m ust be  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o r  
s e c u r i t y  /
a  s i t u a t i o n  w here  a l l  p r o p e r ty  o f  t h e  w if e  wee ced ed  
t o  t h e  h u sb an d  on  m a r r ia g e ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  p o i n t  
I n  s u in g  h e r#  She waa In d e e d  a  women o f  s tre w #
The m a r r ie d  woman, a s  hma b een  s e e n ,  rem ain ed  
a u b je o t  t o  h e r  h u s b a n d 'a  r i g h t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and  
c u r a t o r i a l  pow er b e tw een  1 8 6 1 -1 9 2 0 , an d  t h e r e f o r e  a  
p u r s u e r  w as o b l ig e d  t o  su e  b o th  th e  w if e  an d  h e r  
hu sb an d  f o r  h i e  I n t e r e s t ;  on  th e  o t h e r  h a n d . I n  
c e a e a  w here  t h e  1861 A c t a p p l i e d ,  m w if e  w as a b l e  t o  
s u e  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  d e l i c t u a l  w rongdo ing  (b y  a  t h i r d
t o  h e r s e l f ^  a n d  any
1 #
s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r ty ,  th o u g h  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n ,  h e  f e l t ,  l a y  I n  th e  p u rp o s e  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  r a t h e r  th a n  I n  t h e  k in d  o f  p r o p e r ty  w h ich  m ig h t form  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  a c t i o n ,  and  a t  p # 4 8 2 , h e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  c la u s e  b e g in n in g , " e x c e p t  a s  a f o r e s a id "  w a s . I n  a  s e n s e ,  s u r p lu s a g e ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  w ords ( d id )  " s e r v e  t o  em p h a sise  t h a t  th e  s e c t i o n  c o n a t l t t i t e s  an  e x c e p t io n  t o  t h e  common law  r u l e ,  w h ich  o th e rw is e  s t i l l  a p p l i e s  an d  w ould  s t i l l  p r e v e n t  a  m a r r ie d  woman from  p u r s u in g  a  p u r e l y  p e r s o n a l  c la im  a g a i n s t  h e r  husband###" ( l l b e l / s l a n d e r /  a s s a u l t ) .  An a c t i o n  i n  t o r t ,  I n  h i s  o p in io n ,  w as a  t h in g  I n  a c t i o n  and  3m to o k  I s s u e  w lt3 i th e  m ore l i m i t e d  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  u s e  I n  t h e  1862 A ct o f  " # * ln g  I n  a c t io n " ,^ a d o p te d  by M cC ard le , J#  I n  O o t l l f f e  V# M e l s t o n  [1 9 5 0 ] 2  K #B,578 ( s e e  I n f r a ,  
p #  271  f a ,  1 ) ,  who c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  i t  d id  n o t  
I n c lu d e  a  w i f e ' s  r i g h t  t o  su e  h e r  h u sb an d  f o r  a n  a n t e - n u p t i a l  t o r t ,  The H#w#P#Act, 1 8 8 2 , s# 2 4  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  w ord " p r o p e r ty "  when u se d  I n  t h e  A ct S h a l l  I n c lu d e  a  t h i n g  i n  a c t io n #  O t t o  K ahn- F re u n d , " I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  and  I n j u s t i c e s  I n  th e  Law o f  H usband an d  W ife" (1 9 5 2 ) 15 M*L#R#153, a t  p#142 , fn * 4 3 , and  p p # 1 5 0 -1 5 2 , w h e r e  O u r t l a  and  G c t l l f f e  a r e  d i s c u s s e d ,  p r e f e r s  th e  d e c i s io n  i n  C u r t la  v# W ilox# The h u s b a n d 's  r i g h t  t o  re d u c e  a  chose I n  a c t i o n  t o  p o s s e s s io n  w as rem oved by  t h e  M#w#P#Act, l i s t ,  88*2 an d  3 (IW in -F re u n d ,  p ,1 4 2 )#  Bee g e n e r a l l y  on  a # 1 2 , K ahn-F reund  p p , l4 2  s e c # s e e  f n .  1  b e  l o w .
l# e #  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  j u s  m & r l t l* M#w#P#(8o#) A ct# 1881# 8*1(1}# S h e r i f f  I nA itk e n  V# A* 1954 8#L #T #(8h#a t# )60  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  was n o  e x a c t ly  s i m i l a r  S c o t t i s h  e q u iv a le n t  t o  t h e  E n g l i s h  M#W#P#Act# 1 8 8 2 , s . 1 2 , w h ich  a llo w e d  t o  
a  w ife  freed o m  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  h e r  p r o p e r t y ,# ,  " b u t  e x c e p t  a s  a f o r e s a i d  no  h u sb an d  o r  w ife  s h a l l  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  su e  t h e  o th e r  f o r  a  t o r t " ,  S e c t io n  12 was b y  no  m eans d e v o id  o f  d i f f i c u l t y  I n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  i t s  c o n s t r u c t io n #
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dam ages i^diloh sh e  won sh e  m ig h t keep  a s  h e r  own 
p r o p e r ty ^ , p ro v id e d  that h e r  husband's concurrence 
I n  t h e  a c t i o n  h ad  b e e n  g iv e n .
Since,1920, ho w ev er, a m a rr ie d  woman may sue 
and  b e  su e d  a s  a n  In d e p e n d e n t p e rso n *  Any dam ages 
re c o v e re d  by  h e r  a r e  t r u l y  h e r  p r o p e r ty ,  and  f o r  any  
damages due by  h e r  sh e  I s  not entitled to lo o k  t o  
h e r  husband, b u t  must meet t h e  c la im  h e r s e l f  (unless 
sh e  h a s  a c te d  a s  s e r v a n t  o r  a g e n t  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d )^ .
U nder th e  (Scotland) A c t, 1920, the
h u s b a n d 's  c u r a t o r i a l  pow er end  right o f  administration 
were a b o l i s h e d ,  except (e.2) (as to curatorial power) 
w here th e  w ife  i s  m in o r -  that is, i n  context, b e tw een  
the ages o f  s i x t e e n  and  e ig h te e n :  Age of Marriage
Act 1929 and Age of Majority ( S c o t la n d )  Act, 1969 - 
and c e a s e s  upon  attainment by h e r  of t h e  age o f  
e ig h te e n ^ .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  imagine that t h e  
a d u l t  w if e  sui j u r i s  of a m in o r h u sb an d  w ould  be 
p r e f e r r e d ,  a s  h i s  c u r a t o r ,  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  f a t h e r  
in t h e  rare s i t u a t i o n  w here  su c h  a minor w as n o t  
f o r i  s f a m i l i a t e d ^  /
1 # D#M«Walker, The law  o f  D e l i c t  i n  Scotland, I ,  p#84 ;Smith Vi T u rn b u l l  (1894) 2 S*L#T#554, w here  th eaction was allowed to p ro c e e d  at t h e  instance o f  t h e  m a r r ie d  woman a lo n e ,  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  te rm s  o f  
h e r  a n t e - n u p t i a l  marriage-contraot w h ich  excluded t h e  husband's .lus m a r i t i  and .lus adminlatratlonls and of t h e  te rm s  s  #( e x c lu s io n  o f  t h e  jus, m a r i t i  from  a c q u ir e n d a  h e r i t a b l e  o r  moveable, andincome Wefecf7“1post Act f o r  th o s e  m a r r ie d  b e f o r e  the Act);. M oreover th e  husb an d  took no notice of h e r  r e q u e s t  f o r  h i s  consent o r  l a t e r  of h e r  intimation to him  of th e  a c t io n *  The sp o u se s  w ere  l i v i n g  a p a r t ,  th o u g h  n o t  i n  te rm s  o f  any  fo rm a l ag reem en t o r  d e c re e *2* See infra 1 p *2.64 e t  s e q . Walker, D e l i c t ,  1,84#3* C f# pre?T92b d i s c u s s i o n ;  M ullen  v* March’s Trs*1920 2 S*L*T. 372m The ,ju8 administr a t i o n i s  was abolished by the Act o f  1920*™*“ ''¥heïEer'"€Se""curatory of the h u sb an d  i n  this exceptional c a s e  is of th e  n a tu r e  o f  a  p a t e r n a l  c u r a to r y  o r  i s  a  rem n an t o f  t h e  m a r i t a l  c u r a to r y  i s  a m a t te r  f o r  c o n je c tu r e *Be© Clive & W ilso n , pp*247-50# and  C h a p te r  1»As t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  t h e s e  c u r a t o r i e s ,  s e e  Er8k*1*6*23#
4 .  See S.L.C. C o n su lta t iv e  Memo. No. 5 4 » 6 . 1 - 6 . 4 .  A married male minor does not come under the cu ratory  o f  h is  a d u lt  w i f e .The r u le  " c le a r ly  o f fen d s  a g a in s t  the p r in c ip l e  o f  sex  e q u a lity "
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f o r i s f a m i l i a t e d #  The f a t h e r  l a  iPSO j u r e  c u r a t o r ,  
and  i t  w ould seem t h a t  o n ly  th e  r i g h t s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s  
of t h e  w ife * #  f a t h e r  would be rem oved by t h e  marriage# 
I f  both spouses are m in o r , but not forisfamiliated, 
th e  c u r a t o r  o f  each would be t h e  father ( o r  mother"*) 
of eaoh^#
I n  l a t e r  l i f e ,  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  i n o e p a c i t y ,  one 
sp o u se  m ig h t b e  t h e  b e s t  c h o ic e  a s  p u r a t o r  b o n is  o f  
t h e  o th e r^ #
T h e re  a r e  many a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  t3ie e f f e c t  t h a t  
n e i t h e r  sp o u se  w i l l  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e l i c t u a l  
a c t i n g s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  u n l e s s  h e  o r  sh e  i s  a c t i n g  a s  
t h e  o t h e r ' s  s e r v a n t  o r  a g e n t^ #  E xam ples a r e  B a r r  v# 
N e i ls o n s ^ ,  M urray  v* G raham ^, B a i l l i e  v# C h a lm ers^ ,
M ilne  V, S m ith ^ , and  t h e r e  i s  t h e  f a m i l i a r  s t a te m e n t ,  
" M a rr ia g e  a f f o r d s  no indem nj.ty  f o r  d e l i c t ,  and  a  w ife  
re m a in s  /
1# G u a rd ia n s h ip  A c t, 1 9 7 5 , s ,1 0 ( 1 )  e t  s e c #2, M#¥*F# (Bo#) Act, 1920, 0*2: wife's father shallrem a in  h e r  curator u n t i l  h e r  m a jo r i t y  o r  u n t i l  t h e  commencement c f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  c u r a to r y  on t h e  
c e s s a t i o n  o f  h i s  i n c a p a c i t y  a n d /o r  m in o r i ty #  Bee 
C lX V e a n d  W i l s o n ,  i b i d #  And see  S * L. C * co n su l ta tiv e j. Memo .JIo. 54 5# Bee how ever I n  r e  L a n g le y 's  S e t t l e m e n t  T r u s t s  11961]3 A l l  E ,R *803 , a  c a s e  a r i s i n g  i n  t h e  c o n f l i c t  o f  la w s , w here th e  E n g l is h  c o u r t  d i s r e g a r d e d  th e  s t a t u s  ( c o n f e r r e d  by  th e  C a l i f o r n i a n  C o u rt o f  t h e  d o m ic i le )  o f  a  w if e  a s  g u a rd ia n  o f  h e r  husband#  The l a t t e r  h ad  b e en  d e c la r e d  by t h a t  c o u r t  t o  b e  " a n  in c o m p e te n t"  ( p h y s i c a l l y ,  n o t  m e n ta l ly ,  ^ n ca p ax #)#  I t  may be  t h a t ,  i f  r e g a r d  i s  h ad  o n ly ^ to  t h e  d i s a b l i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  a s t a t u e ,  t h a t  s t a t u s  sh o u ld  b e  d i s r e g a r d e d  h e re  
a s  b e in g  p e n a l  i n  n a tu re #  Bee e#g# Worms v* De V a ld o r  (1 8 8 0 ) 49 L ,J# C h # 2 6 l, and  I n  r e  B e l o r 's  T r s .  [1 9 0 2 ] 1 Ch#488 ( c o n c e rn in g  th e  p r o d ig a l  s t a t u s  i n  F r a n c e ) , w h ich  have  been t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  c r i t i c i s m #4# The m ost l i k e l y  i n s t a n c e  o f  t h i s  w ould  be  delictual 
c o n d u c t by the w ife  w h ile  acting a s  p r a e p o s i t a  d o m e s tio is  - See Clive & Wileon; ’ P 
i> K o p a T ’^ WT#
M.6079#M#6085#
20 R#95$
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re m a in s  l i a b l e  I n  p e r s o n  f o r  h e r  c r im e , and  l i a b l e  
p e c u n i a r i l y  I f  sh e  h a s  a  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  and  I n  
p e rs o n  a f t e r  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e * ^ ,
pI n  Thomson v* D uggle ,  I t  was h e ld  t h a t  a  widow 
h ad  in c u r r e d  no  p e r s o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a  w rong 
com m itted  by  h e r  husband# A widow m ay, h o w e v er, be  
su e d  i n  h e r  c a p a c i ty  a s  e x e c u tr ix #  T h e re ,  a  c o l l i s i o n  
h ad  o c c u r re d  b e tw een  two s h i p s ,  and  th e  m a s te r  o f  
one o f  them  d ie d  n o t  q u i t e  two y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  d a te  
o f  th e  a c c id e n t#  The ow ners o f  t h e  o t h e r  s h ip  b ro u g h t 
a n  A d m ira lty  action jh i personam against t h e  widow, 
c la im in g  damages for l o s s  a l l e g e d l y  r e s u l t i n g  t o  them  
from  t h e  a l l e g e d  fault and  negligence of the deceased 
m a s te r#  I n  t h e  P ro c e d u re  R o l l ,  th e  w id o w 's  c o u n s e l  
c o n te n d e d  t h a t  the a c t i o n  was in c o m p e te n t a s  directed 
s o l e l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  widow "an d  I r r e l e v a n t  i n  a s  much 
a s  the widow o f  a d e c e a s e d  p e rs o n  was n o t ,  as such, 
h i s  l e g a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " .  P u r s u e r s ' c o u n s e l  a l l e g e d  
t h a t  th e  widow, o r  h e r  solicitor, had  f a i l e d  to d i s c lo s e  
t h e  m a s t e r 's  t r u e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s #  The a c t i o n  was 
d is m is s e d  a s  incompetent, and p e r  L#0#(Birnam) J, 
fo u n d  th e  v ie w :-  " I n  my judgm en t t h e  widow o f  a  
d e c e a se d  p e r s o n  i s  n o t ,  a s  s u c h , h i s  l e g a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
and  l i a b l e  t o  be  su e d  f o r  a  wrong w h ich  h e r  h usband  
may h av e  co m m itted  d u r in g  h i s  l i f e t i m e " #
However, i t  i s  w e l l  t o  rem ember that one s p o u s e ,
" i f  p r e s e n t  a t  and  j o in i n g  a p p ro v in g ly  i n  a  w rong by  
t h e  o t h e r  to a t h i r d  p a r ty "  may b e  l i a b l e  i n  c o n ju n c t io n  
w i th  t h e  o th e r^ #  O th e rw is e , t h e r e  l a  no  j o i n t  and  
s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  b e tw een  sp o u se s  i n  d e l i c t #  A w ife  
i s  l i a b l e  t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  f o r  w rongdo ing  a s  i f  sh e  
w ere  u n m arried ^ #
P r o f e s s o r  /
1# p e r  L# A rd m illa n  i n  B a r r  v# N e ils o n s  a t  p p # 6 5 5 -6 , an d  r e m in is c e n t  i n  te rm s  c f  E rsk#  1#6#24 , a# 1949 S#L#T# (M o tes) 53#5# W a lk e r , D e l i c t ,  I# 8 4  w ^ #4# Ib id #  8 9 , c i t i n g  Hook v . ^ G a l l u m  (1 9 0 5 ) 7  F#528: ïïarr v# M e ils o n s , supra#
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P r o f e s s o r  W alker a l s o  h i g h l i g h t s  t h e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  
r u l e  ( n o t  now I n  f o r c e ) ,  t h a t  w here a  d e f e n d e r  was 
a l l e g e d  t o  h a v e  c a u se d  t l ie  d e a th  o f  a  c h i l d  by  h i s  
w ro n g fu l actings, the title to sue v e s te d  I n  t h e  
husb an d  on ly^*
The Law Reform  (Damages and  S o la tiu m )  (S c o t la n d )
A c t , 1 9 6 2 ^ , t h e r e f o r e ,  r e l i e v e d  a d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n #
The A c t , P r o f e s s o r  W alker n o t e s ,  was a  r e s u l t  o f  some 
o f  t h e  th o u g h ts  o f  t h e  Law Reform  C om m ittee f o r  
S c o t la n d ? ,  and  i t  p r o v id e s ,  by  8 * 1 (1 ) t h a t  " n o tw i th s ta n d in g  
a%]y r u l e  o f  la w , i t  s h a l l  n o t  be  e  b a r  t o  an y  r i g h t  
o f  a m o th e r  t o  r e c o v e r  dam ages o r  s o la t iu m  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  t h e  death o f  h e r  c h i l d  that th e  f a t h e r  o f  that 
child i s  a l i v e " *  T h u s , i n  the c a s e  o f  a d iv o r c e d  o r  
d e s e r t e d  w i f e ,  who i s  p e rh a p s  m ost l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  h a d  
t h e  c a r e  and  co m p an io n sh ip  o f  t h e  c h i l d  i n  q u e s t io n ,  
t h a t  p e r s o n  m ig h t s u e  " i n  h e r  own r i g h t  en d  f o r  h e r  
own I n t e r e s t " ,  a l th o u g h  t h e  a u th o r  rem a rk s  t h a t  
i n t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  s h o u ld  no  d o u b t be m ade, 
e d i c t a l l y ,  t o  t h e  h u sb a n d , a n  o p p o r tu n i ty  g iv e n  
t o  him  t o  b e  c a l l e d  a s  d e f e n d e r  f o r  h i s  i n t e r e s t ^ \
An o b v io u s  q u e s t io n  is r a i s e d  by th e  wording 
o f  t h e  SG O tion: i n  t h e  o r d in a r y  c a s e ,  %vhere th e
p a r e n t s  a r e  c o h a b i t i n g ,  and  at one i n  desiring t o  
i n i t i a t e  p r o c e e d in g s ,  d o e s  e a c h  have  a  s e p a r a t e  
t i t l e  t o  S'
W a lk e r 's  /
s u e ,  o r  i s  t h e r e  j o i n t  t i t l e ? ^  P r o f e s s o r
1# Ib id *  8 5 -8 9 , w here  t h e  s o r r y  t a l e  i s  t o l d ,
2* 7 9 5 2 , 0 * 4 2 ,  ^ ^3 ,  o o n ta in c d  i n  i t s  T e n th  R e p o rt (1 9 6 0 ) Cmnd*1103*4 ,  W a lk e r, D e l i c t ,  I ,  89*5 ,  The common law  p o s i t i o n  a s  t o  t i t l e  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  W a lk e r , D e l i c t ,  I ,  p,E38, id3;ere t h e  c o n c lu s io n  i s  re a c h e d  t h a t ,  on  1 ^e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s io n s  
i n  B a r r e t t  v* N*B,Ry#(1899) 1 F #1139 , A itk e n  v* G o u rla y  (1 9 0 3 ) 5 F ,5 8 5 , and  L a id la w  v* N*C*B, 1957 8*C*49 im re  e r ro n e o u s  ( a s  a  r e s u l t  p a r t l y  o f  m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s  o f  p re v io u s  o a s e s ) ,  and  f o l lo w in g  
E l s to n ,  b e lo w , t h a t  p a r e n t s  e ac h  h ad  a  t i t l e ,  o ra  j o i n t  t i t l e ,  t o  su e  f o r  t h e  d e a th  o f  t h e  c h i l d ;  t h a t  b e f o r e  t h e  1881 A c t ,  t h e  w i f e ' s  r i g h t  was subm erged j u r e  m a r i t i  i n  th e  husband, b u t  t h a t  thereafter vEey™were^entitled j o i n t l y  to sue*
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W a lk e r 's  v iew  i s  t h a t ,  a l th o u g h  a j o i n t  o la im  w ould 
n o t  he  in c o m p e te n t ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib ly  p r e f e r a b l e  
p ro o e d u ra l ly ^  t o  h av e  s e p a r a t e  o la im a  w i th  s e p a r a t e  
oono lu& lons and  s e p a r a t e  c la im s  f o r  dam ages, t h e s e  
p a r t s  b e in g  o o n jo ln e d  i n  a  s i n g l e  a o t i o n ;  h e  n o te s  
t h a t ,  i f  a  j o i n t  a%mrd w ere  n o t  m ade, ( i* e #  n o t  
s o u g h t p re s u m a b ly ) ,  t h e  aw ards t o  h u sb an d  and  w ife  
"w ould s t i l l  h av e  t o  be  r e g a rd e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
oaoh  o t h e r  a s  p a r t s  o f  a n  i n t e r r e l a t e d  f a m i ly  o la lm "^ #
T h is  A ot oame i n t o  e f f e c t  on 1 3 th  May, 1976 , and  
b r in g s  t o  f r u i t i o n  recom m endations made b y  t h e  S c o t t i s h  
Law Com m ission^*
H en o e fo rw ard , t h e  m a t t e r  o f  e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  s u e ,  
o f  r e l a t i v e s  o f  a  d e o e a se d  p e rs o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  
d e a th  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  th ro u g h  w ro n g fu l a c t i n g s  b y  a  
t h i r d  p a r t y  i s  g o v e rn e d  by  s t a t u t e ,  and  n o t  by  th e  
c a s e  o f  Elston v* N#B*Ey»0o#^, t h e  principle of which 
h a s  b e en  " r e s t a t e d  b u t  m o d if ie d "  by  t h e  A c t .
I f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i s  " a  member o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d 's  
im m ed ia te  f a m i ly " ,  a  sum b y  way o f  c o m p e n sa tio n  f o r  
l o s s  o f  n o n - p a t r im o n la l  b e n e f i t  ( w i th o u t  p r e j u d i c e  t o  
an y  o la lm  f o r  l o s s  o f  s u p p o r t  u n d e r  s * 1 ( 3 ) )  may be 
aw arded  ( s , l ( 4 ) ) ,  A ch an g e  i n  th e  ( g e n e r a l l y )  
" e n t i t l e d  r e l a t i v e s "  c a te g o r y  h a s  b e en  b ro u g h t  a b o u t 
by  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e d  s p o u s e s ,  c o l l a t e r a l s ,  
an d  a s c e n d a n t  an d  d e s c e n d a n t  r e l a t i v e s  w iiere  t h e  
i n t e r v e n i n g  g e n e r a t l o n ( s )  e x i s t s  ( e x i s t ) #  An aw ard  
o f  /
1# I ,  8 9 , c i t i n g  K e l ly  v# M u t ta l l  1965 8*C#427#2* I b i d # ,  c i t i n g  i n  com parison#  K e l ly  v# G lasgow  
^ o t ip o r a t io n  1951 8#C# (H#L*)15# S ee  now, i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  c a s e .  Damages ($ o * ) A c t ,  1 9 7 6 ,s#3#
3 .  1 976 , 0 * 1 3 .4* Memo Mo# 17 -  Damages f o r  I n j u r i e s  C a u s in g  D e a th , 1 9 7 2 , and  R e p o r t  on th e  Law R e la t in g  t o  Damages f o r  I n j u r i e s  Causing Death (S c o t.L a w  Com.M o*31,1973)5 .  (1 8 7 0 ) 8  M&oph. 9 8 0 .
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o f  s o la t iu m  f o r  g r i e f  a W  s u f f e r i n g  e x p e rlm io o d  by 
t h e  r e l a t i v e s  i s  r e p la c e d  by  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  o f  s * 1 (4 )  
above  ( I n t r o d u o in g  W hat 1$ t o  b e  known a a  a  " l o s s  o f  
a o o ie ty  aw ard ")#  T h is  m m rd  l o  a v a i l a b l e  o n ly  t o  
spouse#  p a re n t#  o b lM #  o r  " a c c e p te d  c h i l d "  o f  t lio  
deoe&Geda
The A c t a i m p l i f i e s  and  o l a r l f l o a  t h e  law  c o n o e m in g  
t h e  I n t e r - a o t i o n  o f  o la im s  by  th e  e x e c u to r  and  by
r e l a t i v e s  { a a # 2 -5 #  ,j ^ r q #p.53i e t  -seg j. U lio re  ( s # 5 )
dam ages a m  c la im e d  by  e x e c u to r  and  by  r o l a t i v e ( 8 ) #  
t h ( ^  m m t bo brouglit in  one action# although a  
" c o n n e c te d  p o rc o n "  ( b e in g  "a  p e rso n #  n o t  b e in g  a  p a r t y  
t o  t h e  a c t io n #  who ( a p a r t  from  t h i s  a e c tlo m )  w ould 
h a v e  0  t i t l e #  %Fhether a s  t h e  e x e c u to r  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  
o r  a s  a  r e l a t i v e  c f  M a#  t o  c u e  t h e  eeme d e f e n d e r  i n  
e n o # ie r  s u c h  a c t i o n  b a a e d  on  # e  r e l e v a n t  i n j u r i e s #  
o r#  a s  t h e  a a a e  may be# on  t h e  d e a th "  a # 5 (1 ) ) #  may 
b r in g  a  s e p a r a t e  a c t i o n  I f  t h e  c o u r t  l a  a a t i s f l e d  
t h a t  h e  wee I g n o r a n t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  a c t i o n  o r  f o r  o t h e r  
r e e a o m b le  c a u s e  wee im a b le  t o  make a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
bo  s l a t e d  a a  a  p u rs u e r*  The ( o r i g i m l )  p u r s u e r  m ust 
n o t i f y  a l l  c o n n e c te d  p e rs o n a  o f  w hose ^ l a t e n c e  h e  
knows o r  c o u ld  r e a s o n a b ly  bo  aw are# o f  t h e  fo r th c o m in g  
l i t i g a t i o n #  On M e  f a i l u r e  t o  do  so#  t h e  coi%rt# i n  
i t s  d i s c r e t i o n #  may d ia m ic a  t h e  a c t io n *
T h is  i s  a  s t a t u t o r y  r é i t é r a t i o n  an d  e l a b o r a t i o n  
o f  % )re-e% iating  ccmmen lavf r u l e  t i m t  i n t e r - r e l a t e d  
family claims e h e u M  be  viewed to g e th e r ^ #
The Act# by a*0# abolishes the right cf 
a e sy th m e n t /
1# l# r m a l ly  ( a w  D e l i c t  I #105$ I f  I n j u r e d  by t h e  same w rong o f  t h e  sam e d e fe n d e r  a n d  c la im in g  on  th e  sam e g ro u n d s#  may j o i n  i n  c m  n o t io n ;  t h e  same 
d e f e n d e r  a n d  t h e  sam e c ir c u m s ta n c e s  d o  n o t  j u s t i f y  one  a c t i o n )  e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  p u r s u e r s  ( u n r e l a t e d  t o  e a c h  o th e r )  w i l l  su e  in d e p e n d e n tly #  a l th o u g h  th e  c o u r t  may c o n jo in  t h e  a c t io n s #  o r  c i s t  them  t o  a w a i t  t h e  d e te r m in a t io n  o f  a  " t e s t  c a se " #  However p e r s o n s  ' r e l a t e d '  o n ly  b y  a  common i n t e r e s t #  i n  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  common t o  them  a l l  ( a s ,  e#g# r i i ? a r i a n  p r o p r i e t o r s )  may a l s o  su e  to g e th e r #
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a s sy th m e n t (w h lo h  h ad  allo% md a  o lq lm  by  r e l a t i v e s  
f o r  dam ages f o r  d e a th  c a u se d  by  c r im in a l  w ro n g ) , and  
r e p e a l s .  I n t e r  a l i a ,  th e  Law Reform  (Damages and*■ - nmwu-wmmiii * » w
S o la tiu m )  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t, 1962* I t  l a  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  
p r o v i s io n s  o f  t h e  new A ct h av e  o v e r ta k e n  th o s e  o f  
1 9 6 2 ,  and  h av e  made t h e  a p e o la l l a e d  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  
l a t t e r  im n e c e a a a ry .
W here a  sp o u s e  l a  p u r a u e r  I n  l i t i g a t i o n  a g a i n s t  
a  t h l %  p a r t y ,  I t  c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  no r e s t r i c t i o n  now 
e x i s t a  a g a i n s t  @ m a r r ie d  w om an's t i t l e  t o  s u e ,  a in o e  
t h e  anom aly  d la o u e e e d  was rem oved by  th e  A c t o f  1962^#
I n  c iro u m s ta n c e a  w here  b o th  apoueea  h av e  s u f f e r e d  
l o s s  and  damage t h r o u ^ i  t h e  d e l i c t u a l  a c t i n g s  o f  a  
t h i r d  p a r t y ,  i n  th e  same i n o id e n t  ( e a ,  f o r  ex am p le , 
i n  a  m o to r a c c i d e n t ) ,  e a c h  h a s  s e p a r a t e  t i t l e  and  
i n t e r e s t  t o  s u e ,  and  a l th o u g h  one a c t i o n  o n ly  i s  
b r o u g h t ,  " t h e r e  m ust b e  s e p a r a t e  c o n c lu s io n a  and  
s e p a r a t e  a v e rm e n ta  o f  lo b a " ^ *  W here t h e  c o u r t  
aw ards dam ages t o  one sp o u se  o n ly ,  t h e  o t h e r  w i l l  h ave  
no  c la im  t h e r e i n ^ .
H ow ever, i f ,  a s  happened  i n  t h e  %mll known c a s e  
o f  F in b u rg h  v* M oss' Ekapires L t d .^ ,  s e p a r a t e  vnrongs 
h av e  b e e n  done t o  t h e  s p o u s e s ,  a  s e p a r a t e  a c t i o n  m ust 
be b ro u g h t by  each. I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  b o th  husb an d  and 
w ife  h a d  b ro u g h t  a n  a c t i o n  f o r  ' s l a n d e r '  i n  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  
w h e re , w h i le  th e y  were attending a theatrical performance, 
c e r t a i n  s ta te m e n ts  had  b e e n  made by a n  em ployee o f  t h e  
t h e a t r e  ow ners t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  w if e  was a 
n o to r io u s  p r o s t i t u t e ,  t h a t  two w eeks p r e v io u s ly  sh e  
had b e en  thrown o u t  f o r  b e in g  drunk and d i s o r d e r l y ,  
an d  t h a t  s h e  m ust le a v e *  The w i f e 's  a v e rm e n ts  w ere  
h e ld  r e l e v a n t ,  b u t  t h e  husband was n o t  s u c c e s s f u l  (per 
L ord  /
1* and  s e e  now 1976 A ct*2* W a lk e r , D e l i c t ,  I ,  8 9 ,3 .  I b i d . .  c i t i n g  M axim ll v. Young (1 9 0 1 ) 3 P .638#4 .  7 5 3 5  8 * 0 .9 2 8 .
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L ord  A rd w a ll, b e c a u se  th e  s ta te m e n ts  c o m p la in e d  o f  
d id  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s l a n d e r  on h im , a n d , p e r  L o rds 
S to rm o n th -D a r lin g  and Low, b e ca u se  i t  was n o t  
r e l e v a n t l y  a v e r r e d  t h a t  th e  s ta te m e n ts ,  so  f a r  a s  
th e y  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  h u sb a n d , and  n o t  m e re ly  t o  th e  
w i f e ,  w ere  u t t e r e d  by th e  d e fe n d e rs*  s e r v a n t  i n  th e  
c o u rs e  o f  h i s  em p loym en t).
L i t i g a t i o n  b e tw een  S p o u ses
P o s s ib ly  t h e  m ost i n t e r e s t i n g  a s p e c t  o f  th e  
d i s c u s s io n  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  i s  t h a t  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t h e  
l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  h u sb an d  and  w ife  i n t e r  s e . t h e  l i a b i l i t y  
o f  e a c h  t o  be  su e d  b y , and  th e  r i g h t  t o  s u e ,  t h e  
o th e r*  The m is g iv in g s  w h ich  have  t r o u b le d  S c o ts  
ju d g e s  on t h i s  q u e s t io n  have  a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  E n g l is h  and 
A m erican  c o u n te r p a r t s  e q u a l ly .
A lth o u g h  a c t io n s  be tw een  hu sb an d  and  w ife  a r i s i n g  
o u t  o f  c o n t r a c t s  be tw een  them  became p o s s ib l e  a f t e r  
th e  A c t o f  1 920^ , t h e  c o u r t s  a llo w e d  no l a t i t u d e  t o  
w o u ld -b e  p u r s u e r s  on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  com petence  
o f  su c h  a c t io n s  when g rounded  i n  d e l i c t *  They 
a d h e re d  s t r i c t l y  t o  t h e  common law  r u l e  t h a t ,  s in c e  
h u sb an d  and  w ife  w ere one p e rs o n  i n  la w , n e i t h e r  m ig h t 
su e  t h e  o th e r  i n  d e l i c t  and  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  was th o u g h t  
t o  have  a s  i t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  p u b l ic  p o l i c y ,  a l th o u g h  
i t  i s  p e rh a p s  a  l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  why 
su c h  c o n s id e r a t io n s  d id  n o t  p r e v e n t  th e  c o u r t s  from  
c o u n te n a n c in g  a c t io n s  i n  c o n t r a c t .  The tw in  re a s o n  
f o r  d o u b t a b o u t  i n t e r - s p o u s e  l i t i g a t i o n  was d i s r u p t i o n  
o f  m a r i t a l  harm ony: s u r e l y  p ro c e e d in g s  o f  any  k in d
m ig h t p ro d u c e  d is c o r d ?  In d e e d , i n  t h e  "m o to r a c c id e n t"  
case ; 
o f  /
2s  w h ich  p rom p ted  g r e a t  d i s c u s s io n  ,  t h e  e x i s te n c e
1 * th o u g h  n o t  e x p r e s s ly  p ro v id e d  f o r  t h e r e i n :  s e eH o rsb u rg h  v .  H, 1949 S*L*T*355, and judgm en t o f  L ord  B irnam  t r a c i n g  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  E n g l i s h  and  S c o t t i s h  j u d i c i a l  th o u g h t  on th e  m a tte r*2* See e . g .  i n f r a * , See a l s o  e .g .M cC urdy ,T o r ts  b e tw een  P e rs o n s  i n  D om estic  R e la t io n  1930 43 Harv*L*R*1030, a t  p . 1 0 4 3 -4 4 : a r t i c l e  c o n s id e re d  
i n f r a ,  a t  p. 284 e t  seq .
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af the ineuranoe might have been thought to
have softened the effect of liability# Where breech 
of contract waa alleged# there would normally be no 
a%*ch Intermediary#
In any event# the traditional view was clear 
and accepted* and Included a prohibition on inter- 
apouae litigation  founded upon delicto committed 
before marriage  ^#
With acme exceptional* there aeems to have been 
acceptance /
Gf# American expedient of postponing the mrrlago until tim conclusion cf the litigation*In England# there aeema to have been a certain dubiety about this point# The proposition (cf non-litlgloalty) la supported the caeea of G etliffe V# Bdelaton [1930] 2 K.B#37e, and Baylia V# Blackwell [1952] 1 E*B#154 (in which a husband was held not entitled to cue his wife i n  respect of an ante-nuptial tort committed by her against him)* Wt not by that cf Curtis v# ifllccx [1948]2 K#B#475# See also generally Fr# K#è ¥.1*577;^ Clive & Wilson* PP#350 et mo#; Young v# Y#(l903)5 F#330; Phillips V# Bamot%1&76) 1 Q#B#D#436; Walker* Delict 1*90* c it in g  Inter alia Harper v#H# 1929 $#C#220* Cameron v# GlasgoSr?orporatlon 1936  B#0#(H#L#) 26# Bruce v# Murray 1926 8#L#T.236* and Young v* Rankin 1934 S*C»499#See e#g# Young v# Rankin supra# in idMch an action in delict (or quwl-dellot) oy a minor son against his father was held competent* per b.Mcrison at PP#515-516:- (drawing an analogy with the wife's position! md referring to the case of Harper v# H# 1929 B#G#220) "Harper's case followed the decisions of Phillips V# Bamet and Young v# Young* wMch both proceeded on the principle that# in the eye of the common law# the husband and wife are %adem jges&gn&# That principle haa never boon applied* ana does hot epply# to the case of a father and ills miner son#I wish to add that* having b een  In charge o f  the Warned Women's Property (Sdotland) Act* 1920* during it s  unopposed passage through #ie House of Commons as a Bill# I understood Its purpose was# I n t e r  alia# to end the application of that doctrine finally as between husband and w ife #  I humbly think that the principle of the statute* as regards a ll the c iv il rights of a married woman# Is to place her In the same position as If she were unmarried #### I hmbly think timt since the passing of t^ dLs Act* It la Impossible to held that the old doctrine of the common /
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acceptance that It was not In accordance with the 
fitness of things that husband and wife should be 
able to sue each other in delict# After the 
decision in Horsburgh in 1949, "spouses could sue 
each other in any type of action except one based 
on delict"^#
The doctrine of unity did not always work to 
the parties’ disadvantage. Mention may be made of 
the English criminal case of Mawjl v. The Queen^, in 
which a charge of conspiracy failed m  the ground 
that# since husband and wife were one, i t  was impossible 
for them to conspire together*
The rules relating to proceedings against a 
third party initiated by husband or wife separately or 
together /
common law that the wife is  a^dem persona withthe husband survives to any extent or“for any ■ purpose# I quite assent to the view that litigations between husband and wife are undesirable# and that is ,  of course, a very good reason why resort to the law Courts should be avoided by the spouses# But I venture to doubt whether it promotes harmony in domestic relations that the wife alone is deprived of the benefit of a claim against the insurance company with Which the husband has contracted# which is given to every other member of Mb household" # In the earlier case of Murray supra* L.Morisoîi had given an indication that he might be inclined to take this view (about the 1920 Act) in an appropriate case#His Lordship was of the opinion that the point was not fully argued in Harper, and urged a reconsideration of the decision and "further elucidation" of the statute# which further elucidation, quoad delict, was not achieved until 1962#1# Clive, & Wilson, p*359#2# [1957] A*C#126* "A husband and wife cannot alonebe found guilty of conspiracy, for they are considered in law as one person, and are presumed to have but one will": quoted by L•Somervell ofHanow at p*134, from "Pleading# Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases", J#F•Archbold, 33 ed#• p.22# See criticism of this rule: "Legal Unityof Husband and Wife", (1947) 10 M#L#R# 16 at pp.20-24#
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together have been considered* It is interesting 
to note that, during the period when the fetter 
upon inter-spouse litigation in delict existed, it 
was still possible for one spouse to sue, and recover 
damages from, a third party, even though the other 
spou0!e"%ad been guilty of contribhtbhy negligence in 
the incident^# Since his fellow wrongdoer could 
not have been sued and rendered liable, because of 
the cloak which marriage provided, the third party 
was i n  an unenviable position, and could not claim 
(or could not compel) a contribution from the spouse, 
with which to offset the amount which he was obliged 
to pay to the pursuer# Clearly this was a most 
unjust result #
In the American context, later considered, where 
the negligence in Injuring the wife was the husband’s, 
t h e  wife could not sue her husband’s employees and 
in this way circumvent the problem that an action 
against her husb an d  was not competent, because the 
employers could be liable only if their employee was 
so liable. If the court were to sanction a wife’s 
action against the employer, this would mean the 
sanction indirectly of that which it would not 
countenance directly « In Scots law, it would seem 
that a wife cannot sue her husband’s employers for 
incidental loss to her, arising out of a wrong to 
the husband, if the husband is alive and able to 
pursue the action, for all loss allowed according 
to the relevant rules of culpability and compensation 
in /
1. Walker, Delict, 1,90, and authorities there cited#
2» See McCurdy, ibid. p#1044, and discussion of th e  evolution of A m erican  thought upon inter-spouse litigation, infra# , See contradiction(apparent, aTTeast) of position above s t a t e d :  Schubert v# S .Wagon Co. p e r  C.J.Cardozo, 249 N.Y. 253 at 2 5 3 ; 164 N .B . 42 at 43 (1 928 ) McCurdy,p.1049, infra. p. 284 2I  ££i*
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i n  d e l i c t #  T h is  a p p e a rs  t o  be  m ere ly  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
exam ple o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  t h a t  one p e r s o n  h a s  no
title to pursue an  action grounded upon a d e l i c t u a l  
ifrong  done t o  a n o th e r^ #  H ow ever, t h e r e  may b e  
o irG u m atan o es i n  w h ich  one apouae may e a t a b l l a h  and  
r e c o v e r  f i n a n c i a l  l o s s  ( th o u g h  no  aw ard  f o r  s o la t iu m  
may b e  made) arising out of i n j u r y  t o  the o t h e r  ,  b u t  
d o u b t i s  case on t h i s  by  a  r e c e n t  example of a wife's 
unsuccessful a t te m p t  t o  su e  the husband*a employers 
f o r  l o s s  t o  h e r s e l f *  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  C o l l i n s  v .
South of Scotland Electricity Board”^, the wife averred 
t h a t  sh e  had  had  t o  g iv e  up h e r  em ploym ent i n  o r d e r  
to /
1* S ee  e . g .  M cLaohlen v* B e l l  (1895) 23 R .126  (c o n c e rn in g  a l l e g e d  w ro n g fu l a c t i n g s  by a  j u d i c i a l  f a c t o r  upon a  s e q u e s t r a t e d  e s t a t e ,  t h e  c la im  h a v in g  b e en  made by  t h e  wife o f  th e  ab n k ru p t#  and  i l l u s t r a t i n g ,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n fu s io n  fo u n d  i n  m a t t e r s  of m a r i t a l  p ro p e r ty *  " I  th in k  the f a c t o r  w ould not h a v e  b e en  d o in g  h i s  d u ty  i f  h e  h a d  n o t  ta k e n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  t h e  w ho le  a r t i o l e s  w h ich  p re su m a b ly  w ere i n  th e  b a n k r u p t ' s  p o s s e s s io n  at t h e  time# If in th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  h i s  d u ty  h e  came to a lo c k e d  door i n  the h o u s e , was h e  to'take t h e  b a n k ru p t  * a w o rd , o r  t h e  b a n k ru p t ' s  wife's word, that that room c o n ta in e d  p r o p e r ty  b e lo n g in g  e x c lu s iv e ly  t o  h e r?I think he  w ould n o t  h ave  b een  d o in g  his duty to t h e  e n ta  t e  i f  ho h ad  rem a in ed  s a t i s f i e d  w i th  t h a t  
d e c l a r a t i o n  . . . .  W hat i s  f a t a l  t o  t h e  p u r s u e r 's  c a s e  i s  that t h e  room , i f  i t  was i n  the p o s s e s s io n  o f  any  o n e , was i n  possession of t h e  husband# I f  anyone was i n j u r e d ,  i t  was not the b a n k ru p t  ' s  w ife  but the b a n k ru p t# "  ( p e r  L.Adam, at p#128)*2# S ee  d i s c u s s io n s  i n  C i v i l  R em ed ies, D .M .W alker,"Awards t o  R e la t i v e s  o f  I n ju r e d  P e r s o n s " ,  pp*926 G t s e q # and  C l iv e  and W ilso n , p p .272 ^  s e q . ,  w here relevant authorities on t h i s  point a r e  discussed (b e g in n in g  MoBay v# Hamlett 1963 S#C#282) i.e, c la im s  by  one sp o u se  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  i n j u r y  t o  t h e  o t h e r ,  o r  by  th e  i n j u r e d  sp o u se  f o r  l o s s  o r  e x p en se  t o  him  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  w h ich  h i s  i n j u r y  h ad  upon  t h e  e a r n in g  c a p a c i ty  o f  h i s  w i f e  o r  th e  f in a n c e s  o f  th e  h o u seh o ld #  The conclusion i s  reached that although "T h ere  i s  much to be  said f o r  r e c o g n is in g  th e  s p e o i e l  n a tu r e  o f  the m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  t h i s  a s  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  th e  la w " , any  change how w ould r e q u i r e  to be  legislative*
See C o l l i n s ,  a b o v e .5 .  W 'T I X . f T  (N o te s )  2 .
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t o  c a r e  f o r  h o r  h u sb an d  who h ad  b een  I n j u r e d  a t  work 
a l l e g e d l y  th ro u g h  th e  n e g lig e n c e  o f  h l a  e m p lo y e rs .
She c la im e d  dam ages f o r  th e  r e s u l t a n t  lo a a  o f  h e r  
w ag es , on th e  b a s l a  t h a t  auoh a l o s s  waa r e a s o n a b ly  
f o r e s e e a b le  by t h e  d e fe n d e rs #  L ord  G r ie v e ,  h a v in g  
c o n s id e r e d  t h e  a u t h o r i t l e a ,  d is m is s e d  t h e  w i f e 's  
c la im  aa  i r r e l e v a n t  (%iyhile re m a rk in g  ( a t  p #4 ) t h a t  
" I t  may aeem anom alous t h a t  a  c la im  su c h  a s  t h a t  p u t  
fo rw a rd  by the iflfe sh o u ld  be r e f u s e d  as i r r e l e v a n t ,  
w h e rea s  i f  t h e  same sum h ad  been  c la im e d  by  th e  
h u sb an d  on t h e  g ro u n d  t h a t  h e  had  t o  e n g ag e  d o m e s tic  
a s s i s t a n c e  and  p a y  f o r  i t  b e c a u se  o f  h i s  i n j u r i e s ,  
h i s  claim w ould have been s e n t  t o  p ro o f#  T h is  casehhow ever i s  n o t  p le d  t h a t  way •##"). The reporter 
n o te s  t h a t  t h e  w if e  i s  th o u g h t  t o  have e n te r e d  a 
r e c la im in g  m o tio n . L ord  G r i e v e 's  judgm en t c o n ta in s  
comment on  some o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c a s e s ;  i t  a p p e a rs  
t h a t  h e  c o n c lu d e s  t h a t  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  m ust b e  draw n 
b e tw een  e  c la im  f o r  l o s s  o f  s u p p o r t  th ro u g h  d e a th  o f  
( o r  i n j u r y  t o ? )  a s p o u s e , and  a  c la im  f o r  l o s s  t o  
t h e  p u r s u e r  ( n o n - in ju r e d  sp o u se )  a r i s i n g  b y  re a s o n  
o f  t h e  in c r e a s e d  dep en d en ce  upon  h im /h e r  o f  th e  
i n j u r e d  s p o u s e . The l e t t e r  h i s  L o rd sh ip  d id  n o t  
c o n s id e r  a  good c la im , and  he  r e g a r d s  L o rd  C am ero n 's  
judgm ent i n  McBay" a s  a n  a t te m p t  " to  g iv e  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  c la im  t h e  c o lo u r  o f  a  c la im  f o r  l o s s  o f  
s u p p o r t " , when i t  was t r u l y  t o  be v iew ed a s  a n  
in d e p e n d e n t c la im  f o r  l o s s  t o  t h e  p u r s u e r  by  re a s o n  
o f  i n j u r y  s u s ta i n e d  by t h e  p u r s u e r 's  w if e  and  n o t  
f o r  l o s s  " c a u se d  by  t h e  rem oval o f  s u p p o r t  w h ich  he 
was e n t i t l e d  t o  r e c e i v e " .  I t  seem s l i k e l y ,  ho w ev er, 
t h a t  L o rd  Cameron saw m ore c l e a r l y  th e  d e  f a c t o  
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  th e  husb an d  and  w ife  d u ty  o f  
s u p p o r t  /
1 .  C l iv e  and  W ilso n  (p .2 7 2 )  d o u b t L .G am e ro n 's  o b i t e r  s u g g e s t io n  i n  McBay t h a t  a  husb an d  c o u ld  r e c o v e r "  t h e  c o s t  o f  a  h o u se k e e p e r  made n e c e s s a r y  by th e  d e a th  o f  the w if e ,  ' •
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s u p p o r t .  "The o la lm  h e r e  I s  n o t  one f o r  l o s s  o f  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  o la lm  s u p p o r t  from  th e  o t h e r  sp o u s e ,,  b u t  
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  In o re a e e d  o o s t  t o  w hloh one sp o u se  l a  
p u t  I n  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  a  c u r r e n t  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t  
t o  th e  o t h e r " ,  ( a t  p * 2 8 7 ) . , C l iv e  and  w ila o n ?  s u g g e s t  
t h a t  one re a s o n  f o r  th e  r e lu c ta n c e  o f  th e  c o u r t s  t o  
a l lo w  c la im s  o f  t h i s  ty p e  i s  t h a t  t h e  i n j u r e d  p a r t y  
h im s e l f  c o u ld  c la im  d i r e c t l y  t h e  c o s t  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  
h e lp  i n  t h e  home; i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h i s  k in d ,  w h ich  
m ust b e  common, p resu m ab ly  th e  m ethod o f  s e c u r in g  a  
rem edy w ould  be  f o r  th e  sp o u se s  t o  draw  up  a  c o n t r a c t  
f o r  t h e  re im m e ra tio n  o f  t h e  w ife  f o r  u n d e rta l^ in g  th o s e  
e x t r a  d u t ie s *  T h is  w ould be a  m ost u n n a tu r a l  c o u rs e  
o f  a c t i o n .  A h y p o t h e t i c a l  l o s s ,  i n  E d g a r v .  L ord  
A d v o c a te ^ , w as n o t  r e c o v e ra b le *  I f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
i s  t h a t  members o f  th e  f a m ily  may c la im  o n ly  upon  
t h e  r e l a t i v e ' s  d e a th ,  b u t  n o t  i n  n o n - f a t a l  i n j u r y ,  
and  t h a t  t h e  i n j u r e d  p a rk y  may c la im  o n ly  f o r  a c t u a l  
b u t  n o t  h y p o t h e t i c a l  l o s s  t o  h im s e l f  ( a s  th ro u g li  t h e  
c o s t  o f  p a id  ( t h i r d  p a r ty ? )  d o m e s tic  h e lp )  b u t  n o t  
f o r  l o s s  t o  h i s  w i f e ,  th e n  c o m p e n sa tio n  f o r  l o s s  t o  
t h e  'f a m i ly  f u n d s ' c o n se q u e n t upon t h e  a c c id e n t  i s  
e x tre m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n ,  and  w ould  a p p e a r  t o  
n e c e s s i t a t e  e l a b o r a t e  a rg u m en t and  u n n a tu r a l l y  h a r d -  
h ead ed  and  w e l l - in f o r m e d  t a c t i c a l  b e h a v io u r*  L o rd  
Cameron r e c o g n is e d  t h e  t r u e  s i t u a t i o n  when h e  s a i d ^ ,  
"Such a  o a se  a s  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  h o w ev er, i s  n o t  fo u n d ed  
on e  c la im  f o r  l o s s  o r  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g a l  
o b l i g a t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t*  b u t  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  p e c u n ia ry  
l o s s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t h a t  m u tu a l 
an d  c u r r e n t  o b l i g a t i o n  a s  be tw een  h u sb an d  and  w i f e " .  
P e rh a p s  i t  may b e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  a p p a r e n t  s t a t e  o f  th e  
law  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  b l in k e r e d  v iew  
o f  f a m ily  f i n a n c e s  and a  s t r i c t  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  t h e  
th e o r y  /
1* p # 2 ? 3 .2 .  19&5 B .C .6 7 .3# I n  MoBay, a t  p # 2 8 8 .
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theory and consequences of separation of p ro p e r ty #
"##. the real q u e s t io n  for th e  law i s  the e x te n t
to which t h e  special relationship o f  h u sb an d  and 
wife should be recognised^"# An argument may be 
made out f o r  change, o r  a t  least clarification of 
the position; if this is so, it i s  u n f o r tu n a te  t h a t  
u s e  was n o t  made of t h e  legislative vehicle of the 
Damages ( S c o t la n d )  Act, 1976 , t o  p rom ote  discussion 
and to achieve such change, or clarification, as 
o p in io n  dictated#
However, m ore m odern a u th o r i t y  ( b e f o r e  the Law 
Reform  (Husband and Wife) Act, 1962, w hich  p e rm its
a c t io n s  i n  delict betw een  spouses) suggested that a 
spouse might recover damages from  the o t h e r  spouse’s 
em p lo y er on  the ground o f  v i c a r io u s  liability for 
the seco n d  spouse’s wrongdoing, as a  result of which 
t h e  first spouse had b e en  injured: this must have
seemed a d o u b le  i n j u s t i c e  t o  the third p a r t y ,  who 
(contrary to the u s u a l  o a s e )^  c o u ld  not recover from  
t h e  /
1# C l iv e  and Wilson, p#273#2# V ery  little i s  s a i d  upon this p o i n t :  if recovery from the husband w ere  p e r m i t t e d ,  th e  r e s u l t  would h ave  made a nonsense of th e  prohibition on inter- spouse litigation (o f« A m erican  view, supra)# The discussion i n  Broom v# Morgan cone e r h s t S e  q u e s t io n ,  inter alia# whether the competence o f  suit against ’S ïe '*em pK yee i s  a prerequisite of vicarious l i a b i l i t y  i n  the employer (i#e# "true" v i c a r i o u s  l i a b i l i t y  o r  a l i a b i l i t y  o f  the master h im s e l f  to see that the work was p r o p e r ly  done -  s e e  p e r  Singleton and D enn ing , L # J # J # ) .  I n  Bruce v# Murray, L ord M o riso n  d id  n o t  commit h im s e l f  on th e  point whether a joint wrongdoer could obtain a contribution from the h u sb a n d , ( "# * # !  think the result o f  the Married Women’ s  Property (Scotland) Act may have a  b e a r in g  on the s o l u t i o n  of t h i s  q u e s t io n  i f  and when i t  a r i s e s , " ) ,  b u t ,  i n  any case, he felt that th e  p u r s u e r ’ s  c la im  " sh e  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  e n fo r c e  (it) in any  lawful way i r r e s p e c t i v e  of any  o b l ig a t io n s  w h ich  a r i s e  among the d e l in q u e n ts  i n t e r  s e "  (at p,23B)# See Cameron v. Glasgow Corporation 1933 S#G#333, where th e  First D iv is io n  r e f u s e d  an order for t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  a t h i r d  party 
n o t i c e  on th e  h u sb a n d ; and i n  the House of L o rd s -  1936 S#C#(H*L#)26 - n o t i c e  was refused by exercise o f  the court’s discretion: see judgm en t of Lord Thankerton#
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t h e  h u sb an d  and  who# I n  a sen se#  was p r o v id in g  a 
rem edy w here  o th e r w is e  none e x is te d *  The o a s e s  t o  
some e x t e n t  h av e  t h e  smack o f  p o l ic y  d e c is io n s *
W hether t h a t  was so  o r  n o t#  th e  t r e n d  o f  t h a t  l i n e  
o f  a u t h o r i t y  m ig h t te n d  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  
a g a i n s t  l i t i g a t i o n  was b ased#  n o t  on t h e  n o t io n  o f  
u n i t y ,  b u t  on  th e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  " s t r a ig h t '*  husband  
and  w ife  f o r e n s i c  confrontation*
Relevant cases are Webb v. I n g l i s ^  # Smith v# Moas^, 
Broom V. M organ^ and  G orm anley v* E v en in g  C i t i z e n  Ltd*^* 
I n  G orm anley a n  a c t i o n  was r a i s e d  by  a  woman a g a i n s t  
th e  em p lo y e rs  o f  t h e  d r i v e r  o f  a  m o to r v a n  i n  w hich  
sh e  h ad  b een  I n ju r e d  w h ile  t r a v e l l i n g  th e r e in #  The 
d r i v e r  was n o t  a llo w e d  t o  c a r r y  u n a u th o r i s e d  p a s s e n g e r s .  
When t h e  a c c id e n t  happened# sh e  was u n m arried #  b u t  
s u b s e q u e n t ly  sh e  had  m a r r ie d  th e  d r iv e r *  F o llo w in g  
Webb V* In g liB #  th e  a c t i o n  was h e ld  t o  be  c o m p e te n t 
( c o n t r a s t  t h e  u s u a l  p o s i t i o n  c o n o e m in g  n o t i o n s # b e fo r e  
1 9 6 2 # f o r  p re # * n u p tia l d e l i c t ) ,  b u t  t h e  p u r s u e r  f a i l e d  
i n  that it was considered t h a t  th e  d r i v e r  had  b een  
acting o u tw ith  th e  scope o f  his em ploym ent*
I n  Webb, i n  similar circumstances to Gorm anley# 
and  a g a i n s t  th e  d e f e n d e r 's  a rgum en t t h a t  t h e  p u r s u e r 's  
averments w ere  i r r e l e v a n t  i n  that# s in c e  th e  p u r s u e r  
c o u ld  n o t  su e  h e r  husband  f o r  damages i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
i n j u r i e s  s u s ta in e d  by h e r  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  h i s  n e g l ig e n c e ,  
t h e  d e fe n d e r  c o u ld  n o t  be  v i c a r i o u s l y  l i a b l e  f o r  su c h  
n e g lig e n c e #  L#W heatley# allowing a p r o o f ,  said at 
PP#819 -  "*##It i s  u n d o u b te d ly  th e  law o f  Scotland
that a w ife  c a n n o t su e  h e r  husband  for dam ages i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  i n j u r i e s  w h ich  sh e  h a s  s u s t a i n e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  
o f  his n e g l ig e n c e  (c f*  H a rp e r  v# H a rp e r  1929 B.C.270# 
1 9 2 9 S.L#T*187). The ground o f  that d e c i s i o n  was t h a t  
a t  /
1# 1958 8 .L .T *  (N o te s )  8 .2* [1 9 4 0 ] 1 K*B#424*
3* 1 1 9 3 3 ] 1 Q*B*397*4# 1962 S .b .T *  (8 h .G t* )6 l*
2 7 9 ,
a t  common law  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t i n g  b e tw een  
h u sb an d  and w ife  i s  o f  ao in t im a te  a  c h a r a c t e r  t h a t  
i t  i s  a g a i n s t  p u b l ic  p o l ic y  t h a t  t h e  one s h o u ld  have  
a  r i g h t  o f  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  #%e o th e r  a s  c o n seq u e n ce  
o f  a  w rong d o n e . W here, how ever, t h e  a c t i o n  I s  l a i d  
a g a i n s t  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  whose l i a b i l i t y  a r i e e a  b e c a u se  
o f  h i e  v i c a r i o u s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e 's  
a c t i o n s ,  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  seem t o  me t o  a r i s e .
I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  th e  t h i r d  p a r t y 's  l i a b i l i t y  s p r in g s  
from  t h e  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e  f e c i t  2 ^  a l l m  ^ [a c i t  j3gg 
ae and he  i s  deemed to'be th e  p e r p e t r a t o r  o f  t h e  wrong 
a l b e i t  th e  actual i n j u r y  was o c c a s io n e d  by th e  hand  o f  
another. I n  such  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i t  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  
me t o  m a t te r  w h e th e r  th e  hand  was th e  hand  o f  t h e  
p u r s u e r 's  h usband  or th e  hand  of a s t r a n g e r ,  b e c a u se  
th e  wrong i n f l i c t e d  was a  wrong which i n  the e y e s  o f  
the law was done by  th e  em p lo y er o f  t h e  h a n d " .
R e aso n in g  o f  t h i s  type  may o r  may n o t  h av e  b een  
good : c e r t a i n l y  i t  w orked t o  t h e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e
sp o u s e s  a t  t h e  eaqpense o f  t h e  em p lo y er b u t ,  on t h e  
o th e r  h a n d , h a d  th e  p a r t i e s  b een  s t r a n g e r s ,  t h e  em p lo y er 
w ould  h ave  b e en  l i a b l e  ( a l l  o t h e r  r e q u ir e m e n ts  b e in g  
met) to the pursuer* The o th e r  a p p ro a c h  w ould have 
s t r e n g th e n e d  a n  im m unity  o th e rw is e  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  ( s e e  
below). A d e s i r e  t o  h e lp  th e  w ife  a p p e a rs  t o  be 
i d e n t i f i a b l e ,  h o w ev er, i n  th e  r e l e v a n t  c a s e s .
R e fe re n c e  was made i n  Webb t o  th e  E n g l i s h  o a s e s  
o f  Broom, an d  S m ith  v .  M oss, I n  Broom, p e r  S in g le to n ,  
L*J# th e  v iew  i s  v o ic e d  ( a t  p*607) t h a t ,  "They"
( t h e  e m p lo y e rs )  " rem a in  l i a b l e ,  and  t h e r e  i s  no  re a s o n  
e i t h e r  i n  law  o r  i n  common s e n s e  why th e y  s h o u ld  be  
g iv e n  a n  im m unity  w h ich  s p r i n g s ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  h u sb an d  
and  w i f e ,  from  t h e  f i c t i o n  t h a t  th e y  a r e  o n e , and 
from  th e  d e s i r e  t h a t  l i t i g a t i o n  be tw een  h u sb an d  and 
w ife  s h a l l  n o t  b e  e n c o u ra g e d " . L o rd  D e n n in g 's  
o p in io n  was t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d * s im m unity  w as a n  im m unity  
o n ly  /
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o n ly  o f  s u i t  b u t  n o t  from  d u ty  o r  l i a b i l i t y *  The 
l a t t e r  s im p ly  u n e n fo ro e a b le  by a c t io n *
A g a in , i n  S m ith  v# M oss, t h e  p l a i n t i f f  had  
r e c e iv e d  i n j u r i e s  w h ile  a  p a s s e n g e r  i n  a  c a r  owned 
by h e r  mother**»in**law, an d  d r iv e n  by h e r  husband# 
a f t e r  all t h r e e  had  been at a party# and  after the 
h u s b a n d 's  m o th e r  had  been d r iv e n  home* The car 
ow ner h ad  t h e  f r e e  u s e  o f  h e r  s o n 's  g a ra g e#  en d  sh e  
p a id  a l l  t h e  ru n n in g  eii^enaea#  ro a d  l i c e n c e  and  
in a u r a n c e  o f  t h e  o a r#  a n d  a l lo w M  o n ly  h e r  so n  t o  
d r i v e  i t #  I t  was fo u n d  t h a t  t h e  o o l l i s i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  
i n  th e  w i f e ' s  i n j u r i e s #  h ad  b een  e n t i r e l y  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  fault*
I t  w as h e ld  that at th e  time o f  t h e  accident 
t h e  h u sb an d  was d r iv in g  t h e  c a r  i n  t h e  capacity o f  
his m o th e r 's  agent# and t h a t  th u s  t h e  principle t h a t  
t h e r e  c o u ld  be  no tortious liability b e tw een  sp o u se s  
did not p r e v e n t  h e r  from  r e c o v e r in g  damages from  h e r  
m other**ln"law # No doubt t h e  l a t t e r  was adequately 
in s u re d *
I n  te rm s  of the Law Reform  (H usband and  Wife)
A ct# 1962^# s#2# "*** e a c h  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  a  m a r r ia g e  
s h a l l  h av e  t h e  l i k e  r i # i t  t o  b r in g  p ro c e e d in g s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  o t h e r  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a  w ro n g fu l o r  n e g l i g e n t  a c t  
o r  o m iss io n #  o r  for t h e  prevention o f  a w ro n g fu l a c t#  
a s  i f  th e y  w ere  n o t  m a r r ie d  #*#"# but t h e  c o u r t  may 
d is m is s  any  su c h  p ro c e e d in g s  b ro u g h t d u r in g  th e  
s u b s i s t e n c e  c f  t h e  a c t i o n  i f  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  "no  
s u b s t a n t i a l  b e n e f i t  w ould a c c ru e  t o  e i t h e r  p a r t y  
from  th e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  t h e r e o f ;  and  i t  s h a l l  b e  t h e  
d u ty  o f  t h e  c o u r t  to c o n s id e r  at an e a r l y  stage of 
t h e  p ro c e e d in g s  w h e th e r  t h e  pow er t o  d i s m is s  t h e  
p ro c e e d in g s  *# , sh o u ld  o r  sh o u ld  n o t  be e x e r c i s e d " #
By s# 3 (3 )#  it i s  p ro v id e d  that t h e  w ords " p a r t i e s  
t o  a  m a r r ia g e "  in c lu d e s  p e rs o n s  who w ere  p a r t i e s  to a 
m a r r ia g e  /
19 62 , 0 * 4 8 .
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m a rr ia g e  w h ich  h a s  s u b s e q u e n t ly  b e e n  d le a o lv e d #  T h u s, 
i t  m a t t e r s  n o t  %vhether th e  d e l i c t  waa co m m itted  b e f o r e ,  
o r  d u r in g  th e  m a r r ia g e ,  o r  a f t e r  I t s  d l a e o l u t l o n ,  
b u t  pow er o f  l i t i g a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  a r i s e  w here  t h e  
(o th e n ^ fla e )  a c t i o n a b l e  c o n d u c t to o k  p la c e  b e f o r e  th e  
d a te  o f  t h e  Aot^# P resu m ab ly  t h e r e  w as n e v e r  any  
c o n tr o v e r s y  a b o u t  t h e  com petence  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  
b e tw een  d iv o r c e d  epouaea  i f ,  by c h a n c e , th e y  w ere  
in v o lv e d  i n  a n  i n c i d e n t ,  po8 t»*d ivo rco , g iv in g  r i s e  
t o  p r o c e e d in g s .  A c co rd in g  t o  C l iv e  an d  W ilso n ^ , 
t h e r e  was no  c l e a r  pre*»1962 a u t h o r i t y  upon  th e  
q u e s t io n  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  b e tw een  d iv o r c e d  a p o u a e s  w here  
th e  a c t io n a b l e  c o n d u c t h ad  ta k e n  p la c e  d u r in g  th e  
m a rr ia g e #  S in c e  th e  com ing i n t o  f o r c e  o f  t h e  A c t ,  
" d iv o rc e d  ap o u aee  c a n  su e  e a c h  o t h e r  a s  i f  th e y  had  
n o t  b e en  m a r r ie d " , b u t  th e  authors n o te  t h a t  the 
pow er of d i s m is s a l  o f  th e  c o u r t  c a n  be  e x e r c i s e d  only 
w here t h e  p ro c e e d in g s  are b r o u # i t  d u r in g  th e  
s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  the m a r r ia g e ,  ( I s  t h i s  an  ech o  of th e  
d o m e s tic  harm ony mlef) " T h is  raises t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a w ife  who h a s  o b ta in e d  a  d iv o r c e  
f o r  physical c r u e l t y  c o u ld  su e  h e r  fo rm e r  hu sb an d  
f o r  dam ages f o r  a s s a u l t " ^ #  O liv e  and  W ilso n  s u g g e s t  
a l s o  t h a t  t h e r e  w ould a p p e a r  t o  be no b a r  t o  i n t e r ­
p a r t y  l i t i g a t i o n  w here  t h e  m a r r ia g e  had  b e e n  d e c la r e d  
n u l l#
( F o r  England, the Act r e p e a l s  8*12 o f  t h e  M a rr ie d  
Women's P r o p e r ty  A o t, 1 8 8 2 , and  m akes a  o o n s e q u e n t ia l  
d e l e t i o n  i n  t h e  Law R e fe r#  (M a rr ie d  Women and  
T o r t f e a s o r s )  A o t, 1 9 3 5 ) .
I t  w ould seem , t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  happen  
t h a t  a  widovf a s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  m ig h t f i n d  t h a t  sh e  
w ish e d  t o  su e  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e ,  o r ,  a s  m ig h t be  
th e  c a s e ,  herself as e x e c u t r i x ,  i f  sh e  h ad  b een  i n ju r e d  
i n  /
1 .  0 * 3 (4 )#
2* p .5 5 9 #3# pp#359""60, and  fn#22*
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I n  an incident in which h e r  husband had been wholly 
o r  partially to blame, and h e r  husband had died as 
a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  I n o ld e n t  o r  had  d ie d  a f te r w a r d s #
T h is  w ould  b e  a  m oat u n p le a s a n t  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r e ,  
a n d , p re su m a b ly , i f  t h e  c a s e  arose at a l l ,  i t  would 
b e  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  w here  t h e  widow was n o t  fa v o u re d  
i n  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  w i l l ,  and  th e  e s t a t e  g r e a t l y  
e x ceed ed  h e r  r i g h t s  i n  i n t e s t a c y ,  s h o u ld  sh e  o o n te e t  
th e  w i l l#  P resu m ab ly  a l a o ,  i n  su c h  a  c a a e ,  ahe  
w ould n o t  a c c e p t  o f f i c e  a s  e x e o u tlr ix ,  i f  in d e e d  sh e  
h ad  b e e n  named a s  s u c h , w h ic h , i n  t h e  o iro u m s ta n c e s  
im a g in e d , m ig h t n o t  b e  l ik e l y *
An exam ple w h ich  o c c u r re d  so o n  a f t e r  t h e  p a s s in g  
o f  t h e  A c t was t h e  c a s e  o f  Bush v* B e l l i n g  & Go#^ i n  
w h ic h , a s  a  r e a u l t  o f  a  ro a d  a c c id e n t  i n  1 9 6 0 , h u sb an d  
an d  w ife  w ere  s u in g  t h e  d e f e n d e r s ,  and  c o u n s e l  f o r  
t h e  l a t t e r  moved th e  c o u r t  f o r  a n  o r d e r  f o r  a  t h i r d  
p a r t y  n o t i c e  upon  tl^e h u sb a n d , who h ad  b e e n  th e  d r i v e r  
o f  a  ear In v o lv e d  i n  th e  a c c id e n t ,  w i th  t h e  aim t h a t  
t l ie  h u sb an d  m ig h t be  r e n d e re d  l i a b l e  w i th  t h e  d e f e n d e r s ,  
t o  h i s  w i f e ,  i f  l i a b i l i t y  was fo u n d  t o  e x i s t#
L ord  Walker r e f u s e d  t h e  m otion#  Before the 1962 
A ct was p a s s e d ,  a  wife c o u ld  n o t  have  su e d  h e r  husband  
i n  t h e s e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s #  The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  allowing 
t h e  m o tio n  o f  c o u rs e  was t h a t  th e  husband  might be 
re n d e re d  l i a b l e  t o  his w ife  i n  reparation f o r  an  
e v e n t  w h ich  h appened  i n  I960, b e fo r e  t h e  advent o f  t h e  
Law Reform  (H usband and w ife )  Act*
I t  i s  m ost i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  see t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d e r s ' 
c o u n s e l  m et t h e  p ro b lem  w ith  th e  an sw er that th e  
rationale b e h in d  t h e  fo rm e r  r u l e  was t o  guard a g a i n s t  
d o m e s tic  d i s r u p t i o n  by th e  i n i t i a t i o n  by  a w if e  o f  
p ro c e e d in g s  a g a i n s t  h e r  h u sb a n d , o r  y iq e  v e rs ja , b u t  
t h a t  h e r e ,  t h e  h u sb an d  was b e in g  b ro u g h t  i n ,  n o t  by 
th e  /
1 ,  1963 S .1 ..T , (N o te s )  6 9 .
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t h e  w i f e 's  w is h , b u t  by  t h e  d e f e n d e r s ' w ish#  and  t h a t  
th u s  t h e r e  w ould be  no  a f f r o n t  t o  p u b l lo  p o l ic y ^ *
L ord  W a lk e r 's  r e a c t i o n  w as t h a t  " I  am n o t
s a t i s f i e d  t l i a t  d i s tu r b a n c e  o f  t h e  m a rr ia g e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
i s  t h e  t r u e  o r  o n ly  g round  on  w h ich  th e  common law
p r o l i l b l t e d  a  w ife  from  m aking h e r  h u sb a n d  l i a b l e
t o  h e r  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n " ,  an d  q u o te d  L ord  A n d e rs o n 's
s u g g e s t io n ^  t h a t  t h e  t r u e  r e a s o n  was one o f  p u b l ic
p o l i c y  o p e r a t in g  a g a i n s t  a c t io n s  i n  c o n t r a c t  o r
q u a s l - d e l l c t #  The r e s u l t  o f  a l lo w in g  su c h  a c t io n s
"w ould n o t  be  o o n d u o iv e  t o  d o m e s tic  p e a c e  o r
m a tr im o n ia l  f e l i c i t y " .  H ow ever, L .W alk e r n o te d
t l m t  " th e  p u b l ic  p o l i c y  was n o t  so  f a r  r e a o h ln g  a s
t h a t " :  a n  a c t i o n  i n  c o n t r a c t  had  s in c e  b e e n  h e ld%competent''^ .
L .P .C ly d e ,  i n  Cam eron v* G lasgow  C o r p o r a t io n  
1933# i n  w h ich  c a s e  a l s o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  n o t i c e  was 
re fu s e d #  h a d  e ch o ed  t h e  r u l e  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  c f  d e l i c t #  
and  h a d  c i t e d  H a rp er*  I:X)rd W alker n o te d  t h a t  t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  p a s s a g e  h ad  b een  q u o ted#  when t h e  c a s e  
w en t t o  t h e  H ouse o f  L ords#  by L .T h a n k e r to n  who 
o b se rv e d  t h a t  H a rp e r  w as b in d in g  i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
S e s s io n #  an d  h e  was n o t  sw ayed by th e  a t t e m p ts  o f  
c o u n s e l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  th e  c a s e  o f  Cam eron from  th e  
c a s e  i n  d is p u te *
Thus# o u t  o f  a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  common l a w / s t a t u t e  
d i f f i c u l t y #  we f i n d  a  good# s h o r t  résum é o f  S c o t t i s h  
j u d i c i a l  o p in io n  t o  s e t  a g a i n s t  t h e  E n g l i s h  and  
A m erican  c o u n te r p a r t s *
When c o n s id e r in g  th e  s o r r y  h i s t o r y  o f  t h i s  b ra n c h  
o f  m a tr im o n ia l  law # w h ich  c a n  be  p la c e d  u n d e r  th e  
p r o p e r ty  a s p e c t  i n  t h e  s e n s e  that the ru le #  be  it p r e  
o r  /
1 * at p*69*2# i n  H a rp e r  v .  H* a t  p*226, 3* H o rsb u rg h  v# H#
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o r  p o s t  s t a t u t e ,  a f f e o t s  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n s  o f  
t h e  p a r t i e s ,  b e n e f l o l a l l y  o r  o th e r w is e ,  and  when 
c o n s id e r in g  t h e  m odem  li^p rovem ents t h e r e o n ,  o u r l o s l t y  
I s  f e l t  a b o u t  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  fo u n d  -  o r  t h e  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s  
in d u lg e d  I n  -  f o r  t h i s  p ro b lem  by o t h e r  sy s te m s  o f  
la w , an d  i t  I s  p e rh a p s  e m o u r a g ln g  t o  f i n d  th e  v iew  
e x p re s s e d  by  McCurdy^ t h a t  "Pew t o p i c s  I n  t h e  law  o f  
p e r s o n s  and  d o m es tlo  i l l a t i o n s ,  I n  v iew  o f  m odem  
eoonom lo , s o c i a l  an d  l e g i s l a t i v e  c h a n g e s , d i s p l a y  I n  
t h e i r  t r e a tm e n t  g r e a t e r  in o o n s ls te n o y  an d  m ore 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e a s o n in g  an d  p r e s e n t  a  m ore e h a r e o t e r i s t i o  
d ev e lo p m en t I n  j u d l o i a l  r e a o t i o n " .
I n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  t o r t s  a f f e c t i n g  h u sb an d  and  
w iv e s ,  McCurdy d i s t i n g u i s h e s  th o s e  d o t s  p r i m a r i l y  
a f f e c t i n g  p r o p e r t y ,  t h o s e  p r i m a r i l y  e f f e c t i n g  t h e  
p e r s o n ,  and  th o s e  a f f e c t i n g  b o th ,  a n d , o n  à  t im e  s o a l e ,  
th o s e  o c c u r r in g  b e f o r e  t h e  m a r r ia g e  came I n t o  e x i s t e n c e ,  
o r  d u r in g  i t s  s u b s i s t e n o e ,  and  w here  t h e  a c t i o n  was 
r a i s e d  *,s t a n t e  m a tr lm o n lo ' ,  and  th o s e  w here  t h e  a c t i o n  
w as r a i s e d  a f t e r  t h e  t e r m in a t io n  o f  t h e  m a rr ia g e *
A t common la w , i t  seem s t h a t  a  m a r r ie d  woman h ad  
no c a p a c i ty  t o  s u e  o r  be  su e d  i n  h e r  own nam e.
H ow ever, i f  " sh e  had  a  s u b s ta n t iv e  c a p a c i t y ,  o r  was 
s u b s t a n t i v e l y  t h e  h o ld e r  o f  a  r i g h t "  o r  cv/ed a  d u ty  
w h ich  sh e  h a d  n o t  d i s c h a r g e d ,  a s  e  r e s u l t  o f  w h ich  
a n  a c t i o n  was t o  b e  r a i s e d ,  th e  a c t i o n  h a d  t o  be  
b ro u g h t  i n  th e  names o f  b o th  hu sb an d  and  wj*fo "an d  
judgm en t im s e n fo r c e d  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  h u sb an d  o r  
a g a i n s t  b o th  h u sb an d  and  w ife "  ( a  s t a t e  o f  t h in g s  
w h ich  a p p e a rs  u n f a i r  b u t  iffhich a c c o W e d , p re su m a b ly , 
w i th  t h e  p r o p e r ty  s i t u a t i o n  o f  s p o u s e s ) ^ .
I f  s h e  h a d  w h a t i n  B o o ts  la i f  w ould b e  c a l l e d  
i n t e r e s t  t o  s u e ,  t h e  m a t t e r  became a  c h o se  i n  a c t i o n  
o f  /
1* 'T o r t s  B etw een P e rs o n s  i n  D om estic  R e l a t i o n '  (1930 ) 43 H a rv a rd  L .R .1030#  wm# E# M cCurdy.2* See McCurdy p p .1 0 3 1 -3 3 .
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Of t h e  w i f e ' s ,  a n d . I f  t h e  husband  d ie d  b e f o r e  
re d u o ln g  I t  I n to  p o a a e sa lo n #  I t  rem a in ed  t o  t h e  w ife *
I f  a  m a r r ie d  woman oom m itted  a  t o r t  d u r in g  
s m r r ia g e ,  o r  c o n t r a c t e d  a  d e b t  b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e ,  any  
a c t i o n  w ould  b e  b ro u g h t  a g a i n s t  t l ie  h u sb an d  and w ife  
an d  judgm en t c o u ld  be e n fo rc e d  a g a in e t  t h e  p r o p e r ly  
o f  e i t h e r ,  and  h e n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  h u sb a n d , b u t ,  i f  
t h e  h u sb an d  d ie d  b e f o r e  t h e  ju d g m e n t, t h e  a c t i o n  
rem ain ed  a g a i n s t  t h e  \ f i f e  a lo n e *  I f  t h e  w if e  d ie d  
b e f o r e  ju d g m e n t, " a  q u e s t io n  o f  s u r v i v a l  o f  c a u s e s  
o f  a c t io n "  a ro s e *  The r e s u l t  was t h a t  "A c o m b in a tio n  
o f  e l l  t h e s e  i n c i d e n t s  made i t  im p o s s ib le  a t  common 
law  f o r  one sp o u se  e v e r  t o  be  c i v i l l y  l i a b l e  t o  t h e  
o t h e r  f o r  a n  a o t  w hich  w ould  b e  a  t o r t  i f  t h e  "husband  
and  w ife "  r e l a t i o n  d id  n o t  e x i s t " ,
ROW, MoGurdy e x p la in s ,  '(fAaiere a  t o r t i o u s  a c t  by 
a f u t u r e  h u sb an d  o c c u r re d  b e f o r e  h i s  m a r r ia g e ,  and  a  
c a u s e  e f  a c t i o n  a r o s e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  w if e  ( a  common 
s i t u a t i o n  and  one w h ich  g ave  r i s e  t o  many o f  t h e  
c a s e s  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d )  t h i s  c a u se  o f  a c t i o n  w ould be  
a b le  t o  be  re d u c e d  i n t o  p o s s e s s io n  by t h e  h u sb an d  
upon  m a r r ia g e ,  t h e  u n io n  i n  one p e rs o n  o f  r i g h t  and  
d u ty  w ould  e x t in g u i s h  t h e  d u ty  ( s u b s ta n c e )  and  i n  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  h u sb an d  c o u ld  n o t  be  b o th  p l a i n t i f f  
and  d e fe n d a n t  (p ro c e d u re )  * I f  t h e  w ife  h a d  b e en  t h e  
w ro n g d o e r, upon  m a r r ia g e ,  once a g a in  r i g h t  and  d u ty  
w ould  b e  v e s t e d  i n  one p e r s o n ,  an d  e x t in g u is h e d  
confusioiT^e  (a n d  t h e r e  w ould  b e  th e  some p r o c e d u r a l  
d i f f i c u l t y ) .
The p r a c t i c a l  rem edy i t  ml0%t be  th o u g h t  wo%*ld 
h a v e  b een  t o  p o s tp o n e  th e  m a r r ia g e  u n t i l  t h e  l i t i g a t i o n  
h a d  ta k e n  p l a c e ,  an d  a l l  t h e  c o n se q u e n c e s  t h e r e o f  
s e t t l e d *
On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , d u r in g  m a r r ia g e ,  a s  r e g a r d s  
p r o p e r ty ,  t h e r e  vms o n ly  one i n s t a n c e  i n  t h e  a u t h o r 's  
o p in io n ,  i n  w h ich  a  c a s e  c o u ld  be made t h a t  a  h u s b a n d 's  
a c t  am ounted  t o  a  t o r t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  h i s  w i f e ,  and  
t h a t  /
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t h a t  was " w a s te  upon  th e  w i f e 's  r e a l t y " ,  o t h e r  
p o t e n t i a l l y  t o r t i o u s  a o t s  b e in g  n e g a tiv e d , by  th e  r i g h t s  
th e  h u sb an d  a c q u i r e d  %;tpon m a rr ia g e  o v e r  t h e  p r o p e r ty  
o f  h i s  w ife#
The p ro b lem  o f  t h e  f u s io n  o f  r i g h t  an d  d u ty  i n  
th e  same p e r s o n  a l s o  b e s e t  an y  p ro p o se d  a c t i o n  
r e l a t i n g  t o  i n j u r y  t o  th e  p e rso i^ .  a n d , a s  f a r  a s  
p e o u n ia ry  l o s s  t o  t h e  w if e  was c o n c e rn e d , t h e  l a c k  
o f  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  an y  l i t i g a t i o n  was e x p la in e d  on th e  
b a s i s  t h a t  th e  h u sb an d  h a d  n o t  o n ly  a  r i # i t  t o  h i s  
w i f e ' s  s e r v i c e s  and  e a r n in g s  b u t  a l s o  a  d u ty  t o  
s u p p o r t  h e r*
.A fte r  th e  d e a th  o f  one o f  t h e  s p o u s e s ,  t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  n o n - s u r v iv a l  o f  o a u s e s  o f  
a c t i o n  f o r  t o r t  a ro s e *  The r a r i t y  o f  d iv o r c e  a t  
t} i is  s t a g e  re n d e re d  t h e  p ro b lem  i n  t h a t  c o n te x t  
academ ic*  O f c o u r s e ,  no  c o m p le te  l i c e n c e  was 
a c c o rd e d  t o  h u sb an d  and  w if e  i n  t h e i r  t r e a tm e n t  o f  
e a c h  o t h e r :  some a c t s  w ould  p r o v id e  g ro u n d s  f o r
d iv o r c e  menssi a t  t h o ^ .  a n d  some am ounted  t o  c r im e .
MoCufdy n o te s  t h a t  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  ' r i g h t '  o f  a  
h u sb an d  t o  c h a s t i s e  h i s  w if e  m o d e ra te ly  an d  d e p r iv e  
h e r  c f  h e r  l i b e r t y  i s  lo n g  o b s o le te ^ #  When t h e  
m a t t e r  c o n c e rn e d  t h e  p e rs o n  o f  t h e  s p o u s e ,  t h e  common 
law  d i s r e g a r d e d  u n i t y  c o n c e p tio n  i n  c a s e s  o f  c r im e s  
by  one sp o u se  a g a i n s t  th e  o th e r*
Thus i t  c a n  be s e e n  tk m t a t  common la w , i t  was 
n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e x p l a i n  and  j u s t i f y  t h e  r u l e  on 
th e  g ro u n d s  o f  s u b s ta n c e  o r  p r o c e d u r e ,  b u t  a s  t im e s  
c h a n g e d , and  in r o a d s  w ere  made b o th  on t h e  s u b s ta n t iv e  
r u l e s  r e g a r d in g  m a r i t a l  p r o p e r t y ,  and  i n  p ro c e d u re  
w here  t h e  p r i n c i p a l s  a r e  e a c h  a d u l t  in d e p e n d e n t  
p e r s o n s ,  %fhose autonom y m ig h t b e  r e g a rd e d  a s  n o t  
e n t i r e l y  /
1# R eg in a  v* J a c k s o n  [1 6 9 1 ] 1 Q#B.671$ Fulgham  v* S t a t e  46  A la ,  143 (1 8 7 1 ) .
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entirely extinguished by the marriage bend, i t  beoame 
necessary to look for another ground of ju s t if ic a t io n ,
and McCurdy expressed d issa tisfa ctio n  with the placing  
of too great a reliance on the notion of the merger 
of leg a l id en tity , since i t  was thought e a s ily  capable 
of being disregarded by the criminal law in  su itab le  
oases, as a lso  in  certain  c iv i l  matters, and was not 
applied in the e c c le s ia s t ic a l courts* "At most, i t  
i s  a usefu l phrase to sum up a result in  certain  oases".
He concludes that the source of the common law treatment 
of husband and wife i s  a "mixture of the Bible and 
mediaeval metaphysics" to  which had been added the 
Roman Law conception of the 'paterfam ilias*, affected  
in  personal matters by the natural law conception of 
the family as an "informal unit of Government" headed 
by the husband, and in property p atters, by the idea 
of feudalism*^# 
pBryce , when describing a wife's position in  the 
common law of England, concluded -  "it i s  better not 
to  attempt to  explain the w ife 's  p osition  as the 
resu lt of any one prin cip le , but rather to regard i t  
as a compromise between the three notions of absorption, 
of a sort of guardianship, and a kind of partnership 
of property in  which the husband's voice normally 
prevails"«
He wryly observes that the Roman lawyers were 
more truthfu l about the lega l position  of women ( 'In  
many points o f our law the condition of the female sex 
i s  worse than that of the male*) than was the notoriously  
optim istic Blackstone who concluded, somewhat unjustifiab ly  
-  "even the d is a b il i t ie s  which the wife l i e s  under are, 
for th e  most part, intended for her protection and 
benefit# So great a favourite is  the female sex of 
the laws of England"*
By /
1# a t  p*1035#2* Studies in History and Jurisprudence Vol.II, p#819#
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By the eighteenth century# the more fortimate and 
a la o  p raau m eb ly  th e  w e a l t h i e r  m a r r ie d  woman i n  A m erica 
might h av e  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  through th e  d e v ic e  of a 
tru st, and  w ith  t h e  a id  o f  e q u ity *  "The husband could 
ev en  fo re g o  Ms right t o  h i s  w i f e 's  s e r v i c e s ,  and  th e  
p ro c e e d s  t h e r e o f  would constitu te s e p a r a t e  property," 
Any i n t e r f e r e n c e  by  th e  husband  w ith  h is w ife 's  
e q u i t a b l e  right might give r i s e  t o  an action betw een  
them , but the d o c t r i n e  of s e p a r a t e  esta te  a f f e c t e d  
o n ly  "existing p r o p e r ty  so  s e t t l e d " , and  o th e rw is e  
the e f f e c t s  o f  marriage on p r o p e r ty  and l it ig a t io n  
rem a in ed  u n a f f e c te d *
The e q u i t y  expedient, t h e r e f o r e ,  waa n o t  the f u l l  
so lu tion , and in  t h e  n i n e t e e n th  c e n tu r y  w ere  passed the 
H*W,P#Acts, or Emancipation A c ts ,  very sim ilar i n  
e ffe c t  to  t h e i r  English an d  Scots couterparts, and 
providing t h a t  a l l  p r o p e r ty  held ait a separate e sta te , 
and a l l  p r o p e r ty ,  r e a l  o r  p e r s o n a l ,  owned at t h e  time 
o f  th e  marriage by  a woman m a rr ie d  a f t e r  the passing o f  
t h e  A o t, and  a o q u ire n d a  r e a l  o r  p e r s o n a l  a c q u i r e d  by 
any m a rr ie d  woman during m a rr ia g e  a fter  t h e  passing 
of th e  Act should rem a in  h e r  s o l e  and separate p r o p e r ty  
f r e e  o f  t h e  control of her husband, and not lia b le  for  
his d e b ts *  Some endowed a m a r r ie d  woman w i th  
contractual capacity, f u l l  or lim ited and power t o  
transfer property* Some e n s u re d  that what she earned 
was her own and some dealt w ith  w rongs committed by 
or against a married woman *^ Although i t  was clear  
that the in tent of the leg isla tu re  was to  cloth© the 
wife with fu lle r  r i g h t s  and to deprive her husband of 
inconsistent common law r i g h t s ,  the Acts d iffered  in  
t h e  power w hich  they granted to women t o  enforce t h e s e  
oimd
I n  /
new -f un  rights^#
1* See McCurdy, pp#1036-37, from w hich  t h i s  passage i s  t a k e n ,2* T h is  i s  d e s c r ib e d  by  McCurdy at p .1037,
I n  an y  a v a n t#  I t  i s  t r u e  t o  s a y  t h a t  a  num ber o f  
s u i t e  w ere  a n to r t a i n e d  by  t h e  C o u rts#  a n d  among them  
a o t io n a  f o r  f ra u d #  t o  r a e o v o r  r e n ts #  f o r t r e o p a s a ,  
o je o tm e n t#  o r  d é t e n t i o n  o f  goods# f o r  in ju n o t lo n e  t o  
k eep  t h e  h u sb an d  o u t  o f  h i a  v f i f e 'o  h o w o #  t o  p u t  a  a to p  
t o  in to r f e r a n o o  w ith  p ro p e r ty #  and# i n  t h e  a t a t e a  w here  
t h e r e  was freedom  o f  o o n t r a o t  be tw een  h u aband  and  w ife#  
a o t io n a  t o  o n fo ro e  any  auoh  o o n tr a o t*
I f  a  s t a t u t e  gave  a  m a r r ie d  woman a  r i g h t  t o  h e r  
e a rn in g a #  t h i s  was o o n a tru e d  a s  b e in g  r e a t r i o t e d  t o  
money e a rn e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  home # h u t  t h e r e  a p p e a r  t o  
h a v e  b een  o o c a a io n o  w here  a  w i f e 's  e m p lo y e r w as h e r  
husband#  en d  a h e  h ad  a n  o n fo ro e a h le  r i g h t  a g a i n s t  him  
f o r  wages#
8 0  f a r #  t h e r e  was no o e r io u s  o « m tro v e ray #  n o r  
was t h e r e  an y  n o t io e a b le  d i f f e r e n o e  from  t h e  S o o t t i s h  
p a t t e r n #  b u t  i n  t h e  o a a e  o f  t o r t a  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  p e rso n #  
t h e  t r u e  b a t t l e  rag ed *
M en tio n  h a s  b e en  made o f  t h e  E n g lis h  e a s e  o f  
P h i l l i p s  V* B a rn e t  * A o o n tem p o ra ry  A m erican  c a s e  
w as t h a t  o f  A b b o tt  v* A b b o tt # In A b b o tt ,  we a r e  to ld #  
t h e  c o u r t  w en t further along t h e  lin e  o f r e a s o n in g  
o u t l i n e d  by  B lack b u rn #  J# in  P h illip s v# B a m e t#  and 
t h e  fee lin g  w a s # th a t  "We a r e  not c o n v in c e d  that i t  i s  
d e s i r a b l e  t o  h a v e  th e  law  a s  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  c o n te n d s  
i t  t o  be* T h ere  i s  no n e c e s s i t y  f o r  i t #  P r a c t i c a l l y #  
t h e  m a r r ie d  woman h a s  rem edy enough# The c r im in a l  
c o u r t s  a r e  open  t o  h e r  # ,#  As a  l a s t  r e s o r t #  i f  n eed  
be# sh e  c a n  p r o s e c u te  a t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  ex p en se#  a  s u i t  
f o r  d iv o r c e  *#*# I n  t h i s  %my# a l l  m a t t e r s  w ould  be  
s e t t l e d  i n  m ie s u i t  a s  a  f i n a l i t y  ####
I f  t h e  w ife  c a n  su e  the husband# h e  c a n  su e  h e r .
I f  a n  a s s a u l t  w as a c t io n a b le #  th e n  w ould  s l a n d e r  and 
l i b e l  /
1. ( i e ? 6 )  1 Q#B*D#436.
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libel and  o t h e r  t o r t s  b e .  I n s te a d  of settling, a 
divorce would v e ry  much unsettle all matters between 
m a rr ie d  parties. The p r i v a t e  matters of the w hole 
p e r io d  of m a r r ie d  existence might be exposed by suits »
With divorces as common as th e y  are n o w -e -d a y s , there 
w ould be new harvests of litigation. If su c h  a 
p r e c e d e n t  was p e r m i t t e d ,  we do not s e e  why any  w ife  
s u r v iv in g  th e  husband c o u ld  n o t  m a in ta in  a suit 
againit h i s  e x e c u to r s  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  -  and this 
w ould add a  new m ethod by  w hich  estates c o u ld  be 
plundered^"#
It seem s# t h e r e f o r e ,  that one of the o b je c t io n s
raised to the bringing of p ro c e e d in g s  after d iv o r c e  
upon t h e  c o m p la in t  of alleged a s s a u l t s  w liich  o c c u r re d  
during marriage was t h a t  am ple remedy could be found 
f o r  t h e  w ife  i n  c r im in a l  o r  d iv o rc e  proceedings, tooth 
s o l u t io n s  w h ich  m ig h t toe th o u g h t  t o  p r o v id e  h a r d ly  
a d e q u a te  c o m fo rt*  (T he judgm ent q u o te d  a p p e a rs  f i r s t  
t o  recommend d iv o r c e ,  a s  a rem edy o f  l a s t  r e s o r t  ( f o r  
tort) and then t o  h o ld  it in d i s f a v o u r ,  i f  t h e  extra 
d im e n s io n  o f  a  r e c o u n t in g  o f  t o r t i o u s  c o n d u c t  d u r in g  
th e  marriage was t o  toe a llo w e d #  In  f a c t ,  since 1962, 
r e l a t i v e l y  few  h u sb a n d /w ife  a c t io n s  i n  d e l i c t  have 
taken place i n  Scotland)^. McCurdy c i t e s  o th e r  
exam ples /
1# Here once more i s  the e x p re s s io n  of h o r r o r  of i n t e r - s p o u s e  d e fa m a tio n  actions s t e n t e  matrimonii 2 ,  O tto  K ah n -F reu n d , i n  a n o te  upon((1962) 25 M.L.H.695) remarks that this and similar U.S. legislation was prompted toy the coming of the motor-car and of third party insurance# The discretionary power in the court to stay (or dismiss) an action would remove unsuitable cases while, toeing procedural and not substantive in nature, would not work injustice with regard to strangers to the marriage# Presumably, i t  was with the discretionary power in mind that he set the Act in its  wider context* "It is  one of those measures which are intended to mitigate the rigidity of the separation of property as between husband and wife established under the Law Reform (Married Woman and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935* Like the provisions of the Larceny Act, 1916, on thefts between husband and wife, this new statute i s  /
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exam ples o f  s i m i l a r  r e a e o n in g ,  r e s t r i o t i v e  i n  i t s  
e f f e c t s .
However, there were states i n  which a more 
e n l ig h te n e d  view was taken# For ex am p le , in 
Connecticut in 1914, in th e  case of Brown v* B* 
it was h e ld  that under a M a rr ie d  Women's statute of 
that state, it was c o m p e te n t f o r  a  w ife  t o  seek 
damages from her husband f o r  a s s a u l t  and  b a t t e r y ,  
and for false im p riso n m e n t, and  in d e e d  t h i s  right was 
'preserved* for a m a rr ie d  woman (for, so i t  was argued, 
n o t  'gained*) by  a s u b t l e  a rgum en t that, "The right 
t o  contract w ith  t h e  husb an d  and t o  su e  him  f o r  breach ' 
of contract, and  to su e  f o r  t o r t s ,  i s  n o t  given t o  
t h e  w ife  by  th e  s t a t u t e .  T hese  a r e  r i g h t s  which 
b e lo n g e d  t o  her b e f o r e  m a r r ia g e ,  a n d , b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
new m a rr ia g e  s t a t u s  c r e a t e d  by  t h e  s t a t u t e ,  a r e  n o t  
l o s t  by  th e  f a c t  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  a s  th e y  w ere  u n d e r  th e  
common-law s t a t u s  . . . "
The decision in Brown was a p p l i e d  i n  the same 
c o u r t  in 1925 to a  case of n e g lig e n c e  ^ [ and  several 
other s t a t e s  th o u g h t  similarly b o th  i n  i n s t a n c e s
of "intentional aggression" and i n  car. accident 
o a s e s  /
i s  designed t o  make i t  im p o s s ib le  f o r  sp o u se s  t o  a s s e r t  p r o p e r ty  claims w ith  regard t o  those assets w h ic h , though legally s e p a r a t e ,  a r e  i n  fact enjoyed in common. T h is  is good p o l ic y  and  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t o r t  c la im s  b e tw een  t h e  sp o u s e s  must b e  w elcom ed",  True property ■d i s p u t e s  ( i n  England) h e  f e l t  should be  d e a l t  with u n d e r  5 .1 7  o f  M .W .P.A ct, 1802, and  s h o u ld  n o t  a p p e a r  i n  th e  guise o f  an  action in t o r t #T h is  v iew  m ig h t have  seem ed o p t i m i s t i c  i n  1 9 62 , 
y e t  t h e  p a u c i ty  o f  cases u n d e r  th e  1962 A ct t e s t i f y  to its prescience# Spouses seem a v e r s e  t o  a t te m p t  t o  o b t a in  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r ty  a d v a n ta g e  thereby; u n le s s  a clear b e n e f i t  t o  b o th  ( a s  through in s u r a n c e )  appears to be a l i k e l y  outcome su c h  litigation d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  be fav o u re d *
B u s h n e ll  v# B#
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oases*
The cruK of the matter seems to toe th a t, while 
there was no objection to seeking the court's aid , 
while married, in  the case of tore#ch of marital duty 
(the path i s  open for a wife in most leg a l systems, 
i t  i s  thought, to  seek decree for maintenance while 
not seeking divorce -  in  Scotland, of course, actions 
for adherence and aliment, separation and aliment, 
and interim aliment toeing competent'*) or, while married, 
to  seek to cease to toe married, that i s ,  to  have the 
court d isso lve the marriage, tout the concept that, 
while married, husband and wife might sue each other 
for  breach of a non-maritaX duty, as i f  they were 
strangers to  each other, was one at which many courts -  
English, Scottish  and American, no doubt in  company 
with others -  baulked for a long time, before 
recognising the p r a c t ic a lit ie s  of the s itu a tio n , and 
permitting such action s, while perhaps providing 
safeguards, such as the exercise of ju d ic ia l d iscretion  
against frivolous or unjustified  actions^# The courts 
of New York were in  the vanguard of more modern 
thinking; In Schultz v# for example, i t  was 
sa id , "It is  not regarded as discourteous to  say 
that the i l l  treatment of the wife toy the husband 
which con sists in  the violence of an assau lt and 
battery, i s  more destructive to conjugal union and 
tranquillity than the declaration of a right in  the 
wife to  maintain an action against her husband for an 
assau lt and battery upon her would toe# I t  i s  not 
at a l l  unlikely that i t  would operate as a restra in t 
upon militant husbands disposed to indulge in  such 
evidence of conjugal union and tra n q u illity  ##*."
Unfortunately these brave and sensible words
were /
1* See Chapter 4*2* See e .g . Law Reform (Husband and w ife) Act, 1962, 8 *2(2 ).3 . 27 Hun.26 (N.Y.1882).
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were to no avail, because the order was reversed in 
the Court of Appeals and this result was thought to 
have settled the law of New York in the matter*
*1A change of opinion began in 1927 in Allen v* A# 
and then, in 1928, in the case of Schubert v# 8.Wagon 
Co*^ the Court of Appeals held that an action by 
the wife against the husband's employer for damages 
inflicted on her by her husband's negligent car 
driving would lie^.
McCurdy's view is that there appeared to be, in 
New York, a policy against civil suits between husbands 
and wives for personal torts, which did not exist 
towards property suits#
I t  is interesting to see that the American Courts 
have experienced the same qualms as the British 
courts on this matter, and McCurdy is able to identify 
six principal reasons for the trend of judicial 
opinion^ of which perhaps the overriding reason for 
the restriction or prohibition of such actions was 
the feeling that the granting of permission to pursue 
them would disrupt the harmony of the home, and drive 
a  wedge between husband and wife.
In the case of assault, McCurdy remarks that 
there obviously is little domestic tranquillity left.
In the case of car or other accidents, where the true 
defender may be an insurance company or an employer, 
the negotiation or pending litigation or negotiation 
may have no effect upon family happiness, peace and 
harmony. "Indeed, the strongest argument against 
such actions is not disruption of domestic tranquillity, 
but the danger of domestic collusion".
Further, when the marriage was terminated by 
death /
1 . 246 N.Y.571, 159 N.E. 6 5 6  (1927).2. 249 N.T.253, 164 N .B . 42 (1928).3. Cf. Broom v. Morgan [1953j 1 Q.B.397 and othercases referred to supra #4. See pp.1 0 5 0 -5 4 .
2 9 4 .
d e a th  o r  divorce, why should n o t  an  a c t i o n  have
been allowed t h e n ,  against th e  fo rm e r  spouse or 
t h e  spouse's représentâtIves?
While it could have been said t h a t  a private 
prosecution by one sp o u se  against the other, or an 
action for separation o r  divorce or maintenance were 
more disturbing t o  domestic harm ony th a n  a n  action 
i n  d e l i c t ,  and yet of c o u rs e  t h e  fo rm e r  were permitted, 
e x c e p t io n  c o u ld  b e  ta k e n  e a s i l y  to that argument, 
b e c a u se  i n  those cases, t h e r e  was no danger o f  
disturbing f a m i ly  h a p p in e s s ,  as i t  h a d  b e en  disrupted 
a l r e a d y .  McCurdy s u g g e s ts  t h a t  t h e  a rg u m en t o f  
th o s e  who a im ed  t o  u p h o ld  f a m ily  u n i t y  was b a s e d  upon  
a  d e s i r e  t o  guard a g a i n s t  th e  possibility that there 
might abound c a s e s  arising out of trifling instances 
o f  n e g lig e n c e  and  s m a ll  w rongs# I t  i s  o e r t a i n l y  
t r u e  that, in the absence ef s p e c i a l  r u l e s  as, for 
e x am p le , one placing t h e  m a t te r  i n  the d i s c r e t i o n  of 
t h e  o o u r t^  t h e r e  w ould  be no check against ill-advised 
l i t i g a t i o n  i n  civil m a t te r s  except p e rh a p s  the expense 
t h e r e o f  and  the s o l i c i t o r ' s  a d v ic e ,  w h i le  i n  criminal 
m a t t e r s ,  w here i n  a s t a t e  o r  public p r o s e c u t i o n ,  the 
prosecuting o f f i c e r ,  or in Scotland, t h e  Lord Advocate 
and t h e  Crovm O f f i c e ,  would tend t o  deflect u n d e s i r a b le  
or unnecessary cases, i n  a private p ro s e c u t io n #  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, some o t h e r  check  w ould s u r e l y  b e  needed 
although, a s  h a s  b een  said, by  that stage, too much 
fear sh o u ld  not be f e l t  f o r  d o m e s tic  harm ony , w hich  
m ust have b e e n  somewhat u p s e t  by t h e  alleged act, 
and th e  t h r e a t  o f  p ro c e e d in g s #  I n  Scotland, the 
c o n s e n t  o f  th e  L ord  Advocate to a p r i v a t e  p r o s e c u t io n  
s h o u ld  b e  obtained, or a t  l e a s t  sh o u ld  be  sought - 
for h e :h a s  no  right of veto, and upon c o m p la in t  by 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h e  H igh  C o u r t  o f  Justiciary may 
u p h o ld  t h e  Lord Advocate's decision o r  d i r e c t  him 
t o  /
Cf# S c o t la n d :  Law Reform  (Husband and Wife) Act, 1 9 6 2 , s # 2 (2 )#
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to give his concurrenoe, or allow the individual to 
c o n t in u e  w i th o u t  h i e  o o n c u rre n c e * . W here a  B i l l  
for C rim in a l  Letters t o  a u th o r i s e  a  p r i v a t e  prosecution 
is presented, its a u th o r  m ust at least have so u g h t 
th e  ooncurrenoe of t h e  Lord A dvocate^# In view of 
t h e  rarity o f  p r i v a t e  p r o s e c u t io n s  i n  Scotland, a 
c o m p a riso n  i s  a r t i f i c i a l ^ ,  and  i t  may h e  t h a t  a  
d o m e s tic  d i s p u t e  w ould he  dealt with m ore a p p r o p r i a t e ly  
(mow) by c i v i l  action. A lth o u g h  i n  p r i v a t e  p r o s e c u t io n  
some s p e c i a l  personal i n t e r e s t  m ust he show n, ( a  w rong 
to th e  p r o s e c u to r  m ust he alleged), yet a t  least 
a c c o rd in g  t o  L,J,Cl,MacDonald^, the n a tu r e  o f  t h e  
a c t i o n  /
1# C f ,  J .  & P* C o a ts  L td ,  V, Brown 1909 B .C ,( J )  2 9 ,2 ,  S ee  R o b e r ts o n  v ,  H .M .Adv, 1892 , 3 W M te 23 0 :
15 R ( J )  1 .3# As to E n g l i s h  r u l e s  .concerning prosecutions between s p o u s e s ,  s e e  i n f r a ,4, I n  J* & P# CoalFTtd, at p#34, w here t h e  L ,J* C 1 , s t a t e s  that th e  High C ourt#  i n  i t s  c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  w ith h o ld in g  by t h e  L.Adv# o f  hia consent 
t o  the p r o s e c u t io n ,  m ust p o n d e r  w h e th e r  that r e f u s a l ' "may in v o lv e  a wrong t o  t h e  c i t i z e n  complaining, and a failure o f  p u b l ic  justice", 'The 'right* to p r o s e c u te  m ust n o t  be  u s e d  "for v i n d i c t i v e  or m a lic io u s  e n d s " ,  a n d , in his o p in io n ,  
t h e  r e q u ire m e n t  of seeking t h e  L .A d v ,* s  concurrence s e r v e d  a s  a  check against su c h  u s e  or m is u s e ,A r e c e n t  exam ple o f  a t te m p te d  p r i v a t e  prosecution is McBain v, Crichton 1961 J,C,25# i n  w h ich  an i n d iv i d u a l  so u g h t to p r o s e c u te  a  b o o k s e l l e r  for t h e  s a l e  o f  b ooks a l l e g e d l y  o b scen e  and  d e s ig n e d  to corrupt t h e  public m o rals*  See generally " C r im in a l  P ro c e d u re  According t o  t h e  Law o f  Scotland", R en to n  & Brown, 4th e d ,  4-04-06 and  13-19-13-21*Cf, O l a n v i l l e  Williams, "The Legal Unity of Husband an d  W ife" (1 9 4 7 ) 10 M.L.R* 15 a t  p p .2 5 - 2 6 :  "On th e
o t h e r  h a n d , if t h e  r u l e  is that nobody i n  th e  w o rld  can p r o s e c u te  one spouse for a c rim e  co m m itted  against t h e  o th e r  spouse, it becomes n e c e s s a r y  to d i s t i n g u i s h  b e tw een  c r im e s  com m itted  against the o t h e r  sp o u se  a s  such and c rim e s  against other p e rs o n s  This in v o lv e s  a new judicialc l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  c rim es*  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  w ould be necessary to d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  i n s u l t i n g  behaviour d i r e c t e d  against t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  i n  p u b l i c ,  whereby a breach o f  th e  peace is likely # # , i s  a crime 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  against the o th e r  s p o u s e , or a crime a g a i n s t  /
2 9 6 .
a c t i o n  is M  vii^ diataiB p u b llo a m .
I n  t h e s e  question®, we a r e  i n  t h e  re a lm  o f  
p u b l ic  p o l i c y  (and a  vaguer a s p e c t  o f  it than u s u a l ly  
e n c o u n te r e d ) ,  w h ich  l a  a  c a te g o r y  th o u g h t  i n  S c o t la n d  
Im p ru d en t t o  e x te n d *  McCurdy rem ark s t h a t  t h e r e  l a  
n o th in g  t o  ehow t h a t  t h e r e  h ad  b een  a  a i g n i f l o a n t  
r i s e  I n  m a r i t a l  d i s r u p t i o n  o r  a  n o t i c e a b l e  f lo o d  o f  
l i t i g a t i o n  i n  th o a e  s t a t e s  w hich  p e r m i t t e d  au ch  
a c t i o n s , He quotes the d ia s o n t ln g  o p in io n  o f  Mr*
J* Grownhart i n  Wick v* Wick^ t h a t  "Courts may 
p ro p h e s y , but t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f t e n  leads them  to 
embarrassment -  E v ery  step ta k e n  t o  emancipate- women 
from  t h e  rigorous restrictions of th e  common law  has 
been met w ith  dark forebodings on the part o f  the 
judiciary* But now t h a t  women h ave  been put on a 
p a r i t y  w i th  men as t o  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  an d  property 
rights, s o c i e t y  survives, w ith  none o f  t h e  d a rk  
p o r t e n d s ■o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l ■prophets r e a l i z e d " .
Possibly t h e  most interesting part o f  Professor 
M cC urdy 's d i s s e r t a t i o n  upon t h i s  s u b j e c t  i s  contained 
i n  h i s  s u g g e s te d  s o l u t i o n s  to t h e  p rob lem # P resu m ab ly  
s i m i l a r  reasoning m ust h av e  been in t h e  m inds of 
many, b e f o r e  Scots law  on t h e  m a t t e r  w as changed*
F i r s t ,  the courts m ig h t d i s a l lo w  any c i v i l  
a c t i o n  b e tw een  husband and w ife  -  but so  many such 
a c t i o n s  w ore e s t a b l i s h e d  an d  a c c e p te d  ( a s  i n  p r o p e r ty )  
and some ( c o n s i s t o r i a l )  a r e  so  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h a t  it 
w ould b e  u n th in k a b le  t o  a t te m p t  t o  e n fo r c e  su c h  a  
r i g i d  r u l e  f o r  t h e  sa k e  o f  l o g ic  and  n e a tn e s s *
I f  /
a g a i n s t  o t h e r  p e rs o n s  ( e .g *  th e  S t a t e ,  o r  t h e  p u b l ic  at l a r g e )  on a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  t o  the p eace*  I f  the latter view w ere  taken, he asks, why s h o u ld  n e t  th e  c rim e  e f  l i b e l  be  t r e a t e d  i n  the same way? "Surely the th e o r y  of t h e  C r im in a l  law  i s  t h a t  a l l  c r im e s  a f f e c t  th e  p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e ,  an d  i f  t h i s  be  t r u e  i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  t o  d iv id e  up c r im e s  i n  th e  way su g g e s te d "*
192 W is*260 , 2 6 4 -5 , 212 N#W*787, 789 (1 9 2 7 )*
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If the courts w ere  t o  p e rm it  all p r o p e r ty  s u i t s ,  
but no personal t o r t  actions, t h e  i n j u s t i c e  created 
w ould a lm o s t c e r t a i n l y  o u tw e ig h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  d a n g e rs ;  
a g a in ,  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  p e r s o n a l  t o r t  a c t i o n s  t o  
th o s e  w h ich  o c n o e m e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n j u r i e s  and  w hich  
w ere  o f  a  n a tu r e  m ost u n l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  d o m e s tic  
r e l a t i o n s  w ould  seem a l t o g e t h e r  to o  p ra g m a tic  a  
s o l u t i o n ,  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  I t s  la c lt  o f  p r i n c i p l e ^ ,  
and  f u r th e r m o r e ,  w ould s u r e l y  r e q u i r e  t h a t  a  g r e a t  
d i s c r e t i o n  b e  p la c e d  i n  t h e  h ands o f  some p e r s o n  o r  
j u d i c i a l  body* I f  a  r e q u ire m e n t  w as made t h a t  th e  
c o u r t  d e c id e  w h e th e r  a prima f a c i e  came h a d  b e en  made 
o u t  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  q u a l i f i e d ,  who w ould  a d d u ce  
e v id e n c e  t h a t  d o m e s tic  harm ony was l i k e l y  t o  be  
u n h a m e d ?  What w ould  h ap p en  i f  h u sb an d  and  w ife  
d i s a g r e e d  on  t h a t  p o in t?  Would t h a t  p e rh a p s  i n  
i t s e l f  be  e v id e n c e  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  s h o u ld  n o t  p ro c e e d ?
To a l lo w  a l l  actions, w h e th e r  p e r s o n a l  o r  p r o p e r ty ,  
and to t r e a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  e s  u n m a rr ie d  and unrelated, 
seem ed t o  th e  author too b r o a d ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand, for 
h e  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  " i t  i s  a  m a t te r  c f  cm m on know ledge 
that t h e  c o n d u c t of husb an d  and w ife  towards e a c h  
o t h e r  g e n e r a l l y  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h a t  o f  s t r a n g e r s " .
F o r  e x am p le , s i n c e  b o th  a r e  in v o lv e d  i n  a  
common e n t e r p r i s e ,  f o r  common b e n e f i t ,  o f t e n  w i th  
common c o n t r o l ,  " e a c h  s h o u ld  b e a r  t h e  r i s k  w h ich  t h e  
o t h e r  t a k e s  i n  the o r d in a r y  c o n d u c t o f  t h e  d o m e s tic  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t " «
H is  c r i t i c i s m  t h e r e f o r e  w ould b e  t h a t  " o n ly  
th o s e  a c t s  w h ich  a r e  o u t s i d e  t h e  sc o p e  o f  m a r i t a l  
i n t e r c o u r s e  w ould  c o n s t i t u t e  c a u s e s  o f  a c t i o n "  and 
t i l l s  w ould  p r o v id e  a  m ore f l e x i b l e  t e s t  t h a n  t h a t  
o f  harm ony a n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  harm# y e t  one  n o t  q u i t e  
so  w id e  a s  t o t a l  p e rm is s io n  f o r  a l l  a c t i o n s  w i th o u t  
allowing /
"*## su c h  a v iew  seem s t o  be w i th o u t  l o g i c  in i t s  p l a c e  o f  c h i e f  a p p l i c a t i o n ;  l i a b i l i t y  In s u r a n c e  p o l i c i e s "  McCurdy, p ,1 0 5 4 *
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a l lo w in g  f o r  t h e  s p e c l e l t l e a  o f  t h e  m a r i t a l  % 'e la tlon#  
IW c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  euoh a  t r e a tm e n t  w ould  toe a n a lo g o u s  
t o  t h a t  r e c e iv e d  from  t h e  c o u r te  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a  
w i f e ' s  s e r v io e s  and  e a m in g a  u n d e r  t h e  M a rr ie d  Women's 
Statutes,
However, this solution, bo  s e n a i to le  at first 
s i g h t ,  i s  followed toy th e  exam ple that, i n  that most 
im p o r ta n t  g ro u p  o f  o a r  a o o id e n t  o a s e s ,  a  w if e  w ould 
n o t  h a v e  a right o f  action a g a i n s t  her husband, for 
i n j u r i e s  s u s ta in e d  while t r a v e l l i n g  a s  a p a s s e n g e r  
i n  h i s  car o r  i n  a  o a r  d r iv e n  toy h im , tout s h o u ld  sh e  
have b e e n  ru n  down toy him u n d e r  su c h  o iro u m s ta n o e s  
that B s t r a n g e r  might have b e en  i n ju r e d  s i m i l a r l y ,  an  
action w ould lie. If t h i s  i s  a fair example o f  th e  
t e s t  i n  action, them i t  i s  not s e n s i b l e ,  and shows a 
s i m i l a r  lack o f  b o ld n e s s  o f  a p p ro a c h  w h ich  w as subject 
s o  f a r  t o  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  a u th o r#  I s  i t  
ro a so n a to le  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  r u l e  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a 
w ife  ( o r  h u sb an d ) im p l ie d ly  a c q u ie s c e s  i n  n e g lig e n c e  
toy t h e  o t h e r  p a r t n e r ,  s im p ly  toy r e a s o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p ?  T h is  i s  a  f a r - r e a c h in g  e x te n s io n  o f  
y o l e n t i  p r i n c i p l e ,  S in c e  i n t e r - s p o u s e  l i t i g a t i o n  
i n  t o r t  i s  noiv c o m p e te n t i n  S c o t la n d ,  E%igland? and  i n  
U #8#?, i t  m ig h t seem t h a t  su c h  d i s c u s s io n  i s  o f  no 
f u r t h e r  uses t h e  b a t t l e  i s  won# Y e t i s  a different 
sy s te m  o f  p ro p e r ty -o w n in g  i n  m a ir ia g e  e m e rg e s , w i l l  
n o t  a  new sy s te m  o f  r u l e s ,  i n  many o t h e r  s p h e r e s ,  
including i n t e r - s p o u s e  litigation, become necessary 
in its t r a i n ? ^  A f te r  all, t h e  p a r t n e r s h i p  i s  not 
l i a b l e  f o r  d e l i c t u a l  a c t in g s  o f  a  p a r t n e r  a g a i n s t  a 
c o - p a r t n e r ,  although p e r s o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  may a r i s e ^ #
A new em brace o f  t h e  communie toonorum w ould  carry 
with It many c o n s e q u e n t ia l  c h an g e s  and  w ould  demand 
c o n s id e r a t i o n  of its e f f e c t s  i n ' a l l  f r e e  a s p e c t s  o f  
m a r r ia g e  /
1* S ee C h a p te r  7#2# P a r t n e r s h i p  A c t, 1 8 9 0 , s#10#
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marriage#
By 1 9 66 , no  g r o a t  Im provem ent e p p e a ro d  t o  have  
ta k e n  p la c e #  I n  " L i t i g a t i o n  Betv;een H usband and 
t h e  re a e o n a  f o r  j u d i c i a l  d i a l i k e  o f  i n t e r -  
ap o u ae  e u i t a  l a  a n a ly s e d ,  a n d , onoe a g a in ,  l o s e  o f  
d o m ee tio  h a m o n y  i a  a  p re -e m in e n t  r a t i o n a l e #  A n o th e r 
r e a s o n  ad d u ced  waa t h a t  t h e  j u d i c i a l  fo rum  was n o t  
t h e  p r o p e r  p l a c e  f o r  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  p ro b lem s 
a f f e o t i n g  f a m i ly  m a t t e r s ;  n o n - le g a l  re m e d ie s  ( s e l f -  
h e lp ,  p r i v a t e  an d  o h u ro h  a g e n o ie a )  may b e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  
h o w ev er, sh o u ld  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l ,  i n  o t h e r  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s  e n f o r c e a b le  a t  la w , be  made t o  depend  on 
h i s / h e r  pow ers o f  p e r s u a s io n  ( t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  im p e r f e c t ,  
t o o l  o f  women t o  a c h ie v e  t h e i r  w is h e s )?  The two 
b a s e s  f o r  t h i s  v iew  th e  a u th o r  i d e n t i f i e s  a s  b e in g  
t h e  'p r i v a c y  o f  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p '  an d  th e  
'c o m p le x ity  o f  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  d is p u te *  a rg u m en ts#
" I f  t h i s  r a t i o n a l e  i s  t o  b e  g iv e n  an y  w e ig h t ,  i t  s h o u ld  
a t  l e a s t  be  a p p l i e d  w ith  s e l e c t i v i t y " #  T h ere  i s  a l s o  
t h e  d a n g e r  o f  c o l l u s i v e  c la im s ,  an  a rg u m en t ru n n in g  
" d i r e c t l y  c o u n te r "  t o  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  d o m e s tic  
harm ony th e o ry #  A g a in , t o  some r i s k s ,  t h e  s p o u s e s ,  
b y  e n t e r in g  I n t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  may b e  s a i d  t o  be  
' v o l e n t i ' .  Plowever, a s  t h e  a u th o r  n o t e s ,  t h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  r e a s o n  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  sp o u s e s  on  m a rr ia g e  
a c c e p t  t h a t  th e y  may s t e a l  from  one a n o th e r ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  w i l l  b e  n o  rem edy f o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  o r  n e g l i g e n t  
h a rm , "an d  o u t s id e  o f  m a r r ia g e  t h e r e  c a n  o f  c o u rs e  
b e  no  i r r e v o c a b l e  c o n s e n t  t o  s e x u a l  i n t e r c o u r s e  w h ich  
w i l l  p r e c lu d e  a  r a p e  p r o s e c u t io n  d e s p i t e  s u b s e q u e n t 
p r o t e s t a t i o n s " #  H ow ever, im m unity  fro m  p r o s e c u t io n  
f o r  t h e f t ,  i t  t r a n s p i r e s  (M odel P e n a l C o d e § 2 2 3 # 1 * (4 ))  
a p p l i e s  g e n e r a l l y  o n ly  w here  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a n  
ag re e m e n t t o  assum e j o i n t  c o n t r o l  o f  h o u se h o ld  goods#
The /
1* 1966 H arv# Law R ev . 79^ pp* 1650-1665 (" N o te s " )#
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The ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n *  l e a s t  a o o e p ta b le  t o  t h e  a i i th o r  
was t h a t  t h e  s t a t u e  o f  m a r r ia g e  d i c t a t e s  t o  th e  
o o n t r a o t in g  p a r t i e s  many o f  t h e  I n c i d e n t s  th e r e o f #  
O h v lo u a ly  t h a t  l a  t r u e ,  (a n d  m uât be t r u e  t o  some 
e x te n t  o r  e l l  l a  c h a o s )  b u t  a s  t o  j u d i c i a l  I n a c t io n  
h e re #  I t  1$ s a i d  t h a t  " a t  b e s t  t h e  la n g u a g e  o f  
"status" provides a rhetoric b e h in d  which some other 
p o l ic y #  Buoh a s  d o m ea tio  harmony# may b e  o p e r a t i v e " .
iR o b e r t  K e e to n  n o te s  t h a t  one mode o f  re fo rm  
( i n  A m erloa) l a  f o r  a  c o u r t  t o  r e g a r d  a n  l a a u e  aa  
u n s e t t l e d #  and  t o  t r e a t  i t  a s  " a n  I s s u e  o f  f i r s t  
im p ro a s lo n "  ivhen n e x t  p r e s e n te d  t o  t h e  C o u r t ,  and  
t h a t  i n  1 9 6 6 , t h e  c o u r t  i n  M in n eso ta  u se d  t h i s  m ethod 
o f  re fo rm  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  p a r e n t a l  and  
in t e r a p o u s a l  im m u n itie s#
9I n  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  ,  t h e  c o u r t  r e f u s e d  t o  
r e c o g n is e  a  c h i l d ' s  im m unity  from  a  s u i t  b y  h i s  
p a r e n t ( s )  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a  c a r  a c c i d e n t ,  b u t  p r e f e r r e d  
t o  a w a i t  a  j u s t i c i a b l e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
upon  a  p a r e n t ' s ,  an d  a  s p o u s e 's ,  im m unity  from  
l i t i g a t i o n #  I t  seem s, h o w ev er, t h a t  " i n t r a f a m i l y  
l i a b i l i t y "  was one o f  t h e  a r e a s  o f  rb fo rm  o f  1958 -6 8  
w h ich  p rom p ted  t h e  a u t h o r 's  b o o k , and  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
B r io r e  v# B# 224  A#20*5B8 (N #H #1966), f o r  e x am p le , a  
c h i l d  was p e r m i t t e d  t o  su e  h i s  f a th e r #  I t  seem s 
strange t h a t  th e  p a r e n t / c h i l d  l a c k  o f  Immunity in 
l i t i g a t i o n  w a s ^ ^ r t h y  o f  n o te  i n  1966* s e e  Young v# 
R ank in  1934 pair L .M o riso n  -  "T h a t p r i n c i p l e "  ( o f  eadem 
n e r s o i ^ # f a r  l e a s  t&%e som etim es h id d e n  d o c t r i n e  o f  
domestic harm ony , t h e  doctrine w hich  m ust s u r e l y  have 
b e en  a t  t h e  r o o t  o f  t h e  A m erican  r u l e  h e r e )  " h a s  n e v e r  
b e en  a p p l i e d ,  and  d o e s  n o t  a p p ly ,  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  
f a t h e r  and  h i s  m in o r son"#
I n  /
1* " V e n tu r in g  t o  do  J u s t i c e "  -  R eform ing  P r i v a t e  Law# R o b e r t  B# K e e to n , 1969*2 .  B a l t s  V* B# 275 M in n .4 1 9 , 142 N#W, 20*66 (1966 )#
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4In Patusco v# P r in c e  Macaroni a wife was held 
e n t i t l e d  to r e c o v e r  damages from  the company, 
i n c lu d in g  damages for her medical expenses, despite 
the h u s b a n d 's  marital duty to provide m e d ic a l  c a r e ,  
and despite h i s  contributory negligence. The same 
o r  s i m i l a r  problems a l s o  exercised English writers#
In 1947, aianville L. Williams wrote an article 
entitled "The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife"^*
He n o te s  th e  usual Biblical Authority for the 
unity of husband and wife^.
The im p o r ta n t  core of the a r t i c l e  i s  the
assessment o f  whether the concept of t h e  unity o f  
h u sb an d  and wife is a principle in u s e ,  or of use, 
today# Is i t  useful, apt and appropriate or should 
it be disregarded, or e x p r e s s ly  rem oved end  replaced?
In p r o p e r ty  m a t t e r s ,  should it be  confirmed?
The author finds, in t h e  judgm en t of Hyde J#  in 
Manby v# Scott^, t h e  following passage?-
"In the beginning when God created woman an 
helpmate f o r  man. He said, "They twain shall be one 
flesh" ; and th e re u p o n  our law s a y s ,  that husband 
and wife a r e  but one person in the laws presently 
after the Fall, the judgment of God upon woman was,
"Thy desire shall be to thy husband, for thy will 
shall be subject t o  thy husband, and he shall rule 
over thee" (Gen.iii,l6). Hereupon our law put the 
wife sub poteatate yiri. and says, quod ipsa potestatem 
aui non habeat# aed v i r  suua. and she i s  d i s a b le d  to 
make any grant, contract, or bargain, without the 
allowance or consent o f  h e r  husband"* For Eve's power 
of persuasion m odern woman has had to pay dearly.
It /
1 .  M o.235 A .20.4Ô 5 ( N .J .1 9 6 7 ) .2# (194?) 10 M#L.E#16.3# and follows it through t h e  Dialogue de Scaecario to Bracton, Littleton end Coke, whence it "becomes part of t h e  stock-in-trade of t h e  common lawyers". 4# (1 6 6 3 ) 1 Mod#124 a t  p .1 2 6 .
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It i s a confusing notion, f o r ,  t h e r e  was n e v e r  
"complete u n io n  o f  property rights"# I t  seem s that 
in England i t  was still p o s s ib l e  for a w ife  t o  own 
real ■(freehold) p r o p e r ty  ev en  though subject to 
certain rights pertaining to th e  husband# As i n  
Scotland and t h e  A m erican  states, the w ife  was n o t  
ig n o re d  i n  litigation, hut was c o n jo in e d  a s  a  party 
to t h e  action. In O la n v l l l e  Williams* words, she 
was not re d u c e d  to t h e  position in law  of a dog#
It w a s, t h e r e f o r e ,  m ore true to s a y  that "the 
m ain id e a  which g o v e rn s  the law of h u sb an d  and wife 
(until t h e  intervention of e q u i ty )  is not that of 
an "unity of p e r s o n ", tout that of the guardianship, 
the gmd, the profitable g u a r d ia n s h ip ,  w h ich  the 
h u sb an d  h a s  over the wife and o v e r  her property"'* #
Of c o u r s e ,  t h e  influence o f  equity, and statutory 
c h an g e s  d id  a  great d e a l  to e r a d i c a t e  any importance 
t h e  notion o f  unity d id  p o s s e s s ,  and  the modern 
p o s i t i o n  became clear, namely, t h a t  in contract and 
property, a distinct legal personality was accorded 
to each spouse* However, Williams rem ark s  that 
where, a s  o f t e n  happens, one spouse (usually the wife) 
lives in a house owned toy the other, it is difficult 
to view them in the relationship of landlord and  
tenant, since it is presumed t h a t  in most cases and  
given the requirement t h a t  the husband must provide
for t h e  wife s u i t a b l e  accom m odation , that would not 
e l r  :
I n  /
otoe th i intention •
1# Pollock & Maitland, 2nd e d ,  1,465,2 .  C i t i n g  H a l l  V, M iohelm ore (1 9 0 1 ) 86 L ,T ,1 7 ,Bramwell v, B, [1942] 1 K*B,370s Pargeter v, P, [1946] 1 All B,H,570s s e e  how ever Scottish case of Millar V, M. 1940 B,G,56 w here a w ife  was held e n t i t l e d  to a warrant t o  e j e c t  from  h e r  h o u se  her h u sb an d  i n  exercise of her pow ers a s  a  landlord ( f o l lo w in g  MeoLure v, M, 1911 3,0,200) w here p e r  L ,P , (D uned in ) at p*206 is fo u n d  the f o l lo w in g  s t a t e m e n t ) -  " A c c o rd in g ly , I  think - an d  I w ould say t h i s  w ith  great c o n f id e n c e  w ere  i t  not f o r  the em inence  /
I n  t h i s  c o n te x t#  a s  i n  t h a t  o f  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  
p r o p e r ty  i n  o o r p o r e a l  m oveables#  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  
e n o o u n te re d  w i th  r e e p e o t  t o  i n t e n t i o n  i n  c o n n e c t io n  
%fith a  m a t t e r  a b o u t  vfhioh n o rm a lly  n e i t h e r  p a r t y  
w ould give a great d e a l  o f  thought# Quoad 
o w n ersh ip  o f  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  hom e, i n  many o e a e a ,  
a l th o u g h  t h e  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  paym ent to w a rd s  t h e  h o u se  
may h av e  b e e n  c o n t r i b u te d  by  bo th #  i f  m o rtg a g e  
f a o i l i t i e a  h av e  b een  ù t i l i a e d #  t h e  husband#  as t h e  
spouse more l i k e l y  to continue to earn# will be taken 
bound by t h e  Building Society to make the monthly 
repayments, and will do so# Bven if t h e i r  liability 
to the Building Society is j o i n t  and several, as it 
p ro b a b ly  will be end  should be where the parties have 
become joint heritable proprietors in terms o f  the 
Disposition in their favour, it will usually be out 
of th e  husband*s funds that the loan is repaid, while 
t h e  wife's money, if sh e  p o s s e s s e s ,  h a s  saved, o r  i s  
e a r n in g ,  m oney, may be utilised f o r  d i f f e r e n t  purposes, 
and, e x c e p t  i n  c a s e s  o f  divorce and separation, t h e  
q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  right o f  p r o p e r ty  i n  the h o u se  w i l l  
not be o f  the slightest c o n c e rn  t o  either o f  them^ #
N o tw ith s ta n d in g  those tw o great a r e a s  o f  
potential conflict ( c o n t r a c t  and p r o p e r ty )  in w hich  
th e  law now displays e  f a i r l y  even-handed a t t i t u d e ,  
aianville /
em inence of th e  le a r n e d  Judges who long ago decided t h e  case upon t h e  other g round" (that is, the c u r a t o r i a l  pow er of the husbands Colquhoun, Me, Husband and W ife , Appx#Ho#3) "##that it is safer to rest the matter upon t h e  m ere right of p r o p e r ty  and not to mix it up w i th  that w h ic h , in my o p in io n ,  i t  has nothing to do, namely, th e  
q u e s t io n  o f  th e  inter-conjugal r e l a t i o n s  w hich  are e n fo rc e d  by  c o n s i s t o r i a l  process# Of c o u r s e ,  i t  fo l lo w s  for s i m i l a r  re a s o n s  that a  w ife  could have t h e  assistance of the Court i n  turning her husband  o u t  o f  a h o u se  w hich  b e lo n g e d  to her"#1# for p r o p e r ty  rights on death, s e e  C h a p te r  5 (2 )#S ee p r o p o s a ls  f o r  p r o p e r ty  t r a n s f e r  o r d e r s  on divorce: Sc*Law C om m ission , Memo# No#22, 3*20 
M  âÊB* F a c u l ty  re sp o n se #
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G l a n v i l l e  W illia m s  p o i n t s  t o  a r e a s  i n  E n g l i s h  lav; 
# 101*0 t h e  f i o t i o n  o f  u n i t y  m i# i t  be  s o ld  t o  h a v e  
s t i l l  some i n f lu e n c e  n am e ly , " th e  law  o f  e v id e n c e ,  
c rim e#  t o r t #  c o n f l i c t  o f  law s#  s t a tu s #  incom e t a x
a n d  in s u ra n c e " *  (No o f  th e s e  s p h e re s  a t  l e a s t  nov;
l o s t  a  good m easu re  o f  t h e i r  dep en d en ce  upo n  u n i ty  *
The English common law r u l e s  of e v id e n c e #  f o r  
o b s c u re  reasons# fo rb a d e  spouses to-give e v id e n c e  
on  b e h a l f  of# o r  against, each o t h e r ,  (P e rh a p s#  as 
s u g g e s te d  by  B la c k s to n e ^ ,  th e  b a s i s  was t h a t  "nemo 
t e n e t u r  m  Imum a c c u s a r e " : "nemo in p r o p r i a  causa 
t e s t i s  e s s e  d e b e t" # b u t  W illia m s  w r i t e s  t h a t ^  t h e  
e a r l i e s t  a u t h o r i t y  on  t h e  q u e s t io n ,  Colte (G o * L i t ,6 b ) ,  
w h i le  m e n tio n in g  u n i t y ,  fa v o u re d  how ever t h e  more 
p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n  t h a t  i f  t h e  r u l e  were n o t  so ^  "it
might b e  a  c a u s e  o f  implacable discord and  dissension
between the husband an d  th e  wife, and a means o f  
great inconvenience"* Thus, we f i n d  echoes of the 
p r e v io u s  d i s c u s s i o n  and we r e t u r n  again to t h e  
"marital /
1,- C o n f l i c t  o f  haw s; s e e  rule t h a t  a m a r r ie d  womana d o m ic i le  in d e p e n d e n t o f  t h a t  o f  h e r  husband -  D o m ic ile  and  M a tr im o n ia l P ro c e e d in g s  A c t ,  1973# s#1*T a x a t io n ; i t  i s  now p o s s ib l e  f o r  m a r r ie d  p e r s o n s  to elect that t h e  w i f e 's  e a r n in g s  s h a l l  be  taxed 
s e p a r a t e l y ,  F in a n c e  A c t ,  1 9 7 1 , s ,2 3 #  I n  o th e r  o a s e s ,  a s s e s s m e n t of all tax due is made on the husband, though Clive and W ilson  n o te  (p,379) that t h e r e  i s  pow er t o  th e  C om m issioners t o  soelc paym ent from  th e  w if e  i f  t h e  husband fails timcously to pay, and a l s o  that rep ay m en ts  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  th e  w i f e 's  incom e are t h e  p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  wife (R e Cameron [1957] Chil), It seem s that, in that c a s e ,  for t h e  p u rp o s e s  o f  collection, t h e  incom e was t o  be 
r e g a rd e d  aa t h e  h u s b a n d 's  (of. Incom e Tax A c t, 1952, s ,3 5 4 ;  now s e e  I ,C ,T ,A # 1 9 7 0 , 8 8 ,3 7 /3 6 )  b u t  i n  h i s  receipt (or r e c e i p t  by  h i s  e s t a t e )  o f  t h e  sums, t h e  h u sb an d  a c te d  as t r u s t e e  f o r  the w i f e ,  and  h i s  e s t a t e  had no beneficial interest t h e r e i n ,  S p o u ses  may e l e c t  t o  b e  a s s e s s e d  s e p a r a t e l y  to t a x  -  incom e and  Corporation T ax es Act, 1970,
8 ,3 8 ,2, Comm.1.443#3 ,  a t  p ,1 9 .
305,
" m a r i t a l  harm ony" th e o ry #  A s i m i l a r  v ie w , h e  p o i n t s  
o u t#  i s  s e e n  i n  l o r d  H a rd w io k e 'a  ju dgm en t i n  B a rk e r  v* 
D ix ie^  -  "The r e a s o n  why t h e  law  w i l l  n o t  s u f f e r  a  
w if e  t o  h e  a w i tn e s s  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  h e r  h uahand  i s  
t o  p r e s e r v e  th e  p e a c e  o f  f a m i l i e s " # )
W illia m s  f i n d s  g r e a t e r  a a t i a f a o t i o n  i n  t h a t  
e x p la n a t io n  o r  i n  W igm ore 'a  v iew  t h a t  t h e r e  i a  an 
e le m e n t o f  rep u g n a n ce  i n  "condem ning a  man on  t h e  
e v id e n c e  o f  th o s e  who s lm re  th e  s e c r e t s  o f  h i s  
d o m e s tic  l i f e " ^  t h a n  on t h e  f i c t i o n  o f  u n i t y ,  th o u g h  
n e i t h e r  explains t h e  absence o f  p r o h i b i t i o n  oh 
p a r e n t / c h i l d  te s t im o n y  o r  ( l e s s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  p e rh a p s )  
the ability of the sp o u se  t o  g iv e  e v id e n c e  on b e h a l f  
o f  t h e  o t h e r .
A t any  r a t e ,  t h e  d i s a b i l i t y ,  w i th  tw o e x c e p t io n s  
(b a s e d  on p o l i c y ,  o r  " th e  r e p u l s iv e n e s s  o f  c o m p e ll in g  
e v id e n c e "  n o t  on  a n y  a rg u m en t o f  u n i ty )  h a s  b e en  
rem oved by  s t a t u t e #  One o f  th e  e x c e p t io n s  w ould be  
p l e a s i n g  t o  W lgm ore, I n  r e c o ^ i t i o n  p e rh a p s  o f  t h e  
s p e c i a l  q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  s p o u s e s  w i l l  
n o t  be  c o m p e lle d  t o  d i s c l o s e  co m m u n ica tio n s b e tw een  
e a c h  o t h e r  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e ^ .  The o t h e r  a r i s e s  i n  
c r im in a l  law#
S e c t io n  3 o f  th e  Evide%%ce (Amendment) A c t, 1853 , 
r e p e a le d  by  t h e  C i v i l  E v id en ce  A c t, 1 9 6 8 , 8 ,1 6 ( 3 ) ,  
I n  S h o n to n 's  c a s e ,  i t  w s  d e c id e d  t h a t  t h e  p r i v i l e g e  
a p p l i e d  o n ly  w h ile  t h e  m a r r ia g e  s u b s is t e d #  I t  seem s^ 
t h a t  i t  %ms c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s e c t i o n  3 
d id  n o t  i n f lu e n c e  t h e  "c a n d o u r  o f  co m m un ica tion  b e tw een  
h u sb an d  and  w i f e " .  The p r i v i l e g e  r e m a in s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
o n ly  i n  c r im in a l  p ro c e e d in g s '^ , a l th o u g h  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  
recom m endation  /
1 .  (1 7 3 3 ) Gas# & H ard ,264#2# B v id , 3 rd  ed* § 2227#3 ,  V fillia m s , p # 2 0 , c i t i n g  E v id e n ce  (Amendment) A c t ,  
1 8 3 3 , s , 3 ;  B hen ton  v ,  T y le r  [1 9 3 9 j C h.620#4# C ro ss  on  Evidence, 4 th  edn# 1974- p p .2 3 8 - 9 .3# C r im in a l  E v id e n c e  A c t ,  1 8 9 8 , s * l ( d )  ( r e p e a l  o fw h ich  e x p r e s s ly  e x c lu d e d  by  1968 A c t)*
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4recom m endation  o f  I t a  r e p e a l  I n  t h a t  c o n te x t  a l s o  *
S p o u ses are competent and c o m p e lla b le  witnesses 
in civil l i t i g a t i o n ,  and, in c r im in a l  c a a e s ^ ,  a 
spouse :1b a  c o m p e te n t witness for the defence (though 
n o t  g e n e r a l l y  c o m p e lla b le )  b u t  will n o t  u s u a l l y  be  
c o m p e ten t f o r  t h e  p ro s e c u ( ; io n , a l th o u g h ,  i n  te m ie  o f  
c e r t a i n  s t a t u t e s ,  h e /s h e  may b e  co m p e te n t th o u g h  n o t  
c o m p e lla b le ^ #  I n  t h i s  s p h e re  o f  la w , t o o ,  t h e  
f a m i l i a r  a rgum m its o f  u n i ty  and  f a m ily  harm ony h ave  
b e e n  u t i l i s e d #  O ro s s ,  h o w ev er, a d v o c a te s ^  t h e  
c a r r y in g  i n t o  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a ls  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  
o f  t h e  C r im in a l  I*aw R e v is io n  C om m ittee t h a t  a sp o u se  
s h o u ld  be a  c o m p e te n t p r o s e o u t io n  w i t n e s s ,  w here  th e  
tw o a r e  n o t  j o i n t l y  c h a rg e d , and  c o m p e lla b le  I n  o a s e s  
o f  a s s a u l t  o r  v io le n c e  to w a rd s  t h a t  sp o u se  ot* a  
member o f  t h e  h o u s e h o ld ;  c o m p e lla b le  f o r  t h e  sp o u se  
w here  t h e y  a r e  n o t  j o i n t l y  olm rged* t h a t  a  sp o u s e , 
w i th o u t  t h e  o t h e r 's  c o n s e n t ,  sh o u ld  b e  a  co m p e te n t 
w i tn e s s  f o r  a  c o -a c c u s e d ,  and  c o m p e lla b le  w here  h e /  
sh e  would b e  c o m p e lla b le  for t h e  p r o s e c u t io n ,  and  that 
d iv o r c e d  sp o u s e s  s h o u ld  b e  competent an d  c o m p e lla b le  
as i f  t h e  marriage h ad  n e v e r  taken p la c e #  The author 
t h e n  s e t s  o u t  t h e  reasons f o r  his s u p p o r t  of these 
changes i n  E n g l i s h  law# . A dm issions o f  one sp o u se  
"are n o t#  as s u c h ,  r e c e iv e d  against the o t h e r  although 
a n  ag en cy  may be h e ld  t o  e x i s t  on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
f a c t s  ###"^
Ttie P o s i t i o n  i n  8 c o ts  la w
I n  S c o t la n d ,  i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  p r i v i l e g e  o f  i n t e r ­
sp o u se  /
1# b y  C r im in a l  I^w  R e v is io n  Com m ittee# Bee C ro88 ,p#299# 
2 #  C r o s s ,  p p # 1 4 ? - 1 4 9 #3* C r o s s ,  pp#154 ^  seg# U nder th e  E v id e n ce  Act 1877 a  sp o u se  may b e  c o m p e lla b le  a s  w e l l  a s  c o m p e te n t a s  h e /s h e  may be also in c e r t a i n  common law  cases#4# p p # t6 l-2 # S ee  S c o t t i s h  c a s e  o f  J a o k so n  v# 
b la sg o w  C o r p o r a t io n  1936 8#C#334# w here# i n  eircum- s t a n c e s  i n  w hich  a w ife  was s u in g  t h e  ow ners of a bus in v o lv e d  in a  motor a c c id e n t ,  a v e rm e n ts  (in o t h e r  
p ro c e e d in g s )  by t h e  h usband  of his own n e g l ig e n c e  was n o t  allowed#
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sp o u se  co m m u n ica tio n s d u r in g  m a rr ia g e  d ep en d s upon 
t h e  s t a t u t e s  g o v e rn in g  th e  oom petenoe o f  w i tn e s a e s ,  
n o t  upon a  " s a o ro d  p r i n c i p l e  o f  th e  common law "^#
I n  c r im in a l  m a t t e r s ,  t h e  s t a t u t e  a p p l i c a b l e  l a  a l s o  
t h e  C r im in a l  E v id e n c e  A c t ,  1698 : T h is  A c t h a s  been
r e p e a le d  by  th e  C r im in a l  P ro c e d u re  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t,
1 9 7 5 ,  t t i e  r e l e v a n t  p r o v i s io n s  b e in g  now s a # l 4 l ,  1 4 3 ,
144 (Solem n P ro c e d u re )  and  a s# 3 4 6 -8  (Summary P ro c e d u re )#  
I n  te rm s  o f  e # l 4 l ,  t h e  a c c u se d  and  h i s  sp o u s e  s h a l l  
be  c o m p e te n t w i tn e s s e s  f o r  t h e  d e f e n c e ,  th o u g h  one 
sp o u se  may n o t  be co m p e lle d  to d i s c l o s e  an y  
communication made by  t h e  o t h e r  d u r in g  th e  m a rr ia g e #
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a c h a rg e  o f  b igm ay, o r  o f  o f f e n c e  
a g a i n s t  a  c h i l d  o r  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  m e n tio n e d  i n  
S c h e d u le  4  t o  t h e  A c t, and  i n  a l l  c a s e s  w here  a t  
common law t h e  following p ro c e d u re  was c o m p e te n t , a 
sp o u se  may be c a l l e d  a s  a  w i tn e s s  f o r  p r o s e c u t io n  
o r  d e fe n c e  w i th o u t  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  p e r s o n  c h a rg e d  ( s # l4 3 )  
T hese  p r o v i s io n s  a p p ly  b o th  i n  so lem n  and  Summary 
p ro c e d u re #  I n  c i v i l  c a u s e s ,  t h e  q u e s t io n  i s  g o v e rn ed  
b y  t h e  E v id e n ce  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t, 1 8 53 , s # 3 ,  a  s e c t i o n  
w h ich  i s  s i m i l a r  i n  te rm s  and  e f f e c t  t o  t h e  E n g lis h  
p r o v i s io n s  c o n ta in e d  i n  t h e  E v id en ce  (Amendment)
A c t , 1 8 53 , s# 3  o f  w hich  was r e p e a le d  i n  1968 e x c e p t  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  c r im in a l  p ro c e e d in g s #  ( I n  t h e  l a t t e r  
A c t, t h e  p h r a s e  u se d  i n  s#1 ( t h e  g e n e r a l  p r o v i s io n )  
i s  " c o m p e te n t and  c o m p e lla b le "  id ie re a s  t h e  B o o ts  A c t 
( s # 3 )  b e g in s  " I t  s h a l l  be  o cm p e ten t t o  ad d u ce  and  
exam ine a s  a  W itn e s s# # * " ; pcnt%*q. a s  r e g a r d s  p r i v i l e g e  
o f  c o m m u n ica tio n , i n  t h e  E n g lis h  A c t ,  o n ly  ( n o t )  
" c o m p e lla b le "  i s  fo u n d , th o u g h  t h e  S c o t t i s h  p r o v i s io n  
c o n ta in s  t h e  w ords ( n e i t h e r )  "o o m p e ten t ( n ) o r  
c o m p e lla b le " )  # G liv e  and  W ilso n , i n  o o n s t r u in g  s . 3 ,  
take t h e  v lew ^  that t h i s  s e c t i o n  r e n d e r s  t h e  spouse 
c o m p e lla b le  /
1# The Law o f  E v id en o o  i n  S c o t la n d :  A#G#Walker &N#M#L#Walker, p#379#2# a t  p#36^K#
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c o m p e lla b le  ae w e l l  a s  c o m p e ten t Im civil a c t io n s *
S e c t io n  3 e x c e p ts  from  its rule m a t te r s  com m unicated  
by  each t o  o t h e r  during m a r r ia g e ,  b u t  i t  i s  c l e a r  
that t h i s  d o e s  n o t  a p p ly  t o  conduct of t h e  s p o u s e s ,  
and  a c c o rd in g  t o  W alker and  W alk er^# D ic k s o n 's  v iew ^ 
that third parties c a n n o t  be  exam ined a b o u t  m a r i t a l  
com m un ica tions i s  of doubtful v a l i d i t y #  "##* a  
com m un ica tion  i n  p re s e n c e  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  c a n  
h a r d ly  b e  s a i d  t o  h av e  b e en  " c o n f id e d  by  one  o f  t h e  
spouses t o  t h é  bosom o f  t h e  o th e r "
U nder t h e  B a n k ru p tc y  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1 9 1 3 , ss# 8 6  
an d  6 7 , a  w ife  may be  exam ined a s  a  w i tn e s s  i n  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  b a n k ru p tc y ^ #
I t  may b e  t h a t  t h e  p r i v i l e g e  o f  m a r i t a l  
co m m un ica tion  s h o u ld ,  a s  i n  E n g la n d , no lo n g e r  ap p ly ^ #
As i n  E n g la n d , a  sp o u se  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a  co m p e ten t 
w i tn e s s  f o r  t h e  d e fe n c e ,  a t  t h e  w ish  o f  t h e  a c c u se d  
sp o u s e  ( b u t  n o t  o f  t h e  c o - a c c u s e d ) b u t  i s  o n ly  
e x c e p t io n a l ly  (u n d e r  c e r t a i n  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s io n s  and  
common la w  g ro u n d s)  a  c o m p e te n t ( s t a t u t e )  o r  c o m p e te n t 
and  compellable (common law) w itn e s s  f o r  t h e  p ro s e c u t io n ^ ,
P e rh a p s  a  more im p o r ta n t  f a c e t  o r  t h e  s u b je o t  
from  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  i s  t h e  
E n g l i s h  r u l e  v ^ i c h ,  a s  shown b e f o r e ,  h ad  i t s  S c o t t i s h  
e q u iv a le n t  -  n a m e ly , t h a t  h usband  and  w if e  c o u ld  n o t  
i n  n o rm al c ir c u m s ta n c e s  be  fo u n d  g u i l t y  o f  t h e f t  o f  
t h e  o t h e r ' s  la ro p e rty #  Even a t  one s t a g e  rem oved -  
t h a t  /
2 # P ,380#E v id e n c e  ( 3 r d  e d # )§  1660# C liv e  & W ilso n  a p p ro v e  t h e  v iew  ta k e n  i n  W alker & W alker#3# Walker & W alk er, p#360#4# Bee C h a p te r  2 ,  pp#5# Bee g e n e r a l l y  a l s o  C l iv e  & W ilso n , p p *364-66#6# Bee p r o p o s a l s  o u t l i n e d  above#7# A d e t a i l e d  a c c o u n t i s  g iv e n  by C l iv e  & W ilso n , pp*3 6 0 -3 6 4 , w here  the p r e s e n t  r u l e s  are c r i t i c i s e d  ont h e  g ro u n d s  o f  a n o m a lie s  end  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s ,  and  on t h e  v lm f  t h a t ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  law  "g o es  to o  f u r  i n  p r o t e c t i n g  th e  c o n ju g a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p " #
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that is, in t h e  hands o f  a receiver of such "stolen" 
p r o p e r ty  -  t h e r e  oould be no  prosecution on the 
grounds o f  t h e  English equivalent o f  reset* However, 
according to Hale, P*C*i*5l4 - "Yet trespass lies 
against ( t h e  receiver) for such taking, for it is a 
t r e s p a s s , but in favorem vitae it shall not be 
adjudged a felony; and so I think the law to be 
notwithstanding the various opinions"^.
It is noted that at common law, of course, the 
t e m p ta t io n  would always be of the w if e ,  since the 
husband had achieved his ends by legal means*
However, under t h e  H,W*P#Act, 1888, 8.12, 
re-enacted in the Larceny Act, 1915, 8,36, inter-spouse 
prosecution became competent i n  England if brought 
while the parties were living apart, and concerning an 
act done while the spouses were living apart, or an 
act done by one spouse "whenteving or deserting or 
about to leave or desert" the other, and b ro u g h t  for 
t h e  protection and  security of property#
The rule that one sp o u se  might not prosecute 
another, therefore, became subject to this exception 
of protection of property, and also to the exception 
t h a t  a  prosecution might be  brought for crimes 
involving personal injury^# A prosecution for libel 
thus would not lie, at least according to the case 
of R.V.LoM Mayor o f  London^#
The Larceny Act, 1916, was r e p e a le d  by the 
Theft Act, 1968, a#30 of w hich  r e n d e r s  each spouse 
liable with regard to offences against th e  property 
of the other as if they were not married# Under 
s#3 0 (2 ), a p e rs o n  may bring p ro c e e d in g s  a g a i n s t  his/ 
her spouse "(whether under t h i s  Act or otherifise)" 
as if they were not married, and  s h a l l  be  a  c o m p e ten t 
witness /
1# See Williams, p#24*2# Contrast U*S#A# struggle in this connection, d is c u s s e d  supra »3# 1866 L#R# TB%TB#772#
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witness f o r  the prosecution at e v e ry  stage of the 
p ro c e e d in g s #  The proceedings must he instituted by 
or with the c o n s e n t  o f  the D ir e c to r  of Public 
Froseoutions unless the parties are living apart by 
reason of j u d i c i a l  decree o r  o r d e r  o r  u n l e s s  t h e  
accused i s  charged w ith  committing t h e  offence jointly 
w ith  his wife o r  husband#
Where an action i s  brought by a  t h i r d  party 
against a m a rr ie d  p e rs o n  f o r  an  a l l e g e d  o f f e n c e  
against t h e  l e t t e r ' s  s p o u s e ,  o r  t h a t  s p o u s e 's  p ro p e r ty #  
the a c c u s e d 's  sp o u se  s h a l l  be  c o m p e te n t f o r  d e fe n c e
or prosecution, and whether the accused is c h a rg e d  
solely or jointly* However, unless the sp o u se  is 
compellable at common law, he/she will not be a 
compellable witness, and if evidence i s  given, marital 
communications need not be disclosed# Failure to 
g iv e  evidence " s h a l l  not be made the subject o f  any 
comment by t h e  prosecution"♦ (s#30(3))^*
In J a n u a r y ,  1 9 4 7 , when th e  article was published, 
it was not possible for one spouse to su e  the other 
in tort and of course, as was fo u n d  i n  the U*S#A#
and i n  Scotland, the rule worked injustice# The 
decis: 
t h e  /
ision i n  Weunhak v. Morgan^ was the result of
As to Scotland, s e e  e#g# H a rp e r v, A d a ir  1945 J*G#21 (the Criminal Law o f  Scotland: Gerald H#Gordon, p#439)#(1 8 8 8 ) 20 a#B #0#635, to the e f f e c t  that i n t e r -  sp o u se  communication could n o t  am ount to " p u b l ic a t io n "for defamation# Contrast Wanman v# Ash (1 853 )13 0 *8 , 8 3 6  (communication through a third party may am ount t o  publication) and  s e e  R a ls to n  v# R#[1 9 3 0 ] 2  K#B#23B in which no action could lie in respect of a graveyard inscription instructed by t h e  defendant h u sb an d  and g iv in g  the ( f a l s e )  impression that the deceased was his wife. The incident was thought to be a  just cause for complaint (the wife being alive, though separated from  the husband) but the defendant, by invoking s#12 o f  the 1882 Act, (to the effect that this action was for tort and not for the protection and security o f  h e r  separate p r o p e r t y ,  was a b le  t o  have the action d ism is se d *
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t h e  n w  f a m i l i a r  m ix tu re  o f  " l e g a l  u n i t y  and  d i s r u p t i o n  
o f  f a m ily  r e l a t i o n s "  r e a s o n in g .
Even if t h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  b aaed  on  t h e  unity 
doctrine, they are no lo n g e r  support f o r  the theory 
now t h a t  t h e  rules relating to actions b e tw een  spouses 
i n  t o r t  and  delict have been abolished. Williams 
s e t  out to discover "whether t h e  maxim" (that husband 
and w ife  a r e  one p e rs o n  i n  law) " r e p r e s e n t s  a living 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  la w , from  w h ich  new d e d u c t io n s  may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y  be d raw n " ,  and c o n c lu d e s  (at 1947) t h a t ,  
w h i le  t h e  fiction of conjugal u n i ty  c o u ld  not be 
said " d o g m a tic a l ly "  to be  p a r t ,  o r  n o t ,  o f  E n g l is h  
la w , i t  h ad  b e en  u t i l i s e d  i n  certain spheres, b u t  in 
su c h  a way as to serve t h e  ends o f  " p u b l ic  p o l i c y ,  o r  
at least h u m a n lte r la n is m " # For that p u rp o se  i t  was 
p e rh a p s  beneficial, b u t  i n  th e  a u t h o r 's  o p in io n ,  it 
s h o u ld  be u se d  " o n ly  to b o l s t e r  up  a d e c i s i o n  a r r i v e d  
at on o t h e r  g ro u n d s , and  (it) i s  n o t  i n  i t s e l f  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  b a s i s  of d e c i s io n " ^ ,  A lm ost certainly
t h i s  w ould  be the m a jo r i ty  view thirty years later, 
when many o f  the instances w hich W illia m s  in v o k e s  no 
lo n g e r  a p p ly ,  and the c l e a r  t r e n d  h a s  b e en  t o  
e r a d i c a t e  such 'unity-based' rules, many of which are 
productive o f  odd and unfair results in t h e  complexities' 
of m odem  life# Y et if there is a new communie# 
this area o f  law would require assessment once again: 
for ex am p le , where p r o p e r ty  is h e ld  i n  common, what 
rules s h a l l  govern i n t e r - s p o u s e  litigation i n  tort?
A re damages for p e r s o n a l  i n j u r y  t o  be  " f r o z e n "  u n t i l  
t h e  u l t i m a t e  p r o p e r ty  calculation on d e a t h ,  divorce, 
or e a r l i e r  " B o s k i l ln a d " ^ ,  o r  are th e y  to form  part of 
a /
1 ,  I W # #  P#31#2* O fte n  financial: s e e  p re v a le n c e  o f  insurance"cover" of all k in d s#3# Bee C h a p te r  7#4# or anticipatory termination provision (as Germany) o r  s u i t  f o r  separation o f  p r o p e r ty  (as France):s e e  Chapter 6 #
312 ,
a  s e p a r a t e ,  p r i v a t e  e s t a t e  a llo w e d  t o  e a o h  sp o u se  
o v e r  and  ab o v e  " f a m ily  a a a e ta " ?  I n  t h e  fo rm e r  
o a a e .  I f  t h e r e  l a  t o  be  no euoh s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  
whence l a  t o  oome t h e  money t o  m eet a  a u o o e e a fu l  
o la im  f o r  dam ages? Vfould auoh  a n  aw ard  b e  r e g a r d e d ,  
t h e  p u r s u e r  r e c i p i e n t ,  a e  g r a t u i t o u s
no  m a t t e r  t h a t  I t s  s o u rc e  was t h e  fu n d s  o f  t h e  o th e r  
sp o u se?  The assumption inherent I n  that question 
I s  that it w ould  be c o m p e te n t f o r  t h e  d e fe n d e r  sp o u se  
to h o ld  such separate funds. I f  that w ere  so, th e n  
t h e r e  would a p p e a r  to be no o b je c t io n  to a " g r a t u i to u s  
acqulrenda" f u n d ,  e x c e p te d  from  the common a s s e t s ,  as 
is fo u n d  In many com m unity p r o p e r ty  régimes. In d e e d , 
such might form the d e f e n d e r 's  fu n d s  out o f  which to 
make payment# What would be the effect on  t h e  r i g h t s  
of a  third party to su e  a  m a r r ie d  person where t h e  
alleged wrongdoing had  been "com m itted"  by  that sp o u se  
only, or, having been sued by one s p o u s e , t o  make a 
claim o f  contributory negligence against the o th e r  
spouse? "#.*■ some very d i f f i c u l t  problems might 
a r i s e ,  aa th e y  do in m ost com m unity s y s te m s , o f  the 
e x te n t  t o  which t h i s  com m unity fu n d  was available to 
t h e  c r e d i t o r s  o f  e i t h e r  sp o u se  f o r  s e p a r a t e  d e b ts " ^  #
I f  no  p r i v a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a t  a l l  w ere p ro v id e d  f o r  i n  
th e  general case, and i f  there had been no contracting- 
out of the g e n e r a l  schem e (a ssu m in g  su c h  was c o m p e te n t) , 
what purpose i s  c o n ta in e d  i n  pursuit by a  partner o f  
p a r t n e r s h i p  a s s e t s  (cf. P a r tn e r s h ip  A c t ,  1890, s. 1 0 ) ,  
u n le s s  a c e r t a i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  is g iv e n  at that p o i n t ,  
o r  on d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  partnership (com m unity  o f  
property) o f  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  c a s e ,  and  this 
recognition /
The quotation i s  ta k e n  from  a paper entitled "Family Property in Scotland", written by Professor M.C.Maston f o r  the F am ily  P r o p e r ty  d i s c u s s io n s  of the F i f t h  Commonwealth Law C o n fe re n c e  (E d in b u rg h , 1 9 7 7 ) . The c o n te x t  was a c o n s id e r a t i o n  of sp o u s e s  ' r i g h t s  I n  a " j o i n t "  a cc o u n t#
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r e o o g m ltlo n  r e s u l t s  i n  a  p r o p e r ty  a d ju s tm e n t?  Human 
f a l l i b i l i t y  an d  a e l f - i n t e r o s t  s ta n d  a s  a p e c t m s  
b e h in d  a l l  oOm m m lty aahem ea^*
I n  1 9 5 2 ,  a n  a r t i c l e  e ^ p e a re d ^  i n  t W  M odem  Law 
R eview  by O t to  K a b n -F re u M , e n t i t l e d  " I n o o n a ia te n o ie a  
and  I n j u e t i o e a  i n  t h e  Law o f  H usband an d  W ife " , and  
some o f  t h e  a u t h o r '»  th o u g h t»  on t h e  s u b j e c t  w ere  
d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  t o p i c  o f  a p o u e e e ' l i a b i l i t y  i n  t o r t *
H ere  i s  fo u n d  a  d ia o u e a io n  o f  t h e  B n g l ia h  p o s i t i o n  t o  
t h a t  d a t e  and  o f  t h e  a h o rto o m in g a  o f  t h e  la w  Reform  
(M a rr ie d  Women and  T o r t f e a a o r a )  A o t, 1935# A f u r t h e r  
t r e a tm e n t  i s  c o n ta in e d  i n  "A C e n tu ry  o f  F a m ily  Law 
1857-1957"^#  K ahn-Frm m d# th m :# i  k e e n ly
aw are  o f  d e f e a t s  i n  l e # l  t r e a tm e n t  o f  t h e  f a m i ly  u n i t ,  
w r i to a ^  ( o f  t h e  pre-19@ 2 p o s i t i o n  o o n o e m in g  i n t e r -  
sp o u se  l i a b i l i t y  i n  t o r t ) ,  " o b se rv e  f a r t h e r  how t h e  
m agio o f  t h e  " u n i ty "  r u l e  e m b le a  h u sb an d  and  w if e  t o  
a p p e a r  e i t h e r  a a  one p a ra o n  o r  a s  tw o , a o o e rd in g  t o  
t h e i r  o o n v e n ie n o e  a n d  u s u a l l y  t o  t h e  d e t r im e n t  o f  
t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  *#*" ( t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  " n o n - i d e n t i f i o a t i o n " )  
* .# a n d  q u o te s  D e v l in ,  J#  i n  t h e  omae o f  D r in k w a te r  v# 
Kimbmg^g " i n  t h i s  b ra n c h  o f  t h e  la w  h u sb an d  a n d  w ife  
o an  /
1* Bee g e n e r a l l y  C h a p te r  7* I n  t h e  B o u th  A f r ic a n  oom m m ity  p ro p e rl^ r  r é g im e , " th e  m l y  f u l l - b l o o d e d  u n i v e r a a l  com m unity eya tem  l e f t  i n  t h e  i f e a te r n  W orld" ( th o u g h  a e e  a l s o  H o llan d ) _
in te r - e p o u e e  l i t i g a t i o n  i s  co m p e ten t#  D oubt e x i s t a  a s  t o  w hei:her t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e  o r  s e p a r a t e  fu n d s  ( i f  an y ) i s / a r e  l i a b l e  f o r  dam ages due t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  r e s u l t i n g  from  d e l i c t u a l  a c t i n g s  b y  one ap cu ee*  (B ee H ^ io y /a ib so n , C h a p te r  6  (8*A #))#W here p a r t i e s  a r e  m a r r ie d  o u t  o f  o c rm u n i ty ,  n e i t h e r  w i l l  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t l i e  d e l i c t s  o f  th e  o t h e r  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  m a s te r / s e r v a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  and  
i n t e r - s p o u s e  a c t i o n s  i n  d e l i c t  may l i e #2* (1952) 15 M.L*R*135*3# Eds# R *H *araveson and  F*R*Grane, O h a p to rs  5 -8#4# Bee J o s e f  v w r  M em orial L e c tu r e ,  1971 #
5# p p , l4 7 - a #6# a t  [ 1 9 5 1 ]  2 A l l  E»R#713 a t  p#715( d e c i s i o n  a f f i r m e d  [1 9 5 2 ] 1 A l l  E#R#7ei#
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c a n  b o th  e a t  t h e i r  o eke  and  h ave  i t " #  l e  i t  
f a n o i f u l  t o  s u g g e s t ,  h e  a s k s ,  t h a t  l e g a l  " I n o o n a ie te n o ie s "  
a r e  i n  m ost o a s e a  aynonymoua w ith  " i n j u e t i o e a " ? "  
w h i le  a d v o e a t in g  a  d is e n ta n g le m e n t  o f  t l ie  r u l e s  and 
a  rem o v a l o f  th e  "anom alous i n e q u a l i t y  b e tw ee n  th e  
a p o u see  W iioh  i a  l a i d  down i n  s e c t i o n  12" ( o f  t h e  
M.W.P# A o t, 1 8 8 2 , r e p e a le d  by  th e  Act o f  1962, e x c e p t 
8 0  f a r  a s  r e l a t i n g  t o  c r im in a l  p r o o e e d in g s ) ,  h e  to o  
argues that care b e  taken n o t  t o  d e s t r o y  " th o s e  
p r i n o i p l e s  and  p r o v i s io n s  w h ich  s e e k  t o  g iv e  e f f e c t  
t o  t h e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  h o u se h o ld  w hich  i s  a f a c t  and n o t  
a f i c t i o n " ^ * The insistence upon a  c l e a r  view o f
reality la a oharacteristic o f  Professor Kahn F r e u n d 's  
thinking and c a n  b e  t r a c e d  t o  his s u g g e s t io n  i n  1971 
o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  t%ie a d o p t io n  o f  th e  
c o n c e p t  o f  " f a m ily  a s s e t s " #
G r e a t  c h an g e s  h ave  t a k e n  p la c e  i n  E n g l i s h  law  
s in c e  P r o f e s s o r  Kahn F r e u n d 's  a r t i c l e  was w r i t te n #
Quqad  p r o p e r ty  r e m e d ie s ,  s e c t i o n  17 o f  t h e  1862 A ct 
w as e x te n d e d  by  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l C auses ( P r o p e r ty  and  
M a in te n an c e ) Act, 1 9 5 8 , s * 7 , u n d e r  w h ich  t h e  court 
m ig h t d e a l  id . th  c a s e s  w here  t h e  p r o p e r ty  w h ich  t h e  
a p p l i c a n t  c la im e d  was no longer i n  th e  r e s p o n d e n t 's  
p o s s e s s io n ,  and  in which t h e  c o u r t  m ig h t order an 
a p p r o p r i a t e  sum of money t o  be  paid to t h e  applicant, 
and i n  addition m ig h t o r d e r  t h e  h u sb an d  or w if e  t o  
p ay  c o m p e n sa tio n  f o r  Im p ro p e r u s e  o r  d e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  
o t h e r ' s  p r o p e r ty #  T hese  p r o v i s io n s  w e re  r e - e n a c te d  
i n  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  C au ses  A c t ,  1 9 6 5 , a s #26-28^#
In 196 2 , by virtue of the Law Reform (Husband 
and Wife) Act, actions in tort between spouses are 
competent provided that the court does not stay the 
action /
1# p#154*2# See, e.g*, Bromley, Family Law, 5th edn# pp#440- 442, and see generally Chapter 6 (England) #
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a c t i o n ,  on th e  g ro u n d  t h a t  ( a )  no s u b s t a n t i a l  b e n e f i t  
w ould a c c ru e  t o  e i t h e r  p a r t y  from  th e  o o n tin u a n c e  o f  
th e  p ro c e e d in g s  o r  (b )  t h a t  th e  q u e s t io n  i n  i s s u e  
c o u ld  b e  more c o n v e n ie n t ly  d is p o s e d  o f  by  a n  a p p l i c a t i o n  
u n d e r  s . 17 ( o f  t h e  M.w.p* A c t ,  1882}^»
H en ce , i f  t h e  c a s e  i s  a  s u i t a b l e  o n e , t h e  c o u r t  
may e x e r c i s e  an y  pow ers w h ich  c o u ld  b e  e x e r c i s e d  u n d e r  
a  s# 1 7  a p p l i c a t io n #  I n  E n g la n d , q u e s t io n s  o f  
p r o p e r ty  a d ju s tm e n t  d u r in g  n m rr ie g e  a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  
s#17#  The M a tr im o n ia l C auses A o t, 1 9 7 3 , s s # 2 4  and  
25 g iv e  w id e  pow ers t o  t h e  c o u r t  i n  t h e  m aking o f  
p r o p e r ty  o r d e r s  a n c i l l a r y  t o  d e c r e e s  o f  n u l l i t y ,  
s e p a r a t i o n  o r  d iv o rc e ^  "%Jhy E n g l i s h  la w  s h o u ld  p ro v id e  
t h e  w ife  w i th  a  s t r o n g  i n c e n t iv e  t o  d iv o r c e  h e r  
h u sb an d  h a s  n o t  b e en  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  e x p la in e d ,  b u t  
tlT^ e f a c t  re m a in s  t h a t  u n t i l  a  c o m p re h en s iv e  co d e  o f  
f a m i ly  p r o p e r ty  i s  i n t r o d u c e d ,  t h e  w ife  w i l l  u s u a l ly  
d o  much b e t t e r  t o  h a v e  h e r  p r o p e r ty  d i s p u t e  d e a l t  w i th  
a n c i l l a r y  t o  d iv o r c e  th a n  u h d e r  s e c t i o n  17 o f  t h e  
M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  A ct 1882 W%ich g o v e rn s  
p r o p e r ty  d i s p u t e s  d u r in g  m a rr ia g e " ^ ^  ( J u d i c i a l
a t t i t u d e s  to w a rd s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  a n d  t h e  a m b it 
o f  j u d i c i a l  pow er im p o rte d  b y  s .  17 h a v e  v a r ie d ) ^ #
F o r  t o r t s  which do n o t  f a l l  i n t o  that c a te g o r y ,  
t h e r e  i s  c o m p le te  freed o m  of l i t i g a t i o n  b e tw een  
s p o u s e s ^ , s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  p r o v is o  %#iich w i l l  e l im in a te  
a c t i o n s  b a s e d  on s p u r io u s  o r  t r i v i a l  r e a s o n s  (p e rh a p s  
m ost l i k e l y  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  d e fa m a tio n , w h ich  was 
t h e  a r e a  w hich  c a u se d  g r e a t e s t  o o n o e m  t o  th o s e  
a n t a g o n i s t i c  t o  c h a n g e ) .  The in s u r a n c e  p o s i t i o n  i s  
th u s  /
1 .  1962 A o t, s* 1 (1 )*2# C ases  and  M a te r i a l s  on  F am ily  la w , P e t e r  Seagoand  A l a s t a i r  B i s s e t t - J c h n s o n ,  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  pp*221-2#3# S ee  e*g* B o th e  v# Amos [1 9 7 5 ] 2  A l l  E*R#321 ende u t l i o r i t i e s  t h e r e  d i s c u s s e d ,  See a l s o  "C o n fu s io n  i n  E n g l i s h  F a m ily  P r o p e r ty  la w  -  E n lig h te n m e n t from  A u s t r a l i a ? " ,  T u rn e r  (1975 ) 38 397 andl e v i n ,  "The Matrimonial Home -  Another Round",(1972; 35 M ,1 ,R , 5 4 7 , and C h a p te r  6 (E n g la n d ) ,
4, Bee Bromley, p,440, 'Action for Damages i n  Tort'*
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t h u s  r a t i o n a l i s e d .
By 8 # 3 (3 ) of t h e  1962 A o t, i t  is made c l e a r  t h a t  
it is c o m p e te n t for a h u sb an d  o r  wife whose marriage 
h a s  b e en  t e n a in a t e d  j u d i c i a l l y ,  t o  su e  t h e  o th e r  f o r  
a t o r t  com m itted  a t a n t e  m a tr im o n lo .  ' The Aot draws 
no  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  husb an d  an d  w ife  i n  a n y  m a t t e r ,  
a n d , i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a n  a c t i o n  b e in g  s ta y e d  i n  
e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  c o u r t ' s  d i s c r e t i o n ,  s u b s t a n t iv e  
l i a b i l i t y  i n  idio w id e r  c o n te x t  i s  n o t  a f f e c te d #  T h u s, 
w here a  w ife  h a s  o b ta in e d  f u l l  dam ages fro m  a  t h i r d  
p a r k y ,  t h e  l a t t e r  may su e  t h e  h usband  i n  a  s u i t a b l e  
c a s e ,  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  l i t i g a t i o n  b e tw een  t h e  sp o u se s  
w ould h a v e  b e en  a l lo im d ^ . C r e tn e y ,  com m enting on 
th e  A o t, w i t e s ^  t h a t  i t  p r im a r i l y  in te n d e d  t o  
e n a b le  one sp o u se  t o  o b t a in  c o m p e n sa tio n  from  an  
in s u r a n c e  company f o r  i n j u r i e s  c a u se d  by  th e  o t h e r 's  
n e g l ig e n t  d r iv in g #  L i t t l e  a d v a n ta g e  seem s t o  h ave  
b een  to k e n  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  th u s  p r o v id e d  t o  
l i t i g a t e  d o m e s tic  d i s p u te s "  *
I n t e r - s p o u s e  a c t io n a  i n  c o n t r a c t  a r e  w e l l  
e s t a b l i s h e d ;  su c h  a c t io n s  i n  t o r k  hove r e c e iv e d  
a c c e p ta n c e  i n  E n g lan d  and  S c o t la n d  o n ly  s i n c e  1962#
I n  o iro u m s ta n o e s  w h ich  would m e r i t  a n  a c t i o n  i n  
d e l i c t  o r  on a quasi-contractual basis such a s  
reco m p en se , o r  i n  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  i n j u r e d  sp o u s e  may 
ch o o se  t h e  c o u rs e  w h ich  a p p e a rs  m oat a d v a n ta g e o u s .
I n  s u i t a b l e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  an d  a c t i o n  o f  c o u n t ,  
re c k o n in g  an d  paym ent w ould  p re su m ab ly  b e  com peten t#
I n  a l l  p r o p e r ty - b a s e d  l i t i g a t i o n ,  h o w ev er, t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  i s  one  o f  p r o o f  f o r  t h e r e  i s  a n  a r t i f i c i a l i t y  
i n  applying to t h e  m a r r ie d  state rules d e s ig n e d  t o  
r e s o lv e  d i s p u t e s  b e tw een  s t r a n g e r s ^  #
By /
1 .  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  F am ily  Law (2 n d  edn#) p#293#
2. I t  was t h e  b o h c iu s io n  o f  th e  S o c i a l  S u rv e y  D iv is io n  i n  t h e i r  r e p o r t  on M a tr im o n ia l P r o p e r ty  (Todd and J o n e s )  (Infra# C h a p te r  7 ) that " i n  the population a s  a whole" many m a r r ie d  c o u p le s  do not h ave  large 
f i n a n c i a l  /
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By 5*3 o f  t h e  Lew Reform  (M a rr ie d  Women and  
T o r t f e a s o r s )  A o t, 1 9 35 , I t  was made c l e a r  t h a t  I n  
E n g lan d  a h u sb an d  was no lo n g e r  t o  be l i a b l e  f o r  
t o r t s  com m itted  by  h l a  w ife  b e fo r e  o r  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e ,  
o r  f o r  a n t e - i m p t l a l  c o n t r a c t s ,  d e b ts  o r  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  
a l th o u g h  o f  c o u r s e ,  a s  I n  S c o t la n d ,  l i a b i l i t y  may 
a r i s e  by  re a s o n  o f  v i c a r i o u s  l i a b i l i t y  o r  j o i n t  
w rongdoing#
I n  S c o t la n d ,  i t  re m a in s  p o s s ib l e  f o r  a  p a r t y  
p r e v io u s ly  b e t r o th e d  t o  su e  th e  o th e r  c o n t r a c t i n g  
p a r t y  f o r  " b re a c h  o f  p ro m ise  o f  m a r r ia g e " ,  a n d , i f  
s u c c e s s f u l ,  may e x p e c t  to r e c e iv e  from  t h e  d e fe n d e r  
a  BUM i n  name o f  s o la t iu m  for hurt f e e l i n g s ,  
re im b u rse m e n t f o r  any e x p e n se s  j u s t i f i a b l y  in c u r r e d  
i n  c o n te m p la t io n  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  and  a l s o  f o r  l o s s  o f  
" f i n a n c i a l  a d v a n ta g e s" ^  which he o r  sh e  might have 
o b ta in e d  on  m a r r ia g e .  The la s t - m e n t io n e d  h e a d  o f  
damage /
f i n a n c i a l  r e s e r v e s  b e h in d  t h e i r  e v e ry  day  e x p e n d i tu r e " ,  y e t  o c c a s io n a l ly ,  s p e c t a c u l a r  f a m ily  p r o p e r ty  d i s p u t e s  o c c u r  a s ,  f o r  e x am p le , a  c a s e  (W o lifso n  V* H a r r i s o n ,  a s  y e t  u n r e p o r te d :  Theà laag o w  H e ra ld  2 9 /7 /7 7 ) ,  w hioli a r o s e  i n  t h e  C o u r t o f  S e s s io n ,  c o n c e rn in g  diam ond j e w e l l e r y  t o  th e  v a lu e  o f  & 2 4 ,0 0 0 , p le d g e d  a s  s e c u r i t y  f o r  a  company l o a n .  The p u r s u e r  a l l e g e d  t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t o r ,  i n  b re a c h  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  o f  p le d g e ,  h a d  made g i f t s  o f  t h e  j e w e l le r y  t o  h i s  w if e  and  d a u g h te r .  
A g a in  i n  1 9 7 5 , a  d iv o r c e d  w ife  su e d  h e r  fo rm e r  h u sb an d  f o r  t h e  sum o f  & 33 ,580 , on  t h e  g round  t h a t  h e  h a d  a b s t r a c t e d  th e  money from  h e r  b y  m eans o f  a s k in g  h e r  t o  s ig n  b lan is  cn eq u es  f o r  s m a ll  h o u se h o ld  b i l l s .  (D e n n is  v .  D. The G lasgow  H era ld *  2 4 /6 /7 5 )M rs . D en n is  W d  r e c e iv e d ,  i t  was s u g g e s te d ,  a n  a llo w a n c e  o f  jS5,000 from  a  m ale t h i r d  p e w ty ,
( a v e r r e d  by  the plaintiff t o  have b e e n  h e r  lover b e f o r e  h e r  m a r r ia g e ,  many y e a r s  b e f o r e )  j e w e l le r y  t o  t h e  v a lu e  o f  ^ 8 0 ,0 0 0 , a n d  a  h o u se  I n  Bermuda -
I n  a l l ,  a  b e n e f i t ,  a u r in g  h e r  m a r r ie d  l i f e ,  o f ,  i twas a l l e g e d ,  o v e r  & 400 ,000 . W ith  t h i s  e s t im a t e ,M rs . D en n is  d i s a g r e e d .  He r e p o r t  o f  t h e  outcom e a p p e a rs  t o  be  t r a c e a b le #1 .  W a lk e r, P r i n s . I ,  p . 2 3 6 .
2 .  S .L .C .  C o n s u l t a t iv e  Memo, No. 54 ( 2 . 1 . - 2 . 1 9 )  c o n s id e r e d  th e  s u b j e c t
o f  b reach  o f  prom ise o f  m arr iage  and c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  need
o f  r e fo r m , t h a t  such  a c t i o n s  sh o u ld  be a b o l i s h e d ,  or  a t  l e a s t
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  damages f o r  s p e c i f i e d  ty p e s  o f  p e c u n ia r y  l o s s ,  and so u g h t  v ie w s .  *
318.
damage I s  p e rh a p s  aomewhat l e s s  j u s t i f i a b l e ,  n o t  t o  
a a y  q u a n t i f i a b l e ,  th a n  t h e  f i r s t  tw o . When e d u o a t io n ,  
c a r e e r  o p p o r tu n i ty  and  s a l a r i e s  f o r  men an d  women 
a r e  oom lng a s  n e a r  e q u a l i t y  a s  may be  p o s s i b l e  o f  
a t t a in m e n t^ ,  m a r r ia g e  s h o u ld  be i^ g a r d e d  p e rh a p s  
r a t h e r  a s  a  f o r t u n a t e  e v e n t  th a n  a s  a  m eans t o  
a c h ie v e  im a l th  an d  s t a t u s ,  b u t  no d o u b t t h e r e  w i l l  
a lw ay s b e  m ateh-m akero  and  f o r t u n e - h u n t e r s .  " I t  i s  
a  t r u t h  u n i v e r s a l l y  ao lm ow ledged , t h a t  a  s i n g l e  man 
i n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  a  good f o r tu n e  m ust b e  i n  w ant o f  
a wlfe"^.
How ever /
1 ,  S ee  e*g# S ex  D i s q u a l i f i o a t i o n  (R em oval) A o t, 1919* Equal Pay A o t, 1970* G#J#Mepham, E q u a l O p p o r tu n ity  and  E q u a l P a y , ( I n s t i t u t e  o f  P e r s o n n e l  M anagem ent)*
, 8 e x  D is o r im in a t ib n  A o t, 1973# (s# 3 3  o f  w h ich  e s t a b l i s h e d  E q u a l O p p o r tu n i t i e s  C om m ission ).2 .  M rs, B e n n e t, P r id e  and  P r e ju d ic e ,  J a n e  A u s te n ,The b e n e f i t  o f  m a r r ia g e  t o  a  w e a lth y  p a r t n e r  may y e t  b e  m o o g ti is e d  by  t h e  c o u r t s .  T h u s , w here  a  h u sb an d  i n  p o o r  h e a l t h  h ad  become accu sto m ed  t o  a  h ig h  s ta n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  by  r e a s o n  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  ( h e r  a s s e t s  am o u n tin g  t o  j& 78,000), t h i s  was r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  lump sum award of £1 0 , 0 0 0  made t o  him  on d iv o r c e ,  (C a ld e rb a n k  [1 9 7 3 ] 3 A l l  B .R # 3 3 3 ), T h is  c a s e  was n o te d  by  G ,A ,M acD onsld i na  p a p e r  e n t i t l e d  'F a m ily  P ro p e r ty  Law i n  E ng land  an d  W a le s ',  s u b m it te d  t o  t h e  3 th  Commonwealth Law C o n fe re n c e  (F a m ily  P r o p e r ty  d i s o u s s i o n ) .  He rem ark s  that t h e  A c t makes no d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  th e  s e x e s  h e r e .
P e r  scarman, L , J ,  ( a t  p ,3 3 8 )*  " B a s i c a l l y  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  the s e c t i o n s "  ( 8 8 ,2 1 - 2 3 ,  M a tr im o n ia l C auses Act, 1973) " i s  t h a t  e a c h  sp o u se  comes t o  t h e  c o u r t  on a  b a s i s  o f  e q u a l i t y " .  A t p#340* r e j o i c e  t h a ti t  sh o u ld  be  made a b u n d a n tly  p l a i n  t h a t  h u sb a n d s  and w iv e s  come t o  th e  judgm en t s e a t  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  money an d  p r o p e r ty  on a b a s i s  o f  c o m p le te  e q u a l i t y .  T h a t complete e q u a l i t y  may# and o f t e n  w i l l ,  h av e  to give way t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  of t h e i r  m a r r ie d  l i f e .  I t  d o e s  n o t  f o l lo w  t h a t ,  b e c a u se  th e y  come t o  t h e  judgm ent s e a t  on  th e  b a s i s  o f  c o m p le te  e q u a l i t y ,  j u s t i c e  r e q u i r e s  a n  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  a s s e t s .  The p r o p o r t io n  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  i s  
d e p e n d e n t on c irc u x a s te n c e s  A lth o u g h  th el e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  m a in ta in  on t h e  h u sb a n d , by  c o n s t r u c t io n  and  to some extent by t h e  back door 
( " o b l i g a t i o n s  and  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s "  -  s , 2 3 ( 1 ) (b )*  a l l  t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e  c a s e  m ust be  c o n s id e r e d ;  
n o t  /
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H ow ever9 f o r  s ol a tiu m  and  o u t la y s  ^  i t  m ig h t 
h av e  b e en  th o u g h t  t h a t ,  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  
b re a o h  o f  c o n tr a o t^  and irdLth th e  o b je o t  o f  
^  I n t e g t ^ '  I n  v ie w , suoh  l i t i g a t i o n  shou3.d 
u n d o u b te d ly  be  c o m p e te n t . By t h e  Lavf Reform  
(M lso e lla n é o u a  P r o v is io n s )  A o t, 1970 , b r e a c h  o f  
p ro m ise  a c t i o n s  I n  E n g lan d  h av e  b e en  a b o lis h e d #
T h is  A ot " I n t ro d u c e d  a  s p e c i a l  code  t o  d e a l  w i th  some 
o f  t h e  p r o p r i e t a r y  p ro b lem s w h ich  may e r l e e  from  th e  
t e r m in a t io n  o f  a n  engagem ent" ( f o r  ex am p le , t h a t  t h e  
(w om an 's) engagem ent r i n g  l a  a n  a b a o lu te  g i f t  ( th o u g h  
t h i s  l a  a  p ro a im p tlo n  w lilch  may b e  r e b u t t e d )  -  i n  
o r d e r  t l i a t  sh e  may th ro w  I t  away r a t h e r  th a n  r e t u r n  
I t ,  I f  " j i l t e d "  -  th u s  c h a n g in g  th e  r u l e  t h a t  sh e  
who u n j u s t i f i a b l y  b re a k s  t h e  a g re em e n t m uat r e t u r n  
t h e  r i n g :  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  1» draw n b e tw een  engagem ent
r i n g s  an d  o t h e r  g i f t s ,  and  ev en  p e rh a p s  b e tw ee n  th e  
engagem ent r i n g  and  a  r i n g  g iv e n  by  f i a n c é e  t o  f i a n c é ,  
a a ,  f o r  e x am p le , a  s i g n e t  r i n g ,  p o a e lb ly  t o  b e  re g a rd e d
88 a  g i f t  c o n d i t i o n a l  on t h e  o o o u rre n c e  o f  t h epm a r r ia g e ) " *  A lth o u g h  dam ages f o r  b ro a c h  o f  p ro m ise  
a m  no  lo n g e r  co m p e te n t I n  E n g la n d , d i s p u t e s  wl^xloh 
az'e p r o p e r ty  b a se d  may be b ro u g h t u n d e r  t h e  a e g i s  o f  
8*17 (M .W .P .A ct, 1 8 8 2 ) , by  p a r t i e s  p r e v io u s ly  engaged  
t o  e a c h  o t h e r ,  p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e  l i t i g a t i o n  p e r t a i n s  
t o  p r o p e r ty  I n  w M ch e i t h e r  had  a n  I n t e r e s t  w h ile  t h e  
a g reem en t s u b s i s t e d ,  and  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  i s  b ro u g h tT|w i th in  t h r o e  y e a r s  o f  i t s  t e m i n a t io n ^ #
I n  S c o t la n d ,  g i f t s  made by  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  
engaged  /
n o t  o n ly  l e g a l  o b l ig a t io n s  a r e  in te n d e d  t o  be  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n ) ,  t h e  h u sb a n d 's  r i g h t  t o  c o n t in u a t io n  w i th in  re a so n "  a  c e r t a i n  way o f  l i f e  ( p r e v io u s ly  p ro v id e d  by  t h e  \ f i f e )  was r e c o g n is e d .1 .  th o u g h  g e n e r a l ly  dam ages i n  c o n t r a c t  a r e  n o t  r e o o v e r a b le  f o r  h u r t  f e e l in g s *  A dd is v .  Gramophone C o .[1 9 0 9 ] A .C ./m e .2 .  See C r e tn e y , p p . 279-283#3 .  L .R . (M is c e l la t ie o u s  P r o v is io n s )  A o t, 1970 , s * 2 ( 2 ) .  S ee B rom ley , p # 4 4 l .
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engaged  c o u p le  a r e  t o  b e  r e tu r n e d  I f  th e  m a r r ia g e  
d o e s  n o t  t a k e  p la o e ^ .  G i f t s  made by  t h e  p a r t i e s  
th e m se lv e s  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  may be r e c o v e r e d ,  i f  th e y  
w ere  made I n  c o n te m p la t io n  o f  m a r r ia g e .  P ro b a b ly  
t h e  m oat Im p o r ta n t  in a ta n o e  l a  th e  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  
r e t u r n  o f  t h e  engagem ent r l n g ( a ) ,  t h o u ^ i  p e rh a p s  
t h e  r u l e s  h e re  a r e  anom alous i n  t h a t  o o n d u o t a p p e a rs  
t o  b e  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  q u e s t io n .
The p o s i t i o n  aeeme t o  be t h a t  i f  th e  engagem ent 
i e  b ro k e n  w ith o u t  j u e t i f i o m t i o n ,  t h e  p a r t y  who 
te r m in a te d  t h e  engagem ent i f i l l  l o s e  r i g h t  t o  t h e  r in g #  
T h u s, i f  t h e  man h a s  b ro k en  th e  a g re e m e n t, t h e  woman 
may k eep  t h e  r i n g ,  and  i f  t h e  woman h a s  b ro k e n  th e  
a g re em e n t w i th o u t  d u e  o a u a e , ahe  m ust r e t u r n  t h e  r i n g .  
A c co rd in g  t o  J a c o b s  v .  D a v ia ^ , th e  r i n g  i s  g iv e n  on 
im p lie d  c o n d i t io n  t h a t  I t  w i l l  b e  r e tu r n e d  i f  t h e  
engagem ent i s  b roken#
H ow ever, i f  t h e  %mman i s  j u s t i f i e d  i n  h e r  a c t i o n ,  
sh e  may r e t a i n  t h e  r i n g  and  l i k e \ f i s e  i f  t h e  man h a s  
l e g a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  h i e  c o n d u c t , he  may r e c o v e r  
t h e  r in g ^ *
I f  t h e  p a r t i e a  a g re e d  t o  t e r m in a te  t h e  en g ag em en t,
i t  /
1 .  S t a i r ,  I n s t l t e . ,  1 . 7 . 7 .  T h is  i s  a n  exam ple o f  t h e  c o M l e t i o  jgtausa oaiw a ao g  e o g m .  . . o f  w h ich  t h e r e  a r e  in n u m e ra b le  i n s t a n c e s ;  a a  a l l  t h in g s  t h a t  become i n  t h e  p o a s e a a io n  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t y  i n  c o n te m p la tio n  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  w h ich  i s  t h e  c a u e e ,  f a i l i n g  t o  be a c c o m p lish e d , t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t y  c e a s e t h ,  and  e i t h e r  m ust r e s t o r e ,  o r  i f  i t  b e  d i s s o lv e d  w i th in  y e a r  and  d a y , w i th o u t  a  l i v i n g  c h i l d  b o m ,  o u r  oustom  m akes a l l  t o  r e t u r n ,  a s  i f  t h e r e  had  b een  no m a r r ia g e ;  o f  
w h ich  f o r m e r ly " ,  ( s t a i r  i b M . )  W hether r e s t i t u t i o n  w ould now f o l lo w  i n  t h e  l o t i e r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  m ust s u r e l y  be  d o u b t f u l .
2 .  [1 9 1 7 ] 2 K .B .5 3 2 . (T he r i n g )  " s t i l l  r e t a i n s  i t sc h a r a c t e r  o f  a  p le d g e  o r  so m e th in g  t o  b in d  th e  b a r g a in  o r  c o n t r a c t  t o  m any, and  i t  i s  g iv e n  on t h e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  t h a t  a  p a r t y  ^fho b r e a k s  th e  
c o n t r a c t  m u st r e t u r n  i t , "  p e r  S hearm an , J .  a t  p . 533#3 .  Cohen v .  B e l l a r  [1 9 2 6 ] 1 K .B . 5 3 6 .
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4it is thought that the ring should be returned #
These rules have been superseded quoad English 
law by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 
1970, 5*3(2), but would appear to remain good law 
in Scotland* The English provisions are that the 
donor (being a party to the engagement) of a gift 
of property made on condition (express or implied) that 
it shall be returned if the agreement is terminated, 
"shall not be prevented from recovering the property 
by reason only of his having terminated the agreement" 
(Sé3(l)), and (s*3(2)), that the gift of the 
engagement ring shall be presumed to be an absolute 
gift, but this presumption may be rebutted by proving 
that the ring was given on condition, express or 
implied, that it should be returned if the marriage 
did not take place (for any reason)*
As f a r  a s  S c o t la n d  is c o n c e rn e d , o u t r i g h t  g i f t s  
LOt r e c o v e ra b le ^ *  I t  u se d  t o  be thought t h a t  
th e  engagem ent r i n g  s h o u ld  be  re g a rd e d  a s  a n  o u t r i g h t  
g i f t ,  
a s  /
pa r e  n o t r l e  .
*e
f t ,  b u t  t h i s  v iew  h a s  changed^ and i t  i s  c o n s id e re d
1& S ee  S avage  v# M c A ll is te r  (1932) 68 S h * C t.E e p * 1 1 .î W alker^ P r ln s *  p p .236-7* C liv e  and  W ilso n , pp * 2 9 - 30# e x p re s s  g r e a t e r  d o u b t about t h e  matter# They n o te  t h a t  "LAjn engagem ent a s  su c h  h a s  no 
p a t r im o n ia l  e f f e c t s *  The n o rm al rules o f  property law a p p ly " ,  and  t h a t ,  by r e a s o n  o f  t h e  c o n d ic t i o  c a u s a  d a ta  c a u sa  non  s e c u t a * t r a n s f e r s  W 'm ohey  o r  p r o p e r ty T r o m  one W  tfiS  o t h e r  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e s  of s e t t i n g  up  t h e  hom e, m ust be r e t u r n e d  if th e  m a r r ia g e  d o e s  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  
f a u l t  o r  c o n d u c t .W edding p r e s e n t s  from t h i r d  parties, upon  b re a k -u p  
o f  th e  m a r r ia g e* a r e  d e a l t  with i n  E n g lan d  i n  a c c o rd a n c e ’'w i th  t h e  d o n o r 's  i n t e n t i o n .  Where th e  marriage d o e s  n o t  take p l a c e ,  th e  g i f t  i s  t o  be  r e t u r n e d ,  i t  b e in g  presum ed t o  be c o n d i t i o n a l  on th e  o c c u r re n c e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  b u t  t h i s  presumption may be r e b u t t e d  a s ,  f o r  example, i f  t h e  p r e s e n t  i s  f o r  immediate u s e .  S ee  B rom ley , p .18 and p.448.
2 .  G old  V . Hume (1 950 ) 66 S h .G t.R e p .8 5 .
3 .  S . L . C.  (Memo.No.5 4 )  thought t h a t  th e r e  sh o u ld  he no s p e c i a l  code o f  r u l e s  g o v e r n in g  the p r o p e r ty  o f  engaged  p e r s o n s ,  but wondered w h ether  or n o t  an e x c e p t i o n  s h o u ld  be made i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  r i n g ( 3 *6 . ) j  perhaps a r e b u t t a b l e  presum p tion  t h a t  i t  was an u n c o n d i t io n a l  g i f t ?
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a s  a g i f t  made on c o n d i t io n  t h a t  th e  m a r r ia g e  w i l l  
t a k e  p l a c e ,  a l th o u g h  o f  c o u rs e  p a r t i e s  may make t h e i r  
own a rra n g e m e n ts  a s  t o  t h i s  m a tte r*  P o s s ib ly  th e  
same v iew  w ould p r e v a i l  c o n c e rn in g  th e  g i f t  o f  a  r i n g  
t o  th e  man, b u t  th e  p o in t  does n o t  seem t o  h av e  b e en  
made c le a r ^  «
G i f t s
D o n a tio n s  b e tw een  sp o u se s  w ere  r e v o c a b le  by th e  
d o n o r , u n d e r  common law , b u t  by th e  H *¥*P*(Sc*) A c t, 
1920 , 8 *5 , th e  o p p o s i te  r e s u l t  was a c h ie v e d ,  and  such  
g i f t s  a r e  now i r r e v o c a b le  e x c e p t t h a t  th e  c r e d i t o r s  
o f  a  b a n k ru p t  sp o u se  may rev o k e  a g i f t  i f  made w i th in
; - 'ix .
a  y e a r  and  a day  o f  th e  b a n k ru p tc y  * I n  t h e  e v e n t  
o f  d i s p u te  a b o u t th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  a c t ,  i t  m ust be 
s h o rn  t h a t  t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  w ere su c h  t h a t  anim us 
d o n a n d i was d i s p la y e d ,  and  t h a t  t h e r e  was s u f f i c i e n t  
p h y s i c a l  d e l i v e r y  t o  s u g g e s t  s t r o n g ly  t h a t  a  g i f t  
h ad  b een  made^* I t  i s  p o s s ib l e  t h a t  g i f t s  o f  
e x p e d ie n c y  (a s#  f o r  ex am p le , a  t r a n s f e r  o f  s h a r e s  
made i n  a s  p a r t  o f  a t a x - s a v in g  schem e) m ig h t be 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  d o n o r i n  tim e  o f  m a r i t a l  d i s p u te  
t o  show t o  be re v o c a b le ^ *
B e fo re  /
1# Gretney (p*280), describes the new Englishposition  in  part by way of examples. He doubts whether fa u lt has been rendered completely irrelevant in  these questions. One manner of rebutting the j>resumption of absolute g i f t  of the engagement ring would be, he notes, to show that i t  was a family heirloom* The South African rules concerning engagement g if t s  i s  outlined in  Chapter 6 (S.A.J*2* Cf* sim ilar provisions concerning p o lic ie s  of assurance, supra *3. Walker, Prini*ï7 261, c itin g  Donald v . D. 1953 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 69.4. N or are donations between strangers recoverable. However, delivery must be made and animus donandi established. Donations to m istresses wouïd"'faïï under th is  ru le, i t  would seem. Such transfers may prove hard to recover, i f  subsequently alleged  not /
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Before 1920# therefore# a gratuitous alienation  
by a husband# "for love# favour and affection"# was 
revocable by him. In Smith v, Smith*^ # m husband was 
held entitled to prove that he had paid the 
consideration for the (heritable) property# although 
according to the disposition# i t  had been paid by 
his wife out of her own funds exclusive of the jus 
mariti# Since irrevocability became the rule# 
i t  is assumed that such © disposition woiild not be 
open to challenge# since pritng fac ie  the taking of 
t i t l e  to  property in the name of one who had not 
given consideration therefor amounts to a g i f t  to  
that person ,
Again# where# aa so often happens nowadays# the 
t i t l e  /
not to  be g ifts*  In Sandiaon v* Das (The Glasgow Herald; 27/6/75)# the plaintiff failed to convince the court that he had loaned, not given# £400 to  the defendant# A remaining sum of £900 had been given on the understanding that the mistress would repay the money on the sale of her house# She had not succeeded in se llin g  the house# and# the defendant being unable otherwise to make repayment# and having 'not broken her side of any bargain'# the p la in t if f  could recover nothing, (A mistress# equally i s  a stranger in  law to the man with whom she cohabits# although occasionally voices are raised in  favour of the establishment of rules to  govern stable extra-marital relationships * (See Chapter 6 (Sweden) (of* Memo No*22# Fropn.*25 and Faculty Response# pp*23-25 (assessment of needs of alimentary obligent to take account# in discretion of court# requirements of members of household de facto dependent on him). It i s  extremely interesting to  read reports of acrimonious property wrangles between such persons# end to  note that the words "partnership" and "partnership rights" are often employed by those who disdain the marriage certificate as an unnecessary piece of paper - in particular see termination of Ekland/ Stewart association* The Daily Express 25/8/77)*1# 1917 2 $,L.T,219*2* Walker# Prlns* p,1471# and authorities there cited*
title ie taken In the names of both spouses, and it 
is presumed that the oonsideration was contributed in 
equal proportions (thou^ this may be far from true 
and indeed the principal contributory is likely to 
be the Building Society, the interest of the latter 
being protected by separate Standard Security), and 
the deposit was made by both parties equally or 
nearly so , but the husband makes the monthly repayments 
to  the Building Society, and the security aspect of 
the transaction is linked with a policy on the 
husband's l i fe #  are there any circumstances in which 
those factors may be unravelled and weighted to  
determine the rights of the parties in respect of 
the house or i t s  sa le  price?
I f  the t i t l e  i s  taken in joint names of the 
spouses, they are deemed to be joint heritable 
proprietors, and, if there i s  a destination  to the 
survivor, the survivor will have the benefit of 
accretion^ . Professor walker notes that the spouse 
who paid the price has been held en titled  to  evacuate 
by will the destination to his own pro in d iv iso  share 
only^# The other share is presumably a donation 
to the other.
Accordingly, the conveyance must take care that 
the destination  in  the disposition is that intended 
by the spouses# It may be that they wish to  own# 
not jointly, but in oomion# An owner in common may 
rid  himself o f his share, or burden i t ,  and i t  will 
pass aa he wishes by will, or according to  the rules 
of intestacy# In this case, the result may be the 
granting of a d isp osition  by a widow qua executrix, 
to /
Walker, Prims.I, 261# c itin g  Walker v. Galbraith (1895) 23 R#347.Hay's Tr. v# Hay's Tra# 1951 8.0.329. There is much confusion of terminology in these questions - see Chapter 3^^ , See English distinctionbetween jo in t tenancy and tenancy in common# explained by Barnsley# in fra , p .17.
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to herself as an Individual, of her husband's share 
of the house, a result whloh la of course less 
convenient than la the operation of aooretlon#
The question of ownership will generally only 
become of importance In case of dispute, and may 
well be settled extra-judicially by the parties' 
agents, especially in caaea of non-judicial aeparation. 
I t  seems that, in practice, in that s itu a tio n , the 
property would probably be sold and the proceeds 
divided, after payment of common debts# If the t i t l e  
was taken in the name only of one spouse, but the 
required amount of money was borrowed on security of 
both spouses, it may be that upon sale of the property, 
each would fee entitled to a one-half share in the 
proceeds cf sale^ # It w ill  often be the case however 
that the vzife's security is not called upon (though 
her indirect contribution to the prosperity cf the 
marriage be not denied), and it is undesirable that so 
great an advantage (or, in its absence, sc much 
uncertainty) should result from an isolated preliminary 
precaution, adopted aa a result cf fortuitous good 
advice# It is interesting that in McDougall, 1*0# 
(Bimam) was disinclined to follow the defender's 
argument th at, although there was a joint obligation 
to  pay# "substantially i t  was only the defender's 
credit that was relied upon by the lending society".
(It was true, he seid^, that of the two parties only 
the defender was earning a salary# But it did not 
follow that the obligation of a married woman was 
valueless merely beoause in emny cases she did not 
receive any wages for her domestic work) # However 
i t  is by no means clear that nominal joint obligation 
would necessarily, or in every case, bring in i t s  
train an identifiable fin ancia l interest in  the 
(probably /
1 # Walker, ib id ## c itin g  McDougall v# McD# 1947 8#N. 102#2* a t  p#103#
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(probably inoreaslng) value of the house* Indeed, 
Professor Meston wltes^ that it is "fairly clear 
that in Scotland nothing other than direct cash 
ocmtrlbutiona will give one spouse an interest in 
the other's house"* She (for 0 0 it is likely to be)
may be entitled only to have her money refunded, which 
is smell consolation when investment in land and houses 
appears to be the only safe investment* Professor 
Meston suggests that the contrary decision in McDougall 
may be attributable to implied contract^#
Where title is taken in one name only# it is 
possible to attempt to argue that the property wo a 
held in trust by him for the other or for both, but 
the averment must be proved by writ or oath^#
The matter may be resolved at divorce, previously 
under the terms of the Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964, 
and now under the Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976, but 
even here it cannot be said that a refined and 
predictable body of rules has been forged# Rather is 
there a blunt instrument at #%e court's disposal, and 
the absence of a power to order transfers of property - 
the present provisions being limited to the making of 
capital sum and/or periodical allowance awards -  
renders it blunter^#
This /
1* 'Family Property in Scotland', gppra*2# The position is extremely œsatïiïactory, artificial, and unrealistic* See Chapter 3 and Chapter 7#An example of the difficulties encountered in explaining the law to the layman is found in "Marriage, Divorce and the Family in Scotland",David Nichols (published by Scottish Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux) , p*33, where the author sets out the law in as simple and sensible a manner as the rules allow# An explanation (addressed to laymen), which is very clear indeed, is provided by Professor D* G* Barnsley, in an Inaugural Lecture in the University of L eicester  (1974), entitled, "His, Hers or Theirs? The Spouses' Rights in the Matrimonial Home" (Leicester University Press)*3, Weissenbruoh v* w* 1961 8*0,340*4* Such a power was advocated in Sc#L*Com*Merao No*22, Fropn* /
i s  a  m ost d i f f i c u l t  p rob lem * As *@
o w n e rsh ip  a l ^ n t e  i a  c e n o e m e d , t h etechnicalities of English law tend to detract from
ItG usefulness as g%;ULde apd ebjeet of comparison^ *
A proaumptlon of joint Wnorahlp la  a solution
l a  h a rd  to r e s i s t ,  w h a te v e r  v iew  l a  ta k e n  o f
the rules which should apply to other .2the opousee^. In England# there would appear to be enthusiasm for this change in the lew# e
full-aoale movement community of property -
or even to a ayatem of fixed rights on death, am 
found in Scotland -  la not favoured^# In general, 
hwever, inspired by divorce ref cm in 1969# English 
IcŸf has achieved a more detailed, and, i t  in auWitted, 
equitable approach in mmttera cf 'family* property^
P ro p n * 9 $  (3 * 2 0  a e g ) (a n d  F a c u l ty  re a p o n e e  -  pp#go ^  ) ; a e  m w lf i t  w ou ld  b e  c o n f in e d
t o  t r a h o f o r s  on  d iv o rc e #  fio gm%%^lmonio#
1 ,  B u t s e e  C r e tn e y ,  pp*239 alni3 mZSleTT'augm, i2 » Beomiacuaaicn in Law acmmV*P#No*42, "Family Property Law", 26 October, 1971, 1*62 sec. At 1,127, (in a passage outlining the field ofcEoioe ae far as ownership of the matrimonial home was concerned), the Commission submit a provisional view timt "a eystem cf co-cwnorahip would be a workable solution and that it would meet many of the objectlcnG to present law", Bee Chapter 7, \\It hen W e n  suggested "Wiat a Bill Introducing co- o w n e rsh ip  o f  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  ( i n  E n g lan d ) w ill
Fr<^erty Law in Bngland and Wales" G*A,HacDoneld,a l e c  d is o u e e io n  i n  Memo No*22 c o n c e rn in g  
t m n a f o m  (o n  d iv o r c e  o n ly #  a s  y e t ) ^ -  3*20a m *  a n d  Fat re n p o m e  ( a c e  fn*1argumenta in favour cf power to order# #p r o p e r ty  t r a n a f e r a  i n  a c c t l a n d  a r e  d e a o r ib e d  by  D ,J#M bN oil ("Herriege and Divorce in S c o t la n d  -  8(me R e c e n t mW P r o a p e o t iv e  R eform s" (D evelopm en ta  i n  
F am ily  Law) (M a rr ia g e  and  D iv o rc e )  5 th  Oommonwealth .Latf Conference# 1977) aa incontrovertible# He note:d t h e  u n f o r t im a te  a y n c h r o n ia a t io n  c f  tkm p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  Wemo,No*22, an d  t h e  p a a a a g e  th ro u g h  P a r l ia m e n t  of me Divorce (so.) B i l l ,  1976#3*. M acD onald , e u n r a #4* Divorce RefcSmlot, 1969# Matrimonial Prcoeedinga and Property Act, 1970, now Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973* See Seago and Bieeett-Johneon, Chapter# 3-7, and generally Chapter 6 (England),
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BAtioement. R a w  and  Loss o f  O oûso rtium
The p e r s u a s io n  o f  one sp o u se  by a  t h i r d  p a r t y  t o  
leave th e  m a tr im o n ia l  home may am ount t o  t h e  a c t io n a b le  
wrong o f  e n t ic e m e n tf  g iv in g  r i s e  t o  a  c la im  f o r  
dam ages a g a i n s t  th e  e n t i c e r #  by the p a r t y  whose spouse 
has b een  so  p e rsu ad e d ^ #  I n  t h e  same c a te g o r y  ( o f  
actionable w rongs against domestic r e l a t i o n s )  was 
t h e  a c t i o n  f o r  dam ages against t h e  p a ram o u r f o r  a d u l t e r y  
w i th  t h e  o t h e r  spouse#  W hile  this rem edy was c o m p e te n t 
(w h ich  no lo n g e r  Is t h e  caa© ^)» i t  might t a k e  th e  
fo rm  o f  a  s e p a r a t e  a c t i o n ,  o r  be  c o n jo in e d  w i th  an 
a c t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e t  b u t  C l iv e  and W ilso n  not© ^ t h a t  
the wife's a c t i o n  o f  dam ages against ' t h e  o t h e r  
woman* (p re su m a b ly  c o m p e te n t b u t  of w hich  there i s  
no t r u e  example) h ad  t o  be  brought i n  a  s e p a r a t e  a c t io n #  
I t  may b e  t h a t  a n  a c t i o n  f o r  damages by  a hu sb an d  
a g a i n s t  one who h a s  co m m itted  ra p e  o f  h i s  w i f e ^  i s  
s t i l l  /
1# See 0 #g. Adamson v ,  G i l l i b r a n d  1923 S#b*T#328#H ow ever, t h e r e  d o e s  not appear to be  an y  "recorded i n s t a n c e  o f  damages i n  f a c t  b e in g  aw arded  f o r  e n tic e m e n t  # .# "  (Sc#L#Ciom#Ho*42, i n f r a # p a ra # 4 4 )#The S c o t t i s h  Law Com m ission i b i d # n o te  t h e  t r e a tm e n ts  o f  t h i s  r i g h t  i n  v a r io u s  te x W o o k s , mentioning the • s c e p t i c a l*  a p p ro a c h  ta k e n  i n  C l iv e  & W ilso n , pp# 28 0 ^2 8 1 .2* S ee  D iv o rc e  (S o#) A c t ,  1976 , s # 1 0 , i n f r a ,3# p#2?7# A c tio n s  f o r  dam ages f o r  a d u ite E y  (com bined  
w i th  d iv o r c e  a c t i o n s )  w ere  th o u g h t  by  t h e  S c o t t i s h  Law Commission ( i b i d , .  p a ra # 10) t o  b e  v e ry  r a r e ,  an d  s e p a r a t e  a c t i o n s  t h e r e f o r  now to be  unknown#4# S #10 i n  te rm s  d e a l s  w ith  dam ages for a d u l t e iy #N e i th e r  th e  A c t ,  n o r  i t s  p r e c u r s o r ,  Sc#L#Com#Report No#42 was c o n c e rn e d  e x p r e s s ly  with damage® f o r  rap e#On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , th e  b a s i s  o f  b o th  c la im s  i s  t h e  same ( in v a s io n  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  e x c lu s iv e  r i g h t s  i n  
t h i s  r e g a r d )  C liv e  and  W ilson  (p * 2 7 7 ) , i n  a  d i s c u s s io n  of t h e  a c t i o n a b i l i t y  ( a s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  hu sb an d ) o f  in d e c e n t  a s s a u l t  o f  t h e  w ife  (w h ich  th e y  d o u b t ( s e e  c o n t r a  W a lk e r, D e l i c t , 1 1 ,7 1 9 ))  c o n c lu d e ,  » [T ]h e  noW on o f  a  h u s b a n d 's  e x c lu s iv e  r i g h t s  t o  h i s  w i f e 's  
body i s  n o t ,  i t  i s  s u b m it te d ,  one w h ich  s h o u ld  b e  e x te n d e d " *  M o reo v er, i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s ,  t h e  husb an d  m ig h t h av e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h a t  r a p e ,  and  n o t  a d u l t e r y ,  to o k  p l a c e ,  an d  i f  h e  f a i l e d ,  h i s  a c t i o n  w ould  c e r t a i n l y  b e  b a r r e d  by  s«10*A rgum ents /
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still competent* It may be actionable that another 
has, by his fault, caused injury to the pursuer's 
spouse, the injury resulting in a loss of the 
amenities of the marriage •* companionship, care, and, 
in England, though not in Scotland, loss or 
impairment of sexual relations'**
It cannot be said that any of these actions 
which lie  on the periphery of husband/wife property 
relations, are common^. They are reminders of a 
proprietorial cast of mind now unfashionable * 
Enticement is  no longer an actionable wrong in 
England ,^ and, by s#4 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1970, damages for adultery are 
similarly no longer obtainable* In Scotland, the 
latter result has been achieved by the Divorce 
(Scotland) Act, 1976, s*10, which states that, though 
the court may still award the expenses of the action 
against /
Arguments for retention or abolition of the action of damages for adultery, and speculation as to the basis of the action, are discussed in Scot.Law Com* Ho*42, from which it can be seen those respects in which the considerations regarding rape differ from those concerning adultery.For example the "disruption of family relations", "loss of wife", (though that was not a prerequisite of the action) and (to a less extent) "public disgrace" arguments for retention of such a remedy are not so cogent, or inapplicable, with regard to rape*1 * See, in England, Best v. Samuel Fox & Co .Ltd*[1952] A*C*716* (Wife's action for loss or impainnent of consortium refused); but consider Gutts V* Chumley [1967] 1 W.L.R* 742* (total loss of services)*2* See e.g, Olive and Wilson, pp#280-2S1*3# Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, 8*5* See prior recommendations for England as to abolition of actions of enticement and of damages for adultery (or the restriction of the latter to its availability in divorce or judicial separation actions only, and its extension to be competent against male and female defendants):Law Commission Report on Financial Provision in Matrimonial Proceedings (Law*Gom*Ho*25) (Family Law) paras* 99-102*
3 3 0 ,
o r  a ll ia g e #  ip&raRKwar*, t&w&
33&&8lbGW%& (BkkB&I aïo 3Le#gp8#* l&erve Gtae te  (BitQ tlae
ipstz'aG&cMwwr <&& 430-die3%BBwâe%» jLn <& aotxloik,
(&%* iko 4B]Lajl8% {)%* i&lstü&jLn t&Bwa&aP&ë; (jwnwalAackl:*#; dhp%)m
*iaja %N&3r <3dr r%&0! %wr<yvjLG:lon <yvn8irtüa&ww&
an d  /
P a r t  I I I  (So*L#Com.Ho*42) d la e u a s e a  t) ie  p& ram our's  îliaj&lljL'tif jfo r Idb# iBWEpeneHB# (>f 1Ü&© <&j/vorGe, gnüwi r#e@B8ae%&djs iBkwst: IBkwe *%uws%k8*tdl fshowld low) lo**#*»!» Tbe entitled ta oite lils wife's p a ram o u r ma o o - d a f e n d e r ,  
l&wct tdbwmi; jljT "G&ke %%&]r**KWBw%* edkwaialxl aoatgrr idhws l i t i g a t i o n  a a  & p e r ty * m ln u te r ,  h e /a b e  s h o u ld  he l i a b l e  f o r  a x p en aea  " o n ly  on th e  n o rm al p r i a o i p l e a  g o v e rn in g  aw ard s o f  e x p e n se s  i n  o i v l l  l i t i g a t i o n " .I t  w i l l  h e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  th o u g h ts  i s  s ,1 0  o f  th e  1976 Aot# H enoe, I f  a  p a ram o u r s u e o & s a fu l ly  r e f u t e s  a  s p o u s e 's  a l l e g a t i o n  o f  a d u l te r y *  th e n *  on t h e  " p r& o tio e "  
t h a t  e x p e n se s  f o l lo w  s u o o e s s ,  h e /s h e  (n o  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t r e a tm e n t  b e tw een  th e  s e x e s  i s  a p p a r e n t )  may r e c e iv e  e x p en se s  a g a i n s t  t h e  p u rsu e r*(S e e  A n n o ta tio n s  t o  S t a tu t e ) *I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  n o t  t o  sy m p a th ise  w i th  th e  v iew  
t h a t  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  su e  t h e  p a ram o u r a s  o o - d o f e a d e r  m ig h t h ave  b een  r e t a i n e d ,  a n d  e x te n d e d  t o  b o th  sp o u s e s  (o n  t h e  v iew  t h a t ,  i n  m odem  o iro u m s ta n o e s , e i t h e r  sp o u s e  s h o u ld  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  e x p e n se s  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  a o o e rd in g  t o  th e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  e a s e ,  an d  t h a t  t h e  husb an d  s h o u ld  n o t  a lw ay s b e  l i a b l e  f o r  e x p e n s e s ,  "w in o r  l o s e "  (p a ra * 2 B , So#L,Com*No*4#)* On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , t h e  q u e s t io n  w as p o se d  (b y  Dr* C l iv e ,  i n  h i a  com m ents on  Memo*H o*1$, w hich  p re c e d e d  t h e  R e p o r t ) ;*  Why s h o u ld  n o t  t h e  d e f e n d e r  sp o u se*  i f  h#/& he c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  h e /  s h e  h a d  b e e n  se d u ce d  b y  th e  p a ra m o u r, a l s o  h ev e  a  c la im  a g a i n s t  t h e  p a ram o u r ( o r  a l l  t h e  p a ra m o u rs)  
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  h i a / h e r / t h e i r  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  e x p e n se s?A l l  i n  a l l ,  i t  i s  p ro b a b ly  b e t t e r  t h a t  t h e  ch an g e  h a s  ta k e n  p la c e *  A r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  q u e s t io n ,  and  a n  a s s i m i l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  fo u n d  i n  " o r d in a r y "  c i v i l  l i t i g a t i o n  r e g a r d in g  t h e  aw ard  o f  e x p e n s e s ,  i s  p o s s ib l y  t h e  b e s t  s o lu t io n *  8 e e  iB lS # *
_ C o n t r a s t  t h e  a p p ro a c h e s  a d o p te d  i n  TaffTv^' T*19S5 a*G*364 an d  C am pbell v* 0* 1975 S ,I„ T * (N o te 8 )4 7 : Sc*L*Com*No*42, p a ra  28* c i t i n g  t h e s e  e x a m p le s , i n t e r  a l i a * end  a l s o  Memo Mo,&2 p@ ra#2,110*2# A s 't o  t r a n s i t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s *  s e e  A n n o ta t io n  t o  S t a t u t e ,  and  s e e  d e c i s io n  i n  McNaught v .  M*1977 8*L*T*75 w h ich  seem s t o  be  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  t h e  s u g g e s t io n s  made i n  t h e  A n n o ta tio n *  N o th in g  i s  s a i d  a b o u t  a  w i f e ' s  r i g h t  ( i f  su c h  t h e r e  b e )  t o  c la im  dam ages f o r  a d u l te r y #  I t  i s  n o t  l i k e l y ,  h o w ev er, t h a t  su c h  w ould  b# r e c o g n is e d  i n  v iew  o f  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  e q u iv a le n t  and  c e r t a i n  rig'îit# I t  i s  a l s o  p o in te d  o u t  i n  t h e  A n n o ta tio n s  that t h e  mmnner o f  e x p r e s s io n  o f  a*10 p r e c lu d e s  any  a rg u m en tîiiûde /
3 3 1 ,
an d  r e p e a l s  s,7 of the C o n ju g a l Rights (Scotland) 
Amendment Act# 1861# This p r o v i s io n  was t h e  result 
of the d e l i b e r a t i o n s  of the Scottish Law Commission, 
in 0 report^ which recommended a l s o  that actions of 
e n tic e m e n t  of a spouse b e  declared by  statute to be 
incompetent (Recommendation 7)* The commissioners 
note t h a t ,  s in c e  Legal A id is not available for such 
actions, there is official d isc o u ra g e m e n t thereof, 
and they suggest t h a t  such actions (if, indeed 
competent) are counter-productive, and  likely to 
engender bitterness and e n c o u ra g e  s p i t e f u l  litigation,
Actions A g a in s t  T h ird  Parties in Respect of a Deaths
Multiple claims
The Damages (Scotland) Act, 1976, has clarified 
the law here, Brior to its enactment, conflicts had 
arisen between the c la im s  o f  r e l a t i v e s  and the claim 
of the executor in respect of the death#
W here the d e c e a se d  had not commenced p ro c e e d in g s  
b e f o r e  his death, it was not competent for the executor 
to r a i s e  an action for solatium, b u t  he might claim 
for patrimonial loss to t h e  estate, to the date of 
death* I f  an  action had been raised by t h e  deceased, 
the executor could continue it for t h e  sums claimed 
(being in r e s p e c t  both of solatium and of patrimonial 
loss if both had been original heads of claim), being 
damages due for the period to the date of death# By 
virtue of s*2 of the 1976 Act, to the executor passes 
the deceased's claim under either or both heads, to 
the date of death only# whether or not the deceased 
himself had raised an action b e fo r e  h i s  death# Any 
sums recovered fall into the estate, to be disposed 
of /
made by a husband t h a t  he  may sue the paramour in an independent reparation action#
1# Family Law - Report on Liability f o r  Adultery and Enticement of a Spouse (S c o t,L a w  Com, No#42 - 
2 3 ,6 ,7 6 ) .
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of aooordlng to the terme of the wl%l or the rules
o f  I n t e s t a t e  su o o e e s lo n *  The c la im  c a n  c o v e r1a n te -m o rtem  l o s e  o n ly  #
To b e  d l s t ln g u l e h e d  from  su c h  a  c la im *  t h e r e f o r e ,  
a r e  t h e  c la im s  o f  s u r v iv in g  r e l a t i v e s *  S e c t io n  4 
s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  e x e c u t o r 's  c la im  (a b o v e ) i s  n o t  t o  
b e  e x c lu d e d  by  a  r e l a t i v e ' s  c la im  u n d e r  s#1 o r  y ^ ce  
v e r s a .
A p ro m in e n t c a s e  on  t h e  p o i n t  h a d  b e e n  t h a t  
o f  D a r l in g  v .  O ray^* w h ich  h ad  d e c id e d  t h a t  c o n c u r r e n t  
a c t i o n s  by  a  m o th e r  qua e x e c u t r i x  o f  h e r  s o n  and  cue  
r e l a t i v e  f o r  s o la t iu m  an d  dam ages ( i n  h e r  own r i g h t )  
w ere  in c o m p e te n t .  ( " T h e re  i s  n o t  a  s i n g l e  in s t a n c e  
i n  w h ich  t h e  c o u r t  h a s  a llo w e d  tw o a c t i o n s  t o  b e  
b ro u g h t  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  same n e g l ig e n t  a c t  l e a d in g  
t o  t h e  i n j u r y  and  d e a th  o f  one p e rs o n " )^ *  The 
d e c i s i o n  was s u b s e q u e n t ly  r a t i o n a l i s e d  t o  t h e  p o in t  
( b r o a d ly ^ )  o f  a l lo w it ig  a n  a c t i o n  by  t h e  e x e c u to r  f o r  
an te -m o rtem *  a n d  by  t h e  r e l a t i v e s  f o r  p o s t-m o rte m  
l o s s  on ly*  an d  was o v e r r u le d  b y  th e  c a s e  o f  D ick  v .  
B urgh o f  F a lk ir k ^ *  i n  w hich* i n  c ir c u m s ta n o e s  v e ry  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  D a r lin g *  b o th  c la im s  w ere  a llo w ed #
Tliis result is  upheld by s#4* and amplified by 
8*5 (Provisions for avoidance of multiplicity of 
actions). The effect is  that the executor shall 
have such right of action as had the deceased for loss 
and suffering to the date of deaths relatives shall 
have the rights accorded to them by a*1 (that is  to 
claim for loss of future support (&#1(3))* and* in 
the case of entitled relatives* t o  claim a "loss of 
society /
1* Annotations to Statutes D* M. Walker.2. (1692) 19 a. (H.L.) 31.3* per t.Watson at p.32.4. S ee  g e n e r a l ly *  Walker* P r i n s .  pp.1116-7.5 .  1976 8 .L .T .  2 1 .
533 ,
s o c i e t y  awar&w (8 # 1 (4 ))# y *
T h e re  s h e l l  n o t  be  t r a n s m ie s lb l e  t o  t h e  e x e c u to r  
t h e  r l # t  o f  t h e  d e ce ag e d  t o  s u e  f o r  s o la t iu m  (u n d e r  
t h e  r u l e a  p r e v io u s ly  a p p l i c a b l e )  o r  (m w ) a  l o s e  o f  
e o c lo ty  #woM  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  d e a th  o f  a n o th e r  ( s * 3 )#
M
I n  c  syo tom  o f  a e p a rm te  p r o p e r t y ,  e a c h  sp o u se  
w i l l  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  e x p e m e e  o f  p ro c e e d in g s  i n  
w h ich  h e /a h e  1$ in v o lv e d .  H ow ever, i f  t h e  a c t i o n  
c o u ld  b e  re g a rd e d  a e  a  'n e c w e a r y '  o r  i f  t h e  a p p a r e n t ly  
n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i n g  epouao  i s  t h e  t r u e  s o u rc e  o f  t h e  
a c t i o n  an d  t h e  t r u e  i n t e r e s t  t h e r e i n ,  t h a t  o t h e r  
may b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  eaqaenaea t h e r e o f .  T h ese  tw o 
c e a e a  eoem u n e x c e p t io n a b le ;  h o w ev er, e v e n  a f t e r  
1 9 2 0 , a  h u sb an d  may b e  r e g a rd e d  a s  n a i^ ic e n a  M M S #  
a n d  may i n c u r  l i a b i l i t y  th e re b y #  T h is  g ro u n d  i s  by 
no  m eans u n re m a rk a b le , a M  t h e  a m b it o f  i t s  sc o p e  
10 u n c le a r^ *
P e r h a p s ,  h o w e v e r, s i n c e  l i t i g a t i o n  i a  a  l%mwy 
few  c a n  a f f o r d ,  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  f o r  
oxpcnm aa, i n  n o n - c o n a i a t o r i a l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  w i l l  r a r e l y  
bo  a  m a t t e r  o f  m a tr im o n ia l  d is p u te #  The i n i t i a t o r  
o f  p ro co ed in g G  may be  w e l l  a b le  t o  p a y , o r  th e  
a p o u sea  may r e a c h  in f o r m a l  a g re e m e n t upon  t h e  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  i f  t h e  i n t e r e e t a  o f  b o th ^  
a r e  /
1. "It in eaeential in an appropriate oaeo that the executor's claim under a.È and the relativoa* claim under a#1 should be clearly distinguished in the pleadings end clearly be made referable to ante-mortem losses to the injured, now deceased, person himself, and to post-mortem losses to the relatives respectively"# (Annotations to Statute), 2# See Clive & Wilson, pp#367-$, and generallypp#366- 8 # s ee  p .  355,  f o o t n o t e  1.3# a "family" interest, requiring "family" fim nolal rules? 8es Chapter 1# and otto Kahn-Freund "Matrimonial Property; Where Do We oo from Here?" Josef irnger/' Memorial Lecture Jan#1971 ("family assets").
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are affected. In computations for the purpose 
of Legal Aid, the disposable capital and income of 
the other spouse is relevant in non-consistorial 
but not in consistorial litigation.. The matter of 
divorce expenses is possibly the most contentious 
aspect of this subject* v- Traditionally, probably 
for reasons which are a mixture of chivalry and a  
memory o f  the older property rules, these have often 
been met by the husband, whether pursuer or defender 
and whatever the merits of the situation. Times 
have  changed, and, rightly, it is thought, there is 
at present a proposal^ that the expenses of 
consistorial o r  other litigation when incurred by a 
person entitled to aliment "should not be treated as 
necessaries for the provision of w hich  the alimentary 
obligent is liable", although w here the spouses are 
living together and have no contrary interest in the 
subject m a t te r  o f  the litigation, the expenses of 
such litigation "should (as under the present law) 
be t r e a t e d  a s  necessaries ..."
It i s  clear that this is one of the areas in2which there is a mood for reform . Lord Cameron,%in the case of Campbell v. Campbell‘S, expressed this 
view /
1* See Sc,Law Commission, Memo No,22, 2.110, Propn,23 and Faculty response. See "Expenses i n  Divorce Cases; A Modem Reappraisal", Frank Bat. 1974S.L.T. 45. In Australia (Family Law Act, 1975, s.117(1) and (2)), the general rule (which may be d e p a r te d  from by the Court i n  a particular case) is that each party to proceedings under the Act shall meet his own costs*2, Cf. Divorce (Sc.) Act, 1976, s.10 (a husband shall no longer have a right to cite the paramour as a defender in an action of divorce) - see supra.
3. 1975 S.L.T. (Notes) 47, at p.48. Here, no expenses were awarded to o r  by e i t h e r  party in the exceptional circumstances of the case. The successful pursuer ( t h e  wife) was wholly legally aided, and it was thought that the husband would suffer great financial hardship if made liable for expenses as well as bearing th e  other financial adjustments /
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v ie w  o l e a r l y :  " I n  c o n s i s t o r i a l  c a u s e s  t h e  g e n e r a l
r u l e  h a s  b een  t h a t  t h e  husband  i s  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  
ex p en aea  o f  h l a  w ife*  T h is  g e n e r a l  r u l e  l a  e u b je o t  
t o  m o d l f lo a t lo n  a t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  t h e  c o u r t  I n  
o a e e a  w here  t h e  w ife  h a s  's e p a r a t e  e s t a t e '  o r  w here 
u nsuG oeesf^ il p ro o eed liiig s  a t  h e r  I n a ta n o e  c a n  be  
stigmatised as frivolous #.#*# In t h e  o r d in a r y  case 
i t  a p p e a ra  t o  me t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no lo n g e r  any  
j u s t l f l o a t l o n  f o r  a  b l i n d  a d h e re n o e  t o  a  r u l e  
d e s ig n e d  t o  m ee t m o o la l and  eoonom lo c o n d i t i o n s  v e ry  
d i f f e r e n t  from  th o s e  w hich o b ta in  today ###.  I  am 
strongly of opinion that t h e  time Is more th a n  ripe 
f o r  a n  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  r e c o n s i d e r a t io n  o f  t h e  e x te n t  
to w hich  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  this general r u l e  is 
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  c irc u m a ta n o e a  i n  w h ich  m a r r ie d  l i v e a  
a r e  c o n d u c te d  to d a y *  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  c a e c a  w here  b o th  
p a r t i e s  a r e  n o t  o n ly  c a p a b le  o f  e a r n in g  b u t  a r e  
a c t u a l l y  d o in g
a d ju s tm e n ts  consequent upon d iv o rc e *  As a result of brain damage i n  a n  accident* th e  h u sb an d  h ad  s u f f e r e d  a  change  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  su c h  as t o  ground an a c t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e  f o r  
c r u e l ty *1 . S . L . C.  C o n s u l t a t iv e  Memo. No. 54 ( 1 1 . 1 - 4 )  c o n s id e r s  the  
h u sb a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u s t a n c e s  f o r  
e x p e n s e s  in c u r r e d  by the  w i f e  i n  l i t i g a t i o n  a g a i n s t  
t h i r d  p a r t i e s , i f  he a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  th e  
l i t i g a t i o n  though n o t  as dominus l i t i s  and though the  
e x p e n s e s  are  n o t  " n e c e s s a r i e s ” f o r  which he i s  l i a b l e
( 1 1 . l )  and co n c lu d e  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  ( 1 1 . 4 )  t h a t ,  w ith o u t
p r e j u d ic e  to  any l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  h u sb a n d 's  as  ( t r u e )
dominus l i t i s  or  o t h e r w i s e , th e r e  sh o u ld  be no s p e c i a l
r u le  o f  l i a b i l i t y  i n  the  h u sb a n d /w ife  c a s e  s im p ly  
b e c u a se  th e  husband has a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  the  
l i t i g a t i o n .
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A g e n e r a l
We t u r n  now t o  o o n s M e r  one o f  th e  m oet Im p o r te n t  
a s p e c t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n e  d u r in g  t h e  a u W la te n c e  
o f  a  m a rr ia g e *  w h e th e r  one  o f  happy  c o h a b i t a t i o n  o r  
one id ie re  t h e r e  h a s  b e en  a  s e p a r a t io n  j u d i c i a l  o r  
e x t r a  j u d i c i a l #  and  t h a t  l a  th e  t o p i c  o f  a l im e n t*
"The S t a t e  t a k e s  a  s h a r e  I n  t h e  c a r e s  o f  t h e  
lo v e r#  and  prescribes t h e  fo rm s t h a t  a r e  t o  bind him 
t o  h i s  m is t r e s s *  Nature# w h ile  sh e  f i t s  the s e x e s  
f o r  each o th e r*  le a v e s  It t o  p o l i t y  o r  law# t o  
r e g u l a t e  t h e  mode o f  t h e i r  c o n n e x io n ^ " .
A t p r e s e n t*  it is w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t ,  on  the 
a c c e p te d  b a s i c  assumption that 'stante matrimonio' 
t h e r e  I s  a  d u ty  upon  t h e  h u sb an d  t o  a l im e n t  h i s  w ife  
and to keep  h e r  from wmmt^ -  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  
r e g a r d in g  t h e  c o n d u c t o f  sp o u ses*  t o  be  c o n s id e r e d  
l a t e r  -  that d u ty  I s  m ost commonly d is c h a r g e d  by 
th e  husband'a m a in te n a n c e  o f  h i s  w if e  a t  b ed  and b o a rd  
o r  by  h i s  o f f e r  t o  do so* by h i s  p r o v i s io n  f o r  h e r  o f  
a  r o o f  o v e r  h e r  head* t h a t  r o o f  b e in g  one o f  h i s  
c h o o s in g , an d  w hich* I f  r e a s o n a b ly  s u i t a b l e *  ju d g e d  
a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  s ta n d a r d  o f  l i f e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  ( a  
s t a n d a r d  w hich# a t  l e a s t  d u r in g  c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  a p p e a rs  
s t i l l  t o  b e  h i s  t o  s e t ) ,  sh e  may n o t  r e f u s e #
I n  n o m a l  c irc u m s ta n c e s *  th e r e f o r e *  t h e  htm band 
m u st a l im e n t  h i s  w ife*  a  d u ty  n o rm a lly  d i s c h a r g e d  
"by  m a in ta in in g  h e r  I n  f a m i ly  w ith  him* o r  by  p r o v id in g  
a  /
D r , G i l b e r t  S t e w a r t 's  View o f  S o c ie ty  I n  E urope  a s  q u o te d  by  P e t e r  H a lk e r s to n  i n  "A D ig e s t  o f  t h e  M a rr ia g e  Law o f  S c o t la n d " ,
t h i s  w as a  r e t u r n  dem anded by j u s t i c e  I n  t h e  d a y s  when t h e  w i f e ' s  e s t a t e  upon m a rr ia g e  f e l l  to t h e  h u sb an d  -  'T h e  h usband  by m a rr ia g e  becom ing  p r o p r i e t o r  o f  a l l  t h e  w i f e 's  p e r s o n a l  e s t a t e  and e n t i t l e d  t o  a l l  t h e  e a r n in g s  from  h e r  la b o u r*  I s  bound t o  p ro v id e  h e r  I n  a l l  the n e c e s s a r i e s  o f  l i f e ;  and  I f  t h i s  c a n n o t  b e  done I n  c o n ju g a l  c o h a b i ta t io n #  m ust b e  done i n  a  s t a t e  o f  s e p a r a t io n  stair 1.4*10; Irak. 1.6.19* Fr. i, 8 3 7.
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1a  home and  money d u r in g  h l a  n e o o a a a ry  a b s e n c e  "#
pF r a s e r ' '  e x p la in s  t h e  h u s b a n d 'a  o b l i g a t i o n  t h u s ;
"The husband  by  t h e  m a r r ia g e  becom ing p r o p r i e t o r  o f  
a l l  t h e  w l f e 'g  p e r s o n a l  e e t a t e ,  and  e n t i t l e d  t o  a l l  
t h e  e a m in g a  from  h e r  l a b o u r ,  l a  bound t o  p r o v id e  
h e r  I n  a l l  idie n e c e a a a r le a  o f  l i f e ;  and  I f  t h i s  
c a n n o t  b e  done I n  c o n ju g a l  c o h a b i t a t i o n .  I t  m ust be  
done  I n  a  s t a t e  o f  s e p a r a t io n " #  C l e a r l y ,  t h l a  
r a t i o n a l #  becam e o u td a te d #  I t  h a s  b een  auggem ted  
t h a t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  a r l s e a  " le a a  a a  a  q u id  ,|) r g  quo 
f o r  t h e  w i f e ' s  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  h e r  m a r i t a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  
th a n  a a  a  eo n aeq u en ce  o f  t h e  bond o f  m a r r ia g e " ,  b u t  
I n  v ie w  o f  t h e  u p h e a v a l  I n  a c c l o l c g l c a l  a n d  em ploym ent 
p a t t e r n s  I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  
t h e  t r u e  " m a r r ia g e  p a r t n e r s h i p "  n o t io n )  t h l a  e x p la n a t io n  
appom re v ag u e  and  l a  n o t  e a p a o la l l y  h e l p f u l  o r  
c o n v in c in g ,  N e v e r th e l e s s ,  a  fram ew ork o f  r u le #  w ith  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  s u p p o r t  l a  u n d o u b te d ly  
n e c e a a a ry  t o  p r o t e c t  th e  c h i l d - b e a r in g  a n d  ( u s u a l ly )  
r e a r i n g  p a r t n e r ,  o r  th e  e c o n o m ic a lly  w e ak e r p a r t n e r .
I t  o a n  b e  a e e n  c l e a r l y  t h a t  th o u g h t  and  
custom  h av e  ch an g ed  o o n a ld e r a b ly  r e c e n t l y  and  
p a r t i c u l a r l y .  I t  l a  s u b m i t te d ,  s in c e  1965# G r e a te r  
o p p o r tu n i ty ,  g r e a t e r  e x P ^ G ta t lc n c ,  g r e a t e r  c e r t a i n t y  
i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  b i r t h  c o n t r o l ,  a n d , m oat lmpo% ?tant, 
more jo b s  a W  a  c l im a te  o f  o p in io n  I n  w h ich  I t  l a  
I n c r e a s in g l y  a c c e p ta b le  f o r  a  m a rr ie d  woman t o  work 
w i th o u t  r a i s i n g  a c c u s a t io n s  o f  " s t e a l i n g "  t h e  p o a ta  
o th e r w is e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s i n g l e  women who c a n n o t  lo o k
t o  a  man ( u n l e s s  t o  a  f a t h e r )  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  a i d  a s«m a r r ie d  women may d o ,  u n d e r  th e  p r e s e n t  syatem "^, o r  
o th e r w is e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  men who o%m a  d u t y ,  u n d e r  th e  
p r e s e n t  /
1# W a lk e r 'a  P r i n c i p l e s  1 ,263#2# I ,  $37#3# S e e , h o w ev er, r e c e n t  a u g g e a tlo n a  t h a t  m a r r ie d  women s h o u ld  le a v e  t h e  te a c h in g  p r o f e a a lo n  I n  o r d e r  t o  make a v a i l a b l e  m ore p o a t s  f o r  new e n t r a n t e  t o  t h e  p r o f e s s io n #
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p r e s e n t  sy s te m , to a l im e n t  their w iv es and families, 
and without r a i s i n g  doubts aa to h e r  husband's 
solvenoy, o r  a b i l i t y  t o  m a in ta in  h e r ,  have combined 
to create a situation o f  'tw o -o a re e r*  marriages, and, 
not o n ly  i n  Scotland and England but I n  other 
c o u n t r i e s , including Russia, of falling birth rate^#
A t l e a s t  I n  B r i t a i n  i t  may b e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  b e en  
a  ch an g e  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  e a r l y  m a r r ie d  l i f e ,  i n  
w h ich  i t  i s  p e rh a p s  no lo n g e r  t h e  n o rm al c o u rs e  o f  
conduct f o r  a husband  to provide h i s  housebound w ife  
w ith  a  "h o u se k e e p in g  a llo w 0 n o e " , th e  l i m i t s  o f  w hich  
sh e  m ust not o v e rs te p #  It was against this 
b ack g ro u n d  t h a t  t h e  S c o t t i s h  Law C om m ission , i n  1 976 , 
p ro d u c e d  i t s  Memorandum Ho#22, "A lim en t and  F in a n c i a l  
P r o v i s io n ", to w hich  a re s p o n s e  was prepared by t h e  
Faculty o f  Law, U n iv e r s i ty  of Glasgow, and s u b m itte d  
t o  th e  C om m ission .
The members o f  th e  Faculty Working Party w ere 
Miss E. M. M# A ttw o o l l ,  Mr# I a n  B# McGhee, M rs, A. M. 
McLean, Mrs# E# E# Shapiro, Mrs# M. Stevenson, Mr. R. 
S u th e r la n d ,  and  th e  a u th o r  o f  this t h e s i s ,  who was 
r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  the p r e p a r a t i o n  of t h e  i n i t i a l  re s p o n se  
f o r  d i s c u s s io n  by th e  Working Party, and for the 
co-ordination o f  comments th e re o n #
Where/
R e ce n t p o p u la t io n  f i g u r e s  su g g ested a  c o n s i s t e n t  annual d e c r e a s e  i n  the num ber of b i r t h s  i n  
S c o tla n d #  The A nnual R e p o rt of the Registrar- General f o r  Scotland f o r  1973 shows that th e  num ber o f  l i v e  births i n  1973 was 74,392, compared with 102,691 in 1 9 6 3 # 1 9 6 3  may have b e en  a 'boom*year, b u t  n e v e r th e l e s s  the 1973 f i g u r e s  r e p r e s e n t  th e  n i n t h  a n n u a l  d e c r e a s e  I n  t h e  num ber o f  b i r t h s #  Again, the figures for Glasgow, f o r  ex am p le , f o r  
1 9 7 6  r e v e a l  an. increase I n  I l l e g i t i m a t e  b i r t h s , 
b u t  a  d e c r e a s e  o v e r a l l  i n  b i r t h s #  However 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 O;
the  S c o t t i s h  b i r t h r a t e  f i g u r e  has in c r e a s e d  s t e a d i l y  (w h i le  
n o t  a p p r o a c h in g  th e  s i x t i e s  'boom»). The S c o t t i s h  
In fo rm a t io n  O f f ic e  p r e d i c t s  a c o n t in u e d  s t e a d y  r i s e  to  
7 6 , 0 0 0  in  1 9 8 3 . (Glasgow H era ld , 3 0 * 7 . 8 1 . )
3 3 9 ,
ivhere a p p r o p r i a t e ,  r o f e r a n o e a  a r e  made i n  
f o o tn o te s  i n  t h i s  C h a p te r ,  C h a p te r  3 ,  and  C h a p te r  7 
t o  r e l e v a n t  p a a a a g e s  i n  t h e  F a c u l ty  Memorandum#
C^ueationa w h ich  Riay a r i s e  c p n o ep n in g  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l 
Home
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  t h e  B u i ld in g  S o c i e t i e s  h av e  
n o te d  a  m oat m arked te n d e n c y  f o r  m o rtg a g es  t o  h e  ta k e n  
o u t  i n  t h e  naroee o f  huahand  and  w ife  (a n d  o f t e n  
c a l c u l a t e d  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  b o th  s a l a r i e s ,  o r ,  on th e  
b a s i s  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  s a l a r y  and  a  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t h e  
w i f e ' s ,  on  t h e  v iew  that t h e  w ife  c a n n o t  be  regarded 
a s  t h e  m ost p e rm a n en t o f  s a l a r y - e a m e r s )  and  th e  
e a r l i e r  f o r m u la t io n  o f  t h e  r u le s ^  w h ich  i n s i s t  t h a t  
a  h o u se  m ust be  p ro v id e d  by  th e  husband  a n d  th e  c h o ic e  
t h e r e o f  m ust be  made ( f i n a l l y )  by him seem s in a p p r o p r ia te ^ *
A discussion o f  the b e n e f i c i a l  r i g h t  t o  the 
m a tr im o n ia l  home is not o f t e n  m et w i th ^ ,  and it i s  
t h e r e f o r e  i n t e r e s t i n g  to see th e  arguments and  th e  
r e s u l t ,  th o u g h  som ewhat in o o n o lu s lv e ,  o f  C a lm s  v*
H a l i f a x  Building S o c ie ty  ^  I n  w hich  t h e  m is s iv e s  h ad
b e en  e n te r e d  i n t o  I n  t h e  name o f  t h e  w if e  a s  t h e  
h u s b a n d 's  /
1. Stair 1.4*8.2# As a m a t t e r  o f  I n t e r e s t ,  and  p o s s ib l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  it now seem s t o  be  e a s i e r  f o r  a s i n g l e  woman withoutm ale  b a c k in g  t o  o b t a in  a  m ortgage*
3# S e e , h o w ev er, a f r e s h ,  I n t e r e s t i n g  and  tlm e o u sapproach to t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  and th e  broader s u b j e c t  o f  a l im e n t  g e n e r a l l y ,  u n d e r  t h e  head  o f  "A lim e n t and  Financial P r o v i s i o n " , Memorandum Mo*22, Scottish Law C om m ission , March, 1976, p a r t i c u l a r l y  at Part III, "Pow ers of t h e  C o u rt"  ( e . g .  P r o p e r ty  Transfer O rd e rs )#  By c o u r te s y  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  Law C om m ission , the a u th o r  h a s  h ad  sight o f  d r a f t  c o n s u l t a t i v e  Memorandum on F a m ily  Law, The M a tr im o n ia l  Home, b u t  t h e  c o n te n t s  thereof are c o n f i d e n t i a l  at this d a te *
4* 1951 8*L*T. ( S h .C t . )  67*
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husband's agent, and the husband had paid part of 
the price, signing a loan agreement with the Building 
Society as to the repayment of the rem a in d e r#
Since these events took place before the
introduction o f  the Standard Security, title to the
property stood in the name o f  the Building Society,
and there was a minute o f  agreement concerning1repayment and reconveyance , By this minute of 
agreement, the Building Society bound itself to 
reconvey the subjects to the husband and wife on 
payment o f  the final instalment, which was due in 
December, 1947, and was made by the husband pursuer*
His w ife  had died i n  Novem ber, 1947. The q u e s t io n  
arose whether the true owner was the husband, or 
w h e th e r  the representatives of the w ife  had any claim 
to t h e  whole of the property or to part-ownership 
with him therein* This action was one by the husband 
seeking declarator that he was the true owner of th e  
house*
The house was purchased in 1939 (for £650,
£520 being advanced by the Building Society) and from 
1 9 4 0  to 1944 the parties lived there together* In 
1944 the wife sought warrant to have the husband 
ejected, alleging that the whole beneficial right in 
the property lay in her since she had bought the 
subjects and had made the instalment repayments. Her 
husband had defended the action on the g ro u n d  that, in 
entering missives, she had acted as his agent, and that 
the money to make the repayments had come from his 
bank account* The Sheriff a s s o i l z i e d  t h e  defender 
(husband). "His judgment proceeded on t h e  view that 
th e  pursuer, in the present action, had a right to 
occupy the house. In any event, while the obligation 
on the society contained in the minute o f  agreement 
stood, Mrs* Cairns * right could not be h ig h e r  than 
joint /
1. Cf. Clive & Wilson, p*307
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j o i n t  ow nersh ip*  C e r t a in  p a e a a g e s  I n  h i s  n o te  
I n d i c a t e  t h a t  h e  o o n o M e m d  t h a t  t h e  p w a u e r  h ad  
p ro v e d  t h a t  Mra* C a lr im  tm d a c te d  ma h l a  a g e n t*
The ju d # m n tp  h o w ev er, o l e a r l y  p ro o e e d a  on t h e  v iew  
t h a t  Mrm# C a lm a  h ad  f a i l e d  t o  e a t a h l l a h  t l i a t  t h e  
w hole  b é n é f i c i a i  r i g h t  waa i n  h e r*  T h a t l a  n o t  t h e  
aeme t h i n g  me a  d o o la io n  t h a t  tl?e  w ho le  b e n e f i c i a l  
r ig irb  m o  i n  t h e  pnrm uer# v # io h  l a  w ha t h e  meeka i n  
th im  a c t i o n ^ " .
I n  t h e  a c t i o n  I n  q u e s t io n  (1951) t h e  hnabawKd 
p le a d e d  lu d io a ta ; h i c  p le a  waa r e p e l le d #  m inoe 
t h e  p r e v io u s  a c t i o n  h a d  pq;% d e c id e d  t h e  q u e s t io n  
w h e th e r  t h e  w h o le  b e n e f l o i a l  r i g h t  l a y  i n  t h e  p u ra u e r#  
( I n  8 0  d e c id in g #  t h e  8 ! m r i f f  r e v e r s e d  th e  d e o ia io n  o f  
t h e  S h e r i f f  S u W t l t n t o  who h a d  fo u n d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  
p u r a w r  a n d  3md recom mended a n  mwmdmont o f  t h e  c ra v e  
s o  a a  t o  mak f o r  a n  o r d e r  upon t h e  ï W l d i n g  S o c ie ty  to execute a diWpoaitlon (taking the defenders aa 
Q o m em tera ) h i e  f a v o u r )*
I n  t h e  S h e r i f f - S u W t i t u t e 'a  o p in io n #  we g le a n  
t h e  in f o r m a t io n  t h a t  t h e  p u r a u a r  (h u eb a n d ) c o n s id e re d  
t h e  c o n te n ta  o f  t h e  bank  a c c o u n t  t o  bo m % tire ly  him 
p r o p e r ty  w h ile  t h e  d e fe n d e r s  ( t h e  w i f e ' s  r o p r o a e n t a t iv e s )  
m a in ta in e d  t h a t  i t  r e p r e a e n te d  h e r  aav ln g o #  th o u ^ i  
opened  i n  him  name -  a  good p m c t i c m l  exam ple  o f  t h e  
l a c k  o f  c l a r i t y  w h ich  o f t e n  a t t e n d e  t h e  o w n e rsh ip  o f  
t h e  m s e t a  ( e s p e c i a l l y  m oveab le ) o f  m a r r ie d  p e r a c m  
an d  o f  t h e  p ro b lem a  w h ich  auoh  c c n f b a le n  p r é s e n ta  t o  
t h e  c o u r t*
The p u r a u e r  a l s o  e x p la in e d  t h a t  h e  w ae ig n o r a n t  
o f  t h e  te rm e  i n  wM oh th e  roco%&voyanco w a  e v e n tu a l ly  
t o  be  made# b e l i e v i n g  i t  t o  be  a  conveyance#  upon  
repaym en t#  t o  him  a lo n e  and  n o t  t o  him  e n d  t o  h ie  
w if e  /
1# p e r  S h e r i f f  (a o m a o n )  i n  1951 S#L*T# (S h#G t#)67 a t  p .7 0 *
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w ife  j o i n t l y  ( a v e r r in g  t h a t  he  had  s ig n e d  th e  
dooum ent w i th o u t  h a v in g  h ad  i t  r e a d  o v e r  and  e x p la in e d  
t o  h im ; f o r  th e  oonaequenoea  o f  au ch  l a c k  o f  o a re  
and  o r d in a l^  p ru d e n c e # i n  t h e  eb aen o e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
m ia r e p r e a e n ta t io n  o r  f a o l l i t y ,  h e  was p re su m a b ly  
r e s p o n s i b l e ) .
On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , t h e  d e f e n d e r s ' o o n te n t io n  was 
t h a t  th e  p u r s u e r  h ad  m e re ly  " s ig n e d  t h e  a a id  docum ents 
a s  g u a r a n to r  f o r  h i s  w ife  and  was n o t  i n  an y  way ow ner 
o r  p a r t - o w n e r  o f  th e  h o u s e " ,
A oG ording t o  t h e  p u rs u e r#  h e  h ad  m et t h e  m o n th ly  
rep a y m en ts  and  a l l  t h e  r a t e s  end  o th e r  o u tg o in g s  o f  
t h e  p ro p e r ty #  w h e rea s  t h e  d e fe n d e r s  o o n te n d e d  t h a t  
t h e i r  m o th e r  h ad  p a id  a l l  t h e  S o o le ty  rep a y m en ts  
e x o e p t t h e  f i n a l  one and  a l l  t h e  o u t la y s  up  t o  h e r  
d e a t h .  The p a r t i e s  s e p a r a te d  I n  1 9 4 4 , a b o u t  F e b ru a ry  
when M r s ,  C a irn s  l e f t  t h e  h o u se ; th e  a c t i o n  f o r  
e j e c t i o n  was r a i s e d  by h e r  i n  D e c e m b e r  o f  t h a t  y e a r .
The q u e s t io n  o f  r e s  lu d ic a t a  i s  n o t  r e l e v a n ta'mWft'fwAc*  - - -
t o  th e  p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n .
I t  i s  e x c e e d in g ly  d i s a p p o in t in g  t h a t  no u l t i m a t e  
o o n o lu s io n  on t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  p r o p e r ty  i n  th e  
h o u se  a p p e a rs  t o  h av e  b e en  r e p o r t e d .  The S h e r i f f  
h a v in g  d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  fo rm e r  a c t i o n  had  n o t  d e te rm in e d  
w h e th e r  th e  h u sb an d  had  s o l e  b e n e f i c i a l  r i g h t  i n  th e  
p r o p e r ty  ( b u t  m e re ly  t h a t  l i i s  w ife  h ad  n o t )  and  had  
l e f t  open  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  j o i n t  ovm ersh ip#  th e  c a s e  
was r e m i t t e d  t o  th e  S h e r i f f - S u b s t i t u t e ,  E x p en ses o f  
t h e  a p p e a l  w ere  aw arded  t o  th e  s u c c e s s f u l  a p p e l l a n t  
an d  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  o t h e r  e x p e n se s  l e f t  f o r  th e  
S h e r i f f  S u b s t i t u t e ' s  d e c i s i o n .
The c a s e  i s  m ost u n u s u a l  and v a lu a b le  i n  i t s  
d e t a i l e d  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  p ro b lem s w h ich  
m a y  a r i s e  a n d  w h ich  a r e  n o t  e a sy  o f  s o l u t i o n  ( o r  even  
w h ich  a r e  n o t  o f t e n  r e s o lv e d  a t  a l l ,  j u d i c i a l l y ,  o r  
w h ich  /
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which must he presumed to receive no judicial solution, 
because of the comparative scarcity of litigation 
upon the problem and perhaps also because the facts 
may be difficult to elicit with reasonable certainty). 
It would have been interesting to have had reported 
the terms of the disposition to the Building Society*
In a straightforward disposition to husband and wife, 
where the missives have been taken in the name of 
one party only, it is usual to insert a clause in 
the disposition in their favour, taking that party's 
consent to the inclusion of the other party as a 
dispones (on the lines of •*. "and with the consent 
and concurrence of X for all right, title and interest 
competent to him in terms of the missives of sale or 
otherwise ..*") in case there is any subsequent doubt* 
Nor were the missives produced "and their actual terms 
do not appear from the averments of the parties so as 
to make it clear whether the missives constituted a 
contract for the sale of the house between the sellers 
and the pursuer's wife without any reference to her 
acting as pursuer's agent or mandatory o r  whether she 
specifically contracted as his agent or mandatory"^. 
Husband and wife together were "the second party" - 
to whom reconveyance was to be made - in the loan 
agreement*
The question of housing may be one of the 
principal problems of the parties where the marriage 
tie remains, but where there is no longer cohabitation*
If the house is rented (whether privately or as 
local authority housing) the lease may well be in the 
husband's name and it would appear that he cannot 
transfer to his spouse a right to remain, upon his 
desertion /
1* per Sheriff-Substitute (Reid) at p.68*2. On the important point of destinations to husbands and wives jointly, see infra .p p . 3 5 o-2 and supra #Chapter 3$ pp.3 2 4 - 3 2 7 .  see  a l s o  chapter  5  3
344.
cleaertion of the aiatrliaonlel home. See Temple v, 
M itc h e l l  a  c a a e  o f  aummaiy rem oving  w ith  eomewhet 
W re h  r é s u l t a #  I n  w h ich  th e  w ife  a lo n e  d e fe n d e d  th e  
a o t lo n  on t h e  g ro u n d  t h a t  h e r  husb an d  h ad  r e t a i n e d  
p o a a e a a lo n  o f  t h e  r e n t e d  h o u se  by  l e a v in g  h e r#  t h e i r  
c h i ld r e n #  an d  t h e i r  f u r n i t u r e  I n  I t *  She h ad  
a t te m p te d  t o  p a y  r e n t  t o  t h e  l a n d lo r d  b u t  h e  had  
r e f u s e d  t o  r e ç o iv e  I t *  L ord  M aok ln toah  wan i n  
f a v o u r  o f  f o l lo w in g  t h e  E n g lis h  o a a e a  o f  Brown v .  
D ra p e r^  I n  w liloh  I n  a  v e ry  s i m i l a r  o aae  L ord  a ro e n e  
M#R* h ad  a a ld  t h a t  t h e  p o a s e a a lo n  o f  th e  w if e  w as 
t o  "bo  re g a rd e d  a a  t h e  p o a a e a a lo n  o f  t h e  huaband  and  
o a m io t b e  t r e a t e d  a a  unlav^Pul so  lo n g  a a  t h e  h usband  
h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  c la im  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  A ota"#  
and  O ld  G a te  E a te t e a  v* A lexander^#  w hore t h e  d e o la lo n  
o r  t h e  t r e n d  o f  j u d i c i a l  th o u g h t  was i n  f a v o u r  o f  
t h e  w ife#  a lth o u # %  t h e r e  h ad  b e en  I n  f a c t  a  re s u m p tio n  
o f  c o h a b i t a t i o n  " a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  e n t r y  t o  t h e  
p l a i n t " #  and  so  t h e  husband  was s t i l l  t o  b e  re g a rd e d  
a s  a  s t a t u t o r y  t e n a n t  i n  p o s s e s s io n  an d  e n t i t l e d  t o  
t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  th e  R e n t R e e t r l o t l o n  A o ts# ^
I n  t h e  fo rm e r  e a s e ,  t h e  h usband  had  n o t  rev o k e d  
t h e  p e rm is s io n  t o  t h e  w ife  t o  rem a in  I n  t h e  house#  
a l# io u g h  he  d i d  d e c l a r e  t h a t  h e  h ad  no  I n t e r e s t  I n  
t h e  house#  b u t  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  t h e  h usband  p u r p o r te d  
t o  w ith d ra w  t h a t  p e m l s s l o n  ( b e f o r e  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  
re s u m p tio n  o f  o o h a b l t a t l o n )  an d  I t  was d o u b te d  by  
B u o k n lll#  L*J*# w h e th e r#  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  w rong 
o o n d u o t by  t h e  w ife#  su o h  a r e v o c a t io n  could have  
any l e g a l  effect# ■ Somervell# L*J* p o n d e re d  th e  
e f f e c t  o f  su o h  a revocation had  th e  h u sb an d  rem oved 
t h e  furniture (o n  t h e  a ssu m p tio n #  p resu m ab ly #  t h a t  
I t  w as h i s  t o  rem ove and  t h a t  h e  a o h le v e d  t h a t  o b je c t ) #  
a  /
1# 195& 8#C*a67*2. [19441 K*B* 509*5. [1950] 1 K.B, 5114 . But see  nott/Mat .Homes (Fam. p r o t . ) ( s c . )A c t , 1981, s . 13, ( c t .empowered to  t r a n s f e r  te n a n c y  from t e n a n t  spouse  to  o th e rs p o u se ,  on a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  l a t t e r ,  o r  i n  c o n s i s t o r i a l  a c t i o n s )  
The l a n d l o r d  s h a l l  he g iv e n  an o p p o r tu n i ty  o f  b e in g  h e a r d .(Not a p p l i c a b l e  where house 'g o es  w i th  j o b ' ,  e t c . j
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a question unnecessary for the decision of the case 
and perhaps a little unsatisfactorily answered on 
the basis that "it might turn on the question whether 
the landlord accepted that position as a proper 
surrender". In the opinion of Denning, L.J. is 
found a firmer answer, vis. "... the wife, so long 
as she is behaving herself properly, has a very 
special position in the matrimonial home. She is 
not the sub-tenant or licensee of the husband* I t  
is his d u ty  to provide a r o o f  over h e r  head. He is 
not entitled to tell her to go without seeing that 
she has a proper place to which to go" "He is not 
entitled to turn her out, without an order of the 
courts see H. v. H. (1 9 4 7 ) 63 T.L.R. 645# Even i f  
she stays there against his will, sh e  i s  lawfully 
t h e r e  ; and so long as she i s  lawfully t h e r e  the 
house remains within the Rent Restriction Acts after 
he leaves, just as it d o es  after he is dead. She 
can pay the r e n t  and perform the obligations of the 
tenancy on h i s  behalf, and the landlord can only 
obtain possession if the conditions laid down by the 
Acts are satisfied."^
Lord Mackintosh felt these were not grounded on 
any peculiarity of English law but his view did not 
prevail and it was held that the husband having left 
with no intention of returning, he had not retained 
possession o f  the house, and that th e  wife h ad  no 
common law or statutory title to defend t h e  action - 
the protection of the Acts was not available to her. 
The house was a controlled tenancy under the Rent 
Restriction Acts. The Increase of Rent and Mortgage 
Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, s.15(1) conferred 
on a tenant "so long as he retains possession" a 
statutory /
1* Cf. the Scottish case of MacLure v« M. 1911 S.C.200. 2* For a discussion o f  devolution, and bequest o ftenancies u n d e r  Scots law, see Chapter 5 - "Rights in property arising on death".
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statutory tenancy» and the question of possession 
was a question of faet^. It seemed that t h e  manner 
of his going and the fact that his wife» it appeared, 
had not seen oa? heard more of him, and the absence 
of support-by him of her, would not allow any inference 
of retention of possession-or^intention to return, 
and that was the crux of the m a tte r#
It might seem, therefore, that the following 
Scottish authorities might be at odds with Lord 
Denning’s view that a wife "has a very special 
position in the matrimonial home. She is not thepsub*»tenant or licensee of the husband" «
However, if Lord Denning’s view be correct, then 
here is another example of an exception to a rigid 
adherence to a doctrine of strict separation of property 
(in English law)^# The existence of aliment (or 
alimony) itself is another example, as are the special 
provisions on death* All stem from the fact that 
although in theory husbands and wives are to be 
regarded as strangers to each other in property, it 
is difficult always to adhere to this and at the same 
time to achieve a humane and fair result, bearing in 
mind /
1* Skinner v* Geary [1931] 2 K#B* 346: Menzies v*Mackay 1938 S.G.74.2* See Memo*Ho.22. 3*23 et seq. Faculty Memo*PP#36-5B. (transfers of tenancies on divorce).3# Professor Clive (Clive & Wilson, IifusbandT'and Wife, p.311) traces the development in England of a "possession through wife" rule to dicta in National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. A in sw o rth  [1965] A#C*1175 (e*g* per L.Hodson, referring to Brown v. Draper and Old Gate Estates Ltd., and to Middleton V* Baldock [1 9 5 0 ] 1 All E.R.708 at p ,1 2 2 7 ;  and see per L*Wilberforce at p.1252).See now Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, s.7 (power to transfer tenancy on divorce or nullity). Cretney (Principles of Family Law, 2nd edn., p.289) comments that this is not available to a widow, or in cases o f  separation o r  neglect to maintain and d o es  not apply to local authority t e n a n c i e s ,  but o n ly  to those falling within the ambit of t h e  Rent Acts (citing in comparison, Thompson v* T# [1975] 2 W.L.R.868).
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m in# t h e  in te rd o p e n d e n c e  o f  husband  an#  w ife *  and  
t h e  alm a o f  f a m i ly  l i f e *
l a  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  te a a n o le a #  how ever* S c o ts  law  
d o e s  a p p e a r  t o  t a k e  a  s t r i c t e r  v ie w , l a  M i l l a r  v ,  
a  w if e  w as h e ld  e n t i t l e d  t e  e v l e t  h e r  husband*  s ln o e  
I n  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  h o u sin g *  th e y  s t e e d  t o  e&oh o t h e r  
I n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  l a n d lo r d  an d  t e n a n t ,  a n d  t h e  
m a tr im o n ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  c o n se q u e n t o b l i g a t i o n s  
w ere  n o t  r e le v a n t^ *
I n  L&hno v* t h e  h usband  a t te m p te d  t o  have  
h i s  w ife  e j e c t e d  from  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home h u t  t h e  
8 h e r l f f * 8 u h & t i tu te  h e ld  t h a t  a n  a c t i o n  o f  e j e c t i o n  
w as in c o m p e te n t*  s in c e  h i s  w i f e ’ s  p o s s e s s io n  h a d  n e t  
b e e n  v i c i o u s  o r  p r e c a r io u s #
I n  h i s  a p p e a l ,  t h e  h u sb an d  argued*  p re su m ab ly  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  i n  M il la r*  t h a t  " c o n s i s t o r i a l
c o n s id e r a t i o n s  w ere  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  a  q u e s t io n  w h ich  
w as p u r e ly  p a t r i m o n i a l " ,  and  a  p r o o f  b e f o r e  Gnawer 
was a l lo w e d , t h e  c o u r t  b e in g  o f  t h e  o p in io n  t h a t  t h e  
" c i r c u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e  w i f e ’s  oceupmnoy an d  p o s s e s s io n "  
w ould d e te rm in e  t h e  com potenoy o f  t h e  a o t io n ^ ^
O f c o u rse #  t h e  w ife * #  c o n d u c t may be  s u c h  a s  t o  
j u s t i f y  t h e  h usband  i n  t u r n in g  h e r  o u t  o f  d o o rs  (a n d  
i n t o  o t h e r  accom m odation) ^w ithou t r e l i e v i n g  him  o f  
t h e  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t  h e r^  i n  w h ich  c a s e  one  m ust 
su p p o se  t h a t  I f  he  w ere  n o t  w i l l i n g  v o l u n t a r i l y  t o  
s u p p o r t  h e r*  h e r  rem edy w ould  be  t o  su e  f o r  t h e  #c*  
c a l l e d  ’ i n t e r im  a lim e n t*  *ao  lo n g  a s  t h e  d e f e n d e r  s h a l l  
r e f u s e  /
1 .  1940 a .0 .5 #  (foil. M aoto -e  v. fU I f l l  S .C .gO O J.see  1981 A o t.s .i2 ,  S ee  a l s o  «eU »oa v. McL. 19§8 S .L .T . ( S h .C t . )  31»Meeisheraon v« M« 1930 S.L.T. (Slï.Ct.) 24* Soott v.3 ,  <194 .8 ) 64  . S h .G t.  R® p,119.3 .  1 9 4 9  a . L . ï .  (M otes) 18» r e p o r te d  b r i e f l y  a s  a  n o t e .4 ,  S ee  a l s o  O onaoh le  v ,  D» (1940) 64  Sh»S t»R ep»120.9 .  « a c - tu re  V .  M. 1911 S .C .2 0 0 .-
r e f u s e  t #  r e c e iv e  end e n t e r t a i n  h e r  a #  h i#  w ife "  #
I f  p r o p e r ty  l a  b o u g h t by  t h e  h u sb an d  end  p l& oed , 
f o r  w h a te v e r  r e a s o n ,  I n  h i e  w ife * #  nam e. I t  w ould 
eeam t h a t  t h e  la w  preeum ea t h a t  a n  n n o o n d l t lo B a l  g i f t
wa# in tended* o f  o o u ra e  don & tio n a  b e tw een  ep o u aes
o r e  n o  lo n g e r  r e v o a a b le  by  t h e  d o n o r  *
P ro fe & eo r A n ton  i n  h i e  a r t i c l e ,  *The S f f e o t  o f  
M a rr ia g e  Upon P r o p e r ty  i n  S o o t#  iaw *^ e u g g e a te  t h a t  
t h e  o a a e  o f  MoDowgall v* may h e lp  t o  eh ed  l i g h t
on  t h i s  s u b j e c t  i n  o u r  la w , a l th o u g h  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  
h i#  a r t i c l e ,  no  B o o t t i a h  o&ee h e  f e l t  wa# on  a l l  f o u r a7w ith  t h e  B n g lia h  o nea  q u o te d ,
Mr»» fir# e D o u g a ll, t h e  m is s iv e s  w ere ta k e n  i n  th e  
ewawd’s  nam e, b u t  ^ 7 0  o f  t h e  purohm ae %




Logon V, Wood M,5@77 (19&1)* Gray v, croall (1802),11 8.1&5, Ferg, Gona# Law p,19&; Balf, p«93) 8 0080 in which the pursuer sought aliment alnee her husband had turned her out of doors end in which h# in turn alleged that She had committed adultery and that he had rai6ed an action of divorce against her# He had & aelery of &70 p#a* and offered aliment at the rate of 5/* per week#The pursuer sought &20 P#&# ^a& what #ho would be entitled to in the event of & judicial amparetion"# The Oourt awarded &18*5/- p#@*# being 1/* per day# The wife olted in aupport the oase of Leslie 4 Brown*& 8upp* 880# However, this ia one of the old "aliment only" oaaea dlaouaaed later (infr^. p# 561) (See al#o Moffat v, M* 1 Mar#1804 not reported but at&ted HUme, SeaaeP&pera, Winter 1803*4, Mo*46, i\d v ,L lb #  J- #Newton V* N , 1923 8#G# 15 p e r  L+Smnda a t  p # 2 6 : Beveridge v# B# 1985 8#L#T# 834; R# v# R, 1925 8#L#T# C 8 h ,C t,)  49#M#W#P. (So*) Act, 1920, a#5.For the English position, before the flood of new family law législation (The Matrimonial Homea Aot, 1967s Divorce Reform Act, 1959* The Matrimonial Froooedinga and Property Act, 1970% and the oonaolidatlng Matrimonial Cauaea Aot, 1973) see
195& M .L ,R , &53*7 8.M#
I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  n o te ,  now, however, th a t  the Matrimonial Homes (Family P r o te c t io n )  (S co t la n d )  A ct, I 98I ,  (See Chapter ?)  
c o n fe r s  a s ta tu to r y  r ig h t  o f  occupancy upon a spouse who i s  not  
the owner or the tenant o f  the m atrim onial home.
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d e r iv e d  from  the wife’s side of the family (from 
her mother) and the remainder was supplied hy a 
Building Society#
It was a "life assurance l in k e d "  mortgage for 
which b o th  spouses completed proposal forms# and 
the application f o r  a  loan was Joint# B e fo re  the 
disposition had been granted and recorded# t h e  
husband had re-sold at a substantial profit and had 
appropriated the difference# The wife not 
u n n a tu r a l l y  claimed repayment o f  the £70 which 
belonged to her mother and half of the net proceeds 
of the re-sale*
Lord Blmam sustained the wife’s c la im , since 
it was m clear as it could be that the intention had 
been to take the title in both names and to hold the 
property as their joint property (and in the 
circumstances. Professor Anton thought the decision 
easier than Rlmmer)^.
Professor A nton  also notes the absence in o u r  
law o f  a provision analogous to the M.W.P# Act, 1882, 
8.17 o r  t o  the rule to be seen i n  operation i n  Bendall 
V# McWhirter^* He remarks rightly that this is a 
most important question because o f  th e  possibility o f  
eviction but also because these days (even in 1956, 
but how much more so in the inflationary decade of 
the 1970*s?) investment in heritage may prove to be 
the b e s t  o f  all investments and may r e p r e s e n t  more 
than ever before the spouses’ principal and most 
valuable asset*
The precise terms used by the conveyancer o f  
the destination to a husband and wife will be  o f•Kim p o r ta n c e ^ *
Thus, /
1. Of* Cairns v* Halifax B.S* supra* 2* [1952] 2 Q*B* 466.3* See Chapter 3# pp*324-327*
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ThW8* I t  t h a t  I f #  &8 o f t e n  th@ o a s e ,the doBtlnmtlon &# to "huohand and wife equally between 
them  and  t o  t h e  a u r v lv o r  o f  th e m " , t h e  r o g l a t r & t i o n  o f  
t h e  d eed  o o n fo ra  o n  e w h  a  o n o * h a lf  a h a re
t h e r e in *  Now# I t  m&y h e  t h a t  I f  th e  p u ro h a e e  p r l o e  
WB8 made up  t r u l y  o f  m ore o r  l e s a  e q u a l  G o n tr lh u t lo n a  
by  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  t h a t  t h e  deot&n&t&on l a  t o  b e  re g a rd e d  
a#  e o n t r a o tu a l  and  n e i t h e r  may re v o k e  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  
t o  t h e  o th e r^ a  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d . I f  t h e  t a k i n g  o f  
t i t l e  waa p u r e ly  a n  e x p e d ie n t  a rra n g e m e n t and  th e  
fu n d s  w ore p ro v id e d  w h o lly  by  one apouee# P r o f e a a o r  
M#G*M08ton^ B uggoet#  t h a t  t h a t  epouae  may h a v e  pow er 
t o  rev o k e  t h e  d e a t i n a t l o n  t o  t h e  o th e r#  *ao f a r  a a  I t  
p r o v id e s  t h a t  h ie  o r  h e r  o n e ^ h a lf  o f  t h e  p ro p & rty  l a  
t o  p a a a  t o  t h e  o t h e r  epouee  -  t h a t  la #  aaaum lng  a  
pow er t o  re v o k e  *  I n  w hloh  o e a e  i t  w i l l  b e  n e a o a e a ry  
f o r  t h e  p u rp o se #  o f  t h e  1964 Aot# a * 3 S (2 )^  t o  d l s o o v e r  whether the destination has or haa net been evaoueted. 
I f  n o t#  i t  w ould a t l l l  h av e  b e e n  p a r t  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  
f o r  t h e  p u rp o se a  o f  E s t a t e  D uty (now o f  o o u ra e  r e p e a le d  
en d  r e p la o e d  by  C a p i t a l  T r a n s f e r  Ta%s t r a n a f o r e  
b e tw een  a p eu ao a  do  n o t  a t t r a c t  C a p i t a l  T r a n s f e r  Tax# 
w h e th e r  made on  d e a th  o r  d u r in g  t h e  l i f e t i m e  o f  t h e  
t r a n s f e r o r  a n d  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  apouee#  a r e  
c o h a b i t in g  /
1 .  F e r r e t t ' a  T r e .  v« ?» 198# s»0*52&*2 ,  "The SuG oeeaion  (Bo*) Aot# 1964% %n& edn# P»16*3* w hloh  d e f in e #  " e s t a t e " ,  and  in o Iu J o ^  w l th in  t h ed e f i n i t i o n  e& t& te o v e r  w hioh t h e  d ^ re a a e d  h ad  a  pow er o f  a p p o in tm e n t ,  e u b je o t  t o  th o  p r o v la o a  t h a t  (a)%H#re a n y  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r ty  b e lo n g in g  t o  a  d e c e a se d  p e r s o n  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  h&a d e a th  ( i a )  s u b j e c t  t o  a  a p e o ia l  d e s t i n a t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  an y  p e ra o n ,  ( t h e  p r o p e r ty )  a h a l l  n o t  b e  t r e a t e d  f o r  t h e  p u rp o a e a  o f  t h l 8  A ct 0 8  p a r t  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  d e o e a a e d  u n le s s  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  &8 one wh&oh o o u ld  o o m p e te n tly  b e ,  an d  h a#  i n  f a c t  been# evaoM ated b y  t h e  d e o e a e e d  by  t e s ta m e n ta r y  d la p o G it io n  o r  o th e r w ia ^ a n d  (b )  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r ty  o v e r  w hich  t h e  d e o e a a e d  h ad  a  pow er o f  a p p o in tm e n t b u t  w h ic h , by ram son o f  h i#  f a i l u r e  t o  e x e r o i s e  t h a t  power# f a l l s  t o  be  e x e r c i s e d  by  a n o th e r  p e rs o n  a h a l l  n o t  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  p e r t  o f  th e  e s t a t e  o f  th e  de& eased#
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oohab&t&ng *  s e e  " P in s o n  on R evenue Law ", 1 0 th  o d n ,*  
1 9 - 0 2 ) ,  b u t  P ro fe & ao r M eston a t  p * l6  s u g g o a ts  t h a t  
t h e  e x e c u to r  may n o t  c o n firm  t o  & t, P re su m a b ly  i t  
m u st v e s t  a u to m a t i c a l l y  I n  t h e  e u r v lv o r  w i th o u t  neod  
o f  a  f u r t h e r  d & e p c a lt lo n  r e g i s t e r e d  I n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  
s u r v iv o r  *  f o r  Who w ould g r a n t  t h a t  doodT The 
e x e c u to r  c o u ld  n o t  do  so# I f  t h e  re m a in in g  h a l f - a h a r e  
of heritage %me not Included In the confirm ation . ^
An Interootlng caae upon special de&tlnatlon# la 
W alker*# Exec* v* W*^ i n  w h ic h , w here  & huab& nd, I n  
ex ch an g e  f o r  a  l e a n  o f  & 500  ( e n t i r e l y  h i e  own money) 
l e n t  t o  h a rb o u r  t r u s t e e s  on  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e i r  
h a rb o u r*  to o k  t h e  e a & lg n a tio n  I n  t h e  name o f  h im e e lf  
an d  h i e  w ife  " e q u a l ly  b e tw een  them  and  t o  t h e  s u r v iv o r  
o f  them " e tc *  an d  k e p t  t h e  aa& lgnm tlon  I n  a  d ra w e r  
a c c e a a lb lc  t o  b o th  o f  them* i t  wea d e c id e d  t h a t  t h e r e  
h ad  b e e n  no  d e l i v e r y  o f  t h e  deed*  en d  t h a t  t h e  cum 
r e p r e s e n te d  by  t h e  e a a ig n e t i o n  b e lo n g e d  t o  h i e  e s t a t e #  
T h e re  h ad  b e en  no  d i v e a t i t u r e  o f  t h e  a a a ig n a t io n #
However# a f t e r  ae& ing  t o  t h a t  d e s t in a t i o n *  h e  had  
made a  w i l l  c o n v e y in g  h l a  Whole e & ta te  t o  hi@ e x e c u to r  
t h a t  h e  m ig h t d iv id e  i t  among t h e  r e l a t i v e a  an d  g iv e  
o n e * th l r d  o f  t h e  w ho le  e s t a t e  t o  t h e  widow# I n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  h e r  C h a re , t h e  widow wa# e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  &500 o f  
t h e  a s s ig n a t io n #  bee& uae I t  w&& h e ld  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i e !  
d e & tin m tic n  t h e r e i n  waa n o t  a f f e c t e d  by  t h e  g e n e r a l  
d & B p o a itlo n  i n  t h e  w i l l*
Ckarrio (#& confirm ation. . i&f ËG#H&WtC2#
tdbi&l: 1&ÏC 42o*Mrect 1k%%Bw&1sww&n1: <>jr S&ie %2rc33«&%*t%f dkagsemwâe 
CW& 'wRiartkMBip i&kie <&ecCHa80<% *'e'&ei&r%ed 4&Gml:e"c3L <%» iskw) 
p r o p e r ty  o r  wa& d iv e s te d  d u r in g  h i e  l i f e t i m e  i n  
f a v o u r  o f  t h e  donee# I f  h e  d id  r e t a i n  c c n t r c l  an d  
waa /
1 ,  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  M eaton , 0P#15*17*2 .  (1 8 7 8 ) 5 m*9&5,5# "The O o n f im a t io n  o f  E x e c u to rs  I n  S c o t la n d " .  7 t h  edyi# (A#E#McRae) pp#171/172*
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was e n t i t l e d  t o  a l t e r  t h e  d e s t i n â t  I o n ,  d id  W  do  a@? 
U%)on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  a l t e r ,  t h e  3)owor 
may h av e  b e e n  rem oved by  d e l iv e r y #  o r
or  by the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  d e s t i n a t i o n  was t r u l y  c o n t r a c t u a l .Upon t h e  aeoond  q u e s t io n ,  t h e  pix)hlem i^ ll  orlao 
u m m lly  w here  t h e r e  h a a  b een  a  g e n e r a l  w i l l ,  a%id 
Currie atatea that preaimptlon la  that a general
oonveyenoe o r  g e n e r a l  o la u a e  o f  r o v o e a t lo n  I n  t h e  w i l l  
w i l l  mot operate t o  re v o k e  t h e  a p e o la l  d e a t ln e t lo m ^  
w h e th e r  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  was e a r l i e r  o r  l a t e r  th a n  
t h e  w i l l#
%f t h e  d o c t im a t lo n  rem aim e g o o d , i t  l a  "o o m p le te  
t o  t h e  d o n w a  a e  t l t l o a  w i th o u t  t h e  a i d  o f  c o n f ir m a t io n .  
They r e a l l y  d o  n o t  pmee t o  tl%o oam outor a a  auoh# o r  a t  
T h u s , th e y  sh o u ld  n o t  ho  e n te r e d  i n  t h e  
in v e n to r y  p ro p e r*  b u t  an n ex ed  i n  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
aoom m t#
The m e e tin g  o f  m o rtg ag e  repaym en t#  may s t i l l
h e  im dertm ken  m o st oommonly by t h e  h uebaW ^ and  th u a  
i t  may be  em ld th a t#  w h a te v e r  t h e  form  o f  
a rran g em en t#  t h e  h o u se  l a  a t1 1 1  b e in g  p ro v id e d *  I n  
many o r  m ost o a ae s*  by  %%lm* b u t  I f  a  w i f e  i s  a l s o  
e a r n in g  a  s a l a r y  ^  o r  Indeed#  ev en  i f  sh e  i e  n e t  -  a  
o o n t r l b u t i o n  ( i n  money o r  I n  k ind#  i n  t h e  o en ae  o f  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n  by  h e r  o f  %mrk o th e rw is e  p e rh a p s  
r e q u i r i n g  t o  W  a o h le v e d  b y  t h e  paym ent o f  a  wage t e  
a  domes t i e  h e lp )  i n  n o v e r th e lo 8 8  made by  h e r#
A ooord lng  /
1# isv a o u a tie n  o f  t h a t  p a r t y ’s  own ® harel a  s t i l l  p o e a ib lo  a f t e r  r e g i s t r a t i o n "  o f  # e  d W o a i t l o n  H ay’ e Tr# v# H#’o T m # 1951 8#C#329, 2# b u t  a o e  O em eren’s  T ra#  v# Ommeron 1W F 8#C#407# d ia e u a a e d #  d io t in g u ie h e d #  end  ( p e r  L#Sha%f o f  D u n fo n a lln e )  d o u b te d  i n  C e n a ie h é e l  v# C#*a B&ac, 1920 a,G # (H .L #) 195#
3# Of* a l a o  C l iv e  an d  W ilson# pp#29B#303*4# W elker» M u rray ’ s  Bxre# v# O aek ie  1929 8#3j#T#524%P e r r e t t #5* C u rr ie #  p#172#6* t h e r e  a r e  a  m y ria d  weye o f  fa m ily  budgetlaogs s e e"Mmtrimo%%iel P r o p e r ty "  by  Todd en d  Jo n e e  H#M#8*0# 1 9 7 2 , d ie o u e a e d  i*% C h a p te r  7#
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A c co rd in g  t o  F r a s e r ,  su c h  an  e f f o r t  seem s t o  h ave  
b e en  e x p e c te d  o f  h e r  a t  h i s  day  a l s o  -  "A w ife  i s  
bound t o  c o n t r i b u t e  h e r  e x e r t io n s  t o  th e  f a m ily  
s u p p o r t ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  h e r  h u sb a n d ’s  m ean s" .^  I s  
i t  t h e r e f o r e  r i g h t  t h a t  sh e  sh o u ld  r i s k  th e  f o r f e i t u r e  
o f  h i s  s u p p o r t  by  r e a s o n  o f  la c k  o f  e n th u s ia sm  f o r  
h i s  c h o ic e  o f  a s u i t a b l e  home?
Once a g a in ,  we s t r a y  f a r  from  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  
t h in g s  h e r e ,  s i n c e ,  i n  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  c a s e s ,  i n  th e  
s p i r i t  o f  e q u a l  p a r t n e r s h i p  w hich  e x i s t s  i n  many 
m a r r ia g e s ,  t h e  husb an d  w ould no more t h in k  o f  th e  
p u rc h a s e  o f  a  h o u se  w i th o u t  h i s  w i f e ’ s  a p p ro v a l  th a n  
sh e  w ould  w i th o u t  h i s  -  i n  o th e r  w o rd s , n e i t h e r  w i l l  
a c t  w i th o u t  th e  o t h e r ’s  know ledge and  c o n se n t*  In d e e d , 
w here  a  m o rtg ag e  i s  ta k e n  o u t i n  j o i n t  nam es, th e  w ife  
m ust be c o g n is a n t  o f  and  a c q u ie s c e n t  i n  th e  t r a n s a c t i o n  
and  i t s  c o n se q u e n c e s . N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  w ould a p p e a r  
t o  be  a  l i t t l e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  t h a t  a  r u l e  sh o u ld  rem a in  
w h ich  endows th e  h u sb a n d ’ s o p in io n  w i th  a l l ,  o r  f i n a l ,  
pow er i n  th e  m a t t e r ,  when p e rh a p s  t h a t  s h o u ld  n o t  b e , 
and  i n  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  c a s e s  i s  n o t ,  t h e  t r u e  p o s i t io n *
H ow ever, i f  h o u se s  a r e  com ing i n c r e a s i n g l y  i n t o  
j o i n t  o w n e rsh ip , sh o u ld  t h e r e  n o t  be  a r u l e  o f  j o i n t  
c h o ic e ,  n o t  o n ly  i n  f a c t  b u t  i n  law ? M o reo v er, i f  i t  
becom es th e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home m ust be 
p la c e d  i n  j o i n t  names , i s  t h e r e  n o t  a s t r o n g  argum en t 
f o r  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h i s  r u l e  i n  th e  f a c e  o f  th e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  e q u a l i t y  * o f  s t a t u s  and o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  * 
b e tw een  sp o u se s?
Of c o u r s e ,  th e  r u l e  s tem s from  th e  d u ty  o f  ad h e ren c e , 
The w ife  m ust f o l lo w  th e  h u sb a n d , u n le s s  sh e  h a s  l e g a l  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  n o t  d o in g  s o ,  and so  a  m o d i f ic a t io n  
o f  t h e  r u l e  m ig h t be more f a r - r e a c h in g  th a n  w ould be 
d e s i r a b l e  /
1 .  F r .  H usband and W ife , p . 837*2 .  S ee  C h a p te r  7 .
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d e e l r a b l e *  The o o n v e n tlo n e !  v ie w , a f t e r  a l l ,  t h a t  
t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e tr im o n ia l  home d e p e n d s  upon  
t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  h u e h a M ’a  W e in e e e  o r  t h e  b e e t  
p la o e  f o r  t h e  f u r th e r a n c e  o f  en d  f o s t e r i n g  o f  h i s  
c a r e e r ,  h a s  i t s  b a s i s  i n  t h e  th o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  p rim e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  f a m ily  i a  h u sb a n d ’ a ,  and  
8 0  lo n g  a s  t h a t  re m a in s  t r u e  ,  t h e r e  i s  a  lo o k  o f  
f a i m e a a  a s  i m l l  a s  a  l a c k  o f  d i g n i t y  i n  a q u a b b le a  
a a  t o  p r i o r i t y  o f  o a re e r*  a u f f i o e  i t  t o  e a y  a t  
p r e s e n t  t h a t  a i t u a t l o n e  auoh  a s  th o s e  r e v e a le d  i n  
t h e  f o l lo w in g  o a a e a ,  a r e  n o t  e n t i r e l y  a a t i a f a o t o r y *
I t  may v e r y  w e l l  be  t h a t  a s  lo n g  a s  t h e  h usband  
h a e  t h e  p r i o r  d # ty  t o  p ro v id e  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  hom e, 
h e  sh o u ld  h av e  t h e  p r i o r  r i g h t  t o  d e te rm in e  i t s  
l o c a t i o n  and  t o  ohooae  i t ^ *
I n  M uir V# M#^ i n  o iro u m e ta n o e a  i n  w h ich  a  d iv o r c e  
o n  t h e  g ro u M  o f  d e s e r t i o n  waa g r a n te d ,  a n d  from  w h ich  
i t  m e r g e d  t h a t  t l io  h u sb an d  h ad  d is a p p e a r e d  t o  A u s t r a l i a  
i n  o r d e r  t o  ev ad e  c r im in a l  p ro c o e d in g a  a n d  h ad  n o t  
com m unicated  i n  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  m anner t o  h i s  w ife  
h i s  c l r c im e ta n c o o ,  a l t h o u # i  h e  h ad  w r i t t e n  t h r e e  l e t t e r s  
t o  h e r ,  t h e  L # J# C le rk  (M o n c r ie f f )  fo u n d  t h a t  h e  c o u ld  
p o t  s a y  " t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  d u ty  o f  a  w ife  t o  go  w h e re v e r  
h e r  h tm band c h o o s e s .  A t a l l  e v e n t s ,  t h e  h u sb an d  m ust 
b e  i n  e a r n e s t  vdien h e  a s k s  h e r  t o  j o i n  h im , i f  h e  d o e s  
s o " .  L . O rm id a le  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  c a s e  was s u f f i c i e n t l y  
p e c u l i a r  i n  i t s  f a c t s  a s  t o  make i t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  
judgm en t c o u ld  form  a  p r e c e d e n t  f o r  o t h e r  c a s e s .
I n  MecLuro v* M#^ i t  w as h e ld  t h a t  a  h u sb a n d , a s  
t e n a n t  o f  t h e  h o u se  "* a  h o t e l  *  was e n t i t l e d  t o  h a v e  
h i s  w i f e  rem oved th e re f ro m  and  i n t e r d i c t e d  from  
r e t u r n i n g  /
1# See h o w ev er, r e c i p r o c a l  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t  s u g g e s te di n  Memc«No.22, 2 .1 2 ,  an d  F a c u l ty  Memo. pp.3"*6.2 .  G f ^ te i r  I ,  4»B . Bat see  Chapter ?. See a l s o  S.B.C.Memo N o .54, 9 .1 -4
3# ( i a 7 9 ) e m . i 3 5 3 .4 .  1911 8 .0 .2 0 0  ( f o i l #  O olquhoun v .  0 .  (1 8 0 4 ) M.
" I I .  & w . "  a p p x .  N o . 5 . )
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r e t u r n i n g ,  s in c e  sh e  we# o f  In te m p e ra te  h a b i t s  and 
u p s e t  th e  h e p p in e s a  and o r d e r  o f  th e  h o u s e h o ld , on 
th e  s t r i c t  u n d e re ta n d in g  and c o n d i t io n  t h a t  he  w ould 
p ro v id e  a l im e n t  f o r  h e r#  (H om m lly*  r e f u s a l  t o  
r e c e iv e  a  w ife  i n t o  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  hom e, i f  p e r s i s t e d  
i n  f o r  y e a r s ^ ,  and  I f  t h e  w i f e ’s  b e h a v io u r  d id  n o t  
j u s t i f y  h e r  h u ab an d ’a  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n ,  w ould  
o o n a t i t u t e  d e s e r t i o n ) #  A lthough  t h e  C o u r t  i n  th e  
e a r l i e r  a u t h o r i t y  o f  C olquhoun seem s t o  h av e  
p ro c e e d e d  on t h e  b a e la  o f  t h e  husband*# c u r a t o r i a l  
po%mr t o  n o t  I n  t h i s  vmy -  a s  i n  Mao3s,ure d o e s  L# 
J o W n to n  who fa v o u re d  t h e  v iew  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  w as 
fo u n d ed  on  t h e  r i g h t  o f  c o n t r o l  by t h e  h u sb a n d , n o t  
on  h l8  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r ty  -  L .P . I n g l l a  p r e f e r r e d  t o  
r o o t  h i s  ju d g m en t on t l i e  b a a ia  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d ’ a 
r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r ty  ( a s  t e n a n t )  i n  t h e  h o te l#  I n  t h e  
w ords o f  L# K in n e a r ,  t h e  husband  was e n t i t l e d  t o  
p r o t e c t  h i s  home and  b u a ln o a a  from  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s
In tru m io n  made by h i#  w ife ^
L ord  M ackenzie  a l s o  fa v o u re d  th e  g ro u n d  o f  
p a t r im o n ia l  r i g h t  t o  t h a t  o f  c u r a t o r i a l  pow er and  
e m p h asised  t h a t ,  " s in c e  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  t h e  M#w#p.
A c t ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s ib l e  t h a t  th e  w ife  may be 
p r o p r l e t r i x ,  and  aha may d e s i r e  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e  
r i ^ t a  w h ich  t h e  C o u r t now h o ld  t h e  huaband  c a n  p u t  
i n  f o rc e #  The same g round  upon w hich  t h e  husb an d  
may g e t  a  w a r r a n t  t o  e j e c t  h i s  w ife  w i l l  e q u a l ly  
e n t i t l e  t h e  %?fife i f  t h e  o iro u m a ta n c e a  p e r m i t ,  t o  g e t  
t h e  same w a r r a n t  t o  e , je c t  h e r  h u sb a n d , w ith  t h e  
accom pany ing  i n t e r d i c t  a g a l n a t  h l a  r e tu r n " #
T h is  p o i n t  was e m p h asised  a l s o  b y  t h e  3^#P# who 
n o te d  /
1# s e e  now D iv o rc e  (S c# ) A c t, 1976 , a * l ( 2 ) ( c ) .2# R e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h i s  c a s e  was th e  o ld  c a s e  o fM c In ty re  v# Mol# w h ich  i s  n o t  r e p o r t e d ,  b u t  c i t e d  a t  Hume’s  S e s s io n  P a p e r s ,  Bummer 1 8 2 0 , No#26 o f  w h ich  L# J o h n s to n  rem arked  t lm t  t h e r e  im s a good p r é c i s  i n  S h e r i f f  N a p i e r 's  judgm ent i n  H is lo p  v# H# G u th r i e ’s  B e le o t  C a s e s ,  p#209#
3 .  But s e e  now 1981 A c t ,  8 , 1 .
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noted that the decision in McIntyre was not so (that 
is, that a wife could have the assistance of the 
court in turning her husband out of a house which 
belonged to her), but that McIntyre was decided when 
the jus mariti was in full force, and accordingly that 
the husband "through his jus mariti had such a 
regulation of his wife’s property that he could insist 
upon her quitting her own house* But now that the 
jus mariti no longer exists, I think that the result 
would be exactly the opposite’’*
Lord Johnston sounded the necessary warning note * 
"Further, the Court ought not to interfere if their 
action in preventing a public impropriety in one 
direction is to result in a shock to public decency 
in another# They must, I think, require assurance 
that if they intervene to remove the wife from her 
husband’s house, her immediate wants will be provided 
for until she can have these regulated either by 
agreement or by a proper action for aliment"*
*1Gloag and Henderson (citing this authority ) 
incline to the view that a spouse might exclude the
other from his/her house "provided that he or she is
willing to perform the conjugal duties" - but what
exactly is meant thereby (apart from the duty of
financial maintenance) is unclear, since it would 
seem rather that in certain circumstances the husband 
or wife, or both, is relieved of the duty to adhere#
While these authorities have touched upon the 
question of the matrimonial home and the spouses’ 
rights and duties as to residence therein, the case 
of Young V .  Y*^ brings the problem into sharper focus*
In this (defended) action of divorce, brought by 
the husband on the ground of the wife’s desertion, 
the /
1. at p.606*2* 1947 S.L.T. 5.
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the circumstances were that shortly after their , 
marriage in 1933, the husband, who was in the Army, 
was sent to India, where he remained till 1939*
The wife did not accompany him because she averred 
that there was an agreement that it was necessary 
for her to remain in London to look after her invalid 
mother* The husband did not admit that there was 
such an arrangement and it was proved that he had 
written to his wife inviting her to come to India, 
and that his wife’s reply had been a refusal on the 
grounds of the necessity to attend to her mother*
After receiving the refusal, the husband wrote to 
say that he did not wish to force her and that she 
must do as she pleased.
The wife sent to her husband a certain amount 
of money over a considerable period to augment his 
pay and in 1939 the husband returned to London to 
live with his wife and her mother, thereafter lived 
at Aldershot until discharged, but was subsequently 
called up again upon the outbreak of war* A child 
was born in May, 1940.
L.O.Birnam, on these facts, held that the wife 
could not possibly have been in desertion in respect 
of the period 1933-39, since cohabitation was resumed 
in 1939, and in any event, the choice of residence 
had been, in the husband’s own words, left to the 
wife.
On leave from France in 1940, the husband spent 
most of the time with his relations in Scotland before 
spending his last night with his wife, thus causing 
her keen annoyance. They spent a fortnight together 
in August, and in October (and subsequently by letter) 
he asked his wife to live with his father and sister 
in Falkirk, and upon her refusal to do so based the 
action of divorce for desertion*
Was the wife legally bound to accept her husband’s 
plans /
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p la n e  à »  t o  w hat waa t o  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  matrimo%%lQl 
home? The h u sW n d  was n o t  l i v i n g  i n  F a lK irk *  b u t  
a t  b a r ra o k a  i n  O le n e o ra e  and  was l i a b l e  t o  be  s e n t  
o v e rs e a s#  and i t  a p p e a re d  t h a t  from  e a r l y  i n  1941 , h e  
W0 8  r a r e l y  t o  b e  a e e n  a t  hom e, e x c e p t  on s h o r t  l e a v e s ,
" I n  t h e s e  o lro u m a ta n o e a  I  have d i f f i c u l t y  I n  
h o ld in g  t h a t  th e  d e fe n d e r  im s bound t o  go t o  a  s t r a n g e  
p la o e  t o  l i v e  w i th  s t r a n g e  p e o p le  i n  a  h o u se  w here 
h e r  h u sb an d  n o t  t o  r e s i d e  h im s e l f " ,  a a i d  L .B lm a m , 
and  q u o te d  t h e  o p in io n  o f  t h e  L .J # C le rk  I n  M u ir , when 
h e  s a i d ,  " I  o a n n o t nay  t h a t  i t  i #  th e  d u ty  o f  a w if e  
t o  go w h e re v e r  h e r  huebend  o h o o e e a " .
"No d o u b t i t  i a  h e r  d u ty  t o  follo% f him  w h e re v e r  
h e  b a a  a  home f o r  h o r  t o  go to #  b u t  t h a t  l a  a v e ry  
d i f f e r e n t  p r o p o s i t i o n  from  s a y in g  t h a t  ah e  l a  bound 
t o  go t o  any  p la c e  w hich  h e  may a p p o in t  w h e th e r  he  
him ae^jf i a  I n  ro a ld e n o e  t h e r e  o r  n o t"*  (L .B lm a m )
I n  any  c a s e  ( th o u g h  i t  was n o t  n o c e a a a ry  f o r  
t h e  d e o la lo n )  h l a  W rd a h ip  n o t ic e d  t h a t  t h e  h usband  
a o q u ie a c e d  v e ry  r e a d i l y  i n  th e  w i f e ’ s  r e f u a a l  t o  
come t o  S c o t la n d ,  axid a l th o u g h  he  t h r e a te n e d  t h a t  h e  
m ig h t b e  f i n i s h e d  w ith  h e r  and  would a to p  h e r  a l lo w a n c e , 
h e  d id  n o t  do a o ,  and  i t  seem ed t W t  he  was n o t  v e ry  
a n x io u s  o r  ev en  w i l l i n g  t h a t  sh e  sh o u ld  c h an g e  h e r  
mind*
H ow ever, t h e  g ro u n d  o f  h ie  L o rd a h ip ’ a d e c l a io n  
was " t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  made by  th e  p u r e u e r  i n  1940 waa 
n e t  one w i th  \/h lo h  th e  d o fa n d e r  was bound t o  com ply 
u n d e r  p a in  o f  b e in g  h e ld  t o  be  I n  d e s e r t i o n "  *' "The 
h u sb a n d ’s  r i g h t  l a  t o  o h co ae  t h e  p la c e  w here  t h e  
ep cu eea  a r e  t o  l i v e  to g e th e r *  Re h a s  no r i g h t  a p a r t  
from  t h i s  t o  s a y  w here  h i s  w ife  i s  t o  l i v e " \
5?A g a in , i n  Hood v* a n o th e r  exam ple  l e  fo u n d
o f  /
1* O liv e  & W ilso n , p ,1 7 6  (com m enting upon  th e  c a s e  o f  Young)*
2* ()B71), 9 Macph* 449*
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o f  a  hu sb an d  h a v in g  gone a b ro a d  -  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  Canada 
and  h a v in g  made h i s  w ife  an  o f f e r  t o  a d h e re  i n  th e  
form  o f  a s k in g  h e r  t o  come o u t to  j o i n  h im , i n  w h ich  
th e  c o u r t  d id  n o t  c o n s id e r  i t  r e a s o n a b le  t h a t  th e  
w ife  sh o u ld  do s o ,  and  w ould n o t  e n t e r t a i n  th e  o f f e r  
a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  d i s m is s in g  an  a c t io n  o f  a l im e n t  r a i s e d  
by th e  w i f e .  "H is  o f f e r  i s  s im p ly  an  o f f e r  t o  sen d  
h i s  w ife  and  c h i l d r e n  t o  a p la c e  w here he i s  n o t  now, 
and  may n e v e r  be  a g a in ,  w here h e  h a s  n o th in g  o f  t h e  
n a tu r e  o f  a home, and w here he was m e re ly  w o rk in g  f o r  
w eek ly  w ages , so  lo n g  a s  h i s  em p lo y ers  w ere  w i l l i n gAt o  keep  him " •
I n  su c h  ex trem e  c a s e s  -  and w here an  o f f e r  may 
smack o f  e x p e d ie n c y  and la c k  o f  bona f i d e s  -  an  
an sw er may n o t  be  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d ,  b u t  th e  m e r i t s  
may be l e s s  c l e a r - c u t ,  and le a v in g  a s id e  th e  som etim es 
d i f f i c u l t  and  t e c h n i c a l  r u l e s  c o n c e rn in g  o f f e r s  t o  
a d h e re  ( a l th o u g h  o f  c o u rs e  th e y  c a n n o t be  f a r  d i s t a n t  
from  th e  d i s c u s s io n )  p r i o r i t y  i n  c h o ic e  o f  home i s  
t r u l y  a s u b j e c t  p r o d u c t iv e  o f  p ro b lem s when t h e r e  a r e  
two c a r e e r s  w i th in  one f a m i ly ,  and w here t h e r e  a r e  no 
c h i l d r e n ,  o r  grow n-up and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  c h i l d r e n  
o n ly ,  and  w here th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  h u sb an d  and w ife  
d i f f e r  on th e  m a t t e r .
I f  t h e  r u l e  w ere t h a t  th e  w ife  had  t h e  c h o ic e  
o f  g o in g  w ith  h e r  husb an d  and  b e in g  s u p p o r te d  i n  a 
home o f  h i s  c h o ic e ,  l o c a te d  i n  a p la c e  t o  s u i t  h i s  
r e q u ir e m e n ts ,  o r  re m a in in g  b e h in d  and r e c e iv in g  
p e r i o d i c  r e g u l a r  a llo w a n c e s  from  h im , p e rh a p s  t h i s  
w ould b e n e f i t  t h e  w ife  to o  g r e a t l y  and w ould  r e p r e s e n t  
a  m easu re  o f  u n f a i r n e s s  t o  h u sb a n d s , who w ould th e n  
be r e q u i r e d  t o  a l im e n t  n o t  o n ly  an a d u l t e r o u s  o r  c r u e l  
w ife  b u t  one who, w h ile  n o t  i n  d e s e r t i o n  s t r i c t l y  
s p e a k in g ,  n e v e r th e l e s s  r e f u s e d  to  accom pany him t o  
th o s e  /
1• p e r  L .P . ( I n g l i s )  a t  p . 454,
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those places which his career dictated* As regards 
cruelty or adultery, the reason for his continuing 
obligation is that the remedy is in his own hands; 
he may obtain a decree of divorce* Under any such 
new formulation, non-compliance with a husband’s 
reasonable plans could hardly be said to amount to 
desertion, if that was one of the choices legitimately 
open to the wife to take*
It is possible that the "two-year consent divorce"
(Divorce (Sc*) Act, 1976, s*1(2)(d)) may provide a 
natural solution to this dilemma in cases where lack 
of co-operation is in truth indicative of marriage 
breakdown* In other cases, matters will be arranged 
privately and amicably* The answer must lie, of 
course, in the criterion of ’reasonableness* and the 
rule, at present, would seem to be that a wife must 
comply with requests and plans, and accept new 
accommodation so long as i t  i s  • not highly
unsuitable* It may be that there is a trend towards
taking more account of the wife’s wishes and views, if 
reasonable*
Under our present law, the husband must aliment 
his wife if she is living apart with his consent or 
at his request (MacLure v. M.) but not if she is 
living apart without his consent or without legal 
justification for doing so* In the latter case, he 
also has the remedy of an action of divorce for 
desertion*
Though the duty of adherence may be owed, the 
Courts will not order spouses to resume cohabitation, 
or order one spouse to cease being unwilling to adhere, 
which would be an order u n d e s i r a b le ,  and Impossible, 
to enforce* An action for permanent aliment alone 
(that is, without a conclusion also for adherence o r  
separation)is nowadays unknown*
It was not always so, there being older cases 
where /
1 .  Cf. S . L. C.  C o n s u l t a t iv e  Memo. Fo. 54, 9*3•
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where the matrimonial offence was proved I n  the
action for aliment and the result in practice was
the same, hut Lord Fraser comments, "in this neglect2of fo rm , principle is apt to he oyer-looked" . A 
great deal of confusion surrounds the terminology 
used here. The Scottish Law Commission has 
recommended a clarification"^.
To return to the subject of accommodation, 
the case of Darroch v. D. provides another interesting 
example of behaviour#
This case again was an action of divorce brought 
by the husband on the ground of the wife’s desertion# 
One of the principal points of conflict was that 
desertion was averred, by the husband, to have 
commenced on 15th March 1943, at which date the wife, 
holding decree of adherence and aliment, refused to 
return to her husband and live with him in a furnished 
room, on the ground that the accommodation was 
inadequate.
The Sheriff Substitute refused to recall the 
previous decree of adherence and aliment. In turn, 
his interlocutor was recalled by the Sheriff^Principal 
and this decision was affirmed by the Second Division*
The L.O. (Keith) held that the effect of the 
interlocutors of the Sheriff-Principal and the Second 
Division could not be retrospective, and that therefore 
it could not be said that desertion began in May, 1944 
(the /
1* Mackellar v. M* (1838), 16 8.1149: Williamson v.¥.(1860) 22 D.599% Mason v* M* 26 June 1839, F.C* cited by Fr* (1,840).2. See generally L. Fraser’s discussion of thissubject - I, 840-843* And see also, on thesubject of the roles of Sheriff Court and Court of Session historically in the provision of the remedy of aliment, Memo. No.22, Appendix A, para*10.3* Sc.Law Com* Memo. No.22, Faculty Response.
4. 1947 B.C.110.
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(the date of the Sheriff Principal’s interlocutor). 
However, it was decided by the Second Division that 
the opposite was the case, and that the effects o f  
the judgments (that the offer was reasonable and 
should be accepted) were retrospective* I t  was also 
held that t h e  time-lag between the S h e r i f f  « ^ S u b s titu te  ’ s  
Interlocutor and th e  application to t h e  Sheriff, did 
not necessarily interrupt the running of the period 
of desertion *
The accommodation consisted of a furnished room 
with use of kitchen and bathroom# The parties had 
previously lived with the defender’s mother, in a 
bungalow, an arrangement which had not turned out 
well, and had resulted in the defender’s mother 
ordering h e r  son-in-law out of th e  house. 
(Notwithstanding these facts, the defender had 
succeeded in 1936 in obtaining decree of a d h e re n c e  
and aliment).
The L.J.Clerk (Cooper) on reading the Sheriff- 
Substitute’s note, was able to say that the case had 
caused him some difficulty and was in his opinion 
a narrow one. He felt that th e  husband’s (standing) 
offer and the pronouncements thereon by the Sheriff 
Principal and Division ought to have been accepted 
by the wife, "and I do not understand why our decision 
should be subordinated to that of the Sheriff-Substitute 
whom we reversed".
According to Lord Mackay, the Substitute had not 
concurred in the wife’s standard (which consisted of 
a desire for something comparable with "a modern 
bungalow with three apartments and kitchenette and 
bathroom") nor had he concurred in the wife’s view 
that the proffered accommodation was "filthy"* His 
Lordship felt the notion was absurd (and seemed to 
think /
1. See per L.Mackay at pp*117/118.
363
think that the Substitute thought so too) that the
wife of a soldier returning to civil life - or 
partly doing so - should aspire to the standard of 
housing to which h e r  mother had attained*
The "bungalow" suggestion was withdrawn at the 
proof in accordance with the Sheriff’s decision*
His Lordship felt that proof must be allowed and he 
suspected that it would show that the wife had not 
changed her attitude from the beginning (which he 
paraphrased as "I will not adhere to you unless you 
o f f e r  me something better than t h a t  house and something 
as good as the bungalow of my mother")* If that was 
proved, L ord  Mackay c o u ld  not see why it should be 
"impossible" (L.Keith’s word) to hold that desertion 
commenced in March, 1943, and why I t  had  t o  be said 
that the desertion could not have begun before June 
1945 (date o f  decision by Second Division)* The 
action of divorce was brought on 7/3/46.
The height of unreasonableness, absurdity and 
unfairness can be seen in the case of Stewart v. S*^  
in which a husband brought an undefended action of 
divorce f o r  desertion against his wife*
L* Kilbrandon regretfully f e l t  himself obliged 
to grant divorce* The pursuer averred that, though 
he was willing and anxious that there should be a 
resumption of cohabitation, his wife refused to comply 
with his request*
"He has proved that" (i.e. willingness to resume 
cohabitation) "subject to this qualification - he 
insisted on making his home with his parents, his 
mother being in charge of the joint household".* To 
that qualification the wife perhaps not surprisingly 
was unwilling to accede* There was no necessity for
such a course of action. A local authority house
had /
1. 1939 S.L.T* (Notes) 70.
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h a d  b e e n  a l l o t t e d  t e  t h e  huabaW # and  h l a  w if e  h ad
h e r a e l f  p u ra h a e e d  a  h o u se  I n  A berdeen# B e th  t h e s e  
o f f e r s  o f  aeoom m odatlon w ere  r e f u s e d  by  t h e  h u a b an d .
I t  w ou ld  th u e  a p p e a r  t l i a t  a  w ife  may n o t  
u o re a e o n a b ly  r e f u s e  h e r  h u sb a n d *a  o f f e r  o f  a  hom e, 
b u t  i n  l i k e  o lp o u m e tan o ea  h e  may r e f u s e  h e r  o f f e r #
H ie  L o rd s h ip  o o n o lu d e d ) -
" T h is  a t t i t u d e  was oom ip le te ly  u n re a a o n a b le  end  
u t t e r l y  e e l f i e h ,  b u t  I  r e g r e t  t o  s a y  t h a t  by  o u r  law  
t h e  h u sb an d  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  ivW le e a y  on  t h e  
q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  l o o a t i o n  o f  th e  m a tr im o n ia l  hom e, 
ev en  w here  t h a t  l o o a t i o n  l a  n e t  d l o t a t e d  by  a  
o o n a id e r a t i o n ,  euoh  a s  t h e  lo o n t lo n  o f  t h e  h u e b a n d ’n 
em ploym ent, w h ich  l a  o f  j o i n t  I m te r e a t  t o  t h e  apouaea# 
8 u o h , aa  I  u n d e ra ta n d  I t ,  l a  n o t  th e  o f  E n g la n d , 
lA e re  a  m ore e n l ig h te n e d  v lev / o f  t h e  r i g h t s  end  
o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o r tn e r a  i n  m atrim ony eeem s t o  
p r e v a i l  on  t h i a  p a r t i o u l a r  to p ic #  H ow ever, I  M v e  
t o  a d m in i s t e r  t h e  law  o f  B o o tland#  I t  may be  t h a t  
i n  t h i s  om ae, h a d  0ho  d e fe n d e d  i t ,  t h e  w if e  c o u ld  
h av e  d is c h a r g e d  t h e  pniqe o f  show ing t h a t  t h e  accom m odation  
o f f e r e d  by th e  huebend  w as u t t e r l y  u n e u ltm b le ,  b u t  
t M t  d oea  n o t  a r i e e " #
Thun#, we h a v e  tw o good d e m o n a tra t io n a  o f  
u n re n a o n e b le  b e h a v io u r  -  one by a  h u a b a n d , an d  one 
by  a  w if e  -  end  o f  t h e i r  o f  f o o t  a a  t h e  lew  a ta n d a
1# Cf# C l iv e  and  W ilso n , p#1T5% "A lth o u g h  t h e  
im ab an d ’ a r i ^ i t  t o  ch o o se  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home i s  n o t  a W o lu te  h e  i n  a t i l l  i n  a  s t r o n g e r  l e g a l  p o s i t i o n  th a n  t h e  w ife  #### The h u a b a n d ’a c h o ic e  m ust b e  ro a e o n a b le  b u t  i t  n eed  n o t  bo m ore r e a s o n a b le  t h a n ,  o r  oven  @a r e a s o n a b le  a s ,  t h e  
w i f e ’# # "  See S.L.C.Memo. N o .54» 9 . 1 - 9 . 4  ( r e a s o n a b le n e s s ) .2# Bee a u g g e a te d  t r e a tm e n t  o f  t h i s  p ro b le m :" L o c a tio n  o f  M a tr im o n ia l Home", C h a p te r  7#
3 . With regard to  the m atrim onial home, th ere  i s  now, o f  co a r se ,
a new Act o f  c o n s id e r a b le  importance and co m p lex ity :  the
Matrimonial Homes (Family P r o te c t io n )  (S c o t la n d )  A ct, I 98I .
See book o f  th a t  name, D .I .  N icho ls  and M.C. Meston. See 
a l s o  Chapter 7*
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Importance of Willingness to Adhere and R e la te d  Topics
Until the Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976, it could
be said that the obligation upon a husband to aliment
his w ife  did not extend to the situation w here she
lived apart from him without legal justification*
This rule was referable to the principle previously
noted that a husband performs all that is legally
required of him by maintaining his w ife  at bed and
board, and consequently if she, by her conduct, ,
renders that situation impossible, then his duty
towards her is at an end unless and until cohabitation
is resumed or she at least shows herself willing to1adhere whatever his f e e l i n g s  in th e  matter • section 
7 of the 1 9 7 6 Act has stood this rule upon its head.
A wife was not entitled to disdain aliment 
provided in such a way (by the provision of food, 
clothing, warmth and a roof), and to demand support 
instead in cash terms, but the new rule makes inroads 
upon this principle to some extent by providing that 
the court may grant depree for interim aliment where 
the parties are living apart^ and where the pursuer 
is unwilling to cohabit with the defender whether 
or not the pursuer has reasonable cause for not so 
cohabiting by virtue of the circumstances set forth 
in /
1. "But unless she has left his house in consequence of his c r u e l t y  or adultery, or with his consent, he is not bound to aliment her while she is living apart from him", Walton, p.142: note theuse of " h i s "  house. A revolution in th o u g h t  has taken place ev en  since 1951.2. Memo*Ho*22, 2.165/166 (Propn.33) recommends abolition of the present confusing d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  ’interim* and ’permanent’ aliment:Faculty Response, pp.37/38.3* See Memo. Propn.39 (enforceable a l im e n ta r yprovision stante matrimonio): "... An offer bythe defender to provide support in kind in the home should n o t  be a defence to such an action i f  in fact i t  was the lack of adequate support which rendered the action necessary". Faculty Response, pp.41/42.
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in s.l(2)(a) - (o)^, but, where the pursuer does
not have reasonable cause for not cohabiting, the
court shall not grant decree if satisfied that the
defender is willing to cohabit with the pursuer*2Professor Clive explains that since divorce was
to become competent after the expiry of certain
periods of separation, a provision of this kind,
operating to allow a claim for aliment where neither
spouse wishes to adhere to the other, is useful.
On quantum, the Act (s.7(2)) states that, in decrees
of separation and aliment, adherence and aliment, or
interim aliment, the court shall have regard to the
respective means of the parties and to all the
circumstances of the case, (s.5(2)), and hence it
seems to be clear (not so before ^ ) that (Clive)
"conduct is relevant in quantifying aliment in an%action of separation and aliment" *
On the other hand, it is not true to say that
cohabitation was always the test in this context,
since, as has been seen in the case of MacLure, the
duty would and will continue where the wife lives
apart with her husband’s consent and at his request,
and, further, perhaps more surprising, the duty to
maintain will subsist though the wife has been4guilty of adultery - or, indeed,of cruelty . It 
does not appear that the 1976 Act, though making a 
certain discernible shift of emphasis in "conduct 
criteria for entitlement to aliment" , (willingness 
to adhere) has made any change with regard to the 
treatment /
1. See Memo. 2,150 (Methods of fulfilling alimentary obligations): Faculty Response, p,34,2. "The Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976", E.M.Clive, p.25.3* Clive, ibid* and oases there cited.4. Milne vTTC (1901) 8 S.L.T.375, Harkness v. H. (1961) 77 8h.Gt.Rep.l65, Donnelly v. D. 1959 S.C.97.5. Nisbet v. N. (1896) 4 S.L.T. 158.6* See infra, p. 36? e t  s e g .
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t r e a tm e n t  or significance in law of t h e  (other) 
b e h a v io u r  of the claimant#
An adulterous or c r u e l  w i f e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  is
entitled t o  lo o k  t o  her husband f o r  aliment so long 
as the marriage subsists, and the rationale behind 
this principle appears to be that, as th e  law  of 
d iv o r c e  stood b e f o r e  1 /1 /7 7 ,  the rem edy lay in t h e  
husband’s hands* He might bring an action o f  
divorce on e i t h e r  o f  those g ro u n d s and th u s  rid 
h im s e l f  o f  t h e  financial liability o f  t h e  marriage 
bond"** Until 1977 , it could be said in broad terms 
that the duty to adhere was the counterpart o f  the 
duty to aliment^* Now, if the d e fe n d e r  has given 
the pursuer no cause for the letter’s non-adherence, 
and the defender is willing to cohabit, t h e  court 
may not grant decree for aliment# Willingness of 
the pursuer t o  adhere remains relevant - but in an 
indirect manner - and the provision i s  more 
conservative than at first sight it appears, but 
the emphasis h a s  changed. The section begins, 
"Without prejudice to i t s  other powers to award 
aliment **•", which opening words may perhaps be 
said to cut down t h e  ambit of i t s  operations 
P resum ab ly  it i s  still the case that, until divorce, 
th e  husband owes a duty to aliment the wife if the 
latter, be h e r  conduct, in the fo rm e r  terminology, 
’guilty’ or ’innocent’, is willing to a d h e re  ( o f .  
Clive, "The Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1 9 7 6 " , p . 25 : 
"[T]hese o th e r  pow ers include t h e  power to award 
aliment in an action of separation and a l im e n t ,  
or a d h e re n c e  and aliment, or inan application for 
aliment pendente lite in an  action for divorce, or 
in /
1. See now Div.(Sc.) Act, 1976, s*1(2)(a)-(e).2. See e.g. L.Guest’s opinion in Jack v. J. 1962 S.C.24, at p.25, "...the husband’s duty of support is correlative to the wife’s willingness to adhere".
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in an action of interim aliment where the pursuer
has a relevant claim at common law, e.g. where he
or she is willing to adhere") and her duty is still
that laid down by the Act of 1920, s.4. The 1964
Act, s.6 remedied an undoubted defects 1976 Act, s . 7 , may be a
continuation of a train of thought."* The result is
however that aliment may foe due to the adulterous
and/or cruel wife, though unwilling to adhere
(provided that the other is not willing to adhere):
a thorough and fundamental review of the relationship
between conduct and entitlement to aliment is surely psorely needed #
Thus, it seems that while a husband must 
support an adulterous wife (willing (or not) to adhere) 
if he does not choose to divorce her or to provide 
support in kind by cohabitation, his wife, in an 
equivalent situation, would have justifiable grounds 
for non-adherence, entitling her to seek decree of 
divorce or separation or to attempt to obtain a 
consensual financial or other settlement, but in any 
event would be entitled to claim an alimentary 
allowance.
In other words, her adultery does not necessarily 
deprive her of her marital rights or at least of all 
of them (since her adultery is ample cause for her 
husband legitimately to refuse to adhere to her ) or 
relieve her of her marital duties - all will depend 
upon the husband♦s inclination - but his adultery - 
depending upon the wife’s inclination - will probably 
render mandatory one of his marital duties (of support) 
without any reciprocal marital rights, since his
wife will be quite justified in refusing to adhere,%if that is the course which she wishes to take .
The /
1. See infra,pp_.373-4 f and see Clive, ibid., pp.25/26, where is discussed the interaction oT“common law and statutory rules.2. Cf. Memo.No.22, 2.120-125; Faculty Response, pp.25-31. 3* Cf. the interesting case of Taylor (1903), infra,pp. 382-5.
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The latter situation (of the wife) is not 
criticised: the fo rm e r  (of the husband) is also
logical, (though the effect of s.7 is surely to 
make the r u l e  p o t e n t i a l l y  h a r s h e r )  y e t  it is not
t h e  case i n  e v e ry  jurisdiction that a man who does 
not wish ( o r  perhaps does not recognise) d iv o r c e  
need aliment an adulterous wife'* #
Of c o u r s e, if a wife has a duty to aliment her 
husband in terms o f  th e  M.W.P. (So*) Act, 1920, s.4, 
she too in the above circumstances might be required 
to aliment an adulterous spouse*
pL*J.Cl#Thomson’e view in Donnelly was that 
"On principle, so long as t h e  marriage subsists, 
t h e  obligation to aliment likewise subsists". It 
was long accepted, he said, that, i f  having grounds 
f o r  divorce, a h u sb an d  prefers th e  l e s s e r  rem edy o f  
separation, he must continue to aliment h i s  wife 
during the resultant separation. Until he actually 
obtained decree of divorce, t h e  obligation remained.
"The advantage of t h e  view that, so long as 
the bond s u b s i s t s ,  so  does th e  obligation, i s  that 
everybody knows where they stand* T h ere  is no 
room f o r  a debateable g round  of c h a rg e  and counter­
charge, suspicion and u n c e r t a i n t y " . The husband 
could obtain a divorce and so  terminate the 
o b l i g a t i o n  to aliment.
T hus, u n t i l  the marriage bond is severed by 
decree of divorce, the husband is liable to support 
h i s  /
1. See, for example, South Africa - Hahlo, The South African Law of Husband and Wife, p.110, fn.65, where Scots law (Donnelly) is contrasted withS.African, Rhodesian,and English Law. As to English law, see Cretney, pp.217/218 - no common law obligation t o  maintain if the wife has been guilty of a d u l t e r y ,  cruelty, o r  i s  i n  desertion and has made no bona fide offer to return. By virtue of s.7, Scotland seems to h ave  placed herself yet f u r t h e r  out of step.2* at p.101*
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his wife though she he cruel or adulterous, (and 
this now without the proviso of willingness to 
adhere) or if she is living apart with his consent 
o r  at his request (MacLure).
The concept of cruelty itself has undergone
much r e f in e m e n t  over the years'*. An interesting
light is shed upon standards in this matter at
the time of L* Fraser’s Treatise. He cites as
examples the f o l lo w in g : -  *’The. husband has the right
and i t  i s  therefore not cruelty in the eye of the
law, f o r  him  absolutely to forbid the wife’s friends
from v i s i t i n g  her in his house* I n  ordinary
circumstances, t h i s  might be considered a harsh
exercise of marital authority; but there may be
c a u s e s  to j u s t i f y  the prohibition, of the reasonableness
of w hich  a c o u r t  cannot, and is not, called upon
to ju d g e ;  for though the wife may be v e ry  amiable,Pher connections may not be so"”. Again, he refers 
to Grotius (2.5.8) for authority to the effect that 
a wife may be confined by her husband to the house, 
or that at least he might ^direct her movements in 
such a manner as to p r e v e n t  her going to places, and 
engaging in pursuits, of which he disapproves".
If i t  transpires that a defender’s offer to 
adhere is held to be genuine, and it is considered 
that the pursuer has unreasonably r e f u s e d  i t ,  the 
latter p a r t y  will be in desertion thenceforth^*
Nowadays he or she is not entitled to refuse the 
offer, or to hedge it about with conditions, on 
the ground that the defender’s friends are not to 
his /
1. See A.M.McLeans ’The Evolution of the Doctrine of Matrimonial Cruelty’s a note on Grant v. G. 1974S .L .T . (N o te s )  54. Jo* of the Law Society of Scotland Jan.1975 Vol.20 No.1.2* C i t in g  Cadboll v. C. 5 S u p .475 (1 7 5 8 ) ;  Waring v* W. 2 Hag. C.R.159; Neeld V. N. 4 Hag, E.C* R.268,3 . D a rro c h  v .  D. 1947 B .C .110 .
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h i s  o r  h e r  l i k i n g  and  t h a t  t h e  d e fe n d e r  m ust g lv a  
them  up * p r o v id e d ,  o f  o o u r a e ,  t h a t  th e r e  l a  no 
q u e s t io n  o f  a d u l t e r o u s  o r  Im m oral b e h a v io u r^ #
pWe a r e  rem inded  by F r a a e r  t h a t  I t  l a  a n  
e s s e n t i a l  o r  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  o f  a  s u i t  f o r  a l im e n t  
t h a t  t h e  husb an d  and w ife  b e  n o t  c o h a b i t in g #  " I f  
8he o o h a b i t  w i th  h im , an  a o t l o n  f o r  s e p a r a t e  
m a in te n a n c e  i s  absurdw # T h is  ru le #  th e r e f o r e #  w i l l  
p r e c lu d e  t h e  w ife  from  c la im in g  i n  c o u r t ,  d u r in g  
c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  any  f i x e d  p r o p o r t io n ,  o r  r e a s o n a b le  
sum# o u t  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  s a l a r y ,  and  i t  i s  s u b m itte d  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  d e f e c t  i n  o u r  p r e s e n t  sy s tem ^^
I f  sh e  h a s  b e e n  d e s e r t e d ,  h e r  rem edy i s  a n  a c t i o n  
o f  a d h e re n c e  and  a lim e n t*  i f  c r u e l l y  t r e a t e d  
( a c c o r d in g  t o  m odem  s ta n d a r d s  and v ie w s  and  w h e th e r  
i n  m ind , s p i r i t  o r  i n  body) th e n  s h e  m ust s e e k  d e c re e  
o f  s e p a r a t i o n  and  a l im e n t .  ^B ut t o  i n s t i t u t e  an  
a c t i o n  f o r  a l im e n t  d i r e c t l y  and  n o t  a s  i n c i d e n t a l  t o  
a n o th e r  a c t i o n ,  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  p r i n c i p l e  and  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  c o n ju g a l  r e la t io n * ^ ^ ^ ^
G re a t  /
1* B u r n e t t  v# B* 193# 8#C#1, ( s e q u e l  t o  c a s e  r e p o r t e d1955 B«G#183) i n  w h ich  t h e r e  was in v o lv e d  a  f r i e n d s h i p  w i th  a  p e rs o n  o f  t h e  o p p o s i te  s e x  from  t h e  d e f e n d e r ,  a  f r i e n d s h i p  w h ic h , i n  & p r e v io u s  
a c t i o n  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n  and  a l im e n t ,  h ad  f a i l e d  t o  p ro v id e  t h e  b a s i s  t h e r e f o r ,  and  upon  w h ic h , i n  t h e  i n s t a n t  a c t i o n ,  t h e  c o u r t  fo u n d  no g ro u n d s  f o r  s u s p i c i o n .  ■ I n  th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s , t h e  wife's o f f e r  t o  a d h e re  was o b j e c t i o n a b le ,  e i t h e r  on t h e  
g ro u n d  t h a t  i t  was n o t  g e n u in e  (v ie w  o f  8h#~8ub8*88 s e t  fo rm  and  a p p ro v e d  by  th e  L .P . (C ly d e ) )  a n d /  o r  on t h e  g ro u n d  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  n o t  be  s o  q u a l i f i e d  
( d e c i s i o n  o f  F i r s t  D i v i s i o n ) ,2* a t  p . 639#3* Gf* Memo# N o .2 2 , p ropn#39  (2 .1 8 2 )  and F a c u l tyR e sp o n se , p p .4 l /4 2 #4. F r . I ,  # 3 9 , and  s e e  supra# p p ,  3 6o-3 6i.
5. But se e  S .L .C .C o n su lta t iv e  Memo.wo,54,4 , 1- 4 .6  ( c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  the  a c t io n  o f  a d h eren ce) .  The Commission ( 4 . 4 )  saw no reason in  fu tu re  why a w ife  should  n ot r a i s e  an a c t io n  f o r  a lim ent a lo n e ,  and concluded p r o v i s io n a l ly  (4*6)  th a t  i t  should  not lo n g er  be competent 
to  cVatfe or conclude f o r ,  a d ecree  o f  adherence. The proposa l ^is  not conce’ti^ed w ith  the concept o f  w i l l in g n e s s  to  adhere* (or  w ith  freedom to r a i s e  an a c t io n  fo r  a l im en t)  'but s im ply  with the  
competency o f  a sk in g  a court to  grant a d ecree  ordgù&ng one spouse  to  adhere to  the o th e r * .  The view was taken  th a t  the remedy was u n necessary  and o b s o le t e ,  and could  be used  fo r  t a c t i c a l  rea so n s .
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Great importance has been ascribed to the duty
to a d h e re  and because of t h i s ,  th e  courts will not
enforce a contract for voluntary separationj although,
as will be discussed l a t e r ,  the financial aspects2thereof may be regarded as severable #
I t  cannot be pretended that the history and 
development o f  this subject has been as straightforward 
or satisfactory as an outline of the rules might first 
suggest* For example, until the Divorce (So*) A c t, 
1964, 8 *6 , i t  was necessary f o r  a w i f e ,  whose husband's 
conduct had given her j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  non-adherence 
though n o t  p e rh a p s  for decree of divorce o r  separation, 
or who had  d e s e r t e d  her, to aver h e r  willingness to 
adhere to him* If sh e  could not or w ould not do so, 
her position was that, while she was not regarded as 
being i n  d e s e r t i o n ,  she was not e n t i t l e d  to make a 
claim for aliment*
T h is  artificial and punitive rule was remedied 
by 3 * 6 which provides*** "W ithou t p r e ju d ic e  t o  its
other powers to award aliment, it shall be competent 
for t h e  court in an action of i n te r im  aliment to 
g r a n t  decree of i n t e r im  aliment where it is satisfied 
t h a t  the pursuer is with just cause living in 
separation from  the d e fe n d e r  by reason of the 
desertion or o t h e r  c o n d u c t o f  the defender"^*
A /
1, Of* Macdonald v* M**s 1rs* (1863) 1 Macph* 1065 p e r  L* Ardmillan - "Now, the separate residence of spouses is what t h e  law does n o t  favour, and a contract for separate residence the law will not enforce. Such voluntary separate residence 
may be t e r m in a te d  at any time, and, that being so, the deed making provision f o r  such an  arrangement is as revocable as the a rra n g e m e n t itself"*2* Hood V* H* (1 8 7 1 ) 9 M acph*449: B e l l  v .  B* F e b ,22, 1812, F.C.s Livingston V. Bogg 1666 M.6153*3. see further, Clive & Wilson p.194, footnote 72 explaining t h e  amelioration provided by 8 .6 ,  and the problems which existed before as to the attitude of C o u rt of Session and Sheriff Court t o  actions o f  aliment alone*
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A good judicial expression of the law before
1964 is found in the Slieriff-Substitute's opinion 
1 \in Barrow v, B, , ) In Jack , L.J*Clerk (Thomson)^ /rem arked  "It i/é not unreasonable to suggest 
t h a t ,  if t h e  l a #  i s  prepared to say that one spouse 
need not adhere because o f  the other's unconscionable 
conduct, the innocent spouse should be entitled to 
aliment, ev en  though she  cannot establish the grounds 
which t h e  law requires for judicial separation. But 
it i s  not within our powers as a c o u r t  of law to make 
such an innovation* Parliament, and Parliament a lo n e ,  
can do so".
Parliament provided the rem edy^, but that 
legislative provision I t s e l f ,  t o g e th e r  w i th  all other 
provisions of the 1964 Act, has been repealed by the 
Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976^.
The Divorce (Scotland) A c t, 1976, s . 7 provides 
that the c o u r t  (being the Court of Session or the 
Sheriff Court) may grant decree f o r  i n t e r im  aliment 
if satisfied that the parties a r e  not cohabiting, 
and that the pursuer is unwilling to cohabit with 
the defender w h e th e r  or not the pursuer has reasonable 
cause for not so cohabiting by virtue of the 
circumstances set out in s*1 (2 )(a) (c), but that,
where the pursuer does not have reasonable cause for 
not cohabiting, the court shall not grant decree if 
satisfied that the defender is willing to cohabit 
with the pursuer*
T h is  b r in g s  one step c l o s e r  the position that 
conduct sh o u ld  not be a relevant consideration i n  
financial /
1* 1960 8 .L .T *  ( S h . c t . )  18 a t  p . 19*2* 1962 8*C*24.
3 * at p.31*4. of* Memo*No*22, 2.165/166.5. see Clive, i b i d ** p,26* "The 1964 Act i s  repealed in i t s  entirety. So it i s  necessary to p ro v id e  afresh in s.7 *•••"
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financial questions arising during the marriage.
It is interesting that the concept of 'willingness 
to adhere* (of the defender) remains of importance'*.
An action of interim aliment may he brought 
before the Sheriff as a summary cause if the am ount 
c la im e d  does not exceed the sum of per week in
respect of the pursuer, and £7 * 5 0 per week in respect 
of each child ( i f  any) of the marriage.. These 
amounts may be varied by order of the Lord Advocate, 
the power to be exercised by Statutory I n s t r u m e n t  
subject to annulment by resolution of either House^.
An example of the post-1964 situation is found 
in the case of Barr v. B. which p ro v id e s  authority 
for the proposition that a p r o p e r  construction of 
the /
1. Contrast Memo.Ho.22, 2 .1 2 0  et seq. (M o n -p a tr im o n ia lconditions of liability)# Propn* 27 advocated that "it should no longer be a condition of . e n t i t l e m e n t  to a l im e n t  as between spouses that the claimant is willing to adhere o r  has reasonable cause for non-adherence"♦ This was set as thebasis for discussion, but it can be seen t h a t  the recommendation has b een  speedily answered by s.8 , at least in part: the continuing importance ofthe defender's attitude therein affirmed takes away perhaps from  the fundamentalist character of t h e  change. At 2.125, th e  suggestion made was t o  dissociate considerations of conduct from questions of entitlement to aliment. The arguments in favour o f  and against conduct-linked criteria are well set forth at 2.120-1251 in Faculty Response, pp.25-31, an alternative scheme, retaining the concept of willingness to adhere, and utilising a new concept of "gross contempt of the marriage" is put forward f o r  consideration.There are, of c o u r s e ,  two aspects o f  "conduct- linked criteria" - Willingness to adhere (of either or both), and the old notions of " f a u l t " , which at least in ss.1 (2 )(a)-(c) form  the basis of the irretrievable breakdown ground of dissolution of marriage. See Clive "The Divorce (Sc.) Act, 
1 9 7 6 ", pp.2 5 / 2 6  for assessment of current position with regard to 'willingness to adhere' and 'reasonable cause f o r  not cohabiting*.2. 8 ,8 , 1976 Act.3 .  1968 S .L .T .3 7 .
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the statutory phrase - "by reason of the desertion 
or other conduct of the defender" - is that "other 
conduct" be read to mean conduct which, in the context 
of a divorce for desertion, would provide a defence 
of reasonable cause for non-adherence.
The action was one raised by the wife in which 
she sought a declarator that she was with just cause 
living in separation from her husband, and for 
interim aliment* Custody was not disputed nor was 
the pursuer's right to aliment for the child.
The crux of the question therefore was whether
she had just cause for living in separation from her
husband in terms of the 1964 Act, s.6 , and in construing
"other conduct", Sh. Forsyth remarked , "In my opinion,
the "other conduct" cannot be restricted to a
matrimonial offence, such as cruelty, adultery or
sodomy. There already exists the remedy of
separation and aliment when such an offence can be
proved, and therefore there would be no need to
introduce the provision contained in s.6". On the
other hand, although in terms the crave was for
"interim aliment", the old problem arose that it
could continue indefinitely and become permanent2aliment de facto , and the Sheriff was not disposed 
to d is p e n s e  with full legal proof.
If the "other conduct" be not construed as 
being a matrimonial offence, then it would be conduct 
falling short of that, but sufficient to justify 
decree of separation, but if that were the case, 
where would the line be drawn? The Sheriff elected 
to follow L.Patrick's definition in Richardson v. R.^ 
namely /
1. at p.3 8 .2. See MemOèNo*22, 2.165 ^  seq. and Propn. 33 (abolition of distinction between 'interim' and 'permanent* aliment) and Faculty Response, pp. 
3 7/3 8 , on this problem.3* 1956 S.C. 394.
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namely that conduct to excuse non-adherence, if not 
adultery, cruelty or sodomy "must be something grave 
and weighty and such that it would shock the conscience 
of reasonable men to require the offended spouse to 
live with the offender again".
The husband was willing to resume cohabitations 
the wife was not willing to go back.
Applying that test to the case in hand, the 
Sheriff had no difficulty in finding the evidence of 
the husband more credible than that of the wife, and 
even if the letter's averments had been sufficiently 
vouched, they did not in themselves approach the ' grave 
and weighty* standard and the declarator and also 
consequently aliment were refused. Had the case 
arisen after 1st January, 1977, since it was held 
that the pursuer had not reasonable cause for not 
cohabiting, and since the defender was willing to 
resume cohabitation, the same decision would have been 
reached.
4Clive and Wilson point out that, in certain cases, 
wives may be incapable mentally of forming an intention 
to, or of entertaining willingness to, adhere, (through 
mental illness or disturbance) or physically cannot 
give effect to willingness (if, for example, the 
husband is incarcerated in a prison or other place of 
confinement) and that in these cases the husband must 
still aliment her.
pWalton makes clear that since a wife's claim 
for aliment ranks after claims against her husband 
by his (other) creditors, the husband "cannot resist 
an action for a lawful debt on the ground that he 
must maintain his wife". Similarly, it may be 
noticed, it is generally thought that a husband 
Cannot /
1. p.191 and cases there cited.2. p.142.
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cannot resist an action o r  a claim for aliment by 
his wife on the ground that he must maintain his 
mistress •
Although that may be so, and although there is 
no obligation in law for a man to support a paramour, 
the husband's obligation to support any children born 
of his mistress if he has fathered them (though not if 
he has not* even  though they are living in family 
with him - although the circumstances may indicate 
that he has voluntarily adopted this responsibility^) 
remains exigible in law, and morally, and* because it 
is undoubtedly more expensive to maintain two 
establishments than one, and because the courts will 
hot award a sum so high as to be unlikely to be 
recovered, however well merited such an award might 
be - and even if they did, or even if they awarded a 
moderate sum, there are great practical difficulties 
in the recovery of that sum since t h e  unwilling husband 
may be elusive - it may be that cognisance is given in 
fact, albeit tacitly, to the second establishment^*^.
In /
1. but see below.2. See Memo.No.22, 2,52 et seq. (De facto family membership) (Propn. 13 - iTabili'îy W"aTiment an "accepted" child, having supported him for a period of not less than five years); Faculty Response, pp.14-16 where it was suggested that the five-year provision might be harsh, and that the proposed formulation might be improved by the insertion instead of a wider test, such as "for a substantial period".)3. But see MeCarrol v. McC. 1966 S.L.T. (Sh.C.t.) 45, and Hope v. H* (1956) 72 Sh.Ct.Rep.244, to the effect that a man's 'obligation' to another woman will not be taken into account in placing a monetary value on his obligation to his wife.4. Upon this point, see Memo.No.22, Propn,25 (2.116), and Faculty Response, pp.22-25. In the Response, a 'tautening* of the terminology in which Propn,25 is couched, is suggested, as followss-"in assessing the needs of an alimentary obligent, the courts should have a discretion to take into account the requirements of a paramour with whom he 
o r  /
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I n  M oC arrel#  I n  vjhloh a  wlfi» n o u g h t an d  
r e c e iv e d  a  d e c r e e  o f  a e p e r a t lo n  on t h e  g ro u n d  o f  
her hwWnd'8 adultery# ehe vaa awarded only a 
nominal am% In name of aliment# Woauae she wee 
receiving more from the National Aaelatanoe Board 
than the huehand could be expected to pay* The 
clroumatancea were that the husband warn supporting a 
mistressi and the case waa appealed from the Sheriff- 
Suhatltute'a declalon# The Sheriff reversed the 
BuWtltute^a ruling# on the Wale that M.A&B* grants 
should he Ignored and that no account should be taken 
of the fact that the huaband was mklng payment to 
his mlatreee# since he owed her no duty of support*
The B h e r l f f - B u b a t l t u t e  (Ja8*A *F oray# i#  a*C *) b a ae d  
h i e  r e a s o n in g  on # i e  v iew  th a t#  a ln c e  t h e  h u sb an d  
( d e f e n d e r )  e a rn e d  &10#4*8d n e t  p e r  week# a n d  h l a  
w if e  ( p u r s u e r )  was I n  r e c e i p t  o f  £B*3#6d p e r  week 
from  t h e  S t a t e  (b e in g  £7*5*M  from  N#A#B*# I B / -  F am ily  
A llo w an ce ) "an y  aw ard  o f  a l im e n t  w h ich  I  make w i l l  n o t  
b e n e f i t  h e r  by  one  penny# s i n c e  t h e  e f f e c t  w i l l  s im p ly  
b e  t o  re d u c e  t h e  a llo w a n c e  p a id  t o  h e r  b y  t h e  M.A*B*" 
a n d  "o n  no  p o e a lb le  v iew  c o u ld  h e  a f f o r d  t o  p a y  a l im e n t  
I n  e x c w a  o f  £7*5#6d p e r  week"# o r  anyt& ilng a p p ro a c h in g  
I t *
T h is#  t h e r e f o r e #  l a  a n  exam ple o f  t h e  se co n d  
h o u se h o ld * a  e x i s t e n c e  sw ay in g  a  j u d g e 's  o p in io n  a s  
t o  /
o r  Che l a  c o h a b i t i n g  a%id %&om h e  o r  s h e  l a  s u p p o r t in g "  -  b u t  t h e  Worltltxg P a r t y  u rg e d  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  th e  r u l e  be  c l e a r l y  d e f in e d #  W t  t h e  p o l i c y  b e  w e l l  th o u g h t» c u t#  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  l a  a  c l e a r  d a n g e r  o f  a a s lm llm t ln g  " th e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  c o n c u b in a g e  t o  th o s e  o f  m a rr ia g e " *  U lt im a te ly #  t h i s  a t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  may come a b o u t  (a n d  t h e r e  l a  e v id e n c e  th a t#  I n  o t h e r  j u r l a d l o t l o n a #  tho% ight h a s  b e e n  expended  on t h e  a u b je c t  o f  ' r i g h t s  I n  p r o p e r ty  a r i s i n g  from  s t a b l e  im lo n a * )#  b u t  I t  s h o u ld  t%ct come a b o u t  by  In a d v e r te n c e #  w i th o u t  f u l l  d laoum alon#  by  a  e l d e - t r a o k  b ra n c h in g  from  t h e  p a th  m arked 'E n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  D aoreea  f o r  A lim e n t '*
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t o  t h e  c e r m e t  am otm t o f  ( I n  t h i s  c a s e ,
b e s M e e  m # p o r t ln g  h i s  m i s t r e s s ,  t h e  W s b a M  alee supporting an Illegitimate child hern ef the 
parm m our)*
The s h e r i f f  « S u b s t i t u t e  ad d ed  t h a t #  s h o u ld  t h e  
defender's cireumetamee imipreve, the pursuer had 
h e r  rem edy i n  t h a t  th e  c o u r t  m e  open t o  h e r ,  end  
t h a t  t h e  N,A*B# h ad  t h e i r  rem edy im  s e e k in g  
re im b u rse m e n t from  t h e  h u sb an d  o f  some o f  t h e  m oneys
The S h e r i f f ,  on  a p p e a l ,  aw arded  £ 2 * 3 /^  w eek ly  
t o  t h e  p u r s u e r  a n d  25A  w eek ly  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  
o h l ld r e n  ( a s  a g e i n a t  S u W t l t u t e 'a  g r a n t  o f  1 0 / -  
p e r  w eek f o r  t h e  w i f e ,  and  1/ -  p e r  ivaek f o r  e a c h  c h i ld ) *  
The Sheriff's opinion wee that**, "While I appréciât# 
t h e  m # e r a n t  l o g i c  o f  t h e  lo o m e d  S h e r i f f - S u b a t i t u t o 'a  
a p p ro a c h  t o  t h e  m a t t e r ,  I  am n o t  m t i o f i e d  t h a t  i t  la 
c o r ï 'o c t#  G ra n ta  made by  t h e  N a t io n a l  A a e ia ta n c e  B o a rd , 
i f  I  u n d e ro te n d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  c o r r e c t l y ,  a r e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
g r a n t a  made by  t h e  B oaM  ##*# No p e r s o n  h a s  a  l e g a l  
r i g h t  %diich c a n  b e  e n fo rc e d  by  t h e  C o u r ts  t o  demand 
a e e i e t a m e  from  t h e  B oard* I t  seem s t o  mo, th e r e f o r e #  
t h a t  th e  p r o p e r  a p p ro a c h  t o  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  a l im e n t  
i o  i n v e r t e d  i f  t h e  C o u r t Dmkoa i t #  aw ard  b y  r e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  g r a n t  w hich  t h e  w ife  may a t  a  
particular time be receiving from the National 
Aaaietance Beard* It is only, I should have thou#it, 
when the Courts have already determined the legal 
claims of the parties one against the other# that it 
can then be possible for the National Assistance Board 
to a%)ply its m m  discretion# subject to its own rules# 
to any appliceti<m vd%ich oi#ier of them may make for 
a s s i s t a n c e " #
The S h e r i f f  w as i n f lu e n c e d  by  tw o f u r t h e r  
c o n s ld o m t io n s  /
1 ,  a t  p*46#
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considerations, namely, first, that the public funds 
grant and the private law award of aliment would he 
enmeshed in an interlocking relationship"*. ( "To
include among the circumstances justifying a variation, 
a change in the rate of assistance granted by the 
National Assistance Board to one of the parties, would 
introduce into a sufficiently difficult task a quite 
unnecessary and unwarranted complication and would 
result in a vicious circle of adjustments to which 
there might be no final conclusion") and second, that 
"it appears to me to be contrary to public policy 
that the Courts should encourage the view that a 
husband is entitled to leave his wife and legitimate 
children to be maintained from public funds, and to 
devote his own resources to the maintenance of himselfpand of any woman with whom he cares to cohabit" •
Again, in the case next reported - Hawthorne v .  
(adherence and aliment) - MeCarrol was followed, 
in a case where the Sheriff Substitute had awarded 
aliment /
1• a t  p*47*2 .  T h is  i s  a  v iew  w h ich  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a p p e a l  t o  th e  m a jo r i t y :  ho w ev er, t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  law  o f
a l im e n t  m ust be  r e a l i s t i c *  M o reo v er, i t  m ustbe  a d m it te d  t h a t  f o r  m any, s u b s is t e n c e  i s  p ro v id e d  by  t h e  S t a t e ,  and  n o t  by  p e rs o n s  from  whom a l im e n t  
i s  l e g a l l y  e x i g i b l e .T h is  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  h a s  p ro m p ted  some t o  a d v o c a te  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  law  o f  a l im e n t .  T h a t was n o t  a  p o i n t  o f  v iew  a d o p te d  by t h e  W orking P a r ty  engaged  i n  m aking th e  F a c u l ty  R esponse  t o  Memo.No.22s se e  P a r t  V t h e r e o f  ( R e la t io n s h ip  b e tw een  P u b l ic  and P r i v a t e  Law) and  F a c u l ty  R e sp o n se , p p * 8 2 -8 4 . "O ur aim  w ould  b e  th e  l i m i t e d  
one o f  r e n d e r in g  aw ards more r e a d i l y  e n f o r c e a b le .We f e e l  t h a t  e v e ry  e f f o r t  sh o u ld  be made t o  e n s u re  
t h a t  t h e  p r i v a t e  law  r u l e s  o f  a l im e n t  a r e  a s  r e a l i s t i c  and  a s  e f f e c t i v e  a s  p o s s ib le *  S t a t e  a id  • a l th o u g h  i t  s h o u ld  be a u to m a tic  on p r o o f  o f  n eed  -  s h o u ld  be  re g a rd e d  a s  a  se c o n d a ry  r a t h e r  th a n  p r im a ry  m eans o f  s u p p o r t " .3 .  1966 S .L .T . ( S h .G t . )  4 7 .
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alimentt taking into account the suras paid by a 
husband, for the support of his mistress and her.i. * *...
two illegitimate children, and his ovm illegitimate 
child born of her.
It was emphasised on appeal that only the 
obligations o f  the husband exigible in law should 
be brought into consideration. (Sheriff Prin.Walker: 
Sheriff Substitute D avid  Y. Abbey), The logic of
the Sheriff is not to be faulted, but the attitude of 
the Substitute was perhaps more realistic*
In the earlier case of Hope (1956), an action of 
separation and aliment on the ground of adultery, the 
action was defended on the point o f  the amount of 
aliment claimed. The report is som ewhat unsatisfactory 
as reported in 8c,L.Review and Sh.Ct.Reports, since 
all that appears to have been decided is that certain 
of the husband/defender's averments as to his 
maintenance of his illegitimate child and his mistress, 
and as to a house purchased by the husband for his 
wife, be included in the proof and not excluded from 
probation as the wife %fished.
The Sh.Prin. a d h e re d  to his Substitute’s 
interlocutor, and in a note added that in a consistorial 
action it was very unusual indeed to exclude from  
probation any averments having a possible bearing 
on the financial circumstances of either or both of 
the parties"**. '
"X think these a v e rm en ts  fairly read relate to 
the a s c e r ta in m e n t  of the means of the defender on 
the one hand and the b e n e f i t s  which the pursuer is 
presently enjoying on the other. Perhaps the only 
effective criticism which the pursuer’s solicitor 
made /
1* Expenses of appeal not allowed t o  th e  w i f e ,  and also on the question o f  expenses, see Liddell v .L. (sisted action of adherence/action of divorce)1903 11 S.L.T. 488.
2.  See a l s o  r e c e n t l y  pove 1985 S . L . T . ( s h . C t . ) 2 l ;  t h e  c o u r t  mustt a k e  ac c o u n t  o f  t h e  d e f e n d e r ' s  a c t u a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  ( s i n c e  he co u ld  n o t  he s a i d  t o  have been e x t r a v a g a n t ) ,  and sums g r a n t e d  
were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  lower  th a n  th o s e  so u g h t  (by th e  w i fe  i n  s e p a r a t i o n  and a l i m e n t ) .
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made in presenting his appeal was with regard to 
the averment by the d e fe n d e r  that he is "maintaining 
his paramour"* I think h i s  criticism of this 
averment was too narrow* It is trite law of course 
that the d e fe n d e r  is under no legal obligation to 
maintain his paramour, and if I had thought that 
that was the sole meaning of this averment I should 
have excluded it from the proof, but I think that 
all that the defender means is that he is being put 
to expense i n  maintaining a separate home f o r  himself 
and the illegitimate child and that this may involve 
his paying something to his paramour in t h e  nature of 
wages as his housekeeper. I feel sure that in 
assessing the aliment in the end of the day the 
Sheriff-Substitute will not give effect to any 
obligation the defender is Incurring in alimenting 
the paramour"*
It must be hoped not, since one might imagine 
that the "housekeeper" loophole might prove altogether 
too useful*
On t h e  other hand, whatever may be the v iew s of 
Social S e c u r i t y  Officers who, it is s a i d ,  maintain a 
certain scrutiny of wives supported by  t h e  state to 
ensure that they are not receiving support also from 
a man other than the husband, it seems that such 
support MAY b e  taken into account by th e  Court when 
assessing the wife’s needs, even though it may transpire 
that such support was of a transitory and impermanent 
nature and, as already p o in te d  out, such a p ay m en t, 
from t h e  man’s point of view, would be p u r e ly  ex  g r a t i a  
and not based on any duty in law*
4In Taylor v* T* in which the wife admitted, in 
an action for separation and aliment on t h e  ground of 
cruelty, that she was living in adultery and had been 
doing so for some time, decree was granted and L*0, 
Pearson’s /
1* 1903 11 S.L.T. 487.
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Pearson’s view upon the question whether her 
admission disentitled her from d e c r e e ,  was that her 
husband was "bound to aliment her so long as she is 
his wife, and unless decree of separation is granted 
he will have it in his power to condone her offenoe 
and offer her a home, thus putting an end to his 
liability to pay her aliment # Against this she is 
entitled to be protected, and the o n ly  way of securing 
that is to grant decree of separation* T h is  does n o t  
in v o lv e  any hardship on the husband, because, in th e  
first place, the present state o f  affairs was brought 
about by him committing a matrimonial offence* And 
he h a s  his remedy of divorce* The wife’s conduct* 
however* m ust be ta k e n  into account in the question of 
f i x i n g  the amount o f  aliment * I  think the husband 
must pay h e r  enough to keep h e r  from absolute want, 
but not m ore; because anything f u r t h e r  would enable 
her to contribute to her present guilty mode of life" « 
17th December, 1903.
T h is  seem s an eminently s e n s ib l e  and reasonablepapproach •
P re su m a b ly , upon a change of circumstances - 
p e r h a p s, upon the departure of the param o u r - the 
wife could a p p ly  for a variation of aliment, on the 
basis o f  a great change in h e r  needs and resources, 
in /
1. emphasis added.2 . Clive, ’The D iv o rc e  (Scotland) Act, 1 9 7 6 ’ , p.27 contrasts with the approach ta k e n  in Taylor that adopted in Malcolm v. M. 1976 S.L.T,(Sh.Ct.) 1 0 ,The Act (a.7 ( 2 ) )  states that in determining the amount o f  aliment regard shall be had to ( s . 5 ( 2 ) )  " th e  respective means of the parties •,. and to all the circumstances of the ease, including any s e t t le m e n t  o r  o t h e r  arrangements made f o r  financial 
p r o v i s io n  f o r  any child of the marriage", (that is, to the criteria for the making, or not, o f  orders f o r  financial provision on divorce). Professor C liv e  (p.25 and p.27) interprets "...all th e  circumstances o f  th e  case*.."as allowing without 
d o u b t the assessment of conduct as a relevant factor in the quantification of aliment. Gf.Memo.No.2 2 , 
2 .1 2 0 -1 2 5 : Faculty R e sp o n se , p p .2 5 -3 1 . A t p . 3 1 , the v iew  was taken that, on balance, "conduct s h o u ld  n o t  
a f f e c t  quantum o f  aliment".
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in the same way as a husband may return to the court 
to aver a change in means*
The effect of t h e  attitude of th e  courts is to 
disapprove such extra-marital activity w h e th e r  on 
the part of t h e  husband or the wife, and to endow 
that disapproval with c e r t a i n  legal consequences, 
the expense necessarily involved i n  the upkeep of 
the second household being ignored in calculation 
(at least in theory) where the husband is concerned, 
and of being taken into account i n  calculation where 
the wife is concerned* In that sense, a certain 
ev en -h an d ed  justice is obtained, but it d o es  seem a 
little strange and anomalous that a man’s c o n t r i b u t i o n  
to his paramour may be taken into consideration in 
fixing the amount due to h e r  by h e r  husband, while the 
same sum will not foe regarded in fixing the first man’s 
aliment to his own wife# Perhaps it i s  t h e  case that 
the result i s  not anomalous, but i s  sensible, b u t  the 
absence of a clear rule or policy u n d e r ly in g  this state 
of affairs, apart from a recourse to presently accepted 
standards of morality or equity, is a little 
unsatisfactory^'^#
General Rules Pertaining to Entitlement to Aliment
In th e  case of a decree of adherence and  aliment, 
t h e  wife may lo o k  for support unless and until the 
husband i n t im a te s  a desire for a re s u m p tio n  o f  
cohabitation, in which case the offer must be  made 
in /
1 * See also d i s c u s s io n  o f  quantum of aliment, i n f r a #p.  4 2 5  ejb s e g .2* The Scottish Law Commission i n  Memo#Ho*22 discuss this p rob lem  (2#116) (see Faculty Response (pp.22- 
2 5 ))and also lay open for general discussion t h e  broad question of the relationship which conduct should bear to entitlement t o  aliment (2*120-123)• A t e n t a t i v e  re-casting o f  th e  rules o f  entitlement (adherence: conducts non-patrimonial conditions o f  liability) is suggested i n  Faculty Response pp.2 3 - 3 1 #
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I n  good an d  m ust w t  ho one made f o r  t w
purp o o o  olmpZy o f  e v a d in g  o r  p o s tp o n in g  o r  o o m p llo e tln g  
a  w i f e ' s  o th e rw ie e  j u s t i f i a b l e  o la im  f o r  a lim e n t#
I t  a p p e a ra ^  t h a t#  ev en  i f  a  buaband  h a a  b e e n  
s e r v e d  w i th  a  c h a rg e  f o r  paym ent o r  a  w a r r a n t  f o r  
im p rieo n m en t i n  r e a p e o t  o f  a  d e c re e  f o r  a l i m e n t ,  onoe 
h e  maKea a  genuine o f f e r  t o  a d h e re  end o o n a e q u e n tly  
t o  p ro v id e  a l im e n t ,  t h a t  o f f e r  by  him w i l l  e n t i t l e  
him  t o  a u a p e n a io n  o f  th e  c h a rg e  o r  w a r ra n t^  the 
r e a s o n  b e in g  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  t o  a d h e re  o o n e t i t u t e s  a n  
o f f e r  t o  p r o v id e  ( t h o u #  n o t  m o e a a a r i l y  t o  p a y )  
a l im e n t ,  an d  " th e  o f f e r  t o  a d h e re  w i l l  t e r m in a t e  t h e  
o b l i g a t i o n  t o  p ay  a l i m e n t ,  ev en  i f  t h e  d e o re a  h a s  n o t  
b e e n  r o o a l l e d ,  u n l e s s  t h e  o t h e r  apouae  h a s  j u s t  c a u s e  
f o r  n o n -a d h e re n c e  o r  h o ld s  a d e c re e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  
an d  a lim e n t" ^ #  O b v io u s ly  when th e  h u sb an d  l a  i n  
su c h  d i r e  atralta, it may be that th e  genuineness o f  
h i e  d e a l r e  t o  e x t r i c a t e  h im s e l f  th e re f ro m  may b e  
u n d o u b te d , b u t  o f  c o u rs e  a true d e & ire  t o  resum e 
c o h a b i t a t i o n  on  a  r e a s o n a b ly  p e m e n e n t  bm ela  m uet 
b e  t h e  t e s t ,  a n d , i n  th e  n a tu r e  o f  t h i n g s .  I t  w ould  
a p p e a r  t h a t  he  m ust be  g iv e n  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  d o u b t 
a a  t h a t  l a  t h e  o n ly  way I n  %Jhich h e  may p ro v e  h i a  
good intent ions-•
T h u s , i n  M a c d o n a ld 's  c a s e ,  a  c h a rg e  f o r  paym ent 
a n d  warrant f o r  imprisonment w ere  cu ap en d ed  when th e  
f a t h e r  o f f e r e d  t o  m a in ta in  h i a  tw o i l l e g i t i m a t e  
d a u g h te r s #  The o f f e r  a p p e a re d  t o  be  bona f i d e  and  
t h e r e f o r e  /
1# for e x am p le , a n  o f f e r  to resum e c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  b u tc o u p le d  w i th  a  r e f u s a l  t o  s h a r e  t h e  sam e b e d  i sn o t ,  in Fraser's w ords (1 ,8 4 9  -  an d  s e e  g e n e r a l l ya u t h o r i t i e s  t h e r e  c i t e d )  " a n  o f f e r  t h a t  t h e  w ife  i s  bound t o  a c c e p t" .
2# C liv e  an d  W ilso n , p#203#3 ,  M acdonald v* Dencon 1929 8#C#172# 8c#h#Com#Memo#Nc#22 2#223 m akes r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  c a s e  i n  i t s  o o w i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  t h e  d e c r e e  f o r  a l im e n t  m e re ly  q u a n t i f i e s  a n  e x i s t i n g  o b l i g a t i o n  o r  c r e a t e s  a  new o b l i g a t i o n ,  ' t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  pay  u n d e r  t h e  d e c r e e '#4# C l iv e  and  W ils o n , .ll^ id#
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therefore the coniplainer was not held to be a person 
wilfully refusing to pay aliment within the terms of 
the Civil Imprisonment (Scotland) Act, 1882, s.4#
This was an appeal from the decision of the 
Sheriff who had granted warrant for imprisonment#
It was affirmed by L#Moncrieff that "when boys are 
7 years of age and girls are 10 years of age, even 
in the case of children born out of wedlock, the 
father can in ordinary circumstances discharge his 
legal obligations of offering maintenance" (i.e. to 
take them into family with him) - see Corrie v. Adair 
(I860) 22 D*897; Ballantyne v. Malcolm (1803) Hume’s 
Dec*424; Moncrieff v. Langlands (1900) 2 F.111. "The 
father had consistently made an offer of aliment in 
an alternative, but optional form"#
After the opinion of the L#0. had been given, the 
mother of the children reclaimed, and the case was 
heard before the Second Division# The mother again 
was unsuccessful# There is an exception to the rule"* 
that, after the ages specified, the father may discharge 
his duty to aliment in the most convenient and least 
burdensome way, and that is that the child shall not 
be taken away from its mother if that course of action 
would be detrimental to its health#
2In the case of Brunt v. B# on the other hand, 
the genuineness of the husband’s alleged offer to 
adhere was not accepted by the Sheriff, and it was 
held that the "wilful failure to pay" of s.4 of the 
1882 Act applied, although one week was allowed for 
possible settlement#
"#.*I cannot find in the letters or oral evidence 
any reasonable ground for holding that in May, 1953, 
the defender made to the pursuer (or was justified in 
thinking he had made to her)" - or presumably that she 
was /
1# see per L.Ormidale in Denoon at p#179.2. 1954 S.L.T# (Sh.Ct.) 74.
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was unjustified in not taking seriously and testing 
out - "a bona fide offer of cohabitation""**
One may contrast with Brunt the case of Cassells
V# C#^ V^here the Sheriff was satisfied that offers of
accommodation were made ^  bona fide. It is
Interesting that the. Sheriff (Wood) stated that he
felt himself strengthened in his opinion by the ex
•parte statement of the pursuer’s solicitor to the
effect that he did not consider that his client was
willing to resume cohabitation and that the Sheriff
considered that "it was only right and proper in the
special circumstances of this case involving possibly
imprisonment of an innocent party, that the. Procurator
in question assisted the court by putting factors
before it that might be of relevance in coming to a
decision". On his view of the evidence, the defender
had made bona fide offers of accommodation to the
pursuer, and the Sheriff affirmed that "there is legal
authority to the effect that a bona fide offer of
maintenance (that is accommodation) discharges any
liability for a man to pay aliment to his wife, even
if a decree to pay aliment, or a maintenance order, be%in force against him" and his Lordship made reference 
to Denoon and Brunt. Again, in Drummond v. D.^ the 
husband was successful in bringing a suspension of 
diligence upon a decree of adherence and aliment since 
he had made genuine attempts to aliment his wife by 
showing himself willing to resume cohabitation with her 
and thus to provide for her within his own home. Per 
Sheriff (Garrett)^:- "Aliment in an action of adherence 
is thus conditional and is not really permanent. If 
parties resume cohabitation the decree is spent"«
It /
1. per Sheriff Reid at p*752. 1955 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 41.3. at p.43.4. I960 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 49.5. at p.50.
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I t  w i l l  b e  t h a t  t h w e  e a e e s  p e r t a i n  t osituations In which the huohand has deserted the 
w ife  o r  t h e  w if e  h a s  s o u g h t  d e c r e e  o f  a d h e re n o o  an d  
a i lm e n t0
The 1976 A ct h a s  made o%3Wig;ea I n  t h e  rem edy o f  
j u d i c i a l  r e p a r a t i o n  p r e v io u s ly  o o m p e to n t on  p r o o f  o f  
a d u l te r y #  o r  c r u e l t y  ( I n c lu d in g  h a b i t u a l  d ru n k en n e o a )#  
% o  m a t t e r  l a  now g o v e rn e d  b y  a  # 4 , w hloh  e t a  t e e  t h a t  
a e o t lo n s  I  ( I r r o t r l e v e h l o  breaM ow n# and  g ro u n d s  upon  
w h ich  euoh  e W l l  h a  tm hen t o  bo e a ta b l le h e d *  b e in g  
a# 1 (2 )(a )« '^ (e ) a d u l te r y #  b e h a v io u r  auoh  t h a t  t h e  piwauor cannot reasonably be expected t o  cohabit %rith 
t h e  d e fe n d e r#  w i l f u l  d e a e r t l o n  w i th o u t  r e a s o n a b le  
q a u a e  f o r  a  o o n tln u o u a  p e r io d  o f  t w  y e a r s #  d u r in g  
w h ich  p e r io d  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  n o  c o h a b i t a t i o n  an d  no  
r e f u a a l  by  t h e  p u r s u e r  o f  a  g e n u in e  and  r e e a o n a b le  
o f f e r  t o  a d h e r e ^  n o  o o h a b l t a t i e n  d u r in g  a  c o n t in u o u s  
p e r io d  o f  tw o /a o o o :# a n le d  by  c o n s e n t  o f  t l i e  d e fe n d e r  
t o  d e c r e e  o f  d iv o m o  ( j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t io n ) #  o r  d u r in g  
a  c o n tin u o u s  p e r i o d  o f  f i v e  y m r s ) #  2  (e n c o u ra g e m e n t o f  
r é c o n c i l i a t i o n )  a n d  I I  (a p p o in tm e n t o f  c u r a t o r  ^  
w here  t h e  d e fe n d e r  i a  m e n ta l ly  i l l )  s h a l l  a p p ly  t o  
a c t l o n c  f o r  r e p a r a t io n #  o r  ce% )am ti(m  an d  a l im e n t  
b ro u g h t  a f t e r  t h e  commencement o f  t h e  A c t ( 1 /1 /7 7 ) #  
F r o f e a s o r  O liv e  commenta^# " S e p a r a t io n  w i l l  becom e a  
p a l e  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e  -  d iv o r c e  w i th o u t  p e rm ia a io n  
t o  re m a rry  an d  w i th o u t  t h e  p o e c i b l l i t y  o f  a  c a p i t a l  
cum"* ^ H en ce , i n  th e o ry #  d e c r e e  may b e  r e f u s e d  i n  t h e  
" f i v e  y e a r "  c a n e  i f #  i n  t h e  o p in io n  o f  t h e  c o u r t ,  g r a n t  
t h e r e o f  w ould  r e s u l t  i n  g ra v e  f i m n c l a l  h a W o h ip  t o  
t h e  d e fe n d e r#  An a c t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e  may f o l lo w  upon  
a n  e a r l i e r  d e c r e e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  ( a $ 3 ) ,  b u t  t h e  l e t t e r ' s  
e x i s t e n c e  /
1# "T he D iv o ro e  ( S c o t la n d )  A ct# 1976"# p#21# As t o  r e c c n c i l i a t i c n a ,  and  c o n d o n a tio n #  and  d e c r e e s  o f  r e p a r a t i o n  o r  a d h e re n c e  a n d  a l im e n t#  s e e  C l iv e  an d  W ilson#  p p # 2 0 3 /4 . As t o  d iv o r c e ,  s e e  D iv o rc e  ( S c o t la n d )  A ct# 1976# s ,2 #
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existence does not necessarily guarantee the 
successful pursuit of t h e  former. Besides many 
other considerations, consent to separation is not 
equivalent to consent to divorce*
Previously it could be said that where the only 
offence was desertion, refusal of a bona fide offer 
to adhere would terminate the desertion, but that 
where t h e r e  were other offences, or conduct giving 
reasonable grounds for non-adherence, the "innocent" 
party would require to consider carefully his/her 
response, and a refusal would not necessarily 
prejudice, but might rather safeguard, his/her 
position"* *^ *
This would appear to be good law still with 
regard to s*1(2)(a) and (b); s*1(2)(c) specifies its
own terms (and see s.2(3) - possible three month 
reconciliation period after expiry of period of 
desertion); refusal of a bona fide offer to adhere 
during the two or five years* non-cohabitation 
(which must presumably have been at its inception 
consensual: indeed, the emphasis seems to be on
de facto separation whatever the reason for the 
separation) is not treated directly, though, in 
accordance with s.2(4), no account shall be taken of 
any period or periods not exceeding six months in all, 
during which the parties cohabited, but equally, such 
periods shall not count towards the period of non- 
cohabitation required by the Act* With regard to 
(d) and (e), the mental element seems to be ignored: 
(which could have,odd consequences)s with regard to 
(o) (desertion), the relevant mental attitude seems 
to be that which obtains at the moment of parting 
(unless there be a subsequent offer to adhere, the 
nature /
1. of* Walker, Prins*, 2nd ed,, p.287*2. As to reconciliation/condonation provisions, see now 1976 Act, s.2.
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nature o f  which must h e  considered) . Professor PClive , noting the areas in which the common law 
remains unchanged, comments that a consensual 
separation can be converted into desertion if one 
calls upon the other to adhere and the latter 
refuses (would this then "inject" a mental element 
into non-cohabitation, so as to result in the period 
of desertion running from the date of refusal?)*
"The same", he writes, "applies if the person holding 
a decree of separation departs from  his or her rights 
under the decree and calls on the other to adhere".
It is c l e a r  that the A ct raises many questions, 
and that the c o n c e p t o f  desertion re m a in s  a highly 
complex one, potentially productive of strange 
r e s u l t s ,  but these matters are on th e  p e r ip h e r y  of a 
p r o p e r ty  review.
Resumptions of Cohabitation
The effect of the discussion o f  the authorities%and the merits by Clive and Wilson is to tend to a 
preference for the view that resumptions of 
cohabitation, so long as genuine, should have the 
effect of discharging the first decree and rendering 
necessary a second decree, based on a new claim and 
new facts, to regulate the situation, if the 
cohabitation ceases once again.
That may be so, but it must be r e c o g n is e d  that 
the task o f  t h e  deserted wife in bringing up a family 
on a non-existent or paltry and grudgingly-given 
allowance from her husband ia not an easy one, and, 
while in oases of separation and aliment, or divorce, 
at least a three-month trial period is provided for^ , 
and /
1* cf* Clive, "The Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976", PP*16 and 17 .2. at p.15.3. at pp.203/4.  ^ ,4. See now Div.(Sc.)Act, 1976, s.2 (s.2(2) adultery- three monthsI s*2(4) - six m onth provision, supra? 8.2(3) period of cohabitation after eîÿïryof period of desertion).
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and thereafter i t  might he said with justice that 
the wife must take the consequences of her own 
condonation of h e r  husband’s behaviour, in cases of 
adherence and a lim e n t#  where the husband may take atmm tmnwmmmfwmmrm mm» ^
temporary fancy to resume married life, he may as 
easily become disenchanted with it, and the necessity 
to apply once more to court for a decree with w hich  
to a t te m p t  to enforce her rights, makes the task no 
easier, and perhaps handicaps the wife u n f a i r l y  in 
the race to track do\m and do diligence against a 
husband, who may be using his best endeavours to 
evade her*
The task of enforcing payment i s  one which it 
might be argued is not one to be subjected to the 
delays of t h e  court process, when it has already 
undergone those delays, albeit possibly some years 
before. The subject of enforceability of decree is 
one which causes perhaps the greatest public 
dissatisfaction x-/ith the present s y s te m , and while 
the greatest problem involved - that of t h e  disappearing 
husband - is one impossible of solution, it seems 
strange not to frame the rule in such a way as to 
ameliorate the pursuer’s position in so far as it 
may be done. This may be an over-simple approach. 
Certainly a husband must be protected against a wife 
who may exploit an extract d e c re e  of unlimited 
v a l i d i t y .  Contra. the weight o f  probability would 
appear to lie on th e  side of legitimate usefulness 
of th e  r u l e  to t h e  oft-deserted w ife  than on the side 
of abuse of a remedy, t h e  essence of w hich  would be the 
acceleration which it would permit of process of 
diligence at t h e  instance of the wife against the 
husband, who, in these instances,, must always have 
"a head start". I t  is competent in every case for 
either party to return to the court to seek a 
variation of d e c r e e ,  on the ground  o f  ch an g e  of 
circumstances.
I t  /
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I t  seem s* though#  t h a t ,  d e s i r a b l e  o r  n o t .  I t  
l 8  p ro b a b ly  t h e  c a s e  t h a t ,  a t  p r e s e n t ,  a  %irlfe m ust 
r e t u r n  t o  t h e  c o u r t  f o r  a  rei^ew al o f  h e r  d e c r e e  -  
t h a t  lOp ahe  m u st s e t  o u t  onoe m ore (new ) f a c t s  
w h ich  justify h e r  c ra v e  for a d h e re n c e  and a l im e n t  
o r  s e p a r a t i o n  a n d  a l im e n t  -  i n  t h e  acme way t h a t  sh e  
o r  h e r  h usband  m u st r e t u r n  t o  c o u r t  t o  e f f e c t  a  
V d r i^ t lo n  I n  t h e  am ount o f  a l im e n t  j u d i c i a l l y  
im p o sed , upon  p r o o f  o f  ch an g e  o f  c lrc u m a ta n c e e #
L i a b i l i t y  o f  W ife  t o  A lim ent  H usband*xmPjW^fl«4*lflle.lîWilW,lK!i«f4WW!mK»WWW*SWWWWm»wfeîw*t#W™iF^S»WWs^^
£ iS li3 i:.B £ âS ÎiS 2 S l4 S S
I t  ia u s u a l ly  supposed t h a t  t h e  e q u iv a le n t  
d u ty  of a  w ife  t o  aliment h e r  h usband  (a n d  th e n  o n ly  
i f  sh e  h a d  am ple  m eans t o  do  so  # t h a t  i s ,  s e p a r a t e  
e s t a t e  o r  a  s e p a r a t e  incom e m ore th a n  r e a s o n a b ly  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  h e r  own m a jjite n a n c e  -  and  h e r  h u sb an dAwas in d ig e n t )  was n o n - e x i s t e n t  a t  common law  and  was 
in t r o d u c e d  by  t h e  M$W#P»(Sc*) A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , s*4*
I n  F i n g s i e s ,  w h ich  D av id  M urray^ r e a d s  a s  
b e in g  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  w i f e ,  
th o u g h  n o t  bound a t  common law  t o  m a in ta in  h e r  
i n d i g e n t  husband, m ust contribute to t h e  expenses of 
the h o u s e h o ld , an d  w h ich  i s  perhaps the most often- 
quoted case on t h i s  subject, t h e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  were 
t h a t  a m a r r ie d  woman was su e d  by  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  father 
f o r  e x p e n se s  i n c u r r e d  by him i n  a l im e n t in g  the 
h u sb an d  and p r o v id in g  him w ith  m e d ic a l c a re #
The h u sb an d  h a d  no  means o r  e s t a t e  and  c o u ld  
n o t  w ork b e c a u se  o f  i l l n e s s #  The f a t h e r ,  i n  s p e n d in g  
t h i s  m oney, was n o t  a c t i n g  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  an y  
a g re em e n t made b e tw een  him  and  t h e  w ife#
I t  was h e ld  t h a t  th e  p u r s u e r  c o u ld  n o t  r e c o v e r
!, at n. es V. F. (1890) 28 S,L.R.6
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against his son’s wife (e v e n  if she too were bound 
to aliment him - see opinion against this possible 
obligation in the report) because he had a duty 
arising out of natural law to aliment his son.
The father had removed his son from the 
matrimonial home at Leith to his own house in 
K i n r o s s - s h i r e ,  since medical advice was that th e  
son s h o u ld :h a v e  r e s t  and country air. T h e re , he
was nursed by his sister and th e  father paid the 
local doctor’s bills. The father had waited two 
and a half months b e f o r e  demanding financial 
assistance from the wife.
It is significant that t h e r e  appeared to have 
been no agreement about expenses b e tw een  th e  father 
and daughter-in-law, nor did the pursuer aver that 
the wife wished, or proposed, o r  was even a party 
to the arrangement to remove the son from h i s  home.
The financial circumstances of the parties were 
that the father was old and impecunious, and that 
the w ife  was possessed of a capital sum of £2,000 
and was living comfortably in Leith,
L.Kyllachy concluded, t h e r e f o r e ,  that there was 
no question of h e r  ability to pay or perhaps of th e  
moral claim of the pursuer to be re-imbursed, nor as 
to the inadequacy of h e r  tender of 5/^ a week as a 
contribution - but was she legally liable to pay 
anything?
He considered that the father had a duty super 
j u r e  naturae, unless it could be shown that the wife 
was liable f o r  the aliment, and l i a b l e  primo loco, 
and "that th e  circumstances were such as to exclude 
the presumption t h a t  aliment furnished me pietate 
paterna cannot found a claim against any third party" 
(By analogy, it might be said that H ed d erw io k ’s  case 
(infra) goes almost so far a s  to say that aliment 
f u r n i s h e d  ^  pietate conjugale may not b e  competent 
to /
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to found a debt against the other spouse, but 
perhaps that goes too far).
"Eato that a wife who has separate estate is 
on some ground or other liable to support h e r  
Indigent husband, I am not able to find sufficient 
grounds for holding that her liability is any o th e r  
higher or more p r im a ry  th a n  the father’s liability*
She is certainly not liable super jure naturae*
The relationship between h u sb an d  and wife is one 
arising entirely out of c o n t r a c t ,  v i z * ,  the contract 
of m a r r ia g e " .
Today, marriage is often r e f e r r e d  to as a 
partnership of equals* Furthermore, may t h e r e  not 
be a natural law duty upon each spouse to aliment 
the other in time of need, regardless of the s t r i c t  
legal position either at common law  o r  u n d e r  the 
1930 Act? I f  that is a t r u e ,  or a reasonable 
assumption, might it not be s t r e n g th e n e d  by  statutory 
enactment, thus providing a n  e q u a l i t y  o f  duty between 
h u sb a n d s  and wives, w hich  does not exist i n  law, 
though it may very well exist in practice? W here it 
d o e s  n o t  exist in practice, it could be a rg u e d  that 
t h e  law s h o u ld  give a lead, and sh o u ld  provide a 
sanction f o r  non-compliance (th o u g h  sanctions in this 
area of legal regulation are notoriously unsatisfactory)^*
To /
1- Memo*Ho*3’2 has suggested that the parties should owe to each o t h e r  a reciprocal d u ty  to aliment (2*12: Proposition 2) and with this view in principle the Faculty (pp.3-6) was in agreement* "*..the terms i n  which the r e - s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  duties to s u p p o r t  are couched must be carefully considered". Reciprocity of obligation was welcomed where there were no children o f  the marriage: where there were children,it was argued that the husband’s principal duty to aliment s h o u ld  be re-affirmed, and the wife’s obligation s h o u ld  be one "to make a monetary contribution to the expenses of t h e  household and to the support of her h usband  if and in so far as she /
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To continue L# Kyllaohy’a opinion, we find,
"and assuming it to b e  an  im p lie d  incident of that 
contract that the wife if possessed of separate 
means shall he liable to aliment h e r  indigent husband,
I  have n o t  been furnished with any authority or any 
argument f o r  the proposition that t h i s  liability is 
to b e  held as primary and comes b e f o r e ,  f o r  example, 
the liability o f  a son, or, as here, the liability 
of a father**#
Even i f  this were otherwise, "it i s  I t h in k  
settled that except in v e ry  special oases aliment 
furnished by a p e rs o n  subsidiar© liable (e.g., a 
grandfather) cannot b e  recovered from a person 
primarily liable (e#g*, a father), at all events 
until after a demand has b e en  made f o r  relief, and 
t h e r e  has been a refusal or failure on the part of 
the person primarily liable to do what is requisite"^ #
This he felt was borne out by Fraser’s views 
and  authorities cited in Parent and Child, and that 
it was c o n c lu s iv e  a g a i n s t  th e  pursuer’s case for the 
period at least before 22/4/89 (being the date at w hich  
the father made his demand)#
H is  Lordship was not quite satisfied about the 
general conclusion which o u g h t to be reached, although 
what had been said was sufficient for decision o f  t h e  
particular /
ah© is r e a s o n a b ly  able to do so»* It ia s u b m itte d  
t h a t  t h e  principle of r e c i p r o c i t y  is a c c e p ta b le  anddesirable (and, it was n o te d ,  may not perhaps import equality o f  burden) b u t  that a certain subtlety of d r a f ts m a n s h ip  will be r e q u i r e d  in order to achieve a  j u s t  result# T h e  obverse of this t o p i c  is the d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  extent t o  which a wife’s non- financial contribution to th e  marriage should be r e f l e c t e d  i n  property r i g h t s #1# at p#7* cf# Memo#No#22, 2*67 and 2*75 (P ro p n #  15) "the alimentary obligation of a r e m o te r  relative s h o u ld  arise not only if th e  p r i o r  relative is unable, through lack o f  means, to provide s u p p o r t ,  but also if, and f o r  so long as, the alimentary creditor f i n d s  it im p o s s ib le  o r  impracticable f o r  any other r e a s o n  to obtain aliment from  the prior r e l a t i v e " #
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particular case. .If the pursuer had been a 
stranger (perhaps the doctor?) and the wife had 
separate estate, would she he liable to pay?
The question, he noted, revealed an almost 
entire absence of authority, since any authority 
generally on the subject of the wife's liability 
seemed to concern her liability to contribute to 
the expenses of the household for example, to 
her own aliment and that of the children of the 
marriage.
Therefore the question had to be considered 
open, and any liability he felt must rest bn 
contract, - "that is to say, must rest on something
implied by law in the contract of marriage"^#
"Now, taking the contract of marriage as it
stands, or rather as it stood, at common law, it
was, it rather seems to me, impossible that any 
liability such as that suggested should attach to 
the wife. For at common law the wife's whole 
moveable estate passed upon marriage to her husband, 
and the fruits of her heritable estate were in the 
same position. She, therefore, apart from special 
paction, had nothing wherewith to aliment anybody, 
and if by special paction the spouses varied the 
legal incidents of their marriage, the variation 
required to be expressed, and only operated so far 
as expressed. Prior, therefore, to the recent 
Married Women's Property Act, I hold the suggested 
liability excluded by the very first principles of 
the marriage law, and if that was so and still is so 
at common law, I cannot hold that the Acts in question 
make any difference* For those Acts carefully 
express the consequences which are to follow from the 
changes which they introduce, and the imposition of 
any /
1. ib id .
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any  new liability on the w ife  in the case of her 
husband's indigence is not one of them* The law 
therefore on that subject remains in my opinion as 
before"•
The argument that, onee equality in the 
respective estates of spouses was achieved, there 
must be reciprocity of obligation to aliment 
"appears to me to overlook two points, viz* - (1)
That at common law the husband's position was 
altogether different from the wife's, he being not 
only the breadwinner and head of the family but 
having also the entire administration of the wife's 
estate as well as his own? and (2) that the 
obligation of parties being established on this 
footing, recent legislation cannot be held to have 
made any difference in respect that, as I have 
already stated, that legislation proceeds on the 
principle of expressing fully the alterations on the 
rights and obligations of the spouses which are to 
follow from the changes in the marriage law which 
it has introduced"*
On the facts of the case, he would much have 
preferred to find for the pursuer, and since the 
question of expenses was in his discretion, he awarded 
none to either party^é
Even after the 1920 Act, the wife's duty is not 
equally onerous* The duty i s  t o  support him if he 
cannot support himself and if it is the case that she 
can do so without suffering financial hardship herself; 
his to support her whatever h i s  financial position, 
and, whatever hers under certain limitations in t h e  
form o f  judicial scrutiny and discretion as to the 
amount of aliment to be awarded to her in the light 
o f  /
1, Authorities relied upon; Fr* H.& ¥* 1*837; Stair, 1*8.2? Pr. Parent & Child pp.86, 99, 100; More's Notes to Stair vol.!* Note B. XXIV*
o f  h e r  en d  h e r  need#,
O f G ourae now adays* o&ee# o f  w ive#  b e in g  r e q u i r e d  
j u d i c i a l l y  t #  p ay  a i lm e n t  a r e  m ore f r e q u e n t ,  th o u g h  
a t l l l  p ro b a b ly  uou& uel e x e e p t  p a rh a p e  I n  t h e
I n  Sweden* a lim o n y  paym enta  by  wlv&e m leo  a p p e a r  
t o  b e  becom ing  m ore common* b u t  I n  E n g la n d , a l th o u g h  
f ln a n o & a l o r d e r #  a n c i l l a r y  t o  d e c r e e s  o f  d& voroe* 
n u l l i t y  o r  s e p a r a t i o n  c a n  b e  made i n  f a v o u r  o f  e i t h e r  
p a r t y  ( e in o e  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  t h e  D&voree R eform  A c t ,  
1969)#  w *#*beoau#e o f  eoonom io f a o t a  *** o r d e r a  a r e  
o n ly  r a r e l y  mode a g a ln & t wiveaH^V
F r a a e r 'e  v ie w , a l r e a d y  n o ted #  wee t h a t  t h e  w ife  
wma bound t o  c o n t r i b u t e  h e r  e x e r t io n e  t o  t h e  f a m ily  
s u p p o r t  a c c o rd in g  t o  h e r  huaban& 'e  a t a t l o n #  He 
o o n a id e r e  t h a t  t h e  g n e e t io n  w h e th e r  ah e  wa& bound  t o  
go  f u r t h e r  a n d  p a y  a  a h a re #  from  h e r  in d e p e n d e n t  
meana* o f  th e  eK peneea o f  t h e  h o u a e h o ld , waa n o t  
o l e a r ,  a l th o u g h  i t  waa th o u g h t  t h a t  t h a t  wan a  j u a t  
r u l e  an d  t h e  l e g a l  eon& equenoe o f  r e o o g n ia in g  h e r  
r i g h t  t o  h o ld  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ^ .
I t  i s  m oat i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  see#  from  t h e  w r i t i n g s  
o f  F e rg u s s o h ^ , t h a t  h e  d id  n o t  e x c lu d e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
Gom petenoe o f  a  s u i t  by  & h u sb an d  a g a i n s t  h i s  w ife  
f o r  s u p p o r t  ( i # e ,  b e f o r e  1920)#  He sa y s*  " T h e ra  o an  
b e  /
1 * -4 F ô r exam ple* B h e i la  Orah&m (& suoG es& fu l A m erican  j o u r n a l i s t )  h a s  s a i d  t h a t  a l l  s h e  r e c e iv e d  from  h e r  s h o r t  m a r r ia g e  was a n  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  pay  h e r  e% *husband a b o u t  &100 m o n th ly  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  h e r  l i f e *  A p p a re n tly  t h e r e  i s  i n  A m erica  a  g ro w in g  r e v u l s i o n  f o r  t h e  o o n o e p t o f  a lim o n y , ( t h a t  i s ,  p o s t  d iv o r c e  o r  s e p a r a t i o n  p re su m a b ly ) w h e th e r  e u e  b y  h u sb an d  o r  w i f e ,  and  th e  U#B$N ation& l O r g a n is a t io n  f o r  Women h a s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t ,  i n s t e a d ,  & d iv o r c e  in s u r a n c e  s h o u ld  b e  ta k e n  o u t  t o  c o v e r  f u t u r e  s u p p o r t  f o r  w ife  ( o r  h u sb an d  e v e n ? )  and  c h i l d r e n , s h o u ld  t h e  m a r r ia g e  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l#2# G re tn e y , p # l6 4 ,5* F r # I ,  B 37/$39 an d  c a s e s  t h e r e  c i t e d #4# C o n s i s t o r i a l  la w , &t p # 1 7 4 , c i t e d  b y  F r a s e r *  above#
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be no doubt that the right to alimony, unconnected
with any other claim, forms a relevant ground for an
action, when the conjugal society has not been
interrupted, but means of subsistence to his wife,
suitable to her station, have been refused by the
husband, as administrator of the goods in communion*
Were a case to occur in which the .jus mariti of the
husband had been effectually excluded by contract of
marriage, or other deed, while he had no means of
subsistence without recourse to the separate income
or funds of the wife, there can be as little doubt
in principle, that he might become the pursuer of
a process of aliment" * This intriguing passage
raises two issues which are of interest - first, the
potential entitlement of a husband to aliment from
his wife, and second, a hint (only) that a claim of
aliment stante matrimonio might be competent* The
introduction of the latter remedy - which has been
thought unknown to Scots law - is suggested by the2^
3
oScottish Law Commission and vigorously supported
in the Faculty Response'
On this point, Fraser concedes that a duty of 
support by t h e  wife might exist at least if the 
husband has no means or is unable to earn any 
because o f  illness and the wife has "abundance", 
and for this formulation, which obviously closely 
resembles the present statutory rule, he cites in 
support L.Braxfield and L.Eskgrove in the case of 
McLaine^ ' /
1. The author refers to "Appendix Note XXXVIII" of his text (which could not be found),2* P ro p n . 39* 2.179 et seg.3* pp.41/42. "It is our view that one of the most serious flaws in our rules of aliment is that, during cohabitation, a wife cannot enforce her husband * s duty to support her at a reasonable level .... We feel that Proposition 39 represents an advance which is long overdue"•4* Hailes 1013.
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M cL alne, when t h e  fo rm e r  d e c la re d #  1# th e  c o n te x t  
o f  8#  in d ig e n t  hwaband n o t  e n t i t l e d  t o  oo w rteey #
" I  h o ld  t h a t  a n  i n d ig e n t  huaband  m net h e  p ro v id e d  
f o r " #  and  t h e  l a t t e r  c o n c u rre d *
T h e re  rem & ina f o r  d e a i e io n  t h e  g u e a t io n  w h e th e r  
8 w ife  wa& requ&fG&# ow t o f  h e r  own e e t& te ,  t o  
c o n t r i b u t e  to w ard #  t h e  hou& ehold e x p en se #  i f  h e r  
h u sb an d  w as q u i t e  a b le  t o  p ay  f o r  them  a l l  h lm e e l f ,  
o r  w he ther*  i f  h e  w&& n o t  a b l e  t o  oomp&l h e r  t o  
make e  o o n t r ib ,  t i o n ,  i t  was s im p ly  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  h e  
oou ld l, %fhe%& ta%ke#Gi>l<8%re(& saw&dl laoedgF* w<a]LajLnt {&3LlfaeE%t qui: 
(%f hw»** !&%Mw*idba%MHeR,
jlOHBordai&ig ibe (%reeB&*2& !S%w83ro!K(Mpg&@<âjLa ' i8uLta%<)%y&%i Iktwe 
w i f e  h e v la ig  aepm rm te e # t a t e  m u$t a l im e n t  h e r  e h i ld r e n #  
inf kwer li&wBl&andl jls jL%w3SQf3&%;le (%f g*o* %so Bi0rkt:@%»
%&CMM i8f&8ul3L 9fOir<& 15%W& ]bU8l)«W&<&*8 i&«W&*38, 13^  ikkHBIf
1:0 (Mjgpp&ar ibbw* fawmjl^ ky rw&ew&e# tübe tfUEe T&Ews4iwoMk ;ijU&b3j& to i&U83&3MRl; ibüwBKR *» f&Bwi <%(wndb%\&lyurbe Ibo iWhe 
laGHaa&GW&ekld ill: tf&e t&icRagdil: IbSk&l: **&%&*?
position in this reapeot at common law ia not affected 
by the Married women's Property Act of 1980"* In 
it#  comment upon the 1980 Act, &#4, the Bnoyolopaedie 
is  perhaps a l i t t le  misleading: "The mom&ure of the 
wife*# oblig&tign towards her indigent hueb&nd la 
precisely the aemo &a that of the huaband towerde 
hie wife: #*,"#
L# Fraaer, in an attempt to anawer hie own 
double question, looks to the writings of Pothier^ 
and to the Code Civil^ and concludes that the result 
of a study of both of which seems to suggest that 
more we# demanded of a French than of a Scottish wife*
A c co rd in g  /
1* 8ub,nom# "Aliment", p#300 (p&r&*739)*8* Fingsles* The Encyclopaedia contrasts Walton (M$& w* (8nd #dn*) 198; and Fraser (1*837),Tr* do le Communauté sec#464*
4 #  A r t # 1 4 4 8 *
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A c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  C ode, "La femme q u i  a  o b te n u  
l a  s é p a r a t i o n  d e  b ie n # ,  d o l t  o o n t r ib u e r ,  p r o p o r t io n n e l le m e n t  
â  # 0 8  f& o u lté #  e t  & c e l l e #  d u  m a r i ,  t a n t  e u x  f r a i e  
d u  mén&go qu*& oeu#  d 'é d u o e t lo m  de#  e n fe n tG  oommune*
E l l e  d o i t  s u p p o r t e r  e n ti& re m e n t ##8 f r a i s  a * l l  n e  
r e n t e  r i e n  a u  m ari"*  (T h e re  a r e  d e o ia lo n e  on t h i a  
a r t i c l e  t o  be  fo u n d  i n  "Lo& Godea A nno tée"  by  S i t e y ,  
p . 5 5 9 ) .
I n  t h e  v ie w  o f  P o t h l e r  (#80#464) *  "81  1& femme 
q u i  en  e o n séq u en o e  &*une s é p a r a t i o n  c o n t r a c t u e l l e ,  
j o u i t  s é p a ré m e n t d e  oeo  b ie n # ,  r e f u s a i t  d e  o o n t r ib u e r  
a u x  obargOB du  m ariag e*  l e  m a r i p o u r r a i t  l a  f a i r e  
oondam nar & y  c o n t r ib u e r #  Le ju g e  d o i t  e n  eo  oaa  
r é g l e r  l a  p e n e lo n  que c o t t e  femme d o i t  p a y e r  & so n  
m a ri ave#  q u i  e l l e  d em eu ra , â  une  aomme, a n  é g a rd  &
80# f a c u l t é #  e t  au  q u a l i t é s  i l  d e l t  p a r e i l l e m e n t  
r é g l e r  l a  somme p o u r  l a q u e l l e  e l l e  d o i t  c o n t r i b u e r  
au x  a l im e n ta  e t  & l 'é d u o m tio n  de#  e n fa n t#  commun#"*
I t  #e@me t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  a  F re n c h  w if e  who 
e n jo y e d  o o p a r a t io n  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  m ig h t be  c o m p e lle d  
t o  c o n t r i b u t e  so m e th in g  t o  t h e  e x p en ac»  o f  t h e  
m a r r ia g e  an d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  and* i f  h e r  h u sb an d  
w ere  I n d ig e n t*  t h e  w ho le  b u rd e n  o f  s u p p o r t  o f  h im , 
o f  t h e  c h i l d r e n  and  o f  t h e  h e u B e h c ld , m ig h t h a v e  t o  
b e  m et by  h e r*  I t  c a n  b e  aeo n  t h a t  t h e  e x t r a c t  
from  P o t h i e r  i a  t h e  m ore G tro n g ly  w orded , s i n c e  t h e  
w ife * #  o b l i g a t i o n  l a  & et f o r t h  w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  hu8band*8 m eane, a l th o u g h  t h e  f i r s t  a e n te n c e  o f  
A r t# l4 4 8  l 8  t o  t h e  aame e f f e c t ,  and  demand# a  f u l l  
r o a p o n m ib i l l ty  f o r  a l l  o u t la y #  o n ly  when t h e  huBband 
h#8 no fund#^*
-pP r o f e a a o r  A nton n o te a  t h a t  t h a r o  i s  no  fo rm u la  
f o r  t h e  a p p o r tio n m e n t o f  h o u se h o ld  e x p en se#  w here  b o th  
p a r tn e r #  /
1* Ac t o  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n ,  a c e  C h a p te r  6  (P ra n c e )*  2# 'E f f e c t  o f  M a rr ia g e  Upon P ro p e r ty  i n  B c o ta  Law* 1956 M*L*a, 695*
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partners are earning a salary (but refers the reader 
to Fr.1.837 which i s  the passage under d iscussion ).
Fraser goes on to  mention those cases in  which 
the point has arisen in d irectly . Thus, where the 
w ife 's  income has for years been co llected  and 
administered by the husband, and used to  pay certain  
family b i l l s ,  i t  would seem that i t  i s  not competent 
for the wife or her executors to demand an accounting 
and payment of those sums, a resu lt which leads him 
to  the conclusion that i t  may be that "the wife l i e s  
under an obligation of rateable contribution". I t  
may be however that such a resu lt arises from considerations 
of acquiescence, personal bar and equity and upon 
a consideration of the facts  of each case and may not 
support such a d efin itiv e  conclusion, or substantive 
ru le , (see C uthill v . Burns). In C uthill v . Burns^
§ wife had received certain  money from her father  
exclusive of her husband's jus m ariti. one portion  
being given in  terms of her marriage-contract and 
the other her father obliged himself to have paid to  
her at h is  death. The husband conveyed to  her the 
estate  of Garvald, h is heritable e sta te , reserving to  
himself the l ife r e n t . About one h alf of the w ife 's  
fortune was spent shortly a fter  the marriage in  meeting 
some of her husband's debts, and certain other sums 
were spent in  improving the estate* In 1831, the 
wife succeeded to heritable estate of her brother, 
which yielded £2,832. After 1836, the finances of 
husband and wife were completely mixed up, apart 
from £320 deposited in  the w ife 's  name in  a bank.
The husband died in testa te  in  1842, survived 
by h is wife and a son, who subsequently died in  1848 
in testa te  and unmarried.
The personal estate  of the husband amounted to  
about £408 and there was a bank deposit account of 
£300 /
1. (1862) 24 D.849.
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£200  I n  name o f  t h e  w if e  a t  t h a t  d& te t o g e t h e r  w ith  
a  D e p o e lt  R e o e lp t  o f  £6#000# w hloh wee i n  t h e  name 
o f  b o th  ep o u eea  an d  t h e  lo n g e â t  l i v e r *  T h e re  waa 
a  d i s p u t e  b e tw een  t h e  h u a b a n d 'a  n e x t  o f  k in  an d  t h e  
widow m ^. r e l l o t *  The d e o is lo n  i s  in terestin g  in  the  
s e p a r a t i o n  w hloh  i t  makee o f  fund#* an d  t h e  r u l e s  
a d o p te d  t o  p e rfo rm  t h i s  ta s k *
The d e p o s i t  r e o e l p t  f o r  &6#000* a n d  t h e  d e p o s i t  
o f  £200  o o u ld  b e  t r a o e d  t o  h a v e  some fro m  t h e  w i f e 's  
e s t a t e ,  from  h e r  s i d e  o f  th e  fa m ily *  a n d  w e re , 
t h e r e f o r e *  h e rs #
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , t h e  sum o f  £408  r e p r e s e n te d  
t h e  h u s b a n d 's  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r ty  and  a s  su o h  f e l l  t o  
t h e  n e x t  o f  k i n .
I n  a d d i t i o n .  I t  w as h e ld  t h a t  i n  o lrG um st& noes 
w here  t h e  w i f e ' s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty  h ad  b e en  u se d  t o  
p ay  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  d e b t s ,  an d  i n  w h ich  on t h e  o t h e r  
h an d  s h e  h a d  g r e a t l y  b e n e f i t e d  from  t h e  te r m s  o f  t h e  
m a r r la g e ^ o o n t r a o t  ( t h e  esta te  having b e en  made o v e r  
t o  h e r )  i t  w as n o t  c o m p é te n t f o r  her t o  re v o k e  t h e s e  
paym en ts a s  d o n a t io n s  in ter  virum e t uxoram ( f o r  
revocation w as th e n  p o s s i b l e )  b u t  rather s h o u ld  th e y  
b e  re g a rd e d  a s  in  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  a  " re m u n e ra to ry  grant", 
a n d  t h e r e f o r e  c o u ld  not b e  rev o k e d  so  a s  t o  fo rm  a  
claim on  h e r  husband's e s t a t e  n o r  c o u ld  certa in  o t h e r  
a d v a n c e s  b e  s e t  o f f  against h is e s t a t e *  T h is  I s  a n  
i n t e r e s t i n g  I l l u s t r a t i o n ,  but p e rh a p s  should n o t  be 
regarded a s  to o  s t r o n g  a n  authority* s i n c e  the p o in t  
in  s u p p o r t  o f  w h ich  L# fraser c i t e s  i t  la  v e ry  
I n d i r e c t l y  d e c id e d ,  upon  m certain  d e g re e  o f s p e c i a l t y  
o f  f a c t s *  a c e r t a i n  acquiescence by the w if e  i n  the • 
e x p e n d i tu r e  o f  h e r  money an d  oven  p e rh a p s  u pon  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  e q u i ty  (w h ich  I n  th is  s u b j e c t  
m ig h t ^  o r  may now * p la y  a  u s e f u l  r ê le ) .
I t  c a n  be  s e e n  from  a  c o m l d e r a t l o n  o f  t h e  
ju d g m en t o f  L#Benholm e t h a t  h l a  L o rd sh ip #  i n  e f f e o t ,  
th o u g h  n o t  s p e c i f l o a l l y  i n  w o rd s , l a  r e f u s i n g  t h e  
w i f e ' s  /
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wife’s plea on something very akin to personal 
bars much of the decision is referable to the 
particular quality of the facts, and it cannot 
truly be said that a substantive rule emerges#
In a note to his interlocutor, th e  L#0. states, 
"But if i t  i s  necessary for t h e  defender to claim 
the sum in the deposit-receipt, or any part of it 
on the footing o f  its being a donation in her 
favour, in addition to the provisions settled upon 
h e r  by Mr# Burns in the marriage-^contract, it is 
d i f f i c u l t  to see how she can be permitted to accept 
of that donation as irrevocable by her husband's 
death, and at the same time to revoke a donation 
previously made by her to her husband, where both 
may fairly be regarded as remuneratory rights 
b e tw een  husband and w if e .  In questions of this 
s o r t  little inequalities cannot be weighed in nice
disposition between parties where the opposite 
qualities of justice and moderation should prevail"^«
L« Benholme's opinion may not have c o in c id e d  in 
every respect with t h e  views of the L.O#, but with 
that last sentiment he, and very many others, would 
surely concur. In fact, the sentence provides a 
well-worded aim; moderation and justice must not be 
lost sight of in the scramble f o r  a modern code to 
reflect m odern ideas. In particular, the post-1970 
position of husbands must not be reduced to the circa 
1830 position of wives with the result that marriage- 
contracts for th e  protection of the husbands* rights 
must be created.
Fraser also cites English authority (Gardner v.
G. 28 L.J.Ch.p*904 and the opinion of Vice-Chan.Stuart) 
and also refers to Bright, Husband and Wife vol.ii. 
p.239* In such circumstances, the Vice-Chancellor’s 
view /
1. emphasis added,
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view ifas "that the case was not one of gift to the 
husband, but it was one in which the husband, holding 
the money upon trust for the wife, or as she should 
direct, employed it for the most part in purposes for 
their common b e n e f i t; and t h e  question was, w h e th e r , 
after all that had been done with the knowledge and 
assent of the wife, she was to recover the money from 
the husband’s estate, just as if it h ad  remained in 
his hands, without any act of hers, to put an end to 
the trust for her separate use?" A f te r  such assent 
to the utilisation of the money for business and 
family expenditure, it was impossible for the wife to 
claim it.
Thus, on reasoning based on acquiescence and 
personal bar or estoppel, perhaps, English law, while 
possibly not expressly stating a rule, would r e n d e r  a 
wife’s acceptance of the use of her money for family 
welfare and the expenses of running the establishment, 
i r r e v o c a b l e ^ , a result which at least provides some 
guidelines a s  to conduct and a s  to the English Courts* 
v iew  of the justice of th e  matter, and it would seem 
that t h e  Scottish Courts, in v e ry  s i m i l a r  circumstances 
(e.g. o f  Cuthill V . B u rn s) w o u ld  not stray f a r  from 
that path.
H ow ever, i t  c a n n o t b u t  be  f e l t  t h a t  Fraser h a s  
n o t  s q u a r e ly  g iv e n  an  an sw er t o  th e  q u e s t io n  w h ich  he 
s e t  f o r  h im s e l f ,  b u t  h a s  c irc u m v e n te d  i t ,  and s tre w n  
th e  t r a i l  w i th  F re n c h , and E n g l i s h ,  e x a m p le s . I t  may 
be t h a t  th e  p a u c i ty  o f  S c o ts  a u th o r i t y  was su c h  t h a t  
he  f e l t  no r e s p o n s ib le  o p in io n  c o u ld  be v e n tu r e d .
2I n  t h e  su b s e q u e n t c a s e  o f  A d a ir  v .  A., w h ich  was 
a n  a c t io n  o f  separation by th e  w ife  a g a i n s t  t h e  
h u sb an d  ,on th e  g round  o f  c r u e l t y ,  th e  h u sb an d  so u g h t 
i n t e r im  /
1 , c o u ld  i t  am ount t o ,  p e r h a p s , an  i r r e v o c a b le  g i f t ,  th o u g h  n e i t h e r  G a rd n er n o r  C u t h i l l  e x p r e s s ly  makes any  su c h  s u g g e s t io n ?2 .  1924 S .C .7 9 3 .
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interim aliment, since he was unable to maintain 
himself, and she was well placed, financially. (She 
had the liferent of a trust fund which her husband 
estimated at £300 p.a., and she valued at £300 p.a., 
and she admitted that she had previously, for a 
limited time, helped her husband to the extent of 
10/- per week). The 1.0. granted that sum weekly 
as aliment to him, and this exercise of the discretion 
conferred upon him by the Act of 1920, s.4., to do 
so was not disturbed on appeal.,
The terms of s.4. are as follows;- "In the
event of a husband being unable to maintain himself
his wife, if she shall have a separate estate or
have a separate income more than reasonably sufficient
for her own maintenance, shall be bound out of such
separate estate to provide her husband with such
maintenance as he would in similar circumstances be
bound to provide for her, or out of such income to
contribute such sum or sums towards such maintenance
as her husband would in similar circumstances be1bound to contribute towards her maintenance" •
A careless first reading would suggest that 
their duties are equivalent and reciprocal and 
equally onerous, but the duty of the wife is cut down 
by the wording of the first paragraph, namely, "if 
she shall have a separate estate or a separate income 
more than reasonably sufficient for her own 
maintenance
Moreover, the husband's condition must be one 
in which he is 'unable to maintain himself'* It may 
be that the wife's duty does not extend to the husband 
who is merely shiftless and unwilling to maintain 
himself. Under the present system, shiftless and 
lazy wives are well protected, but equally there are 
many /
1 .  1920 A c t ,  10 & 11 G eo.V , 0 .6 4 ,  8 .4 .
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many for whom, through economic or other ciroumstances - 
that is, where the earnings of the husband cannot 
support the family, or where the husband is untraceable - 
the private law rules of aliment are of little help.
"Indigence" suggests perhaps physical or mental 
inability to maintain oneself, rather than mere 
indolence, and refusal or disinclination to maintain 
oneself^.
pIn Hedderwiok v, Morison at the time of the 
marriage the husband had a salary of not more than 
£100 p.a. and the wife had inherited £1000 a little 
while before. Seven y e a r s  later, the h u sb an d  inherited 
about £4000-£3000 from his father, and in the same 
year "granted a trust assignation, making over £1000 to 
trustees, directing them to pay the income of that sum 
to his wife during her life and on her death to pay 
the fee to the children of the marriage, the narrative 
clauses relating that "I have at various times received 
large sums of money from my wife"? "that it is right 
and proper that I should make some provision f o r  her 
and my family"*
In 1900,. nine years after the marriage, the 
h usband  obtained decree of d iv o rc e  against his w ife  
and the t r u s t e e s  declined to c o n tin u e  the trust 
payment to her on the ground that she had forfeited 
by r e a s o n  of the divorce the trust assignation 
provision which they said was a matrimonial provision.
The wife sought declarator that the trustees 
were bound to continue paying the income o f  the trust 
fund to her, during the course of which it was made 
clear that the g r e a t e r  part of h e r  original £1000 had 
been spent by her on household expenditure during the 
marriage /
1 .  " i n d ig e n t " s -  needy, poor. Concise Oxford Dictionary, (Root: egere, to foe in need, destitute, be needy, poors Cassell's Latin Dictionary).?2. (1901) 4 P.165; 9 8.L.T.255.-
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marriage*
The decision (which affirmed the judgment of the 
L,0,(Pearson)) was that this expenditure by her did 
not place h e r  husband in the position of a debtor for 
those sums so expended, and that the liferent provision 
was "a proper matrimonial provision" which, by reason 
of her divorce, she had forfeited#
I n  this L# Young dissented, holding that the 
husband’s conveyance,to his wife through trustees of 
pecuniary benefit was "a restoration to the wife of 
her own estate" and that accordingly what she was 
claiming was her omi property# He felt that this 
had been done in fulfilment of an honourable 
obligation which, while not attaining the character 
of a legal d e b t ,  was an onerous cause for the granting 
of the deed.
The aspect t h a t  the wife, initially at least, 
b e f o r e  the financial position of the parties became 
less disparate, was fulfilling a legal obligation of 
h e r  own ( t h a t  is, to augment the family finances 
w h ile  h e r  husband’s income was small) is not mentioned, 
although of course the husband’s subsequent substantial 
enrichment w ould rob such an argument of some a t  
least of its force# It i s  u n f o r tu n a te  that th e  issue 
was clouded by that latter factor#
Walton commences his discussion of this topic by2a r e f e r e n c e  to ErsKine’s words that, "It Is the duty 
of t h e  husband as the head of the family t o  defray 
the expenses of the household, and to maintain and 
educate the children o f  the marriage", and upon t h e  
question of w h e th e r  a w ife  endowed with separate estate 
must contribute to t h e  expense of the household, he 
quotes Erskine^ to the effect that, " I f  the w ife  has a 
subject /
1# p#223*2# 1 ,6 ,5 6 #3# a t  1 ,6 .1 5 .
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s u b j e c t  e x c lu s iv e  o f  th e  husband*#  r ig h t#  s h e  m ust 
o o n t r lb u t e  ^ p r o p o r t io n a l ly  to w a rd s  th e  m e ln to n en o e  o f  
t h e i r  oommon o h l ld r e n *  and  I n  d e f a u l t  o f  t h e  f a t h e r  
sh e  I s  s im p ly  l i a b l e " *
W hile  t h e  m o th e r 's  l i a b i l i t y  t o  a i lm e n t  th e  
o h l ld r e n  a f t e r  t h e  d o o e a se  o f  t h e i r  f a t h e r  I s  
re o o g n la e d ^  h e r  l i a b i l i t y  w h i le  he  i s  a l i v e  w ould  
a p p e a r  t o  be  p o s tp o n e d  t o  h la ^ »  F a th e r  and  m o th e r 
o f  a n  c h i l d  a r e  j o i n t l y  l i a b l e  f o r  i t s
s u p p o r t*  a n d  i f  one i s  n o t  a b le  t o  p a y  a l l *  o r  th e  
due  a h a r e ,  t h e  w hole  l i a b i l i t y  f a l l #  on  th e  o th e r^ #  
W alto n  a t a t e a ^  t h a t  " I t  l a  u n d o u b ted  law  t h a t  v/hen t h e  
f a t h e r  i s  dead* th e  m o th e r  i s  bound t o  a l im e n t  t h e  
o h i ld r o n  o f  t$ie m a rr ia g e " *  However* i t  w as h i s  v iew  
t h a t  n o n e  o f  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  s p e o i f lG a l ly  a t a t e s  
t h s t  h e r  l i a b i l i t y  o o - o x i s t s  w i th  t h a t  o f  h e r  im aband  
JE&ÈIÉS m W a m A S  ■that tlw language Is consistent 
w ith  th e  v im f t%mt h e r  l i a b i l i t y  a r i s e s  o n ly  a f t e r  
t h e  h u s b a n d 's  d e a th  and  t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  I t  m lg lit b e  
s a i d  /
1$ E r s k ,  1#6*56a F a i r g r i e v e s  v* H en d erso n  (1 8 8 5 ) 15 R# 9 8 ; m y t e  v* W* ( ig O I)  5 F#957$ B uohan v* B*1666* M .411; M aodom ld  v* W* (1 8 4 6 ) 8  0 * 8 5 0 .
2* See e x p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  h i e r a r c h y  o fl i a b i l i t y  t o  a lim e n t*  8o*L#Com*Memo#No*22, 2*68* T h e ra  M s  b e e n , h o w ev er, a n  e q u a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  f a t h e r  and  m o th e r a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t u t o r  o r  c u r a t o r ,  b u t  no e q u iv a le n t  f i n a n c i a l  b u rd e n  h a s  b e e n  im posed  ( s e e  G u a rd ia n s h ip  A c t, 1 9 75 , p a r t i c u l a r l y  s . 1 0 ) .  "Shis p o in t  was n o te d  by t h eS c o t t i s h  Law Com m ission (2*74# " I t  1# now r e c o g n is e d  t h a t  p a r e n t s  o f  l e g l t i i m t e  o h i ld r e n  h av e  e q u a l  % )aren ta l r i g h t s  and we th in k  t h a t  th e y  s h o u ld  have  e q u a l  pagtreiital d u t i e s " )  en d  a  recom m endation  made t h a t  f a t i i e r  axid m o th e r o f  e  l e g i t i m a t e ,  a s  now o f  an  i l l e g i t i m a t e ,  c h i l d  s h o u ld  be  p la c e d  on th e  same ra n k  o f  l i a b i l i t y *  A t 2*76 ( P r o p n .1 6 ) ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  t o  a l im e n t  o f  t h o s e  i n  th e  same ra n k  "e h o u ld  I n  p r i n c i p l e  be  e q u a l ,  b u t  s u b j e c t  t o  m o d i f ic a t io n  i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  t h e i r  r e s o u r o e s " ,  Wnich i n  a l l  aem m  a  m oat e e im ib le  
a p p ro ach #  I m p o s i t io n  o f  e q u a l  p a r e n t a l  d u t i e s  w ith  r e g a r d  t o  a l im e n t  was welcom ed by  t h e  F a c u l ty  %;orklng P a rk y  ( a t  p p # 1 4 /1 5 )#3* O n c k e n 's  ^*^*0892.) 1 9.R.5 1 9.4* a t  p # 2 2 3 .
4 1 0 .
a a ld  t h a t  a  w i f e 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w ould  a r i s e  o n ly  i f  
h e r  hu sb an d  was in c a p a b le  o f  s u p p o r t in g  th e  c h i l d r e n  
( o r  p e rh a p s  had  d is a p p e a r e d ? )  and t h a t  ev en  th e n  
sh e  w ould have  a c la im  o f  r e l i e f  a g a i n s t  h im .
On th e  more d o u b t f u l  g ro u n d  o f  a  w i f e ' s  l i a b i l i t y  
t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  h o u se h o ld  e x p e n se s  w here  t h e  
hu sb an d  i s  n o t  i n d ig e n t  and  sh e  h a s  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e ,  
W alto n  , w h ile  a ck n o w le d g in g  L ,F r a s e r 's  v iew  t h a t  
su c h  a  l i a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  l e g a l  c o n seq u en ce  o f  
r e c o g n is in g  h e r  r i g h t  t o  h o ld  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y , !  
s t e e r s  a  m id d le  c o u rs e  and  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
( l e g a l )  c o m p u ls io n  upon h e r  t o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  b u t  t h a t ,
i f  sh e  d o e s ,  h e r  h u sb an d  w ould  n o t  th e r e b y  be  madeoh e r  d e b to r " .
A t common la w , he  w r i t e s ,  she  w ould h a v e  no fu n d s  
o f  h e r  own o r  e l s e  sh e  w ould  have fu n d s  s u p p l ie d  by a 
m a r r l a g e - c o n t r a c t  w hich  deed  w ould s p e c i f y  h e r  
l i a b i l i t y  a ls o #  Up t o  1 9 20 , th e  M .w .P, l e g i s l a t i o n  
made no s p e c i f i c  m en tio n  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to w a rd s  
h o u se h o ld  e x p e n d i tu r e ,  and th e  1920 A c t, 8 .4  made no 
m e n tio n  o f  c h i l d r e n  o r  h u sb an d s w ith  am ple m eans.
An E n g l is h  w ife  m ust p r e v e n t  h e r  hu sb an d  from%becom ing  c h a rg e a b le  t o  th e  p a r i s h  and  m ust m a in ta in  
h e r  c h i l d r e n  and  g r a n d c h i ld r e n  ( s . 2 1 ) ,  a l th o u g h ,  
a c c o rd in g  t o  W a lto n , p ro b a b ly  o n ly  i f  h e r  h u sb an d  i s  
in c a p a b le  o f  d o in g  s o .
I n  sum , i t  was p o s s ib l e  f o r  W alto n , w r i t i n g  a s  
a t  1 /1 /5 1 ,  t o  c o n c lu d e  c o m fo r ta b ly  t h a t  a t  common law  
no su c h  l i a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  i n  money te rm s  to w a rd s  
t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  h o u se h o ld  a t t a c h e d  t o  a  w ife  
and  /
1# a l th o u g h  F r a s e r  f e l t  t h a t  th e  p o s i t i o n  rem a in ed  d o u b tfu l*2* H edderw ick  v .  M o riso n  (1 901 ) 4 F # l6 3  d i s c u s s e d  
above#3 .  M .W .P.A ct, 1 8 82 , 8 .20*  c f .  N a tio n a l  I n s u r a n c e  A c t, 1948 and  M in is t r y  o f  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  A c t ,  1966 .
4 1 1 *
an d  t h a t  t h e  E n g lis h  p re c e d e n t#  ( t o  th e  e f f e o t  o f  th e  
s u p p o r t  due t o  d e s c e n d a n ts  and  t o  th e  h u sb an d  i f  i n  
d i r e  s t r a i t s )  w ould be  fo llo w e d ^  w here t h e r e  h ad  b een  
no  s t a t u t o r y  amendment#*
I t  i a  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  s e e  t h a t  W alton* h a v in g  
rev ie w ed  th e  o l d ,  and  t h e  E n g l i s h ,  a u t h o r i t i e s ^  d id  
n o t  th in k  i t  n e o o e e e ry  o r  a d v is a b le  o r  s t i m u l a t i n g  
t o  i n s e r t  f o r  d ia o u a e io n  ev en  a q u e ry  t h a t  p e rh a p s  
t h e  w if e  s h o u ld  i n  f u t u r e  s h a r e  e q u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  t h e  c h i l d r e n  an d  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be a  m u tu a l 
o b l i g a t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t  b e tw een  sp o u ses*
The l i s t  o f  p e r s o n s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  t h e  a l im e n t  
o f  th e  in d ig e n t  i s  draw n up by G r e e n 's  E n c y c lo p a e d ia ^  
a s  f o l lo w s :^  f i r s t ,  h u sb an d  ( " F o r  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  a  
m a r r ie d  woman h e r  husband  i s  p r im a r i l y  l i a b l e " ) ,  and 
th e n  i n  t h e  o a se  o f  i n d ig e n t  p e rs o n s  g e n e r a l ly *  
d e s c e n d a n ts ,  i n c lu d in g  g r a n d c h i ld r e n ,  t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  
f a t h e r  an d  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  h i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and  
th e n  t h e  m o th e r ( a s  t o  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  whom th e  
E n c y c lo p a e d ia  d i f f e r s  from  K r s k in e 's  v iew  (1 ,6 * 5 6 )  
t h a t  e l l  p a t e r n a l  a s c e n d a n ts  m ust f i r s t  b e  e x h a u s te d  
b e f o r e  th e  m o th e r i s  c a l l e d  upon t o  a l im e n t)^ *
T h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  i n d ig e n t  p e rs o n  m ig h t lo o k  t o&h i s  p a t e r n a l  g r a n d f a th e r ^ ,  h i s  p a t e r n a l  g ra n d m o th e r , 
p a t e r n a l  g r e a t  g r a n d f a th e r ,  and  m o th e r , (p re su m a b ly ) ,
and  i n  d e f a u l t  o f  a l l  t h e s e ,  h i s  m a te rn a l  g r a n d f a th e r6 *7and  m o th e r , (p re s u m a b ly ) , an d  s o  on * '*
There /
1 ,  s e e  e*g* H odgens v* H *(1837) 4  C*& F .325*  Colem an 
V* Birm ingham  O v e rs e e rs  1891 , 6  G*B*D*615 c i t e d  by  W alto n , p*224*
2* l a t e r  E n g l is h  a u t h o r i t i e s  and  th e  r e c e n t  g r e a t  c h a n g e s  i n  E n g lis h  f a m ily  le w , c u lm in a t in g  i n  th e  
M a tr im o n ia l  C au ses A c t , i9 7 3  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  (C h a p te r  6  -  E n g lan d ) when E n g l i s h  law  i s  s p e c i a l l y  
c o n s id e re d *5* (1926  e d i t i o n )  Sub Mom* 'A l i m e n t ' ,  pp*287 /8#4* S ee  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h e r e  c i t e d .5 ,  B e l l ,  (1 8 9 0 ) ,  17 R.549*6* W ileon  1 8 2 5 , 5 8*547) F r .P .&  Ch. 88*7* See h i e r a r c h y  o f  l i a b i l i t y  p ro p o se d  i n  Memo,No#22 P r o p o s i t i o n  1 4 , and  s u g g e s te d  am endm ents ( i n s e r t i o n s )  mede /
4 1 2 ,
T h ere  i s  a t  p r e s e n t  no  l i a b i l i t y  I n  a l im e n t  *1b e tw een  c o l l a t e r a l s  and  a b r o t h e r ,  I n  t h a t  c a p a c i ty ,  
w i l l  h av e  no l i a b i l i t y  t o  a l im e n t  a  b r o t h e r ,  b u t  
may be  c a l l e d  upon i f  h e  h a s  assum ed th e  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  * The S c o t t i s h  Law 
C om m ission recommended t h a t  no change be made i n  
t h i s  ru le ^ #  s o  much th e  more s t r a n g e  i s  t h e  1976 
p ro v is io n *
A f t e r  d i v o r c e ,  t h e r e  may be l i a b i l i t y  upon a 
h u sb an d  /
made i n  F a c u l ty  R esponse  p# l6*  T h e re  i s  d i s c u s s e d  a l s o  i n  th e  Memo, and R esponse th e  q u e s t io n s  o f  l i a b i l i t y  i n  a l im e n t  t o  and  by ^  f a c t o  members o f  a  f a m i ly ,  and  " o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s  th r o u ^ T m a r r i a g e " .The Memo* ( P r o p n .10) p ro p o se d  t h a t  t h e r e  be  no a l im e n ta r y  o b l i g a t i o n  b e tw een  a  p e rs o n  and  th e  r e l a t i v e s  ( o t h e r  th a n  c h i ld r e n )  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  sp o u s e ;  t h e  F a c u l ty  R esponse  ( p p .10 -1 2 ) a d v o c a te d  an  a l im e n ta r y  o b l i g a t i o n  b e tw een  c h i l d r e n  and  p a r e n t s -  in - la w  ( b u t  n o t  f u r t h e r ) :  s e e  i n  co n seq u e n ceamended h i e r a r c h y .  A h i e r a r c h y  o f  e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  a l im e n t  i s  s e t  f o r t h  f o r  c o n s id e r a t i o n  -  F a c u l ty  R e sp o n se , p . 1 8 : Memo.2 .9 0  (P ropn#  1 9 ) .1 .  C f . B i s t e n  V. N .B .R y, (1870) a  M acph. 9 8 0 . H ow ever, t h e  Damages ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1976 , Sched* 1 h a s  
in c lu d e d  c o l l a t e r a l s  and  t h e i r  i s s u e ,  u n c le s  and a u n ts  and  d iv o rc e d  sp o u s e s  i n  th e  l i s t  o f  p e rs o n s  e n t i t l e d  t o  su e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  d e a th  o f  an  i n d i v i d u a l ,  f o r  l o s s  o f  s u p p o r t .  O nly im m ed ia te  members o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d 's  f a m ily  ( p a r e n t ,  s p o u s e , c h i l d ,  a c c e p te d  c h i l d )  may se e k  a  " l o s s  o f  s o c i e t y  aw ard" ( f o r m e r ly  te rm ed  s o l a t i u m ) .  I t  seem s s t r a n g e  t h a t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  sh o u ld  e x i s t ,  b u t  
p e rh a p s  i t  i s  a  f a i r e r  r u l e  i n  t h a t  i t  p e rm i ts  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  be g iv e n  t o  l o s s  o f  ^  f a p to  s u p p o r t  w here su c h  may h av e  b een  g iv e n .  w T Il"^ h e  o a se s  
t h e r e o f  be fo u n d  t o  be  in f r e q u e n t?  C o n tr a , t h e r e  a r e  many o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  -  o r  n o h ^ reT alE ionah ip s -  i n  w h ich  s u p p o r t  was g iv e n  w here no l e g a l  d u ty  was owed, and  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  th e  l i s t  (u p o n  wW.ch t i t l e  t o  su e  d e p en d s) may a p p e a r  a r b i t r a r y  
and  i n c o n s i s t e n t  when c o n t r a s t e d  w ith  th e  t e s t  o f  ' l e g a l  d u ty  t o  a l i m e n t ' l a i d  down i n  B i s t e n .
2 .  M a ck in to sh  (1 8 6 8 ) 7 Macph.67% E r s k .  1 .6 .5 8  « , position of h e i r  v i s - a - v i s  h i s  c o l l a t e r a l s . Waiker, P irn s . i , 319 .3 .  Propn# 1 1 : F a c u l ty  R e sp o n se , p p .1 2 /1 3 .
4 1  :
huabaïid to support his ohlMron until the age of
is i x t e e n  and  any  sum aw arded  t o  th e  w ife  f o r  t h a t*• *■» i «st^Fîfctütîau»
p u rp o se *  1# te rm e d  " a l im e n t"  *** One o n n n o t f & l l  
t o  bo d i s a p p o in te d  t h a t  F e rg u s s o n ’a  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  
a  huaband  m ig h t lo o k  t o  h i s  w ife  f o r  a l im e n t  d id  n o t  
r e c e iv e  f u r t h e r  d ia o u a a io n #  P e rh a p s ,  h o w e v e r, th e  
t r u e  v iew  m uet be  t h a t  FergiJtaaon in te n d e d  M e  rem ark  
t o  go no f u r t h e r  th a n  t h e  e a s e  he  p o a tu l& te d ,  nam ely  
one  i n  w h ich  t h e  hueband  h ad  no meene o f  s u p p o r t#  
and  had  no a c c e s s  t o  h i a  w i f e ' s  f u n d s ,  I t  w ould  
a p p e a r  t h a t  a t  oomiaon law  t h e r e  may h a v e  b e e n  a d u ty  
f o r  a  w ife  w ith  s u f f i c i e n t  fu n d s  t o  a l im e n t  a n  
I n d ig e n t  h u sb a n d , and  i f  t h a t  i s  th e  c a s e ,  th e n  th e  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  1 9 2 0 , h e r a ld e d  a s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  
W if e 's  l e g a l  d u ty  i n  t M s  r e s p e c t  w as n o  more th a n  
a  s t a t u t o r y  r e i t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  d u ty  w h ich  a r o s e  a t  
common law*
Be t h a t  a s  i t  may# I t  m ust b e  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  n o th in g  t o  l e a d  u s  t o  su p p o se  t h a t  t h e  d u ty  was any  
m ore o n e ro u s  th a n  t h a t  im posed  by s t a t u t e  (a n d  may 
n o t  i n  many o a s e s  h av e  b e en  aw arded  t h e  d i g n i t y  o f  th e  
s t a t u s  o f  r u le #  b u t  h a v e  b e en  th e  r e s u l t  o f  e q u i t a b l e  
r e a s o n in g  /
1 .  W atson , 1 8 9 5 , 35 8 * L * a .1 5 0 ,2", Dunn V# M atthew s (1 8 4 2 ) 4  D»454; C o n ju g a l  R ig h ts  ( S c . )  Amendment A ct# 1861# 8 ,6 *
5# S ee  W a lto n , pp# 150/151*  The to n e  o f  t h e  d l s o u s s io n  (1 9 5 0 ) so u n d s  o d d ly  d a te d *  Where d iv o r c e  i s  c o m p e te n t b y  c o n se n t#  o r  o s t e n s i b l y  w i th o u t  " f a u l t " ,  and  w here  w iv e s  form  a  s l g n l f i o a n t  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t h e  w o rk in g  p o p u la t i o n ,  t h e r e  may r e q u i r e  t o  be  a  
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  n o t  o n ly  o f  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  s u p p o r t  b e tw ee n  s p o u s e s  an d  ex -sp o u ae a#  b u t  a l s o  & 
r e - f o r m u l s t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  d u t i e s  t o  th e  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a rr ia g e *  T h u s , Memo* No#22 ( 2 .7 4  ) recommends t h a t #  I n  t h e  l e g i t im a t e #  a s
i n  t h e  I l l e g i t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n ,  a  c h i l d  s h o u ld  be a b le  t o  lo o k  f o r  s u p p o r t  t o  h i s  m o th e r  e q u a l ly  w i th  h i s  f a th e r *4* C f ,  Memo,No*22, 2 *175 ; p ro p o s a l  t h a t ,  i n  S c o ts  law # t h e r e  s h o u ld  be  u s e  I n  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s io n s  c o n c e rn in g  s u p p o r t  o f  c h i l d r e n  o f  th e  te rm  " a i lm e n t" ,  r a t h e r  th e n  " m a in te n a n c e " #
414*
1 2 r e a s o n i n g  o r  o n  s p e c i a l t y  o f  f a c t s  * F r a s e r
i s  f o u n d  n o t  t o  h a v e  a n s w e r e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h i c h
h e  s e t  h im s e l f .  T h e r e  i s  n o  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  p r e c i s e l y
w h a t  i s  m e a n t  by th e  o b l i g a t i o n  " t o  c o n t r i b u t e  h e r
e x e r t i o n s  t o  t h e  f a m i l y  s u p p o r t § a c c o r d i n g  t o  h e r
h u s b a n d ' s  s t a t i o n "  n o r  i s  t h e r e  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h i c h  s u c h  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  m a y  a r i s e ,
e x c e p t  t h a t ,  f r o m  th e  c o n t e x t ,  i t  c a n  b e  s e e n  n o t  t o
s i g n i f y  p e c u n i a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  -  t h a t  i s ,  w h e r e  t h e
h u s b a n d  i s  a b l e  f i n a n c i a l l y  t o  m e e t  a l l  t h e  f a m i l y
c o m m i t m e n t s  h im s e l f ,  A c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  m o n e y  F r a s e r
d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  p r e p a r e d  t o  a f f i r m  t o  b e
e x i g i b l e ,  ( t h o u g h  " [ T ] h e  p o i n t  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  e a s i l y
s o lv e d ,  i f  th e  h u s b a n d  w ere w i t h o u t  m e a n s ,  o r  f r o m
s i c k n e s s  u n a b l e  t o  e a r n  a n y ,  a n d  th e  w i f e  h a d  %a b u n d a n c e "  • )  b u t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  c o n c e p t  c o m m e n d s  
i t s e l f  t o  h im  a s  b e i n g  j u s t  a n d  i n  k e e p i n g  w i t h  t h e  
w i f e 's  i n c r e a s i n g  r i g h t  t o  h o l d  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e .  
P r o f e s s o r  C l i v e  h a s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  M e m o r a n d u m  N o , 2 2 ,  
f o u r  a p p e n d i c e s .  A p p e n d i x  A c o n c e r n s  ' T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  t h e  L a w ' ,  a n d  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t ,  a t  p a r a g r a p h  
8 ,  h e  c o m m e n t s  u p o n  t h e  d o u b t  w hich  s u r r o u n d s  t h e  
w i f e ' s  p r e - 1 9 2 0  d u t i e s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  a l i m e n t  o f  th e  
h u s b a n d .  H e  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  P i n g z i e s ^ '  a n d  a l s o  
t o  M o n t g o m e r y - C u n i n g h a m e  v ,  M o n t g o r a e r y - B e a u m o n t  a n d  
R i t c h i e  V , R e n n i e ^ ,
I f  i t  w a s  n o t  a  d i s p l e a s i n g  n o t i o n  t o  F r a s e r ,  i t  
i s  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  l a w  u p o n  t h i s  m a t t e r  r e m a i n s  a s  
s e t  down b y  t h e  1920 A c t, 8 .4 ,  w h e n  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  
t h e  g r e a t  c h a n g e  i n  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  t h i n k i n g ,  a n d  
i n  t h e  l a w  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  w o m e n ,  t h e i r  e a r n i n g  p o w e r  
a n d  /
1 , C u t h i l l  V . B u r n s  (1862 ) 24 D .8 4 9 , s u p r a  p p .  402- 404 .2 ,  H edderw ick  v ,  M orison  (1901) 4 P .i'E F ; 5  8 .L .T .
2 5 5 ,  s u p r a ,  p p .  407 - 4 0 8 .
3 ,  I ,  8 3 7 .I: ffm;
6 . (1840) 13 S c . J u r .7 3 .
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and property in the years since 1 8 7 8 *
However, in terms of the National Assistance 
A c t, 1948, 8.42 i t  was provided that a man should 
be liable to maintain his wife and children and that 
a woman should be liable to maintain her husband 
and children and that "children" should include 
illegitimate children where a woman was concerned 
and children the paternity of whom had been admitted 
or otherwise established where a man was concerned.
S.43 entitled the N.A.B. or the local authority 
to attempt to recoup the cost of maintenance from the 
person liable to maintain the assisted person, and 
the Court might order the defendant to pay such sum 
as it might consider appropriate (s.43(2))•
Under 8.44(7)9 as far as orders for affiliation 
and aliment were concerned, the Board might use 
diligence, including civil imprisonment under the 
Civil Imprisonment (Scotland) Act, 1882, in the same 
way as might a wife, and that w h e th e r  the decree 
had been taken in favour of the Board, the local 
authority or the mother.
National Assistance was superseded by Supplementary 
Benefit, and the Ministry of Social Security A c t, 1966 , 
contains (in s.23) similar provisions as to recovery 
of the non-contributory benefit provided by the Act,
and reiterates (in 8 .2 2 ) the liability to support
2existing between spouses and towards children . 
Imprisonment for a period not exceeding t h r e e  months 
or a find not exceeding £ 1 0 0  o r  both, is provided 
by /
1 « and see now Ministry of Social Security Act,
1 9 6 6 , 8 8 . 2 3  and 3 0 .2. Imprisonment is a competent sanction f o r  persistent refusal or neglect by an individual to maintain himself or th e  p e rs o n  f o r  whom he is responsible with th e  r e s u l t  that benefit is awarded to him or them  and free board and lodging given in a reception centre.
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toy
j â & m L ,M W k a k L M Ê 2 *
The of mâ "pemmment"
ailment are pspoâmetlv# of great dlfflomlty# It aeema 
t h a t  OM  .m m t $ r m t  "p e rm am w t"  M m rd s o f  a i lm e n t  m  
hM m g th o a e  ^rom m m ee&  a f t »  a  4 e o r e e  o f  e # a r a t l o m  
»  W ,M w w 0  M e  Worn g m n tM *  ( W m e l l y  1 9 5 9 )#
'Ailment* In a Wem# ammo of oowee im tho 
an#or%$ Im omh md/or In Maâ$ omâ % immbmâ 
to %Flfe 'atamte matrlmoM#** m # o #  to the rmlea 
B tm te#* % < # o r ly  ep#akim $$. m p e r l e ê l o a l  a l l w m o o  
$ r m # â  #  t W  w i f e  f o r  h e r  w m  m M ntem m oe a f t e r  
ê e o m #  o f  d l v e m #  1# m ot t h m ^ h  m  w a r â
mo /
1$ ?or Mooverv 1$% of mleroY>k^ wntatlOB. or mom""psriÆSkta^ ^9 3 3 ?  ro o » # o ry  a fZ  w a $  fZ # a  o f  d e o e e a MolfLWwt. 194Ü ikOt# aW #2* Homo Mo#22$ Part f:  UoluUiomohlp heWeem Whilenu! j'rivat'O Z#%f# 5#7 1966 Aot# $*22)*##"I t lo oloar the wmion low hleœrohg' of a3.1ucatary oWJ \' nim ;bi lf.,uolo%nt$ proovodlnr;n midc.v motion /V ur £-i f.r,-# brwufvAt only thel;i&,blo rGlatiVv.L refc^rred to 1;: GWtiom 22# It le  mmoh lemo olomr iik.tWr the oo^ moo Imr of ullmmt $s Irrelevant &%t al) other roapeoW##*'*# 5#B* ’’It 1# aeoeme^ r^y to elerlfy  the èonhtw Im th# pm ewt lf?,w on roooYow from Ila&Ie w)*âtive# of the cost of hmefit* #m wlntlom wouM%WWnhtMly he to hœwniee tM rmle$- on llm hlllty  imder tW publie la# rmu private Imf ayatone# (^ ur pmpoaalm would go & lo%: #@y in tMa dlrootlom*#*"* In w  far iG #0^3) were mwae (mo e#$# omdwt m &  w lllln i\ am hi.' adhere* grmidj.^ont/grmdohlM '. obllg&tlor io. mipmort) W&eré Fao%üty vlaWd to differ from # e  the Faomity Ewpomeew t#e (p##2) that **tbe hmzmmy aoltlw # with the rulw  of pmbllo Iw  "^ rouia be leae thm that which would follow tho prepommla#**See al(;o Olivo tmd wileon. ;D#590 ^  eeqa "Hm^ rlege 5ky/d D 'u o ia l aod  ( \  Cew o r 'O l i v e )  Memo*Me#22* App@Mi% A* 'lutomctlom of publlo md private l w \  p»w * 1&#2i* (short hletormal survey to prwent day)*
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$0 made for the auppert of children thereafter 1$ 
aorreetly âo termed*
"laMrim" allmeat Im tW%t mtmetas^ y support 
which la a<m0%t la aamjimatien with a wave for 
eaperatlqn w aâhareaoe* mâ le able to he 
âl0tlngal#L#à fmm #m ward 'peademta l l ta \
that la* m award ma# W imtil the raeult
ef pmaemt (or embmquemt) llti^atioa ehall haoome 
oMm*#
of interim allmmt we
It would oWLomly he Inéquitable and imjast 
that* peMlag litigation* a #lf# he mqalrad to 
oohahlt wltli Mr Wahaaâ fm* fear of belmg totally 
laokl% im financial au#ort; md tWm hy thla 
r w a d y  /
Jlâ . 6  ( I n t e r i m  a l im e n t;\ceof ;Fier# a wife had $1500 of he# ^' the inm mmritl* Im the bw;c; "1 fpB.oulr had w aou% %f' the woman\'Ct O' her mm$ Wt hwlmg momy of MrOUR L'l'' W')L$ $W &o$B not meed money from her hiuRfund to rAf\hie her to Tu^ r^o the action* I ooimot t*"ko tho emmmt nf imoome which thefTiM vl) A yhu/ any m'b"'* ,rroy in hmk le the vur,3 Of wwy fo'/ * * Motion* It laonly I'WLeh jnotlfloo nn interim awarâ innuo't Of *:ou; f*h : ae there la no neooBalty here###"(pc?.^  L* nwicewie* at p*.1221}* Urn doubt theif imt 'the 8im# remrisu* ai mod pmldot
1  *  3 4 2 ; s e e  ( N ' O t e # )  2 $ ,  h o w e v e r(allnoat jM i#er&M# for the dwatlom of the (dlvoroe) litigatlo owarRou. it ate of uer week* tZ$ou(ÿi the wife- b<%4 nro( A eete of . 3'3#000 (hoûae ("y$300) lAvc.Thnr^ atL etC9$5uO* produolng,'fi inem# o./ 5^%0 p*r&*) the defenderwm for ;!i;tiaU.:n;moe during thatr^ Tlod# Z'xypd oh#rl;uo4; I^'ojectod the argument that rïe ehoulf u.-quirju. w :\Fcnd her aa^ etm to ^mlntalBh'^ 'reelf dwin% a pe% led tv bo terminated poeeihly w mwarâ im her fsKVom* of a porlodloal allowamoe of 0 5  p e r  w eek m d   ^ #ltal payment of £ 1 5 #0 0 0 * TMdefender* It wme a maa of meam#
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rem edy  8h.e may g a l a  m a in te n a n c e  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  o f
the litigation,
>1However* as W alto n  demonstrates * if she was 
I n  employment and accustomed to w ork and to receive 
a salary sufficient for her needs* she might thereby 
disentitle herself from receiving aliment a l th o u g h  
a wife unused to w ork  would not - at least at Walton’s 
date^* and still p r o b a b ly  now - be required to seek 
employment. Professor Olive n o te s ^  t h a t  this is an 
axfard which " m is t  be made in t h e  dark* or at least 
in t h e  h a l f  light, and for this reason it is accepted 
that the c o u r t  m u st have a considerable m ea su re  o f  
discretion",
’Aliment* to an indigent h u sb a n d  in terms o f  
t h e  M,¥,P, (Sc,) Act* 1 9 2 0 * 8 ,4 *  may m ean ’interim 
a l i m e n t* pendente lite^*
I f  a woman has no other means of support* it 
would b e  exceptional f o r  a c o u r t  to refuse her 
application, A prima facie case must b e  shown* but 
t h e  older law was stricter and required
I t  /
1, at p,145 and cases there cited,2# 1st e d n : 1 8 9 5 : 3nd edn; 1 9 5 1 ,5* Olive and Wilson* p,212,4"# A d a ir  v .  A , 1924 8 ,0  ,  7 9 8 ,5* WaIWon7'*pvT46* 0*& ¥ ,*  p , 2 1 5 * f n ,6 5 *  b ,P ,C ly d e  i nAdair* supra* at p,801* commented* perhaps somewhat confusingly* "The evidence r e q u i r e d  t o  warrant an  
i n t e r i m  allowance o f  aliment in a consistorial cause has b e e n  described as a aemiplena probatio, and consists of such m a t e r i Court* as present a  prima facie case," An example of averments considered insuffiol e n t  w as A le x a n d e r  v .  A, (1849) 12 D,117, lord Sands* upon  th e T c e n R a T lp o In F "- w h e th e r  t h e  w i f e ’s* and the husband’s* obligation t o  each o t h e r  in t h i s  matter w ere  identical (in the m a t t e r  o f  evidence at t h i s  stage), the former having been supplied by statute* (that is* the general o b l i g a t i o n  t o  aliment t h e  indigent husband*  and "There is nothing t o  e x c lu d e "  the A c t’ s  "application to i n t e r i m  aliment?" per L,P, Clyde, at p,801) at p,802 remarked* "In regulating matters of interim arrangement d u r in g  a p r o c e s s  the Court must proceed upon a prima 
f a c i e  view of the facts* and I am of opinion thaF'iîe Ëh'bt"talie this course in dealing with the w i f e ’ s  liability to the husband", A more detailed d i s c u s s i o n  /
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It has been thought that the court will 
not grant interim aliment pendente llte until the
husband has had an opportunity to state his1 Pdefence * but Professor Olivo takes the view that
application may be made at the earliest stage of 
the c a se *  and "even b e f o r e  the defender has had an 
opportunity of lodging defences”,
The grant of an award of interim aliment 
’pendente llte’ is entirely in the discretion ofmltii.tinr i. JÜ i.r i jij .
the C o u r t b u t  F r a s e r  ' says that this I s  not an 
a r b i t r a r y  but a judicial discretion* and quotes 
Bir J, Hicholl i n  Ooolt© v, 0 ,  2 Phill. 40* a s  
f o l lo w s  : - "Although alimony* that i s *  t h e  allowance 
to be made to a wife for her maintenance* e i t h e r  
d u r in g  a  m a tr im o n ia l  s u i t *  o r  when sh e  h a s  p ro v e d  
h e r s e l f  entitled to a separate maintenance* - i s  
s a i d  t o  be  discretionary with t h e  Court; b u t  it is 
a judicial* not an arbitrary discretion w h ic h  i s  t o  
b e  e x e r c i s e d ;  and t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  clearly a subject 
of appeal”. If a w ife  has a reasonable case at all* 
it i s  most unlikely that she will b e  refused.
However* not only m ust th e  pursuer show a 
t>rima facie c a s e  to justify t h e  remedy she (or he) 
i s  /
d i s c u s s i o n  (dealing separately with different types of action) is to be fo u n d  in O liv e  &, W ilso n  pp,213-21? and se© Memo,Ho.22,1 * Walton* ibid, * citing and outlining P i r r i e  v« P, 
(1 9 0 5 )  10 598$ and  Jo h n so n  v ,2 191$2, Olive & Wilson* p,212* c i t i n g  Fyffe v# F» 1954 8,0,1* (see 1 .Guthrie’a opinionaT"^T^7?) and Ourrie v , 0* (1855) 12 B,1?1* and distinguishing firr£e Sïà*'Tohnston on t h e  ground that the wife had an income of her own, L, G u th r ie  in F y f f e  maintained that t h i s  was a matter l y i n g  e n t i r e l y  i n  the discretion of the Court* and certainly circmstances can be envisaged (as those in Fyffe) in which such a discretion will be necessary* if t h e  object of the awards- is not to be frustrated. See also Ourrie* at p#1?5$
5 ,  G u r r ie  v .  0 ,  (1 8 5 5 )  12  B ,1?1*  M u rieo n  v .  M. 1925o .v4 ,  E ,  & W, I*  a t  p ,8 4 8 .
4 2 0 ,
la  (or W) amat WLm ohow Jgg&l2
p m o f  # f  m m alage"^*
fh# p#a#loe #f ollmdaG mlimnt ^  
t o  a  w i f e  1$ w M m t l y  e t  lem g h ie te m y  œ d  wae 
a c c e p te d  % #  O m m le e m ie e #  M alW retom '^  q w t e c  
tw o o M »  #mwm om^^the W p M *  m m e ly *  W d y  Im m o z  
a # lm a %  lo # d  t h #  % '# e r t  c m # ;a im in g  t h e
Watememt, tw  depeWmoe of the prewme
o f  ê l v w c w e n t  f o r  ^ ^ e t m e y #  t h e  e m it
a t  t h e  w l f e ’ e  j m e tm w *  y $ t$  1%& t W  m eantim e# 
t h e  I j c r #  f o m d  '*# B he w m  t o  W  a l l iw m te d  a t  t h e  
himhmd'# #hw #$ ^ 23:g»â H#ah$ 1579#^* Bad th la  
thorn# the hueWW, offered #  melmtalm her a t home* 
prom im m hly # m ? i%  t W  4 # p e M e # e  o f  t h e  w t lo m  mid* 
a W .M r l y *  W w4^#
I t  wemld. a p p e a r ' t h a t  eome #  l e a a t  o f  t h e  
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t h a t  a b r o g a t io n  o f  t h e  m orm A  m arx 'lod  p a t t e r n  
e m r le a g e â  b y  t h e  I w  (nam ely#  j o i n t  # (^ ty  o f  
W h e re n o e #  p e rh a p s  h e w l e r  o n  t h e  w ife  ( a a  
e v ié e m o e ê  p o m e lb ly  b y  h e r  <l%ty t o  " fo l lo w " h lm  )
«*  a  # . # . , # &  # * 0  f o r  k « r  æ ig h t  t o  lo o k  t o  h e r  
h w h m a â  f o r  s u p p o r t :  joint o f  a lim em t#  %moh
h e a v i e r  on  t h e  Im eb an â  a n â  im ^ e se â  on  t h e  w i f e  i n  
tema of (Bo*) iot$ i%0$ e#4)$ mmifesten
by the valuatm^ esEtrof^ judlolal eeparation 
s e t t l e m e n t#
B aeh e e t t l e m e n ta #  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e i r  s u b s t a n t i v e  
I f  n o t  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  a e p e o ta #  a r e  n o r m a l ly  o a tw l th  
j a d l o l a l  k en #  W in g  a  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p a r t i e s ^  a f f a i r s  
o u ta id o  t h e  law # a  vlev^ r e a u l t i m g  ## p o A a p s  
f o r t i m a t e l y  a n d  p e rh a p s  o o r r e e t l y ^  ^  I n  t h e  
d ia o o w a g e m m t o f  t h e  w e  o f  e o w t o  o f  Im f a s  
b a r g a i n in g  o e m tre s  f o r  a p o w e a  eqraahhlim g o v e r  
money m a t t e r s *
'f h i r d #  a n d  foi% rth# a r e  i n t e r i m  a l im e n t  an d  
i n t é r i m  /
w h ic h  a h o a ld  W  Im t h e  know ledge  o f  a  j u J  ;u who l a  c h a rg e d  w i t h  t h e  d u ty  o f  m ak ing  p r o p e r  f i a m o i a l  p ro v im lo n a  a s  b e tw e e n  p a r t i e s " *1* fet# however# judicial power of award of alimeat d u r in g  o o h a h l ta t lo m  l a  w f ^ d  i n  Memo* No* 2 2 ,
^*"^79  ^  a n d  P ropn*  3 9 ,  Bloom ed i n  jg 'ao u lty  ïW apop T #  an d  lu g e d  i n  O h a p te re  4and  /  a( ^ o f  ; c o u ld  n o t  w o h  p o w er h e  e z to n d e d  t o  im o iu d e  ju d io l m l  r e v ie w  o f  t h e  f l m m e i a l  a a p e o ta  o f  v o l im t a r y  arram gem em to t o  l i v e  a p a r t ,  w h i le  k e e p in g  t h e  m a r r ia g e  m o m ia a lly  i n  W in g ?  !k!!%ie iirould h e  r e v o lu t io n a r y #  Im t  p e r h a p s  r o m l i a t i e *  i t  may h e  t h a t  t h e  a i g n i f i o a n a e  o f  t h e  a d h o re n o e  r u l w  l a  d iW n d .e h in g  (o f#  D iv# ( 8 o * )  A e t ,  i9 ? 5 #  0 *8 ) ,  an d  w m  w h i le  t h e  m e i s t l n g  a t t i t u d e  p r e v a i l e  ( m  t o  w h ioh  s e e  Wa3,k0r# ? r in e *
.o ia lly  awarded i s  alweye open to  revleiom  the Court; omd i t  would seem anomaloue that tore should he mo esoape from a oontraotim lly  stip u la ted  rate" (per h# Ooratablo a t p#6?i)*
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i n t e r i m  a l im e n t  p e n d e n te  l l t e * The l a t t e r ,  a s  
i t s  name s u g g e s t s ,  m ean s , a s  h a s  b e e n  n o t e d ,  
m o n e ta ry  s u p p o r t  s o u g h t p e n d in g  th e  r e s u l t  o f  
l i t i g a t i o n »
The fo rm e r  m e a n s  a l im e n t  s o u g h t  i n  a n  a c t i o n  
w here  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n c l u s i o n  f o r  a l i m e n t  b u t  w h ich  
d o e s  n o t  c o n c lu d e  a ls o  f o r  t h e  r e m e d i e s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
l i n k e d  w i th  i t ,  n a m e l y  a d h e r e n c e  o r  s e p a r a t i o n »  I n  
o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  'p e rm a n e n t*  a n d  
' i n t e r im *  a l i m e n t  l i e s  i n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  f o r m e r ,  
a  d e c i s i o n  u p o n  s t a t u s  h a s  b e e n  m a d e ,  w h e r e a s ,  i n  
t h e  l a t t e r ,  i t  h a s  n o t ^ ,  The t e r m i n o l o g y  i s  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y *  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  
d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  be  any  s a f e g u a r d  a g a i n s t  a  
w i f e ' s  en jo y m en t o f  ' i n t e r im *  a l im e n t  f o r  t h e  r e s t  
o f  t h e  p a r t i e s '  j o i n t  l i v e s ,  w h ile  l i v i n g  a p a r t  from  
h e r  h u s b a n d ,  n o r  a n y  c o m p u l s i o n  o n  h e r  t o  t a k e  s t e p s  
t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  d i s p u t e  m o r e  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
o r  /
1 »  B e e  p e r  1 »  M a c k i n t o s h  i n  D o n n e l l y ,  a t  p p . 1 0 7 /8 ;  s e e  a l s o  p e r  l*J*~01*(Thom 8on)% ~ "Any d e c r e e  
w h i c h  i s  p ro n o u n c e d  b y  a  C o u rt w i t h o u t  d e c i d i n g  
o n  s t a t u s  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  o f  a  t e m p o r a r y  a n d  
i n t e r i m ,  c h a r a c t e r  a s  i t  c a n  l a s t  o n l y  t i l l  t h e  
c o m p e t e n t  c o u r t  h a s  d e c i d e d  t h e  c o n s i s t o r i a l  
i s s u e  and  w i th  i t  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t i a l  i s s u e  o f  a l im e n t#  The c o u r t s  h ave  shown a  v e r y  u n d e r s ta n d a b le  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  p ro n o u n c e  su c h  
" in te r im "  d e c r e e s  w here  th e y  h a d  no  a s s u r a n c e  
t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  th e  c o n s i s t o r i a l  i s s u e  w a s  i n  t h e  o f f in g #  The f e e l i n g  o f  t h e  C o u r ts  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  u n l e s s  t h e y  h a d  s o m e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  
t h e  c o n s i s t o r i a l  i s s u e  w a s  t r u l y  g o i n g  t o  b e  t r i e d ,  th e y  w ere  p u t  i n t o  t h e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  p o s i t i o n  o f  
m a k i n g  w h a t  w a s  i n  e f f e c t  a  p e r m a n e n t  a w a r d  u n d e r  t h e  g u i s e ,  o f  a n  i n t e r i m  o n e , I  f u l l y  
a p p r e c i a t e  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y .  H o w e v e r ,  f r o m  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  I  d o  n o t  s e e  a n y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  h a lfw a y  h o u s e .  I n t e r i m  d e c r e e s  
p e n d e n t e  l l t e  a r e  e a s y  b u t  c l e a r l y  " in te r im "  c a n n o t  b e  so  n a r r o w ly  r e s v r r c t e d .  I f  t h e  1 r s  r s  n o t  a c t u a l l y  c u r r e n t  I  do n o t  s e e  any  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
w a y  o f  p u t t i n g  p r e s s u r e  on a  p a r t y  t o  commence 
t h e  l i s . " ( p . 1 0 2  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  d i s c u s s i o n ) .
42g,
or at with torminologloal# if not
a o tim l#  f i n a l i t y *
Thera iieed he no tldylng*#w by ;n;ubaequant 
pWBuer ^ i]*3ii$ti$atod. litigation* It is oertaimly 
true timt thia potoatlal oaiise of dlatroao to 
the ailment(Ary debtor (usually the hwband) haa 
W o n  allovlaWd by the iatrodaotlom of the millateral 
or "with eouj^ont" dlvoroo #* (Dlvoroe (Sootlmid) Act# 
1 9 7 s# a*i(2)(&) @md (#)) which mogmo that litlg&tloa 
may bo  I m a t l t u t e l  b y  e i th m ?  p w t y  a f t e r  & t w o '^ e a r  
or flvo#yoar ooparatloa# Nevertheloas, it la 
para&oxieal that neither "pormamont" mor "Interim" 
ailment mean iifhat they aay "permanent" aliment 
may alwayi^  ho rovlewod; "Intérim" allmoat may 
prove to ha -tlie moat pormanomt of all oouroee of 
#
I t  dooo appear^ t h a t  t h e  ooiiirtB* thou#%
h e s l t m i t  /
i# TTiie topic h#B aroused orltiolBm: ooe 8 0 *h* Oom# 
Memo# 3io#22$ 2 * 1 #  ^  a w  (Propm* 33 ) an d  F a c u l ty  Roapowo# ûM, (auggeatod re#^o a c 'tim ^  o f  r u l o a  u p o n  e a t i t lo m e m t  t o  a l im e n t ) *Bee alèo dleouselon la Donnolly# 1939*2* S ee  V a lto n #  pp*13l«4^# @md.oa$e@ t h e r e  o lW d :Olive mid Viimn# p*l96* Fraeer# MucUuad & %^ ifo I# 8 3 5 .etateo that quantification'is a :?iatter for the judioial âlaoretlom of the court# "There has not been In Bootlwd any vo%*y aolmatiflo attempt to reduce thla dieorotloa to a rule, end the attompta made in to do # 0 do not appearto he very mieoeaaful# It muet ho a i^roportionof tho huahmid^B Income; hut what proportion la in no wa^ '' aottlM# Sometimee a half laaometlmoa a third, $;om0 timee a fifth or lea#"# Variou# factors* he oo&#lu&08) are worthy of oonsidoratlor* Theoo inoludo the r «nk of parties# tholr reoidonce* thol]/ health and ago, the àhaemoe or preeeaCe of ohildroa aad upon who.^ Uheir support falls, the aource of imoome* "aa holing from realised capital* or the imeortWn return# from & trade or profession*" The oon&uot of the huahmfid mhou).d not he relevmit* (see Infra^P* 42$ *
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hesitant to state a rule, have adhered fairly 
consistently to the practice of granting the 
proportion of one third o f  the husband's gross^ 
income (or less, depending on the circumstances, 
but rarely more, unless (Walton) there were also 
children to b e  supported by the w if e ^ ,  or (Olive 
and Wilson) the s i z e  of the husband's income was 
such that the adoption of that fraction meant the 
award of a totally inadequate sum) as a suitable 
amount to b e  set aside over th e  year for the support 
of the wife (enforcement thereof being a different 
matter entirely) and though the older cases in 
their pecuniary awards are quite outdated, and 
though increasingly even very recent cases may 
be of detailed use for only a s h o r t  time, 
obviously the fraction of the husband's income 
which is taken is the important part of the 
judgment, providing a guideline to enable interested 
parties to d e te rm in e  whether judicial attitudes 
remain largely the same or whether more is to be 
e x p e c te d  of women in the way of self*^support^ *
A t any rate, it appears clear that f o r  a long 
time t h e  aim has been to award the wife such sum 
as w o u ld  maintain her at the same financial position 
as (he or) she would have been had the marriage 
continued^ *' and enough to e n a b le  her with reasonable 
ease t o  support h e r s e l f ^ *
In the w ords of W alto n  , "It w ould  not be 
right that she be reduced to a bare pittance, while 
her husband is living i n  affluence", but, on the 
other hand, he points out that t h e  amount of or 
grounds /
1# See Olive and W ils o n , pp*197-8 (and pp.210-11). 2# See So# Law Com* Memo* Ho#22 2*105, and  Propn* 2 2 ; Faculty R e s p o n s e, p.20*
5# Of* Olive and  W ils o n , p . 193*4# Alexander v# A* 1957 S.L*T# 298 at 299*5* fgdmson''v*^ '''''¥'7/f951 B*L*T* (Sh.Ot*) 56*6 *
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on which œoimt of ailment le 
mardod$ ahouM w t  he regarded aa <m IWuoememt 
W  aeparatlen* '^ Amd w  during eehahltatlem a 
wife follows the varying. forWrnw of her h w M M ,  
so W%e law does not gumrmteo to a wife living 
apart # m t  eh$ ehall W  aeowed %mlnat the 
emlamltloa which mqr Wfmll him* She la #111 
hlo wife# mmd hmo taken him "for better# for
I t  l a  f w l t l o B B  o%i& u n p ro d m o tlv e  t o  w a r d  
a m m  g^emtor t h «  th# huahmd cam possibly pmy^$ 
m d  % e  mslmtonmo# of W o  howoholàa
la a Immry few omm afford*
On the other hmd# o v m  if the huahmd ie mot 
l i v i n g  w i th  e m o tW r womam* t h e  c a l e u l a t l o m  oaxm ot 
proofed from th# mtmrtlngwpolmt # #  a remoaably 
oomforWble a t m é w â  of life s m #  he provided for 
him# m d  that mBoaroee to aetiefÿ the wlfo*a 
meeda are to ho met out of the remalixdor of hla 
I m o m *
It aeeme that in thle area the art of the 
poaelhl# is more lR#ortamt them edhoremoo to
the mlern of a emmsel of perfootioa# <md it may 
W  oom%tor**prod%otlve to let moml rule#
for la pwaul## that oowse^th# momlly leme 
Momeworthy may not bemeflt^*
.Aiamnt o f  a lim o m t l a  a  m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  d i o o r e t i o n  
of the oowt* Bo a^ ler 3me merged, and L# Fraeer
&%o L ,iiô,@ tifAC a t t o
f l M  a rule into which the diawetlon ml#xt ho 
dlotilled *
Be etatee that the ohj#ot"-of aliment ie to 
)port the wife "roasoamhly and rospeotmbly"#
/
1 # F r*  l»#039-*2* Bee* w orn  t h e  l a r g e s t  q u e s t io n  h e r e  t h  Bupport of pmeently illic it eoeond homoh 
H em *% *2B # l r # m * 2 3  am# F a c u l t y  iW ep o m e#  pp*22*#25#
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"not* to pimieh the husband for his brutalAconduct or scandalous #
The grant of aliment is not intended as pretribution for the behaviour of either party**#
Nevertheless, i t  is possible^, despite t h e  
absence of punitive intent in awards of aliment, 
that less may be given to a wife who has brought 
about the marital discord by her adultery or 
cruelty^ than to an innocent wife turned o u t  b y  
her husband, although in the former case, the wife, 
if her husband does not choose to d iv o r c e  her, is, 
as has been seen, quite e n t i t l e d  t o  look t o  her 
husband for support#
Conduct (on the wife's side) Fraser admits-^ , 
might be taken into account, and perhaps especially, 
for example, that ancient sin o f  women, extravagance#
I t  /
1* Fr. H*& W#,I, 855$ where he criticises certain English cases* See a modern,and broader, discussion of conduct and its relevance to entitlement to aliment (rather than to the level ofTœTawarï), Memo# N o#22, Propn# 27 (willingness to a d h e re  o r  reasonable cause for non-'adharence no longer to be a condition of e n t i t l e m e n t  to aliment), and Faculty Response, pp#25"^31# As to the relevance of conduct to quantification, see Hemo#lfo#22, Propn# 48, and Faculty Response, pp #44*-45 *2# Bowswell V .  D. 1943 8*0*23*3# 9mn!^F*smin?'JilBon p#199*4# Tavlor V# T. (1903) 11 B*X,#T#487s Thomson v# T#
# r t ; r : r r ( N o t e s )  4 9 # -----------------------------
5 . Fr# H# & ¥*,1,857 ###"Although i t  is not al e g i t i m a t e  ground for giving a large aliment t o  the wife, that t h e  husband has been guilty of bad conduct to her, it is a fair ground for n o t  giving her a large aliment, that she has been guilty of extravagance i n  incurring debt, whichthe husband has had to meet * ##" Thereafter, headds that "It is a circumstance t o  be t a k e n  into consideration, as a ground for increasing t h e  wife's a l lo w a n c e , t h a t  sh e  b ro u g h t  a large fortune t o  t h e  husband" (p#858)* This sentiment, th o u g h  fair minded, d e m o n s tr a te s  a century's changes, both i n  modes of action and of t h o u g h t .
I t  in  other he motes# be kind
to a huabWl to  order Mm #  grant to  hie wife 
m  a llw en o e , thmm to  permit M r to  moke f u l l  uee 
of her power to  pledge her hwbmiâ*$ cred it sin ce  
he m i# t  s t i l l  be lia b le  fo r  her b ills #  at le a s t  
for *meowBwiea*# though $M wuld no longer
%» " m i m M M  m k m  *
W m L W & a W l J B L J L a B m m &
If the parties have tkemelwe mmeWd a 
omelwioh abo# a mm mwe#able to both* this 
w i l l  W  g i v e a  w i g h t  b y  % #  o o w t* . w i l l  u s u a l l y  b  
aooepted* will mav# tlw  and trouble* md mey be 
mvieed mad revimmd by the oowt la mmotly the 
em# ww w if  the sum had Wo# oomi^ uted 
*
Ammmt im e r a  A m era  l a  Ao Ammememt B em m e# #
elder oaeem oitM by Wmltonf 
support the view that about one third to <me 
quartet' of the Wobw&^ e laoome la a suitable 
propoeitlom to^glve to the wife* L o rd  M L a re n  
im  B o o t t  # u p r§ ^ s t a t e d " S o  f a r  m  w  
mparleaoe Mare *## I mm w t aware of my oame
g*rimoipIe th at where ham already Mem a #m  o f alim m t a# on b a tw e m  t h e  p a r t i # #  .» t h e  erne p a r t y  be:%^ilii% to  md the other party to  moepi m o w tm im  e œ  t h a t  l a  a  m l l m b l e  m ea su m  o f  wWt i s  fa ir  amd equitable im the olrowatmmoee* md the O owt w ill  be alow to  Im terfere with  what the p artie#  themoolvo# have iaadioateâ ma fWLr md reamoaablo" per # er lff# a u W #  Haloolm (N o te )  a t  #*5 0  ( a l t lm g  Im s u p p o r t  Thomson m d  B eott aum ra» )2# at p#l!..
3* a t  p * % 7 *  %&era L# o m o lu è e o  "M ere th o3^bmd# who la a mtireâ tmiomm* has iméo a p ro v l! : '« ~ : me Im r^o* I f  xm t l a r g e r *  #m m  t h e  l a #  would, f/;/'» to him widow* I do mot think should increamo It*" That m oomparleom with ^ t i t l e m e m t  o a  d e a th  w as t h o u A t  iv o r th y  o f  m e n tio n  l a  I m te r e a t in # *
430#
In which the Court has allowed the w if e  more than 
one^third of the income o f  the h u s b a n d 's  estate 
in cases o f  judicial separation". He added that 
a case had ‘been cited in which a s m a ll  additional 
amount was allowed w h ere  a child had been horn 
a f t e r  the separation, and that, on the o t h e r  hand, 
less than one^third would h e  awarded if the w i f e 's  
"position in life" did not merit that proportion*
As has been noted, ho w ev er , the courts have 
hesitated to commit th e m s e lv e s  to a r u l e  favouring 
a p a r t i c u l a r  fraction, o r  acceptable range of 
atfard, and have i n s i s t e d ,  it is thought r i g h t l y ,  
on r e t e n t i o n  o f  a d i s c r e t i o n .  " * . . t h e r e  i s  no 
fixed or r i g i d  limit of legal liability* I n  
practice the Courts have been i n  u s e  to award 
aliment varying in amount from  about one-^ fourth 
t o  about one-third of the husband's income, but 
they have been careful to insist that there is no 
d e f i n i t e  rule or limit, that it is a question of 
circumstances in every c a s e ,  and that the Court 
has a f u l l  discretion i n  the m a t t e r * "**. I 
do n o t  t h i n k  i t  conclusive to shew what proportion 
the amount of aliment proposed bears to the total 
income o f  t h e  h u sb a n d ; X t h i n k  i t  has also to be 
considered w h at i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  sum to maintain a 
woman i n  the r a n k  of l i f e  to which the wife b e lo n g s "  2.
A c c o rd in g  t o  Green's Encyclopaedia, it is, 
or was, unusual for more th a n  one third to be 
given^, and in d e e d ,  so  far as can be ascertained, 
t h e  present practice of s o l i c i t o r s  a c c u s to m e d  to 
deal in this field is to draw up an initial writ 
w i th  a crave seeking a sum w hich  i s  approximately 
a /
1. Hurray, supra p e r  Sheriff-Sube*Malcolm (Note) at p . 48*2. Thom son, supra p e r  I ,$ P * (X n g lis ) ,  at p.1092*5. voce 'AlimenP*, p a ra * 7 3 3  ( p * 2 9 8 ) .
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a  -b lilrd  o f  w lia t i s  t b o a g h t  t o  b e  t h e  h u s h a n d 's
income # Salary alone may not give a true 
I n d io  a t  io n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a f f a i r s  an d  m anner 
o f  l i f e  of the persons i n  q u e s t io n #  Olive and 
Wilson n o te ^  that if capital has b e e n  drawn upon 
i n  order to maintain a c e r t a i n  standard of l i v i n g ,  
th e n  t h i s  may b e  t a k e n  i n t o  aocoimt, as may a 
v o l u n t a r y  allowance which one p a r t n e r  receives^#
O th e r  Pertinent F a c to r s
As was s e e n  e a r l i e r  i n  the S h e r i f f  Court cases^, 
whatever may be the practical a rg u m e n ta , t h e  
e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  aliment and t h e  obligation to pay 
it are f i r s t  fixed, and t h e r e a f t e r  it i s  on  t h a t  
b a s i s  t h a t  the applicability of our modern sy s te m  
of g o v ern m en t support o r  a t  least those parts of 
i t  which have "n eed "  a s  the c r i t e r i o n ,  will be 
•Judged*
Thus, supplementary benefit receivable b y  a 
wife is n o t  t a k e n  into consideration in the f i x i n g  
o f  a l im e n t ,  b u t  th e  family allowance, w h ic h  Olive 
and W ilso n  note^ is not related t o  need, will b e  
considered /
1# that is, g r o s s  income (Olive and Wilson, pp#197-8): alimentary payments, made u n d e r  binding arrangement or court decree, will b e  taxable in t h e  hands of the payee (Olive and Wilson,pp.210-11)#2# G#&W*,  p .1 9 6 ;  Memo#No#22, 2#115#3# th o u g h  not "mere charitable support" ( i b i d #& p*197)î see Mamo#Mo*22, 2*114, T re a tm e n t  o fb o th  matters (encroachment on capital and significance of voluntary allowances) the Scottish Law Commission recommended be left to the discretion of the C o u rt#  (Faculty Response (in agreement), p#22)#4# McOarrol 1966 8 #L*T# (8h*Gt # )45, and Hawthorne1966 8,L*T* (Bh#0t*)47, discussed supra» p#3?8 et sec » : and see a l s o  Purdom v* F»T 1*9?4 8*1*1#'ï^ jï?T5%per L. Mackay at p*3'5# p#197# Gee Hem.o*lo*22, 2*98 (a n d  t h e  obverse -effect of social security payments received by alimenta r y  d e b t o r; 2*113)#
432,
o o n e ld o re d *  g e  c h a r i t a b l e  s u p p o r t  o r
s u p p o r t  fro m  o h l l d r e n  w i l l  n o t  r i d  a  h u a b an d  o f  
l i g a t i o n  whj
io o o r d ln g  /
1a n  o b l i g t h ic h  p r i m a r i l y  b o lo n g o  t o  h i # : #
1 .  G#& ,!%(%# Memo# No*22$ 2#99# . E q im l ly ,a l im e n ta r y  p o y iaen ta  a r e  n o t  g jite n d e d  t o  b e  o u f f l o i e n t l y  am ple*  f o r  e x a m p le , t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  w i f e ' s  m o th e r  ( s e e  Thomson v* T# ( 1 8 9 0 ) ,  1 ?  R# 1 0 9 1 , p e r  L # p # In g lla  A h u a h a n ai s  n o t  o b l ig e d  t o  s u p p o r t  h i e  w i f e ' s  r e l a t i o n s ,  im loBB t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  w if e  t o  h e r  r e l a t i o n e  o o u ld  b e  s a i d  t o  b e  a n  a n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t  (w hich  o b l i g a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  s o  r e g a r d e d :"No d o u b t  i t  i s  n o t  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  o o n t r a o t  b u t  a  n a t u r a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  l e e s  o n  t h a t  a o o o u n t an  a n t e n u p t i a l  d e b t  o f  t h e  w ife #I t  e x i s t e d  th o u g h  i t  w as n o t  p r o e t e b l e "  p e r  D #?. ( I n g l i e ) ,  i n  H o A Ila n , j g g g a ,  a t  p # 6 6 4 : w i th  
r e g a r d  t o  a  w i f e ' s  e o n t r m % a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  p o s t  m a r r i a g e ,  t h e  M #W #?#(8o#)A ot, 1 9 2 0 , B # 3 (1 ) s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  h u sb a n d  " s h a l l  n o t  b e  l i a b l e  I n  r e s p e o t  o f  a n y  o o n t r a o t  s h e  may e n t e r  i n t o  o r  o b l i g a t i o n  s h e  may i n c u r  on  h e r  own b e h a l f " )  an d  t h e  h u sb a n d  c o u ld  b e  s a i d  t o  b o  l u o r a t u o  b y  t l i e  m a r r ia g e  ** H o A llan  v#  A le x a n 3 m rT # 8 6 ) 1 5  R*8G3: s e e  g e n e r a l l y  o f  n#w  ^ ) A c t ,  1 8 7 7 ,
PP#82«#83) ( h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  w i f e ' s  a h f e - n u p t i a l  d e b t s  l i m i t e d  t o  " th e  v a lu e  o f  any  p r o p e r t y  w h ich  h e  s h a l l  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  fro m , th r o u g h ,  o r  i n  r i g l i t  o f  h i s  i f i f e  a t ,  o r  b e f o r e ,  o r  s u b s e q u e n t  t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  # * # " ) ,  an d  C#& W*, p p #265-66# P r i o r  t o  th e  1877 & o t, a  h u sb a n diobuld b e  l i a b l e  g e n e r a l l y ,  on  t h e  g ro u n d  t h a t  t h i s  o b l i g a t i o n  w as a  d e b t  o f  th e  w if e  (B e id  v# H o ir  (1 8 6 6 )  4  maophelOGO# "The f o im d a t lo n  o T ''T 5 r h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  1$  t h i s :  By r e a s o n  o f  h e r  
m a r r ia g e  t h e  w i f e ' s  p a r s o n  i s  e n t i r e l y  s u n k , an d  h e r  m o v eab le  e s t a t e  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  b y  a s s i g n a t i o n  t o  h e r  h u s b a n d , so  t h a t  h i s  and  h e r  e s t a t e ,  d u r in g  t h e  s u b s i s to n o e  o f  th e  m a iT ia g o , fo rm  o n e  m o v eab le  e s t a t e  u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  an d  m anagem ent o f  t h e  hu sb an d #  T he l e g i t i m a t e  o o n se q u en o e  o f  t h i s  i s ,  
t h a t  e v e ry  p e r s o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  w if e  l a ,  a lo n g  %'j l^tn h e r  e s t a t e ,  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d , an d  beoom ee h i e  d e b t# # # #  E v e ry  c o n t i n g e n t  an d  f u t u r e ,  th o u g h  n o t  p r o s t a b l e ,  d e b t  o f  t h e  w if e  a t  m a r r ia g e  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  th e r e b y  a g a i n s t  t h e  h u s b a n d , a n d  t h i s  i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  w h ic h  m u st r u l e  t h e  d e o ls lo m  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  e a s e "  ( p e r  L * J# -'O l0 %k ( I n g l i s )  a t  p p  #1063-64# L#Bhand i n  t h e  l a t e r  o a s e  o f
'  a  * S u i t !  % ^ . 1 0 9 0 )t o  t h e  e f ïS o S  t h a t ,  "A lth o u g h  I n  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e  
a  /
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1A cco ix llng  t o  F ra m e r - $ l e e s  w i l l  b e  g iv e n  t o
the w ife where #m Ineom# i s  drawn a "precariow" 
W s lm e a a ,  t h m  w h e re  t h e  Imeome l e  d w m  fro m  
re a lised  eat&te*
N o th in g  f u r t h e r  w i l l  b e  e a ld  a b o u t  m o w t  
o f allmemt  ^ mad fa e tere  relevant to  qum&tlflcatlom* 
R o fe re n e e  I s  made g w e r e l l y  t o  O liv e  a n d  W ileon#
'î'ThG L ae  o f  EumbeWL m d  W lfo  I n  B o o tla n d " '^ , m d. t o  
^m oam ndum  No*22 en d  F a c u l t y  R eepena#*
H g s i * a O s » i
I t  w i l l  em m tim # #  he  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a m o e r ta lh  
t h e  e x a c t  e tm t#  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s '  f l m n e w ,  a M
eom etlm ee  t h e  w i f e  h#$  o n ly  t h e  h m B iee t i d e a ,  e r
i e  Im m a t a t a  o f  q e # l $ t e  i # w m e e ,  a b o u t  h e r  
h u e  W a d '#  e m m lm g e . I t -  may w e l l  h e  m rm  m om  
d i f f i c u l t  w here  t h e  p a r t l e e  a te n d  a t  t h e  h i # ^ e r  
e n d  o f  t w  lim em e e o a l e ,  e l m e  d l m l e w r e  m y  
im v e lv e  t h e  r w e l a t i e m  o f  e m f i d e n t l a l  m et t e r n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  I f  t h e  M m bm d l e ,  f w  e m m ê le ,  a  
p a r t n e r  Im  a  p r o f e h e l o a e l  f i r m  w  i t  m#y W
t h e  e r n e  (w M eh  % w e r  r e g a r d e  j w t i f l e m t l c m  f o r  
a  sm aller aw ard  (g!@g2§r) b h a t  p r o f i t e
f l w t m e t e  /
a WebaM he marrlem imaurs l ia b i l i t y  fo r  h iew i f e 'a  d # t 8 #  I  # i lm k  t h a t  I n  m e a e e  111m t h e
p m m n t  t h e m  i e  f o r  e a y ln #  t h a t  th a t gem erm l
t r i n e I p l #  n e t  A p p ly * ") B ee a l e e  p''rvo%Ho*22,
&6 R % #$ ( w g g a e t im g  t h a t  w  o h l l g a t i o r  b e tw e W  à  p e r s o n  w d  t h e  w l m t i v e e  ( o t h e r  t h wo f  h i n / a e r  b e  l a t r o à u e e d  (Pm pm *1 0 )  w. oom tr& et a f?p reaeh  te k e n  i n  F a m l t y  R e e p o n e e , p p # 1 0 - i2 }  an d  f o o t n o t e  ? 3 ,  oM  h i é r a r c h i e s  o f  i i & h l l i t y  (2 * 6 7  #  e # o # (. w  m #14) m id F a o u lt^ f  Roapomm, p*%) and w  cullklom m t ( 2*90; Faculty B e a ^ m e e ,  p p * l6 / 1 9 ) oW  s ^ o h o ra l ly ,  # # # » pp*41"W12* 1# E*& W», I ,  BgS, m d  o m o e  the? ;e  e i t w *  Agélm*t h i s  h a s  mm m ro h a le  rlA<; p v rh ap e*  The momteommon momw o f allu(;at üoât:;^ '' muet ho wagem ora&l&ry*2# o x e e p t  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m h j m t  o f  t ob e  G iv en  t e  w i f e '#  Perm onm l R asouroem  o r  É arn i& g  P o w e r" ,
4 3 4 ,
fluetuâte greatly, and figures for several years 
may require to be scrutinised in order to obtain 
a r e a s o n a b ly  clear and accurate picture*
Olive and Wilson note that in an extremely 
complex ease* (w here  perhaps there is not a high 
degree of co-operation from parties* one might 
thinlc), the Court may grant a commission and 
diligence* but would in th e  general case refrain 
from taking such a course#
In some cases i t  is found that t h e  husband 
has an earnest desire that matters be settled 
judicially* and not in a lawyer's office or 
between lawyers* offices* or less formally still 
in a dispute between t h e  marriage partners* 
conducted perhaps not too amicably and amid a 
web o f  rumour and possible exaggeration b o th  a s  
to w h at is earned by t h e  h u sb a n d , and w h at is 
wished b y  t h e  wife#
M o re o v e r , i n  an  u n d e fe n d e d  c a s e  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
n o n -a p p e a ra n c e  an d  u n w i l l in g n e s s  t o  d e fe n d *  ev en
on quantum will mean t h a t  t h e  court must do th e
best i t  can* on the b a s i s  of limited and one-sided
information* th e  subsequent enforcement history
being a guide to its success# This subject has
attracted t h e  attention of the Scottish Law PCommission"#
Under the te rm s  of the Conjugal Eights (Be*) 
Amendment Act* 1861* 8*15^, an award of aliment 
may be  made w ith o u t  proof p r o v id e d  the action 
is /
1# a t  p#198#2* See Memo, Mo#22* 2*209-11  and Faculty Response* pp.47-49*3* The Act refers to "Actions of Aliment" which in terms of s,15#are to be dealt with by the Xj.O*, w ith  the proviso that* w h e th e r  I*H* or O.H# causes, they shall be  regarded as summary causes and decree may be pronounced without p ro o f*  where no appearance is entered for the defender*
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4Is undefended or no relevant defenoe Is stated 
but there can be mo award of aliment Im a 
defended motion In which the pursuer lapim o u o o e s a fu l  i n  p r o v in g  h e r  ease #
H ow ever, I f  th e  p a r t i e s  lo d g e  a  j o i n t  m ila u te , 
the 00 w t  may Imterpome it a wthority thei'oto, 
thereby giving judicial aamotion to the p&rtieo* 
arrangement, where the pursuer abamdoas her 
oonolualom for separation or adherence, and there 
will be no further imreatisatlom of the defender's 
ooaduot^ but, although moat convenient, the 
procedure eemm a little irregular ** does It not 
amoimt to a w%sF of allmeat, one which is mot
interim mor intérim pemdemte lit## and yet la, while 
b e in g  "perm am eat"  im  so  f a r  a s  m y  m ^ard  l a  o r  
can be permanent, mot permanent in the aemae of 
being promotmoed together with a decree of eeparatiom 
o r  a d h a re a c e ?
P c a a i b ly  t h e  e x p la m a tio m  l a  t h a t  i t  i s  m ia lo g o u c  
w i t h  a  v o lu m ta ry  c o m tr a o t  o f  m ep a ra tio m  w i th  
f im a m c ia l  p ro v ie lo m B  im  r e a p e c t  o f  w h ic h  t h e  c o u r t  
w i l l  e n f o r c e  a n d  g iv e  e f f e c t  t o  t h e  f im m n o ia l b u t  
m ot t o  t h e  o t h e r  ( s c p a r a t i c m )  p ro v ie lo m a #
L e v e l  of  A lim en t. 'B ta m te . M atrim om io*
When t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a l im e n t  
d u r in g  c o h a b i t  a t  lorn Im o o m eid ered *  i t  i s  fo im d ^  
t h a t  t h e  huebam d "may b e  c o i # e l l i t  t o  em etem e h i e  
w if e  i n  m e a t ,  oiaAtM s,: and  u t h e r  n e c e e e a r l e ,  
O f f e i r a n d  t o  h l r  e a t  a i t  and  t o c h e r  r e e e a v l t  %fith 
h e r "  /
1, Waltoa, P.-H3, Gitiite Wood v. W. 1Sfî3, 19 S.i.H,
^ 6 3 1 ;  ^H i t o e  y .  H . 1 9 0 l 7 V B 7 O F r  3 7 5 »
3: WaïtoÊÎ oilîlag 9^19 3.0.576*
4# B a lf *  P r a c t l c k e  p#95# O f t h e  hm eband andw i f e ,  c*%I* ( c i t i n g  7 H a r t #1561* Dame J e a n e  H a m iltc im  c o n t r a  Hew E r i e  o f  B g lm g to im #  1 t* C # 1 2 a2 )#
436,
4h e r "  W t  F r a s e r  s t a t e s  "A lim e n t e%m b e  c la im e d  
by  a  w if e  om ly  o a  t h e  f o o t i n g  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  fro m  
h e r  h u sb a n d * "
A t l e a a t  w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  l i m i t s ,  o r  ab o v e  a  
c e r t a i n  l i m i t  (b e lo w  %^hloh th e  w if e  may c o m p la in , 
p e r h a p s ,  o f  o r m l t y )  t h e  h im b a n d 'a  ju d g m en t and  
s t a n d a r d s  w ere  (a n d  i t  s e  a im , a r e )  am prem e, a l t h o u ^  
i t  i s  a lw ay e  reoogn lB O d t h a t  oesetm ln e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
e x p en d ltu re * ^  may r e q u i r e  t o  be  m et b y  him #
A h u a b am d 'a  o b l i g a t i o n ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  n o te d .  I s  
f u l f i l l e d  i f  h e  p r o v id e s  f o r  h i s  w i f e  a  r o o f ,  and  a  
re a e o m s b le  am otm t and  s t a n d a r d  o f  fo o d  a n d  o l o t h l n g :  
h e  I s  %% o b l ig e d  t o  p r o v id e  a  s e p a r a t e  r o o f  f o r  
h e r ,  e x c e p t  w hore a  d e o re e  o f  j u d l e l a l  s e p a r a t i o n  
(a n d  a l im e n t )  h a s  b e e n  p ro n o tm e ed ^  a ) . t h o u ^ ,  I f  h e r  
c o n d u c t  m e r i t s  I t ,  h e  may ohoo$<^ t o  do  so^#
O liv e  a n d  W lloon^  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  d l f f l o u l t l o a  
w h ioh  a  w if e  may e x p e rie m o e  i n  e n f o r o i i ig  h e r  r i g h t s  
l a  t h i s  m s p e o t ,  f o r  i f  a l im e n t  jgjgagtg m M a s m & a  
l a  l a o k i n g ,  n e i t h e r  t h e  rem edy  o f  t h e  a o tio m  o f  
s o p a r a t l o n  and  a l im e n t  n o r  a d h e re n c e  a n d  a l im e n t  
w i l l  f i t  t h e  f a c t s ,  h e r  psg^epe^^^tixr^ may b e  cancelled  
and . . a lth o u # %  h e r  h u sb a n d  w i l l  r e m a in  l i a b l e  
f o r  n e c e s s a r i e s  e ix p p lie d  t o  h e r ,  m eves^thelesB  I f  sh e  
h a s  b e e n  f o r m a l ly  i n h i b i t e d ,  o r  i f  l o c a l  s h o p k e e p e rs  
h a v e  b e e n  w a rn e d , h e r  p o s i t i o n  i s  a  d e g ra d in g  o n e ; 
P r o f e s s o r  O liv o  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  s h e  o s im o t o b t a i n  
s u p p le m e n ta ry  b e n e f i t  a ln e e ,  as she is c o h a b i t i n g  w i t h  
h e r  /
1# I ,  839* "If she cohabit with him, anaction  for separate imintemmce Is  ebaui^d******* ***,*##** to  In s t itu te  an action fo r  aliment d ir e c t ly , and not as in cidenta l to  another action , la  inoonêlatemt with prin cip le  and the character o f the conjugal relation*"2# cuoh as medj.oal ezpensea Einfmms v* K# M*5B82 ( 1 7 1 I ) ;  as to the w ife 's  oSSgm%oa''W aliment s e e  A d a ir  1924 8#0*?98*
4*5.
1, 5, 74; Erek* 1, 6, 19 laclurc V* H* 1911 8*0*200*
M r w ill  W
("end sh a ll W treated  a# the end
remmrke th a t 1# wouM appear extension
o f  t W  m r a l l m h i l l t y  o f  t h e  rem W y o f  I n t e r i m  
a l im e n t  u a e â  "kfith eam tlom  w o u ld  b e  d a e lrm b le *
in  theory and Im IW  worêi%  th e motion 
fo r  Im twM  elimemt could m #ply a po^aaible 
remedy ("$o long w  the defender # a l l  m fuso to  
m eelv#  md jgX&K&pjjï her m  h is  w ife") % ofosaw  
O livo polu'W 0(.U: thr^ i'L h is to r ic a lly  i t  has not Wez 
s o  u se d *
D w im g o o k m h ita tlo m , t h e  w if e  may olm lm  o n ly  
f o r  n o o e m e a rie # #  m d  ' i t  iB  t W  h W h m d  w ho, a t  
paet years# ha# hem  t&# jn% e o f l i f e  
a ty lo '^ #  T h a t  l e  t h e  t h m o m t io a l  p o m i t lw #  T he 
d u t y  /
1* M in i s t r y  o f  SoolgKl B e m r l% r  Aot# 1 % 6 *  8&h*2$
2* L\;f> R vF un '/i'fmxx.*'{3 0 j / : »f% y iC e 'o  o i r d n  H u i\la ||
Llic ofy r> \  L' ' n Ir  f/'. n\ 1 ; ( o r  if n  :n aro?ton   ^ oykd 
t h e  1 ' t h  ,o l<  t o  theI'O, x irlo h  "U/''C"\ H#'%'':* I ,  6 1 4 ,Wuoj/:' L* t r r j r n  %.;H/vmon a)f::'L :- ’' ï ' r  n :ÛA 1/1];D i vf' j^u ' {'u'/u 1 1 cHi iS
u o x r t 'Bt o  %r;3tiu,h i.U.-Or e w o u a W /, , t 'v -  -hi.'LA or/ l i v e  #c ' r  ;W d  # ( , ' \ : ) l o  1^) n):,:fhs4u,^ h r r  hw tbam & 'x mx'fMw*( o f .  O r o W e /,  p#21i; locaiooM ln'.:; w i ü 'u lS,k3;-:lf;Ou I'rj Au" ro.'-TCiV'K* ' "y 'ifll^'*27: H at3 :d i.ionial %v.o;icrÿ.i\i"(nftr;i/E)r.'i uoArU 3) iv y t, 19f% \ u * 1 (1  ) ( h ) ;  # <L l'w  c o r 4'. t L ; - > m..th o  o f  Kiv ?tnn:>c>a'l'*1 Cfr/'/o'q I.'/*
l i a b i l i t y  Do -,'% lhvaln I- '*1 o fl i l f >  w h ic h  Cc Ificvc.c bhc w */%
e n v i t l f ^ J  t c  h o o e i i t ;  / 'ro ; :  :a I n  t h eh u rù x r :d ' e  w o ;'OA;U-,iur<c; J ; "n ^ ) % "^Thier c f l c c t o  thw  corX do;:) evfuuoyt ')rM$ %0s é p a r a t i o n  L ie  DLRwl wC o f  i s  ' 'u M r o I y  am n tto i ' f o r  t h e  hwcbr:Wfi; r ll 'u /*  . .c .jo ra llc x ;  i t  1# a  q i r . r t l c n  a t  u h c t  1 1 ro c o o ja lw  o l a  cllyîi'^'^o 0:l/ljr;:nDa;cC'-‘C#
m ih q l^ te ,  h w m m r ,  t l i e  o m r t  mg^ y h e  e a l l M  u p o n .
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duty /
in the case of a disputed b i l l ,  to adjudicate upon the suitability to her husband's situation, of a wife's purchases* See O liv e  and W ils o n ,P P #255 /256  ( p r a e p o s i t u r a ) .  and  e a s e s  c i t e d ,  and  
p p *264 /265  ( p l e â g e ^ T T E s b a n d 's  c r e d i t  f o r  n ê o e s s a r i e s )  an d  c a s e s  c i t e d ,  and  P r#  I ,  6 1 5 , where, at f n # ( d ) ,  L* F r a s e r  cites the case of Waith m a n  and  A n o th e r  y *  W akefi e l d  1 8 0 ? , 1 Oamp. l2 T ,  and  'lÿïôte s T b  * l^TïenlD ordu^ ooioment t h a t  "how ever low a m a n 's  circumstances may be, if he allow h i s  wife to assum e an appearance w h ich  h e  is unable to support, h e  i s  answerable f o r  the consequences. When a tradesman i s  t h e r e b y  deceived, the loss must fall upon him  who connived at t h e  deception H ow ever awarning is fo u n d  i n  the r u b r i c ,  t o  the effect t h a t  i f  a  t ra d e s m a n  t r u s t s  a  m a r r ie d  woman, d e c e iv e d  b y  t h e  f a l s e  a p p e a ra n c e  sh e  a ssu m e s , when b y  cautious enquiries he might have ascertained h e r  real situation, he cannot come u p o n  t h e  husband b ey o n d  the extent t o  w h ic h  those enquiries would have shown him to be r e s p o n s i b l e  * L o rd  E l le n b o r o u g h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  i s  th e  d u ty  of a tradesman to make enquiries before t r u s t i n g  a m a r r ie d  woman who i s  a s t r a n g e r  t o  him* There may be little t im e ,  today, f o r  "cautious enquiries", which, i n  any case, f o r  reasons of alleged d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  ( f o r  the p r o t a g o n i s t s  o f  sexual equality w i l l  be quite out of sympathy w ith  the p h i lo s o p h y  w h ic h  t h e  praepositura and 'pledge o f  husband's credit f o r  necessaries' principles embody) - as w e l l  as o f  privacy, would be resented greatly#T h ese  principles are quite unsuited to modern conditions, and it i s  a s o u rc e  o f  w onder that they are still part of our law* (o f#  Olive and 
W ils o n , p . 2 6 2 ) (A s t o  E n g la n d , t h e  w i f e ' s  a g en c y  o f  n e c e s s i t y  w as a b o l i s h e d  b y  M a tr im o n ia l  P r o c e e d in g s  and P r o p e r ty  Act, 1970, s #41* A"common h o u s e h o ld  ag en cy "  (to pledge the husband's credit f o r  necessaries f o r  th e  household), as opposed to the broader ambit (food, clothing, 
m e d ic a l ,  l e g a l  and  o t h e r  e x p e n s e s )  o f  t h e  a g e n c y  o f  n e c e s s i t y ,  r e m a in s ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  "F a m ily  Law", Ju d g e  Brian Grant, edn* (1 9 7 7 )  ( J e n n i f e r i e v i n ) .  p#24# S ee  a l s o  " P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Family Law", S*M *O retney , 2nd edn* (1 9 7 6 ) ,  
p . 2 1 5 , fn *  3 5 , end  p * 2 1 6 , fn * 3 6 , an d  g e n e r a l l y  pp*214-216)ftS ee  rec o m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  ch an g e  c o n ta in e d  i n
C h a p t e r  7#
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duty of husband and wife to aliment the other 
h a s  b e e n  s t u d i e d  # O c o a s io n a l ly  to d a y ,  m ore 
f r e q u e n t l y  than i n  the past, i t  may b e  found 
t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  w i f e ' s  a a l a r y  w h ioh  a lo n e ,  o r  
p r i n c i p a l l y ,  s u p p o r t s  t h e  h o u s e h o ld ,  a n d  s u r e l y  
t h e n ,  in practice, she "who pays the piper calls 
the tune".^ The difficulty lies i n  the 
ascertainxaent /
It must be remembered that i n  Scotland, a cohabiting wife (only) has an agent's authority 
p rG ie p o s ita  r e b u s  d o m e s t i c l s  t o  p le d g e  h e r  husband's c r e d lW T h e r e T F " % [ 8 0  f o r  all wives (except, it seems, those xfho a r e  cohabiting - see below), entitled t o  but d e p r iv e d  o f  adequate aliment, an entitlement to pledge the husband's credit * Glive and W ilso n  stress (p*234 (and fn#SO), and p*263) that the liability of t h e  h u sb a n d  i n  e a c h  c a s e  r e s t s  u pon  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o n o e p tu a l  ground (agency/ostensible authority, o r  récompense / u n j u s t  en r ic h m e n t  respectively)# The result, of course, w i l l  be s i m i l a r ,  i f ,  on  either g ro u n d , the t r a d e s m a n  succeeds* (Is the tradesman e n t i t l e d  t o  assume that the wife i n  the capacity of praeposita has authority to bind t h e  husband i n  
SEe c o n t r a c t  i n  q u e s t io n ?  H as t h e  t ra d e s m a n  i n  effect fulfilled the husband's obligation to aliment the w if e ?  O liv e  and Wilson, p . 2 3 4 , p*263)» I t  seems clear that the former principle p e r t a i n s  only to the cohabiting w if e  (Olive and  W ils o n , p.* 260), and  although, even under the present la w , where t h e r e  is no p r o v i s i o n  for th e  m ak ing  o f  a m o n e ta ry  award d u r in g  cohabitation, i t  is not impossible to imagine that an  attempt might be made to argue, o n  b e h a l f  o f  an  in a d e q u a te ly  s u p p o r te d  w ife  ( o r  h u sb a n d  - sea below) in f a m i ly  with her h u sb a n d  ( w i f e ) ,  that she (he), lacking a f a i r  a l i m e n t ,  was e n t i t l e d  t o  p le d g e  h e r  husband's (his wife's) credit f o r  necessaries, it would appear that the r i g h t  arises o n ly  where the spouses live apart (of* W a lk e r , Prins*, 2nd é d . ,  pp * 258-9) ♦ The latter principle may apply, it seems, to a husband ( O liv e  and  W ils o n , p # 2 6 5 ) ,  b u t  t h e  p r a e p o s i t u s  r e b u s  domeeticle. th o u g h  h e  may weliexist, " seems ¥cTl)e a role-exohanger n o t  yet known t o  the law*On t h e  " h o u s e k e e p e r"  r e a s o n in g  which l i e s  at the root o f  the praeposita rules (w h ic h  may be extended to in o lu d G  daughter, o r  any  o t h e r  housekeeper - Olive & Wilson, p*2$3), there seem s no r e a s o n  why the principle s h o u ld  n o t  b e  e x te n d e d  to include the husband or male housekeeper* The p r i n c i p l e  of a g en cy  
i s  not r e s t r i c t e d *  Yet for the long-term, i t  i s  to be hoped, j o i n t  household o f  man and wife, p e rh a p s  
i n  an y  case a new principle i s  desirable*2# of* Olive and Wilson, pp*192/3*
m aoertm inm om t o f  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  a o iw o o o a o m io a lly  
w t i v e  p a r t n e r #  im u a l ly  t h e  w ife #  I n  t h e  m@ 
t h e  o t h e r  d u r in g  e e h a b i tm tlo n #  & #  i  
a  rem edy  o f  w  w a r d  o f  allm mm t a b l e  t o  W  mou^ 
th o iïg h  th e  p m r t le o  odt& ahlt 1$ o t r o n g ly  urgod"^*
I t  i e  m t  o m # e t e n t  I n  m  a o tio m  t ^ l o h  oeW 
m i m 'ferd o f  mllmomt# i m l l k e  o t h e r  a c t  l o r n  o o a e lu d ln g  
f o r  t h e  paym en t o f  money# t o  a r r # # t  momeyo o n  t h e  
dopoM em oe o f  t h e  w t l o n  ( a l w e  t h e  d e b t  I s  a  
f u t u r e  o n e )#  im le ee - I t  aeomo o l o a r  t h a t  t h e  hu eh o n d  
l a  m ot a e t l n ^  Im home f i d e  m id l a  e m m g ed  ImJHjKWftW- W*tfMWlWWP
d lsp o M m g  o f  h lB  f tm d a  w i th  t h e  a im  o f  d e frm td lm g  
h i #  : w i f e ,  o r  im le e e  h e  1$ v e rm m a  a d  Imooimm o r
M o reo v er
1* B ueh e  i>3X>x:^o^al h m  heem  mode h y  t h e  s e o t t i e h  I ,w  Oorwlr^.ilom: Homo Bo*22# F r# m *  39  ( t h a t  " a  epomme s h o u ld  h e  a b l e  t o  o h ta lm  a n d  e m fo re e  a  d w r o e  f o r  e l l ; , :o n t  f o r  h lm e e l f  o r  h o rm o lf  # a M  o h lM re m  e n t i t l e d  t o  e llm em t fro m  t h e  o t h e r  e p o u a e .  m o w i th a tm d im g  t h a t  t W  mpoimoB o r e  o o h # i t i m g *  Am o f f e r  b y  th n  d o f o M o r  t o  p r o v id e  m # p o r t  I n  M m â Im t h e  homo (''houM  m ot b e  m defom oe t o  o u eh  m  a o t l m  I f  Im f e e t  I t  warn t h e  Imok o f  a O n q u a te  e u p p o r t  W liloh ro m âe red  t W  m etlom  m o o eo m ry " , >00 F a o u l ty  Bommomte# pp#4i*#42*2# wMtom# pp*15#/5$ J* Graham Stewart# of
!&a
h l a W r y  o f  t h e  W e h a M  w w  e u f f l o l e m t  " t o
j u e t l f y  t h e  mee o f  t h i s  aom m A at % tra o rd lm # 7  b u t#  I  th lm k #  v e r y  b w e f l o i a l  d l l lg e m o e  proSmblllty le 'very groat th<)t Im m mWrt time hew i l l  b o  p r o t e o t e ê  fro m  t h e  rna^^h o f  d l l lg e m o e  by  t h e  A tla m tlo #  o r  memo emoh m vr-com duotlm g  body*#**' B u t I  "iflB h m ot t o  bo  h o ld  w  m alm telm lm s t h a t  t h e  m ere  m a tu re  o f  h i e  pm m iu lto#  w h ic hm uet m 0 o esce rl3 .y  t a k e  h im  o o o w lo m a l ly  b ey o n d  OW  ju r lB d lo t lo m #  w o u ld  o f  I t o o l f  o u th o r lm o  t h i s  a i l lg o m o e " #  p e r  L# J e f f r e y #  a t  M oreover#Im e w h  m o a o e  (L #P *B oy lo . a t  p * 1 2 1 )  "T h e re  l a  m ot t h e  u m a l  p r m m # t l o m  t h a t  h i s  o b j e o t  Im  le o v lm #  t h e  o o u m try  i s  t o  e v ad #  d lllg o m o o " #  b u t  Im t h i s  t h e  hw bm m â moved a b m # #  m ot o n l y  fro m  tow n t o  tow n  b u t  fro m  o o im try  t o  o e im try #  " e e  t h a t
Momwer* wreara (Im tW whioh laoy
he % of Iwgumge, of #m#ml oontriWtima
t o  m ain tem m ice#  tm p aM #  y e t  d m  w d e r  t h e  # m e r o l  
law Wt mot wdor epeoiflo agreement or mowt 
dwree) we- mot able to he If m
desertM wife# for wemple# hm mehiewé by herself 
md by her o%m efforts# m adequate maimtwmee* 
if  $w hw Im faet ewpertM heeeelf* them her 
hmbmd'm legal to hwe mmppwted her
d w im g  # e  e m m e  o f  t h a t  p é rim é#  d o e s  w t  o m e t i t u t e  
a d#t im her hmde* Pemt debts #r meeeoewiea 
m # ' b e  e x i g i b l e  fro m  t w  W e W M #  %md#r t h e  p r im e ip le o  
e e $  o u t  ah  w e #  W l  t h e  e o r m e t  p ro e M m re  i s  f o r  t h e  
omdiWr te me the Wahwl met for him to imdmw 
the wife te aw for arreera of Im pmetioe#
however# if the wife 1# #Ie to pay# she is likely 
t o  do  $0  Im t h e  f w e  o f  t h e  e r e d i t o r ' e  d e m m # #  m d
M e  w i f e  o a m o t  Aepemd f o r  a  e im g le  d a y  on  h i e  h e lm #  w lth im  W ?  r m o h " *  w if e * a  d i l ig e m o evma h e l d  t o  h e  eom #etem t#  m â  % 'm m w ted* )3* B w  m m i m t m  (1 8 ? 5 )  3  m .2 0 %  p e r  L#P#mt th lm k  #% at a  I W y  %)he i soG or,r.qt$4 fro m  h e r  h w b m d #  mm s h e  d o e e  m et tUor''%>y e e m w  t o  b e  Mm w ife #  m w t  # 1 1 1  f o l lo w  h i s  m &  i f  h e  e h o ù ld  b y  i m f o r e e e woe#% rrem w a f M l  l a t e  pm -v.rty# t h a t  im  t h e  m ie f o r t im e  o f  t h e  w h o le  I  mhomld Wv#3:y e ie w  t o  h o ld  t h a t #  %.4o^mee a  w i f e  i $  s e p a r a t e d  fro m  3m r W m haM # s h e  i s  m t i t l #  t o  h a v e  h e r  a l in o m t  w o it r e d #  no  m  t o  (ÿiv# h e r  n  profo^yomoe f<;»r l i f e  o v e r  m il  iMW e r e d i to r m #  T h a t
I 'o u W  %# D v a r y  aao% 3em e ooam^aquomoe o f  d l l ig e m o e  umorf i%poE IL e  dcpomc^eveo o f  on  f i c t io n  o f  t M e  3cl:tKl* ëm t mWLll m ere  imormlomm a o m # # e m e e s  %'îOuM fol3.<mf i f  t h e  a rm m tm e n t w m  t o  e w e r  & t w e  a l im e n t  **#*" _  ' ».
T he m ttl tm d o  m v e a lo d  h e r e  tm ^m rde p M o M tÿ  o f  o m d l t o r / w i f o  ol.aim o i e  I n te re m tim # *1# W alton#  p » i$ 3 #
2  # VI a l to m  # -:§%AA*
la  tWLs wy# amd even i f  t&e blllm %e
remitted ImwélaWIy te  the hwhmd# there le  a 
dmger #m t ah# w ill hmlld i#  a h letery e f aelf**muppert.# 
%% le  eertalmly m% ImaimWmt $m a wife te  epmd 
a i l  h w  em m lm ga t e  s u p p o r t  h m m e l f  # t h e r e b y  
rellw lm g her hmbmé of Ms ebllgatlon'^* % le 
problem did met paw imaetloM la  Hemoram#m #o#22 
The ^oettlek Lw Oemmleelom eu^osted. for oomalâeratlem 
(Prepwitiom # change Im the rule te  th# e f fe #  
of Whetltutlmg m bwmâ ju â le la l dlwm tlem  ("that 
tW eew te ^euM  W glvem pwor te  haoMate mfwê# 
of allm m t l#a* te  mmd fo r a pwlod whleh
M# already elapaM"#) Fam lty re # m # d  
om tlew ly# puttiag forward th# v l»  that whl3,# tW 
e o w t  a h o M â  m et h a  p r e o lM e d  fmmR hm okêatlm g  w  
award# I t  mmt have a âleemtlom te  te  de m#
or to  m#e a eimallw mwaM tWm %M% I t
la  w l l  m ttle#  #m t mwemm dim imder a decree
w  mGtremjuélelal hewem the partiee #»
b o th  o i^ m h le  o f  q w m t l f l o a t l i m  #" may h e  reeoverad"^*
Im tw  oaae #f ameara dm# w der # sw rt deeme#
" th e  m o m a l m i& M e  # f  ê i , l l # w e *  Im elm êlm # p a l M l %
ef goods m â mrrwtmmt e f mt##* we
W here # e  c a s #  oomeermm m m s d w  w % w  agreom em t#
8 o m # t  /
1# mee# # e  o o w t* $  v l w  o f  aa  w i f e  who oom tlnuW . t e  m oeW f^ illm e m t w M le .  t e  h e r  h w h m d #  W lm g  Im
2 .  isateè3# F a e u lL y  R csp o m e#
gg i3C % -r%  (1 W 1  j  9  H tiW h#449i j # t a  oace;} v w e  NiiGe c o m p ile  a t  eO h y  offo^^ar h y  t3m  h iirb tm dto  "R lv ;re  * , ' g* ¥ !!# < # #  ##207*
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sought to be translated into court decree for 
enforcement, Is t h e r e  any reason why there should 
not he arrestment on the dependence?^
V a r i a t i o n s  of Awards and A greem en ts
"An award of aliment la not absolute or 
u n o h a n g e a h le  " #
It will always he competent for parties to return 
to the court for a variation, provided that the 
change of oircumetances i s  t r u l y  a m a t e r i a l  one^#
Although in consistorial oases, the rule is 
"no decree without proof" (thus r e q u i r i n g  proof of 
the averments i n  an undefended action for divorce^) 
t h i s  does not affect matters p e r t a i n i n g  t o  a l im e n t
(unless disputed, presumably) an d  it i s  certainly 
c o m p e te n t for the parties to agree on  a figure 
themselves and to have it set out in terms of a 
j o i n t  minute^#
Among legitimate c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which might 
have the effect of increasing aliment would he 
such /
1# The conclusion does n o t  th e n  relate o n ly  t o  "a prospective o b l i g a t i o n "  o r  " c o n t in g e n t  d e b t " ,(A Treatise on  the Law of D i l ig e n c e ,  J.Graham Stewart, p#20)i see a l s o  W#J#Lewis, Sheriff Court Practice, "Arrestment on D ependence" - p#100# 2# Of* Lang v. L# (1868) 7 Haoph# 24# As t o  prooedrôelT’aee olive & Wilson, p#200#3* Now i n  u n d e fe n d e d  divorce a c t i o n s , affidavit evidence may be  tendered, by virtue of a change effected b y  Act of Sederunt, com ing i n t o  effect on 2 5 t h  April, 1978* F o r  the general g u id a n c e  o f  Members of the F a c u l ty  o f  Advocates and of the Law Society of Scotland, Notes upon this new procedure have b e e n  prepared b y  t h e  D ean o f  t h e  F a c u l t y  o f  Advocates, and t h e  P r e s i d e n t  of t h e  Law S o c i e t y  of Scotland ("Affidavit Evidence in Undefended D iv o rc e  A c t io n s "  -  1 1 th  April, 1978)*Bee Chapter 5*4* See Olive and W ils o n , p*204*
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Bucîi factors as the s u b s e q u e n t  birth of th e  
husband's child^, the combined effect of increased 
earning capacity and increasing costs of education^, 
and, today perhaps especially, the general increase 
in t h e  cost of l i v i n g ,  and p r i n c i p a l l y  among those 
factors which m ig h t have the opposite e f f e c t  is the 
c ir c u m s ta n c e  of the. husband falling upon hard times#^
I n  th e  latter case, i t  m ig h t be that t h e  wife 
should have the same proportion of the new lower 
incom e as of the higher one but, as was pointed 
out in Purdom supra, t h e  smaller t h e  m eans th e  
larger m ig h t b e  the proportion which the wife 
should receive.
In Lang supra, L.Oowau'^  re m a rk e d  that 
although t h e r e  w as a right to apply for variation,
"we are not to b e  understood as sanctioning yearly 
applications to t h e  Court* The ch an g e  in the 
husband's circumstances must be m a t e r i a l  before we 
will alter the am ount of a l im e n t  now given". A 
foreseen change of circumstances, which has b e e n  
ta k e n  into a c c o u n t ,  will not be a good ground for 
variations a hope unrealised may be^.
When the amount o f  aliment has been fixed at 
first instance, that, in m ost cases, will be the 
end of th e  matter (in that particular litigation) 
since parties receive no encouragement to appeal, 
upon t h a t  ground, and even if an  appeal on that 
factor alone or èn t h a t  and upon the substantive 
decree /
1. Hay V* H* 1882, 9 R.GG7* contrast Scott v* 8*E.855 where the birth was"HoH$empIaWed at the date o f the original agreement.2 . Howat V. H. 1904, 12 B.L.T. 449*
3 * FS3om"virT* 1934 S.L.T. 515: Brothers ton v# B.? 9 ? 8 " " ^ * i ; : T r ( 8 h .o t . )  5 9 * --------------------------------
4 * B ea to n ^v *  B , 1951 8 .L .T *  ( S h .G t . )  1 0 2 .5*6* See f u r t h e r ,  Olive and  Wilson, pp.200-202*
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#md w would only he -mmwmAIe for the élffemme 
heWem her wd th# amoimt of the expènae
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1* o f  * 011%  o M  w i i e w #  p*2W #2# m# & ¥ # $ ! , .  a w .
I :  : W f é w a e - . l  ‘° i ^ S . . ! * ! « f s  d .' h, f / '  %md iU  ^ # 9 6 2 , G^tod (% y r ; '* . v ,  1$  BGO $
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In t h e  p r e s e n t  o l r o im s ta n o e s, oould this hear 
th e  addition» "or h y  her own earnings» ordinarily 
and i n  acoordanoe w i t h  past custom, received"?
If so, then the argument concerns the presence or 
absence of a duty to enter again or for the first 
time s u i t a b l e  or unsuitable em ploym en t, and it is 
submitted t h a t  a g e ,  health and legitimate 
expectations of, and conceptions of, the married 
state at t h e  date of m a r r ia g e  may be factors which 
persuade that at least in a p a r t i c u l a r  case su c h  
a duty does not exist * Equally, i n  the f u t u r e ,  
there will be few married women to whom paid/Iemployment is unknow n ,  (and few  women to  whom m arriage  
i s  unknow n).I n  Bowswall supra, there are t o  be found 
observations to the effect that there is no  rule 
that a wife acquiring or earning money must expend  
the whole of such money on her maintenance to the 
relief o f  her husband * s obligation under a decree 
for aliment; on  the other h a n d , in T h a c k e r^  lord 
Anderson^ remarked, "I should add, however, that 
in my judgment this is not a case where I should 
hqye advised an award of any aliment at all* I 
t h i n k  /
1# It may be said that judicial o p in io n s  must be imbued with the spirit of the age in w h ic h  they are expressed* The conditions and thinking even o f  the 1950*8 are now remote from us, and habits and expectations have changed greatly* Of# Murray V# M# (1 9 3 4 ) 3 1 Bh,0t#Sep#47, per Sheriff-*BuSsT Haïoolm, at p # 4 9 ,  "If she is in that station in life in which work of some kind would be expected of her she m ust contribute h e r  reasonable quota ####" Statistics compiled to assess t h e  European situation suggest that the percentage of adult women (status not specified) i n  employment is (W*Germany) 30% (Eranoe) 63% (Denmark) and 7 1 % (Sweden)#2 ,  T h a c k e r  v .  T . 1928 S # b ,T , 248#
447  *
t h i n k  th e  p r o o f  d i s c l o s e #  t h a t  t h e  p u r s u e r  i s  
earning a handsoBie in c o m e , q u i t e  s u f f i c i e n t  to 
s u p p o r t  h e r a e l f ,  and  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t im e  h e r  
h u sb a n d  is not i n  a much b e t t e r  *  i f ,  indeed, 
i n  an y  b e t t e r  position t h a n  she i s #  Accordingly, 
I t h i n k  q u i t e  clearly t h a t  t h i s  is n o t  a case 
where aliment should be awarded at all "*
Even though the wife i s  i n  em ploym ent, it 
i s  l i k e l y ,  i n  p r e s e n t  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  that the
husband who owes a duty, i n  general terms, to 
aliment h i s  wife^, w i l l  be called upon at least 
t o  augment h e r  income^
D i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  Enforcement of a Decree
Even i f  the w if e  holds extract decree for 
payment of an amount o f  aliment which i s  reasonable 
in all the c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  t h i s  may prove to be 
extremely difficult to enforce*
Civil imprisonment remains competent f o r  
non^-payment o f  "sums decerned for aliment"^ *'* In 
te rm s  /
1 « The question is, of course, whether earning capacity should affect both entitlement and quantification, or only t h e  l a t t e r  or (unlikely) neither*
2* o f*  S id n e y  v .  8# (1 8 6 5 )  4  T#178*5# HeferenFo Ts'“miEe on t h i s  subject generally to Memo«ho*22, 2*95 et aeq ( j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o nadvocated)? PacuT^y uaaponse, pp* 19/20 (in agreement)*4# D e b to rs  (Sc#) A c t ,  1880, s*4; Civil Imprisonment (So*) Act, 1882, 8*4* As to "sum or sums decerned f o r  aliment", see Tevendale v# Duncan (1885) 10 E* 852# "I think t h e T r u S T E s S S ^ T u T E a t  th e  sums must be decerned for with a view to be applied, when they are got, in alimenting t h e  party in whose favour th e  decree is given *#** Aliment is a very comprehensive word «**# A human being is not alimented by being supplied with food only#He requires to b e  provided with shelter and clothing, and such things as are r e q u i r e d  as absolutely necessary to sustain human life# The h o u se  proprietor s u p p l i e s  shelter, t h e  tailor supplies clothing ** without which the human being could not, at least i n  this climate, be alimented t h e  b u t c h e r  and baker supply food# In another sense /
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terms of t h e  OlTil Imprisoiment (Scotland) Act,
1882, 8*4, a Sheriff may comm it to prison for a 
period not exceeding six weeks, or until payment 
of t h e  sum(s) of aliment and expenses of process 
decerned for, o r  su c h  i n s t a l m e n t ( s )  t h e r e o f  as 
t h e  Sheriff may appoint, or until the creditor i s  
o th e r w is e  satisfied, any person who w i l f u l l y  fails 
t o  p a y  w i t h i n  t h e  d a y s  o f  c h a rg e  any  su c h  sums f o r  
w h ic h  decree has b e e n  pronounced against him by a 
competent c o u r t# 'failure to pay "shall be presumed 
t o  have been wilful u n t i l  the contrary is proved 
by  t h e  d e b t o r " ^ ,  but a warrant o f  imprisonment s h a l l  
not be granted i f  it i s  proved to the satisfaction 
of the Sheriff that the debtor h a s  n o t ,  since the 
commencement of the action in w h ich  t h e  decree f o r  
aliment was p ro n o u n c e d , possessed or been able to 
earn /
sense than that which I have attempted to give, t h e y ,  if sued for the price of these necessaries of life, are suing f o r  aliment# If the expression 
m e re ly  m eans that the sums must be due i n  respect of a d e b t  contracted for aliment, say a hotel 
b i l l *  extending over it may b e  a term of months, t h e  am ount d e c e rn e d  for would be sums f o r  aliment# But I t h i n k  it is impossible to say that i n  excepting a decree f o r  sums f o r  aliment from the general law, an exception enacted for considerations of policy, sums of that k in d  were in te n d e d  to be included in the exception# There is no reason why t h e  general law should not apply to such d e c r e e s " ,  (per L* Y oung, at p#854)# The decree must b e  used in t h e  present aliment of some living human being, it appears# See also (xlenday24 (per h#P#(DunedinTat' "y «Johnston (1903) BE*p7^W "^"% #Hcharen a t  p#50 summarised the judgment in Tevendale as "where a l im e n t  has b e e n  f u r n i s h e d  b y  a person who is not t h e  p r im a ry  obl'igant, the claim for relief i s  not an alimentary claim"*)# Civil Im p riso n m e n t (So*) Act, 1882, s # 4  (proviso 
( 3 ) ) $
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e a r n  the means to pay the sum due, o r  such 
instalment thereof as the Sheriff shall consider 
reasonable, A warrant of imprisonment may be 
granted of new, subject to th e  same provisions 
and conditions, against the same person in 
respect of failure to pay the same sum(s), o r  
instalment(a) thereof, or any sums a f t e r w a r d s  
accruing due under the decree, o r  instalraent(s) 
thereof, at intervals o f  not less than six months^, 
and the imprisonment s h a l l  not operate to any extent 
as a satisfaction or extinction of the debt, or
interfere with the creditor's other r i g h t s  andPr e m e d ie s  f o r  its recovery * The creditor shall 
not bo liable to aliment t h e  debtor during the 
incarceration of the latter^# However, for 
reasons which appear to rest upon principles of 
statutory interpretation, the creditor must pay 
for the expenses involved in seeking this d i l i g e n c e ^  
(that is, for seeking Sheriff's warrant to imprison? 
expenses of process i n c u r r e d  prior thereto will form 
p a r t  i t  is suggested of the debt^). The Sheriff's 
a u t h o r i t y  to commit to prison is necessary^.
Certainly the f i n a l  sanction of imprisonment 
is a useful one i f  the debtor's whereabouts are 
Imown, but i t  is o f  no u s e  whatever i f  the husband 
is nowhere to be found, as is commonly t h e  case.
I n  /
1, 8*4, p r o v i s o  (4),2, 8,4, proviso (5)*5# 8*4, proviso (S),4, Reference may b e  made to the case of Wilson v, W. (1936) 32 Sh,0t,Hep,200, and the earlTer’"casei~“ of Strain v* S, (1887) and McLeod v. I,ayes (1885), 4 SK7W'rifep"*T25 and 127 respect'Ively''^ ''''peF"'8h*Prin* ;(Berry) at p#127, and per Sh#Lees at pp*128**129*3# b y  inference of s*4*6* See the words o f  L.Young in Tevendale, s u p r a .at pp*B35*-B34, u p o n  the f u n c t i o n  o f  the'"’judges o f  the Court of Session in this sphere* Prior to these Acts, for civil imprisonment, a warrant fro m  the Supreme Oourt was necessary, and the expenses thereof could be recovered b y  separate action. See note b y  Sh.Hair to Strain, infra, and contrast text and fn#4 above.
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l a  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n ,  o r  w here  t h e  huebam d rem oves 
f r e q u e n t l y  fro m  a d d re a e  t o  a d d r e a e ,  o r  w h e re  h e  
eeem e im o a p a b le  o f  m ak ing  r e g u l a r  p a y m e n t, t h e  
%^ife may h a v e  no  o h o io e  h u t  t o  r e l y  o n  B t a t e  
p ay m en ts  a lo n e ^ »
Aa f a r  a s  t h e  movement o f  a  d e f e n d e r  w i t h in  
t h e  H#E# and  a b ro a d  i e  e o n o e m e d , t h e  M ain tem m o e  
O rd e rs  A o t, 1950  an d  H a in te n m o e  Order?^ (R e e ip ro o & l 
B nfo roem em t) A c t ,  1 9 7 2 , may b e  o f  h e lp *  U nder 
P a r t  I I  o f  t h e  1950  A c t ,  o r& ere  may b e  r e g i s t e r e d  
a n d  a r e  e n f o r c e a b le  t h e r e a f t e r  i n  E n g la n d  o r  
B o r th e m  I r e l a n d #
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  t r o u b l e s ,  t h e  w i f e  may 
h a v e  t o  c o n te n d  w i th  c o m p e t i t io n  fro m  t h e  h u a b a n d 'a  
c r e d i t o r s #
She h e r s e l f ,  u p o n  p ro n o u n cem en t o f  a  d e c r e e  
w h i le  h e r  huebiGmd 1$  e o l v e n t ,  becom es a  c r e d i t o r ^  
and  h e r  c la im  may com p e te  e n c c c e a f n l ly  w i th  t h e i r a ,  
a s  i n  M a c g re g o r 'e  Trs. y* M acg rego r^  i n  w h ic h  a  
h e r i t a b l e  e e c u r i t y  h e  3d b y  a  w if e  an d  g r a n t e d  t o  
h e r  w h i le  t h e  h u sb a n d  w as s o l v e n t ,  t o  m ee t h i e  
o b l i g a t i o n  i n  te rm e  o f  a  d e c r e e  a A i t r a l  ( p e r t a i n i n g  
t o  a  c o n t r a c t  o f  r e p a r a t i o n )  wae u p h e ld  a g a l n a t  
them  *
L o rd  F r a e e r  r e m a rk s ^  t h a t  t h e  w if e  who h a s  
o b ta in e d  no  d e c r e e  f o r  a l im e n t  Im e no  c la im  f o r  
a l im e n t  /
1* The w if e  l 8  n o t  a lw a y s  d e s e r v in g  o f  aym pathy*I t  i s  n o t  uhkncw n f o r  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  S t a t e  fn n d e  t o  p ro m p t a  lm eband*e  te m p o ra ry  d i s a p p e a r a n c e ,  w i th  t h e  w i f e ' s  c o n n iv a n c e  o r  a c q u ie s c e n c e *2# F r#  I #  8 S 4 /5 #  c i t in p s  L o c k h a r t  o r  Thomoeon v# B h a w  
1 5  IWV# 1828». ?*0*  '5# 2 2  Ja n #  1820$ F#0# ( c i t e d  and  n a r r a t e d  b y  L#F r a s e r ,  jW ,d #)#4# Bee g e n e r a l l y  u p o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  w i f e  and  o f  c r e d i t o r #  O h a p te r  2#
5# 1$ 865#
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a i lm e n t  against her husband's creditors, and cites 
t h e  old case o f  Turnbull^, to the effect that 
she has only herself to blame i f  she is sufficiently 
ill«*advised o r  reckless t o  m a rry  a shiftless man - 
"if she has made an ill bargain, she t a k e s  him 
f o r  b e t t e r  and f o r  worse, and has none to blame 
but herself, and all that can be s a i d  i n  t h i s  
case i s ,  caveat emptor» If he have an  opulent
f o r t u n e , she has the benefit of it;^ if he fall 
i n  s t r a i t s , sh e  m ust r u n  the r i s k  and h a z a r d  with 
him, and bear patiently these accident a of providence"^
Before decree can be obtained, however, notice 
of the action must be served on the husband, and 
th e  wife may be met constantly with the "gone away" 
and "closed against delivery" responses of the 
inventive, energetic, ingenious and  nomadic non** 
payer* However, if personal service on the 
defender is not possible, service may be made by 
the Sheriff Officer leaving the copy w r i t  and 
schedule of citation with a member o f  t h e  d e f e n d e r 's  
household (termed "a servant"^ **) to be given to the 
defender /
1* T u r n b u l l  v* T*. H* 5895 (1709)*
3* The rights of wife ana of creditor are discussed in C h a p te r s  2 and 7* The priority of claim is a difficult question (Bee discussion, Memo. No*22, 2*118 pointing out that "superfluity" on the part of th e  alimentary d e b to r  is a prerequisite of a successful claim for aliment ; the merits or justice of this admitted priority of " o th e r  creditor's" is not discussed, and a more d e t a i l e d  treatment of the subject is remitted to t h e  Scottish Law Commission's consideration of the law of bankruptcy). Ho comments were made by Faculty*T o d ay , t h e r e  is, o f  course, t h e  support afforded by t h e  Welfare State see i n f r a # , •4* So c h a r a c t e r i s e d  s im p ly  by  FeoeTpt of. the documents; Sheriff 6ourt Practice, J. Dove Wilson, p*112 (citing A* v B* (1 8 3 4 )  12 S.
3 4 7 ) .
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defender, in the presence of a witness, o r ,  if 
no reply at all is received, after g iv in g  six audible 
knocks, by the Sheriff Officer f i x i n g  the writ 
and schedule to the door, or i n  the keyhole, i n  
the presence of a witness^# Edictal citation 
will be competent if the defender Is o n tw l th  
Scotland: edictal citation, and citation at t h e
defender's last known residence, may be the best 
course of action if it is not clear whether the 
defender is ontwith Scotland or n o t  .  E d i c t a l  
citation i s  competent also i f  the d e fe n d e r " h a s  
left h i s  usual residence for forty days and h i s  
present address is unknown", "as the only method 
of convening the defender"^*
Once extract decree has been obtained, it will 
be placed in the hands of Sheriff Officers for 
the purpose of enforcement# T h e r e a f t e r  t h e  debtor 
will b e  charged, and then, failing payment o r  
o th e r w is e  satisfactory arrangement, there will be 
a poinding and sale by warrant of his non-essontial 
goods and furniture* It i s  possible also to 
inhibit t h e  debtor from dealing with his heritable 
property, by use of the diligence of adjudication, 
but frequently he owns no heritable property#
Where the debtor has a bank account, the details 
of w h ic h  are know n, a r r e s tm e n t  may b e  made of 
moneys t h e r e i n .  There is also a more expensive 
•floating* arrestment w h ic h  may b e  u s e d  I n  respect 
of several banks w here  i t  i s  possible that the 
debtor /
1# Act 1 3 4 0 , c*73* Bobie, Law and Practice of The Sheriff Oourts i n  Scotland, p*124* The ultimate usefulness i f  obtained of decree so initiated, might be small. International co-­operation and modern statutes are necessary to help t h e  alimentary creditor here. Consider Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 
1 9 7 2  and G#& W., p . 251 ©t seq# See i n f r a .2, Dobie, p.120: W#J.Lewis, sEeriff C o u r t  Practice, p.9 4 .3. Dobie, p.120.
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d e b to r  h a s  a n  a o o o im t, en d  w h ich  ' f l l t e z 'S '  down 
an d  may l o c a t e  an d  g r r e s t  t h a t  w e o im t*
G a le  o f  t h e  d e b t o r 's  p o e e e e s lo n s  l a  l i k e l y  
t o  b e  a n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  d i l i g e n c e  i n  t h e  o a e e  o f  a  
o o n t in u in g  d e b t  e a c h  a e  i@ c o n ta in e d  I n  a n  e x t r a c t  
d e c r e e  f o r  p a y m e n ts  i n  name o f  a l im e n t#
A rrea tm em t o f  laeom e l a  m ore e a t  l e  f a c t o r y  and  s in c e  
t h e  M agee A rre a tm e n t L im i t a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t, 
1870^ d o e s  n o t  a p p ly  t o  a  d e c r e e  f o r  a i l m e n t ,  
a r r e a tm e n t  /
1# b y  v i r t u e  o f  @#4 th e r e o f #  0#& W## p#20?# fn #11  an d  s e e  P r o f e s a o r  O l i v e 's  g e n e r a l  d l a c u a a lo n  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  e& forcem e& t o f  cl& im e f o r  a l im e n t#  p p # 207^209#Of## f o r  E n g lan d #  t h e  A tta c h m e n t o f  E a r n in g s  A ct#  1971$ w h ic h  a u th o r i a e a  t h e  m ak ing  ( t o  s e c u r e  p ay m en ts  im d e r  a  m a in te n a n c e  o r d e r )  o f  a n  o r d e r  b y  t h e  h ig h  O o u rt#  t h e  O o u n ty  O o u rt#  o r  t h e  H a g ia t r & te a ' O o u rt#  a d d re e e e d  t o  t h e  d e b t o r 's  e m p lo y e r  and  r e q i i i r i n g  h im  t o  make p e r i o d i c a l  d e d u c t io n s  fro m  t h e  d e b t o r '#  e a m in g e #  e n d  (8  # 6 ( 5 ) )  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  n o rm a l d e d u c t io n  r a t e #  an d  t h e  'p r o t e c t e d  e a r n in g e  r a t e *  ( b e in g  t h e  r a t e  b e lo w  w h ich#  "hav:)ng r e g a r d  t o  t h e  d e b t o r 's  r e a o u r e e a  and  n e e d s#  t h e  c o u r t  t h i n k s  i t  r e a s o n a b le  t h a t  t h e  e a m in g e  a c t u a l l y  p a i d  t o  h im  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  reduced*)# A p p l i c a t i o n  may bo  made b y  d e b to r  o r  c r e d i t o r  u n d e r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o rd e r#  b u t#  i f  b y  t h e  l a t t e r #  f i f t e e n  d a y s  m u st h a v e  e la p s e d  s in c e  t h e  m ak ing  o f  t h e  m @ i.ntenance order* an d  t h e  d e b to r  zm at h a v e  f a i l e d  t o  m ake o n e  o r  m ore p ay m en ts  th e r e u n d e r #  (# # 5 (2 )  and  ( 5 ) )  and  t h e  c o n a^  s h a l l  n o t  make t h e  o r d e r  i f  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  i t  t h a t  th e  d e b t o r 's  f a i l u r e  t o  make p a y m e n ts  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  
o r d e r  i s  n o t  d u e  t o  h i s  " w i l f u l  r o f n a a l  o r  c u lp a b le  n e g le c t " #  ( $ # 5 ( 5 ) ) #  Borne a t t e m p t  t o  f r a e t r a t e  e v a s io n  i e  mad# b y  a#21 w h ich  r e q û l r e a  t h e  d e b to r  t o  n o t i f y  t h e  o o u r t  I n  % ^riting  w i t h i n  s e v e n  d a y s  i f  and  when h e  c h a n g e a  em ploym ent an d  a  new e m p lo y e r  aw are  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  a t ta c h m e n t  o r d e r  m m t a l s o  n o t i f y  t h e  o o u r t#  L l t t l o  m ore# o r  l e e e #  c o u ld  b e  done*  O le a r ly  t h e s e  p r o v ie io n e  a r e  ai%q>le t o  ig n o r e #  S e e  g e n e r a l ly #  'Law and P r a c t i c e  i n  M a tr im o n ia l  O a im e s '#  F ase ingbem # PP*259#*261* B ro m le y 's  F a m ily  Lmf ( g t h  e d * )#  pp# 5 2 1 * 5 2 4 # w h e re  m e n tio n  l a  made o f  t h e  F i n e r  R e p o r t 's  v ie w  t h a t  t h i a  A c t i n  p r a c t i c e  h a s  b e e n  a  d is a p p o in tm e n t#  I n  many c a a e a #  o f  G ourae# t h e  s e a r c h  i c  u n d e r ta k e n  b y  t h e  s t a t e  
( s e c  s u n ra #  pp#41W M 7)*
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arrestment may be made up  to the amount on the 
face of the decree. Clearly details of the 
husband's em ploym ent must be Imown, as must the 
day of t h e  week on which he is paid, since 
arrestment may only be made "for each term's 
aliment as it falls due"^* "F o r all that i s  
due and bygone the diligence is competent, but 
for future debts X think we cannot lay i t  down 
too distinctly that the diligence is incompetent 
unless the d e b to r  is vergens ad inopieum. or there 
b e  other circumstances o f  a parallel kind" ,
As far as the movement o f  an alimentary debtor 
within the U.K« and abroad i s  concerned, reference 
should be made to the Maintenance Orders Act, 1930, 
and also to the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act, 1972, which (by Part I) permits 
t h e  enforcement i n  a ' r e c i p r o c a t i n g  c o u n t r y ' (s*1) 
of a maintenance o r d e r  granted in the U.K. and 
gives j u r i s d i c t i o n  to a Sheriff to make a provisional 
maintenance order ( b u t  not a decree o f  separation, 
o r  adherence, and aliment or an order containing a 
crave f o r  the custody o f  a Child‘S) i f  the defender, 
t o  the b e s t  information o r  belief of the pursuer, 
i s  residing in a r e c i p r o c a t i n g  country, if t h e  
p u r s u e r  r e s i d e s  w i t h i n  the Sheriffdom, and i f  t h e  
Sheriff w ould  not o th e r w is e  have jurisdiction i n  
that a c t io n ^ *  In suoh an a c t i o n ,  "it shall not 
be n e c e s s a r y  f o r  the p u r s u e r  t o  obtain a warrant f o r  
t h e  /
1. Fr#, citing Symington v« 8# (1873) 3 R.203, in w h ic h  case a u p  * SU T T G IF T K glis e x p la in s  t h e  business inconvenience and * anom alous c o n s e q u e n c e s ' which w o u ld  attend a g e n e r a l  pow er o f  the w ife  t o  u s e  a r r e s tm e n t s  i n  respect of f u t u r e  aliment. 
The w i f e ' s  e n t i t l e m e n t  m ig h t b e  l i f e - l o n g ;  "I do n o t  t h i n k  that a creditor can, b y  a r r e s t i n g  money i n  t h e  hands of h i s  d e b to r  ' s  d e b t o r ,  c o n v e r t  him i n t o  a t r u s t e e  f o r  h i s  i n t e r e s t " .2# S y m in g to n , per L.P# I n g l i s , ibid.5 .  1972  A c t ,  8 Û 4 (2 ) .
4 .  s  # 4 (  1 )  .
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f o r t h #  c i t a t i o n  o f  a n y  p e rs o n #  and t h e  a c t i o n  may 
GOmtence an d  p r o c e e d  w i th o u t  cuoh, c i t a t i o n "   ^#
M a in to n a n o e  o r d o r a  made i n  r e o ip r o o a t im g  c o im t r i e c  
may h e  r e g i s t e r e d  and  e n f o r c e d  l a  t h e  
V a r i a t i o n  and  r e v o c a t i o n  o f  r e c i p r o c a t i n g  c o u n t r y  
d e c r e e s  i s  a ia o  c o m p e te n t^ #
P a r t  I I  l 8  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  r e o i im o c a l  e n fo ro e m e n t 
o f  o la lm a  f o r  m a in te n a n c e  h e tw ee n  th e  U#K* m d  
'c o n v c n t io z i  c o im tr ie e *  ( a  *25)# and  P a r t  I I I  w i th  
U#K* a r ra n g e m e n te  i^ i th  o t h e r  o o im tr le a ^ *
One pow er#  o r  rem edy# n o ta b ly  l a c k in g  i n  t h e  
w i f e ' s  a rm o m y  i s  t h a t #  w h i le  c o h e h i t a t i o a  e u W is ta #  
s h e  c m m o t com pel h e r  h u c h an d  t o  p a y  h e r  a  r e a s o n a b le  
a llo w a n c e ^ #  F a i l u r e  t o  m a in ta in  a t  a  r e a s o n a b le  
l e v e l#  w h e re  t h e  h u ab en d  h a s  r e a o u r c e a  to  do  ao# 
t h e  w i f e 'e  s i t u a t i o n  b e in g  o u ch  ( f o r  h e r  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  s u p p o r t  h e r s e l f  en d  t h e  h o u s e h o ld  g e n e r a l l y  i s  
m ot o l e a r ^ )  t h a t  t h i s  c a u e e d  h e r  d l e t r e e a  an d  
e a b a r ra a a m e n t  m ig h t p e rh a p e  am eim t t o  c r u e l t y  (unreasonable 
F r a a e r ^  e t a t e e  t h a t  i t  w ould  b e  c r u e l t y  f o r  a  behaviour).
h u sb a n d  d u r in g  c o h a b i t a t i o n  t o  s t a r v e  h i e  w ife #  and  
to d a y  a  p a re lm o n lo u a  a t t i t u d e  su c h  aa  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  
w i f e ' s  p u b l i c  atm ndlm g m d  p r i v a t e  ca lm  m ig h t amoumt 
t o  /
1 * ® #4(4) ( a )  *2# CS*6*8# See K illen .
3» 8*9*4# The p u rp o s e  and  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  A c t 'e  p r o v ia io a o  a r e  w e l l  e x p la in e d  b y  P r o f e e a o r  O liv e  (C«& W. 
p#251 ^  e&&#$ s e e  a l s o  t h e  e x p la n a t io n  o f  t h e  i n i  ra rU S "*  p o s i t i o n  (  1950 ; l o t  ) # pp  # 226*251 * )
5^ DP* 436-440.6* S u p r a * f7# T # o ? 9  (2acL ed*# 1876)*  L o rd  F r a s e r  a p p e a re d  t o  e iu r ls a g e  no  c l r c u m s ta n c e a  i n  w h ich  t h e  e x i s t i n g  re m e d ie s  w o u ld  n o t  p r o v id e  a  s u f f i c i e n t  a n sw e r f o r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n *  " I f  s h e  c o h a b i t  w i th  him# mu a c t i o n  f o r  s e p a r a t e  m a in te n a n c e  l a  a b s u rd " *  
m n m # p#436.
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1to mental cruelty , b u t  in any event the remedy 
of separation and aliment is by  no means necessarily 
appropriate or desired by  th e  parties. The position 
with regard to enforcement of decrees therefore 
i s  h i g h l y  i m s a t i s f a c t o r y ^ *
Some^ argue that the state should act a s  
detective, and provider of funds if its detective 
work f a i l #  Thus, i t  might be  that a  state-provided 
allowance specifically intended for wives who are 
entitled to receive aliment in cash amounts, but who, 
for practical reasons, c a n n o t  obtain a l im e n t  - that 
is, an additional rem edy  t o  those available at 
present to the needy individual or family unit^ - 
would s o lv e  some o f  the p ro b le m s  # The entitlement
t h e r e t o  /
1 . On the other hand, women th e m s e lv e s  by their demanda have made it more reasonable for the attitude to be t a k e n  that, i f  at all p o s s i b l e ,  they Should enter paid employment and support th e m s e lv e s  and the household as a matter of duty and personal wish r a t h e r  than as a matter of complaint or d e s i r e  for luxuries but t h i s  may be predominantly a 'm i d d l e - c l a s s  attitude, and  in lower income groupe it has always b e e n ,  (and perhaps increasingly in t h e  middle c l a s s e s  i t  h a s  now become) a m a t t e r  of necessity* An e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  a fixed proportion of the husband's in c o m e , i f  d e s i r e d ,  is thought to b e  a change which m a r r ie d  women of all c l a s s e s  and  in all situations but for r e a s o n s  varying according to t h e  class and situation, w o u ld  vrelcom e# It might b e  a vital right for wife and children, or it might b e  balmto s e l f - e s t e e m ,  o r  it might afford opportunity 
f o r  w iv e s  t o  sa v e  ( a  r e c e n t  s u rv e y  h a s  shown t h a t  the average married woman has savings in h e r  own name of no m ore t h a n  £12), but it i s  suggested that f o r  any of these r e a s o n s  the introduction of such a right w ould  b e  desirable* Be© Memo*Ho.22, 2.179 et seq., Propn.39 and faculty Response, p p .4 1 - 4 2 .  Of# 0#& ¥ * ,  p . 1 9 3 , where Professor O liv e  advocates the u s e ,  w i th  caution, of a power to award a l im e n t  to a cohabiting wife. Of. su;^ ra. 
p p .4 3 6 -4 4 0 .
2 .  S ee  O liv e  and  W ils o n , p * 2 0 9 , end  s u g g e s t io n s  
t h e r e  outlined.3# f o r  example, the "Gingerbread" Pressure Group.4. Bee Olive and  Wilson, p.390 et sep. t "Marriage and Social Security".
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1thereto would eubsiat so long as the r e c i p i e n t  .  
remained entitled to aliment under the private 
law rules of aliment above set out* Would this 
be a flat-rat© payment (a certain amount for e v e r y  
(entitled) wife, and so much for each child, perhaps 
depending on age) or would it Involve a means-tost?
The choice m ig h t be made in t h e  light of a decision 
upon the nature of the rem edy# If t h e  payment were 
thought to b e  an underpinning by the State of a 
private law r i g h t ,  rather th a n  a public law remedy, 
then perhaps the wife should be entitled to p aym en t 
from t h e  S t a t e  (for example, through the administrative 
machinery p r o v id e d  by the Post Office) of such sum 
weekly as appeared on the face of the extract decree* 
This would constitute an immensely increased burden 
on the tax-payer (especially since there would be 
no safeguard to ensure that the decree continued to 
reflect t h e  circumstances of the recipient; this 
would p r o v id e  a good example of aliment permanent 
in nature if not in name), and for this, and other 
(moral) r e a s o n s ,  w ould  be unlikely to receive general 
approbation# Such a remedy would alleviate hardship 
in many worthy cases, however; the award would 
commence a s  soon as extract was issued, and registered 
with the Post Office or D e p artm en t o f  Social Security, 
in oases where the husband's whereabouts were unknown 
and in other cases could be c a l l e d  upon if the 
husband proved to be elusive, and a bad payer# In 
every case, the alimentary creditor would b e  required 
to raise with th e  h e lp  in most cases, it is envisaged, 
o f  Legal Aid t h e  appropriate action in order to 
establish /
1 # male or female (M#W.P#Act, 1920, s#4 - and see proposals f o r  reciprocity o f  obligations Memo* No#22, Propn#2s Faculty Response, pp#3-S)
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am tabllA  m â the $w h a
aye'Wm be Im t w t  W mbm#
wouM W ctromgtkamd Im M ielr m eolv# to  avoid  
m k in B  a n y  a l i m e n t a r y  paymomW* h o w o v w  am ;all ^  
whether fo r  rem om  of #*e#â$ irroap oim lb ility#  03 
a  m i# ta k w $  o r  A im p m p o r t io n a te #  m o m l e b l i ^ t i o m  
a aaooM w ife mmd fam ily^ aM evm  tW e# who 
would pay# a t #ome iw om vm iem # or hardship to  
thamme3vd$ %fmal4 W 4im om % od from doing ao#
th a t the oW .i#atioa womM be take# mrer 
a  p u b l i a  b o d y  o w e  a m g lB t r a t lo #  o f  t h e  o x t r a e t  
deeree wm made by the w ife# in ev ita b ly  imuM e ffe c t  
attitu d es*  % e p m iew orth y  aim would be th at from 
the oeata involved in  fo r  the MebaM#
md fmm the lom##4g#m e ffo e t o f fa ilu r e  in  # a t  
@e#%h$ the w ife would be protected# W t the oM o- 
effo e ta  would be d ifflo m lt #  eirem vm t#  Hereon 
pwhape too high a. premlim would be plaeed u#o# 
oomplimmo w ith the p rivate I w  r u lw  (th a t is#  im 
effec t*  i# e #  the p rew w e m* abggm&e# o f w illliig n w e  
t#  adhere)^# would the eom em im lly be
able to  m g ia ter  the o m tm #  o f i f  I t s
flm m iolal teama w m  met bei;% implememtedT 
eeem e /
1* Cemtmmt here Fimw Co> i# w  Report (Report o f  t h e  D e p a r tm m ta j. Co I t t e o  o #  O n e -P a re n t  F m dL llea#  O m d * % 2 9  11^74)#  m  o u t l i i m  o f  t h e  p m p o e e la  o f  %fhioh i# m m t m i u M  Im Memo*B#*22. Part T# and im detail at 5*12# (the "administrative oMor" ayetom* to bo operatM W  #10 'xipplemmtmry Beimflte üwmif^cio#)#2# Wamt #wuid be the legal position? (At pmamt# of oowOC# ' the Wobmm MÔ a dmty to alimemt illeg itim a te  ohlldrm* a duty which ho and the mother share -  wo Walker* Prima#!#$52$#)# 800diaouaalom w  to pmramow# Momo#Bo#22* Propa* 23# and RaapoDee# pp#22- 25* am to hiorarohyo f  o m tl t le m o n t#  2 * 8 8  ^  g m #  w.& P ro p n # l9 #  Faculty pp#17-19*5# Of* Faoul'by Rcopomao# "Hoa-patrimonial oondltloos of liBblIi%"# m » 2 W 1 #
s c o w  n o ■in o t  W
A w W m # a u o h  ami t h l a  
t o  êlm chem ge o f  a  d u ty  oweâ# 
r e e u l t  laa t w  abm donm em t o f  
rm m edlee Im f w m m  o f  m
p ie #  A y  t h i s  ehom ld  
2 I d  b e  a  # ^ lm e e m tlv 0  
i t  m ig h t 
0 I # r  r u l e s  m id
law
A l t h o u ^  I n  m m y om$e$ a t  p re e e m t*  malmtemmaee l e
p r o v id e d  %  %W 8 t # t e *  i t  I s  f e l t  t h a t  %W p r i v a t e
I w  o b l i g a t i o n  .4 > a llm eg  * T he M l  
m re #  a n d  t h e  e w i
ho
T puoisLO # n a  p r  j 
ailabl# under each y e  
m Of groat im#ertamoe mmd publie imtereat'^# 
t a lengthy m%d detailed etudy of public 
p e c e l b i l l t l e #  i e  n e t  y e t  t h $ u # t  #  b e  m a m i ta b le  
or neoeamary werolae in the oomte%t of a private 
law  dlwwelKm o f  the property o f  married pereome* 
That whieh le  at  ^tptad to h# deawj 
wMeh oortalm mt f o r  i#rwememt are
tmitatlvely m a d e I s  emewtlally a 
B ystem  /
1#2# W alk er*  2 # ? ,w t h e r  p o $ ^ i% 3 .1 ty  w ouM  ho a  e y e te m  o f  " m a r r ia g e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  a p p l l o a h l e  #T h ia #  to e *  m ig h t b e  w a e o e p tm h le *  ough  a o m p u la o ry . ' t h e s e  m eet l i k e l y  t o  l
I
o w m lm te m tly  t o  o o : i t r i W t e  m ig h t b e  tm o w  L east l i k e l y  W  Wr*n-fl'l^* amd th e y  w o u ld  r e a w t  
t h e  W r d %  p la o M  im e n  them  o f  f im m ao ln g  % e  o a B u a l t l# #  o f  a  pezhqpr'i h m t y  # M  m a r r ia g e *  o v e r  t h e  l;o r :4 i)m tio n  o f  A l e h  th e y  
h a v e  mo o e n t r o l *  A p m m ly  %aere<mhl* o r  'I m d lv id u a l*  m m rr i% e  Inoura^ io#  m # i t  W  i m m f f l e i m t l y  am p le  t o  fu n d  a  b re a k d w m  f o r  m y  lem gtm  o f
tim e #  # L le o 8  oom puleo ry#  i t  w o u ld  m ot a o h le v e  i t #  e M ;  i f  o o m p u lw ry *  i t  m i # t  g iv e  o f f e n o e  t o  m uny, b o th  l a  i t s  w e t r l e t i o m  o f  f re e d o m  and  i t #  p ù ü ^ i ln ic t io  o u t lo o k *  M oreover*  a lM m ig h  e v M e a o o  o f  th e  t a k i n g  o u t  o f  m o h  ' a  p o l i c y  e o u M  
b e  i n o l c t e d  u p o n  a t  eelohrat)% '*n o f  v  m r r i a g e *  t h e  )>aymont e f  prom lum e A o ro a i'L iu *  c m ot W  g e a r w t e e d *Of* Memo* Ko*Z3. 2*1 - 2*9*Of* Mfmo# Ko*22* m &  P#B4*
6* Ohai 7# C h a p te r  *;
**5:^ * P a r t  V*e  1 -5*
*
P a e u l ty  Reepom ee# pp,
w o ,
B ystem  o f  i f  ey e tem  i t  be*
Am award of aliment w ill eome to am end i f  
the marriage to which i t  relates is  diaeolvad by 
d i v o r c e ^ ,  o r  b y  d e a th *
It la the owe# however# that, upon the 
death of one apouae, the survivor# i f  imeuffioiertly 
provided for (aooordlmg to 'the raitk and poaltiom 
of the parties*^)# la entitled# i t  being "ooneonmit 
with equity"^# to aliment out of the eetate# and this 
olaim la a claim of debt and exigible during the 
lifetim e of the survivor* The survivor ie  not on 
a par with other oreditore# though# and "hue no
right to permanent aliment t i l l  a ll the debts be#4 ^
Under the old rule# of euooeaeion# the estate 
of the hueband might be distributed in euoh a way 
at his death t3mt there was no teroe# and the jus 
represented only a email eim *^ Equally# 
(for the htmband'e claim wae/ia aleo oompeteut# i f  
"indigent"^)# common law a huabaud had no
relioti*  and hie right to oourteey was oorditlonal 
on the birth of a living c h i l d " C l e a r l y #  in view 
of tlie oubeequent reoogndltion of a spouse's riglit 
in the estate of the deoeaeed epowe \  the claim 
would /
1* S ee  g e n e r a l l y  O h a p te r  5# F i n a n c i a l  P r o v i s i o n  on  D iv o rc e #2# Fr*, M* & W*# II# 971* 5* Walton# p*2G7#4#  F r*  I I #  971*5* a s  e x p la in e d  b y  ? r * I I #  % e  ( V o l i t i o no f  t e r o e  mud c o u r t e s y  (b y  S u e o e a a io n  (S o # )  l o t #  1964# $ # 1 0 ( 1 ) )  givG6 g r e a t e r  free d o m  t o  t e a t  an d  
e o n e e q u e n t  in o id e n o e  o f  o o m p la in t .0* F r * I I #  969% W alton#  p*268*
7* W alton#  p*267*8* S ee  e#g* M#W#P*Aot# 1881# 8*6 ( due  M l i g t l ) *I n t e s t a t e  E u e b a n d 'e  E s t a t e  ( 8 o #% AoW # i 9 i  1**1959 ; Lmz R efo im  (M i8O *P rov0*)(S o*) A ct#  19^4^0# e#5#
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would be found to be appropriate in f e w e r  cases, 
and today, in oases of intestacy^, it must be almost 
unknow n: prior and legal rights will exhaust a
small estate, and will usually ensure adequate 
provision in a larger estate^* In cases of testacy, 
where /
1. Succ# (Sc*) Act, 1964, Parts I  and I I ;  Buoo* (Sc*)Act, 1975, 8#1;
2.0 As to the prior right to the house, the surviving spouse must have been 'ordinarily resident* there at the date of the deceased's death (1964 Act, a*8(4)), though the deceased need not have been resident there (H*0*Meston, 'The Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964*, p*29)* This'proviso applies also to the right to the furniture and p l e n i s h i n g s  (s.8(5))# Financial provision (s*9) i s  able to be claimed by "the surviving spouse" whatever the domestic arrangements (except that a decree of judicial ■ separation obtained by a wife prevents a husband from claiming on her death intestate any rights of s u c c e s s io n  in estate acquired by the w if e  after separation (Conjugal Bights (So.) Amendment Act,1861, a*6: see Chapter 1, p.77 and Chapter 5(2)),Professor H e s to n  (p.22) notes that the disqualification falls if t h e  spouses resume cohabitation* As to mournings and (temporary - as i t  transpires) aliment on death, Walton asserts (p,269, citing the cases of MacOallum v* Maclean, 1923 S*L«T,(Sh.Gt*) 117*an9"lior3[s6n "v'*"'K  's Trs# 1930 8.L.T* (Bh*Ot.) 37) that lE'e"wi'fe"1 s enfitTeS" thereto,"even though she has been l i v i n g  apart from or in desertion of her husband". It seem s s t r a n g e  that the rules of aliment on death do not correspond with those in operation in l i f e *  H ow ever, the cases w h ic h  Walton cites pertain to te m p o ra ry  aliment (see infra* p. 4 6 5) and mournings, respectively,"*and"“not to that ("continuing" - 0.& ¥*, 
P * 6 9 4  e t  seq.) aliment which might be seen (in so far, ±T**aW all, as it is found t o d a y )  as a substitute f o r  a right of succession so termed, a right or palliative to offset the stringent results of a spouse's considerable freedom of testation, the type of right which may b e  said perhaps to be a recognition of some common financial r i g h t  and interest of s p o u s e s  i n  t h e i r  joint v e n t u r e ,Professor Olive (0*& W ,, p*693) d e c l a r e s  r o u n d ly  that HacOaXlum's decision seems wrong* He t a k e s  the v ie w  that the right to temporary aliment (till payment of the provisions, legal o r  conventional) r e s t s  on the argument that the family till that date i s  deemed to remain in being, whereas i n  such a case (of the wife's desertion) that is not so, nor in life did the husband owe a duty to aliment the /
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w here  now only jua relictae (i) remaina as a 
spouse's claim against the other's will, and 
w here  clever management c a n  arrange an estate 
in such a way as does not favour the s u r v i v i n g  
spouse^, a claim for aliment could arise and he 
useful*
pThe Scottish Law Commission comment ,
"*** aliment on death fulfils t h e  function of a 
safety net underlying the law of legal rights", 
state their impression^ that such claims are not 
frequently found in practice, b u t  suggest^ that the 
right to aliment on death should rem a in *  If, 
however, "there i s  a c o n s e n s u s  favouring t h e i r  
abolition*’^ , "a statute dealing with a l im e n t  w ou ld  
provide a n  appropriate vehicle"* If retention were 
favoured, then the right should be examined in the 
context /
the claimant* If, on the other hand (see infra* p* 4 6 4)the object of the aw ard  was to m a in ta in  the husband's establishment, and was so used wherever the home of t h e  wife and whatever h e r  circumstances, a reason for the grant of the aw ard  could be seen, but that was not a prerequisite of a successful claim f o r  such a l im e n t  (Walton, p*269), although (Walton, ibid*) the fact'that t h e  widow " d id  not keep up'*‘*lEe house will affect the amount"# Sheriff Wark in HacGallum (aoe infra p* 465 fn«3 ) o p in e d  that it'"was'’'not necessary to Save resort to the fiction "that for the, purpose of aliment the husband's existence is regarded aa continuing for six months a f t e r  his death (Fraser, H usband and W ife , 11*965)"-? the status o f  w if e  of the deceased at his death sufficed*.1* Of* Hemo*Ho#22, 4*18* "Under the present law a man can readily d e f e a t  his family's claims to legal rights b y  investing in heritable property and dying testate"*2* Hemo*Ho*22, 4*2 (and see generally, on this subject, Part 1? thereof - A lim e n t on  Death of liable Relative)*
5* 4 , 1 7 *4* .'Propn* 99 (4*18)*5$ 4*3#
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1context of a review of family property law *
Faculty^ favoured retention until ouch time as 
a full-scale consideration of "family property" 
can b e  undertaken^ *
Lord Fraser suggests^ that one third or one 
quarter of the income to which the heir has 
succeeded might be a correct award, if this 
p r o v id e d  a reasonable aliment - but if not, "then 
she would get the half, or, if necessary, the whole*i 
The court may award such sum as it considers to be 
reasonable aliment in the circumstances of the case, 
and, according to Walton^, may encroach upon capital 
if the Income is insufficient to provide reasonable 
aliment. A contingent claim of the widow cannot 
be allowed to delay distribution of the estate^*
It may b e  that the wife has barred herself 
from claiming aliment by reason of having accepted 
some provision in an antenuptial marriage-contract, 
though /
1* 4*3#2, pp#81-82 (in agreement with Propn* 99)#3# It is understood that such a review by the Scottish Law Commission is in train#4# II, 971#5# 0*267* citing the case of Anderson v* Grant(1899) 1 F*484*6# H ox '/ard 's E x e c u to r  v* H o w ard 's  C u r a to r  B o n is I nwere special circumstances* The widow was of unsound Blind and living in an asylum# It was auggested that t h e  next of kin's portion of the estate should be retained until it was known whether it would be required for the widow's maintenance # "What is said is that on the arrival of an event which may never occur, the capital of that part of th e  estate t^ hich belongs t o  the next of k i n  shall be utilised for the widow's maintenance, and that it shall be kept up by the first party, and not p a id  to the next of kin, until it shall b e  seen whether that conditional event will ever occur* I do not t h i n k  that we can give effect to that proposition" * per L+Adam at p*7B8*
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th o u g h  " i f  t h e  re a u h O la tlo m  o f  th e  r i g h t  t o  
a l im e n t  b e  made b y  p o a t a u p t i a l  o o n t r a o t ,  t h e  
w if e  may r e j e c t  t h e  in a d e q u a te  G o u v e a tio u a l  
p r o v la io m , end  r e s o r t  t o  h e r  l e g a l  o la im  f o r  
a l im e n t" ^ *
pF rao e r""  e t a t e a  t h a t  i t  l e  d o u b t f u l  w h e th e r  
t h e  a l lm e i i t  c a n  h e  e le lm e d  i f  t h e  widow ro # # m arrlee . 
I n  th lB  q u o a t lo a  o a u  h e  s e e n  p e r h # a  t h e  e o n f l l o t  
b e tw e e n  t h e  name o f  t h e  r i g h t  an d  t h a t  w h ic h  ( " s t a k e  
I n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  a e e e t e " )  h a s  b e e n  o o u je o tu r e d ^  
t o  h e  a t  l e m t  p a r t l y  I t a  p u rp o se #  T he te rm e  o f  
t h e  d e c r e e  may l i m i t  t h e  aw ard  t o  much t im e  ae  t h e  
r e o l p l e n t  rem alUB I n  v l d u l t y #  I f  n o t ,  an d  t h e  
widow M - m a r r l e e  a  man who 1$ a b le  * a d e q u a te ly ' t o  
m a in ta in  h e r*  many w ou ld  a rg u e  t h a t  'a l im e n t*  fro m  
t h e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  e h o u ld  eeam e^# E ven I f  
s h e  m a rry  a  p a u p e r*  t h e  sam e v ie w  m ig h t b e  ta k e n *  
o n  t h e  " f o r  b e t t e r *  f o r  w o rse "  a rgum en t#  I f *  
how ever*  t h e  aw ard  l a  a e e n  a a  a  r e o o g n l t lo m  o f  t h e  
w l f e 'e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e *  o th e r w is e  
r e o o g n la e d  n o t  a t  a l l *  t h e  o o m e ld e re t lo n e  %fould 
b e  d i f f e r e n t #  I f  t h e  meoond h u a b a a d  d ie *  l e a v in g  
h e r  l a  p o o r  o lro u m a tam o ea  ( w i th  o r  w i th o u t  a n  
a llm o m t fro m  h i e  e s t a t e ) *  o o u ld  tdie f l r a t  a l im e n t  
r e v iv e ^ ?  A l l  m uat d e p e n d  o n  t h e  p u rp o a e  o f  t h e  
w a r d *  and  t h e r e  eeem a t o  b e  no I n d l o a t l o n  o f  a  
common /
1# F r * I I *  970-971#2# I I *  970#P# P# 461*. fu #  2*
4# Of# t h e  c a e e  o f  a  p e r i o d i c a l  a llo w sm ce  ( d i v o r c e )  an d  e u b e e o u o iit  r c '^ a r r l a g e *  Oucc# (S c # )  A ct* 1964* a # 2 6 (5 )$  D lv# (B e# ) A ct* 1976* e # 5 (5 )#5# Of# q u e s t io n  p o s e d  b y  P r o f c s a o r  H e sto n *  'T he  B u c c é a e lo n  (S c c t la m d )  A ct* 1 9 6 4 '*  2nd  e d i t i o n *  pp#104 -10g#
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1common view, or m j view, upon th e  point ♦
The widow is entitled also to aliment till 
the first term after t h e  husband's death, unlesspt h e  estate be "manifestly insolvent" - that is, 
"to the f i r s t  term at which her provisions, legal 
or conventional, are payable", and the amount (of 
aliment) being calculated with r e f e r e n c e  to the 
husband's position and estate, and n o t  a c c o r d in g  
to "the amount of h e r  provisions"^* The basis o f  
the entitlement appears to have been to enable t h e  
widow to continue to keep up h e r  husband's 
establishment# Waltort^ ** notes that t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  /
1# It might b e  said that at present, Scottish •matrimonial p r o p e r t y  law' consists o f  a bundle of rights* only loosely related to each other, and not l&hked at all to any identifiable - or, at least, express - principle# After the M#M#P*(Bo#) Act, 1920 set the seal upon the earlier r e f o r m s , t h e r e  appears to have been an aversion to the discussion of what should be the philosophy u n d e r ly in g  married persons' property rights, despite fundamental (Buoc# (Sc#) Act, 1964) reforms, and interesting though perhaps ineffectual (M*W#P#Act, 1964) amendments#2# Walton, p*269# See also generally Olive and Wilson, pp*692-694 (especially with regard to the (MacOallum# supra* 1 9 2 3 : Bari ass v# B's T rs  # 1916 *"3 #741 s XX' months) peHod""f or'''which'"' suchtemporary aliment has in modern instances been awarded)*3* Walton, ibid* Olive and Wilson, p#693# ("Theamount wîïT"be governed b y  the standard o f  living formerly e n jo y e d  as a wife, rather than the income to b e  e n jo y e d  as a widow" and "will b e  affected b y  t h e  widow's own means and position*")# Hence presumably support in the interim fro m  her own f a m i ly  m ig h t d en y  her right to t h i s  tesiporary aliment out of the estate* (Of* Olive & Wilson, i b i d ** and see text, re support by husband's representatives)* See again M acO allum  (six month a l im e n t  given, thbugh wi¥e''E'ad 'been i n  desertion of her h u sb a n d  for three and a half years (or, i n  the averments of the pursuer, had been put out of th e  house and never re-admxtted) :"1 think i t  clear that the widow has a r i g h t  to aliment if at the date of her husband's death she was still his wife" (nor had the husband acquired a right to divorce her: period of desertion requiredt h e n  four years) per Sh* Wark, at p*11S)#4. p*269# (Palmer v* Sinclair# Jime 27, 1811, F#0#)
4G6:
the widow broke up  that establishment^ and returned
to her parental home d id  not th e r e b y  disentitle
herself from receiving aliment ("But the fact that
she did not keep up the house will affect the pam ount ), but that, on the other hand, aliment will 
not be due, if the house was kept up for t h e  widow 
i n  the interim period b y  the husband's representatives* 
Such a. claim, it seems, may now be made by the 
(indigent) husband^*
The widow ' a claim under t h i s  head i s  t o  be 
regarded therefore as a charge on the estate, not 
"a mere payment to account", but rather " a k in  to 
a debt, although it cannot prevail against the 
claims of creditors"^* It is believed that in 
practice today, a claim for temporary aliment is 
rarely e n c o u n te r e d  and the usual procedure, if the 
widow is in any financial hardship, i s  to make an 
advance to h e r ,  a  paym en t to account of h e r  ultimate 
entitlement^# I n  a competition w ith  creditors, 
reasonable /
1* This is a branch of t h e  law in which t h eauthorities are old; nevertheless, even as late as 1 9 5 1 (Walton, 3rd ed#), the term, "the husband's establishment" (rather than "the matrimonial home") would sound much l e a s  strange t h a n  it does now, so rapid has b e e n  social change#2. Walton, ibid#3* on the b a s i s  of H.W#?#(8G';) Act, 1920, s.4: seeHeston, p#25f 0#& W# p#694# See also Memo* Ho#.22, 4# 16 where it is pointed out that the 1920 Act, s#4 makes no. express provision in respect of the (indigent) husband's right to aliment after his wife's death# 'Permanent' or 'continuing* (G*& W*, p#694) aliment i s  certainly available to t h e  indigent husband - Fr*II, 969*4# 0#& ¥#, p.692, and authorities there c i t e d #5# M e n tio n  is made of the claim of temporary aliment in Memo# Ho#22 (at 4*7)* With regard generally to claims o f  aliment on death, P r o p n . 99 suggests that, despite the rarity of these claims, th e y  be r e t a i n e d  unless or u n t i l  modifications t o  the law of legal rights are m ade, and render them otiose. The existence of the right to claim performs a safety net function still (4#18)
( F a c u l t y  Response in agreement - p#61)#
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reasonable mournings will be allowed to the wldoiz^  #
I f  the husband is p a y in g  aliment in terms of 
a decree, end  then makes a b o n a  fide offer to 
adhere^ and this offer is turned down by the wife, 
he may obtain a recall of the aliment decree 
(under the same procedure as an application for 
variation) which is severable from the separation 
aspect of the decree# The latter is not subject 
to recall at the husband's instance ^ though by 
resumption o f  cohabitation the decree may lapse#
Where decree of adherence and aliment is held, a 
bona fide offer to adhere will b e  an immediate and 
effective answer to the claim for aliment^ ^^ #^
A contract of voluntary separation (which will 
usually contain financial provisions) will be revocable 
by agreement of the parties, ore may b e  brought to 
an end if t h e r e  i s  a genuine offer to a d h e re  by one 
party, who c a l l s  upon the other to do the samO^#
If it is considered, as s u r e l y  i t  m ust be, 
that /
1# 9G7-8#Olive and Wilson, pp#691-2*The Scottish Law Commission (Memo«Ho #22, 4*19) state "There are few 20th century cases on this topic and i t  seems likely that changes in social customs have made the widow's right to an allowance" (for reasonable mournings) "something of an anachronism", and suggest accordingly (Propn* 100, with which faculty was in a g re e m e n t)  t h a t  the right, together with any similar rights enjoyed by other relatives, be abolished, "unless there is an unexpected demand for its retention"#2» see Parrcch v# D# 1947 8*0. 110*3# Bee llraIn^r"^’H7”( 1890) 1? R#297, and discussion
4 .  O oyle  v l  0# 1950 8«L#T, (N o te s )  22#5# gee now%vorce (Sc#) A c t ,  1976, s# 7  (supra# p . 3 75 ) 
6# f r * ,  E* & ¥ # ,  I I ,  913% 0*& W ., p#407Bee the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in f l e t c h e r  v # ,Young 1936 8#L#T# 572# Walton, p. 144^ r"‘^"TrS!Ei' v 
(1 7 6 9 )  2 P a t#  184 and  Hood v# g j ""(18711 9Macph. 4 4 9 #
468.
t h a t  t h e  p r e a e n t  r u l e  o f  B o o ts  law  ae  r e g a r d e  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  m m rrled  p o re o n e  l a  t h a t  o f  e e p a r a t l o n  
o f  p r o p e r ty ^ #  a n d  t h a t #  w i th o u t  a  co d e  t o  r e g u l a r l a o  
I t ^ ÿ  t h e  a p o u a e a ' p r o p r i e t a r y  r e l a t i o n e  a r e  
g o v e rn e d  b y  t h e  r u l e s  w h ic h  g o v e rn  t h e  p r o p r i e t a r y  
r e l a t i o n e  o f  e tra m g e ra #  t h i s  O h e p te r  -  t h e  r i g h t  
t o  r e c e iv e #  and, t h e  d u ty  t o  p ro v id e #  a l im e n t  -  e n d  
t h e  n e x t  -  r i g h t o  a n d  d u t i e s  l a  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
d lm la lo u  o f  p r o p e r t y  i# o n  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
im iom  b y  d iv o r c e  o r  d e a t h  -  d e m o m atra te  eaG oeptioua 
t h o r e t o #  o r  a t  l e a o t  p a r t i o u l e r  an d  a p e o i a l i a e d  
e f f e o t a  w h ic h  m a r r ia g e  o r e a t e e  upon t h e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  t h o s e  p e ra o u a  who o h o o e e  t o  t a k e  u p o n  th e m e e lv e a  
t h e  s t a t u a  o f  m a r r ie d  pereom # and  who a r e  m ot# o r  
hm re n o t  been#  a t r a n g e r e  t o  e a o h  o th e r #
1# Of* Bo# la w  Oom# Memo# Bo #41# ? F a m ily  L a w \  
'O ooupanoy  R ig h to  i n  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  Home end  Pom oB tio  V lo l e n o e ' (1 9 7 # )$  0#11 a n d  7*3 ^  g § o : Homorandum d a te d  2 5 th  Bovémhor# 1 ^ 7  b y  W e  O o im o il o f  t h e  Law B o o le ty  o f  B oo tlam d  t o  t h e  B e o t t i o h  C o u r te  A d m in is t r a t io n #  o n  t h e  D r a f t  C o n v e n tio n  ou  M a tr im o n ia l  P r o p e r ty  (H ague C o n fe rim e e  o o to b e r  1976  -  F i n a l  A O t)# p a r a g r a p h  
5*2* Bee A nton# PThe E f f e c t  o f  M a rr ia g e  Upon P r o p e r t y  i n  B oo to  Law*# ( 1 9 % )  1 9  M#L#R# 653#
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d iv o r c e  law # a e  i t  a f f e e  t e d  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  
apouem s# i n  i t s  t r e a tm m i t  o f  t h e  f a c t  o f  d lv o r e e  
a s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  f a c t  o f  d e a th #  may h a v e  
r e f l e c t e d  t h e  o ld  v ie w  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t e d  a  
oom m im lty o f  p r o p e r t y  he  W e e n  t h e  ep o u ae e#  As 
we s h a l l  s e e  i n  chapter 6 o f  t h i s  d ie o u e a lo n #  t M a  
o l d e r  a l l e g i a n o e  t o  t h e  ixotiom  o f  c o m x a n ity  a o o o rd e  
w i th  t h e  v ie w s  o f  L e u la ia n a  la w y e rs  a n d  l e g i s l a t u r e #  
f o r  i n  t h a t  j u r l s d l o t l o n #  upo n  d i s a o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
m a t r im o n ia l  reg im e#  w h e th e r  i t  b e  o o n t r a o t a a l  o r  
l e g a l  ( t h a t  i s #  s u p p l i e d  b y  t h e  law  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
o f  p r i v a t e  a g re e m e n t)  and  i n  w h a te v e r  m m m er t h e  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o o o u rre d #  e a c h  s p o u s e  o r  t h e  s u r v iv o r #  
a a  t h e  c a s e  m ig h t be#  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  t o  
some e :e te n t  i n  t h e  o o m m m lty  o f  g a in s
U n d e r t h e  o l d e r  S o o ts  law # t l ie  'g u i l t y *  sp o u se#  
u p o n  d iv o rc e #  l o s t  h i s  o r  h e r  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  
e s t a t e  o f  t h e  o th e r #  w h ic h  w ould  o th e r w is e  h a v e  
a o o ru e d  t o  h im  o r  h e r  u p o n  t h e  d e a t h  o f  b i s  o r  h e r  
p a r t n e r  -  o r  u p o n  d lv o r o e  i n  w h io b  h e  o r  sh e  w as t h e  
' i n n o o e n t '  p a r t y  -  end. t h e  'in n o c e n t*  sp o u s e  warn 
p l a c e d  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  b e in g  a b le  t o  c la im  h i s  o r  
h e r  le g a ) .  r i g h t s  a a  i f  t h e  'g u i l t y *  a p o u ee  w ere  dead#  
I n  t i l l s  r e a p e c t  d iv o r c e  o p e r a t e d  a s  d e a th *  W here 
b o th  e p o u e e e  h a d  b e e n  g u i l t y  o f  m a t r im o n ia l  o f f e n o e e #  
a n d  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n ,  p e rh a p s #  s u c c e e c f u l  o r o a s - a c t i o n s #  
t h e  f a c t  o f  d iv o r c e  w as c o n a id e ra d #  t h e o r y  a t  any  
r a t e #  n o t  t o  h a v e  a n y  bearing u p o n  p r o p e r t y  t o  t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  b o a to w in g  a  b e n e f i t  on  e i t h e r  p a r ty #  The 
p r o p o s i t i o n  /
1* "The B u o c e a e io n  ( S c o t la n d )  A ct#  1964"#  M#0*Meaton# 2 n d  ed*# p#98*2# S e e  O h a p te r  6  (L o u ia ia n u ) *
proposition that each spouse had forfeited all
rights arising out o f  t h e  marriage was h ig h - s o u n d in g *
hut n o t  entirely practical nor in d e e d  entirely i n
accordance with the idea of a "share-out’* of j o i n t l y
owned goods upon cessation* for any reason* o f  the
purpose of the jointly-owned fund - even if that
notion waB still entertained seriously* ®he fiction
was t h a t  both spouses h a d  died at the date of decree io f  divorce*
PÏïhe reason advanced by Professor H e s to n  for 
the content of the pre-1964 divorce rules i s  that 
the theoretical basis of them lay* not in the concept 
of p u n ish m e n t espoused by t h e  unreformed Church and 
p e r s i s t i n g  after the Reformation* but in the fact that* 
i n  I960* it was s t i l l  possible to hold the opinion 
that a community of property e x i s t e d  between t h e  
spouses *
Dhere is an interesting discussion of the 
"communie bonorum"* in the case o f  F r a s e r  v# Walker* 
in which* upon pronouncement of decree divorcing 
each from the other* property questions w e re  r e s e r v e d *  
and the wife t h e n  s u e d  her fo rm e r  husband for half 
of t h e  goods i n  communion a s  t h e y  stood at t h e  date 
of decree of divorce* Her claim w as r e f u s e d *  u p o n  
th e  ground that the spouses had forfeited all rights 
arising out of t h e  marriage*
One w o n d ers  in such cases how th e  assets were 
d i v id e d  (if they were divided at all) after such a 
glib* unsatisfactory * incomplete and possibly unfair 
"solution"?
Originally* the wife h a d  s o u g h t her conventional 
provisions /
1* See generally Fraser v* W a lk e r (1872) 10 Hacph* 837)*2* Heston* ibid** p*98*
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provisions in terms of a post-nuptial marriage- 
contract* and th e n *  guarding against the possibility 
of failure in that claim* added an action which 
c o n c lu d e d  for teroe and iua relictae* ( th e r e a f t e r *  
for jus reliotae* was auhstituted t h e  phrase "one- 
half of t h e  goods in communion" as belonging to the 
parties at t h e  date of decree of divorce # I n  money 
terms * she estimated t e r o e  at one-third of t h e  a m m a l 
value (which she averred was £ 2 5 0  p*a#) of h e r  former 
husbfmd*B heritage* and claimed h e r  r i g h t  to the 
goods i n  communion a s  amounting t o  one half of her 
h u s b a n d 's  moveable fund o f  £10*000* since the society 
of the marriage had been dissolved* d?he defender 
c o n te n d e d  t h a t  th e  p u r s u e r  had n o t  brought anything 
"to the common p u r s e  b y  a c q u i s i t i o n  or o th e r w is e  
d u r in g  t h e  s u b s i s t e n c e  of the marriage"* and that 
sh e  had no claim for l u s  r e l i o t ÿ e ,  t e r c e *  o r  u n d e r  
any other head#
I n  r e c l a im in g  a g a i n s t  the decision of t h e  Lord 
Ordinary* the p u r s u e r  cited t h e  uccesaful a rg u m en t 
o f  the p u r s u e r  In Thomson v* Donald E x e c u to r ^ .
Her c o u n s e l  did not insist i n  th e  claim for 
conventional provisions* and t h e  decision of the 
case t u r n e d  u p o n  h e r  right* i f  such it be* to her 
legal provisions uponT d iv o r o e  #
I t  is clear fro m  t h e  lord Ordinary's note that
he felt that* i n  a case of misconduct b y  both parties 
leading to divorce* "To hold *.# that an exact count 
an d  r e c k o n in g  s h o u ld  t& ke p l a c e  so  t h a t  e a c h  o f  t h e  
guilty parties may b e  d e a l t  w i th  as they stood when 
the marriage was entered into* is p l a i n l y  an
i n a d m i s s i b l e  course* incapable of extrication* and
inconsistent /
1 .  (1 8 7 1 )  9  Haoph# 1069#
472*
i& o o m s is te n t  a l i k e  w i th  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  p r lm o lp lo # " *
B o r  d i d  h i e  D o rd e h lp  f e e l  t h a t  a  s o l u t i o n  c o u ld  
t u r n  o n  p r i o r i t y  l a  g u i l t #  E l s  oom oluelom  w as t h a t  
t h e  a i d  o f  t h e  law  w i th  r e f e r e a o o  t o  t h e i r '  
p a tr lm o a i& l  r i g h t o  s h o u ld  m ot b e  g iv e n  t o  e i t h e r *
H ie  l o r d s h i p  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  d o m ia l w as q u i t e  f& lr*
B o th  p a r t i e s  w e re  l o e i n g  & p o t e n t i a l  r i g h t  t o  
p r o p e r t y  ( t h e  w ife  w as lo e im g  a  p o t e n t i a l  r i g h t  
t o  t e r o e  an d  l u s  a a d  t h e  h u a b a n d  waa
l o a i u g  am a o tu & l amd & p o te m ti& l r i g h t  ( t o  t h a t  
p r o p e r t y  b r o u g h t  t o  W #* o r#  om# m&ppoeee# properly  
a p e a k ln g  (o th e rw & ao ) b ro u g h t  t o  him#
im a r it i*  ao d  t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  o o u r t e e y )  a n d  h e  expl&l&&& 
ow&y p o s s i b l e  u a f a i r a e e e  i a  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a t e  o f  
a c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  helom glm g t o  e&oh a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  
d iv o r c e  ( t h a t  I s #  t h a t  t h e  w i f e  m ig h t h a v e  l i t t l e  o r  
mo h e r i t a g e  o r  m ov eab le#  n o r  p ro e p e & t o f  a G q u iriB g  
such#  w h i le  t h e  huebam d m ig h t p o e e e a e  b o t h  I n  l a r g e  
m easu re#  t h a t  t h e  w i f e  m ig h t  ho  l e f t  d e s t i t u t e  a&& 
t h e  huaha& d h e  l e f t  i n  t h e  e x o lu B iv e  e n jo y m e n t o f  
t h e  good# ( a l r e a d y )  im  Gommu&lOB# &&& t h e  w ho le  o f  
h i #  h e r i t a g e *  f r e e d  a l i k e  from  t e r o e  amd l u a  r e l i o t & e ) 
b y  t h e  e x t r e m e ly  d o u b t f u l  r a t lo u a l i& & tlo m  t h a t  i n  
a n o th e r  G&#e# t h e  p o s i t i o n  m ig h t w e l l  b e  r e v e r s e d #  
an d  t h e  h u sb a n d  b e  r e n d e r e d  d e s t i t u t e *
#po& t h e  ol& im  f o r  h a l f  o f  t h e  good# i n  communion* 
h l a  L o rd s h ip  q u o te d  l o r d  O u r r l e h i l l  i n  M u irh e ad  v* 
H u irh e a d " #  p & o te r# ^  a a  f o l lo w s * -  "vo m uet g u a rd  
a g a lB o t  b e in g  m is le d  b y  t h e  m anner i& w h ic h  t h e  
e x p r e a a io n  "wmmu&lo bomorum" l a  o o o a s lo m a lly  ma&e 
u s e  /
i *  On th e  o t h e r  hand#  w here  v ie w s  on  p r o p e r t y  w ere  a a t a g a n iB t l e  t o  oom muulty# #&& v ie w s  o n  m iso o n d u o t d is a p p r o v in g *  one m ig h t h a v e  th o u g h t  i n  im tem m m  à  s u i t a b l e  s o l u t io n #  H oW ver#  im e liaw w o u lo  n o t  l e n d  i t #  a i d  t o  e f f e c t  t h i s *  a ,  (1B&7) e  H&oph* s@ ,at 1^99.
use from which am idea appears to h$v% mrl^ em that the## war## demote a f##â a kind ofpertmorahlp ocpltal* of which the hmebgmâ le merely th# edmlnlotrmtw for behoof of hie wife emâ ehllêroa* ms well ms h&meolf* Dhqmwhlommh&y* th# wife mod ohlldrem hevo ultimate Imteromto of/very groat 1& the off#### of $h# family* hu# during the merrlm## he 1# $b#8lu&e t#m%ÊK4em0vwhâo eetmto* with umliml### peweme of It lehie death #hm# emy #f the proT^ t^y #mk#eplmee* emd tha# which them forme the ofW^kvia&Lem jLe &WLe #^8&e%0&^y *#&###%»$ <&n#*dWr;'t' ed^i&e %du&o# iN&ol#
g o a tl l  <l$3Ëüh mawK u%w&#r #3k3 lam# %w&feam& #&w& 
rgwHj oT 2%#w,dp* ##%> 0%Kw&e $a& *gwümm%œdW2m*'
td&e
##g&# ]^woMe#e 3Ü& %r* i&e&w&ld*#
m&w»t %M9 ia& %&%&
d&eaar&h &w&â %%%&# #%&&@üU&g %Nw# a%& ta&#8# a&mg&Bml %K%good reaeom $# apply the rule wh&eh would ohtmlm where only the wife #%# guilty* thereby mllewimg the &%#&##& 
contirnæ. Ih #  w lfC *# Of IhOin o&mmmmion amâ to êra# the remte ef her heritage# B# though# #hm# %h# fair rule wma that 
B w d ^ È ^ # e h d m â d h ^ a l lo w # à  %# elm lm  mmy r i g h t  <&r imterem# in the esta## of #h# ether* # view ia harmony i^ iWb the deoielem Im the Imter $aa# Fm#s#r ha# dlfferlm# from it im #hm$ hie &o^ &#hip mo# emlythe hm# #%d&&veu##d to give effeot to it*A# #0 heritage* each mhoml# take full pooeeosioa of hi#/h#r own proper#!##* h^mra warn more difficulty mm #0 the gwd# imoommmmiom* wmlthemgh they are
:)M -peA y  /
1* ea9h&üi% aêâ#& ,2* (1871) 9 Ha%h# 10&9#
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p r o p e r t y  I n  w h ic h  t h e  sp o u s e e  h a v e  & oommon i n t e r e s t *  
end t h e  wife takes a b s o lu te  p o s s e s s io n  of t h e  half 
when a m a r r ia g e  is dis solved* t h e  right of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
during t h e  marriage* which belongs to the husband 
alone* i s  of so  exclusive a nature as to b e  almost 
equivalent t o  a r i g h t  o f  property in him* in as much 
as the whole goods may be expended and disposed of 
b y  him* o r  attached by h i s  c r e d i t o r s  for debt. A 
husband's right of administration* how ever*  i s  in 
t h i s  respect not m ore absolute than i t  i s  in regard 
to the rents of t h e  w i f e ' s  heritable e s t a t e *  which 
belong exclusively to t h e  husband d u r in g  the marriage* 
and h i s  r i g h t  t o  which may be attached by h i s  
creditors b y  adjudication* And as this r i g h t  so to 
deal with each depends s o l e l y  u pon  the jus; marlti 
w h ic h  comes to an end b y  the d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  the 
m a r r ia g e  * i t  appears to t h e  Lord O rd in a ry  that there 
i s  no sufficient g ro u n d  f o r  h o ld in g  t h a t  t h e  husband 
s h o u ld  b e  allowed to retain t h e  wife's s h a r e  of the 
goods i n  communion any m ore th a n  he would have b e e n  
t o  r e t a i n  t h e  r e n t s  o f  h e r  heritable estate in a case 
w here  * a s  here* the marriage has b e e n  d i s s o l v e d  i n  
consequence of t h e  guilty conduct o f  b o th " ^ *  T h is  
solution s u r e l y  w ou ld  be m ore l i k e l y  than t h e  other 
to find favour today)#
This* th e n *  i s  a  very slender, insubstantial and
unfair communion* u n w o rth y  of t h e  name* and deserving
o f  the cynicism with which i t  h a s  often been t r e a t e d .2Lord Kinloch stated in the Inner House decision* 
t h a t *  upon investigation* i t  became obvious t h a t  no  
such thing as a proper partnership or s o c i e t y  in 
marriage existed# "Emphatically the reverse has 
been /
1# N ote  t o  Interlocutor* r e p o r t e d  i b i d # a t  p.1074.2# Fraser v# W a lk e r (1872) 10 HacpKT^37 a t  p#847#"... we must not be led astray b y  a mere phrase * but must carefully inquire i n t o  w h a t the phrase has truly signified#*''
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been again and again held*" During the marriage* 
the husband was not merely administrator* but 
'dominus* of all moveable e s t a t e  belonging to 
both parties* "The wife is destitute o f  any 
right* The whole belongs to the husband* To 
call any part of the effects the wife's own during 
the subsistence o f  t h e  marriage is a l e g a l  solecism." 
'Gommunio bonorum* in the law of Scotland meant 
one* t h e  right of lus reliotae* and* two* the rights 
of s u c c e s s io n  of a predeceasing wife's legal 
representatives to one half of the moveable estate 
upon the later death of the husband* a r i g h t  removed 
b y  the Intestate Hove able Succession Act* 1855 
(itself repealed in full by t h e  Succession (Scotland) 
Act* 1964* s*54).
At any rate* even had there existed such-a 
communion as the wife envisaged* the Lord O rd in a ry  
did not approve the wife's claim for one half* I f  
sh e  alone had been the g u i l t y  party* sh e  would have 
had no cMm to h a l f *  on th e  allegation that it had 
b e e n  hers all along. Should it matter that in t h i s  
case not only she*  b u t  also her h u sb an d *  was g u i l t y ?  
(By t h e  same token* had th e  goods physically been 
within the possession and control of the wife* the 
h u s b a n d 's  claim to one half w ould  have r e q u i r e d  t o  
have been met b y  the same re s p o n s e *  since his wife's 
guilt did n o t  entitle him* as a guilty party also* 
to claim one h a l f .  The theory was that the remedy 
must be denied to b o th *  and a 'blinkered* view w as 
taken of the practical consequences # The important 
point * of course * was t h a t  t h e  balance of power lay 
t h e  other way). The Lord Ordinary felt t h a t  where 
there had been mutual misconduct* the claims of 
neither* as against the other* ought to be sustained. 
N e i th e r  party was awarded expenses*
According to L o rd  President (Inglis)^ there 
w o u ld  /
1 . a t p .642,
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would have been no d i f f i c u l t y  o r  n o v e l t y  had the
divorce n o t  b e e n  one i n  which decrees of divorce 
had b e e n  pronounced simultaneously against both 
spouses i n  one judgment on the grounds of the 
a d u l t e r y  of both spouses* I n  Stair* 1*4*20 are 
found these words -
"Marriage dissolved by  divorce* e i t h e r  upon 
wilful non-adherence (or wilful desertion)* or 
adultery* t h e  party injurer loseth all b e n e f i t  
a c c r u in g  th r o u g h  t h e  marriage (as is expressly 
provided by  th e  fore said A ct of P a r l ia m e n t*  1575* 
0 * 55$ concerning non-adherence)* but the party 
i n j u r e d  hath the same benefit as b y  t h e  spouse's 
n a t u r a l  death*" If a wife were t h e  innocent party* 
t h e n  she would be entitled either t o  h e r  conventional 
p r o v i s i o n s  or i f  there were no conventional 
provisions to l e g a l  provisions of teroe and 'lus 
reliotae*
The a rg u m e n t of counsel f o r  the wife was t h a t  
upon d i s s o l u t i o n  of th e  partnership* the goods of 
t h e  partnership had to be divided among the fo rm e r  
p a r t n e r s  * on the b a s i s  o f  the doctrine of the * commun: 
bonorum*. bnfortunat0ly* for our purposes* the Lord
President did not "think it necessary* in giving 
ju d g m en t i n  t h i s  case* t o  trace with an y  minute and 
jealous accuracy t h e  extent t o  which that doctrine 
has been adopted i n  our law*"^ He merely noted 
that i n  practice it meant that t h e  survivor wife is 
entitled to o ne  t h i r d  o r  one half* d e p e n d in g  on  the 
presence o r  absence of c h i l d r e n ,  o f  the husband's 
moveable estate, or o f  his free executry* ' jure 
reliotae * » He conc3uded that* i f  the wife's c la im  
succeeded /
1# I t  w o u ld  appear t h a t *  if there were conventional provisions, t h e  innocent party would take both conventional and legal provisions! Walken* p * 2 )0 ; 0# & We* p.540#2# p . 8 4 5 .
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stioceeded* she would he talcing benefit from the 
marriage and its dissolution* since the goods i n  
communion were in fact her husband's personal estate* 
and such benefit was not available to the g u i l t y  
party in a divorce action* (She w as the g u i l t y  
party only i n  her husband's action* of course)*
The claims of the divorcing were extinguished b y  the 
acquisition o f  the status of the divorced* This was 
true o f  both spouses* but f e l l  harder o n  the wife*
The Lord President'^noted the novelty of the questions 
initially the w if e  had sought conventional provisions 
arising from a postnuptial contract* as if the 
husband had died* Thereafter she sought in the 
alternative for her legal provisions of terce and 
j u s  reliotae* confining her a rg u m en t mainly to the 
latter* probably because the h u sb a n d  had little 
heritable property* I n  Donald* Lord Mure h%d 
p ro n o u n c e d  in favour of such a claim* L o rd  Ormidaie 
in this case had taken the opposite view* "We are 
c a l l e d  u p o n  to c o n s id e r  the question for the first 
time * "
A great w e ak n e ss  i n  t h e  wife's case w as that it 
d id  not appear that before marriage she had had any 
great fortune * and she had brought little * if anything, 
to the s to c k  of the marriag;e, "Her c la im  now is for 
her s h a r e  o f  the p r o p e r t y  and funds said to belong to 
both spouses during the marriage* but not s a i d  to 
have b e e n  previously her own* or to have been brought 
b y  her into the mutual stock* T h is  claim r e s o l v e s  
i n t o  a demand for some right an d  interest arising to 
her a s  a  w if e  i n  respect of the marriage# Such a 
claim on the part of a w if e  divorced for a d u l t e r y  I s  
n o t  well fo u n d e d # " ^  It takes an enlightened age to 
apportion /
1 *  p*842*2* per I,* Ardmillan at p#844'*
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a p p o r t i o n  p r o p e r ty *  n o t  o n ly  w i th o u t  r e f e r e n o e  t o  
c o n d u c t  * b u t  also w ith o u t  reference t o  contribution*
The p r o p e r t y  aspects of the decree of divorce* 
as t h e  grounds of divorce widened (to i n c lu d e  cruelty* 
d e s e r t i o n *  end  sodomy and bestiality)* was assimilated, 
i n  every case except that of divorce for incurable 
I n s a n i ty *  t o  that which obtained upon grant of decree 
of divorce on the g ro u n d  of adultery# ^
Before 1964* the in n o c e n t  wife might claim iue 
r e l i o t a e  and  t e r c e *  t h e  in n o c e n t  h u sb a n d  m i ^ t  
claim c o u r t e s y  o n ly *  s in c e  b y  th e  M#W#P# (8 c # )  Act* 
1881* 0 *6 * which introduced i n t o  the law the lus 
^^ elictl right for a surviving husband equivalent to 
the common law ,1ub reliotae right for surviving wives* 
the right was made exigible o n ly  i n  the case of 
death* n o t  divorce#^ The in n o c e n t  party* whether 
husband or w ife *  could claim also any conventional 
p r o v i s i o n  w h ic h  w ou ld  have b e e n  exigible had the 
d e a th  of th e  g u i l t y  p a r t y  occurred# The o t h e r  
f o r f e i t e d  ( h i s )  marriage contract rights#^ D e cre e  
did not have the effect of b r i n g in g  i n t o  operation 
m a r r i a g e - G o n t r a c t  p r o v i s i o n s  in favour of " s u r v iv in g  
c h i l d r e n "
An odd e f f e c t  w h ic h  divorce had u p o n  a wife 
b u t  n o t  a h u sb a n d  guilty of a d u l t e r y  w h e re  the
paramour w as nam ed and where sh e  "married" (for su c h  
marriages strictly w ere  null) or openly cohabited 
w i th  the p a ra m o u r w as a restriction upon  her ability 
to alienate her heritage to any person ("husband" 
o r  second family) in prejudice of the i s s u e  of the 
m a rrj.a g e  /
1# Divorce (Scotland) Act* 1938* a,2(1),2# See Mdington v# R o b e r ts o n  (1895) 22 R#4gO#5# S e e  Walton* p#230 and c a s e s  there cited*4# See Dawson V* Smart (1903) 5F#(H*L,)24; sequel* S a v i n 's  T rs#  v# W a lk e r 's  T rs#  (1907) 15 S.L*T*681 #
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The Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976, a*1 "contains 
t h e  whole statute law on the grounds of divorce in 
any action for divorce commenced after January 1, 
1 9 7 7 " and s#5 permits either party to the marriage 
to apply to the court f o r  an order of payment of 
periodical allowance and/or paym ent o f  capital sum 
and/or variation of the terms of any s e t t l e m e n t  made 
in contemplation of or during the marriage b o  far 
as talcing effect on or after the termination of the 
marriage. Previously divorce granted on t h e  ground 
of i n c u r a b l e  insanity had been treated a s  a special 
case^ but t h i s  i s  no longer so* Such circumstances 
would fall u n d e r  t h e  head of s.1(2)(b) (behaviour 
such that pursuer cannot reasonably be expected to 
cohabit w i th  the d e f e n d e r ,  whether the behaviour 
arise from mental abnormality or not, and whether 
the behaviour has been active or passive) and the 
court's d i s c r e t i o n  in the matter of p r o p e r t y  
regulation, given by a.5* i s  wide*^ The Act d o e s  
not apply to dissolution of marriage on  th e  g ro u n d  
of /
1# "The Divorce (Scotland) Act. 1976”, B* M. Olive General Note upon s.1 (p.lO).2. See e.g. 0. & V. pp.561-2* The court might make such order, if any, a s  i t  thought fit, having regard to the respective means of the parties, of a capital sum or periodical allowance to b e  made by either to o r  for behoof of t h e  other or of any children. Professor O liv e  notes that the Act d id  not expressly empower the court to award both*3* The matter h a d  been regulated by t h e  D iv o rc e(Scotland) Act, 1938, 8 8 .2  and 3, as amended b y  the Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1964, s.7« In the case of incurable insanity divorce only, it seemed t h a t  t h e  remedies provided by the Succession (Sc,) Act, 1964, n a m e ly , awards of capital sum and periodical allowance, were alternative an d  mutually exclusive (Me at on, p.100) Divorce ( S o . )  Act, 1964, 8.7 ^ vpu3?t order o f  payment by  either marriage partner o r  his/her executors of a capital sum or periodical allowance for behoof of t h e  other partner or of any c h i l d r e n  of the marriage.
o f  p resu m ed  d e a th #  n o r#  a f  o o u reo #  t o  c a s e a  o f  
m f l l i t y  o f  m a r r l a g o .
Tho S uooeao lom  (a o o t la m d )  A ot# 1 9 #  g a v e  
fo rm  t o  a  o o n s M o r a b lo  c h an g e  o f  a t t i t u d e  w i t hmr e g a r d  b o th  t o  r i ^ t a  o f  B uoo o o a lo #  a n d  t o  
p r o p e r t y  am lo e  o n  d iv o ro o #  l a  t e m a  o f  8 * 2 5 ( 1 ) ( a ) $  
t h e  p u r s u e r  m ig h t a p p ly  t o  t h e  c o u r t  f o r  o r d e r  o f  
pay m en t o f  a  o a p l t a l  m m  a m d /o r  o f  a  p e r i o d l o a l  
m llo w a w o #  and#  u n d e r  a * 2 $ ( 1 ) ( b ) $  e i t h e r  p a r t y  
m l # i t  a p p ly  t o  t h e  c o u r t  f o r  am o r d e r  v a r y i n g  th o s e  
te rm #  of m y  aato-wptlal o r  poaWmptlal oottlemmt 
#%iOh w e re  t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  u p o n  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m a r r ia g e #
The 1964  A c t ( a # 2 6 ( 2 ) )  d l r e o t e d  t h e  c o u r t ,  l a  
I t e  t r e a tm e n t  o f  a p p l l o a t l o a s  im d e r  8 # 2 6 ( 1 ) ( a )  o r  
( h ) #  t o  h a v e  r e g a r d  t o  " th e  r a e p a o t l v e  m e a w  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e #  t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  a n d  t o  a l l  t h e  e l r c im s t a a o e a  
o f  t h e  o a ae * * * "  T he c o u r t  a  h a v e  b e e n  d l a l a o l l a e d  
t o  a t a t e  l a  e p e e l f l e  te r m s  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
p a y e r 's  a a a e t a  w M eh m l# i t  b e  th o a g g it t o  b e  a  a u l t a b l e  
a t a r t i a g - p o l a t  f o r  d l e o u a e lo a  l a  th e  g e n e r a l  a a e e #
Iio rd  E u a te r ^  to o k  t h e  v ie w  t h a t  t h e  p r e - e x l e t i a g  l # f  
G ould  n o t  b e  ta k e n  me a  b a s i e  f o r  h o ld in g  a a  a  g e n e r a l  
p r l a o l p l e  t h a t  e i t h e r  ome t h i r d  ( d e f e n d e r  *e a rg im e n t )  
o r  one  h a l f  ( p u r a u e r 'a  e u g g e e tlo n #  a t  o n e  s t a g e  o f  
h i e  a rg u m e n t)  o f  t h e  ( d e f e n d e r 'e )  a a e e t e  s h o u ld  
o o n e t l t u t e  t h e  c a p i t a l  a im  aw ard# " T h e re  d o e s  n o t  
a p p e a r  t o  me t o  b e  a n y  e s c a p e  fro m  t h e  v ie w  t h a t  Im 
t l i e  e n d  o f  t h e  d a y  e a c h  o a e e  m uat b e  d e c id e d  on  i t s  
own o lro im ato m o o e# " '^  %n t h e  r e s u l t ,  h o w e v e r , a  
c a p i t a l  /
1# Boo P re e u m p tlo a  o f  L i f e  L im i t a t i o n  (8 o # )  A c t ,  
1977  ( C h a p te r  7  ) - 2# i n f5# m i l o W  V# C# a#L .T #  (N o te s )  92  a t  p*95#
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capital a m  r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  proportion b e tw e e n  one
t h i r d  and one half of the husband's assets was 
made over to the wife, together with an  award o f  
weekly aliment for the child. The parties had 
agreed that a capital paym ent was appropriate*
I t  was emphasised b y  Lord Hunter that t h e  defender's 
p r im a r y  financial obligations were the p u r s u e r  and 
the child of the marriage and that, in his view, 
one of the objects of the new provisions of the 
1964 Act was to make the enforcement of the first 
of these a r e a l i t y #  " I f ,  as seems l i k e l y ,  the 
defender f i n d s  i t  difficult to support two households 
the rem edy  lies i n  his own h a n d s .
pIn Robertson v# Robertson where the defender, 
a  b o o k m ak er, had a s s e t s  o f  £ 2 1 ,0 0 0 ,  Lord Johnston 
awarded a capital sum of £7,000 and a periodical 
payment of £ 1 ,2 0 0  p.a* to the pursuer. Here, 
capital and income were c l o s e l y  linked, as would be 
the case w i t h  a p u b l i c a n 's  business, or i n  any  
situation where "the defender's capital i s  largely 
t i e d  up in h i s  b u s i n e s s  premises and ... any 
substantial call on his capital w ould  require to be 
met by the sale of the business premises or by a  
loan w i th  a consequent reduction in his income*"*^
The traditional v ie w  w as taken, namely, that t h e  
(innocent) pursuer has a right to retain, after 
divorce, t h e  standard of life permitted and provided 
b y  the marriage. "The periodical payment, the 
interest on t h e  capital sum and her own earnings or 
potential earnings w i l l  enable h e r  t o  enjoy a standard 
of l i v i n g  comparable to that which the d e f e n d e r  enjoys 
and /
ruBWwm iw¥mi
1 ,  i b i a .2 .  S.L.QD. (N o te a )  7 8 .5 .  I b i d  «, p e r  Ii» J o im s to n  a t  p . 7 9 ; amd o f ,  N lo o l  ? n ,  1969  (N o te s )  6 7 .
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y]and which she enjoyed when they resided together*"
The standard of living had been relatively high; 
the husband had spent f r e e l y  on his w if e  and on 
himself#
E x t r a c t  decree in this case was suspended i n  
respect of £2,000 until three months had elapsed 
from date of decree and in respect of the remaining 
£5,000 u n t i l  twelve months from that date #
In an undefended case, the pursuer's averments 
as to income an d  standard of living, which the 
defender has not troubled to contradict, will usually 
form the basis of the judicial assessment "and 
diligence for the recovery of documents w i l l  normally 
be refused"^* but where there is obscurity or evasion 
or where the action is defended, a commission and 
diligence may be allowed#^ It may be that some 
documents will be subjected to the c o m m iss io n  and 
diligence, end some will n o t# ^
Where r e c o u r s e  has been had to c a p i t a l  i n  order 
to maintain a certain standard of living, this f a c t o r  
s h o u ld  be taken into account*^ A full and a c c u r a t e  
picture o f  t h e  financial circumstances of th e  marriage 
i s  sought* Lord K lB sen  i n  Hogg^ took the view that 
the terms of e*26(2) were v e r y  wide, and that he could 
have regard to the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  which led to the 
marriage* The wife had induced the defender to 
m a rry  /
1# p*79# L*Johnston agreed w ith  L.Hunter thatthere could be no fixed formula in the exercise of t h e  judicial discretion conferred by 8 ,2 6 ;  each case must b e  decided on its own circumstances*2 , Heston, p*102* (citing Gould v. G# 1966 S*L*T. 
1 3 1 ) .3 .  D o u g la s  V* D. 1966 8 .L .T *  (N o te s )  43*4* Galloway v# G* 1947 S.0*3301 Alexander v. A*
1957 8 .L ,T ,  2 9 8 .3* 1957 B.L.T* 298* See reasoning and detailed a r i t h m e t i c  of L. W heatley*
6 ,  1967 S .L .T *  (N o te s )  91*
4'84 «
marry h e r  through false allegations of pregnancy 
by  him, and the marriage had lasted only eight days 
(that is, until discovery b y  the husband of th e  
deceit). She concluded for a capital sum payment 
of £2,000 (her husband's assets at proof being £4,500) 
and for a periodical allowance of £6 per week. An 
allowance was refused but a capital sum award of 
£250 was made # I n  other c ir c u m s ta n c e s  he would 
have awarded a sum of £1,500# "The court must, 
in my view, have regard to the fact that the 
defender did not have what the law regards as 
"reasonable cause" for leaving the pursuer# That 
is the factor w h ic h  has influenced me in deciding 
to award a capital sum to her." However, the pursuer 
had used deception and "She was, to a l a r g e  extent, 
the authoress of t h e  desertion and of her own present 
position a s  a deserted w if e  * " Many would f e e l  that 
the husband had some cause for leaving, but the law 
held that i t  did not amount to reasonable cause, and 
t h e r e f o r e  "I am afraid that I m u s t ,  i n  all t h e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s, allow h e r  to profit from her ovm 
initial fraud on the defender but I think that the/Ip r o f i t  must b e  small" #
In te rm s  of e#26(1)(b), either party might apply 
to t h e  c o u r t  f o r  an order to v a r y  t h e  terms of any 
s e t t l e m e n t  made i n  contemplation of o r  during the 
marriage, so far as t a k i n g  effect on o r  after the 
termination of the marriage and again (s.26(2)), 
where application was made under s *26(1) (a) or (b) 
the court is directed to make such order, if any, 
as i t  t h i n k s  fit, having regard to the r e s p e c t i v e  
means /
1. at p#92* See 0. & ¥* p*498« See also Hastings 
V* È * , 1941 S .L .T .  323*
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m im m w  o f  s tm a o im tln g  th e  d l f f l o u l t l w  I n  
e n f w o ln g  cm o r d e r  f o r  m p e r i o d i c a l
Amy o r d e r  f o r  p e y w m t o f  a  p e r i o d i c a l  
a llo w e n o e ^  a h o u M  o e a e e  t o  h a v e  o f f o o t  on t h e  
r e m a r r i a g e  o r  o f  t h e  p u r m e r ,  o z o e p t  im
r e l a t i o n  t o  a n y  w m a r a  à w  u M e r  i t  o n  t h e  d a te  
o f  m o h  ovem t (8 * % (5 ) )$ . W here t h e  p a y e r  
p ro d e o e a e e d  t h e  p a y e e ,  t h e  l a t t e r  ml0% t lo o k  f o r  
P ! ^ e n t  t o  t h e  p a y e r* #  w e o m to r#  I t  l a  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t h i s  eham ge i n  o l r o im a tm o e a  m i# k t j u s t i f y  
a n  a p p l i e a t io m  u n d e r  e » 2 6 (4 )  f o r  v a r i a t i o n  o r  re o a l)* , 
made h y  t h e  p a y e e  o r  h y  t h e  m ce o u to ra  o f  t h e  d e e e a e e d  
p a y e r*  And e e #  O l iv e  and  W ile o n , p * $4$  ( " In e u rm m e  
o r  p e n s io n  f tm d a  f a l l i n g  i n t o  h e r  m s -h w h a m d 'a  
e s t a t e  on  h i e  d e a th " ) #  ( $ l a o e ,  l a  te r m s  o f  e # 2 6 ( 5 ) ,  
a n  o r d e r  f o r  a  p e r i o d i c a l  a l l w m o e  s h o u ld  o e m e  
%%pem t h e  d e a t h  o r  r w a ^ a r r l a #  o f  t h e  p u r m io r ,  t h e  
r e fe re m o o  t o  e x e c u to r  I n  a # 2 6 (4 )  m m t ho  t o  t h e  
e x e c u to r  o f  th e  d e fe n d e r*  @ee M eo to a , p * i0 4 )*
"The d i r e o t i o a  t h a t  t h e  O o w t i s  t o  t a k e  i n t o  
a e o m m t t h e  r e e p w t l v e  m a w  o f  t h e  p a r t i e e  I n d l o a t e a  
t h a t  t h e  O o w t  may make m i aw ard  i f  t h e  h u eh an d  o m  
a f f o r d  i t  e v e n  i f  t h e  w if e  c o u ld  l i v e  w i th o u t  i t " # ^
T he p o e o l b i l i t y  o f  r e * # a r r i a g e  l o  r e l e v a n t ^ #
A«S.» p e r  L,
t h a t  i e . ww w v f # p o u o e #  (H e a to n , p * i v ^ /  $ c h ild re n *  s  r i g h t o  w o u ld  h e  u n a f f e c te d #  Ae t o  o f  r e v i v a l  & s e e  pp*10 4 -1 0 $ #  
v i g h t  V* a #  1965  g^#L#T# (m o te s )  5 9  ^ __ a i e  a t  p#  59.
0 w  0# & W#, P p * 5 5 7 /6 #  l a  3î:mglmid$ t h e  d i a t a a t e f k  p r a o t i o e  o f  amaeeam emt o f  a  w id o w 's  o h a n c e s  o f  reH m arrlm ge  w as a b o l l # i e d  t y  I(*R# ( H la o e l l# I T o v s * )  A ct*  1 9 7 1 ;  8 * 4 (1 )  -  ^  '  '" "O lro im e  ta a o e o  "
o lro u m s ta n e e s #  I t  w o u ld  n o t  n o r m a l ly  I n o l u d e ,I, t h e  p a r s i m r 'a  a p p e a ra n c e  o r  oharm *"
k#J# U f# 0# & W#,ed  t o  r e l e v a n t
487-
1In Hiool the wife sought a capital sum award
of £1000 and £6 per week as a periodical allowance* 
Judicial attention was paid to the fact that the 
husband's business as a publican had been built up 
b y  the joint efforts of the spouses* The wife 
received a capital sum award of £1000  and a 
periodical allowance of £4 per week* Today there 
i s  probably considerable general support for the 
view that a court should take account of non-finan.cial 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to family well-being o r  to the prosperity 
of a f a m i ly  business#'^ In Nicol, more might have 
been awarded to the wife (that is, one half (£2 ,7 0 0 ) 
of the value of the business) had not Lord Fraser 
been satisfied that the m aking  of such an aw ard   ^
would have compelled the defender to sell the business 
which w ould  n o t  have been in the Interests of the 
spouses or the children* The amount of the wife's 
award was determined by the amount Lord. Fraser 
thought the husband could raise by loan*^
The court i n  its calculations looks to gross 
e a r n in g s
N ot o n ly  m ean s, and needs, but a l s o  conduct i s  
s e e n  to b e  a  relevant c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  the cases 
which followed t h e  Act* In Turner^ a capital sum 
w as awarded but no periodical allowance* L o rd  
Thomson c o n s id e r e d  that the wife's lack of 
consideration/
1* 1969  8*L*T* (N o te s )  67*2* See discussion infra (post 1976) and of* specific English proviaionT’ Batrimonial C a u se s  Act, 1973, 6 , 25( 1 )*3* of* g e n e r a l l y  Robertson v* R# 1967 S*L*T* (Notes) 78, and Patterson v* P* 1966 B*L#T* (Notes) 20#
4 .  G ray  v ,  G* 1968 8 * L ,T , 2 5 4 , 8 e e  C , & ¥ * ,  p ,5 5 0 *5* 1973 8 ,L ,T ,  (N o te s )  2 ; s e e  a l s o  H ogg, s u p r a ,and Thomson v, T. 1966 S*L*T* (N o te s )  4 9 l % o s s -  actions of divorce, b o th  of which w ere  s u o o e s s f u l*  t h e  allowance otherwise due to the wife was halved (Xi# Kxssen)*)*
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consideration, petulance and "extravagance of 
character" h a d  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  b reakdow n  of t h e  
marriage* However, in Gray , the Lord O rd in a ry  
made no deduction in respect of the wife's isolated 
act of adultery and this point, among others, was 
upheld on appeal* "The statute does not contemplate 
that the Court will penalise either of the spouses on 
the g ro u n d  that they have co m m itted  adultery ox* any 
o t h e r  matrimonial offence* The Lord O rd in a ry  
u n d o u b te d ly  took what the w ife  had done into account 
and properly did so, as it warn a circumstance w i t h in  
the meaning of the subsection, but he made i t  plain 
that in the circumstances of this case he did not 
consider that there was any reason for m aking  any 
deduction in respect o f  i t .  He was manifestly 
e n t i t l e d  in t h e  light of the discretion conferred 
upon him by the statute to take that view". (L*P*
( O l y a e ) ) ^ ,
As in the case of awards of aliment, appeals 
on quantum are not looked on ifith favour* In Gray, 
supra.* Lord Oameron stated that " T he determination 
o f  the amount of any award of periodical payment o r  
of a capital sum Is again essentially a m a t t e r  f o r  
the discretion o f  the Lord Ordinary, a s  indeed is 
the issue o f  w h e th e r  o r  not any o r d e r  is to be made 
at all*"^ The L o rd  Ordinary's award was not open 
to attack " m e re ly  on the grounds that it e r r s  either 
on t h e  side of excess o r  o f  niggardliness." It 
would be o th e r w is e  if it could be shown t h a t  the 
L o rd  Ordinary had misdirected h im s e l f  in law o r  had 
f a i l e d  /
1 .  1968  8 * 0 * 1 8 5 , 1968 8 ,L * T .2 5 4 . The c a s e  camebefore L .O . (Hunter) and on appeal before theF i r s t  D iv is io n *  The r e p o r t  narrates b o th  
d e c i s i o n s  *2 .  1968 8 .L .T .  a t  p . 257#3 .  1968 8 .L .T .  a t  p * 2 6 0 .
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failed to taîca into a o o o im t what was relevant or
had taken into aoconnt irrelevant or improper
considerations or (Lord Guthrie ) had reached a1 Pm anifestly inequitable resu lt*  * *
W here t h e  p arties have reached agreement as 
to  the terms of a settlem ent, th is  u su a lly  w il l  be 
accepted by the court although o f course i t  need 
not be a c c e p te d
Anti-Avoidance /
1* See Olive &, Wilson, p * 5 5 7 , where relevant passages of the judgments are set out*2* And see recent case of HcEae v* McRae 1979 S*L*T*(Notes) 45, in  which the court rejected  the husband's argument that the cap ita l sum award o f  £6,000  was "m anifestly inequitable"* Hie to ta l  cap ita l  amounted to  £11,000# L*P*Clyde's views in  Gray were c ite d , as were L .G u t h r i e 's  t e s t s  (that Is", ' that in terference was ju s t if ie d  only i f  the 1*0$ had m isdirected him self in  law, or had fa ile d  to  t a k e  in to  account a relevant and m aterial fac tor , or had reached a re su lt  which was m anifestly  inequitable ) * I t  had been suggested for thehusband that a "normal" award would be in  the range of one third/one h a lf of the payer's cap ita l  unless there were sp ec ia l oiroumatancea and that the court should approve that approach and should in d icate in  some way the weight to be given to  various sp ec ia l circumstances w h ic h  might ju s t ify  an award outside that .range* I t  was stated  t h a t  i t  was not for the (appeal) court "to seek so to  se t  lim its  to , or otherwise to f e t t e r ,  the wide d iscretion  given by sta tu te  to the judge o f  f i r s t  in stan ce•"In this case, the award am ounted  to the paym en t to 
t h e  wife of two-thirds of the difference b e tw e e n  h e r  capital and that of h e r  husband* Of* approach advocated i n  Chapter 7*3* 0# & ¥*, p .556*4* See r e c e n t  case of Dunbar v . D* 1977 S*Ii*T*169,c ite d  by Professor Clive in " F i n a n c i a l  Provision on Divorce", 1#M* Olivo 1979 S*L*T*165, i n  w h ic h  three years a fte r  an award of period ica l allowance on divorce had been made to  the w ife , the p arties agreed to have the entitlem ent commuted to  a sum of £2,000  in  discharge* Subsequently t h e  w ife attempted to  r e d u c e  the a g re e m e n t as incompetent but fa iled*"This c a s e  d e a l t  w i th  the d i s c h a r g e  of an existing right to a periodical a llo w a n c e  already awarded but the same principles would apply to a discharge 
o f  /
In term# o f oppliomtlom had been
made fo r  a ca p ita l BW m #/#r peri,o#loal mllewwoe 
ward* or fo r  p eriod ica l a llovm oe a fte r  d ivorce, 
or fo r  va ria tio n  or ro o a ll o f a porloâiem l allow m oa, 
the pmmwr  ^ ^hü, a# m y $ iw  W fore # #  explm tlom  
o f cm  year r, , # $  dlapoeol o f mmh a##^Iloa%lon, 
o^ply te  the Oourt o f Boemlw for m  order r o # o la g  
or varying m y aettlememt or dlepom ltion o f property 
bolo% ln$ $o the defoM or mf%â# by him 1%. fwouaz o f  
any th ird  pm?ty at m y t l w  a fte r  the date ooowrlm$ 
year# W foro tW  mklmg o f the prlmolpal 
applloatlom  (th a t l e ,  a m*B6(l)(a) w  a#25(3) or 
##26(4) a p p llo a tlm ) w  the defender
fmm #%y meh eew im em t or d l# e# ltlem *  or
trammferrlM# eut o f tw  jw lM le t lm  o f the oew ig, or 
otWrc^lae dealing w ith , m y property helm glm g to  the 
defender# The m itrt might make mmh order 
i f  I t  ehewi to  i t s  m atiofactlm  tM t the 
or was made or was mhotit to  he mde,. or
t h a t  t h e  p m p e r t y  woe a b o u t  t o  h a  t r m o f e r r e d  o r  
o th e r t f i a e  d e a l t  w lt^ *  p r i m a r i l y  f o r  'th e  pw poam  o f  
d e f e a t i n g ,  w W lly  o r  p a r t l y ,  m y  c la im  w hich. th<$ 
p w auw  had made or might mW# imâer a#26(1)(%) or 
b * 2 6 < 3 )  W  ( 4 ) * ^
T h ir d  /
o f  e laim m  f o r  flm A nolm l p m v im lo a  g7%nt@d M f o r o  a  d iv e r o o "  w t e e  3 r o f e u s o r  01iv3& p * i6 9  (W ,m#Eoe m m tio m  o f  T"l%:i;on v# M# |1979] 1 -M l i n  w h ic h  I t  wag: h o M  t f m t  t w  o o w t  jj# e m  an hody  im  a  f l D r 'l  a w a rd , n o t  m h j e o t  t o  v a r l a t i m i ,  rni 'b ,. o o iu m t r^ a o h e d  heW eezt t h e  p a r t i e s #  S e e ,  on  # i i e  *#me# No*22
gmd F a w l t y  ' ,1# B-w ( .^ c n e m ily  Jv > b aa tm e  v#  J *  1 # ?  3 * o * i # ,  i n  w h W i a  w i f e ,  hm rlm g m m e lu d e â  f o r  a  c a p i t a l  aw ard  tm d w  e # B 6 (1 )^ a )$  m o u # it i n t e r d i c t  u n d e r  a i$ a la a t  h e r  h im h m d 'n  tlo a Z in g  w i th  a  e w  o f  momoy w3jieh# #iO  w e rrO ti; , W  had  r e c e iv e d  a s  df'3ia)%oa# The h e r d  O r^ iim ry  ( M l l l i m u )  r e f u s e d  h e r  a D p l l e a t i m  f o r  ln te % :d lo t ,  om t h e  S em la  # i a t  i t  /
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m hm M  m et p r e jW M e  t W  r l # i W  ( I f  m y )  im  
p r o p e r l y  o f  a # *  # w m m  # w  h u d  Im  # o &  f m i #  
w ^ q u im d  I t  w  amy o f  i t  f r m  # e  d e f e n d e r  f o r
I t  WB0 p r c m u tw e ,  a l a c e  aW  h a d  mot 3%Yb 0mW )3iGh''^d W r t#  a mmltml mm# Om appozil, i th e l d  t l u t  a  # * 2 7 (1  )(% ) o m p c tm ika t  w#y a f% w  a  $ # #  hafl bW^u f^ndo#mnJ # 0  e w ls y  o f m é year a fb w  # #  dlupjoalo f  t h e  e .E G  w as{P^mxtoâ#pAv L *J#01* -  #n  a p p l i c a t i o no :% 0)J I V, r*i ' ; cv^h >k‘‘ q t'
qn Umorec o f  divvT'X) U$ p rounuuo##*  I t  e a m o t  v 'jrio ip  ox r o o H l lc d  o,fUar t M  d a t e  o f  d a o re o #  
m w  !*n th w m  m w  p r e v ie ! o n  f o r  % e  moM nf; o r  g r m u i n j  o f  #uob m  a f t e r  d a te *
p .ï,io tr4 tio u  f e r  u)\Y t'bV 'O u o .J  L i /  nw ^\ MU a p p l i c a t i o n *Be fn:a ‘H) :v  ^  ^ t i l t  d</V m uorco\ li'i b e  jfLq F/A.jj?,.‘j!r;q^ . a f  ^ .^In
befox 'o  d o c ro o  o f  d:l\,'X:iX'Oa, u jd  d iv o i^ #Iv wna.'ld be tno late for toof foot w  wWt hod already bow dloipoond of *#**#
T he a.p^>vappiatT(> t e  s@r m iW , wcaXi h e(a) # e  oatablWrUi^ of $reoMe of Jwo&'xio# (h)% 0  oonti^pdvAtloa d  th e  c t t ic o  l a  o a ^ c v  im d o a l  w iij)  t h e  rü \1 u o tW n  mnd ( a )  «
in to x d t 'o r h e : /  dcfO lu-v /.in v  i t f u 'r o e e i y  w i t h  d l v e r e e ,  xWiwüioijk poymmt# %f$ of w u m e #  the p w m  faille to oiew $h# flriiit fwoo, #he never r#ao&#e t h e  w e o M  o r  t h i r d " *  The KVOT%onte i n  t M
&o
$0% t w  bulfU'C'': oonvo$%len<io, i n t e r i m  I m to W ie tA c u M  b jB*2'/(1)(b) oea(ter#e& in terd iet*ooM crm^ podw tioa or vto\lub.l<u% o f any eettlam w t 01 d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  t è  #%#defoM èr muâe by hinn in  favm;r o f m y # ir d  #  m y  t i n e  W f o r o  t h e  d a t e  e c o w r i n ^  t h r e e  yf befom  the o f #m  %mâwe # m ( l ) ( # )  w  ( 3 )  o r  W #
t  t h e  sam e r e e e m l n g  m ee t ws)p].y t&
lo a tio D M #
1 .  c f .  L e s l i e  [1985 ]  I  C .1 .6 2 5 ;  w i f e  f a i l e d  t o  show th a t  p u r c h a se r s  ^  form er m at. home, a l l e g e d  t o  be f r i e n d s  o f
husband, were o t h e r  than  p u r c h a se r s  o f  good f a i t h /  And fo-r v a lu e  ( 1 9 7 6  A c t ,  S . 6 . ) .  (R e d u c t io n  o f  d i s p o s i t i o n  r e f u s e d .
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value, o r  who d e r iv e d  title to the property o r
any o f  i t  f ro m  any  person who had done so. (8 * 2 7 (2 )
proviGO),
The Act presupposed a traditional a p p ro a c h  to
the omershlp of property (that is, separate
o w n e rsh ip )*  The p in zau er m ig h t d e c l a r e  n o t  o n ly
t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d e r  w as a c t i n g  i n  t h e  m anner d e a o r ih e d ,
h u t  a l s o  t h a t  ( h e )  waa d la p o G ln g  o f  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e
ownership of the pursuer o r  t h e  o w n e rsh ip  of w h ich
was n o t  clear# No o p p o r tu n i ty  was given f o r  the
airing of disputes e x c e p t  w i th in  the context o f  a
8 * 2 7  c o m p la in t  concluding f o r  a 8 * 2 7  remedy.^
The Act laid upon the p u r s u e r  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of
timeous detection of potentially damaging actings#
However, t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  d id  supply the m a c h in e ry
w h ic h  a p a r t y  might use to prevent t h e  o c c u r r e n c e ,
or f r u s t r a t e  the e f f e c t *  o f  deals, a n t i c i p a t e d  o r
past, i n  f r a u d  of ( h i s )  c la im  under s#26(1)(a) or
8 * 2 6 (3 )  or (4)I and  th e y  fo rm ed  the b a s i s  of the
most recent p r o v i s i o n s  (Divorce ( S c o t la n d )  A ct* 1976$
8*6) c o n c e rn in g  t h i s  s u b je c t*  The c o u r t  * s  pow ers
are extended, though* i n  that it may o r d e r  reduction
or variation of settlements, or interdict* i f  it is
shown to t h e  court ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n  that t h e  a c t i n g s
wore carried out " w h o lly  or p a r t l y  for the purposePof defeating in whole or i n  p a r t  any claim ***" #
1* Contrast England; M*¥*P#Aat* 1882* s. 17 andMatrimonial P ro c e e d in g s  and Property Act* 1970*
8*37* Of course* t h e r e  are in the Soots law o f  
c o n t r a c t*  g u a s i - o o n t r a o t  and p r o p e r t y  some rules remedies and means of redress but often they seem only incidentally applicable to husband and wife.See generally 0# & ¥#* p.289 et seq*2* Professor Meston (p.105) remarked* " I t  may prove to be difficult to establish that a given transaction was primarily intended for this purpose# A great deal wHT%^ e n d  on how easily the court will be satisfied of the existence of this primary i n t e n t i o n " . On the other hand* gifts made to a bona f i d e  donee m j.ght be attacked, buFTf the donee"aoW eE T Z  good f a i t h  (a n d  even m ore t e l l i n g l y  one w ou ld  t h i n k  i f  
i t  /
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T h e  D i v o r c e  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t *  1 9 7 6  c a m e  i n t o  
e f f e c t  o n  l e t  J a n u a r y *  1 9 7 7 ^  a n d  i n  s e c t i o n  1 ( 1 )  
e n a c te d  t h a t  " th e  c o u r t  may g r a n t  d e c r e e  o f  d iv o r c e  
i f *  h u t  o n l y  i f *  I t  i s  e é t a b l i ahed  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i th  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  ** , t h a t  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
h a s  b ro k e n  d o w n  i r r e t r i e v a b l y "  # " I n  f a c t  w h a t  
t h e  c o u r t  h a s  t o  c o n s i d e r  i s  w h e th e r  o n e  o f  f i v e  
" f a c t s "  h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d #  I f  s o  i t  m u s t  g r a n t  
d iv o r c e * * * ;  i f  n o t  i t  m u s t  r e f u s e  d i v o r c e *  n o  
m a t t e r  how i r r e t r i e v a b l y  b ro k e n  down t h e  m a r r ia g e  
a p p e a r s  t o  b e * " ^  The f i v e  " f a c t s "  a r e  ( a )  a d u l t e r y ;
( b )  b e h a v io u r  a t  a n y  t im e  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  p u r s u e r  
c a n n o t  r e a s o n a b ly  b e  e x p e c te d  t o  c o h a b i t  w i th  th e  
d e f e n d e r  (w h e th e r  t h e  b e h a v io u r  h a s  o r  h a s  n o t  
r e s u l t e d  fro m  m e n ta l  a b n o r m a l i ty  an d  w h e th e r  t h e  
b e h a v io u r  h a s  b e e n  a c t i v e  o r  p a s s i v e )  ; ( c )  w i l f u l
d e s e r t i o n  w i th o u t  r e a s o n a b le  c a u s e  f o r  a  c o n tin u o u s  
p e r i o d  o f  two y e a r s ;  (d )  n o n - c o h a b i t a t i o n  f o r  a  
c o n t in u o u s  p e r i o d  o f  tw o y e a r s  im m e d ia te ly  p r e c e d in g  
t h e  b r i n g in g  o f  t h e  a c t i o n *  t h e  d e f e n d e r  c o n s e n t in g  
t o  d e c r e e ;  ( e )  n o n - c o h a b i t a t i o n  d u r in g  a  c o n t in u o u s  
p e r i o d  o f  f i v e  y e a r s  im m e d ia te ly  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  
b r i n g i n g  o f  t h e  a c t io n * ^
" N o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h a t  i r r e t r i e v a b l e  b reak d o w n
o f  /
i t  a p p e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  d o n o r  a c t e d  i n  g o o d  f a i t h )
" t h e  c i r c u m s ta n o e s  m a y  be  su c h  a s  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  w as n o t  p r i m a r i l y  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e  o f  d e f e a t i n g  c la im s * "  ( H e s t o n *  i b i d #)*
1 .  w i th  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  a  # 8  (Amendment o f  S h e r i f f
C o u r t s  ( C i v i l  J u r i s d i c t i o n  an d  P r o c e d u r e )  ( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1 9 6 3 ) *  w h ic h  came i n t o  e f f e c t  on 1 s t  
S e p t e m b e r *  1 9 7 6 .
2 #  " T h e  D iv o rc e  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t *  1 9 7 6 " *  E * M . O l i v e *  
p .  1 0 *  (O h a p te r  3 :  T h e  A ct a n n o t a t e d ) *
3 * s * 1 ( 2 ) ( a )  -  ( e ) *
4*94 '
o f  a  m a r r ia g e  h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  a n  a c t i o n
for divorce b y  reason of s u b s e c t io n  (2)(e) of 
this section, t h e  court s h e l l  not b e  b o und  to 
grant decree i n  that action if in the opinion of 
the court the grant of d e c re e  would result in 
grave financial hardship to the defender*
For the purposes of this subsection, hardship 
shall include the lose of the chance of a c q u i r in g  
any b e n e f i t , " ^
The provisions of greatest importance for the 
p u r p o s e s  o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  a r e  s e c t i o n s  5 (O rd e rs  
f o r  f i n a n c i a l■p r o v i s i o n )  and 6 (O rd e rs  relating to 
settlements and o t h e r  dealings)#
oI n  te rm s  o f  s#5$  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  m a rr ia g e *
i n  an  action for divorce* may apply to the c o u r t ,  at
any time b e f o r e  g r a n t  of decree* f o r  any one o r  more 
of the f o l lo w in g  o r d e r s  - (a) an  order for paym ent
t o  him o r  for h i s  b e n e f i t  of a periodical allowance; 
(b) a n  o r d e r  for paym ent to him o r  f o r  his benefit
o f  a capital sum; ( c )  an order varying t h e  terms of
any s e t t l e m e n t  made in contemplation of or during 
marriage so  far ae t a k i n g  effect on or after t h e  
termination of t h e  m a rr ia g e *
"Paym ent b y "  s h a l l  i n c lu d e  a  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
p aym en t out of an y  estate b e lo n g in g  t o  t h a t  p a r t y  
o r  h e ld  f o r  his benefit*
The c o u r t  on  g r a n t i n g  d e c r e e  s h a l l  make w i th
respect to  the application such order, if any* as 
i t  t h i n k s  f i t ,  " h a v in g  r e g a r d  t o  the respective 
m eans of the p a r t i e s  t o  the marriage, and to all 
t h e  o iro u m s to n o e s  o f  t h e  c a s e ,  i n c l u d i n g  any
settlement /
1 ,  8 . 1 ( 5 ) .2m emphasis added.
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s e t t l e m e n t  o r  o t h e r  a r ra n g e m e n ts  made f o r  f i n a n c i a lA pprovision for any child o f  t h e  marriage*“ *
Where an application for payment of a 
periodical allowance has been withdrawn or refused, 
o r  where no such application has been made, e i t h e r  
party^ to the marriage may apply to the court for 
such o r d e r  after the date of grant of decree if 
since that date there has been a change in the 
oircumstancos of e i t h e r  of the parties to t h e  
marriage I and the court shall make with r e s p e c t  t o  
that application su c h  order, if any, as it thinks 
fit, having regard to the factors mentioned above
further, any order for periodical allowance 
may, on application by or on behalf of e i t h e r  p a r t y  
t o  t h e  marriage (or his executor) on  a change of 
circumstances, be varied o r  recalled by a subsequent 
o r d e r I t  will be noted that the subsection refers 
o n ly  to orders f o r  payment of a periodical allowance*
"A capital sum can neither be applied for, n o r  varied, 
after the granting of decree of divorce#**®
On the death of the payer, the order shall continue 
t o  operate against (his) estate, subject to the above** 
mentioned provision concerning variation# On the 
death or re*-marriage of the payee, the order shall 
cease to have effect except In relation to arrears 
due u n d e r  it on the date of re**marrlage or doath**^
I t  /
1 ,  8 . 5 ( 2 ) .2* Any reference to a settlement shall be construed as 
i n c l u d i n g  a settlement b y  way of a policy of assurance to which the Harried Women  ^a Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act, 1880, s#2 applies; s#5(7)# (re­enacting Succession (Sc#) Act, 1964, s.26(7)).3# emphasis added*
4 .  8 * 5 ( 5 ) ,5# 8 * 5 (4 )*6* **Ihe D iv o rc e  (Scotland) Act, 1976*’, E*H.Olive, p . 25#7* 8*5(5), I’he wording seeks to clarify, rather thant o  alter, the law. (Olive, p*23) ’’T h e re  is no provision for i t  t o  revive on the d i s s o l u t i o n  of the payee's second marriage but, on principle, it w ould  do so, end with retrospective effect* were the second marriage declared v o i d  ab initio* (olive, ibid* ) And s e e  H e s to n ,  pp*1042T05%-------
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It can be seen that, in Professor Olive's 
words, "m in im al am endm ents to the law on financial 
provision on divorce" have been made*^ Clearly, 
now that, ostensibly, the notion of 'matrimonial 
offence* has been removed and that of * irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage* substituted, it w ould  be 
wrong to allow to continue the rule that o n ly  the 
pursuer i n  a divorce action might a p p ly  for financial 
provision* However, 8,5(6) provides that the pursuer, 
in a s,1(2)(d) or (e) divorce (that is, in t h e  oases 
of divorce f o l lo w in g  two year or five y e a r  non 
cohabitation), has a duty to inform t h e  defender of 
his right to apply for (a) financial provision and 
(b) an o r d e r  providing for the custody, maintenance 
and education of any child of the marriage* These 
categories of divorce contain no hint of moral blame, 
and Professor Ollve^ remarks that " T his subsection 
reveals once more the Act's hypocrisy in providing 
that there is only one g ro u n d  of divorce ##*, I n  
relation to adultery, intolerable behaviour and 
desertion the pursuer will not be bound to inform 
the d e f e n d e r  of t h e s e  rights * This is a clear 
differentiation b e tw e e n  fault and non-fault divorce*"
He notes that the c o u r t  is given no guidance about 
t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of an o r d e r  for financial provision 
nor i s  t h e r e  mention of specific factors t o  b e  taken 
into a c c o u n t ,  apart from t h e  m eans of t h e  parties 
and a r ra n g e m e n ts  made for financial provision for any 
child of the marriage, and r e f e r s  to 'the more 
fundamental review of the law' made in Scottish Law 
Commission's Memorandum Ho*22 (Aliment and Financial 
Provision) /
1# "The Divorce ( S c o t la n d )  Act, 1976", E ,M .O liv e , p*22,
2 .  I b id #  * p ,2 5
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1P r o v i8 la n ) ( 1 9 7 G )  * O oaâuo t o f  e i t h e r ,  o r  b o t h ,  
p a r t y  ( l e s  ) ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  re m a in s  a r e l e v a n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n *
The anti-avoidance proTieions are contained 
in 8*6, which re-enacts t h e  provisions of B*27 of 
the 1964 Act, with the Important am endm ent, a l r e a d y  
noted, that th e  c o u r t ' e p o w ers  t o  act arise if the 
settlement o r  d i s p o s i t i o n  made, or to b e  made, was 
effected " w h o lly  or p a r t l y "  ( a s  opposed to the 
S u c c e s s io n  (Scotland) Act’s "primarily") for the 
p u rp o s e  of defeating i n  whole o r  i n  part any claim 
f o r  financial provision w h ic h  h a s  been made or w h ich  
m ig h t b e  made. T h is  is an easier t e s t  t o  satisfy, 
and the c o u r t ’ s  a rm o u ry  therefore i s  strengthened 
and made more useful to the aggrieved pursuer*^ 
Application may be made w here  there has been a claim 
under 8*5 f o r  financial provision^ or w here  t h e r e  
has been brought b y  e i t h e r  p a r t y  t o  th e  marriage an  
action for separation and aliment, a d h e re n c e  and 
a l im e n t  o r  i n t e r i m  aliment, o r  w here  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  
" a n  application for variation of an award of aliment 
( o t h e r  t h a n  an interim award) in such an action w h ich  
h a s  b e e n  made by t h e  party of the marriage who h a s  
b r o u g h t  that a c t io n " ^ *  hence, "the court’s anti- 
a v o id a n c e  p o w ers  are extended .** to actions for 
s e p a r a t i o n  /
1* as to which, s e e  Chapter 4, and G lasgow  University Law Faculty Response to Memorandum*However, Professor Olive (Financial Provision on Divorce 1979 S*L*T. 165) notes that "any settlement o r  disposition of property" has been held not to include gifts of money (Maclean v* i1* 1976 8,L*T* 
8 6 )  w h ic h  opens "a great loophole in the anti- avoidance provisions" (p * 1 S 9 ) and refers (p.191) to the Scottish Law Oommisalon’s (Memo. Ho*22) suggestion to close it#5# that is, under s*5(1)(a) o r  (b), or a#5(5) or (4). 4# 0*6(1)(c)#
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G e p a r a t lo n  an d  a l i m e n t ,  a o t io n a  f o r  a d h e re n c e  and  
a l i m e n t ,  a c t io n #  f o r  i n t e r i m  a l im e n t  b e tw e e n  spouses, 
and applications f o r  variation of aliment i n  such 
a c t i o n s , " ^
Again, 8*7 m akes changes in the rules governing
t h e  law of a l i m e n t .  It shall be c o m p e te n t for thePcourt to g r a n t  decree for interim aliment if i t  is 
satisfied that the p a r t i e s  are not cohabiting with 
one another, and t h a t  the p u r s u e r  i s  unwilling to 
cohabit with the defender whether o r  not t h e  p u r s u e r  
has r e a s o n a b le  cause for not so  cohabiting b y  v i r t u e  
of the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  set o u t  in S*r1(2)(a)(b) or (o) 
of the 1976 Aot^f However, the court shall not 
g r a n t  decree, i n  circumstances where the pursuer 
d o e s  not have reasonable cause f o r  not cohabiting, 
i f  it i s  satisfied that t h e  defender i s  willing to 
cohabit with t h e  p u r s u e r #
This alleviates p ro b le m s  caused b y  the e a r l i e r  
requirement that, to obtain aliment, a spouse must 
b e  willing to a d h e re # ^
The /
1* O l i v e ,  i b i d * , p*24*2* Prof es sorO live points o u t  that the provision does not a p p ly  t o  applications for aliment pendent^ lite in an action for divorce, or to acHoniof separation and aliment, o r  to actions of adherence and aliment; it applies to actions for interim 
a l im e n t  # "Hor does it affect actions by  thirdparties* Thus a shopkeeper who has supplied awife with necessaries will still not be able to recover from the husband If she is unwilling, without reasonable cause, to adhere* The subsection, in short, does n o t  affect the right t o  aliments it merely extends one particular remedy*" Olive, ibid,, p*25* And see also g e n e r a l l y  "Anomalies in A lim e n t" ,  Alistair D* H & th ie , 1980  8*L *T*61,3* that is, for reasons of adultery; unreasonable behaviour; desertion*4# Bee generally, Chapter 4*
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The court is directed, in d e te r m in in g  the 
amount of aliment, if any, to he aw ard ed  i n  a 
d e c r e e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  and  a l i m e n t ,  a d h e re n c e  an d  
a l im e n t  o r  i n t e r i m  a l i m e n t ,  t o  h av e  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
factors m e n tio n e d  i n  6 ,5 ( 2 ) # ^  She same t e s t ,  such 
a s  it i s ,  i s  to h e  applied in actions f o r  separation 
a s  i n  a c t i o n s  for d i v o r c e , an d  conduct, therefore, 
i s  n o t  e x c lu d e d  a s  a relevant consideration#
I t  may he thought that the Scottish r u l e s  upon 
f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  are skeletal# There la no power 
t o  o r d e r  transfer of property, no d e t a i l e d  d i r e c t i o n  
to the court as to t h e  factors to h e  deem ed relevant 
t o  t h e  m ak ing  o f  a n  aw ard  o r  th e  w e ig h t  t o  h e  g iv e n  
to e a c h  factor*^
How has the"Court of S e s s io n  interpreted these 
m eagre  g u i d e l i n e s ?
Joseph Thomson^ n o te s  that Lord Brand i n  Gowie v#aOowie to o k  the very conservative v ie w  that t h e  
g r a n t i n g  to either party o f  a right to apply f o r  
financial p r o v i s i o n  was Intended to h e lp  defenders 
i n  s#1(3)(e) c a s e s  principally, and perhaps also 
d e f e n d e r s  in s*1(2)(d) cases* Even if defenders in 
other cases were entitled to apply, "their m a tr im o n ia l  
m is c o n d u c t  will he a r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r  i n  assessing the 
amount o f  financial p r o v is io n *
T h is  lead w as n o t  followed in t h e  principal 
point, and it has b e e n  accepted that defenders i n  
oases which previously would have been regarded as 
fault /
1 .  8 * 7 ( 2 ) ,2# "Fettered" d i s c r e t i o n s ,  however, are not n e c e s s a r i l y  desirable I c o n s i d e r  Faculty R esp o n se  to 8,1*0#
Memo, Ho.4 1  (fao# Reap* pp#2, and 18/19)*3* ’Financial Provision on  Divorce.Some Recent Oases* Joseph M* Thomson, 1979 8*L ,T *137*
4 .  1977 8 ,L ,T #  (H o te s )  14?*5* Thomson, ibid** p*137*
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fault cases i n  which the defender was t h e  offender 
may apply for provision; h o w e v e r, t h e  defender’s 
conduct has b e e n  held to be a relevant factor in 
assessing t h e  aise o f  a w a rd , although judges have 
d i f f e r e d  i n  the d e g re e  o f  importance which t h e y  
have ascribed to it# I t  may be that where t h e  
f a i l u r e  of t h e  marriage has been brought about 
largely by t h e  actings o r  a t t i t u d e  of one party, 
he/she - and a woman is more likely to be affected 
h e r e  - is not entitled to expect (her) standard of 
l i v i n g  to be as h ig h  as i t  would have been had the 
marriage c o n tin u e d # ^
pThomson cites the case of G la rk  as an 
illustration of how much easier would be the task 
o f  t h e  c o u r t  and how much more satisfactory th e  
r e s u l t  if the court had m ore flexible powers#
There it seems likely that Lord Stott refused to 
order the sale of the husband’s farm i n  order to 
provide the wife with a capital sum with w h ic h  to 
buy a b o a r d in g  house because to do so would be u n f a i r  
t o  t h e  husband rather than because the w if e  had 
committed adultery# "### a more j u s t  solution might 
have been achieved if the court had the p o w er to settle 
the property in such a way that the w if e  w o u ld  have 
had a share o f  the capital if t h e  farm was ever sold#"'^
Thomson advocates that since the theory is that 
the c o m m issio n  o f  a matrimonial offence is a sym ptom , 
not a cause, o f  the i r r e t r i e v a b l e  b reak d o w n  of a
marriage, no a c c o u n t should be taken of parties’ 
misconduct in matters of financial provision - or, 
at least, t h a t  conduct should be irrelevant w h ere  it 
appears that both spouses are e q u a l ly  t o  blame for 
t h e  /
1 ,  S e e  MaoRae v#  MacEae 1977  8#L#T# (H o te s )  72(L*0 #Dunpark), c i t e d  and explained b y  Thomsonat p#13B*2# 1978  8#L#T# (N o te s )  45#5* Thomson, ibid# p#138*
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the f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  marriage* la the present author’s 
opinion, one party may often he found t o  he more deep 
in g u i l t  than the o t h e r ,  whatever may he laid down 
as the philosophy o f  t h e  nation’s divorce laws, and, 
g iv e n  t h e  p r e s e n t  r u l e  o f  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  and  th e  
property re m e d ie s  p r e s e n t l y  available, i t  i s  
u n r e a s o n a b le  to expect the c o u r t s  t o  ignore conduct#^ 
It i s  suggested that one m e r i t  of the scheme o f  
concurrent c o m p e n sa tio n  put forward i n  Chapter ? 
i s  i t s  e q u a l i s a t i o n  during marriage o f  opportunities 
to p r o s p e r  and i t s  a im e d - f o r  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  
property d i v i s i o n  and s e t t l e m e n t  a t  divorce*
I n  fact, as Thomson r e c o r d s, the Court of Session 
has refused to d i s c o u n t  conduct,'^
It i s  s u g g e s te d  i n  Thom son’ s  article that th e  
Court of Session is conservative i n  its attitude 
towards t h e  subject o f  outside em ploym ent for wives*
He concedes that this a t t i t u d e  may be justified 
where the wife is klate m id d le  age when retirement in 
an y  case would be in view, and notes that the court 
has taken a different view where the w if e  has been 
the " g u i l t y "  party, Thomson argues that i t  s h o u ld  
be made a s  easy a s  p o s s i b l e  for all divorced wives, 
" g u i l t y "  and "innocent" to return to single l i f e #
"The courts at present frustrate this purpose i n  th e  
c a s e  o f  " g u i l t y "  wives b y  not g iv in g  them sufficient 
financial help because o f  t h e i r  "misconduct". On 
the other hand, because they r e f u s e  t o  make financial 
provision /
1, Bee Memo# Wo,28, Aliment and Financial P r o v i s io n■ 373 - 76; Faculty Response, p*50  e t  m g  and p*68* A distinction t h e r e  was draxm b e tw e e n  capital sum awards (conduct in principle not relevant) and aw ard s  o f  periodical allowance (conduct perhaps relevant to a l i m i t e d  e x t e n t )  ( p p ,5 2 -5 5 )#  Faculty (p*25) favoured retention of t h e  relevance of c o n d u c t  i n  questions of a l i m e n t ,2 .  McKay v ,  HoE, 1978 8 * L ,T , (N o te s )  5 6 ; O ra ig  v ,  0 ,  1978 8*L,T* (N o te s )  6 1 , Thomson, p.140,
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Aallowance should he discouraged*
In conclusion, Thomson advocates the removal 
of conduct as a relevant consideration, at least 
in cases where both spouses have been at fault or 
where the marriage has been dead for many years#
The courts should strive "to recognise in financial 
terms t h e  spouses* positive o o n t r i b u t i o n e  to the 
marriage over t h e  years and to " h e lp  them to 
readjust to living as single p e rs o n s " ^ *  In h i s  
opinion, " T he full-scale reform o f  aliment and 
financial provision envisaged by the Scottish Law 
Commission cannot *## come too soon#
Professor Olive too notes that conduct and 
fault may remain "very relevant to financial provision# 
and remarks, "For my part, I think that there is too 
much reference to conduct in recent cases"#® If we 
think that the innocent party should be able to claim 
damages from the other, so be it - but if we do not,
"we should also reject a situation in which judges 
have a discretion to penalise misconduct under the 
cloak of financial provision*" Ha cites two "short 
marriage" cases in which he thinks the wife was 
treated /
1# Another strong argument in favour of reduction of the Incidence of such awards is, of course, the difficulty encountered in enforcing them#2# Thomson stresses the importance of the non-fault theoretical basis of the laws conduct of a positive nature, though, it seems he would not exclude from the list of relevant considerations *In the present writer’s view, it should be possible to limit the relevance of all such factors to the question of award or not of periodical allowances see Chapter 7#3# Thomson, ibid., p#143#4* I b i d #3é ^Œancial Provision on Divorce", a talk given on 27/1/79 to the Scottish Young Lawyers Association's seminar on "marital breakdown", reported at 1979 a .L .T #  165#6 # Ibid.% p.166#
7. Fraser v* F# 197& 8#L.T# (Notes) 69; Downle v* D# 1977 8.L,T. (Notes) 22#
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a p r o s p e r i t y  t o  which (she) has contributed^.
Perhaps matrimonial misconduct should be largely 
irrelevant but conduct in a more general sense 
(contribution in kind) should be taken into accoun t^^  
Expansés #
I n  /
Of. recent case of P. (reported Glasgow Herald 14/11/80) in which ïhe Family Division of the High Court mad© the largest ever divorce settlement in an English divorce action# The husband had amassed a fortune of .4m. The wife was awarded a sum of £700,000. At marriage, t h e  parties had no funds, but the wife worked in order to allow h e r  husband to g iv e  up his employment and start a business. The business prospered, but t h e r e  were no luxuries at home. It was a case of deferred pleasure in which the marriage broke down at the time the pleasure could be expected to begin. Themarriage had lasted for 23 years. The husband re­married and was living i n  luxury. He offered a settlement o f  £3 5 0 ,0 0 0 , but Elobank, J# made an order of double that sum. "This wife has made a substantial contribution by working until 1963 and giving her husband the freedom to leave employment and start in business." Part of the husband's fortune was drawn from hotel interests.It may not be entirely fanciful to draw a general philosophical comparison with that famous conflict case pertaining to the French Code (in its provisions w i th  regard to community of property), namely Be Nicols v. Ourlier [1900] A.0.21* It must be said that wives who never "work" (that is, outside the hom e) also contribute greatly to the husband's prosperity by keeping the home and rearing the c h i l d r e n ,  and thus permitting the p a r t n e r  to make his way outside# The fact that that has been traditional i n  the middle classes, and t h a t  it is likely to continue, th o u g h  perhaps less enthusiastically and  with more numerous exceptions than before, does not make th e  'contribution* arg u m en t loss valid.Often th e  more s u c c e s s f u l  i s  the husband in worldly terms, the greater i s  the d o m e s tic  b u rd e n  on the wife.Of. Professor Olive's comments at p.171*
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AIn Oraigie v* Oraigie , the First Division
having been asked b y  Lord Dunpark to give a ruling 
upon the question whether expenses ought to be 
awarded against a husband defender in an undefended 
action of divorce fo u n d e d  upon five years' non- 
cohabitation* Should there be a new general rule 
of practice to govern such cases (subject to t h e  
overriding discretion of t h e  court)? The First 
Division thought that there should be such a rule, 
but took care first to record its view that, in 
these instances, where divorce is obtainable merely 
on proof of the central fact of five years' non­
cohabitation, conduct should not b e  relevant in the 
general cas© to t h e  question of entitlement to 
expenses* There were two situations t o  be considered* 
FirstI in the case of the legally-aided wife seeking 
divorce on t h i s  ground but seeking no financial 
provision, t h e  normal rule (subject to the overriding 
discretion of t h e  court, which discretion however, i t  
was envisaged, would have little scope for exercise) 
w ould  be to make no award of expenses to the pursuer^* 
Second, i n  the case where the legally-aided wife 
seeks divorce on this ground but seeks also financial 
provision, the general rule should be the same, but 
it /
1* 1979 8.L.T* (N o te s )  60*2. "In such a case, as a wife is no longer entitled to claim t h e  expenses of litigation against her husband as being "necessaries" for which the h u sb a n d  i s  liable and as the element of "matrimonial offence" i s  necessarily absent, the right to decree of divorce accruing to either party b y  the efflux of time alone, in t h e  Interests of simplicity of procedure and of reduction of the overall cost of the action as well as of discouraging the presentation and prosecution of defences directed solely to the conclusion f o r  expenses the normal rule of practice should be to make no award of expenses in favour of the pursuer" (p*G1),
507,
it was thought that cases might arise in which the 
court might, exceptionally, award expenses to the 
pursuer "upon a consideration of the means of the 
parties and the whole circumstances of the case as 
these have been disclosed in evidence which was 
relevant to the claim for a financial provision."^
Opinion expressly was reserved upon the 
question of extending the rule to divorces brought 
under s*1(2)(a)(b)(o) and (d)# However in undefended 
cases brought under s*1(2)(d) (two year separation 
with consent to divorce) where the wife is legally- 
aided, judges might consider whether the new rule 
should be applied* (The court had agreed with the 
view taken by Lord Fraser in Nelson v* Nelson^ that 
the presence or absence of legal aid for the wife 
should be a relevant factor; where the wife is 
legally-aided, the general position should be that 
the award of expenses is a matter within the discretion 
of the court after consideration of all the 
circumstances * On the other hand, where the wife 
pursuer or defender is not legally-aided, the court
Intended "to cast no doubt upon the applicability of%the old general rule of practice"*^ which, based upon 
the husband’s obligation to maintain his wife, extended 
to provide her with funds, if she had no separate 
estate, for necessary litigation, including divorce 
litigation)
Enforcement of Financial Awards
M u c h  of what has been said in Chapter 4 about 
the difficulties of enforcing an award of aliment 
applies equally to the enforcement of awards of 
periodical /
1* p*61*
2* 1969 8 .L *T# 5255# p#61.4* p.GO*
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Apursuit of an unwilling payer* The position ofpmany single parents is an unenviable one* It is 
probable that ’marriage insuranoe ’, (All Risks? ) 
on the lines of car insurance, though effective if 
enforceable and enforced, would be unacceptable for 
ideological and financial reasons*
Procedure
About 9,000 divorces are dealt with each year by 
the Court of Session*
By Act of Sederunt coming into effect on 25th 
April, 1978,^ affidavit evidence may be tendered 
in /
1# P .5 6 4 *2* Finer Report on Single Parent Families (1974);’Gingerbread* Pressure Group*5* A/S (Rules of Court Amendment Mo*1) (Consistorial Causes) 1978; Edinburgh, 25 January 1978* See 1978 B*L*T* 55# This is in substitution for Rule of Court 168* The new procedure applies to divorce (and separation and aliment) cases where no defences have been lodged, and may apply to an action which proceeds at any stage as undefended* It is not to be applied if it appears to the Court that the defender suffers from mental disorder* Evidence, in a suitable case, therefore, will be admissible if in the form of an affidavit* Parol© evidence will not be required* Affirmation includes affirmation and statutory or other declaration* An affidavit shall be treated as admissible if it is emitted before a E*P* or any other competent authority* Proof will be by submission of such affidavits unless the court directe otherwise*In actions where children under 16 years are involved - for whose custody, maintenance and education the court has jurisdiction to make provision - evidence with regard to the welfare of the children shall be given by affidavit, unless the court thinks otherwise, but at least one of the affidavits must be emitted by someone other than either of the parties to the action* Counsel by written minute may move for decree, giving specification of relevant documents *
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1 .  But s e e  D iv o r c e  J u r i s d i c t i o n ,  Court Pees and Legal Aid 
( S c o t l a n d )  B i l l s  d iv o r c e  to  th e  S h e r i f f  C o u r ts .
2 ,  The R eport o f  the  Royal Commission on L ega l  S e r v i c e s .  An 
academ ic v ie w ,  V .A .W ilso n . 1980 S .L .T .  165 ( a t  p . 1 6 6 ) ,
3 .  1979 S . L . T .  (N o tes  8 2 .
5 1 2 ,
t h e  olaima f o r  financial provision on the ground 
that the w i f e ' s  conduct had brought about the 
failure of t h e  marriage» The wife responded by  
m ak ing  similar allegations against t h e  husband*
Lord McDonald granted d e c r e e  of d i v o r c e , b u t  
refused t o  give financial provision, taking t h e  
stance that there was a u th o r i t y ^  to support the 
view that the wide terms of 8 *5( 2 ) may require 
t h e  court t o  consider th e  question of blame even in 
divorces brought upon this ground, and t h a t  in the 
instant case, i t  appeared t o  him that t h e  m a jo r  
blame for th e  breakdown o f  the marriage m u st lie 
w i th  the wife.
Since the separation (1966) t h e  wife h a d  
supported herself* There w as one daughter of the 
marriage, alimented by th e  father until she attained 
t h e  age of seventeen* The w ife  had visited the 
erstwhile matrimonial home and  had rem oved  articles 
which she said b e lo n g e d  to h e r  or had come from her 
family* The period of cohabitation had been s e v e n  
y e a r s *
Shortly b e f o r e  the separation, t h e  h u sb a n d  
had o b ta in e d  a building s o c i e t y  loan and had b o u g h t 
the house, in which he still resided* The wife 
had made no contribution to th e  purchase*
The husband was a f i s h e rm a n  and had become 
t h e  skipper of a fishing vessel i n  which h e  was p a r t -  
ow ner* I n  having i t  overhauled, he and h i s  c o -o w n e rs  
had incurred substantial d e b ts  * "In the event of a 
sale of t h e  v e s s e l  at p r e s e n t  the p u r s u e r  could not 
e x p e c t  to do b e t t e r  than clear his share of the 
i n d e b t e d n e s s *
An /
1* O r a ig  V .  0 .  1978 8*L*T* (N o te s )  6 1 ; F o rb e s  v* F .1978 S*L*T* (N o te s )  80, (cited in ju d g m e n t)*2* p*S3*
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Am interesting feature of the case is  that 
It provMea an example of "gratuitous 
(inheritance of ehare of f la t , the ahare being 
valued at £6,500) and of iacreaeod (independent) 
proapority after separation # The house was
valited at £20,000, the hwhaad had a Rover car 
worth £5,000 and hie eavinge in  hank (£500 at 
eeperatiom) had increased to £5,000# No 
c o n t r i h u t i o n ,  d i r e c t  o r  I M i r e c t ,  h a d  W e n  made 
hy the wife.
Lord McDonald placed ImpcrtmLce upon the 
leiigth of eeparatiom^, am# the aheence of financial 
claim hy the wife during the period of moparatlon*
The wife, i t  #pcared* waa capable of maintaining 
herself# Bhe was largely reapommible for the 
failure of the marriage (" if that ie  relevant"^), 
and ahe had ooatrlhuted nothing to the huehemd'e 
proeperlty# No financial award was made# It le  
submitted with reapoct that thle was indeed tlia juat 
course# Aa hla Lordship pointed out, the partiea 
had for long lived IMopendont llvea# There was no 
fimanclal meed for the link of marriage to he 
contiimed after divorce hy rnamm of a periodical 
allcwamcc, and for the wife to aoek a chare in her 
h u a h m id 'B  /
1# a n d  t h a t  o c c u r r i n g ,  m o re o v e r , a f t e r  e e p a r a t lo n #2# w h i le  n o t i n g  (F o rS e a  v# F* 19?8  B#L#T# (N o te a )8 0 )  t h a t  " T h e r e  may h e  c a a e a  w h ere  i t  l a  p r o p e r  t o  sm ke a  f i n a n c i a l  aw ard  n o t w i th s ta n d in g  % hat a  m a r r ia g e  h a s  been long since d e ad "#  (p#83)*2# p#85# In view of the perauaalvencee of the other factors, it would not seem to have been necesaary to place great weight (or @my weight?) upon conduct, although certainly that factor la the Inctant case confirma the opinion that the wife received her duo reward# even so, should It he regarded ae relevant? It forme part of the 
p i o t œ a ,  ( s e s  pe»j? L.{teray, in. M a S S l i  & M M  %fho however in the reault took no account of blame in fixing periodical allowance) and la one of "all" the clroimetanoee ** hut see Memo No#22, Faculty Reaponae . and new and general property a u g g e m tlo n , O h a p te r  ?#
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ïm a b a n d 's  p r o s p e r i t y  b y  m eans o f  t h e  aw ard  o f  a  
o a p i t a l  sum waa a  n o n se n se *  H e ra  w as a  g re e d y
and i m j u e t i f i a b l e  a t t i t u d e  * The p a r t i e s  w ere
strangers to each other in p r o p e r t y  matters, as 
in all o t h e r  m a t t e r s  * Any p r o p e r t y  r e a d ju s tm e n t
which s h e  thought necessary i t  appeared that she 
had carried out a t  her own h an d  a f t e r  the separation*
Following O r a i g i e * supra* the l e g a l l y ^ a i d e d  
p u r s u e r  was not awarded expenses* "The pursuer, 
who is a n  assisted person, made it inevitable that 
t h e  case would be d e fe n d e d  by the extravagant nature 
of her financial c la im s *  The defender, who i s  not 
i n  r e c e i p t  o f  l e g a l  a i d ,  m u st h a v e  b e e n  p u t  t o  g r e a t  
e x p e n se  t o  d e fe n d  t h e  a c t i o n  and  I  s e e  no  r e a s o n  t o  
add to t h i s  b u rd e n  by f i n d i n g  him liable i n  the 
p u r s u e r 's  e x p e n s e s * "
A n o th e r  ease of divorce brought on the ground 
of five y e a r s '  n o n - c o h a b i t a t i o n  was that o f  N o la n  v* 
N o la n  ,  i n  which the husband w as t h e  p u r s u e r #  The 
w if e  d i d  n o t  d e fe n d  on t h e  m e r i t s  but on the g ro u n d  
p r o v id e d  by s*1(5) o f  the 1976 Act, n a m e ly , t h a t  t h e  
grant of divorce w o u ld  r e s u l t  i n  grave financial 
hardship t o  t h e  w ife *  If divorce were granted, sh e  
s o u g h t  a c a p i t a l  sum o f  £ 5 ,0 0 0  and a periodical 
a llo w a n c e  o f  £ 1 2 5  m onth*
The h u sb a n d  w as em ployed  b y  t h e  P o s t  O f f i c e  
a t  a  s a l a r y  o f  £42 1 6 * 7 6  p e r  annum , w i t h  a n  e n t i t l e m e n t  
a t  t h e  a g e  o f  s i x t y  t o  a  p e n s io n  ( i n d e x - l i n k e d )  
e s t im a te d  b y  th e  p a r t i e s  at £ 2 ,7 6 5  p e r  annum and a 
lump sum o f  £7#000*  He was f i f t y  o n e .  He h a d  no 
capital at the t im e  of t h e  divorce*
The w if e  was fifty-three, and w as i n  p a r t - t i m e
employment as an auxiliary n u r s e  e a r n in g  £ 1 7 1 4 .4 5  
p e r  /
1* p.85»2* 1979 8*L,T* 293*
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per æmum# Her husband voXmitarily paid her £57 
per m onth# If she were married to her husband at 
the date o f  h i s  death, sh e  would be e n t i t l e d  to a 
Post Office pension (index-linlced) of a b o u t  tw o -  
f i f t h s  of t h e  pension payable to t h e  husband, and 
o f  course to t h e  widow’s state p e n s io n ,  and sh e  
w ou ld  b e  able to claim legal rights i n  any lump 
sum paid by t h e  Post O f f ic e  to the husband# She 
c la im e d  that divorce s h o u ld  not be pronounced 
because t h e  l o s s  of t h e s e  r i g h t s  w o u ld  result i n  
grave f i n a n c i a l  h a r d s h ip  to her*
Lord Oowie, com m enting  that this appeared to 
be t h e  f i r s t  case of i t s  kind i n  B o o t la n d ,  took 
the view that t h e  te rm s  of 8*1(5) empowered t h e  
court to have regard to t h e  future e f f e c t  of the 
aw ard  of d e c r e e ,  as w e l l  as t o  t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  
e x i s t i n g  a t  t h e  date of t h e  litigation# He f e l t  
too that t h e  l o s s  of t h e  contingent r i g h t s  would 
am ount to grave financial h a r d s h ip ^  # This p o i n t  
was n o t  ’ s e r i o u s l y  disputed’ b y  the p u r s u e r  who 
had made c e r t a i n  specific s u g g e s t io n s  designed to 
alleviate t h e  hardship# In o t h e r  oircumstances, 
therefore, he would have, refused decree ; since he 
was n o t  convinced that t h e  proposals adequately 
off-set the financial hardship attendant upon 
divorce, but yet d id  not wish to b e  unreasonable 
to t h e  pursuer, who was willing to try to lessen 
that hardship. Lord Gowie continued the case in 
order to give t h e  husband t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  advance 
f u r t h e r  proposals, w h ic h  would require to b e  
*substantially greater* than those proposed#^
(T he /
1 #  and compared the English approach i n  relation to similar provisions in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s L© Marchant v* Le Marchant 1977 1 W#L*R#559* 2# though it was not for the court to suggest what w ould  be acceptable and sufficient proposals to be made b y  the pursuer in order to obtain divorce • However, the c o u r t ,  once satisfied that decree can b e  granted, may t a k e  th e  proposals into account in deciding "what, if a n y , other payment should be made /
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(T he husband had suggested that he would take 
out a policy of insurance for £ 3 ,0 0 0  payable a f t e r  
t h e  expiry o f  ten years, the proceeds to b e  r e m i t t e d  
to the d e fe n d e r*  (It was calculated that the value 
of this, with b o n u s e s ,  would be £4,425)* Even on 
the b a s i s  that there need b e  no ’pound for p o u n d ’ 
compensation, and t a k i n g  into account the fact that 
the defender might predecease t h e  pursuer. Lord 
Gowie considered that t h e  proposals were n o t  
sufficiently ample* The sum if invested would 
not produce much income and would be unlikely to 
be  inflation-proof*)
A note to t h e  case s t a t e s  that t h e  action later 
was abandoned by t h e  p u r s u e r#  T h is  seems a sad 
result*
It would appear that the potential l o s s  of 
private pension r i g h t s  and succession rights must 
be regarded very seriously: surely the loss of the
widow’s state pension is a loss common to all 
divorcing and d iv o r c e d  wives? A system of concurrent 
compensation of gains would render the loss of 
succession rights less significant* T he value of 
the index-linked private pension payable to t h e  wife 
if she became her husband’s widow - and one must 
suppose that it is l i k e l y ,  b u t  not certain, that 
she w o u ld  o u t l i v e  her husband - w ould  have been 
about £1100 per annum, and the husband’s first 
suggestion could not match that* The report does 
not narrate the circumstances of the marriage 
(duration, contribution to prosperity i n  cash and 
kind) but must it not be accepted that the financial 
benefits /
made b y  him b y  way of periodical allowance* It seems u n l i k e l y  that a paym ent of a capital sum would be appropriate in the p r e s e n t  circumstances* " ( p . 2 9 4 )*
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b e n e f i t s  o f  m a r r ia g e  o a m io t a lw ay s  b e  r e l i e d  on
b y  parties? W ould not a c o m b in a t io n  of Instance 
arrangement and periodical allowance have provided 
a  com prom ise  a n s w e r , an d  s u r e l y  com prom ise i n  many 
c a e e e  an d  t a k i n g  a l l  i n t e r e s t s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  i s  t h e  
b e a t  w h ic h  c a n  b e  a c h ie v e d ?  I n  a n y  e v e n t ,  t h e  
ou tcom e ie profoundly disturbing# I f  a n  answer 
c a n n o t  b e  f o u n d ,  o u r  p r e e e n t  p r o p e r t y  r u l e s  i n  
o p e r a t i o n  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e  an d  on  i t s  t e r m i n a t i o n  
m u st b e  l a c k i n g  i n  f l e x i b i l i t y  an d  im a g in a t io n ,  
and  in a d e q u a te  t o  m ee t p r e s e n t  n eed e*
I n  Gray v* Gray , a d iv o r c e  brought u p o n  th e  
g ro u n d  of t h e  husband’ a behaviour, th e  w i f e  concluded 
f o r  a capital sum of £ 2 0 ,0 0 0  and a periodical 
allowance of £ 4 5  p e r  week* The husband r e s i s t e d  
b o th  claims* The case was t a k e n  b e f o r e  L o rd  Murray*
The m a r r ia g e  h a d  l a s t e d  f o r  s e v e n te e n  y e a r s  
until s e p a r a t i o n  i n  1975$ although it h a d  lo n g  been 
'onhappy* The h u sb a n d  h a d  an  u n l io e n s e d  g r o c e r  
sh o p  i n  w h ic h  t h e  w if e  had worked f u l l - t i m e  for two 
y e a r s  u n t i l  t h e  b i r t h  o f  t h e  f i r s t  c h i ld #  Thereafter 
sh e  w orked  p a r t - t i m e  i n  it* She r e c e i v e d  no 
’ s p e c i f i c  r e m u n e r a t io n ’ f o r  h e r  work* She h a d  no 
b a n k  a c c o u n t  and  h e r  h o u s e k e e p in g  a l lo w a n c e  a t  f i r s t  
was £4*50 per week, an d  l a t t e r l y  £ ?  p e r  week# Much 
o f  t h e  family’s fo o d  came fro m , o r  through, th e  shop* 
The w if e  complained that h e r  l i v i n g - i n  m o th e r - in  law 
(who l i v e d  with them  u n t i l  about 1967) ’ran t h e  h o u s e ’ * 
About 1966-69$ t h e  wife b e g a n  a bed-and-breakfast 
b u s i n e s s  i n  t h e  f a m i ly  hom e, and  u s e d  t h e  incom e t o  
make im p ro v e m e n ts  to t h e  house, w h ic h  w as s o l e l y  
owned b y  the husband* A bout 1 9 7 1 , the h u sb a n d  bought 
a much larger house, and the b e d - a n d - b r e a k f a s t  b u s i n e s s  
c o n t in u e d  on  a  l a r g e r  s c a l e ,  being r u n  b y  th e  wife, 
daughter, and a w a i t r e s s #  Incom e again w as u s e d  to 
make im p ro v em en ts  t o  th e  h o u se #
I n  1973, because o f  i l l  h e a l t h  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o
living /
1 ,  1979  B#L.T# (N o te s )  9 4 .
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living with the defender, and on medical advice, 
the wife left the husband, "I consider it 
Improbable that the pursuer could resum e married 
life w ith o u t  t h e  same stressea and strains emerging 
again"
A capital eum o f  £ 5 ,0 0 0  and a periodical 
allowance of £15 w ere  awarded* The husband had 
been in t h e  habit of paying t h e  pursuer £11 per 
week and was willing to continue to male© this 
paym en t p r o v id e d  h e  w as a b le  f i n a n c i a l l y  t o  do  so#
His income came in the main fro m  the b e d - a n d - b r e a k f a s t  
business, w h ic h  he ran. on his own, and t h e r e  was in 
addition rent fro m  a building in the grounds of the 
house* It was a g re e d  that t h e  house had a value 
o f  £ 4 1 ,0 0 0 ,
S in c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  r a i s e  a  sum o f  £ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,  th e  
h o u se  (the source o f  income) w ould  r e q u i r e  to be 
s o l d ,  and  s i n c e  a t  6 3 ,  i t  w ou ld  b e  h a r d  f o r  t h e
defender t o  find employment, "payment of a capital 
sum and a periodical allowance are n e c e s s a r i l y  
interconnected*"^ Had the matter of a capital 
payment not been r a i s e d ,  Lord Murray would have 
thought a periodical allowance of about £16 per 
week appropriate, but " f he p u r s u e r 's  case - 
placed t h e  m a jo r  e m p h a s is  on  a capital payment"
A m ain  s t r a n d  i n  t h e  p u r s u e r ’s  a rg u m en t w as 
t h a t  t h e  b u s in e s s  w as n o t  v i a b l e .  E x p e r t  e v id e n c e  
was called on b o th  s i d e s ,  and  Lord M urray  p r e f e r r e d  
t h e  v ie w  that t h e  b u s i n e s s , th o u g h  u n d e r - c a p i t a l i s e d , 
was c a p a b le  of providing a "modest livelihood"*
Had he b e e n  p e rs u a d e d  t h a t  the b u s in e s s  w as insolvent, 
" t h e r e  would have b e e n  much force in t h e  pursuer’ s 
contention /
1* p»95* 
2 ,  p ,9 5 *3 .  I b i d ,
5 1 9 .
c o n te n t i o n  t h a t  Redwood Lodge s h o u ld  b e  s o ld  a s
soon as possible e n d  the proceeds equitably divided 
b e tw e e n  t h e  pursuer and th e  d e fe n d e r# " ^  (Free 
proceeds of sale were estimated to be between £30,000 
and  £ 3 2 ,0 0 0 ) ,
If t h e  buainesa were regarded as insolvent,
* t h e r e  w ou ld  be some attraction* in giving the 
p u r s u e r  h a l f  th e  f r e e  p ro c e e d s  o f  s a l e ,  " I t  w as 
her enterprise and initiative which c r e a t e d  th e  
b u s i n e s s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ;  th o u g h  a d m i t te d ly  i t  
w as r u n  i n  p r o p e r t y  owned e n t i r e l y  b y  t h e  d e f e n d e r .  
Income f ro m  th e  b u s i n e s s  w as used b y  the p u r s u e r  t o  
improve the facilities and t h e  p a r t i e s  * home. The 
defender himself a t  one t im e  recognised t h i s , for 
h e  t e s t i f i e d  that in 1973 it had been h i s  i n t e n t i o n  
t o  transfer t h e  t i t l e  of t h e  property into t h e  j o i n t  
names /
1 . p.96* What proportions w ould  have been an* equitable ’ division in t h e  clrcimstatices?T he h u sb a n d  im s t h e  s o l e  p r o p r i e t o r  o f  t h e  
h o u se  i n  K e n n e th  Street, I n v e r n e s s  and t h e n  o f  t h e  larger house in Oulduthel Road#
F i n a n c i a l  a r ra n g e m e n ts  f o r  p u rc h a s e  a r e  n o t  r e c o r d e d ;  t h e i r  absence suggests p e rh a p s  t h a t  the purchases w ere  funded b y  t h e  husband (end l o a n  re p a y m e n ts  t o  b u i l d i n g  society and  t o  the d e f e n d e r ’ s  brother-in-law made b y  him)# On t h e  other hand, t h e  w ife  h a d  made t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of wife and  m o th e r  and  had also worked unpaid in t h e  s h o p , and  h a d  r u n  t h e  b e d - a n d - b r e a k f a s t  business f o r  f o u r  o r  five y e a r s .  Bee m ain  t e x t ,supra.
A t p * 9 6 , L o rd  M u rra y , h av iz ig  lo o k e d  a t  t h e  f a c t s ,  
b e g a n  h i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  award by  saying, "I cannot, I t h i n k ,  approach t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  a  capital payment i n  a  marrlEige %fhich h a s  b ro k e n  dovm on th e  same b a s i s  a s  a  b u s i n e s s  p a r t n e r s h i p  w hose p a r t n e r s  h a v e  f a l l e n  o u t ,  S e c t i o n  5 ( 2 )  o f  t h e  D iv o rc e  ( S c o t la n d )  A ct 1 9 7 6 , r e q u i r e s  me to have ’regard to t h e  respective m eans o f  t h e  parties to t h e  m a r r ia g e  and t o  all t h e  circumstances of t h e  case  ..*"*
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names o f  the parties* He did not proceed with this
intention, h e  said, only because the pursuer left 
h im ," '’
A t this point lord Hurray made a telling 
observation* A solution naturally suggesting 
itself would be to have the title taken in joint 
names, under condition that the pursuer did not 
prevent the defender from continuing the business 
’while it remained viable and under his e x c lu s iv e  
control•* To this possible arrangement, Lord 
Hurray would have given serious consideration*
"But I can find nothing in the Divorce (Scotland) 
Act, 1976 which would empower me to make such an 
order*
To require sale of the property would deprive 
t h e  defender of his livelihood and the pursuer of 
any reasonable chance of receiving a periodical 
allowance* "It appears to me that, in the 
circumstances of this case, a capital payment would 
be appropriate if it were not so large as to 
jeopardise the very existence of the defender’s 
business and yet were large enough to meet the 
pursuer’s /
1 « p*96. Frequently it appears that the taking oftitle in joint names is not an issue of major significance in parties* minds# It is by no means unacceptable to the t i t l e - h o l d e r , but action is postponed e#g* until p u r c h a s e  of the next house * See Todd and Jones Survey, Chapter
7 *2# p*96* Since the defender was only tw o yearsaway fro m  retiring age, would the prohibition on sale then cease (whatever the financial arrangements made by the defender (if any) f o r  his retirement?)? It might be reasonable for the w if e  to wish to have her capital payment, yet reasonable f o r  the husband to continue his business, the business being o f  a type in which •retirement age* is perhaps not especially significant *
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pursuer’s reasonable aspirations"*
The wife’s aim in seeking a capital payment 
were the reasonable ones, in Lord Hurray’s opinion, 
of improving the home she provided for the two 
younger children, and of ensuring that both had 
the fullest educational opportunities* The husband 
testified that h e  had set aside a capital sum of 
£ 1 ,3 0 0  for the daughter who was about to enter 
further education, intended f o r  her when she attained 
1 8 , but now to be available to h e r  earlier* A 
similar sum had been given by him to the eldest child*
By means of assuming a partner, the husband 
th o u g h t  that he could meet a capital award of £ 3 0 0 0  
without having to sell the business - "though h e  
himself thought that none should be made"* Lord 
Hurray thought this reasonable and awarded a capital 
sum of £ 3 0 0 0  and a periodical allowance of £13 per 
week* (By the time o f  proof both of the younger 
children, who lived with the w i f e ,  were over 16 years 
of qge)#
think that the capital p ay m en t should 
be the l a r g e s t  consistent with the continuation of 
t h e  defender’s bed-and-breakfast business and his 
ability to make a reasonable periodical allowancepto the pursuer*" G re a t  care and th o u g h t  was given, 
and the very best and fairest solution possible in 
the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  r e a c h e d ,  yet had the statutory 
guidance, so general and yet so  r e s t r i c t i n g ,  been 
more flexible, the area within which the solution 
might have sought would have b e e n  wider* On these 
facts, the wife then m ig h t have benefited more than 
the husband from such new statutory provision#
There /
1* p . 9 6 , 
2* p * 9 7 .
3 2 2 .
/|
T h e r e  o c c u r r e d ,  i n  J a c k s o n  v *  J a c k s o n * a  
c l a i m  b y  t h e  w ife  d e f e n d e r  f o r  a  c a p i t a l  s u m  o f  
£ 1 0 I 0 0 0  a n d  a  p e r i o d i c a l  a l l o w a n c e  o f  £ 2 3  p e r  w e e k .
T h e  l a t t e r  c o n c l u s i o n  w a s  a b a n d o n e d .  T h e  g r o u n d  
o f  d i v o r c e  w a s  t h e  i r r e t r i e v a b l e  b r e a k d o w n  o f  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  b y  r e a s o n  o f  t h e  w i f e ’ s  d e s e r t i o n ,  a n d  
t h e  h u s b a n d  s o u g h t  c u s t o d y  o f  t h e  two c h i l d r e n *
T h e  p a r t i e s  h a d  l i v e d  t o g e t h e r  f o r  t e n  y e a r s  
( w i th  s h o r t  s e p a r a t i o n s )  a f t e r  t h e  m a r r i a g e  (w h ich  
h a d  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  1 9 6 5 ) ,  u n t i l  t h e  d e f e n d e r ’ s  
f i n a l  d e p a r t u r e .  T h e  w i f e  d i d  n o t  d i s p u t e  t h e  
s u b s t a n c e  o f  t h e  c a s e ,  n o r  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  t h a t  
t h e  c h i l d r e n  s h o u l d  re m a in  w i th  t h e  p u r s u e r *  A 
c a p i t a l  s u m  o f  £ 6 , 0 0 0  w a s  a w a r d e d .
The u n u s u a l  a n d  t r a g i c  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  c a s e  
w a s  t h a t  t h e  w i f e  h a d  s u f f e r e d  a  c e r e b r a l  h a e m o r r h a g e  
a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  b i r t h  o f  t h e  e l d e r  c h i l d ,  a n d  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  s u f f e r  a  v e r y  s e v e r e  d i s a b i l i t y  a s  a  
r e s u l t #  l o r d  B r a n d  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  w i f e ’ s  c o n d u c t  
a n d  i n c a p a c i t y  f o r  s o m e  t i m e  a s  a  h o u s e w ife  w e r e  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  h e r  d i s a b i l i t y ,  a n d  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  
w h i le  t h e  h u s b a n d  m a y  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  a s  s y m p a t h e t i c  
a n d  h e l p f u l  a s  h e  m ig h t h a v e  b e e n ,  i t  c e r t a i n l y  h a d  
n o t  b e e n  p r o v e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a n y t h i n g  " p o s i t i v e l y  
r e p r e h e n s i b l e "  i n  h i s  c o n d u c t ,  C o u n s e l  f o r  t h e  
h u s b a n d  a c c e p t e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  s o m e  c a p i t a l  
a w a r d  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  w i f e .
T h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  a s s e t s  w e r e  f o u n d  t o  b e  a b o u t  
£ 7 , 0 0 0  c a s h ,  a  o a r  w o r t h  l e s s  t h a n  £ $ 0 0  a n d  a  h o u s e  
w o r th  £ 1 6 , 0 0 0  s u b j e c t  t o  a  b o n d  o f  £ 4 , 0 0 0 #  L o r d  
B r a n d  t o o k  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  ’ i n  r o u n d  f i g u r e s *  t o  b e  
£ 2 0 , 0 0 0 *  T h e  w i f e  w a s  t a k e n  t o  h a v e  no a s s e t s #
L o rd  /
1 ,  1980 8 .L .T , (Wotes) 17 ,
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Lord Brand was strongly o f  the opinion that 
the award which he sh o u ld  make s h o u ld  not have the 
effect of compelling the sale of the house, and the 
loan upon the security of the house could not he 
increased*
The wife’s accom m odation  in a local authority 
flat seemed suitable in g e n e r a l  t e r m s ,  bût, o n  th e  
other hand, a little capital would enable h e r  to buy 
ifurniture, and domestic equipment to make life easier 
for her in v iew  of h e r  disability* T a k in g  into 
account the defender’s assets and t h e  p u r s u e r ’ s lack 
of them, Lord B ran d  thought it reasonable to order 
payment of a capital sum of £6,000#
Clearly it would have been quite wrong to order 
sale of the h o u se  which was t h e  home f o r  the husband 
and children* Equally, the wife, who had been t h e  
victim of a tragic accident, r e q u i r e d  money* It is 
not revealed whether the wife was able to be in 
employment or whence her weekly income came* It i s  
interesting, though, t h a t  i t  was thought right to 
g iv e  to the wife such a  large p r o p o r t i o n  (three q u a r t e r s )  
of the husband’s free cash assets# He, of course, 
would have the opportunity to begin again to save, 
while she would be unlikely perhaps to be able to 
save, and such an aw ard  must be made ’once for all’ - 
and before t h e  money disappears for other uses* The 
case was unusual*
Depressive illness was the cause of breakdown 
of marriage in the case of HcHann v# McMann* There 
had been fourteen years of m a r r ia g e  before this 
occurred* In 1976, seventeen years after the marriage, 
the wife defender, who had had psychiatrie treatment 
to no avail, left the pursuer*
S ix  /
1 .  1980 S*L*T. (N otes) 20#
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81% months afterwards, the husband met another
woman, and she and her son oame to live w i th  him in
his house in August 1978* The pursuer paid the
rent, and the paramour paid for her own food and for
food for her son* The husband estimated his w e e k ly  
free income after paym en t of t a x  and expenses to be 
about <€32* His opinion was that his wife could 
work, and he said that the son of the m a r r ia g e  (the 
o n ly  child), and hie wife, were living with the 
defender* The son’s evidence was that he paid one 
half of his mother’s r e n t  and rates, that h i s  pay 
as a Bcaffolder varied b e tw e e n  £49 and £10? per week, 
and that his m o th e r  was suffering from d e p r e s s io n  and  
was not working*
A curator ad litem had been appointed to the wife 
and h e  s o u g h t  an  award of periodical allowance* T h is  
w as t h e  o n ly  point at issue b e tw e e n  the parties*
L o rd  Allanbridge made an award of £20 per week#
He fo u n d  no fault i n  the h u sb a n d  but equally held t h a t  
t h e  wife c o u ld  not be b lam ed  for her conduct* There 
had been fourteen y e a r s  o f  reasonably happy marriage# 
Taking into account the respective financial p o s i t i o n s  
of th e  parties, the husband’s g r o s s  weekly wage o f  
£91*80 and the wife’s continuing depression and the 
fact that she was n o t  working, L ord  Allanbridge fo u n d  
£20 per week to be reasonable* This is a f a i r l y  
large ’slice* of t h e  alleged am ount o f  free income 
and it i s  noteworthy that his L o r d s h ip ,  a s  i s  customary, 
d i r e c t e d  h i s  attention to, and based h i s  judgment on, 
t h e  payer’s gross incom e#
A discussion of factors relevant in the making
1in the case of Hyslop v# Hyslop# There, t h e r e  had
of an o r d e r  f o r  financial provision is provided also 
b e e n  /
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been cohabitation for sixteen years, until 1977# 
when the wife left the husband# taking with her the 
three children of the marriage* She sought divorce 
on the ground of h e r  husband’s behaviour# and claimed 
a capital sum award of £20,000* She asked for 
custody of the youngest child, a girl aged seven# 
and for aliment for the child of £12 per week*
The eldest child (male) was seventeen; the husband 
asked for custody of the second child# a boy of 
fifteen# and of the daughter* A f t e r  the separation# 
both boys said that they wished to live with the 
husband# qnd the pursuer agreed to this* The daughter 
remained with the wife*
Lord McDonald granted divorce# and gave custody 
of the boy o f  f i f t e e n  to the father# and of the girl 
to the m other#  with aliment at an  agreed sum. of £10 
per week* The subject o f  t h e  capital sum then had 
to be considered* The only substantial asset of the 
husband was his house# valued at £38*000* His oar 
he required f o r  business purposes (and t h e  wife had 
use of a car), and Lord McDonald accepted that an 
attempt to sell h i s  yacht "produced no practical 
result" and said that "in any event the elder son of 
the marriage uses the yacht# according to the evidence# 
and gains pleasure from it"^# a statement indicative 
of a moderate and sensible approach to the question of 
division of property* The mortgage over the house 
had been paid o f f *  Evidence o f  income (S3 #677) f o r  
the year 1978-79 was produced# although there was a 
suggestion that h i s  incom e for that y e a r  had been 
lower t h a n  in the two previous years* The wife’s 
income (from the sale of paintings) was about £ 3 0 0  p*a## 
but she was being supported by  a  man with whom she was 
living and w hose income per annum was about £6*000*
They /
1 .  p . 2 2 #
5 2 6 .
They wished to buy a larger house# considering 
their existing h o u sed  to o  small# especially i f
custody of the daughter was g iv e n  to the wife, 
and could fund the purchase by the sale of their 
e x i s t i n g  house and the t a k i n g  out of a slightly 
h i g h e r  mortgage # "This w o u ld , i n  effect, meet 
the cost of the new house but i t  is the contention 
of the pursuer that she is entitled to a capital 
sum which she would use in c o n n e c t io n  with the 
acquisition of the new house# The basis upon 
which the pursuer claims to be entitled t o  a 
c a p i t a l  sum is that she, for a p e r i o d  of some 16 
years# ran the family home, brought up t h e  children# 
and although she has contributed nothing financially 
to t h e  one remaining asset of any v a lu e  which the 
defender has she claims that her service o v e r  these 
years is e n t i t l e d  to some recognition# I would 
not take i s s u e  with that but it is necessary to be 
realistic and to c o n s i d e r  what is an appropriate sum 
which’ could be reasonably afforded by the defender on 
the information available to the court The wife
had agreed that she did not wish an order to be made 
which necessitated the sale of t h e  d e f e n d e r ’ s  house,
8 0 depriving the sons of a home* The husband’s 
income was not large and in effect he had t h r e e  
children to m a in ta in #  "It i s  only possible to 
approach a m a t t e r  of t h i s  nature in a broad fashion 
and I  have come to be of t h e  v ie w  that an a p p r o p r i a t e  
figure /
1 * the t i t l e  t o  which stood, p re s u m a b ly , i n  th ename of the man*2# repayments to be made by the man? In whosename(s) would t h e  title stand? Would t h e  parties marry? Each new scene presents issues of (matrimonial) property#3# per L# McDonald at p#22# The acknowledgment in principle of the value of contribution in kind is noteworthy#
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figure for a capital sum would be t h e  sum of £7*000#"^ 
('being approximately twice the defender’s known 
Income). Extract decree so far as p e r t a i n i n g  to 
the capital sum was superseded to 31st M arch# 1981. 
(case heard 2 3 rd  N ovem ber, 1979)*
T h is  seems a fair and sensible r e s u l t .  Even 
had t h e  h o u se  stood in joint names# i n  v ie w  of the 
f a c t  that t h e  sons were not yet f u l l y  adult (the 
elder son having e n te r e d  f u r t h e r  education)# 
postponement o f  sale would have been desirable.
On t h e  o t h e r  hand# as t h e  law stands# many 
questions a r e  left unanswered. "Almost i n e v i t a b l y #  
after the grounds of dissatisfaction with the 
husband have been explored# the question is asked 
"What about my furniture?" While we have made 
some progress ***. the law in Scotland has not 
r e a l l y  moved far enough # and certainly not as far 
as the law in other countries. It is all v e r y  
well to say to a wife client that she can claim a 
capital sum; it is not a capital sum she wants; it 
is h e r  share o f  the actual f u r n i t u r e . A decree for 
a capital sum may not only be worthless i f  the husband 
has no fu n d s#  b u t  i s  almost certainly l i k e l y  to be 
for an amount insufficient to replace the itéras in 
t h e  matrimonial home* This option is not in any 
event available in s e p a r a t i o n  actions*"^
In Whitehous© v* Whitehouse.^  the case was 
brought under s*1(2)(a) (irretrievable breakdovm : 
adultery) # but Lord Wylie found that the husband
defender’s /
i& lâ *2. Wumiture and C o n te n ts  in the M a tr im o n ia l  Home"# 
A l i s t a i r  D* M a th ie .  I9 6 0  8 .L .T *  4 3 .  M r. M a th ie ’ s  v iew  is that w iv e s  (a n d  perhaps some husbands) are in need of legal protection with regard to the contents of the matrimonial home#
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defender*# adultery had nothing to do with the 
breakdown #f the mairla$e* #a# a merrlag#
of eher# dmr&tl&n (1973*^97?# ^Ith m mime memhha 
break Im eehabltatlem)* The emly ahilê of the 
mmrrlmge we# berm alz weakm after the weâê&mg#
The wlf# aiBllkod livimg &m Ed&mhurgh.* where 
the m&trimmmlal home #&a looateâ^* emê la  1976 #he 
le ft  her hmehnmd* mm she admitted* for mo #o#d 
roaaom* The Bdlmhargh hem##* the t it le  t# whloh* 
on lügal aêviee# #teo& la  joint aame&* wae mold 
mad ÜXC frme ^rooeeâe of £i*30a divided betweem 
ia&wE* ]&3&ri&dL3W&» lIMbda iw^ ls&ibi&dL
t3&{% ladlj^ Q (&KÜ& 3&%üUl{l iS&wGl jL1& j&e#Bk53& 'tîüGlt ÎW8» 33g&ljl !&##
&/%> .&%>%* -&#ie ü&üülldl* gs%ks& ltg&*&cwmw%
:%M&4%gg8d%3L%i2dl 3LiK S$(pg%B&ahi&&* **<%& i%bw& gKmülgr Ibs&Bü&ia
a%a&Gw&i>tN8ub3Le t&s* 1&&W9 38w&%*0l3f ;&3&
TÜW& S%uw8M&8dG2& o3&t%sdk2%eil :&3% (5(k8dbl>%r?fk0ge.$ ea&gl
%&e;l33^G ladlGs tü&w8 a&a? ïb3%s& l&o%w8i&
%&*% 3P3%gGmw&2%i$* %&e 1b8>%%#@b.43: #i 3%#iww8g# 1%& gKls&a&#%8%a3t
**%Kkii<83% :&,% 4&s&#:&1%8tl 8W8i&Gr% (y%yt %&f '%%&<& ,pi&r8M&*&3&
j%<%o3d%8 %& <5a%:%&/ka&3L ];%agMawB3&tE# !%8%4& ida&jRGBBwl<%&p 38d%<&Gse<%iJB%%glar
lügp <& ;8%8%%3&i8 s&eatl dlat s&rg&GKKf iü# iN&%stBaw& <&(%hw&33^LtMw^bdl<W8L 
lüdLtüi !%gi# i*3L35e s&awgL 3&a& "ül&e 4B&&3k3r 4#<%B%88% iwüüJü%%& #&ï&3&
iw#wld oomeléer** '^ The reoomolliatiom wmn gh#r%*&iv&â$ 
mad l a  F e b ru a ry *  1 9 7 ?  t h e  ag m la  l o f t *  A
log? 1%%&e j%ogr 3%a%K» aygdLG&laag^ *&3L0o
t h e  /
1 *  % l a  a  d l f f l c u l v  ;v t#  \ : 3  uh*%#tor 4  ( A l v ' û i i : )  nW  7„  \%\ 0 ^  M #  t W
w if t '  : * :."o j o c u f r a  w  W**' bum/.' r w w l f e  
pazef j*,vA,d '\A j ,e  ào  m etd 'X jib  a  ^ r  t b r  m a t r im o n ia lhO)k)# j'rD f f "»i jcun,^:.hl By «/, e  d o f e a ê w
0vB»a I'be-' a lL c /' w * \/f .. 'U  andt h e  C cC 'ju \ . \% 1 I 'V', ' 1 tb 'V f "  Am i t
thk^a;;u* Lii- u f  f e e l lm g # *# h i# h  f r o # n " u t k y  tkam  a v
r u l e  o f  la w  (w h H w * m  '» «,, o a w #  i f  o i^rud;* 1 #  mow
mimh % # a k m ed } 1\* u tW d  tw %M w i f e  havim r; h e r
T he h% #W mê bm % ht R h u u m  l a  a i m # W *  see s .i.e .M em o .N o .5/1,I: l i S :  ’ • '■ ’ ■-■
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m a t t e r  o f  m ot a c t e d  I t
aocma Wuet the marrlag# fo ile d  heoam# # e  
aould not doeMe whether #&e w m lly  w a  Im lo w  
w i th  # m  d e f e M w *  The a d u l t e r y  wae p r e v M  t o  
hm e oo(mm?e& Im rjbcuw y* i9?#*
Wr& Wylie guarded a parlM&eal allow m oe o f  
£10 p#r week# Mit gave mo mm* Thom was
dlm gm m m nt B.^ut th# w 3.w  o f the houm# 3k>rd 
W ylie prooee!' d m the ba#l# th at tM  valuo o f tW  
how e a t the tlrni^  o f wmm £7%?0a*, thmt i t
woï£ld W d if f ic u lt  a t tim t tW e to  aWJ.* md that 
the property %w w t  #e&  #;@ewity from a W ild in g  
aooiety  point o f  view* A ll in  a ll*  a fte r  dedaatlea  
o f the lo r n *  # #  % # i W ,  # m  a%mweo& a t
*^^ *550% limkod em tlw ly  #  #m  h erita b le  property#
Fm; d isa g rw  with M e v ie#
th at th la  mot a m w  ju etify lD g  the #w^ %rd o f  
a o a # to l  am)* % e hw%-aM h o u # t # .#  h tw #  im 
h lo  to  s<## 'Wm m aalag#* md %m# immey
which h#â Mem M e ehmm o f # e  fw im r kw e*  
Pm!T;%zqhly # 0  aeomd home mtood Im M # am # miome;
e ltm m tlo n *  w h a t w o u ld  w  m  
0qnlD ah.l:f é l v l M c #  o f  p M W O #  ( o r  w u l d  d iv i .a io a  
W  e q u i t a b l e ? )  "Whom t i t l e  a t e e d  i n  j o i n t  m m # a l
Oo-immol f w  the hmbmWI u%ed w  w w d  
o f  p a r io d lo m l  a l l w m # e  W  made# T he e f f e c t i v e  
oe im o  o f  t w  W eek d m m  we# t h e  w i f e ’#
% e wlfga #a§^  (25) # )#  # I e  to  % rk part^r^lme*
S he a d m i t te d  i:h r.t #he h a#  mmA# mo o f f e r t  t o  f i n d  
«ploym m t# %'or t e t e l  imeem# per week waa £19 
mMe up o f w  intérim  erdar o f  &3 per %^#ek' for  
ahlM * and £10 fo r  W rmelf* from % e hwbm d,, .am# 
e h l M  a l l w m e e  (^A )*  ^ h a  d e f e M w ^ #  gam## incom e 
w aa /
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was £75 psr week# He did not dispute the amount
sued for under the head of aliment for the child 
and was willing to meet ohild-minding expenses, if 
the wife took up employment* Lord W y lie  took the 
view that, had not the wife r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for a 
child, he would have made no aw ard  of periodical 
allowance, and that certainly w ould  have been in 
sy m p a th y  with modem thinlslng upon the f i n c n o i a l  
repercussions of short marriages, where the ( fo rm e r )  
wife is young and able to work* The presence of a 
child m akes a great difference, and in view of that, 
an award was made of £8 p e r  week in name o f  aliment 
to the child, and the interim allowance to the wife 
of £10 per week was confirmed.
Another five years’ n o n - c o h a b i t a t i o n  case was 
L am b ert v, Lambert^*, In this case the wife did 
not defend on the merits, but s o u g h t  custody, aliment 
and p e r i o d i c a l  allowance* In turn, the husband did 
not dispute the custody question nor argue that 
aliment s h o u ld  not be p a id  to the son nor periodical 
allowance to the wife* His argument rested on 
q u an tu m , and in particular he s a i d  that the amount 
of periodical allowance should reflect not o n ly  the 
means and circumstances of t h e  parties, b u t  th e  
defender’s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the failure of the 
marriage#
T h e re  h a d  b e e n  c o h a b i t a t i o n  f o r  f i f t e e n  y e a r s ,
terminating in 1966* L o rd  Hurray assessed t h e  
husband’s income per annum at £13,500, and the wife’s 
income per annum at £1,800# He awarded decree of 
divorce t o  the h u s b a n d , and  gave custody, aliment 
( f o r  t h e  son u n d e r  the age of 16) and periodical 
allowance to th e  w i f e .
I t  /
1 , 1980 S .I i.l ' .  (îTotes) 77*
5 3 1
It was suggested by the defender that the 
’proportion’ approach be used that is, that the 
wife be awarded a periodical allowance of between 
one-third and one-quarter of the parties* gross 
incomes* Lord Murray, while accepting that "in 
some cases this sort of calculation may give a 
rough-and-ready guide which offers a more rational/Istarting point than an arbitrary guess, I am not 
convinced that it is the correct approach to t a k e  
when the. parties have been living apart for 14 years 
and the parties ’ m a r r ie d  life lasted only fivepyears." Instead, h e  felt that the actual support 
received from the pursuer by the defender over the 
years... since separation and her present (and probable 
future) needs should be considered*
The w if e  alone had talcen responelbility f o r  the 
upbringing of the children (though the husband h ad  
supported his wife and  family since separation) and  
thereby was precluded from  entering f u l l - t i m e  
employment or training* Hence, it w as r i g h t  to t a k e  
account of the wife’s age, the needs of her household, 
the likelihood that the sons w ould  continue t o  depend 
on her for some time, and her prospects for future 
employment *
Upon 8 * 3 ( 2 ), Lord Murray o b s e rv e d  that f i r s t  
"it must be approached on the basis that a matrimonial 
offence i s  no longer a ground o f  divorce* Secondly, 
there i s  no mention in the provision of t h e  parties* 
c o n d u c t * I f  conduct comes into t h e  reckoning at all, 
it must do so under the g u is e  o f  ’all the c i r c u m s ta n c e s ’ 
of the case I I n  the normal c a s e  (that i s ,  o f  s*1(2) 
(d )  and (e) divorces) he f e l t  that parties’ conduct 
w ould  /
1 * I t  i s  interesting how frequently t h i s  cautiousa t t i t u d e  t o  the proportion approach manifests i t s e l f #  2» p*77* This is an important feature# Lord Murrayrefers t o  the case o f  McLean v* McLean 1979 S*L#T* (Notes) 82* See supra*
5 ,  P#78*
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would have little or no r e l e v a n c e  to the award of 
periodical allowance but " P lainly, nonetheless, 
the party resisting payment - must have every 
opportunity of stating the ground of objection to 
the award or to the amount of the award*
A study of the history of the pleadings tended 
to suggest that arguments and counter arguments 
about conduct had entered the dispute almost ’by 
the way* • However, counsel for the pursuer 
contended that certain authorities^ entitled the 
court to make a discount in the financial provision 
to be made to a spouse who had materially contributed 
to the breakdown of the marriage, and that in this 
case, the wife’s conduct being wholly or mainly the 
cause of the b rea k d o w n , no larger allowance than that 
which the pursuer had offered should be ordered* 
Oounsel f o r  the wife argued that, at least in a s*1 
(2)(e) case, there was no ’p r o p e r  foundation in law’ 
for m o d ify in g  the aw ard  on the basis of contribution 
to m a r r ia g e  failure, but if there was such foundation, 
it should not be b y  the blunt instrument o f  r e d u c in g  
the award in direct propostion to the proportion of 
b lam e for breakdown*
Having viewed t h e  evidence, Lord M u rray  placed 
the blame for failure of the m a r r ia g e  upon t h e  
defender as to 75%, and upon the pursuer as to 23%*
I seems most unfortunate that in a s*1(2)(e) ease 
t h e  parties r e n d e r e d  i t  necessary for this to be put 
into words*
His Lordship then considered t h e  oases of McKay 
and Craig*
In /
1, Ibid*2* Counsel f o r  both parties invited adjudication upon complaints about conduct, citing Macrae v# 
M* 1977 8#L *T. (N o te s )  7 2 ; McKay v* McE* 1978 8*L*T. (N o te s )  36  an d  O ra ig  v*  0* 1978 8*L*T*(Notes) 61 *
I n  MoXmr ( e r u e l t y ) ,  o o n d w t  w as 
c e n t r a l * .  I n  t h e  o r o B a - a o t io n e ,  L o rd  B ran d  
a w ard ed  d lv o r o e  t o  b o th  p a r t i e s ,  and  g a v e  t o  t h e  
w i f e  ( e q u a l l y  r e s p o n e l h l e  f o r  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  
m a r r i a g e )  a  c a p i t a l  paym en t o f  h a l f  t h e  a i m  w h ic h  
w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  o r d e r e d  h a d  t h e  h u sb a n d  b e e n  w h o l ly  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  b re a k d o w n . A g a in , I n  
w h e re  n e i t h e r  p a r t y  ifaa  m ore t o  b lam e  t h a n  t h e  
o t h e r ,  L o rd  B ran d  a g a in  h a lv e d  t h e  e l^ ie  o f  th e  a w a rd , 
t h l a  t im e  o f  p e r i o d i c a l  a l lo w a n c e ,  w h ic h  w ou ld  h av e  
b e e n  g iv e n  h a d  t h e  Im abam â b e e n  s o l e l y  r e a p o n e l b l e  
f o r  t h e  b reakdow n#
O o im ee l f o r  t h e  h u e b a a d  a e k e à  n o t  t h a t  
a w ard  b e  r e d u c e d  I n  t h e  proportion  o f  t h e  w ife * #  
b la m e , b u t  t h a t  i t  b e  r e d u c e d  t o  t h e  am ount w h ioh  
t h e  h u eb au d  h a d  o f f e r e d #  B o w ev er, a l th o u g h  u n u a u a l  
o a s e s  m l ^ i t  b e  fo u n d  I n  w h ic h  b y  r e a s o n  o f  o o n d u o t 
some e q u i t a b l e  r e d u c t i o n  mlgght b e  m ad e^ , " A f t e r  
o a r e f u l  o o n a l d e r a t l o a  -  I  f i n d  m y s e lf  u n a b le  t o  
d la o o v e r  a n y  g ro u n d  o f  % )r ln e lp le  o r  l o g i c  I n  t h e  
f o r e g o in g  o a e e e  o n  w h ic h  t o  fo u n d  a  g e a e r a l  r u l e  
t h a t  a n  aw ard  o f  a  p e r i o d i c a l  a llow am oe  s h o u ld  b e  
r e d u c e d  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  to  t h e  d e g re e  o f  m a t r im o n ia l  
f a u l t  w h io h  earn b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  a p p l io a u t#  I t  
w o u ld , i n d e e d ,  b e  8ome%«diat e t a r t l i m g  i f  t l i l a  w e re  a  
n e o e e e a r y  r e a u l t  o f  t h e  oouee<p%eiiti8ul f l n e m e i a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  a n  A c t o f  P a r l ia m e n t  i n t e n d e d  t o  sw eep 
m fay t h e  o o u o e p t o f  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  o f fe n c e # " '^  I f  
t h e y  d i d  h a v e  t h a t  m e a n in g , L o rd  M u rray  fo u n d  h i m s e l f  
im a b le  t o  f o l lo w  t h e  o a e e e  o f  MoKay a n d  O ra ig #  He 
h o d  a a a e e o e d  t h e  a l lo w a n o e  f o r  t h e  i f i f o  a t  0 2 0 0  p e r  
m o n th , a n d  w ou ld  n o t  r e d u c e  i t #
T h e re  /
1# i n  L o rd  H u r r a y *0  exam p le  ( a t  p # ? 8 ) ,  w h e re  ayo im g w i f e  h a d  d e a e r t e d  h e r  h u sb a n d  a f t e r  a  few  w eeké o f  m a r r i a g e ,  and  th e n  s o u g h t  a  p e r i o d i c a l  a l lo w m o e  w hen h e r  hueb tm d  l a t e r  ^yiehéd a  d iv o r c e  
im d e r  e * 1 ( 2 ) ( e ) #2 .  p#79#
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There is here, therefore, a clear reixunciation 
of the relevance of conduct in the generality of 
a.1(2)(d) and (©) divorces^, at least quoad 
periodical allowance: it must he remembered also
that the parties had lived apart for many years*
In McLean supra, again a case where many y e a r s  had 
elapsed between factual separation and decree of 
divorce, Lord McDonald made no financial award at 
all, a decision with which it might be said a 
majority would agree, but he did not commit himself 
upon the relevance of conduct, a  factor which, 
however, in that case (husband’s material prosperity 
having grown after separation) did not figure largely.
Disclosure of Income and Capital
It may happen that the ’spouse of substance* 
is reluctant t o  disclose the details of his financial 
position, and in these circumstances the other spouse 
may ask f o r  commission and diligence to recover 
relevant documents*
Oommission and diligence was granted in theprecent case of Savage v# Savage, which was heard 
before Lord Murray. The action of divorce 
(irretrievable breakdowns adultery) was contested 
both on the merits and on the financial aspect. She 
sought a periodical allowance of £200 per month, and 
a capital sum of £110,000. There was a marked 
difference between the defender’s assessment of th e  
pursuer’s income (£15*000 p.a*) and realised capital 
(£5 3 0 ,0 0 0 ) and the pursuer’s averments (£15,500; 
£5 0 1 ,0 0 0 ).
Lord /
1 . Although the matrimonial offence is no m o re , presumably the key to the differentiation between non-cohabitation and other cases is that ( m is )c o n d u c t  may be less important, or at least not so recent,i n  the fo rm e r  situation*2. 1981 S.L.T. (Notes) 17#
535#
ytLord Murray referred to the cases of Douglas 
and Gould I ^ in which, it had been stressed that a 
specification o f  documents in undefended cases would 
be justified or necessary only in the rarest cases*
In Douglas, the First Division gave three guidelines 
in the matter of allowing specifications in defended 
divorce actions* These w e re  1* that t h e  means of 
the party w e re  substantial and the question of 
finance of considerable importance* 2. that the 
party of substance has not frankly disclosed essential 
details of his assets or income "of w h ic h  he is aware 
but of which the other party c a n n o t have any accurate 
knowledge or where t h e  other party has reasonable 
grounds for inferring that some of the assets or income 
are not being disclosed"* 3* that a specification 
will not normally be allowed before the closed record 
stage *
In the circumstances o f  this case, Lord Murray 
thought that the defender would go t o  proof on th e  
ground that the pursuer had understated his income 
and assets and that that ’seems to me to be the same 
ground as the second leg o f  condition (2)’.^
Therefore, since conditions 1* and 3* were satisfied 
also, the case fell within Douglas* Failing agreed 
figures, recovery of documents before the p r o o f  was 
desirable, the hope being that "it may close the gap 
between the parties * averments of income and assets 
and so restrict the areas of controversy,
W hat /
«4*5
1* 1966  8*L*T* (N o te s )  4 3 .2 .  1966 S .L .T *  1 3 0 .
3# P # 1 8 .4. Ibid*5. Of* 8c.L* Oom* Memo* N o .22 (Aliment and Financial Provision) 5 ascertainment of party’s means, 3*101 (divorce) (Fac. R e a p . p#?6) and 2 .2 0 9  2*11 (aliment) (Fac* Heap* pp*4?-49).
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What emerges from a review o f  cases is a 
realisation o f  the infinite variety o f  circumstances 
(and financial circumstances i n  particular) and o f  
the individuality of each instance. G r e a t  c a r e  is 
t a k e n  to adjust the award to meet the needs and 
reasonable wishes of the parties, to take into account 
the needs o f  children (especially to minimise disruption), 
and to ‘be aware, without specific mention of this 
aspect, of the current state of opinion u pon  such 
matters as the employment of married women* Principles
2
1of basic justice are heeded.
Thus, in a case recently reported in the press, 
the husband of a hardworking wife was ordered to 
make her a capital sum payment of £25,000, even 
though the sale of his (amusement arcade) business 
might be required in order to meet the obligation. 
Divorce was granted on the grounds of the husband’s 
behaviour, and the husband defended only on the 
financial claim* The marriage had subsisted for 
thirty years. There were five children* At the 
date of d i v o r c e , th e  husband’s assets were about 
£77,000 and  the wife’s amounted to about £3,000.
The wife had been saving and hardworking. At 
divorce, she was in employment# Her s a v in g s  she 
had given to her now adult children. The h u sb a n d  
offered a payment of £10,000, and said that a larger 
award would necessitate sale of the business* W h ile  
stating that there were oases where the court was 
unwilling /
1* See e.g. M cLean, supra, where the self-supporting wife was ‘Slowed no part of the husband’s post­separation prosperity, and Whitéhouse, where the wife who had received half share^oFThe proceeds of sale of the first home, was allowed no financial stake in the second, b o u g h t b y  the h u sb a n d  with h ^  share. The marriage had been s h o r t, the wife w as young, and she had c o n t r i b u t e d  nothing i n  m oney, and Irttle in k i n d ,  t o  the second home*2. Lawrence, Glasgow Herald 5/2/81.
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unwilling to force sale in order to provide funds.
Lord A l la n b r id g e  e m p h a s ise d  that he must take into 
account the wife’s position* She could not come 
to the court for a further award#
It is heartening that the court in such a
forthright way has shown that the contribution made 
by the wife and mother is entitled to recognition, 
at marriage b rea k d o w n , in the form of a substantial 
award in a suitable case# Payment i n  three 
instalments was agreed between the parties# A 
determined attempt is mad© to use to the best advantage 
possibly small resources. As Professor Olive notes , 
th o u g h , the cases, i n d i v i d u a l  and special in 
themselves, are the more bo when one considers that 
these are the cases where b e f o r e  t h e  litigation no 
agreement could b e  reached# Such litigation is not 
"procedurally typical, in that they tend to be cases 
where financial provision is disputed to the e n d " . 
Other cases are not "financially typical, in that 
they tend to b e  cases where there i s  more property 
than usual to argue about#"
Nevertheless, the impression gained is of a 
difficult task carefully done. There is perhaps 
the beginning of "back-peddling" on the relevance 
of conduct• Occasionally there is frustration in 
that the b r o a d  yet curiously restricting and 
skeletal Scots law provision (s#5(2)) by its lack 
of elaboration upon means (and, less frequently, 
purpose) prevents the ju d g e  from making a more 
detailed or lo n g  term and perhaps more subtle and 
suitable /
1* "Financial Provision on Divorce", E.H.Olive. 
1979 8 .L #T# 165#
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isuitable arrangement* The approach of the Act is 
basic, but the q u e s t io n  m ust be asked w h e th e r  in
the majority of cases, better arrangements could 
be made i f  more elaborate statutory g u id a n c e  and 
wider statutory authority were given# Limited 
resources are limited resources» It is submitted 
t h a t  free clean (financial and o t h e r )  b r e a k  should 
be made where possible*
Authority to postpone sale of t h e  home while
retaining for the non-resident ex-spouse a financialPinterest therein would be a welcome innovation*
In general, wider scope to act in relation to the 
home /
1* The opinion has been expressed that the financial issue h a s  become in many cases the overriding one, affecting the parties’ attitude towards the principal matter, which i s  t h e  formal t e r m in a t io n  of the marriage, and that sometimes insufficient consideration is given to the n e e d s  and rights of (the husband) who is usually t h e  payer (especially i n  view of th e  fact that, while there may be a return t o  court to have an award of aliment reviewed, the size of the capital sum is fixed at decree) as opposed to the needs and rights of ( t h e  w i f e )  who is usually the recipient# "D iv o rc e  ; the cases that do our law little credit"* George W att#  The Glasgow Herald 9 /2 /8 1  * The author admits that this is a statement to which the facts of an individual case can make retort « Certainly there is a groundswell of opinion among payers against lengthy financial commitment to  the payee* The Campaign for Justice i n  Divorce wishes to see support by both parents of the children until the latter are at least 16 and would favour support by husband of wife for a limited period (perhaps three years) at the end of which th e  wife should have mad© the transition to independent person* The combination of the factors of shorter marriages and better-trained women may make this more realistic and feasible than once it was, and in some cases such an approach would indeed be justified but it is submitted that the discretion of the court to make the most just arrangement possible should not be fettered*2* So© e.g* per L* Murray, in Gray*
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i  2home would he useful* The court in England may
choose to g r a n t  secured o r  unsecured periodical
payments* In the former case, the payer is ordered
to set aside a fund to meet payments should (he)
fail to make them in t h e  normal way* This, though
o b v io u s ly  suited to the case of the relatively
wealthy payer, may extend to other cases, the
matrimonial home being used as security* Every
effort should be made to render periodical allowance
awards enforceable in as many cases as possible*
Sums awarded should be realistic and perhaps there
should be a view upon cut-off point# In many, b u t
not all cases, a young (former) w ife  should not be
encouraged to e x p e c t  to be supported u n t i l  death or
re-marria#e, but r a t h e r  until the family has grow n up?. ^
P r o p e r ty  transfer orders are another possibility, 
but although these m ig h t b e  useful in individual 
instances, they are not advocated h e r e  as a general 
solution, because it is felt that t h e y  represent a 
negative approach to the subject of matrimonial property 
as a whole* Rather is a specific and detailed approach 
to divorce settlements recommended, l i n k e d  t o  a pre­
existing and p e rv a d in g  property system* Each party 
during marriage w ould  have the o p p o r tu n i ty  to  amass 
p r o p e r t y  (or, alternativoly, at or d u r in g  marriage 
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  w ould  h av e  b e e n  e f f e c t e d )  and  
a s  a general r u l e ,  on  divorce, unless "special 
considerations /
1. For example, to require the title to be takenin joint names* Joint ownership of the homei s  urged as the norm, however, in Chapter 7*2. Matrimonial Causes lot, 1973, s*25(l)* Bee"Principles of Family Law", 3 rd  edn* S* M* Gretney, pp.276-278*3* , cf. Gretney, p*279*limited time orders*
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c o n s l d . e r a t i o n s "  w e r e  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h ,  
s o m e  o f  w h i c h  n o  d o u b t h a v i n g  b e e n  i n  j o i n t  u s e ,  
w o u l d  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  o w n e r *  W h ile  c o n t i n u i n g  
i n c o m e  s u p p o r t  m ig h t b e  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h e  c o m p e n s a t o r y  
l u m p  sum , i n  c o n c e p t  a n d  i n  m a n y  s e t t l e m e n t s  i n  
p r a c t i c e ,  w o u l d  b e c o m e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e *
C h a p t e r  7 »  " T h e  H e w  R e m e d i e s " ,  D i v o r c e *
5 4 1I I  DEATH
Ao P r o p e r t y  R i g h t s  u p o n  D e a th  b e f o r e  1 9 6 4  
I n t e s t a t e  S u c c e s s i o n
F o r  m a n y  y e a r s  b e f o r e  t h e  p a s s i n g  o f  t h e  
S u c c e s s i o n  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 ,  t h e  S c o t s  l a w  o f  
i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  h a d  b e e n  r e g a r d e d  w ith  d i s f a v o u r ,  
b o t h  w i t h i n  a n d  o u t s i d e  S c o t l a n d #  S c o t s  L a w  " w a s  
o n e  o f  t h e  v e r y  l a s t  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  t o p
a b o l i s h  t h e  s p e c i a l  r u l e s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  l a n d * "
F e u d a l i s m  c o n t i n u e d  t o  e x e r t  a n  i n f l u e n c e ,  a n d  
t h i s  w p s  m a n i f e s t e d  i n  th e  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  m a l e  
s u c c e s s i o n ,  a n d  u n d i v i d e d  s u c c e s s i o n ,  a n d  i n  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  h e r i t a g e  a n d  m o v e a b l e s ,  t h e  
f o r m e r  b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  o f  i n f i n i t e l y  g r e a t e r  
i m p o r t a n c e  * A  c o m p l e x  s y s t e m  o f  r u l e s  e x i s t e d  t o  
a c h i e v e  t h e s e  e n d s *  T h e  r e s u l t  i n  many c a s e s  w a s  
h a r d s h ip  f o r  t h e  w idow ,^  e s p e c i a l l y  w hen sh e  was o f  
a  c l a s s  n o t  p r i m a r i l y  c a t e r e d  f o r  b y  t h i s  b r a n c h  o f  
t h e  l a w *  I n  t h e  l a n d e d  c l a s s e s ,  t h e r e  w a s  o f t e n  a  
D o w e r  H o u s e  f o r  t h e  m o t h e r  o f  t h e  h e i r - a t - l a w *
H o w e v e r ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  I n t e s t a t e  H u s b a n d ’ s  E s t a t e  
( S c o t l a n d )  A c t s ,  1 9 1 1 - 1 959, a  s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e  
a c q u i r e d  i n d e f e a s i b l e  r i g h t s  t o  a  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
d e c e a s e d ’ s  e s t a t e  ( r i s i n g  u l t i m a t e l y  t o  £ 5 , 0 0 0  i n  
a  s u i t a b l e  c a s e ) ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  d e c e a s e d  d i e d  i n t e s t a t e  
o r  o n ly  p a r t i a l l y  s o ,  b u t  o n l y  i f  h e  l e f t  n o  l a w f u l  
i s s u e *  /
1  « S e e  " T h e  S u c c e s s i o n  ( S c o t l a n d )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 " ,  M i c h a e l
H e s t o n ,  2 n d  e d * ,  p p . 8 - 1 0 ,  w h e r e  t h e  a u t h o r  d e s c r i b e s
t h e  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e f o r m  i t ,  b e g i n n i n g  i n  1 9 2 4  a n d  
c u l m i n a t i n g ,  n o t  b e f o r e  t i m e ,  i n  t h e  1 9 6 4  A c t .
S e e  a l s o  " S h o r t  C o m m e n t a r y  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  S c o t l a n d " ,  
T *B *S m ith , p*401*
2 *  H e s t o n ,  i b i d * ,  p . 1 5 #
5 #  A t  p . 4 0 3 ,  P r o f e s s o r  T . B * S m i t h  r e l a t e s  t h a t
P r o f e s s o r  F a r q u h a r  H a c R i t c h i e  s u p p l i e d  h i m  w i t h  a
d i a g r a m  i l l u s t r a t i n g  t h e  o r d e r  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  i n  
i n t e s t a c y  u p  t o  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  p e r s o n :  n o  m e n t i o n
w a s  m a d e  o f  t h e  w ife  a n d  m o t h e r *
5 4 2 .
i s s u e .
-1
P r o f e s s o r  H e s t o n  r e i t e r a t e s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
s t a t e m e n t  o f  i n t e n t  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  M a c k in to sh  
C o m m i t t e e  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  S u c c e s s i o n  i n  
S c o t l a n d  ( 1 9 5 0 ) *  " w e  h a v e  t h r o u g h o u t  k e p t  i n  
v i e w  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  when a  m a n  d i e s  w i t h o u t  a  
w i l l  t h e  l a w  s h o u l d  t r y  t o  p r o v i d e  s o  f a r  a s  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h i s  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  
m a n n e r  h e  w ould  m o s t  l i k e l y  h a v e  g i v e n  e f f e c t  t o  
h i m s e l f  i f  h e  h a d  m a d e  a  w i l l * "  T h e  t r u t h  o f  t h e  
m a t t e r  w a s  t h a t ,  b e f o r e  1 9 6 4 ,  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  o f t e n  
w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a s t o n i s h e d  a n d  a p p a l l e d  b y  t h e  m o d e  
o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h i e  e s t a t e  i n s i s t e d  u p o n  b y  t h e  
l a w *
M s m i-S ls A M
L e g a l  r i g h t s  w ere  e x i g i b l e  b e f o r e  1 9 6 4  a n d  
r e m a i n  e x i g i b l e  ( a l th o u g h  t e r o e  a n d  c o u r t e s y  h a v e  
b e e n  a b o l i s h e d ) * They a r i s e  i n  i n t e s t a c y  a n d  m a y  
a r i s e  i n  t e s t a c y ,  a n d  m a y  b e  c l a i m e d  a f t e r  p a y m e n t  
o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ’ s  d e b t s ,  b u t  b e f o r e  p a y m e n t  o r  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  l e g a c i e s  o r  b e q u e s t s  t o  o t h e r  p e r s o n s
gW r i t e r s  on  t h e  s u b j e c t " "  a r e  a n x i o u s  t o  s t r e s s  
t h a t  l e g a l  r i g h t s  a r e  n o t  t r u l y  r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  
n o r  a r e  t h e y  t r u l y  d e b t s *  T h e y  h a v e  a  s p e c i a l  p l a c e  
i n  t h e  o r d e r  o f  t h i n g s  * T h e r e  i s  a  n e a t  s e n t e n c e  
c u l l e d  /
1 .  I b i d * ,  p * 1 2 *2* e * g T  W a l t o n  ( " A  H a n d b o o k  o f  H u s b a n d  a n d .  W i f e
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  L a w  o f  S c o t l a n d " ,  3 r d  e d n * ,  p * 2 5 1 ) : 
t h e  w i d o w  " d o e s  n o t  t a k e  h e r  t e r c e  i n .  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a  c r e d i t o r ,  a  d i s p o n e e  o r  a n  h e i r .  H e r  r i g h t  f lo w s  f r o m  t h e  la w , e n t i r e l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d ’ s  v o l i t i o n , "  I n  B u n t i n e  v ,  B , ® s  T rs*
( 1 8 9 1 )  2 1  R * ? 1 4 ,  L * P ,R o b e r ts o n  a t  p * ? 2 0  t o o k  t h e  
v i e w ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  w i d o w  " c l a i m s  n o t  i n  
r i g h t  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d  b u t  a g a i n s t  h e r  h u s b a n d ,  a n d  
a s  h i s  c r e d i t o r , "
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1c u l l e d  from  t h e  c a s e  o f  H a l s m i t h  v *  Boye s  : t h e  
w i f e  a n d  c h i l d r e n  a r e  h e i r s  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  
c r e d i t o r s , "  a n d  c r e d i t o r s  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  h e i r s #  
H e n c e ,  t e r c e  a n d  c o u r t e s y  w e r e  knovm a s  t h e  " l e g a l  
l i f e r e n t s " ,  a n d  w e r e  t h e  o n l y  e x a m p l e s  o f  t h a t  
c o n c e p t  #
T h e  l e g a l  r i g h t s  w e r e  t e r c e  a n d  c o u r t e s y ,  a n d
w e r e  a n d  a r e  l u s  r e l i o t a e ,  l u s  r e l i c t i ^  a n d  l e g i t i m #
L e g a l  r i g h t s  w e re ,  a n d  a r e ,  i n a l i e n a b l e  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  t h a t  t h e y  a r i s e  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  i f  n o  t e s t a m e n t a r y  
p r o v i s i o n  i s  m a d e  f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a n  e s t a t e :  
e q u a l l y  t h e y  m a y  a r i s e  i f  t h e  p a r t y  i n  r i g h t  o f  t h e m  
w o u l d  p r e f e r  t h e m  t o  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f f e r e d  b y  a  
w i l l #  I t  i s  n o t  i n  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  t o  
e x c l u d e  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  i n  h i s  p o w e r  s o  
t o  o r g a n i s e  h i s  e s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  a m b i t  o f  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n  
i s  s m a l l ,  i n  t h a t  t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  o v e r  w h i c h  
t h e y  o p e r a t e  i s  e m a i l  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  w h o l e  e s t a t e #  
I t  w a s ,  a n d  i s ,  p o s s i b l e  f o r  s p o u s e s  t o  a g r e e ,  by 
a n t e - n u p t i a l  m a r r i a g © - c o n t r a c t ,  t h a t  n e i t h e r  s h a l l  b e  
a b l e  t o  c l a i m  l e g a l  r i g h t s  o r  t o  r e j e c t  t h e i r  o w n  
c o n t r a c t u a l  s c h e m e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h a t  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  
l a w  f o r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w h e r e  n o  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p r o v i s i o n  
h a d  b e e n  m a d e ,  o r  w h e r e  t h a t  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  d i d  
n o t  p l e a s e  t h e  s u r v i v o r #  I n  a  s y s t e m  i n  w h i c h ,  
t h o u g h  m a r r i a g e  m a y  b e  a  c o n t r a c t  w h a t e v e r  e l s e  i t  
m a y  b e ,  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h a t  c o n t r a c t  a r e  d i c t a t e d  
l a r g e l y  b y  t h e  l a w ,  s u c h  f r e e d o m  t o  c u t  o n e s e l f  o f f  
f r o m  /
1 # (1899) 1 F# ( H * L . )  7 9 , p e r  L* Watson at p p .81-822# T h e  w i d o w  m i g h t  n o t  c o m p e t e  w i t h  a n y  o r d i n a r y  
c r e d i t o r  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ,  w h e t h e r  h e r  r i g h t  o f  
t e r c e  a r o s e  o n  d e a t h  o r  o n  d i v o r c e  # T h e  r u l e  
a s  t o  d e a t h  w a s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  C o n v e y a n c i n g  
( S c o t l a n d )  A c t ,  1 9 2 4 , s # 2 1 ( 4 ) ( o ) ,  a n d  a s  t o  
d i v o r c e  w a s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  1 9 2 4  A c t ,  s # 2 1 ( 5 ) « 
5 #  i n t r o d u c e d  b y  M ,V /# P #  ( S c # )  A c t ,  1 8 8 1 ,  s # 6 #
5 4 4 ,
f r o m  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o r  d i c t a t e s  o f  t h e  l a w ,  i s  *1
r e m a r k a b l e #  D i s c h a r g e  p o s t n u p t i a l l y  b y  s p o u s e s
o f  t h e i r  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  © s t a t e s  o f  e a c h  o t h e r
w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  c o m p e t e n t  o n  a n a l o g y  w i t h  L o r d
R e i d ’ s  r e a s o n i n g ,  i n  C a l l a n d e r ,  a s  an  a l t e r a t i o n
o f  a n  a n t e - n u p t i a l  p r o v i s i o n  ( t h a t  l e g a l  r i g h t s
w o u l d  b e  e x i g i b l e )  o r  i n  t h e  p a r t i e s ’ f i r s t
s e t t l e m e n t ,  b e i n g  p o s t - n u p t i a l ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  c a s e s  ^
a n d  t o x t w r i t e r s  a p p e a r  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h i s  s u b j e c t
oi n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  a n t e - n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t  # ^  
I m p l i e d  d i s c h a r g e  w o u l d  b e  c o n s t i t u t e d  b y  t h e  
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  a  w i f e  d u r in g  h e r  h u s b a n d ’ s  l i f e t i m e  
o f  a  l i f e r e n t  o f  h i s  e s t a t e  (w h ic h , p re s u m a b ly , s h e  
m i g h t  d o  b y  a g r e e in g  t o  t h o s e  t e r m s  i n  a  m a r r i a g e -  
c o n t r a c t  ( p o s t n u p t i a l ) ) :  i n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a
w i f e  i s  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  h e l d  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  f e e  o f  
a  c e r t a i n  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y ,  w h i c h  
w i l l  h e l p  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  l i f e r e n t  in c o m e , i n  r e■ * *rïlâ*»rscift «sraïwfiwi»
r e l i o t a e #  M o s t  r e m a r k a b l e ,  w a s  t h e  p e r m i s s i o n  
g r a n te d  b y  t h e  l a w  t o  p r o s p e c t i v e  s p o u s e s , by  a n t e -  
n u p t i a l  /
T h e r e  w a s ,  a n d  i s ,  r o o m  f o r  a  ch an g e  o f  m i n d ,  
i t  s e e m s #  S e e  p e r  L ,  R e i d  i n  C a l l a n d e r  v# 0 » ’ a E xec# 1972 S .L .T *  2 0 9  a t  p . 210%- 
" T h i s  e x c l u s i o n  o f  l e g a l  r i g h t s  o r i g i n a t e s  f r o m  
c o n t r a c t *  N o r m a l l y  p a r t i e s  who m a k e  a  c o n t r a c t  a r e  f r e e  t o  r e s c i n d  a n y  o f  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  b y  a  s u b s e q u e n t  c o n t r a c t  a n d  I  c a n  s e e  n o  r e a s o n  why 
s p o u s e s  who h a v e  e x c l u d e d  l e g a l  r i g h t s  s h o u l d  n o t  
i f  t h e y  c h o o s e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e s t o r e  t h o s e  r i g h t s *
T h e  e x c l u s i o n  i s  o f  n o  d i r e c t  b e n e f i t  t o  a n y  b u t  t h e  s p o u s e s  t h e m s e l v e s " *  ( I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  b r i n g in g  t o  a n  end  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  s e t t l e m e n t  t r u s t  w a s  h e l d  n o t  t o  i n d i c a t e  a n  i n t e n t i o n  by 
t h e  p a r t i e s  t h a t  l e g a l  r i g h t s  s h o u ld  r e v i v e  n o r  
d i d  t h e y  r e v i v e  b y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  l a w * )
B u t  s e e  W a lto n  p * 2 4 2 ,  w h e r e  h e  s t a t e s  t h a t  r e l i o t a e  may b e  d i s c h a r g e d  by  a  w if e  b y  p o s t - n u p t i a l  
d e e d  -  " a t a n t e  m a tr im o n ro ,  i n  a  s e p a r a t e  d e e d ,  a  
m u t u a l  s e t t l e m e n t ,  o r  a n y  o t h e r  w r i t i n g * " — a n d  
a u t h o r i t i e s  t h e r e  c i t e d  ( e * g *  S m a r t  v* B . ’s  T r s *1926 8*0*392% im p l ie d  d i s c h a r g e  o f  r e l i o t a e  th r o u g h  p o s t n u p t i a l  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  l l F e r e n t T J ”’
n u p t i a l  ( b u t  m o t  p o s t « * n u p t i a l )  c o n t r a c t a  t o  
e x c l u d e  t h e  c l a i m  t o  l e g a l  r i g h t s  ( l e g i t i m )  o f  
a n y  c h i l d r e n  they m i g h t  h a v e  # S u c h  a c t i o n  i s  n o  
l o n g e r  c o m p e te n t ,  b y  v i r t u e  o f  th e  S u c c e s s i o n  
( S c o t la n d )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 , s*12*
1# TEROE
B e f o r e  1 9 6 4 , th e  s u r v i v i n g  h u s b a n d  o r  w ife  
( b u t  n o t  c h i l d r e n )  e n j o y e d  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i n  h e r i t a g e #  
T hese  w e r e  n a m e d  t e r c e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  w i d o w s ,  a n d  
c o u r t e s y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  w idow ers*  T h e y  w e r e  n o t  
r i g h t s  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  e x c e p t  i n  th e  n a rro w  s e n s e  
t h a t  t h e  h o l d e r  h a d  a  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y  i n  a  l i f e r e n t ,  
a n d  o v e r  t h e  m o n e y s  p r o v i d e d  t h e r e b y  b u t  w ere  r i g h t s  
o f  a n  incom e n a t u r e ,  o f  l i f e r e n t ,  p r o v id e d  b y  th e  law#
B y  t h e  1964  A c t ,  8 * 1 0 ( 1 ) ,  t h o s e  ' l e g a l  l i f e r e n t s *
a r e  a b o l i s h e d ,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a l l  e s t a t e s  o f  p e r s o n s
d y in g  on  o r  a f t e r  1 0 t h  S e p te m b e r , 1 9 6 4 , t h e  d a t e  o f
1c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  A c t #  
oWalton^^ re m a rk s  t h a t  th e  r i g h t  o f  t e r c e  i s ,  o r  
w as^  a n a lo g o u s  t o  t h e  E n g l i s h  "dow er" and  t h a t  o t h e r  
n a m e s  f o r  t h e  l i f e r e n t  w ere  " t i e r c e  p a r t i e " , o r  
" t e r t i a  p a r s " ,  fro m  w h ich  i t  i s  e a s y  t o  s e e  how th e
n a m e  " t e r c e " e v o I v e d #
G r e e n ' s  E n c y c l o p a e d i a ^  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  
i s  s a i d  t o  b e  f o u n d e d  on " th e  o b l i g a t i o n  i n c u m b e n t  
o n  a  la n d e d  p r o p r i e t o r  t o  m a k e  r e a s o n a b l e  p r o v i s i o n  
f o r  /
1 * S e e  a l s o  S c h e d u l e  2 ( 4 )  ( e f f e c t  upon  o t h e r  
e n a c t m e n t s )  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  
c o u r t e s y  o r  t e r c e  i n  any  o t h e r  e n a c t m e n t  s h a l lb e  o f  no e f f e c t ,  a n d  s # $ $ ( 1 ) ,  t h a t  r e f e r e n c e st o  t e r c e  o r  c o u r t e s y  i n  a n y  d e e d  t a k i n g  e f f e c t
a f t e r  t h e  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  A c t  s h a l l  b e  o f  no e f f e c t #
2 #  a t  p * 2 9 0 #9* voce 'T e r c e * ;  c i t i n g  F r a s e r ,  H# & W# II 1079 £tseg^ s M cL aren , Wills and Succession, v o l . 1 ,8 9 "TFnom which the Encyclopaedia t a k e s  its quotation) Oraig, 11, 22*25.
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for his widow suitable to his circumstances and 
condition in life*"
The right was to the liferent of one third 
o f  t h e  h u sb a n d 'B  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r t y  a s  a s c e r t a i n e d
at the date of his death* P r o p e r ty  subsequently
acquired did not become p a r t  o f  the fund p o t e n t i a l l y“1available for legal rights*
A l i f e r e n t  of one t h i r d  o f  the husband's 
heritage might n o t  amount to a great d e a l ,  a n d , 
in view o f  the restrictions upon the types of 
heritage from  which i t  was exigible, might be of 
l i t t l e  value to the widow*
It mattered n o t  how t h e  husband had come by  
t h e  heritage (whether b y  succession, gift o r  purchase)* 
However, i t  was well established t h a t  terce was not 
due fro m  certain heritable items, notably and perhaps 
most important from the widow's viewpoint, the mansion- 
house* In the absence of testamentary provision in 
h e r  f a v o u r ,  sh e  h a d  no c la im  t o  s u c c e e d  t o  t h e  h o u se  
itself and i t  was natural perhaps that she was not 
p e r m i t t e d  /
S ee  L in d s a y 's  T rs*  v ,  L , 1951 8 .0 * 5 8 6 *  The
s t r i n g e n c y  o f  t h e  r u l e  w a s  l e s s e n e d  b y  t h e  
C o n v e y a n c i n g  ( S o * )  A c t ,  1 9 2 4 ,  s * 2 1 ( 4 ) ( a )  w h ich  
e n a c t e d  t h a t  h e r i t a g e  h e l d  b y  t h e  d e c e a s e d  s p o u s e  
o n  a  p e r s o n a l  t i t l e  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  c o m p l e t e d  b y  i n f e f t m e n t  o r  b y  b e i n g  r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  D i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  R e g i s t e r  o f  
S a s i n e s  w ould  q u a l i f y ,  a s  w o u l d  h e r i t a b l e  e s t a t e  
h e l d  i n  t r u s t  f o r  b e h o o f  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  s p o u s e *
T h e  C o n v e y a n c i n g  A m e n d m e n t  ( S o * )  A c t ,  1 9 5 8 ,  s . 5 
a d d e d  t h e  w o r d s ,  " o r  t o  w h i c h  h e  h a d  a  p e r s o n a l  
r i g h t  c a p a b l e  o f  e n f o r c e m e n t  by  a d j u d i c a t i o n  i n  
i m p l e m e n t  o r  o t h e r w i s e " • T h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  a p p l i e d  
b o t h  t o  t e r c e  a n d  c o u r t e s y *The strange result of the previous rule had been that where the husband had sold property and had granted a conveyance, b u t  the purchaser had not become infeft at the date of the seller's death, the seller's widow was entitled to terce out of the lands sold*
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p e r m i t t e d  t o  make an y  c la im  u n d e r  t h e  h e a d  o f  t e r c e  
to one t h i r d  of some notional r e n t ,  while t h e  heir 
and his f a m i ly  w ere  in occupation* n e i t h e r ,  h o w e v e r ,
was she entitled to one t h i r d  of an actual rent if a 
tenant was living there*
"Hansion-'house " was defined with e x a c t i t u d e , 
and c e r t a i n  houses might not q u a l i f y ,  but if there 
happened to be two such houses, then although Waltonpreports that t h e  point was not d e f i n i t e l y  decided , 
i t  was possible that th e  widow might be successful 
in a claim f o r  a t e r c e  o f  the i n f e r i o r  h o u se  o f  the
two «
There was no room f o r  private bargain where the 
subjects out o f  which terce and courtesy w e re  exigible 
w ere  concerned* A conventional l i f e r e n t ,  said Lord 
T ra y n e r  in Constable,-  ^"may confer greater or lesser 
rights a c c o rd in g  t o  the construction put upon the 
deed conferring the l i f e r e n t ,  in view of what is 
expressed t o  be o r  held to have been the intention o f  
the granter* But what is covered by a legal liferent 
i s  defined by the law itself*"
Consequently, a town house or country house 
lacking estate was not "a mansion-house", and never 
c o u ld  b e ,  and  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t e r c e  was e x i g i b l e  
therefrom*^'
Terce /
1 * See generally, Constable's Trs* v* 0 # ( 1 9 0 4 )  6 F# 8 2 6 , p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r  L# T ra y n e r  a t  p * 8 2 8 ; "The mans1on-house is the h e i r ' s ,  and he may occupy it to the exclusion of all others* If he is pleased to let it for the occupation of another, which is a matter entirely in his o p t io n ,  he exercises a p r i v i l e g e  p r o p e r  t o  h i m s e l f ,  from  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  which no claim a r i s e s  t o  the widow*" Honereif v* Tenants of Hewton (1667) H*15844: Srsk.II,9.48: 
W a lto n , E* & W. p * 2 5 1 ; Head v* S w in to n , H *15 ,875  (1 7 9 6 )*2* See also Fr.ii.1097*5. at.p.828*4* F r* ii*1085  and 1097#
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Terce was not due fro m  superiorities, f e u -  
d u t i e s  o r  o a s u a l t i e s ,  n o r ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  f r o m . t e i n d s .
Since the essential n a tu r e  o f  the r i g h t  o f  terce 
w as a l i m e n t a r y ,  u n c e r t a i n  b e n e f i t s  w ere  th o u g h t  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  so u ro e s *  M in e ra l  r i g h t s  w ore 
excluded*
It can be seen from the tone of the (detailed) 
w r i t i n g s  on the subject that their a u th o r s  contemplated 
a  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  fro m  t h a t
which now obtains.
The nub o f  t h e  m a t t e r  w as t h a t  " H e r i t a g e  w h ic h  
c a n n o t  b e  f e u d a l i s e d ,  o r  w h ich  g iv e s  no i n f e f t m e n t  i n  
f e e ,  a f f o r d s  no t e r c e *  T h e r e fo r e  a l l  l e a s e s  , 
personal bonds b e a r in g  i n t e r e s t ,  or secluding e x e c u to r s ,  
t e i n d s  n o t  s e p a r a t e d  fro m  t h e  s t o c k ,  an d  l i f e r e n t s ,  
produce no t e r c e ;  and b e in g  heritable, the widow 
receives no share o f  them as jus relictae* In 
like manner, the h u s b a n d 's  right o f  courtesy being 
a  l i f e r e n t ,  h i s  widow o f  a  se c o n d  m a r r ia g e  w ould  
have no terce fro m  a r i g h t  which dies w i th  h i m s e l f ,  
"ïïeufructuarius", says O r a ig ,  " a l iu m  U B u fru c tu a r iu m  
f a c e r s  non posait*""^ The amendment ty the 1924 and  
1958 C o n v e y an c in g  Actw d id  n o t  d e p a r t  g r e a t l y  fro m  
that princ i p le *
Shootings, f i s h i n g s  and servitude r i g h t s  w ere 
terceable, as was t h a t  chameleon, the heritable 
s e c u r i t y #  H e r i t a b l e  s e c u r i t i e s ,  th o u g h  made m oveab le  
i n  /
1 . that is, w here  the husband was lessees o b v io u s ly ,  w here  the h u sb a n d  was the l a n d l o r d ,  the r e n t s , a s  the f r u i t s  o f  land i n  w h ich  the h u sb a n d  was infeft, w ere  teroeable* The w idow ' s  right arose at the death o f  her husband* T h is  meant that she c o u ld  claim one third o f  the r e n t s  w h ich  fell due at the 
f i r s t  te rm  a f t e r  h i s  d e a th *  B e l s o h ie r  v* M o ffa t 
(1 7 7 9 )  M*15, 8 6 5 . Gee E r a k . i i* 9 * 4 9 ,2 .  F r * ,  H* &, W*, i i .1 0 9 0 *
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4la  the of thn creditor* la  quomtlono
beWoen 3ïwbmM md uif'y rw:%lnM h eritab le  and 
termemble* en tltllm g  fh\) widow to omo th ird  of 
tW  Inoome or Imteroat
I f  a  died Imfeft im 3.m;%ds over which tW  
wldm; of hi# predwea^or Im t i t l e  had a rig h t of 
te ro e , then M# wm widow would bo e n title d  omly 
to  ^ 9  of the imwme of th a t heritage (being of 
the 3,mttor figure repreaemting the wea3.th of 
Imid leea the widow*# rig h t)  dwimg the llfa tim o of 
the f l r a t  widow* %W3 the death o f tW  la t t e r ,  
tw  aoem# widow*.a taroe would oeaae to  W "leader 
te rao ''\ and would heoomo a f u l l  to roe of the laado#
2 .  m '  ^
The r ig h t to  aowM^eey depended on v lr l l i% ^  
f e r t i l i t y  #%& th #  p ro d e o a a a e  an d  I n f e f t m e n t  o f  th e  
wife #
Th# loü of Reg* Hmj# 11#5B §1  ^ fomid
la  Ho%e V* Fruncj/^ la  quoted by Valtoa^ md w ill 
b e  r e p e a t e d  h e re *
"%;hen ane mem reecivem with hi$ W.fe 1%%
name of marriage* and begot$ lapon her w e  heir* com 
o r daughter* heard wlthi%& four walla of the
ho u ae*  w d  t h e  w ife  h a p p e n  t o  d w em ae*  t h e  l a n d s  and  
heritage whloh pertained to tW  wife ^hall, remain m)^ cl 
be poeaoaae# by Mebmd* lîM-urlng hi# lifetim e*"
The iiitrodw tiom  maggeet** th a t the r ig h t waa 
exig ib le out of l;ho brouf^iit 1# xmma of &om.y
or toeher by tW  fui^u'w wife* to  the W t
by  /
1$ T i t l e s  t o  tm W  O oB im oIidatlon (B o*) A ct*  1868*
2* ? r *  11* i m ? ** 1 7 W  M .3 1 1 9 ** a t  p* 262.I
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t >7 1 9 6 4 ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a i i d  f o r  l o n g  p r i o r  t o  t h a t  d a t e ,
the right was ex ig ib le  out of any heritage in.whioh
t h e  w i f e  w a s  i n f  e f t  a t  h e r  d e a t h ,  ( B y  v i r t u e  o f
th e  O o n v e j a n o i i i g  ( S c , )  A ct* 1 8 7 4 ,  s , 5 7 §  i t  w a s  n o
longer a requirement, as a resu lt o f the ab o lition
o f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  f e e s  o f  h e r i t a g e  a n d  f ees
o f  c o n q u e s t ,  t h a t  t h e  w i f e  s h o u l d  h a v e  s u c c e e d e d  t o
th^ lands, in  order that the to courtesy should
a r ise , Lands obtained by her by purchase could
e q u a l l y  f o r m  part o f  the courtesy l a n d s )  . The
r i g h t  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a  l i f e r e n t  o f  h e r  w h o le  h e r i t a b l e
e s t a t e  s o  held ( u n l i k e  t h e  right o f  te rce , w h i c h  w a s
m e r e l y  to o n e  t h i r d  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  husband's
t e r o e a b l e  h e r i t a g e )  b u t  i t  d e p e n d e d  a l s o  u p o n  t h e
h u s b a n d ' s  h a v i n g  f a t h e r e d  a  ch ild  o f  t h e  marriage,
which ch ild  had b e e n  born a l i v e  a n d  h a d  b e e n  h e a r d  ot o  c r y  , th o u g h  i t  m ig h t ,  im m e d ia te ly  o r  some tim e
t h e r e a f t e r ,  have p r e d e c e a s e d  b o t h  i t s  parents. I n  
other w o r d s ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  w a s  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  h a v e  
been, at s o m e  p o i n t  a n d  f o r  however s h o r t  a  time, t h e  
w ife 's  h e i r à
I t  m a t te r e d  n o t  t h a t  t h e  c h i l d  h a d  b e e n  b o rn  
i l l e g i t i m a t e ,  an d  had  b e e n  l e g i t i m a t e d  p e r  su b se q u e n s
matriro.oiLiu3îi^ although a  marriage b e t w e e n  t h e  c la im an t 
and th e  deceased  must have o ccu rred  a t  some date, 
because the former took the courtesy in  the capacity  
of husband and fa th er .asf azMwgeawiVaegeut jsnA»
As /
1 . 8ee Walker v$ W,'s Trs, 1917 8 ,0 ,4 6 , mentionedin  Laydon v , L. 1922 8 ,1 ,T, (8h ,G t,) 129, in fra .
2 , This requirement was imperative; no otherevidence of l i f e  su fficed  Roberton v . Moderatorof General AsseiiRily (1855) 11 8*297 although obviously i f  the ch ild  was healthy, any extra^ ordinary p la c id ity  or s ilen ce  at b irth  (or, as Walton says, deaf muteness in  the ch ild ) would long since h a v e  c e a s e d  t o  h a v e  any relevance to 
t h e  m a t t e r ,5, Crawford' s Trs. v . Hart (1802) M.12, 698: seePr. E, & W, i i ,1 1 2 1 .
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As t o  the requirement of infeftment, the 
am ending  provisions of the 1924 (a*21(4)(a)) and 
1958  ( 8 ,5 )  Acts upon this question, i n  relation 
to terce, applied also i n  the case of courtesy.
One important point was that the begetting
of a live child did not guarantee the husband's
right to courtesy* (sometimes called o u r i a l i t y  or
*Ourialitas*) if he survived his wife. The wife1might have had a son by a former marriage who 
w ould  be her heir, and if he was alive at his 
mother's death - thus precluding the claim of any 
son of the second or subsequent husband, to be 
heir - the claim of the second or subsequent husband 
w ould  fail, since c o u r t e s y  descended to him in his 
r o l e  or character of father of the heir, not husband 
of the deceased proprietrix^*^
Many /
1, hOTBî per Fr, H, &, W * ii,1122, that if th e  wife had had daughters b y  both the first and the second marriage, all the daughters would succeed as heirs - portionere, and the husband "would be entitled to the courtesy of that portion of the p r o p e r t y  which his own daughters succeed to," Similarly, the husband w ould  have right to courtesy if he had fathered the heir (his wife's o n ly  son), no m a t t e r  how many daughters by a previous or b y  his own marriage, she had had,2* D a r l e i t h  v ,  O am pbell 1 7 0 2 , M ,5115#3, Since divorce, though available, of course, i nScotland, was rarely found, it can b e  assumed t h a t  the factor which terminated the previous marriage (of which the heir was born) was the death of the husband in most cases, and thus there could b e  no possibility of two claimants of terce# Even if the former husband had survived (see d iv o r c e  example) he could not have c la im e d  since he would not meet the r e q u i r e m e n t  of being the husband of the deceased (at her death) which is not explicitly r e q u i r e d ,  but no former husband could t r u l y  be  regarded as the deceased's 'h u s b a n d ' especially if he had been followed b y  one, o r  more, subsequent consort(s).Had the dissolution of the prior union, allowing the wife to contract a second marriage, been brought about b y  divorce, the father of the h e i r  might be alive /
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M m y o f  t h e  eo w m m ts p e r ta ln lm #  t o  t # % e  w e  
valid  aliae in # e  #f ecwW^y# though tMM
we 8eme
T he AO'W 1 4 9 1 $ w d  4 5 5 5 $ e*1$$  i^rhioh
cmtiem I f  # e »  #a$ a :^ imk of mimwmagwmt 
o f  %W M f e m m te d  e a tm te  e q m l l y  t o  t h e m  Im
%"igW of om #w y w  W thorn im #f la
vim'^  of the fm t # #  hwhmd had # wgm of tw
imoome to miameme#e$ #  might he tho%W that the 
r i e k  vme p o te m t lm l ly  g r e # # f  l a  M o  oame**^
t W  s m o  p rov lm lom a # p l i e d  t o  e o u rW o y
/
a l i w  #  t h e  o f  âem th  o f  M e  fo r m e r  w lfe ^W t the mituabiem would w lm  e w e ly  la*o f the omiaorte eouM claim toreo-^ elmoo the formw qum3.1fied oc fa tw r  but mot me huehwd# $md the l a # w  ea hunhnnd o f tWdocomeed W% aot ms fa taer of the hoir* %#re coaM be ome ela lm w t or therefore^- thereooi)M mwer he Wo* Im the aheem# o f a elalmamt# oroamehly# # 0  fe e  # f # 0  hei^imgo mit o f  which toree M ght hmm h ew  ex ig ib le  #ouM e i# ) ly  hmre aow lvW 'w eoW lm g to  the terme o f  the w i l l  or #10 w le #  o f  im teetm # ae always wouldhw # beoa # 1# eaae# m l  the Imaome o f heritage  which #ouM hav# fm llea to & m%ltab3,y q u a lified  oleimw%t la  wm# o f bo\"oc$ would devo lw  f;lrllArly$  thou#%  ^ Im ow e o f Inioutaoy w  p a r tia l Inkgt^Umy Im wW*eh I t  fom W  ol th# iu tw ta w  o!ïta*;o$ i t  fturcly be tk>ult qs frooe # a #  md eoul# mwar he a^teohM  elmoe otWrwio# # 0  ru lm  aa to enuIt%S&o?*st to  courWmy w uM  W a lAO'^ o^wor m%oh aronult would W a q u iw  fo r  thatdate# aeelm llatiom  iu  Uroatmmt o f heritage to  mowablea* Thoaa %^re mattem o f  oomjmcture,^ howmrer$ In the abaoao# o f authority* i #  Balaton V# (<o'itau* ib 0 5 $  B o o le*  893*8# I t  la  iaW reati%  to  mad the dlooueuloa by lord  F r a a o r  (1 1 * 1 1 2 0 ) upem t h e  m a e o n a  adduood  6 y  v a r i o t #  w ritoz^u  f o r  :;ae hwbm m d'G  l i f o r m t  im lu g  o f mot of oW',#'#lrd o f the ineome o fth e h $ d iu b lé  oatato#
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08 to terce in the matter of redemption of oourteey 
by a proprietor or eeourlty holder, the provisions  
being the Oonvoyonolng (Go*) &ot, 1924* s*21(5)(&) 
m d  (o )#
In the ease of courtesy* there was no meed of 
aervioe or deelaratCK (i#e# teroe after 1924) to 
eooure to the hUsbemd hie %'ight* It arose 
automatically if the prerequloitoa were presemt,'^
The reason adduoed by Fraser^ for this w w  that 
t e r o e  w as a  m ore c o m p l ic a te d  r i g h t  " r e q u i r i n g  t h e  
partition of a certain subject"* and hence requiring 
"some judicial acta to perfect it; whereas the 
courtesy* needing no partition# la completely voeted 
u p o n  t h e  w if e * a  d e a th #  %i3fithout any  s e r v ic e #
kexm lng# d e c l a r a t o r  o r  o t h e r  l e g a l  fo rm *"
%C l in to n  v#  T r o f a s ie '^  p r o v i d e r  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  
t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  that l a n d s  held burgage# e n d  feu^
d u t i e s #  w e re  l i a b l e  t o  c o u r te s y *  T h ey  w e re  n o t  
l i a b l e  t o  t e r c e #  As %fith t e r c e #  t h e  incom e fro m  
feudW , o a m i a l t i e a  w as e x c lu d e d *  (To c la im  a  o a m u a lty  
o f  a  s u p e r i o r i t y #  t h e  c la i jm m t w ou ld  h a v e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  h a v e  b e e n  i n f  e f t  a s  s u p e r i o r  I n  t h a t  s u p e r i o r i t y #  
a  r e q u i r e m e n t  w h ic h  a  l i f e r e n t  o r#  huBbmnd o r  w lfo #  
o b v io u s ly  c o u ld  n o t  f u l f i l ^ ) »  W here f e u ^ d u t lo s  
w ere  c o n ce rim d #  i t  w as so m etim es d o u b ted #  from  t h e  
p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  t h e i r  n c n * * @ v a ila b ili ty  f o r  t h e  
w id o w 's  t e r c e #  w h e th e r  t h e  r u l e  c o u ld  a lw a y s  b e  
a d h e re d  t o  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  \#er@  fe u r - d u t le a  fo rm ed  
a  s u b e t a n t l a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  h a a b sm d 'a  e s t a t e *  F r& ser#  
a t  11*1099# e i t e e  1 B e l l* #  Com#98# w h e re  P r o f e s s o r  
B e l l  h a d  w o n d ered  w h e th e r  th e  r u l e  w o u ld  h o ld  " i n  
t h e  c a a e  o f  w h o le  c i t i e s  f e u e d  o u t ;  me G reen o ck  o r  
P a i s l e y  /
1* E rek *  11# 9 ,5 2 ,2* 1 1 .1 1 2 4 ,
3* (1 8 6 9 )  8  M acph, 5 7 0 ,4 ,  s e e  F r*  1 1 ,  1125* I n  th e  came o f  c o u r te s y #  and  F r*  11* 1099# i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t e r c e *
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P a i s l e y , "  b u t  t h e  f o r m e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  H i s h e t t ' s  c a s e
h a d  e f f e c t i v e l y  a n s w e r e d  t h a t  q u e r y  i n  t h e
a f f i r m a t i v e .  An e n t a i l  e x c lu d in g  th e  c o u r t e s y
o f  h u s b a n d s  w o u l d  b a r  a  h u s b a n d  e q u a l ly  a s  i t
Pw o u l d  b a r  t h e  w i d o w ' s  t e r c e #  U n d e r  t h e  T i t l e s  
t o  h a n d  C o n s o l i d a t i o n  ( S c # )  A c t ,  1 8 6 8 ,  s * 1 1 ? ,  
h e r i t a b l e  b o n d s ,  m a d e  m o v e a b l e  i n  t h e  c r e d i t o r ' s  
s u c c e s s i o n ,  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  c o u r t e s y  a s  t h e y  w e r e  
t o  t e r c e *
T h e  h u sb a n d  w a s  l i a b l e ^  f o r  t h e  r e a l  d e b t s  o f  
t h e  w i f e ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o n l y ^  o n  h e r  p e r s o n a l  
d e b t s  quantum  l u c r a t u s  b y  t h e  c o u r t e s y ,  a n d  i n  s o  
f a r  a s  d e b ts  p e r t a i n e d  t o  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  
t o  w h i c h  h i s  c o u r t e s y  d i d  n o t  e x t e n d ,  h e  h a d  a  
r i g h t  o f  r e l i e f  a g a i n s t  t h e  e x e c u t o r  ( t h o s e  p a r t s  
o f  t h e  e s t a t e  b e i n g  p r i m a r i l y  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e b t s ) ;  
t h e  w i d o w  w a s  l i a b l e  o n l y  f o r  s u c h  d e b t s  a s  p e r t a i n e d  
t o  t h e  s u b j e c t s  o f  t e r c e .  The h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  
w a s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p e r h a p s  p r o p e r l y ,  h e a v i e r  t h a n  t h e  
w i f e ' s , ^  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  l a y  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
w i f e ' s  r i g h t  su b  nom ine t e r c e  was m e re ly  t o  th etwpfljKsiSMSefiafl ^
i n c o m e  o f  o n e  t h i r d  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d ' s l a n d s *  T h e  
h u s b a n d  " e n j o y s  t h e  w hole  o f  t h e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r t y  
t i t u l o  l u c r a t i v o , "  a n d  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  " h e r  t e m p o r a r y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e •"  F r a s e r  s a y s  ( 1 1 2 6 )  " I f  i t  w ere  
n o t  f o r  t h i s  r u l e ,  t h e  w i f e 's  e s t a t e  m ig h t b e  r u n  o u t  
b e f o r e  i t  d e v o l v e d  o n  h e r  h e i r ,  by  t h e  g r o w i n g  i n t e r e s t  
o n  p e r s o n a l  d e b t s  d u r in g  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  l i f e ;  a n d  a s  
t h i s  w a s  t h e  e v i l  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  r e m e d i e d ,  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  h u sb a n d  h a s  b e e n  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o n l y  
o f  /
1 * N i s b a t t  V, I t ' s  Trs, ( 1 8 5 5 )  15 8 , 5 1 7 »2. 0 1 i n t o n  v ,  Trefusis (1869) 8 M aoph, 570,5 ,  H o n t e i t h  v. H e r  Nearest of K i n  1717, M,5H7#4. p a c e  B e l l ,  Prins. § 1 6 0 7  O o m , i * p , 7 8 ,  c r i t i c i s e d  by F r a s e r *  B e l l  a d v a n c e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  
h u s b a n d  w a s  l i a b l e  a l s o  for the p r i n c i p a l  o f  t h e  
p e r s o n a l  debts*5 .  8 e e  F r , i i , 1 1 2 6 :  W a lto n , 2 6 5 .6. Fr,ii,112G,
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of suoli personal debts,"
Certainly, the courtesy did tend in many 
instances "to t a k e  up where the .jus mariti left off"
since a husband was entitled, during his wife's 
lifetime, to the en jo y m en t of his wife's moveable 
property including the fruits of heritage, and the 
administration of her heritage by the lus administrationis, 
and, after her death if he survived her, to the fruits 
of her heritable property, and, in addition, jure 
r e l i c t ! g to  a  c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t io n  o f  h e r  m oveab le  
p r o p e r ty #  He was well provided for, and, moreover^ 
b y  the ius mariti during his wife's l i f e t i m e , and by  
th e  r i g h t  o f  courtesy after her death, he was entitled 
t o  the en jo y m en t of his wife's honours and titles, 
and all that that might entail, i n c lu d in g  a seat in 
P a r l ia m e n t  and  i n  th e  P r iv y  O o u n c il.-^
It was thought by  Walton^ ' that the abolition of 
t h e  j u s  m a r i t i  b y  t h e  M.W.P, ( 8 0 *) A c t ,  1 8 8 1 , and  o f
the ius administrationis b y  the H .W .P. (8c#) A c t ,  1920, 
did not affect th e  r i g h t  to courtesy, which would be  
exigible o u t o f  the whole estate even th o u g h , during 
t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  w h e th e r  b y  a g re e m e n t o r  l a t e r  b y  
operation of s t a t u t e , t h e  husband would have had no 
m a r i t a l  rights o v e r  the estate of h i s  wife d u r in g  
her l i f e t i m e *  If courtesy was c o n s id e r e d  t o  be  the 
true equivalent of terce, and not a species of i u s  
m a r i t i  taking effect after the wife's death on the 
income o f  h e r  heritable property, th e n  it m ig h t be 
thought that W a lto n 's  view i s  t o  be preferred, 
b e c a u s e ,  after a l l ,  the widow entitled to terce had 
no inter vivos right i n  her husband's estate. The 
text /
1# o f*  B e l l ' s  O o m .1 ,5 9 ,2 . see The Harries Peerage Claim 1848, $ Macq.585#
3 . s e e  W a lto n , p . 265*4# IJ?id; L# F r a s e r  o th e r w is e  and more d o u b t f u l  i i .TTSÜ, 1 1 2 7  and 1219 * where he makes mention ofthe case of Elgin v# F e rg u s s o n  26 J a n .  1 8 2 7 , 5 
8 * 2 5 5 .
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/Itext of Green's Encyclopaedia suggests probable 
agreement with Walton*
As in the case of a terser, a party in right of
courtesy could not compete therefor with an ordinaryPcreditor of the deceased spouse*
5* lus Relictae* lus Relict! and Legitim
In terms of the Succession (8 0 *) Act, 1964,
8 *1 (1 )(b), property, in the case of the estates of 
those persons dying on or after 10th September, 1964, 
the date of commencement of the Act, shall devolve 
according to the provisions of the Act (s*1(1)(a)), 
and according to "any enactment on rule of law in 
force immediately before the commencement of this 
Act which is not inconsistent with these provisions" 
[of the Act] "and which, apart from this section, 
would apply to that person's moveable intestate 
estate, if any; "
Thus, although terce and courtesy have passed 
into history, by virtue of 1964 Act, 8*10(1), and 
the rules concerning them might be said to be of 
academic interest only, the remaining legal rights 
of ius relictae (widow), lus relict! (widower) and 
legitim (children) continue in force* That which 
is éaid about them at this point, therefore, is 
relevant to the situation after 1964s the difference 
lies in the priority given to them in the division 
of the intestate estate# These three legal rights, 
after 1964, are calculated out of the net moveable 
estate after satisfaction of any claims to the "prior 
rights" of the suirviving spouse, introduced by ss*8  
and 9 of the 1964 Act* (1964 Act, 8,10(2))* Prior 
rights /
'Courtesy'*Oonveyancing (Be*) Act, 1924, s.21(4)(b) and (c)(death) and s*21(5) (divorce))#
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r i g h t s  i n  i n t e s t a c y  a r e  a  n o v e l t y  i n  t h e  l a w ,  t h e  
o n l y  p a r a l l e l  b e i n g  t h e  m o n e t a r y  p r o v i s i o n  a l l o w e d  t o  
a surviving spouse by the Intestate Husband's Estate 
(Scotland) A c t s ,  1 9 1 1  *-'* 1 9 5 9 *
T h e  situation before 1964, h o w e v e r ,  a n d ,  w i t h  
modifications, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  a f t e r  
1 9 6 4 ,  w a s / i s  a s  follows.
A . Ius R e l i c t a e
T h e  r i g h t  of t h e  widow to a  c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t i o n  
of her husband's moveable estate upon his death is 
a long-established one, which entitled her to one- 
half thereof, if the husband was notssurvived by
c h i l d r e n ,  o f  t h a t  o r  a n y  p r e v i o u s  m a r r i a g e ,  and to
one-third thereof i f  he was survived by s u c h  c h i l d r e n *1Entitled c h i l d r e n  were entitled, in that c a s e ,  t o  
of the net moveable estate in name of legitim, and 
the remaining was named "dead's part*"^ The present
p o s i t i o n  is that t h e  r i g h t  i s  to one-third, w h e t h e r  
t h e  children a r e  l e g i t i m a t e  or i l l e g i t i m a t e ^  o r  
adopted^* Further, s i n c e  there is now^ representation 
in legitim (previously there had been representation
of d e c e a s e d  c h i l d r e n  by t h e i r  i s s u e  i n  the m a k i n g  of 
claims to " d e a d ' s  part", out of t h e i r  d e c e a s e d  
g r a n d p a r e n t ' s  e s t a t e  t h e  remaining one-third s h a r e ,  
being t h e  remaining f r e e  e s t a t e )  the right i s  a l s o  
c u t  down to one-third, by t h e  p r e s e n c e  of l e g i t i m a t e ,  
but n o t  i l l e g i t i m a t e  i s s u e  o f  predeceasing l e g i t i m a t e  
or i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d r e n  o f  the d e c e a s e d *  Among 
claimants /
1#  s e e  t e x t  b e lo w .2* Alternatively, if there was no surviving spouse,
t h e  children were entitled t o  o f  t h e  n e t  moveable estate as l e g i t i m ,  and t h e  r e m a i n i n g  f e l l  t o  "dead's part".
5 *  by I , R * ( M i s c e l l a n e o u s  Provisions)(8c*) Act, 1 9 6 8 ,  which added a new s*10A to the 1964 Act,4* 1964 Act, 8*25(1),5* by 1964 A ct, 8*11*
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o la im a n ta  o f  t h e  f i r s t  g e n e r a t i o n  d e e e e n A e n te  o f  
t h e  d e c e a s e d *  t h e r e f o r e *  I t  oan  h e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  
o n ly  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  th e y  s h a l l  h e  c h i l d r e n  
o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d *  n a t u r a l  o r  a d o p te d .  I t  m a t t e r s  
n o t  w h e th e r  th e y  a r e  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  and 
th e  wldmv* h u t  c h i l d r e n  ( o r  r e m o te r  I s s u e )  o f  t h e  
widow a lo n e  c a n n o t  q u a l i f y  f o r  l e g i t i m .
I t  c a n  h e  s e e n  t h a t *  i n  e i t h e r  o a se *  o n e -h a 3 .f  o r  
o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  m o v eab le  e s t a t e  ro m ain e*  a p p a r e n t ly *  
u n a l lo c a t e d *  I n  f a c t *  t h i s  p o r t i o n  i s  a l l o t t e d  to *  
an d  known a s*  " d e a d 's  p a r t " #  I t  p a s s e s  i n t o  t h e  
g e n e r a l  i n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e *  an d  i s  d i s p o s e d  o f  a c c o r d in g  
t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  o f  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s io n *  w h ic h , 
b e f o r e  1964*w o u ld  b e  t h e  common-law r u l e s  o f  i n t e s t a t e  
m o v eab le  s u c c e s s io n *  and* a f t e r  1964* w o u ld  b e  th o  
r u l e s  o f  t h e  sy s te m  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  1964  A ct*  s*2#
I t  m ig h t*  a n d  may* b e  t h a t  d e a d 's  p a r t  w ould* o r  w i l l ,  
d e v o lv e  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  te rm s  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d 's  
w i l l *  i f  t h e  r e m a in in g  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  move&ble 
e s t a t e  h a d  b e e n  u n d is p o s e d  o f  b y  th e  t e s t a t o r  and  
h e n c e  liad  f a l l e n  i n t o  i n t e s t a c y *  o r  i f  I n t e s t a c y  h a d  
b e e n  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  throug& i t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
r e m a in d e r  o f  t h e  w i l l  an d  t h e  e l e c t i o n  t o  t a k e  l e g a l  
r i g h t s  # I t  w as * an d  i s ,  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  t e s t a t o r  
h a s  f re e d o m  t o  t e s t *  ( w i th o u t  f e a r  o f  s u b s e q u e n t  
r e j e c t i o n  and  o v e r tu r n in g  o f  h i s  w is h e s  b y  d i s g r u n t l e d  
l e g a te e # * )  o v e r  h i s  h e r i t a g e  an d  t h e  h a l f  o r  t h i r d  
p o r t i o n  o f  h i s  m o v eab le s  * w h ic h  i s  d e a d 's  p o r t*
Thus* 'd e a d ' s  p a r t*  l i v e s  u p  t o  i t s  name# 
O la im o n ts  o f  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i n  l i e u  o f  t e s t a m e n t a r y  
p r o v i s i o n s  w h ich  do n o t  p l e a s e  them  may c la im  o n ly  
l e g a l  r i g h t s *  w h ic h , b y  d e f i n i t i o n *  e x c lu d e  d e a d 's
p a r t#
I n t e r e s t  -  o f  v a r y in g  r a t e *  and  s u b j e c t  t o  
t a x a t i o n  -  i s  due  u p o n  t h e  am ount o f  t h e  l e g a l  r i g h t s
fro m  /
demth till payment# EaepMomally* it not 
be due if the (g):e;tate has earned me 
Oi .^l '^' th e  w if e  who ta k e #  t3m c h a r a c t e r  e f  widow
u<.upon  h e r  )mal3m%d*s d e a th  %my e l m ^  '
A former wife hm# no title thereto*
0%m hl^torioml point of g^roat interest that* 
wtil the ooad,3% imto fore# of the Inte^^taW Moveable 
Suooeesioa (B##,) Aot* 1855* $#5* it was eompf^ teat 
— t h e  r r o c ' t t o r e  o f  a  p re d e e e a e im g  w i f e  t o  c la im
mhrnoqwrnt death of # m  Webmtâ*
'ïfProfoosor T* Smith*" cites the relatively 
reeent eamc of Walker v# Orr'a Tzwteoe^ Im which an 
odd situation arena# The teot^ ttor waa au wived by 
hla widow m d  hla throe dm#tere# %  truet dig^poaitiom 
and j^ettlemoaty an arrmn^ememt had been made that t W  
iaowe of the wtato %ms to form m liferent for the 
widow wder deduction of ^ 1^00 p#a# to each daughter* 
tmd after the death of the widow* the laoeme wae to 
he divided amomg i:he ém%Bht#ro* the fee to be dimpoaed 
of by them aaoordla^^ to the will of each* or* faillmg 
auoh direction, to the lieira Ofmh#
aooorOing; to the law of aeotlead# Thoaee provielome 
to the da%htara were dwiared to he in full of all 
le^al rights competent to them* end to ho auhj&ot td 
forfeiture Im the oaae of who oleeted to take 
legal righta* During the period of their mother's 
vMuity, the dam#tera emh mooepted the imoome of 
2100 pAa*$ W t  upon the widow's deatz&* the dmiightera- 
alleged that they W d  made mo eleotiam* and that they 
worm entitled to claim legitim* the toetamemtaiy
provieiera la their fmmmr to fall Imto imtoBtaoy*
Cut of that intestate eatete* if auoh It be hold to be* 
t h e  /
1* H o lm ty m  Vo M*'m ( i  '* % It'io rh*  1(y?4#2 ,  G h o rt on  t W  ' o f  ,',oob%.u&d*
5* 1958  a ,  t .  65#
t W  widow's mwutore claimed
A proof befoi'a miwer was allm-mé upon the 
flrqt gwmtlon* the being on the dau^ntorta
ehm; tSmt no election by them had boon mmdo; if all 
tliree  ^f ' " wore able to make tmt thmt case* 
then th'-'' .'\ : .r's provielona for them wouM fall 
Into Intemtaoy and they were entitled to out
of the Intestate estate* and the wldow*0 oxeeutore 
would euoeoed in their olmlm# Upon the thli'ê 
quostlom* relating to t W  widow* I,-# (:3traohan %ald*
"I find this quomtlon to be m eomewhat ziarro^  ^on# 
but I h0vo Gome to tha opiujun that on principle 
the exeoutora of the wldoi'' bo entitled to olmim
V  ;  ^ p&rt of the ootate which may
' 1 Mi * Jwy* wem altkon^ ;h that intestacy 
omerge only the d e a th  of the widow# Ths
r q ^ u \ / 0  v e s t e d  o#  tW  d e a th  o f  tiu )  W e t a t o r  b u t  I t e  
eiife.\ t  ^ *' m t  wmo l i m i t e d  b y  th #  p r lm o ip le  o f  a p i> ro b s te  
&md : ; 'obate* That Mr that Mnylmg i^Ksot^ d to
a o o # ./\  Js^r o o m v en tlo D o l p%\. ylaiozD^ u n d e r  th #  e o t t l e m e n t  
the widow could not elalm any part of the estate 
vjhleh by the wa# give^ ü to others# The
rlp;ht .'ov, vot jn (y\c, however* and if m y
pertlcm of the rntoUo Imd (hiring her lifetime beeom# 
nmdlmpoaod of by the eettloment she could have elalmed
tMt 3>ortiom* That fd;W.a'tiom^  
w ould  h av e  3 0 l i e n  e x a o t ly  u n d e r  M a ism ith  v*  Boyoe#"^'
I /
i  # a t  p* 67.  (Walker v .  Orr’s T r s . 1958 S .L .T .  65 . )
2 #  i n  t I f . '  ' ,  ' u ' a  a  r i e u : 3 o  h a d  a b a t e d  t h a t
I t ^ r l w  '"* ! , n ,  p r o v i s i o n  w o%  t o  b e  I m  f u l l  o f  
t ,  I  t h e  t r u e  c o n c u r u o t i o n  w m a  h e l d  t o
' h a t *  1 'P 'O  w i d o w  o o n l d  n o t  l o g a ) .  r i # t t a
. ' ' ' o i ,  f l i c f . ' x l )  o r  w o r e  i n o o n s l a t o a t  o r
v i t h *  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  % o t t l e n a m t $  y e t  j "T vhcM' -'U j Tntr^< u n d is p o s e d  o f  by th e
j»;i ';U'Li I ' jn  f n l l i a g  i n t o  I n t c . / t a o y ,It bu n y n o te d  th e re f ro m *
5 6 1 .
" I  t h i n k  it follows t h a t  her r i g h t  was s t i l l  v e s t e d  
i n  her a t  her d e a t h  a n d  X s e e  n o  r e a s o n  w h y  i t  
should not transmit to her executors like any other 
jus orediti. If, for example* all the pursuers 
should h e  found entitled t o  c l a i m  and should c l a i m  
l e g i t i m  the whole r e s i d u e  will f a l l  into i n t e s t a c y *  
That Is estate which belonged to the testator at 
the t i m e  o f  h i s  d e a t h  and w h i c h  h a s  a l l  along been 
subject to the widow's jus relictae the moment that 
i t  became u n d i s p o s e d  o f  b y  the settlement,"
The case is reported further in the same volume 
at p.220* which reveals that the pursuers were 
successful In showing that they were entitled to 
claim legitim, provided that they accounted for the 
c o n v e n t i o n a l  provisions which they had each received, 
(^1 0 0 p.a, during the 1$ years of their mother's 
viduity),
The question is, therefore, whether the ratio 
of Nalsmith a n d  o f  W a l k e r  is or i s  not c o n s i s t e n t  
with t h e  provisions o f  the 1964 A c t ,  To answer i t  
would i n v o l v e  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the post-1964 r u l e s
upon partial intestacy, a n d  t h i s  will be postponed1t i l l  the c o n s i d e r a t i o n  thereof,
2The estate i s  valued a s  a t  t h e  d a t e  of d e a t h  ,  
a n d  many writers h a v e  pointed out t h a t  the widow i s  
n o t  entitled^ to c l a i m  any particular p a r t  o f  t h e  
estate in satisfaction of ius relictae* She is 
entitled merely to ^ or ^ thereof, as the case may 
be, whatever that fraction may comprise. In Oameron, 
t h e  widow had c l a i m e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  o f  a  holding of 
c e r t a i n  n a m e d  shares in a  particular Oompany ( S o c i e d a d  
Exploradora de Tierra del Fuego) in satisfaction of 
her l e g a l  rights, but it was h e l d  that the shares 
should /
1. S e e  also G, & W. pp.707-710.
2 .  M c M u r r a y  ( 1 8 5 2 )  1 4  D ,  1 0 4 8 .
3 .  C a m e r o n ' s  ' I r s .  v ,  M a c l e a n  1 9 1 ?  S . O .  4 1 6 .
s h o u ld  b e  v a lu e d  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  d e a th  o f  th e  
t e s t a t o r *  added  t o  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  h i e  m o v eab le  
e s t a t e *  and  t h e  d l v l e l o n  made a o o o rd ln g ly #  The 
d i f f i c u l t y  h a d  a r i s e n  h a o a u e e  th e  widow* I n  e l e c t i n g  
t o  t a k e  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i n s t e a d  o f  te a ta m e n ta r ;y  p r o v i s io n s *  
h a d  r e n d e r e d  I t  n o t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  e s t a t e  t o  p a y  
I n  f u l l  a l l  t h e  l e g a c i e s  b e q u e a th e d  b y  t h e  t e s t a t o r *  
and  an  a b a te m e n t w as n e c e s s a ry #  T h e i r  L o rd s h ip s
w ere  q u i t e  c l e a r  a s  t o  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  j u e  r e l l o t a e x
p e r  L* M a c k e n s ie ^ ; -  " I  t h i n k  t h e r e  i s  no  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  a  r i g h t  t o  j u s  r e l l e t a e  
an d  a  r i g h t  t o  l e g i t i m ;  e a c h  i s  o f  t h e  n a tu r e
o f  a  d e b t ;  an d  no  a u t h o r i t y  w as c i t e d  t o  no
w h ich  s u p p o r te  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  widow 
has w ay jug ia re."
en d  p e r  L# D u n d a a ^ ;-  "S p e a k in g  g e n e r a l ly *  I  
t a k e  I t  t h a t  j u s  r e l i c t a e  I s  t h e  l e g a l  r i g h t  o f  
a  widow* v e s t i n g  iR&q b y  h e r  s u r v iv a n c e  o f  
h e r  h u sb an d *  t o  a  s h a r e  -  o n e - t h i r d  w h e re , a s  
h e re *  t h e r e  a r e  c h i l d r e n  -  o f  h i s  f r e e  m oveab le  
e s t a t e  a s  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  h i s  d e a th #  I t  i s  n o t  
a  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y  b u t  a  d e b t#  The widow c la im s  
n o t  a s  a n  h e i r  b u t  a s  a  c r e d i t o r #  ( I n g l l s  v# I#
7 Macph# 4 5 5 #) W here a  d e f i c i e n c y  I n  t h e  
t e s t a m e n t a r y  e s t a t e  r e s u l t s  from  a  widow ' s  e l e c t i o n *  
t h e  o r d e r  o f  p r e f e r e n c e *  a s  r e g a r d s  l i a b i l i t y  t o  
a b a te m e n t*  I s  -  I s t #  s p e c i f i c  l e g a c i e s *  2 n d ly *  
g e n e r a l  l e g a c i e s ;  and  l a s t l y *  t h e  r e s id u e #  ( s e e  
M cLaren on  W i l l s  a n d  Buco#* V ol* I  $ 8 8 )*  I  c a n n o t  
a c c e p t  t h e  a rg u m e n t p u t  fo rw a rd  b y  Mr# M aconoohle  
t o  t h e  e f f e o t  t h a t  a  widow I s  e n t i t l e d  t o  demand 
o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  m o v ea b le s  s p e c i f i c a l l y # "
S u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  v ie w  I s  t o  b e  fo u n d  i n  R te w a r t  v*
X eillo r /
1 * a t  p#419*  Cameron 's  T r s .  v .  Mao Le an I 917 S .C .  AI 6 ,
2#  a t  pp .  4I 8- 419 .
5 6 3 #
K e i l l e r  & S o n s (1 9 0 2 )  4  ?*657$ an d  T a l t ' o  T rs#  v*
L eea  (1 8 8 6 ) 1 3  R*1104#
The im a u c c e s a f u l  a rg w a e n t o f  Mr* M aoonoohle for 
the widow (the aeooad party) la the special case, 
ia i n t e r e s t i n g *  n o v e r th e le a  a * His a t t e m p t  to 
d i s t i n g u i s h  ## the b a s is  o f  l u s  r e l l o t a e  from t h a t  o f  
l e g i t i m  -  on  t h e  n o t io n  t h a t  legitim* i t  w as established* 
w as p u r e l y  a  c la im  o f  d e b t*  and  " in  i t s  n a t u r e  a  
r i g h t  o f  succession*" whereas ius r e l i c t a e  w as a right■o' « wmnwv* «■i*¥w..»«»f«SEw«Bfam»3 ^
o f  p r o p e r t y  i n  a  s h a r e  o f  th e  h u s b a n d 's  e s t a t e  " v e s te d  
i n  t h e  w ife  d u r in g  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  l i f e *  s u b je c t*  i t  was 
t r u e *  t o  h i e  a d m in i s t r u t  io n  an d  c o n t r o l*  an d  [ i t ]  
em erged  t o  h e r  f r e e  o f  c o n t r o l  on h i e  d e a th "  * an d  t h a t *  
t h e r e f o r e  "A t l i i s  d e a th  t h e  widow a c c o r d in g ly  w as t h e  
a c t u a l  o im e r  o f  a  h a l f  o r  a  t h i r d *  a s  t h e  c a s e  m ig h t 
be* o f  t h e  i n a a  c o r p o r a  c o n s t i t u t i n g  t h e  e s t a t e n
f a i l e d *  b u t  a n y  com m ents on  th e  th e o ry *  o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  
b a s i s *  o f  l e g a l  r i g h t e *  i s  welcom e# I n  t h i s  in s ta n c e *  
th o u g h  p e rh a p o  f o r  r e a e o n a  o f  e x p e d ie n c y  i n  t h e  c a s e ,  
c o u n e e l  a rg u e d  t h a t ,  w h i le  l e g i t i m  h a d  i t s  o r i g i n s  i n  
Roman Law* ^ u s  r e l& o ta e  s p ra n g  fro m  Germany* "an d  fro m  
t h e  th e o r y  o f  a  communion o f  goods b e tw e e n  huob&nd 
and  w i f e , "
T h is  i d e a  a r i s e s  i n  a  nuxaber o f  s i t u a t i o n s  
r e q u i r i n g  e x p la n a t io n  (and*  i t  m ust b e  a d m it te d *  i n
p l a c e s  w h e re  m ore o b v io u s  o r  c o n c r e te  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s>1o r  m is ife rs  a r e  l a c k in g * )  W alto n  s a y s  * "The la n g u a g e  
o f  t h e  o l d e r  w r i t e r s  a n d  d e c i s i o n s  i s  c o lo u r e d  b y  t h e  
a n t i q u a t e d  t h e o r y  o f  a  "com m m io bonorum " o f  w h ich  t h e  
h u sb a n d  w as t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r ,  " fro m  w h ich  s e n t im e n t  i t  
c an  p e rh a p s  b e  d e d u ce d  t h a t  h e  h a d  no  h lg l i  o p in io n  o f  
t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  su c h  a  n o t io n  t o - d a y  * Ee* to o *  
i n s i s t s  t h a t  j u s  r e H o t a c  i s  a  c la im  o f  d e b t*  and  
q u o te s  /
at p , 2 3 7 ,
quatem L* la Mgilsmith v# Bourne ' ^ "The' legal
clalBie of widow end o'hlMrem are met* etrietly speaking*
rights of owoeaaloa* and they infer mo repreaontatlon#"^ 
" % 03  ^ai'e in the amtur# of debts %Aleh attach to the 
free muooos$iom &fter the ol&im# of oaeroue creditor#
ÏW# boon eatlmflod#" Thus* WalWn eays,^ If the 
ontat# imaolveat at the date of the hwbmi&'m death*
■bâere a m  b e  no J ^ t  SSM sSM S.*^
Of omirse* tliore may bo o&aea where it %iill bo 
uaohjeotlonablo* or oonvenioat* to give to the widow 
opeolfio ehareo la certain ooi^aniea* or certain 
partloWLar Item# of property* if she ao wlohes* Again* 
it may be more eonelble la tlmoo of aooaomlo aad/or 
B to o k  M a rk e t & ep re$ $ lo a*  f o r  t h e  widow (a n d  any  o t h e r  
beaofiolarlos) to receive eharoa thaa zAoney*
and the tiinhea of the Waefioiarioo i/o rid maturally 
be ooamalWd# auoh a oaae was Mlllw v# M*'a Tre#"^  
li:k id i lo h  L o rd  M om ter mode a  s u r v e y  o f  r e lo v tm t  a m th o r i ty *  
/
1* (1  " / ' )  1 / #  ( 79  » t  p#B1*2# lo  n o t U  19^4* i f h w  b y  8*11 o f  th e  M t*3 \rr^ ino)kralM 0u  wan p e m i l tk o l*  W t  o3yvio\K ly* b y
j;' W  «u 'A ire  o t  XiHi. E B M M U M ^   ^ o n ly  i n
9# r4 , 'no y n c r a i ly  "TZko o t of rù,\:n Property1-' f , fjDh daringUhM o* 1 V4\' or w?dLoh it im ; ar'Xon1;e8 th'n,, /<* the 
" j J / r  Oil lax 'o  .f'tjy law  wW oh o h tb i&  W ' \ * ( ) m # b m a d  IV' w i i o ,  q an  b e  fo u n d  o f  a  ooi r sy stem #i\$ret'.r(r*  n,*p,Wo. ("T h e  H u o o e se lo a  (no*P;> %;\() l o t *PXA" e&iu ro'^ 'arkq "Ther^ 3%()v he,a variowrr/^ pmonto rj" bo the truf uJ.ofl n „ and amt o  t h e  o r i% ie  o f  l e g a l  » h  r i * r A tte m p tsh ^ve  booa  icAu t o  o3.Psa^ , W r '  dobb,3 b y  C' ri \u' r'* '.OR la the estate#I'o  whn v.bbcmr^V'.; l u   ^ „ i o f  m sy s te m  o f  of nmp^^rby In. '^uvtlrno^, " dlaouBsioa%^faa .ta %'» C'-^ ntr^ by. M-' ei3ji)0 Chapter1 'dic^  7 'The UuArr-xio BoaorummlTEurt' n o to ',  mad 'fow Æ % ra Hew Co'J:\»'9o**5» 1914 1
and in which he oatertaimcd the proposition that 
"A widow's right to ow-third of the goods Ian aommimioa * 
la a right of property# It ic a right e W  has during 
hei* hug%band*8 lifetime* thoug;h M r  right to 
adainlstr&tioa of it la œepeMoâ* eund. ho M s  the 
ahoolTito oontrol m'ld disposal of M m  ocmmon 
IMt the moment #ie breath out of his body hlB 
adialnlotration oeaoos m d  her pa?oixrletary right emorgoe* 
free of oomtrol* m d  may be mmiiW affeeWal through h w  
h u a b a W a  exeoutorc or 3?o%>rosemtatlveo#"* W t  woul.d 
seem* at the #ad of hlcD Imtorlaoutor* to have preferred 
the other view, ao Wlmg "most oomaomamt with tho 
&eo:Wloma end t M  of o w  law, which does
not I'ooognlao oommixioa in $oodm heWoen a husbmad 
m d  wife* I thla^ K it olomr fmm the deoleloa in 
Tait'B fra# that If a w n  Ime left a epeoial legacy 
to anyo%'A0 his widow Oim meA'ce no claim to any portion 
of the l$g6%oy if her satisfied
out of the {general eat site# So If a moveable auhjeot 
be not Emeocptible of dlvisdcm I think that the 
w l& aw 'a c la im  i s  f o r  paymmitt o f  a  p o r t i o n  o f  t)io  v a lu e  
thereof ami not to a ooirmyaaoo*"''''
The oame of Millar's Tra* maa ifiemtloaed la 
C-azioron*"^  where Lord (*wan'e opimion above w&s said 
to be* m  D03^ & Kinominey h#& n , , ? * ed la Keillor*'^ 
morely e/.pr')imive of a &o#lro vt'- f* itizigulsh t3ie 
rlfgït from A right of auooesaiom#
Btoir's opinion^ - thou#i out of oto%) vrith the 
l a t t e r  th W ^ ln g »  # i l o h  ham b e e n  a o o a p to d  a$ o o r r o o t  «a* 
waa /
1# e m m ia tia g  from * m&d e^ tp reaeed  jüi t h e  wordm o f*Lord Oowmi In Holmtyre v# M*'e Tro* (1865) 3 îWph* 
1 0 7 4 * a t  %i* 1075 .2# >^5 4 1 6 .3* fro# Va Maclean 191? 8*G* 416*4* %n V* m i l l w  & Gone (1 9 0 2 )  4  F.*65?#
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was that "if the defunct be married there was thereby 
a eomiwLlon of goods hotwlxt the defimot and the other 
spouse, which, being dissolved by death, the aurvivor 
may withdraw their share, which share le estimated by 
tho condition of the family at that time." Eraklne^ 
seems to treat legitim and ine relictae in the aarne 
way* The C o n v ey an c in g  ( 8 c , )  ^ o t ,  1 9 2 4 , o * 2 2 (1 ) 
assimilated the rules by which are determined which 
parts of on estate are subject to legitim to those 
which determine which parts of an estate are subject 
to iuB relictae*
In i.illar, the balance of convenience was to 
award the shares to the widow* No prejudice would 
be done thereby to the trust estate* It la now 
generally accepted that the decision in Cameron la 
correct*
.B&E &@liot&g vests at the date of death of the
husband in the estate poaeesaed by him and subject toPius rolictao at that date*"' The widow's title, 
however, depends upon confirmation*^
Despite protesta at the time of the passing of 
the 19G4 Act, and afterwards^\ Parliament insisted om 
the retention of the dif feront i at ion between heritage 
and noveables for the purposes of legal rights, 
although, of course, one of the main aims of the 
legislation was to assimilate the treatment of and 
devolution of heritable and moveable property* Thus, 
nothing heritable, or in the nature of, or pertaining 
to, heritage, or rights having a tract of future time, 
is /
1* III TX*192* Llleon'o Trs#v..Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1917 i#0*527*3, ^ 0 0  19G4 Act, 0,14; and Part III of the \ct generallyfor the present position concerning the administration of an ootate#4* s e c  h e a to n ,  p*$1#
l e  B u b je c t  t o  l e g a l  r l g h t e  ( t e r e e  m d  o o w t e e y  hm fin g  
bwrn aboliahod by $#10(1)}, imlOE^ a there h^we Men 
fraudulent aliematloms#
The r e l e v a n t  e s t a t e  t o  whic3% l u e  M l % t a e  may 
attach imeludee a l l  mavemhle e sta te  peaw$8#d by the 
liuehmd at hie death $ and certain estate, aueh aB a 
gratuity, payable Miereafter#"^
However# In the eomwhat mmmial elroimetanoee<î>o f Findlay'a Trustees v# Flmdley'a i t  waa
decided that, where a teetator had a liferent in hie 
fa th er 's  e s ta te , with poimr o f dlmpoj^al o f  the fe e ,  
that right should mot he tekw Into aoooumt Im 
oomputlng the widow'# beo&use valim
t h e r e o f  d i d  n o t  a r i e e  u n t i l  t h e  t e s t a t o r 'm  d e a t h ,  a n d , 
in aity came, If the trust dlapomition mml aettlement 
dlepoalmg of the fee to he taken into aooount, the 
d e o t in m t lo #  M ier#  d im oloaed . waa Im o o m a ie te n t w i th  a  
elaim for iga ® »  wldow'a teiisteea had
claimed that the power of diapoeal had a oertmln 
p a t r i m o n i a l  v a l u e ,  a  e u g g e e tlo m  %fhloh L# B o m w ie f f  wee 
imliwd to woept, although at p#497, he eaid,
8U0h maoet m m t  meoe^eerily have Woome part of the 
exeoutry, laot dwimg hie 3.ifo but ae eolmoident with 
or immdlately following on hie death," but the question 
also tU3med upon Mie relative!ly simpler rulea of 
appix)bate and reprobate# "It is mot opom, in my view, 
to thoee %'e.preaeDting the widow to claim that the will 
operates in their favour by imtroduoi% thia estate 
into the exeoutry, amd at the same time to defeat the 
operation of the will by olaimimg agalnat the will and 
not imder it#"
Per Lard Fleming'^, it wa$ explminod, "Aooordlag
to /
1# B w e r l % e  v$ B#'si E%%# 1938 S#0* 160#2# 1941 B#C# 492.3# at p. 498.
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to the authorities, the holder of such a power is 
entitled to use it for his own personal benefit and 
may contract during his lifetime to exercise it in 
favour of a particular person# He may realise the 
power b y  contracting i n  consideration of a money 
payment to exercise it in a specified manner, and, 
if that is done, the sum realised, if forming part of 
his estate at the date of his death, would be subject 
to his widow's legal rights#
The deceased did not realise the pow er o r  convert 
it i n t o  money during his lifetime, and hi a estate at 
the date of his death did not c o m p rise  any share of 
his father's estate or anything that could be said to 
represent t h e  value of the power#**
Ii#P#Normand distinguished the present case from 
that of Beveridge, in which it was quite clearly the 
statutory intent that a certain sum should form part 
of t h e  deceased's estate, whereas, **I cannot hold that 
in t h i s  case the t e s t a t o r  intended to make subject to 
a claim for jus relictae a portion of h i s  father's 
estate over ifhich he had the power of disposal#*' It 
was true that the testator "directed his executors to 
treat it as part of his executory estate, but that 
c o u ld  only be for the purposes which he himself 
defined in his settlement, and not for other purposes 
extraneous to or inconsistent with his testamentary 
intentions#" I t  is, of course, a well-recognised 
principle of our law that it is not competent with 
one hand to take a b e n e f i t  u n d e r  a will, and with the 
other to reject that same document#
Olive and Wilson take exception to what they 
regard as loose t h i n k i n g  on the subject, and state 
that the true construction of Beveridge and similar 
cases /
1 , at p#703
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cases is that it is possible for a statute or deed to 
provide that a payment shall be made to trustees, and 
that the latter shall distribute that payment to those 
entitled to it# "Legal rights are merely an identifying 
and quantifying factor# The relict takes a share 
because he o r  she is entitled to it under the statute 
or deed in question# It is a m is ta k e  to cite such 
cases as authority f o r  the proposition that jus relictae 
extends to augmentations of the deceased's estate after 
his death #•« there is nothing in these "augmentation" 
cases inconsistent w i th  the general principle t h a t  the 
relict's right affects only property owned by the 
deceased spouse at d e a th # "
Insurance policies which have been kept up by 
t h e  regular payment of premiums are part of th e  moveable 
estate subject to legal rights (now, since 1961- A c t ,  
8 .1 0 (2 ), after satisfaction of prior rights (intestate 
succession))"^ »
pIt w ould  seem " t h a t  a partner's posthumous share 
of his firm's profits, payable to his executor, do 
HOT form part of the relevant moveable estate of the 
deceased subject to legal rights#
The position w ith  r e g a r d  to Bonds
This is perhaps the only matter in this area 
which requires particular attention#
It has been noted that heritable securities, xfhile 
regarded as moveable generally in the creditor's 
succession /
1 » Ohalmere' Trs# (1882) 9 H.743s Muirhead v. M.'sFactor (186?) 6 Hacph# 15 (which contains interesting judicial comment upon the (loose) use by the institutional w r i t e r s  of the phrase "goods i n  communion") see e*g# per L. Gurriehill#*at pp. 99 and per I f #  Deas at p#10l#2# Walker, Prins.II, pp. 1745 46, citing Adamson'sT r s # V# A.'s Exrs# (1891 ) 18 R.1135*
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suocession^ were deemed to be heritable for the 
purposes of l e g a l  rights, and hence in the estate of 
the creditor husband or wife, were tereeable or subject 
to courtesy^• Since terce and courtesy h av e  been 
abolished (by 1964 Act, 8,10(1)), there are no longer 
any legal rights escigible out of heritage, and these 
Investments {e,g, bonde and dispositions in security) 
escape all claims to legal rights* Professor Heston 
is rightly incensed by the **chaiaeleon«*lihe** nature 
of these r i g h t s , and a persuasive passage advocating 
the removal from the law of this practice of allowing 
certain r i g h t s  to possess the characteristics both of 
heritage and moveables depending on the circumstances, 
is to be found at pp,46-47# (Certainly, i f  the 
heritable/moveable distinction is to be retained to a 
limited extent in the sphere o f  succession, i t  is 
confusing to  meet with rights of a *hermaphrodite* 
nature*) He notes that under 8,117 of the 1868 Act, 
it used to be possible for the creditor in r i g h t  o f  
t h e  bonds to make them  heritable by the device ofpexcluding executors, but that i s  n o t  now possible , 
and therefore they must be held to be moveable except 
quoad fis cum and quoad legal rights, Shore i s  no choice.
While h e r i t a b l e  bonds must be regarded as 
h e r i t a b l e  inter con juge s» personal bonds, on the other 
hand, though in t h e i r  general nature moveable, can 
become heritable by the exclusion of executors (the 
Act, 1661, 0*32 not having been repealed as at first 
proposed), and if that were done, legal rights could 
be excluded therefrom^,
fhe situation, moreover, leaves room for doubt 
among /
1 *  T i t l e s  t o  L a n d  C o n s o l i d a t i o n  ( S c * )  A c t ,  1 8 6 8 ,8*117, as amended by 1964 Act, 8*34 and Sched# 3,which i n  effect placed ground annuals in t h e  same category*2# see Heston, p*47*3* See Walker, Principles, II 1161-63, and 1167$1304*
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1a w m g  o m rn em taW m *  P m A w w  w allw i* # m t
i t  i a  n o t  ol-em r fw m  ' ' %M A ot$
w M thm ? # » % u d # d  f w i
w o w l t i w  w h ic h  mro m o v eab le  Im i;h< o rm d lto r* .
$ w o w e l » ÿ  W t  w e  é $ f l m i t e l y  e o lu & o â  fro m
a o o m m t ;W le g i t im *
D o b W  ( m o t  o n l y  A o o m W  W  b #  a l l w g # ! #
d e d w t i o w  b y  m #  l a l w d  iW w m t#* W t  o # w  d # t $  o lm o) 
w #  t o  ho  d W iw W d  f i w  th #  # m #  m rm ilm hl#* b e f o r e  
( ( i )  m i d / e r  l e g i t i m )  i e  e a l w l m t e ê *  % o * 3 #  
g w m m m m t dm tioB * m &  g m w a l  p o m w a l  m id 
M s im e e e  â e W 0 $  m d  m v  jW l% â o  t h e  o # a t  Im p w re d  
o f  t h e  widow o M M r m  Im m%j.menting h e r^ *
A m o n #  d o h t m  t h e i ' O  w o  d l m t l m o t i m a # .  P r e f o r o a t i a l  
d # h % m  I m l M e  t M  w l d w * e  a l i m ' m m t  m #  m w m l m g a #  
f w e m i  o f  o h t o i m l m g  o o m f i i ' m a t l o m *
«  out of dmt# im tio m  Im many oaaw 
m ew am ta*  wmgoB# o m #  # $ o w W  d e b t s  a n d  them
im a e e w s d  d eh W #  % o f o s # # r  Wmlk03? p o im ts  o u t  a
a o l l o l t o r * o  f e #  i e  m o t  j g ^ r e f e r s h l o  W  t h e -  w i d o w ^ s  c l a i m  
for legal r l# W  #%w# W %h# &WS remedy of 
f o T
DMw the % t# e  Duty thm allowahia doWa
w e re  f i r a t  â e ê u o tW  e M w  th #  f l g w o  om w h ic h  
B e ta t#  W t y  w w  t o  h e  a$0oo#$&  em a% od# T he a i^ o  
o f  t h #  e s t a t e  w a i l m h l e  f o r  d lT ia lo m  w u l â  them  h e  
r e â w e â  1:^ t h e  p # w m t  o f  e v m  t h w o m f t o r ,
debt# mot allowed by the Imlmmd Rmrmuo were dodwtod# 
TW s*. d e h t s  o o m s t iW tW  t h e  f i r a t  ohm rgs u p o n  t h e  
e s t a t e  /
1* % l m *  I I »2# W lok V# V» ( 4 8 # )  1 P # 1 # #3# P r i m *  I%$ 3^ * 2029 M ito W ).!  v# î la o k e m y
( 1 9 % )  a  # * i W #
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estate, and It was only after satisfaction of them, 
that claims, of any other nature, upon the estate 
could arise
Exclusion* Renunciation* Discharge and Defeat of lus 
Helictae
Xus Reliotae is lost after the expiry of the
long negative prescription (if it has not been lost
b e f o r e  that dato)^ which will normally run from the
%date of death of the spouse but exceptionally^ may 
run from t h e  date at which the estate fell into 
intestacy, if it was only upon the occurrence of 
that eventuality that the claim(a) for legal rights 
arose*
Alternatively, the r i g h t  may be lost by the 
renunciation t h e r e o f  by a spouse (and indeed by each 
spouse, or either of them, as in this, as in so many 
other respects lus r e l i o t a e  and lus relict! are 
identical) in terms of a marriage-contract• In order 
that /
i* See 1964 Act, s#36 (interpretation section),which defines "net estate" and "net intestate estate" as "so much of an estate or an intestate estate as remains after provision for the satisfaction of estate duty and other liabilities of the estate having priority over" legal rights, p r i o r  rights and rights of succession# " O th e r  liabilities of the estate" ranking p r i o r  to those rights are not defined, but rights of succession are postponed to legal rights and prior rights (8*1(2)), legal r i g h t s  are postponed to prior rights (s*10(2);, and p r i o r  rights (sa*8 and 9) are declared to be exigible out o f  the "intestate estate"* The monetary right i s ,  by 8*9 (6)(a), postponed to the right under s*8 to house and  furniture î it i s  exigible from on "intestate estate" specially defined in s # 9 (G )(a )  as "so much o f  the net intestate estate as remains after the satisfaction o f  any claims under t h e  last foregoing s e c t i o n ;" This remains the case, although the system now is that of Capital Transfer Tax, u n d e r  which no tax is payable on the passing from deceased to s u r v iv in g  spouse.2. Campbell*B Trs# v* 0.*s 1rs* 1950 8 .0 * 4 8 *
3 .  H i l l ' s  T rs*  V* H . ' s  T rs*  1965 8 ,0 ,5 8 4 *
573#
.t the dlaoharige niny operjate»# i t  muBt he very a le w  
Im I t s  i t  I s
t h a t  i f  t h a  M B made % w w  "W l m&d
p M v iW .o n  w h ich  ah#  h m  w # # t M  l i e u  o f  h w  
I # # a i  r i g h t #  i s  w W I3 ^  in a d é q u a t# #  e W  w o u ld  W  
e n t i t l e d  t #  œ  m M i t i o a a l  a l im e n t  i f  t h e  a s ta 'i  
a f f o r d  i t * ^  
E m e y e le p z o d la ^  #m gg#atB t h #  O#o%mr^a
wwM tend to dlnoowago #i0 plea of mom 
3*eeion w h e re  a  m in o r  w l #  w o o p te d  a  p ro v lB lo D  ^ghloh#
It trmmpireê# m all 1# om^mrieon w i#  
wmiiimal mim of her W h^m&*a wmahle m tate #
%m tM earn# wrk# It Is mid that poet^muptia]. 
dieohar## wmlA b# to mvooatiom aa being
d m a t lo D »  %&%&% a& 3 K % 3 #  ^  is rm tm lto im lyor fw  #oaaly ImeoffiolmiU emsidwatlm# Wt of 
ooume# by' tM H*w*p* (w *) àùt# 1%0 e#9$ eimh 
donmtiom /
1» lAT ' l l l o i t  V4 UtTUO/m 1395$ 1 #*D ,' , ' r / 3 ,  
v v i ' f i - r c .  fr o m  :;hJ/.s r u l e ;' t  ''H u  (tevv^^;'ad  nH;ç;1,rfrr»/U1 O** Y/-J9 UI
\ ' \ u  I 7 \;V t J  '  ^ iW  1 ^x% M o  .u 'c v lv lv ^  rloou ltC K ^M  tr." l7%o 
« O' on  u.'.,U , i/ c (  q M  %t't %#%$ 3 4  v:l ncife
3% -T '*\r:3  'n u  1  t ' 3 ' ;  x d g b t  oom e
\ r ' i 4  h M 4 ? " \o V (^ T ,% j c z /tn 'M /U . \;(' %Wo r .  .  , i  'n%* 13 1$ 0 .^ ^  " I  dono J Hn ‘ <r'( <* ‘  ^ %/u u  :în*^^.U/1 M o e  o f
a  3\f ; \ t  Y ] .W i u id  y v !'" '. f / j  v'O  t ) " '  UL,. o o n W a o t
V.TÏ M U o r fn  h o j,,! , eu n o^ '4 'V % teê$"
n o r  M  p*55>#2# '.'too *f $
3 *  T h ia  i a  o o B p a m h lo  t o  t h o  o e n W m ip ; ;
o o w e t ^ a t  w h e r e  thm  h%v)hanÂ* b y  i  i i ^ t l u a W  a n d  o i w e r  ' ' n o rro u g o d  h?.o b o tc L o  i? ni«#h a  way
no tîorj'V'7'o M o  w ' M  w i t h  a  p z o v J r lo A  orn  î:o 
:b ':n iifM v lv .u ü *  \''0  Chf^ptc).'' 4  ( i 3 . 1 u c a t ) #  a e y  h a t h  
wo'Uld oou zi t o  î^n Ti ;in% :oblo r 4 i}k )d ie o $  mmd h e  
b y  no«m u*: t h e  * m m  r m W y #  o r  v a r i m i t a  
o f  # 4 0  rokw U ^# r m t h e r  t h m i  mo A l f f e i w t  W U
1'* \  ic A io !  ; *4* V# "% B  ; : o i i o m o ( 1 ) ' \ .  p * '  *
)#  ( l a m )  13  . v % $  1 5  &# 2 1 ,
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d o n a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  h u s b a n d  a n d  w ife  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  
i r r e v o c a b l e  *
S u c h  d i s c h a r g e s  w e r e ,  a n d  a r e ,  q u i t e  c o m p e t e n t ,
a l t h o u g h  t h e y  h a v e  b e c o m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  l e s s  common
a s  m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t s  h a v e  b e c o m e  l e s s  c o m m o n #
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  p o i n t  a r o s e  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s
i n  t h e  r e c e n t  c a s e  o f  C a l l a n d e r  v *  C a l l a n d e r ' s  iE x e c u t o r s  #
A  d i s p u t e  h a d  a r i s e n  c o n c e r n i n g  a n  a n t e - n u p t i a l  
m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a o t  e n t e r e d  i n t o  i n  1 9 IG , b y  w h i c h  t h e  
f u t u r e  w i f e  d i s c h a r g e d  h e r  r i g h t  t o  l u s  r e l i o t a e ,  
a n d  t h e  c l a i m s  t o  l e g i t i m  o f  f u t u r e  c h i l d r e n  a l s o  
w ere  d i s c h a r g e d  i n  a d v a n c e  b y  t h e  p a r e n t s  a s  w a s  
p o s s i b l e  -  t h o u g h  c r i t i c i s e d ^  -  b e f o r e  t h e  S u c c e s s i o n  
( 8 0 , )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 , 8 * 1 2 ,
I n  1 9 5 5 ,  t h e  p a r e n t s  a n d  t h e i r  t w o  m a j o r  s o n s  
e n te r e d  i n t o  a  d e e d  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t ,  r e n u n c i a t i o n  a n d  
d i s c h a r g e  r e g i s t e r e d  i n  t h e  B o o k s  o f  C o u n c i l  a n d  
S e s s i o n ,  w i th  th e  a i m  o f  a n n u l l i n g  t h e  t r u s t  w h i c h  
h a d  b e e n  b r o u g h t  i n t o  b e i n g  b y  t h e  m a x ^ r i a g e - o o n t r a c t ,  
a n d  o f  r e s t o r i n g  t o  t h e  f e e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  t h e  
i n v e s t m e n t s  w h i c h  i n  1 9 1 6  h e  h a d  d i r e c t e d  t o  b e  h e l d  
f o r  h i m s e l f  a n d  h i s  w i f e  i n  l i f e r e n t  ( A n d e r  t h e  
t e r m s  o f  t h e  1 9 1 6  d e e d ,  by  w h ich  a l s o  t h e  w ife  h a d  
r e n o u n c e d  a n y  c l a i m  w h i c h  s h e  m i g h t  h a v e  t o  l u s  
r e l i o t a e , a n d  t h e  p a r t i e s  d i s c h a r g e d  t h e  c l a i m s  t o  
l e g i t i m  o f  a n y  f u t u r e  c h i l d r e n # )  The t r u s t  fu n d s  
b e c a m e  t h e  a b s o l u t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  th e  h u s b a n d  a t  1 9 5 4 , 
t h e r e f o r e *  T h e s e  t h e r e a f t e r  w e r e  t o  b e  d i s p o s e d  o f  
t o  any  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a s  t h e  h u s b a n d  m i g h t  
t h i n k  f i t .  O n  t h e  d e a th  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  i n  1967 
( h i s  w i f e  h a v i n g  p r e d e c e a s e d  h i m ) ,  o n e  o f  t h e  s o n s  
c l a i m e d  /
1 ,  1 9 7 2  8 * L ,T , 2 0 9 * See also G a llo w a y 's  T r s ,  v, G,
1 9 4 5  8 ,0 .559 ,2# e , g *  b y  T * B . S m i t h  i n  1 9 6 2  " S h o r t  Com m entary" 
p > 5 9 4 .
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claimed legitim, averring that by reason of the deed 
of appointment, renonciation and discharge (bringing 
the marriage settlement to an end) hie r i g h t  thereto 
had revived*
The decision of the House o f  Lords (Ls* Held, 
M o rr is  of Borth-y-Gest, Diplock, Salmon and  Viscount 
Billrome) reversed the F i r s t  Division's interlocutor, 
holding that, upon the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the deed of 
1 9 5 5  (registered 1954) it disclosed no intent on the 
part of the parents that legal rights should revive, 
neither did the cessation of the trust a r ra n g e m e n ts  
mean that by operation o f  law, the legal rights caiae 
i n t o  being again* Thus, the s o n 's  claim to legitim 
failed*
If there has been a valid inter vivos discharge 
of a spouse's r i g h t  to iua reliotae ( i ) # the r e s u l t  
w i l l  be that her/his presence will be d i s r e g a r d e d  
i n  the division of the estate, which, i n  c o n s e q u e n c e , 
w i l l  be deemed to be entirely dead's part if there 
are no children, o r ,  if there are children, will be 
composed of two p a r t s ,  one part being legitim ( o r  
bairn's part) and the o t h e r  dead's part* If th e  
estate is disposed of by will, it can be seen that, 
b y  t h i s  method, a childless spouse could achieve t h e  
same measure o f  t e s t a m e n t a r y  freedom as i s  possessed 
b y  an u n m a r r ie d  person, a factor which could become 
s i g n i f i c a n t  i f ,  under a new p r o p e r t y  regime, a new 
awareness of the uses of marriage-contraots became 
prevalent* On the other hand, if intestacy has 
resulted, i t  would become a matter of construction of 
t h e  contract whether the spouse(s) had each "signed 
away" not o n ly  t h e i r  l e g a l  rights, but also the new 
prior rights provided b y  th e  1964 Act* It will be 
remembered /
1 . Hog V. H. (1791) M.8 1 9 5 .
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reme'ibered of that Aot Bupplioc] a helpful
p r c e m ^ t i o a  w li ic h , h o w w % \ la ll-m ltW . Ixk I t a  
applicatlom to teatat0 BuooeoBloa# and to the 
t r a d i t i o n ; ^  l e g a l  r i g h t s #  a M  im u ld  mot h e  o f  mcwo 
thmi mialogo%%e in the oxai#lo cited*
I .f  l e g a l  r i g h t #  m?0 ola.im c4# end  a r e  
fw m  t h e  e a t a t e  I n  t%m o lro m ia ta n e e B  o f  t h e  o a ae #  t h e y  
e r e  a  ehar^$0 f l r e t  u pon  z ro e ld w : i f  t h a t  i s  i i i a v f f l o i o
t h m  $ e ae ra 3 . Ic ^ g w io #  a b a te  ra to i^ th ly  t o  p r o v id e  tW  
am ount r e q u i r e d s  e p e a l a l  l o g a c l e e  w i l l  h e  t h e  l a e t  
to hbatm* '
oA c c o rd in g  t o  Ualtcm"'* w here#  a f t e r  M r  hu8%:m3
d e a th #  a  id .d w  d o o id e #  t o  tW m  % #  to ïü itam en ta ry  
proviclokm and mot to  take leg a l # o  o liM m n 'a
leg itim  (o f -3i# not # oM re) id ,ll  be paid m%t of the 
tdiolo nw eablo fw d# wit3%out taking aooount o f %o 
W,dow''n provieio3%; thereaff^or# %e widow*# pi'ovlaiom 
^'flll be paid, the Msbaud*# exeoutor takiixg what would 
have bis^ en given am ZSSâÈ&gg» o^ i^ploylng i t  to  
e a tie fy  the %iidow*e claim* other wa^ d^e# tho3::% w il l
B t i l l  be a tr ip a r t ite  d iv is io n
Ckioli, a d,isali#rg;o w d  la opo# to aha3.lGngo on 
t h e  g ro u n d  o f  W ^ o r l t y  a id  I w l o h ^  o r  e a a e n t i a l  e r r o r  
romilting 1# ebaowe of oonemmie^# Moreover# mi 
e l e a t l o a  b e tw e e n  l e g a l  m #  ao % iv#n tioaa l provi#ioD % # 
w h ic h  o le e ti,< m  ho#  b e e n  maid# b y  a  m in o r  e w o .to r y
i f i t h o u t  /
3*
1* Talt*8 Tre* v# laew (1686) 13 R*1102# p ,2 4 5 #  o i t r b ïg  % *  H# & W* ,^ i l , 1 0 ? 0 *  w h e re  t h emat 1:07? la  f u l ly100 Fr* 1070* where part o f i*0w rle3tl.ll'^  op iai I n  O r^ ip b e l l te  T ra*  V* 0# (1 8 0 2 )  84  D*1321# 1& quck- m d  s e e  a).ao w h e re  th e  modeo f  (h%i*i#loD o f  e s W to #  whê3% t W  m d  t h eei;&ldaziBa'8 wl@3it<'gc to  W m le g e l w  rightavm der th e  w i l l #  o lv e r* ^ #  d ie w C 'a e l*4* Oooper V* Cooler (1686) 1g H* (H*L,) 21#
5 .  l - M l l e  V# h \ * a  Trm#. 1935 s .L ^ T #  572#
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without the curator's consent, is revocable during 
the lifetime of the minor^ # A Curator Bonis may be 
appointed to exercise t h e  right of election on behalf 
of the ward^*
An a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  e x p r e s s  d i s c h a r g e  i s  im p l ie d
discharge, b y  which, in accepting a conventional 
provision which is inconsistent with a claim a^so 
for legal rights, the entitlement to the latter may 
be l o s t *  There may be t h e  clearest indication that 
such forfeiture was to be the result of a c c e p ta n c e , 
o r  that c o n se q u e n c e  may merely be im p lie d ^  and it i s  
a q u e s t io n  of construction w h e th e r  the two provisions 




1, s e e  Lawson v* Oook 1928 8#L,T* 411 #
2* s e e  S k i n n e r 's  O .B . (1 9 0 5 ) 5 .F .9 1 4 ,5* s e e  B u n tin e  v# B , ' s  T r s ,  (1894) 21 R*714* Darling'sISxeo* V #  D* (1869) 41 B c*Jur«54'3« ’Murray's T r s .
V* M. (1 9 0 1 )  5 F ,8 2 0 .4# of 1964 Act, 8*15 presumption w ith  r e g a r d  to legal and  t e s t a m en ta r y  provisions* If a spouse is dissatisfTeH*lfith the terms of th e  predeceaser's will, an d  i f  the marriage-contract has not e x p r e s s ly  discharged h i s / h e r  claims to legal rights, then thequestion i s  one of construction of the m a r r i a g e -c o n t r a c t ,  n o t  of construction of a " t e s ta m e n ta r y  disposition" (defined in a*36 of the 1964 Act as including any deed t a k i n g  e f f e c t  on the death of the fd eo eased  whereby any part of h i s  estate i s  disposed of o r  u n d e r  which a succession thereto arises) and so i t  w ou ld  appear that 8 * 1 5  cannot apply, unless a v e r y  liberal interpretation of the interpretation section i s  favoured* Thé seas of doubt are wide* To w h at extent must a m a r r i a g e -  c o n t r a c t  smack of a testamentary arrangement before it c an  be said to be a testamentary disposition or a mutual will? On the whole, it is possibly sounder to adopt a literal approach and to  say that the construction here is not g u id e d  by statutory rules* If the two rights are not i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  the survivor may well b e  entitled to claim legal rights (Murray's Trs# ?. H* (1888) 18 S#ïf*R*690) if he/she has been excluded from the b e n e f i t  o f  the will or is dissatisfied with t h e  benefits thereof*
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Where the conventional provision offers a
liferent of the whole estate, i t  is an almost
o v e rw h elm in g  p r e s u m p t io n ,  though not a fixed rule,*1 Pthat this was held o u t  in lieu of legal r i g h t s  *
Again, t h e  surviving spouse, after the death of
the predeceaser, may he called upon t o  elect between 
testamentary provisions and legal r i g h t s , As has 
been stated, t h e  doctrine of election, or of 'approbate 
and reprobate', forbids a party f ro m , at the same time, 
t a k i n g  benefit under, and im p u g n in g , a w i l l #  (see 1964 
Act, 8*15)#  The result of a*13 i s  that, where the 
testator has not declared that b o th  benefits shall 
accrue to the widow, t h e  choice by her of one of those 
benefits effectively excludes all claim to t h e  other, 
except that legal rights may still be claimed out of 
any estate w h ich  h a s  fallen into intestacy (unless th e  
widoxf, in full knowledge of her rights, has by a
discharge e x p r e s s ly  renounced her legal rights in ALL
the estates even if she does renounce legal rights, 
she ought t o  reserve her right to any estate falling 
subsequently into intestacy - Dawson's Trs* v* D#
(1 8 9 6 ) 25 R.IOOG: M e l v i l l e 's  T rs*  v ,  M* 1964  8 .0 .1 0 3 )  
since i n  t h a t  case the underlying t h e o r y  that the 
t e s t a t o r ' s  i n t e n t i o n  must b e  accepted i n  toto or not
at all, and m ust not be  flouted b y  two inconsistent
%claims, i s  n o t  infringed-^ * That is s o ,  of course, 
only /
1. consider Edward V# Oheyne (1888) 13 R# (H*L*) 33, Hurray's Trs*. Riddel v* Dalton 1781, H*6437,S m art v* S* 1926 8*0*392, and Oaitlmesa* T r s .  v*0. (1877) 4 a.937*2. A full and th o u g h t* * p ro v o k in g  discussion and analysis  of t h e  c o n se q u e n c e s  of t h e  leading case of Naismith V* Boyes ((1899) 1 f*(H*L*) 79), upon the e ffe c t  of a widow's acceptance of a t estamentaxy liferent i s  
t o  b e  found i n  0# & W ., pp77%-7ib*3 .  s e e  P r o f e s s o r  Walker's exposition of t h i s  point at P r i n s . I I  P.1798: E a is m i th  v .  B oyes (1899) 1 F .( E * L .)  79; Perrle v. Hander's Trs* 1954 8*0.430% Walker v* O r r 's  T r s .  1938 8 .L .T .6 3  and  220% B u n tin e  v. B . ' s  T r s .  (1891 ) 21 2*714, per L.McLaren at p.721; Hannah's 
T r s .  V . H . 1924 8.0.494; M oon 's  T r s .  V . M* (1899) 2 F .  201; McGregor's T r s .  v. Kimbell 1911 8*0.1195.
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only if the testator had EOT made contrary provisions 
in the event of any estate falling into intestacy*
Similarly, the widow may he entitled to benefits 
accruing, but not forming part of the deceased's 
estate, such as moneys due to her in terms of an 
insurance policy or pension scheme^ which will fall 
to her in addition to the estate to which she will 
become entitled by reason of her choice to take legal 
rights or the provisions of the will, or both, if the
circumstances permit her to do so*
Where there are several testamentary writings, 
they will be read as a whole, and if in some of the 
writings but not in others, provisions are made in 
lieu of legal rights, the widow must elect whether to 
take the provisions or to talce legal rights. The 
widow is on the wrong side of a rule that the twopdeeds should be read as one *
Acceptance of a testamentary provision and 
consequent renunciation of a claim to legal rights 
(if in the circumstances the latter is a consequence
of the former)(as guided now by the 37ule of 8,13) may
be express, or implied from actings, or from silence 
and inaction^ although if no interests are likely to 
be harmed, the decision, if it must be made, may be 
postponed*^ Indeed, a claim to legal rights might 
be excluded by other means than by the claim to 
testamentary provisions instead, Olive and Wilson^ 
note that delay combined with the implication that 
the party in right thereof has abandoned legal rights 
will /
1. see Oraigie's Trs, v, 0, (1904) 6 F*343*2, see Stewart v. Stephen (1832) 11 8,139*3* see Robinson v, R.'s Trs, 1934 S,L.T, 183, and the case, previously mentioned, of Pringle's Executrices (1870) 8 Macph. 622,4* Watson's Trs. v, W, 1910 8,0,975* Robinson: HcFadyen v, HcF.'s Trs* (1882) 10 H,283,
5 . P.711*
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will be sufficient, and cite in support Hobson v.
Bywater (1870) 8 Macph,75?» although, delay short of 
20 years in duration merely, in Walton's words, "is 
not a bar, but only throws on the party against whom 
it is pleaded the duty of explaining his inaction"^,
.At the least, therefore, it would appear that the 
effect of delay would throw the onus of proof upon 
the parties potentially in right to show that they 
had not chosen testamentary (and perhaps by analogy 
conventional?) provisions rather than legal rights.
At any rate, as far as testamentary provisions and 
legal rights are concerned, the matter is regulated 
now by 8 ,1 3 .
Alienation of Subjects
This is undoubtedly the safest method for a 
husband or wife to employ, provided he or she carries 
it out according to the rules, to ensure that the 
survivor of them has as meagre a provision as possible 
after the predeceaser's death.
There never has been any inhibition upon the 
squandering by a person, or a spouse (provided he 
remains able to fulfil his obligation to aliment his 
wife and family, if that obligation in the circumstances 
remains due), of his own resources, nor against 
excessive inter vivos generosity to other persons - 
see Allan v. Stark in which a husband conveyed the 
bulk of his heritage and moveables to his sister, who 
kept house for him, after his wife had left him* The 
wife, upon the death of her husband, claimed that the 
various /
1 * Walton, p .2 4 4 ,  citing Pringle's Executrices ;Seath V. Taylor (1848) 10 D*377; Mackenzie v. M*'s Trs* (1873) 11 Macph*681; Gourlay v* Wright (1864) 2 Macph,1284* See also Walker v* Orr's Trs* 1958 8.L.T, 63 and 220,2* (1 9 0 1 )  8  8*L *T ,468*
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various transactions which resulted in ownership 
passing to her sister-in-law, were simulate and that 
she was entitled to legal rights out of those gifts.
The defender averred that the transactions were made 
in good faith, and ivere irrevocable. The question
of law whether a man was entitled so to deprive his 
widow of her legal rights was decided hy Lord Kincainey, 
after consideration of various authorities (p,468/9) 
in the affirmative (,,,"it must he regarded as now 
settled law that the power of a husband to alienate 
his moveable estate by an inter vivos deed, which 
wholly divests him of all power over the property 
disponed, and all benefit from it, is absolute and 
unqualified, and cannot be regarded as made in fraudem 
of the rights of his wife merely because it reduces 
her jus reliotae o r  deprives her of it altogether. A 
man cannot be held to act fraudulently who does openly 
what he has a right to do*")* He considered that Bell's 
words (Prin# 15, 63,)relating to legitim, applied
equally to lus reliotae (and, one must presume, after 
1881, to lus relicti too), viz:- "legitim is diminished 
by every deed of the father inter vivos and in liege 
potistie disposing of his moveable funds, provided it 
be not fraudulently contrived in order to disappoint 
the children without touching the father's own rights 
during Iiie life," (See also Fr* I-I, & W ,, ii, 1010, 
whose discussion the point Lord hinoainy felt to be 
"really conclusive and as dispensing with any further 
statement of the laif* ")
It will be noted that the fraud consisted not in 
the disappointrfient of the children, but in the absence 
of complete divestiture of the property during the 
father's lifetime* The rule that the deed must totally 
and irrevocably divest the grantor, and that it must be 
made "in good faith" was held also to be satisfied in 
this /
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this case, "The thing to he proved is e x tr e m e ly  
tmusual and improbable - that a man in the prime of 
life should v o l u n t a r i l y  strip himself of n e a r l y  the 
whole of his estate - an d  i t  certainly r e q u i r e s  to  
he established by satisfactory and convincing evidence*
But the proof is all one way - and it is perhaps all 
that was to be expected# There is not a word of 
proof that there was any secret understanding or any 
reservation, or that the deed of gift was not in 
reality what it bears to b e * "
There was very little parole evidence, and the 
"chief p a r t  of the proof is the writ of Allan" (the 
husband)# The case highlights the predicament of 
proof in which the aggrieved widow would find h e r s e l f  
should her husband choose this drastic course of action 
so  to disinherit her# "On the one s i d e  of that 
question" (that is, w h e th e r  the documents truly 
expressed the testator's intention) "are the deeds 
th e m s e lv e s  and the evidence of Stark, On the other 
side there i s  not a s y l l a b l e  of evidence to suggest 
any simulation o r  reservation o r  secret understanding# 
There is n o th in g  but the inherent improbability of 
the alleged transaction, and the suspicion and surmises 
w h ich  that necessarily and legitimately raises*" His 
Lordship felt that n e i t h e r  the sister-in-law nor th e  
husband's law agent were being l e s s  than truthful i n  
their evidence, "and on the whole I have come to the 
conclusion that I have no warrant for adding on m ere 
conjectural grounds any qualification to the deed of 
gift and must sustain i t  as made in bona fides * and as 
a b s o l u t e  and i r r e v o c a b l e # "  T h u s , t h e  evidence of the 
deed itself together with the credibility factor, 
defeated the wife's allegations#
Conjecture as to the husband's intentions, therefore, 
w i l l  /
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will not be of any avail, in the absence of proof 
that his actions were insufficient to achieve his 
intentions* As long as the husband does not falter 
in his resolve I and puts his property entirely from 
him, he may legitimately achieve the object of 
disinheriting his wife, which object is thus, strangely 
(for the provisions of the law are generally in 
favour* of the participation by the surviving spouse 
in the estate of the predeceaser) itself endowed 
with legitimacy, and is one which he (or she) can 
declare quite openly* L* Kinoairney's sentence may 
be repeated - "A man cannot be held to act fraudulently 
who does openly what he has a right to do." However, 
he must not stay his hand;- "The real question is 
not what was done in form, but what was intended in 
substance; the mere form must yield to the actual 
purpose•
At present, however, although it is true to say 
that a spouse must not stay his hand in alienating 
property if he wishes to defeat his wife's rights 
therein, it is nevertheless possible for him to enjoy 
the liferent while ensuring that the fee was destined 
to some third party, thus achieving, expressly or by 
implication, the object of removing his wife's lus 
reliotae therein*^ Such exercises do run the risk 
of reduction on the ground of what might be called 
incomplete alienation* (Bee per L* Eldon in Lashley 
V* Hog (quoted by Walton at p*241);- "The receipt 
of the profits during the life of the pex*son is 
evidence of the ownership of that person in the 
subject matter which produces the profits*")*
Moreover /
1* per L.J.Ol.Moncrieff in Buchanan (1876) 3 R*556, at 359, quoted in Green's Encycl* v* "Legitim", vol*8, p*28.2$ Oollie V. Pirie's Trs* (1831) 13 D*306; Scott v* S, 1930 3*0, 903.
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1Moreover, Olive and Wilson make mention of the casePof Hutton's Trs* v# H*'s Trs* ' which suggests that, 
not only does the "liferent exception " exist, b u t  
also that a deed n e e d  n o t  be  irrevocable, b u t  perhaps 
need o n ly  be revocable but unrevoked at the granter's 
death, in order effectively to exclude the rights of 
the family in the property which is the subject 
thereof - "a startling loophole in the law". Scots 
law may provide a bar to capricious disinheritance, 
by mortis causa deed, but, at present, at least, it 
allows remarkable freedom inter vivos »
B# lus Relicti
lus Reliotae is a common law right of lo n g  
standing; Xus R e l i c t i , the e q u iv a le n t  right of 
widowers, is statutory, having been i n t r o d u c e d  by 
M*W*P* (8 c # )  A c t ,  1881 (4 4  and  4$  T ic t# c ^ 2 1 )  s# 6  -
and is said^ to be "co-equal and oo-extensive" with 
lus reliotae*^
Indeed, the two rights are subject to the same 
rules and conditions, and what has been said ( i n  A) 
above w i th  r e g a r d  to ius reliotae applies e q u a l ly  to 
iua relicti# The same p r i n c i p l e s  apply, mutatis 
multandia» O liv e  and W ils o n , f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  neater 
terminology have adopted the c o m p re h e n s iv e  term "relict's 
right", to describe both r i g h t s #
The /
1# p.715; and  s e e  g e n e r a l l y  "Attempts to defeat relict's right", pp»71^ l—716» See also Walton, "D eeds i n  Fraud of lus Helictae", pp«239**241,
2 .  191G 8 ,0 # 8 6 0 ,3# Walton, p♦ 236*4. 8*6 gave a corresponding share or interest to aw idow er i n  his wife's moveable ©state if she died d o m ic i le d  i n  Scotland as had existed f o r  the widow in h e r  husband's moveable estate, "subject always to the same rules o f  law i n  r e l a t i o n  to the nature and amount of such share and interest, and the exclusion, discharge o r  satisfaction thereof, as the case may be*"
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The widower, therefore. Is entitled to one-half 
or on0*"thlrd, ae the oaee may he, of hie wlfe*e
moveable estate upon her death, and, of Importanoe 
formerly thon^ not now, thla right arose ivhether 
the marriage had taken place before or after the Act 
and whether the wife's moveable estate had been 
acquired before or after the Aot*^  Profeeeor T.B# 
Smith commenta that in hi a view t M  granting to a 
hueband of th is indefoaalble right in hia wife'a 
estate was a corollary of the removal, by the same 
âet, of hia J^a BilUii her estate |ji|or S|22S* 
Similarly, by 2*7, the right of children to legitim , 
exigible at common law In their father's estate, wac 
extended by the statute to their mother's aetata* 
Moreover, where the iu.^ , had been excluded,
before the coming into operation of the Act, by ante­
nuptial marriage-contraot, the hueb&nd, it was held, 
woe still entitled to the appropriate fraction or i) 
of the wife's moveable property, provided that it wasp*h e r  p r o p e r t y  a t  h e r  d e a th #  One d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw ee n  
t h e  W o I ' l g h t e ,  w h ic h  h a s  b e e n  n o te d  I n  a n o th e r  c o n t e x t ,  
l a  t h a t ,  b e f o r e  1 9 6 4 , w h i le  a  c la im  t o  i u a  r e l i o t a e  
a r o s e  u p o n  t h e  g r a n t  o f  a  d iv o r c e  t o  a n  ' i n n o c e n t '  
w i f e ,  a  c la im  t o  iu ^  r e l i c t i  by a p u r a u e r  h u sb a n d  
d i d  n o t#  ( G r e e n 'a  B n c y c lc p a e d ia  v# ' l u s  R el% ct.a^ 
l u e  R e l i c t i * ,  p * 2 g 8 , c o n s id é r é  t h a t  t h l e  r e s u l t  was 
n o t  in te n d e d  b y  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  th e  
p a s s in g  o f  t h e  1881 Act*)
Oontractlngvout of 1 ^  .gj^ ll^ ti by means of 
marrlage-oontract provision appears to be sanctioned 
by /
1#2* . .  . .. _ . . (1 8 9 0 )  18 % ,155#
see Patersons v* Poo (1885) 10 R# (E*L#) 75* F o th o r ln g h a m  (1 8 8 9 )  16  R#&75* Sim ons* T re*
b y  l î ,y « P , < 80«) AGt* 1BB1»
Im Buntine, T t  %pear8 to
me that Im the evmit which hae happened ^ h?a* B**s 
mcvambl^ i wtato is &wtimed to her Mir$ jW mohllibue# 
and w  this destination 1# coatWLwd In m% antenuptial 
Gomtract to Whleh t W  h w h m d  la a co M o m tlD #  party,
Hr# B# oaœot claim, hie r#.)Ljio% commistemtly with 
his miWauptlml obligation* $ho Womm'e
Property Act# 1%"1# rwervoi^  ^mxtlre th# effect- of 
m a r r i a g e - w m tm c tm ,  m d, I m é e p m ê m t ly  o f  t h a t  p r o v i s i o n  
I  s h o u ld  3 W 0  aB m m ed t h a t  % ia M ia g # ^ o n t r a o t  o h l ig a t io m a
# # r #  not in ten d ed  to  be re sc in d ed  by the Act o f  P a r l ia m e n t .”
li^herm r i g h t s  o f  a w o e a e l w  a r e  m a t t e r s  o f  e o n t r a o t  
M W e c m  the poT^ies to the marriage, w  oome w r y  olom 
to the device of the survivorship destination la 
kerit%e owned by both speuee#* mad, j$,ndeed to the 
phem om ow n of t h e  mutuml will*
It will he mmal fsr the Wrms of a m#3:Tia#e- 
e o n t r a o t  t o  make c l e a r  t h e  e a e t  p o w ers o f  t h e  apougoa  
i n  /
1* so# Buntine v* B#'@ Trm* (ÎB91) 21 imwhich, though the fact that the marriage ooourred Wfore the i##i Act did BDT wselWe the iiu^hamd'a e W ^  to i w  m lloti# hie olmim thereto v;&?3 refused* heoauee tte elm# wee imoowlatent with the terms of the narrja^cc-eomtrmet* #cotiw 8 that the rl#it provided, by t W  A #  "oMll mot o.*'<Y0t may oontraote made or to he isiWto hotween s^ aiTlod persona hoforn w  during end the offset of thesoetlo%% in that'ewe act out y#$t oleerly hy the L*P# (ReWrtnoa) at p#720* Im the olrWrnetmooB, the %dfe w w  entitled to rely on her mioeemalon la
t in )  M i l l  i f  eh e  h a d  d i e d  t e a t  a te *  h e  h i iv i r ga#rr<v<l t o  th e  te r m s  o f  t h e  o o n t r a e t?  
'Jw  n o t#2 ,  : ; t  8oe a h )0  p e r  3:;* R ln n o n r*  a t  pp*722/And so #  M urray*#  % # #  V# M# (I'-VOD g
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i n  relation to the property which Is the subject
t h e r e o f  # The difficulty I s  that the marrlage-contraot 
t e r m s, i f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c o m p re h e n s iv e, may avoid the 
creation of an intestacy if t h e r e  b e  no  w i l l , since 
c e r t a i n  of the terras thereof may be testamentary in 
character, and thus may exclude the operation of 
prior rights a ls o #  The te rm s  may a l s o  exclude, 
expressly or by implication, i u s  reliotae and ius 
relicti* Thus, if that is a c o n c lu s io n  correctly 
argued, the s p o u s e s  m u st be cautious in the drafting 
of the contract, especially i n  its quasi-tostamentary 
terms* Children are protected, since by s#12 of the 
1964 A c t ,  their r i g h t  to legitim cannot be excluded 
except by their own acceptance of the exclusion.
Obviously, the earlier discussion of the topic 
of election between legal r i g h t s  and conventional 
provisions, and legal rights and testamentary 
provisions - especially if conventional provisions 
may, on occasion, be regarded as testamentary in 
n a t u r e ,  t o  the extent of allowing the presumption 
provided b y  8 ,1 3  o f  t h e  1964 Act to operate - is 
pertinent h e r e ,
Oan the parties, by marriage-eontract, create 
what are In effect new creatures unknown to th e  law - 
indefeasible testamentary settlements? T h e i r 1Lordships, in Buntine, came to the following conclusion
"If the settled estate remains the p r o p e r t y  of 
t h e  settlor because there is no contract to dispose of 
it otherwise, it will be subject to all the claims 
which by the o p e r a t io n  of law affect such p r o p e r t y ;  
but if one spouse h a s  engaged by c o n t r a c t  that the 
o t h e r  s h a l l  have the absolute disposal of his or h e r  
estate in a certain event, it is irreconcilable with 
the /
a t  p ,830 .
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the contract, that t h e  former should carry o f f  half 
of the estate to the disappointment of the will of 
the other*"
T h is  comes v e r y  near the position that there may
be a species of will (sub.nom# "marriage-oontract")
the provisions of which are indefeasible. This
conclusion stems fro m  the unobjectionable thought
that parties may exclude the operation of t h e  legal
rights of ius relicti and i u s  reliotae i n  exchange
for a consideration with which th e y  both profess to
b e  satisfied* Perhaps it is as w e l l  that the full
potential of marriage-oontracts is rarely explored:
if, h o w e v e r , t h e y  come b a c k  into vogue, their
potential advantages would quickly be discovered, and
w ould  be put to the test in litigation. Thus, if
radical changes are to be made in t h e  rules governing
matrimonial p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  role of marriage-oontracts,
as a means of contracting-out of provisions otherwiseiapplicable, w i l l  require examination*
0* Legitim
Legitim ("légitima portio", bairn's part of gear) 
is the right of a child, or children, to or -J, as 
the case may be, of h i s  deceased parent's moveable 
estate* H is  r i g h t  will always be t o  f of the free 
moveable estate o f  his surviving p a r e n t, unless the 
latter has remarried* It has never been the case 
that children have had a right of any description in 
t h e i r  parents * heritage «
While there had always been r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of a 
predeceasing child's right to dead's part (q.v*), 
until the 1964 Act, s.11, there was no such 
representation /
2
1 * See generally Chapter 7*2* See, generally, Ersk.III, 9,22*
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representation in legitim, though, if a child survived 
his parent hut died before making an election between 
testamentary provisions and legal rights, his executors 
might make that election on his behalf. One of the 
changes effected by the Succession Act in the matter 
of legal rights, however, is that by s*11(1) 
representation now operates in legitim*
Legitim also can be discharged prospootively by 
the child who would otherwise be entitled thereto in 
the same way as a spouse may discharge his/her ius 
relicti(ae). but, since the 1964 Act, s.12, that end 
may no longer be achie^  ed ante-nuptially by the 
prospective parents* wishes alone.
The onus is upon illegitimate children to 
present themselves and to claim legitim, not upon 
the executor to seek them out, which would be an 
impossible and embarrassing task. (L*H*(MiBcell, 
Prove.)(8c.) Act, 1968, s.?)* The distribution of 
the estate may go ahead: the illegitimate person is
not barred from attempting to prove his claim to 
legitim, and thereafter from recovering property from 
those persons in possession of it. ünder s.11 of 
the 1968 Act, a decree against a party in proceedings 
for affiliation and aliment will be sufficient to 
prove the claimant's case, unless there is strong 
evidence to rebut the court's findings, and, of course, 
it may be that the executor will accept less in the 
way of proof. Similarly, the 1964 Act, s.24(2) 
throws the onus of claiming legitim upon an adopted 
person, rather than throwing upon the executor the 
onus of finding the party so entitled.
While /
1. Beo generally 1964 Act, s.4, 3 and 6, 10.A. and 11, with regard to illegitimate children, and Part IV, 1964 Act, S.23 and 24, with regard to adopted children*
590.
While the policy of the Act was, among other 
matters, the ocpialisatioii of the rights of adopted 
children with those of natural children (1964 Act, 
8*23(1)^ the attitude towards the Illegitimate was 
not quite so generous. As between parent/child and 
child/parent succession, illegitimacy is, by virtue 
of the 1964 Act, ©.4(1) and (2), an irrelevance, but, 
as has been noted, there is no representation in the 
illegitimate relationship (©.4(4), 5 and 11) whereas 
the benefit of representation i s  open to adopted 
children (©,23(1); "For all purposes relating to - 
(a) the succession of a deceased person (whether 
testate or intestate), -..an. adopted person ©hall be 
treated as the child of the adopter and not a s  the 
child of any other person," Adopted children, by 
implication therefore rather than by explicit provision, 
a:ce to be regarded as having the right of representation, 
since they are to be treated a© the lawful issue of 
the adopting parents, which means that t h e y  q u a l i f y ,  as 
"issue" ill terms of the interpretation section (©,36(1)) 
which in turn means that the provision© of s.3 and s.11 
extend to them.)
An illegitimate child, now but not formerly 
(new s.lOA of 1964 Act) is entitled to legitim and to 
participate in the distx'ibution of dead's part. A 1posthumous child, according to the old case of Jenvoy
is entitled to legitim^ '. The cost of the birth of a
posthumous child MAT be held to be a legitimate debt%of the estate of the father- .
Legitim may be claimed fx*om the estate of each 
parent /
1 .  1 7 6 2 , H .81V 0.2 .  W b  c f .  E l l i o t t  V,  Jo ic Q y  1935 8 . 0 ,  (H .L .)  5 7 , a n i  s e e  M a s to n , p . 21 ®he S u c c e ss io n . A c t i s  not s p e c i f i c  on  t h i s  p o l j i t .
3 .  E r s k .  I ,  6 .4 1 .
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parent, on the death of each but is postponed, where 
there is intestacy or partial intestacy, to the 
surviving spouse's prior rights^ s, the traditional 
legal rights of ius reliotae and ius relicti are also ^ ^  WwMNWwm* ...... ........ 'm#rw« trnmnrnrntyi
to be talcen from the estate after satisfaction of 
prior rights, but of course the c la im a n t  i s  the same 
person in each case* As with th e  relict's right, 
the ohild(ron) may not claim any particular item or 
part of the estate for the satisfaction of legitim#
If the aittount available for legitim i s  insufficient
to supply the children's needs, the free estate may be%called upon to make up the deficiency"^ and so legitim 
and the relict's right are treated in the same way in 
this respect*
D# Dead's Part
This category comprises '3" or -g*, or the whole as 
the case may be, of the net (i.e# after debts paid) 
moveable estate, depending upon whether the deceased 
has died survived by widow and children, or either, or 
neither* In intestacy, it forms that part of the 
estate which does not comprise a section of the fund 
from which statutory prior rights, and legal rights, 
will be drawn* It has been seen that discharges of 
legal rights by a spouse after the death of the other 
spouse fall to dead's pax*t, as do d i s c h a r g e s  of legitim 
by /
1 * Another aspect of the equal-handed attitude which produced the 1881 Act is that, before it came into operation, only the father's estate was held to bethe fund subject to legitim* This was altered toinclude the estates of both parents, by s.7* Friorto the 1881 Act, of course, most of the wife'sestate would have passed lure mariti, to the husband. 2* 1964 Act, 8 * 1 0 ( 2 ) ,3* Walker, Prins.II, 1903, citing brquhart's E^ crs* v* Abbott (1899) 1 F.1149.
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by children a fter  the death of the parent # Inter  
vivos discharges by a spouse w il l  mean that h is/h er  
share does not v est in  him/her, that h is /h er  
e x i s t e n c e  w il l  be ignored, and  the whole e sta te  w il l  
be dead’s p a r t ,  i f  there are no children# I f  there 
are ch ildren , there w il l  be a b ip a rtite  d iv is io n  of 
the esta te  and thus the spouse’s renunciation w il l  
have the e f fe c t  o f carrying h a lf o f h is/h er  putative  
share to the leg itim  fund, and h a lf to dead’s part, 
b en efitin g  both# Bee Olive & Wilson, pp#703-707#
In testacy, dead’s part is t h e  only part of 
the ©state which cannot be sought for the satisfaction 
of legal rights#
Hence, it is the only part of the estate (with 
the exception of heritage) over w hich  a testator has 
complete freedom to test, and in respect of which he 
can feel confident that his wishes, as expressed 
t est ament arily, will be entirely, or as nearly as 
possible, observed#
I t  used to  be that th e  executor had an in tere st  
i n  dead’s part, but i t  i s  provided by The In testa te  
Moveable Succession (So#) Act, 1833 (18 and 19 Viot# 
c#23), 8*8, th a t;-  "Bo much of an Act o f the 
Parliament o f Scotland passed in  the Y e a r One 
thousand s ix  hundred and seventeen, and in titu le d  
Anent Executors # as allows Executors nominate to  
reta in  to th e ir  own Use a Third of the Dead’s Part in  
accounting for  the Moveable E state of the Deceased, i s  
hereby repealed, and Executors nominate s h a ll ,  as such, 
have no Right to any Part of the Said Estate#"
The order in intestacy of succession to dead’s part 
is now contained i n  the Succession (Sc*) Act, 1964, s*2* 
The order of succession in testacy to dead’s part is 
entirely the testator’s concern#
Pre /
1# Fisher v# Dixon (1840) 2 D.1121
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Pre-1964 Statutory Prior Rights
Intestate Husband’a Estate (Sc#) Acts# 1911-1959
The concept that it was right for a spouse to 
have certain indefeasible rights in the intestate 
estate, which ranked first on the net estate (after 
the claims of ordinary creditors) before any claims 
to legal rights, recognised first in the Intestate 
Husband's Estate (Sc#) Act, 1911^, by s#1 of which 
the widow of a man who died childless'^ , domiciled in 
Scotland and intestate became entitled to his whole 
estate in terms of the Act if the estate did not 
exceed £300# Where his ©state exceeded that sum, 
she was entitled to £ 3 0 0  thereof, with interest at 
\^^ /o from the date of the husband's death to the date 
of payment, the burden of payment being laid upon 
the heritable and moveable parts of the estate 
according to the proportionate value each part bore 
to the whole# She retained her right to terce and 
ius reliotae out of the balance remaining, and for 
the purposes of those legal rights and the legitim of 
any children, the balance remaining was deemed to be 
the whole intestate estate*
From the interesting English case of Re Heath^ 
it appears from this decision that the material date 
for ascertainment of the value of the husband's 
©state, for the purpose of determining whether it 
was below, or whether it exceeded, £500, was the 
date of his death# Thus, a right which appeared to 
be /
1# 1 and 2 Geo#?, c#10#2# note; it was necessary that the deceased shouldleave no lawful issue - Grant v. Munro 1916 1 B#I»T# 338; Professor Walker Prins.II, 1893$ comments that, in spite of the subsequent passing of the Legitimacy Act, 1926, the presence of illegitimate issue did not prejudice the widow's claim, and cites the case of Osman v# Oampbell 1946 B#0#204#
3 .  [1907] 2 0 h .2 7 0 .
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be of little value at that date, but which subsequently 
became of much greater worth, did NOT have the 
retrospective effect of changing the estate from a 
"below-£300" estate to an "above-£300'* estate. If 
the estate, valued at date of death, had been less 
than £3 0 0 , it was the widow's good fortune that an 
item of that estate had become worth a great deal, 
more than its original estimated value, and had 
raised the value of the whole estate to much more 
than £ 3 0 0 *
Provisions for the valuation of the net moveable 
estate are contained in s*6, and for the valuation of 
the heritable estate in s*3* The latter provision 
was repealed by the Intestate Husband's Estate (Sc,) 
Act, 1 9 1 9 , 8 ,3  ^and the provisions of the 1919 Act 
thereafter governed that matter.
The Act of 1 9 1 9  laid doim the procedure by 
which the widow was to realise the rights provided 
for her by the 1911 Act# Briefly, this involved 
application to the Sheriff of the country in which 
her husband had died domiciled or in Edinburgh Sheriff 
Oourt if there was any doubt upon that points by the 
Conveyancing Amendment (Sc#) Act, 1938, s#10^ any 
person deriving right from a widow might malce use 
of the 1 9 1 9  Act procedure, by presenting a summary 
application to the Sheriff - and the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Sc,) Act, 1940^, extended 
the benefit of these provisions to husbands (though 
no difference was made in the title of the amending 
Act of 1 9 5 9 ) and to cases of partial intestacy, (by 
OS,5(1) and 3(2) respectively*)
It remained necessary in all cases that the 
deceased /
1 # 9 Geo#V.c,9,2, 1 and 2 Geo, VI, o,24,
3 , 3 and 4 Geo. VI, c,42.
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deceased spouse should have died leaving no Imfful 
issue* Where there was a partial intestacy» the 
provisions of the previous Acts applied to that part 
of the estate which had fallen into intestacy, hut 
there were special provisions to talce account of 
benefit to a spouse in the form of a legacy bequeathed 
to him or her by the deceased*
By s.5(2)(9), it was provided that where the 
survivor received a legacy from the deceased*s estate, 
he/she was entitled only to such sum, if any, as 
remained after deducting from £ 9 0 0  the amount or 
value of such legacy* According to the pre-existing 
rules, of course, the survivor would not be entitled 
to more than £900, even if the intestate part of the 
estate exceeded that sum* If the intestate part, 
however, was £200, and the legacy was £90, it seems 
unlikely that the Pariiamentary intention was that 
the survivor should have £490, since that amount, in 
the example envisaged, was not available* Presumably, 
the intention was that the legacy be deducted from 
the sum of £9 0 0 , or from the value of the intestate 
section of the estate, whichever was the less.
By s*9(2)(b), a provision concerning the deduction 
of debts, expenses, liabilities or charges was to be 
construed as a provision relating to the deduction of 
such proportion thereof as was properly chargeable 
against that (intestate) part of the estate*
It was clear from the terms of the 19'^ 1 Act 
(s,*/l of which read, *'l'he heritable and moveable estate 
of every man who shall die intestate, domiciled in 
Scotland, after the passing of the Act, leaving a 
widow but no lawful issue, shall, in all cases where 
the net value of such heritable and moveable estate, 
talcen together, shall not exceed five hundred pounds, 
belong /
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belong to his widow absolutely and exclusively" ) 
that i f  the w hole  net value of t h e  estate w as £gOO 
or l e s s ,  t h e  w id o w 's  claim to the heritage comprised 
therein would triumph over the claim of the p a r t y  
who would otherwise, according to the rules of 
intestate heritable s u c c e s s io n ,  have been the heir- 
at-law* T h e re  was of c o u rs e  t h e  requlreînent of 
intestacy (or, after 1940, partial intestacy), and 
p re s u m a b ly  p a r t  of the purpose of the necessity that 
t h e  deceased should have died without lawful issue
was that the eldest son should not be ousted from
the heritage w h ich  was regarded as rightfully his, 
rather than rightfully his mother's* Where the 
estate exceeded £ 9 0 0 , the heir-at-law and  t h e  
representatives of th e  moveable estate were to bear, 
according to s*3 of the 1911 Act, t h e  £900 entitlement
of t h e  widow in proportion to the net values w h ic h  the
heritable and moveable estate bore t o  t h e  whole* In 
that case, t h e  widow w as entitled, it would seem , 
only to the cash surrogatum*
Oould s h e  i n s i s t  upon the t r a n s f e r  to h e r  o f  a 
house v a lu e d  dt £200, if to do so w ould  be to p la c e  an 
unequal or disproportionate share of the burden of 
satisfaction of t h e  w id o w 's  statutory right upon the 
heir-at-law, who might h im s e l f  not be satisfied w i th  
a c a s h  payment o f  the required amount to achieve an 
equalisation, from t h e  h e i r s  mobilibus? (If he 
w ere  willing to s e l l  t h e  house, the a n sw e r  w ou ld  seem 
to be that the widow purchase i t  from  him at the 
p r i c e  of £200, being part of her £ 9 0 0  cash e n t i t l e m e n t  
contributed r a t e  a b ly  by the heir-at-law and th e  h e i r s  
in mobilibus#3 It seem s unlikely that, i n  terms of 
t h e  1 9 1 1 A c t ,  she would be a b le  to i n s i s t  u p o n  transfer 
to her of the house*
The Intestate H u s b a n d 's  Estate (8c*) A c t ,  1959, 
r a i s e d  /
ra ised  tW  fla m ic le l l im it  o f en tltlw em t frmi &9W 
to  £5,000$ wUxloh w u M  ofWn r e m it  in  th e widow 
t h e  vyhole imoWilm# the
Mm#$ provj^^eê of Gowa# timt # e  #eo0a#M loft mo 
Imrful (%e H w kl#o0h rooowm ded
that i f  m  wm wim?v:W'ed by a epowe
I s a w , the eurvi^yiug spow e mWuld taW  the fu im itw o  
mmd p%e%iW'%i%# aW oM tcly* m 4 ehm ld WLw W^ ve a 
p m f w w t ia l  olalm to  £1*000 f%?ce o f  dea#i 
If there I'foro mo ohildrea* the oimriviiiiE$ 
h av ü  % p r e f o r e m t i a l  o lm lm  t o  £ 9 $ o a i  f%*ee o f  d e a th  d u t i e s #  
Bl#to w m l â  them bo {WL^ible frma # #  iwiaimêer 
0f the OBtato, and p%?emimaWy what imie then midlapogM 
o f  %fWZ& d,e%lv0 w oordiog to  'l#io o f  heritcdale
œ d  zwveablo im teetate m cceoeion*)
It is Imtemotin#, fmmi a aoeiologloal 
#mt* in dlGouaalng the pw»*19S% latf* it le 
00 f3W%umtly that t)ie matW^onlal !%omo will be in the 
3iwbmd*a po%mr of beguo^^t, or that # m  tltl# thereto 
iflll etfmd Im hl^ name, a M  hwee i m m  part of M,e 
wtato on intoBtaoy# Iatter3y, it h m  beoow m w h  
3iiore ooms^om for the title to horltag;o to be taken l2i 
# 0  joiaat mamee of ImmWW, and wife with a deatim^tien 
"to the a%2Wiwr"# #ie ooneldwatlom of this phenomenon 
(mid whether It ehouM beoome a etanda^^d praotioi:^  or 
w h e th e r  mioh a rule lo wjimtiflahly dictatorial, 
leaving no room for imllvldual diawetlom m d  âeoi^ i^ ion), 
amd of ita el#ifiemoe 1%% of the partloo'
e o a t r a o t u a l  m%d t e s t a m e n t a r y  fre e d o m  t^ier^oaftoz" l a  
oruolal to e%y m â o m  di$ow%lom of our naloo of 
m a tr im o n ia l, m d  m uet W  W m m  Im to  a o o o im t
iai the promxlgatiom of m y  Im our preset#
m ^  ^
s t a tu tm ^ y  p r i o r  r i g h t s *  l i k e  t h e i r  moooaeo:?^*
ey a te
o f  /
1* S ee  i n f r a *  mid $ e e  jg e n o m lly  O M p te r  ?,
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of the 1964 Act, did not prevail against a will,
Xfh03?aas legal rights did and do p3?evail against a 
will, if those in right of them so wish, The prior 
rights of the 1964 Act are more extensive, hut apply, 
as did their predecessors, only in intestacy or 
partial intestacy, The new rights arise whether or 
not there is surviving issue, legitimate or illegitimate 
The new prior rights also rank before claims to legal 
rights, (1964 Act, s,10(2))*
In the case of deaths occurring on or after 10th 
/September, 1964, the above-mentioned statutory prior 
rights have been superseded by the new prior rights 
contained in the Buooession (Be,) Act, 1964, s,8 and 
9, By s,9(5) of the 1964 Act, the rights conferred 
on the surviving spouse by the Acts 1911 •*1959» are no 
longer exigible*
Mutual Wills
The mutual will is a document of a (principally) 
testamentary nature made by two or more persons with 
the aim of governing the succession to their separate 
estates usiially to the survivor of them, or to the 
survivor and others, or upon similar, perhaps more 
complex lines. They were competent before 1964, and 
are competent still, but examples are usually of 
early date, since it may be said that they have proved 
their troublesome qualities*
It is obvious that the scope for error, and/or 
doubt as to intontion, increases with every co-testator.
One of the principal difficulties is the question 
whether the deed, once executed, can be revoked by all 
or any of the co-testators# The answer depends 
largely on the nature of the deed* If, in essence, 
it /
1. Of# Oraich's Trs# v. Mackie (1870) 8 Macph#878*
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between the parties are contractual* On the other 
hand it is presumed that, where the objects of the 
testator's bounty are other than the parties to the 
deed or the children of the marriage between these 
parties, the provisions are testamentary. It is 
also presumed that persons want freedom with regard 
to the disposal of their own property, whatever may 
happen with regard to the property got from the other 
party. All these presumptions, however, must yield 
to indications in the deed that something else was 
intended." His Lordship referred to HcLaren,wills 
i. p.425, H.Church of Scotland v* Black, and 
Corranoe's 1rs. v. Glen, per L. Kyllachy* In the 
case of Hanlon's Exec, v, Baird B.L.T. 504, the
presumption that provisions in favour of spouse and 
children were contractual was overcome by the terms of 
the deed in question, which carried the estate to the 
survivor as an outright gift, entitling the surviving 
wife to make a valid will excluding the child from all 
benefit thereof*
These few sentences represent a simplistic general 
statement# A great deal will depend upon the 
construction of the particular will, and these deeds 
are notorious for their complexity and difficulty of 
interpretation* It can be said that there is a 
presumption in favour of freedom, and hence of 
revocability, but that is a broad and  may be a misleading 
statement 5 it applies with especial force during the 
joint lives of the co-testators^, and upon the death of 
one, to provisions in favour of third parties as 
opposed to those in favour of spouse and/or children.
In the more skilfully drawn mutual wills, the important 
question of revocabili’ty (by whom and in what 
circumstances /
Bee the case of Baxby v. S.'s Execs. 1952 B.C. 
5 5 2 , where the co-testators were husband and wife. Revocation quoad her o\m property by the wife stante matrimonio was held competent and in accordance with the non-contraotual nature of the mutual will.
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circumetancea and when) would be dealt with 
exhaustively* (See L.P* Dunedin's comments in H.E. 
Ohurch of Scotland v* Black 1909 8*0*25 at p#51, upon 
the draft3Jig of the clause of reservation of power 
to revokes "I do not say that it is a bungled clause, 
but *.**"*)
On the other hand, if a question of power to 
revoke arises during the lifetime of the spouses, 
the presumption is the other way and is to the effect 
that, stante matrimonio* the document is testamentary 
in nature, not contractual, and that either spouse is 
free to revoke the prior mutual will so far as it 
concerns his/her own property, by means of a subsequent 
independent will. This point is illustrated in the 
case of Baxby v. 8. 1952 S.O. 552, which concerned a 
South African mutual will*
L.P.Oooper at p.354 noted the difference between 
this question and that which more commonly arises, and 
which has been discussed in the three oases previously 
studied, in all of which, whatever the result of the 
construction of the terms of the particular deed, the 
general presumption of contractuallty where provisions 
in favour of the surviving spouse and children were 
concernod, was upheld.
His Lordship said, "We are not concerned in this 
case with the all too familiar question who the 3? the 
survivor of two persons who have executed a mutual will 
is or is not free to execute a settlement innovating 
upon the terms of the mutual settlement. The question 
before us Mght have been raised in the lifetime of 
both the spouses, end in essence that question is 
whether in 1915 these two parties, by entering into the 
South African will, each precluded himself or herself 
from ever making a further testamentary disposition of 
his or her own estate without the consent of the other." 
He /
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He thought it s i g n i f i c a n t  that the point did not 
appeal? to have been raised before, despite "the 
e x tre m e  fertility of the mutual will in producing 
litigation" and com m ented, "It is well to recall 
that, after the death of the predeceaser of two 
persons who have executed a mutual will, matters 
are no longer entire, the fact of the death having 
itself introduced an element of ix'revocability. And 
if, as usually happens, t h e  survivor has benefited 
under the imtual will, pmærful equitable considerations 
may come into play to prevent the survivor fro m  going 
back on a bargain - cf* Stone v* Hoskins 1 9 0 5  P . 1 9 4 *  
W h ile  both parties are s t i l l  alive, no su c h  point 
arises."
Thus, the conjugal relationship has no effect 
upon inter vivos, stante matrimonio capacity to revoke ; 
it is only after the death of the predeoeaser, that 
the presumption in favour of the contractual and 
irrevocable quality of provisions in favour of the 
survivor and the issue arises*
It is clear that the device of the mutual will 
could hold a key place in a matrimonial sch em e , 
generally or in an individual case, although in the 
main its g3?ave disadvantages have meant that it has 
been shunned as a means of regulating m a t t e r s  concerning 
3Eatrimonial property*
It seems that, in contrast with the bias towards 
xwooabllity where a non-family settlement is being 
discussed, the court may lean more towards the view 
that the provisions for spouse and children a3?e 
irrevocable# If that view were adhered to in the 
majority of those cases, then, the mutual will and 
the marri age-contract, some of the provisions of which 
are to talce effect on death, approach each other, and 
come veaiy close#
I t  /
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It 1b hoped that imtual testomentary settlements^ 
will not enjoy a revival of popularity# Their 
mtLeanoe value In the past has been notorious, and has 
quite outweighed any possibly advantages which they 
might p088&8&« Althou^i at first sight they might 
present a n  attractive appearance for those reformers* 
bo they in Parliament or indivldualB within their ovm 
marriage, who wish to regulate matters of matrimonial, 
property in greater detail, the oaeoa cited are a tiny 
proportion of those wills which have been found 
fruitful of litigation, and it is thought that few 
practitioners would recommend their uae#
Much t h e  sam e en d  i s  a c h ie v e d  w i th  m ore c l a r i t y  
and  lG 88 o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  p ro b le m s  t o  a r i s e $ b y  t h e  
c o n te m p o ra n e o u s  m alcing o f  s e p a r a t e  w i l l s  i n  s i m i l a r  
te rm e  b y  h u sb a n d  m d  w i f e ,  an d  t h i s  i s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  
m o st commonly a d o p te d  a t  p r e s e n t  b y  t h e  h a p p i l y  
m a r r ie d  -  a l t h o u g h  i t  is t r u e  t h a t  so m e tim es  t h e s e  
w i l l s  do n o t  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  o t h e r  d e s t i n a t i o n s  o f  
p r o p e r t y  b y  t h e  sam e p e r s o n s ,  w i th  t e s t a m e n t a r y  e f f e c t ,  
m ioh ae  a  e n r v iv o r e M p  d e s t i n a t i o n  i n  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home *# D e s p i te  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
p r i o r  an d  l e g a l  t h o s e  am ciouc  t o  d l B l n l i e r i t
t h e i r  s p o u s e s  w i l l  f i n d  a  w ay t o  m in im ise  t h e  ornoimt 
t o  w h ic h  th o  c i i r v iv o r  su c c e e d s*
I n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  h o w e v e r , t h e r e  may b e  r a d i c a l
r o f o z m s  u p o n  t i x o  s u b j e c t  o f  j o i n t  t i t l e  t o  the 
m a tr im o n ia l  hom o, a n d  t o  e o m c  a t  l e a s t  o f  t h e  
K ia tr lm o n ia l  a s e e t a ,  an d  t h e  r e s u l t  may b e ,  a s  b e tw een  
e p o u e e e ,  a  r e e t r l c t e d  pow er to  t e s t  a n d  p e rh a p s  e v en  
a  r e s t r i c t e d  p o w er o f  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  " f a m i l y  p r o p e r t y "  
i n t w  v i y g s * A c c o r d in g ly ,  w i l l s  b y  liu sb an d a  and  
w iv o a  may t a k e  a  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm , b u t  i t  l a  h o p ed  t h a t
i*. s e a  i n f r a ,
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they will not revert to the device of the luutual will. 
The latter* in fact* might lose any doxihtful utility 
which it possesses at present, as a consequence of 




The Succession (So.) Act, 1964 came into 
effect on 10th September, 1964, to regulate the 
succession to the estates of those persons dying•nintestate after the commencement of the Act#
Generally speaking, one of the main aims and 
achievements thereof was the assimilation of the rules 
governing the treatment, by the rules of (intestate) 
succession, of heritable and moveable property, though 
some of the differences in treatment remain. Another 
was the equalisation of treatment of the sexes.
Apart from the special entitlement to prior and legal 
rights, a new system of intestate succession was 
introduced by s.2, to dead's part (or "intestate estate" 
therein defined), which adopted the principle, 
applicable previously only in relation to the intestate 
succession to moveables, that the succession opened to 
all the members of a particular class, regardless of 
sex or age, and, further, a new extension of a principle 
barely before accepted, that relations through the 
mother were to be recognised as having an equal claim, 
in /
1. The provisions of the Act touch testate succession at certain points in addition to certain miscellaneous matters. It has been seen (Chapter 5(1)) that it introduced important changes in the law governing the financial consequences on divorce. (1964 Act, Part V - s*25-27: see nowDivorce (Sc.) Act, 1976.
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in an appropriate case, with those who were related 
to the deceased through the father.
For example, those of the half-blood uterine 
were equated as claimants with those of the half-blood 
c ons anguine an in a succession, but members of either, 
and both, oategory(ies) are ousted by the presence 
of collaterals of the full blood^.
The new Family Provisions
The Act extended the idea of the system of prior 
rights of a surviving spouse, which had been introduced 
by the Intestate Husband's Estate (Sc.) Act, 1911^
1959 (the operation of which was excluded thereafter 
by the 1964  A c t ,  s*9(5)), but which had applied only 
where the deceased died without issue, retaJ.ned the 
system of legal rights while abolishing the legal 
liferents of terce and courtesy, and altered and 
clarified the order of those entitled to succeed to 
dead's part, which part of the estate should 
thenceforvzard consist not only of moveables but also 
of heritage undisposed of under the claim to the prior 
right to the house.
These provisions apply in cases of intestacy and 
of partial intestacy (s*56(1)), but they do not ever 
apply to testate succession, A will cannot be set 
aside by an aggrieved spouse with the aim of t a k in g  
prior rights in lieu of the provisions thereof. Only 
out of the 'intestate estate' (such as is undisposed 
of by testamentary disposition - s#56(1)) are prior 
rights exigible. Thus, in total intestacy, the 
ascertainment of available funds is not complicated; 
in partial intestacy, the prior rights are exigible 
from that part of the estate for which the testator 
has /
1964 A ct, 8*5,
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has neglected to make provision, or where his provisions 
have become of no effect through the predecease of 
legatee(s) or other circumstances, (e.g. failure of a 
legacy from uncertainty) and the matter may be 
complicated by the necessity, imposed by the proviso 
to s*9(1)^ to deduct from the surviving spouse's 
prior right entitlement to cash, the amount of any 
unrenounced legacy (ies) be que a bhed to the surviving 
spouse in terms of the will of the deceased spouse*
The Act improves greatly the position of the Psurviving spouse- - but not where the survivoi* has 
killed the predeoeaser# In the case of Smith, 
Petitioner,^ the widow had been convicted in northern 
Ireland of culpably killing her husband, and had been 
sentenced to 18 months* imprisoniaent, suspended for 
two years# The sentence suggested that some strong 
mitigating factor must have been present, but the 
Sheriff (Hoil Macvicar, Q#G*) agreed with English 
reasoning concerning *sentnmientaX speculation' as 
to the motives of one justly convicted: "I am of
opinion that the rule is absolute in cases where there 
has been a conviction for murder, manslaughter or 
culpable homicide#"^ Accordingly, the widow might 
not succeed to any part of the estate and therefore 
had no claim to be appointed executrix-d a t i v e , ,  and 
this resting not upon any particular authority in 
Scotland (though there are many clear English cases) 
but rather on the general principle ^  turpi causa non 
oritur actio, on considerations of public policy, 
equity and morality#
I* /
1# see infra.2# sometimes subject to qualification (e#g# in the case of 8*8 - house and furnishing) that the survivor (though not necessarily the deceased) was ordinarily resident in the house at the date of death of the intestate#3. 1979 B.L.T. (Sh#Ot.) 35#4# at p#36.
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I Prior Rights
A* The House
The new system supersedes the system in operation 
under the 1911-1959 Acts, and secures for the surviving 
spouse, under s.8(1), a right to the ownership or 
tenancy of any (one) house of which the deceased spouse 
was, at the time of his death, the owner or the tenant, 
and in which the surviving spouse (but not necessarily 
the deceased spouse, who perhaps might have been 
resident in a hospital or geriatric home, or who 
might have been living apart from the other by reason 
of separation, judicial or non-judicial^ ) had been 
ordinarily resident at the time of the deceased's 
death* (s*8(4))*
It is imperative for the operation of the right 
that the deceased shall have died intestate, or, if 
partially intestate, that the dwellinghouse forms part 
of the intestate estate* In the same way, the other 
prior rights (to the furniture and plenishings - s*8(3) 
and to the monetary sum - s*9) are exigible only out 
of the intestate estate*
The right to the house is a most welcome 
innovation in the law. Though there is still ample 
opportunity for wives to be deprived of the matrimonial 
home through the title being held stante matrimonio 
in the husband's name alone, and then disposed of by 
testamentary disposition by him (or through alienation 
of heritage inter vivos by the husband, although it 
is true that the husband's obligation to aliment (q.v. 
Chapter  4) his wlfc will normally secure for her a roof 
of some sort over her head and one whether owned or 
rented /
but as to aCQUirenda of wives holding decree of judicial separation, see Conjugal Rights (Sc.) Amendment Act, 1861, 8.6: supra, s e e  a l s o  s . l . c .
C o n s u l t a t i v e  Memo. No. 54» 5*1~5«5«
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rented, reasonably in keeping with their standard 
of life), the provisions contained in s.S at least 
ensure that the surviving wife will retain her home 
where, the title not standing in her name, her 
husband has not been sufficiently far-sighted to 
make a will and where otherwise, but for the 1964 
Act, the house would have passed to a son, or a 
brother or some other male relation#^ The strong 
disinclination to raake^ 'Will remains, but there is a 
growing trend towards 'joint* ownership of the 
matrimonial home b y  husband and wife^*
Prior rights are for the deceased's surviving 
spouse only, and not for his issue also, and they are 
exigible only out of the deceased's intestate estate, 
which is defined b y  s.3 6 (1 )  as "so much of his estate 
as is undisposed of by testamentary disposition."
In addition, there is an upper monetai'y limit 
upon the right to the dwellinghouse. When the Act 
came into force, that upper limit was s e t  at £15,000, 
but, such as has been the rate of inflation in the 
housing and other markets, that, by the Succession (Sc.) 
Act, 1973, s»1(1)C9), the limit wa& raised to 
£3 0 , 0 0 0  in the case of the estates of all persons dying 
on or after 23/5/73, and further increases may be 
made by order of the Secretary of State* It is 
important that the figure should be kept abreast of 
inflation, although it is true that the omers of 
heritage (and/or moveables) of considerable value are 
wont to ensure for many reasons that they do not die 
intestatq.
If /
The right is subject to provisos - s.8(2)(a) or (b) - as afterwards described*2. see consideration of whether 'jbint* ownership is the true nature of this arrangement, and the consequences thereof infra.
From 1 . 8 . 8 1 .  the sum s are  ( p r i o r  P i g h t s  o f  S u r v i v i n g  S-pouse'I ( S c . ) Order,  I 9 8 I (N0 . 8 0 6 ) : -  S . 8 ( l ) ( a )  and ( b ) ( h o u s e )  -
£ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;  S . 8 . ( 5 ) ( a )  and ( b ) ( f u r n i t u r e ) -  £ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ;  8 . 9 . ( l ) ( a )
( c a s h )  -  £ 1 5 , 0 0 0  and S . 9 ( l ) ( b ) ( c a s h )  -  £ 2 5 , 0 0 0 .  A l l  l i m i t s  
now v a r i a b l e  by 8 . 1 . s u b j e c t  t o  n e g a t i v e  r e s o l u t i o n  
( L . H . ( M . P . ) ( S c . ) A c t ,  1980 ,  8 . 4 . )
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I f  the value of the house oxoeeds £50,000, the
c i t x v i v l n s  e p o u s e  o f  t h e  I n t e s t a t e  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  
a u m  o f  £ 5 # , 0 0 0  -  0 * 8 ( 1  ) 0 > ) #  E v e n  i f  t h e  v a l u e  d o e e  
not exoeed that sum, the surviving apouse la  not In 
every oaee e n tit le d  to  the tran sfer o f the house
i t s e l f .  H e / B h e  m a y  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a c c e p t  a  s u m  
equivalent t o  i t a  v a l u e  I f  t h e  c l r o u m e t a n c e s  o o r a i ' o s p o n d  
with any of those se t  out by a *8(2)#
T h ese  ex co p tio B B  a r i s e  w here  ( & * 8 ( 2 ) ( 9 ) )  " th e  
d w e l 3 . i n g  h o u s e  f o r m a  p a r t  o n ly  o f  t h e  a u b j a c t a  
c o m p ris e d  i n  one  te n e n o y  o r  l e a s e  u n d e r  w M oh t h e  
i n t e s t a t e  im e t h e  te n a n t" ^ *  an d  ( e * 8 ( 2 ) ( b ) )  ifW z'e 
" th e  d w e l l i n g  h o u s e  fo rm s  t h e  w hole  o r  p a r t  o f  s u h jo o t s  
a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  w h i c h  i a  o o m p r i a e d  i n  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  
e s t a t e  en d  w h ic h  w e re  u s e d  b y  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  f o r  
c a r r y i n g  o n  a  t r a d e ,  p r o f e s s i o n  o r  o c c u p a t io n , ' and  
th e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  a s  a  w h o le  w ou ld  b e  l i k e l y  
t o  h e  { .m b s ta n tia lX y  d im in is h e d  i f  t h e  d w e l l in g  h o u s e  
w ere  d i s p o s e d  o f  o th e z ^ ria o  t h a n  w i th  t h e  a s s e t s  o f  
t h e  t r a d e ,  p r o f e s s i o n ,  o r  o c c u p a tio n "  ( t h e  a im  b e in g  
t o  s e c u r e  t h e  m o s t a d v a n ta g e o u s  d i s p o s a l  p o s s i b l e  o f  
t h e  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  : t h e  m o st common ex am p le s
w o u l d  be  t h o s e  o f  t h e  d o c t o r ' s / d e a t i a t * s / v e t a r . i n a r y  
s u r g e o n 's  h o u s e -c u m -e u rg e ry ,  o r  t h e  f a r # i o u 8 e ,  th o u g h  
I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  o n l y  i f  t h e  w i d o w  w as t m w i l l i n g  
o r  unable t o  continue farming t h e  l a n d ,  presumably* 
Suooesslon t o  a g r i c u l i m r a l  land Is a separate end 
h i g h l y  complex s u b j e c t ,  however, w h ic h  c a n n o t  be 
t r e a t e d  /
and where accordingly, "the landlord could not reasonably be required to grant a separate lease  
o f  that f l a t  t o  t h e  surviving spouse". H e a t  c m ,  
p . 3 1 *  The provision does n o t  a p p l y  t o  t h e  t e n a n c y  of one f l a t  in a block, the remaining f la t s  o f which are leased to others, s t i l l  less to tho ownership of one fla t in a block, Mes ton , ,%id#'- In any case, c*8'(2)(a) is  concerned with tenanc3.es only*
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t r e a t e d  h a r e '*  Im may o f  t h o w  oagm a, th o u g h ,  I f  
th o  w lio la  hou^3ohoM  an d  W m in ee#  w i l t  te n m ito d . 
P r o f e s s o r  /
1» 8 0 0  1964 Aot* 8*29(1) and (2)* 8,1%, and %oho&*
2 ;  H eato n *  pp*88*89sPatou and owêrw* The W w  of landlord and Tomant im Süotlœd, 1ï9t Oh^tor XI, "Sueo^Beiomf $th# $#meral rules of miooeaalon to loasoa) mkl O M p W r  XVIIZ, "The Agrioultwal HoIdijag&) Aoto" at P:P*396*'359, "BucooBBlon to loaae" (harvlng roformioe to the aggrioultimkl loano#)By t h e  ( ^ a t i t u W d  ^3*20(1) # f  t h e(%o$) Aot$ 1949 (offwtod by 1964 Act, Bohe&*2, para* 19), tho tenant may bewoath his l e a s #  t o  h lo  o r  $ o r  t omiy pemom who he entitled to auoeeed tothé #gtate 0% la^ tmstaoy iWer t W  1964 AOt, a claoei %-jhieh wold. Include the sujKVivlng apouae, the authors mote tXiat the widow waa àooèptcd aa a suitable iMoeeeaar jja the case of v* GiiuTiahof oODtlmid General Tmato^se (1980) %  s.0*%,.R.16*In tho cme mvisagod, boweiror, tho doooased would have died leaving tho latorost midw tho 3.eaac wdiepoaed of, mid #mt imald result l3% a reforoueo to a#l6(2) of the 19% Act, i^ hloh pm%it0 w  «coûter, liA that sitimtion or whore a baqimat had boon rofuwd tho 3.#gatoe, or whore a bequest la doolarod null end void in tomm of #*20 of the 1%9 Act, or 8*16 the Oroftera Eo3,d:lmg$ (^ :o*) Act, 1W6$ or baaomw mull mad void under 8#10 of tho Oraftera* (r^o*) Act* 1955$ fMd hoWithatm^ding a prohibition, oxpref^ o or l,mplled$ of asalgn t^lozi Of the interest, to trmmfor It to may porson entitled to suo&cod to the intestate estât#, or to the or prior rl#ita of a ewrvivlngeponee out of tSe estate, but hot to any other person except with th# pormieeiozi o f the Uazofters* Oc^mlo&loa (lease of a oroft under 1955 A&t) or t3i0 Itmdlord (other leeeeo*)Of* tenant*# power to Wqwath 3ïis Intereat in t W  f a c e  o f  I m p l i e d ,  n o t  O K pross, p r o h i b i t i o n  aga^J&et aa$lgnatlon, (a*29(1), &lsoWme(L infra. _ atid the agrloultwal epeoialtlea# (a*29(2))#Tharo %#ulâ eocm to he little differaiime hetmooD the pereow to whom the tenant tm&er the 1949 Act ïüi(#t logitlimtely beqimmth hl0 3.0mso, and those to %fhoa the mmoutor, without requiring the eonaent of the landlord, ml#it transfar It* the ozily dlfforenoe apparently being t w  oxtenalon of the olaee, in tbo ease, to inolude the n M  t wdaug^iWrwiiMlw- *
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Professor Heatoa (p*31) points out that tho surviving  
s p o u s e ' s  r i g h t  w ou ld  h e  d e n ie d  u n d e r  a . 8 ( 2 ) ( a )  a l s o # )
I f  e i t h e r  e x c e p t io n  a% )p liee , th e  a u r v lv in g  sp o u se  
w i l l  r e c e i v e  t h e  v a lu e  o f  th e  I n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
i f  t h a t  v a lu e  d o e s  n o t  e x c e e d  ' £ 5 0 , 0 0 0 1  i f  i t  d o e s  
e x c e e d  £ 5 0 , 0 0 0 $. t h e n  t h a t  f i g u r e  £ 5 0 , 0 0 0 )  i s  g iv e n * ^
F u r t h e r ,  i f  t h e  e s t a t e  c o m p r i s e s  tw o o r  m ore 
i n t e r e s t s  i n  q u a l i f y i n g  d w e l l in g  h o u s e s ,  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  
e p o u ee  h a s  s i x  m onths fro m  th e  d a te  o f  d e a t h  o f  t h e  
i n t e s t a t e  i n  w h ich  t o  e l e c t  w h ich  h o u s e  h e / s h e  w ish e s#
F o r  m ore t h a n  one  h o u se  t o  q u a l i f y ,  t h e  s u r v i v o r  w o u ld  
r e q u i r e  t o  show " o r d in a r y  r e o ld e n o e "  I n  b o t h  o r  m o re ,
and would n o r m a l ly  c h o o se  t h e  m ore valuable h o u seaw h ic h , a s  P r o f e s s o r  M eston  s a y s  ,  c o u ld  b e  s o l d  I n
o r d e r  t o  p u r c h a s e  a  m ore c o n v e n i e n t  one#
" R e le v a n t  i n t e r e s t "  i n  a  d w e l l in g  h o u se  i s  
d e f in e d  b y  s * 8 ( 6 ) ( d )  a s  "The i n t e r e s t  t h e r e i n  o f  an  
o w n e r, o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  t h e r e i n  o f  a  t e n a n t ,  s u b j e c t  
i n  e i t h e r  e a s e  t o  a n y  h e r i t a b l e  d e b t  s c o u r e d  o v e r  t h e  
i n t e r e s t ;  a n d  f o r  t l i o  p u r p o c e a  o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  
“ t e n m t "  m eans a  t e n a n t  u n d e r  a  t e n a n c y  o r  l e a s e  
(w h e th e r  o f  t ï ïo  d w e l l in g  h o u se  a lo n e  o r  o f  th e  
d w e l l in g  h o u s e  t o g e t h e r  w ith  o t h e r  s u b j e c t s )  w h i c h  i s  
n o t  a  te n a n c y  t o  w h ic h  t h e  R e n t (8 c * )  A c t ,  1971 a p p l i e s # " ^
P r o f e s s o r  /
1# S ee  M e s to n , pp#91 e n d  94  u p o n  t h e  h e r i t a b l e ,  o r
3 n o v c a b l 0 ,  n a t u r e ,  o f  t h e  m o n e ta ry  s u b s t i t u t e #  T h i s  
i s  an  im p o r ta n t  p o i n t ,  t h o u g h  t h e  R * D .c o m p lic a t io n s  
i t  b r i n g s  i n  t r a i n  a r e  now o b B o le tc ,  s i n c e  t h e  
a d v e n t  o f  0*T*T# (o n  e s t a t e s  o f  t h o s e  d y in g  o n  o r  
a f t e r  1 3 t h  M a r c h ,  1 9 7 5 ) ( n n d  i # v # g i f t s  m a d e  a f t e r  2 6 th  M a r c h ,  1 9 7 4 )  B # B #  s y s t e m  w as r e p e a l e d  w i t h  
e f f e c t  fro m  1 3 th  M arch , 1 9 7 5 *  E ven  b e f o r e  t h a t  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  d c a t l i s  o c c u r r in g  a f t e r  1 2 th  Hovcmbor 
1 9 7 4 ,  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  0 * T #  b e g a n  t o  
h a v e  a p p l i c a t i o n #2# p # 3 0 ,3* According to Professor Meston, (pp* 29/30) thec%C0 I ) t io n  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  R e n t  A c t  w a s  i n s e r t e d  
i n  order t h a t  t h a t  c o m p l i c a t e d  b r a n c h  o f  t h e  l a w  b e  
n o t  f u r t h e r  c o m p l ic a te d ,  and  a l s o  b e c a u s e  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  sp o u s e  /
12#
Profetmor con olu a ioa  ( a t  1969$ I'glien
th e  l im it  Mae I3i5$000 m d a t  p#2S) ifm  th a t  "In m^ oat 
e m w ,  th e r e fo m , A a ia v lv ln #  mpowe w i l l  be enabled  
to  eomWama to  l i v e  in#j.e%urhad in  tho houee ii% whleli 
M  or  mW waa ordlmmrily r#al4omt b efo re  th e  dooeaee&'s
d#ath*N
» •  S> /. ■ - ^ L ^ V lâ ïB .J M « l lâ i iÉ M S .
By a#G(3)$ t w  Act p rw lO w  fo r  t w  e tr v lv in g  
epoiwe a r% ht to  th e  fu a l'W r e  m d ple%%imhimg8 
(heloD^lmg to  th% â w e w e d , tW t  l a ,  mot to
a  M%%^>urchaae arrm ^em m t, a lth m g h  ^loode em c r e d it  
e a le  wmïld be Imeluded (th e se  twm a hoeomimg ouWeded 
igpom th e  coalm# in to  f u l l  e f f e c t  o f  th e  Oommmer O rM lt  
Aet# 1974$ m â , im t w  ImWetaW
e s ta t e  (n e t  hewe& tW d to  th ir d  p m t ie e ) )  t o  a  va lu e  
o f  f,a$OW (am m em io# (ao*) A c t , 1979) ,  p rev io im ly  
£5#000^ w d  Im m y  m e  homee Im
t h e  su rv ivo r im s  osN l-lm ezlly a t  t W  d a te
o f  th e  deeemeeâ^a death* #W  fu r n itu re  m d p im iah lm gs  
must /
B%)ouw i e  n em ta lly  favoured %  the s ta tu to r y  tro& t^art o f  eueee^Blem to  tenem eles
(unde » t o  \ , r u t  *o t  l e # l a l a t i o m * )(o*G. '< R'oj*:; (Be*) A&t*19?1*(19 m d  20 E li& ,2  0*20/ wuLe&ule 1$ per%%^a# 2 , a ta t# $  th a t " i f  th e  ei'lg in a). tem m t worn '-wn who d ied  leav,i%  a  widow Mho rcciXaij'îg ^'ia a t  hii$ dea% th en , A fter  hi.i? th e  wMew A^hnll he th e  s ta tu to r yto i iw t  6io le u #  4W nhe oooAeaeiem o f  the(lweD.lu^^*'howe v ltL o iit Wi)Tg o n v lt le d  t o  do eo im €er a oon tracW al team oy#" Thus, i t  w ith  eom trw tm al tenm elem  th a t th e 19%  l e t  i s  eonoerm d#
TW 1971 Act eonoem a p ro teo teê  s ta tu to r y  M .galated temmwlee; amê so h tm H e d  to jism oies, (i*B ) th e power ( o f  th e'-loeretury o f  ^tete) tn 00w e n t  â (w m tm lled  tm m o y  inti,'' ;;L i'égiO.A#&Bao I'aten wxi L w  o f  Landlord .T enm t in  pp*i?7#480$ pp*5%^599*
1 . NOW £10,000.
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muet form part of the daoeaaed'a intestate estate, 
b u t  th o  dw ell3 j),ghoiiao  c o n ta in i n g  thorn n e e d  n o t  -  
8 , 8 ( 3 ) , ^
I f  t h e  v a lu e  t h e r e o f  m%>eede € io$000 , t h e n  th e  
s u r v i v o r  may c h o o se  I te m s  t o  t h a t  v a lu e *  The p r o v is o  
t o  8 * 6 (3 )  o o u ld  1>© o r i t i o i s o d  on  t h e  g ro u n d  t h a t  $ on  
f i r s t  r e a d i n g ,  i t  c r e a t e s  a  w rong im p r e a e lo n  o f  w hat 
w o u ld  a p p e a r  t o  h e  i t s  m eaning* I t s  t r u e  p u r p o r t  
seem s t o  h e  t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  sp o u se  l a  e n t i t l e d  t o  
t h e  f u r n i t u r e  a n d  p l e n i s h i n g  o f  o n ly  OBE h o u s e , h u t  
t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  m a tb o r  w h e th e r  th e  p r e f e r r e d  o o n te n to  
p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  h o u s e  w h ich  h e / s h e  h a s  o lo o to d  u n d e r  
th o  p r o v i s o  t o  0 *8 ( 1 ) ( i f  t h e r e  i a  m ore t h a n  one h o u s e )  
o r  t o  a  s e c o n d  o r  a iR )seq u o n t h o u se #  A g a in , t h e  c h o ic e  
o f  t h e  s u r v i v o r  t o  t a k e  c o n te n t s  fro m  o n e  h o u s e  ox* t h e  
o t h e r ( e )  m ust h e  made w i t h i n  s i x  m on ths o f  t h e  d a t e  o f  
d e a t h  o f  t h e  d e c e a se d *
E ven  i f  t h e  h o u se  c o n ta in i n g  th e  f u r n i t u r e  i n  
q u e s t i o n  d o e s  n e t  i t s e l f  fo rm  p a r t  o f  t h e  I n t e s t a t e  
e s t a t e ,  o r  i f  t h e  s u r v i v o r  i a ,  f o r  some o t h e r  r e a s o n  
b e f o r e  e x p l a i n e d ,  n o t  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  h o u s e  $ h e / s h e  
re m a in s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  a n d  p l e n i s h i n g  u p  
t o  t h e  s t a t e d  v a lu e *  ( 6 * 8 ( 3 ) ) #  I t  w ou ld  seem  t o  b e  
a  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  ( f ro m  a  c o m p a riso n  o f  t h e  te rm s  o f  8 * 6 (4 )  
and  t h e  w o rd s  " a  o i l i n g  h o u se  t o  w h ic h  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
a p p l i e s "  ( 8 * 8 ( 3 ) ) )  t h a t  t h e  s u r v iv o r  bo  o r d i n a r i l y  
r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  h o u se  c o n ta in i n g  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  a t  t h e  
d a t e  o f  t h e  d e o e a s e d 'e  death*.- % o n  th e  q u e s t i o n ,
"From  w h ic h  h o u se  m u st t h e  f u r n i t u r e  b e  tW c e n ? " , t h e  
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  d r a f t s m a n s h ip  i s  i n f e l i c i t o u s # -  After 
t h e  vexfb " e l e c t " *  i n  s# /(3 ) p r o v i s o  t h e r e  f o l lo w s  " f o r  
t h e  /
1* F o r  d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  t h e  p m p o s e s  o f  t h o  A c t o f  
" f u r n i t u r e  a n d  p le M s h ih g e " , -  s e e  s * 8 ( 6 ) ,  a n d  s e e  d i s c u s s i o n  M en to n , pp#32 ..)3g  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  n o t  ( e x h a u s t iv e ,  an d  " in c lu d e s "  t h e  i te m s  s p e c i f ie d # -
the purposes of this aiihaeotion" (that is, for the 
p u r p o s e s  of e l e c t i o n  of furniture, n o t  for the purposes 
o f  e l e c t i o n  between o r  among tw o o r  more qualifying
dwelling houses) and it must bo assumed that the 
choice of furniture, limited to one - th o u g h  any - 
h o u se  w as Intended, th o u g h  the rule might h a v e  been 
set out much xiicwb clearly# Even when that i s  made 
c l e a r ,  th e  reason f o r  t h e  r u l e  is not obvious# I f  
one  o f  t h e  aims of t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  w as t o  effect a 
moT?e hum ane treatment o f  widows, then a bolder stop 
to that end would have boon to have allowed the widow 
a n  untrammelled choice# I f  t h e  worth o f  all the 
furniture in both or all the h o u s e s  were l e s s  than 
£10,000, s h e  will take a l l ,  and if t h e  w o r th  wae 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more, t h e  c h i l d r e n  may not be u n d u ly  
prejudiced, or indeed prejudiced at all, by t h e i r  
parent's free choice of t h e  items which, after all, 
the p a r e n t s  and not the c h i l d r e n ,  chose an d  am assed#
On the other hand, it Is true that any family emnlty 
is apt to be seen openly at times of division of an 
estate, that many of the additional items of another 
house may fall to the widow jure relie.tae $ and that 
tho instanoGB of Intestacies occurring eozitalnlng W o  
or more houses with together, far lees In each of 
them, furniture the value of which is in excess of, 
or even approaches, £io,000, are rare* The present 
rule, therefore, aids convenience, eaves time, and, 
perhaps most significant, preserves the moveable 
oatate of the other houee(e) for legal rights and 
dead's part (or "intestate estate" as defined in 
a#1(2) of the Act #)
It is obvious that the survivor is t o  make a 
choice of the p r o p e r t y  o f  the deceased*. Part o r  
e v e n  a l l  o f  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  an y  o r  a l l  o f  t h e
qualifying houses may be the property of the survivor, 
but this io a etatoment easier to ssy than to establish# 
I t  /
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It is often hard to prove matters of ownership 
where the furnishing of a house is ooncamed* It 
waa oleorly preferable from an Estate Duty point of 
view for a spouse to show that the content® are his/ 
her property, than to succeed to them qua claimant 
to prior rights under b#8(3), but In the estates of 
those parsons dying on or after 13th March, 1975, 
Capital Transfer fax has replaced Estate Duty, and 
there is no duty " passing between husband and wife.r
T h e re  i s  n o tM n g  ( a p a r t  fro m  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o
px'OTlde accommodation f o r  h i s  wife so long as she i s  
willing to a d h e r e )  to s to p  the alienation, by a 
h u sb a n d  i n  r i g h t  o f  h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r t y ,  o f  t h a t  
p r o p e r t y  and its contents inter ;tr|yqs $ ( p r o v id e d ,  
again, t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  is l e f t ,  in money and o t h e r  
items, to discharge his duty in^er yivqe and £t§nt£ 
m a tr im o n io .  to aliment) thus e f f e c t i v e l y  removing his 
wife's prior rights t h e r e i n ,  and  leaving the other 
moveables (apart from the cash e n t i t l e m e n t  of b#9, 
which roBiains exigible by wife and/or children) to 
bo d i s t r i b u t e d  according to the rules of legal rights, 
b y  which his w if e  would r e c e i v e  one h a l f  o r  one t h i r d  
t h e r e o f ,  and  the remainder would d e v o lv e  according 
to 8*2, and i n  t h a t  a he would have no rights imlosa 
the deceased wae not survived by Isaue or parents 
and/or collaterals# If the alienation was gratuitous, 
there would be no monetary considérât ion t o  swell 
the m o v eab le  fund#
Alternatively, he m ig h t convert much of liis 
estate into heritable p r o p e r t y ,  and die testate, 
having bequeathed his h e r i t a g e  elsewhere #
The 'Widow's hope, if t h e  am ount carried by lue 
re Hot me was e m a i l ,  would r e s i d e  in a claim fox* 
c o n t in u in g  a l i m e n t ,  w h ic h  c la im  w o u ld  a p p e a r  t o  b e  
c o m p e te n t  /
m e #
compétent in inteetacy, w  In testacy# The claim l8 Q%% o q u i ta h M  on e\ and tlw q u a l i f i c a t i o n  la that 
the widow o h a l l  hm ro received little, or n o t h in g ,  out 
o f  th o  d o o e a o o d 'e  o a t a W ,  iw d o r  a w  head#
An i ) # @ m tr a b lo  oyotom  w ou ld  r e s u l t  i n  a n
I m to lo r a b lo  loe:^ o f  free d o m  o f  m o tio n  w id freed o m  
o f  t e a tm t io a *  P e rh a p s  t h e  o n ly  a o o o p ta h lo  o o u ro o  
i o  t h a t  w h le h  o p o o i f i w  w h ich  p r o p e r ty  i s  a llo m o l^ lo  
i n t e r  v lv o e  o r  m ortlm  o a a e a  a t  th o  whlm o f  e i t h e r  
e p o u o e , and  w h ic h  i c  n o t ,  W t  r a t h e r  l e  a u b jo c t  t o  a pre*"ordalKi:ed statutory destination* The 19%  Act 
ay o tem  ù f  p x l o r  r l g h t a  e f f o e t s  pa^rt o f  t h i s  p w p o e e ,
W t  t h e  r i # t 8  p r o v id e d  b y  e # 0  m d  c # 9  a p p ly  o n ly  In caRe® of Intoetaoy, or, i%% partial Ixitestaoy, over 
t h o  intestate p a r t  of t h e  e s t a t e #  The o l d e r  righto 
0 Î  l a s  » * :  la g S iJ te  » »  «tm a® © »» i a  th a t ,
t h e y  m y  h e  c la im e d  egge ine t t h e  te rm s  o f  a  w i l l ,  end  
p r e v a i l  o v e r  th e m , i a  a M i t i o a  t o  b e in g  e x i g i b l e  i a  
l a t e o t a o y *
B#6(5) provider for tho eettlomoat by arbitratioa 
o f  d i e p a to e  c o a c c m d .a g  t h e  v a lu e  o f  e a  l a t e r o e t  a e  
ow ner o%» t e a a h t  i a  a  d w e l l i a ^ o a e e  o r  t h e  v a lu e  o f  an y  furaltwo or ploaig^hiag^#
There la m fm>th#r prior rig)it to i#^eh t W  
m ir v iv ia g  e p o a c c  o f  @a i a t e e t a t o  l e  e n t i t l e d ,  n a m e ly , 
t h e  r i g h t  tm d e r  e # 9  t o  th o  earn o f  £ ^ 5 ,0 0 0 ^  i f  t h e  
d e o e a e e d  wae a c t  e u rv iv o d  b y  l e g i t i m a t e  i e e a e ,  liow ever 
re m o te  end  iao li& d iag  a d o p te d  o h i l d r e a ,  o r  b y  m i 
i l l e g i t i m a t e  e h l M  o r  b y  th o  l e e a e  o f  a  p r e d e o e a e ia g ,  
l l l e g i t i i m t e  /
1# O liv e  & W ilm a ,  p#S95#2# f o r m e r ly  £ 8 , 0 0 0  (S u o c e s e lo a  (no#) A c t ,  1973), ando r i g i n a l l y  £ $ ,0 0 0 ;  t h e  m m  %me l a o r e a e e d  t o  £ 1 0 ,0 0 0  b y  t h e  P r i o r  R ig h ts  c f  G u rv iv ia g  B poaee  ( S c o t le a d )order 1 '9 7 7  ( e *1 1 9 7 7  Z!o#2 1 1 0 )# No^  £2 5 , 0 0 0  or £1 5 , 0 0 0
by r e a s o n  o f  P r i o r  R ig h t s  o f  S u r v i v i n g  sp ou se  ( S o . )  Order,  
1981 (N0 . 8 C6 ) ,  S .L .  1 9 7 7  No. 2110 r e v o k e d .
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illegitimate child, or to £L5,000 if the deceased 
was survived "by ary such persor(s), with interest 
at 7% upon that sum from the date of the deceased's 
death until payment # The extension to favour 
illegitimate children "by inclusion was made by the 
L.R. (Misoell*Provs.)(Sc*) Act, 1968, s.3 and Sched.1, 
in the estates of those persons dying on or after 
November 2 5 , 1968, hut the illegitimate issue of the 
legitimate or illegitimate child of the deceased, as 
has been stated, cannot represent his parent in the 
right to legitim, or in the right to succeed to the 
intestate estate under s#2, nor can his presence 
operate to cut down the surviving spouse's monetary 
right to £l%000 (s»9(1)(u) as amended) in a case 
where there are no living children, legitimate or 
illegitimate, of the deceased, nor affect the result 
in any way if there is surviving issue (s#9(1)(a) and 
9(1 )(b), when read in conjunction with the definition 
of "issue" contained in s#36(1)*)# Although the 
presence of children or issue, as defined, of the 
deceased, will restrict the surviving spouse's cash 
entitlement, the benefit to the children or issue is 
indirect, since they themselves have no similar 
entitlement to £2.5 ,000 or £1 5 ,0 0 0 depending on the 
presence or absence of à surviving spouse* (Contrast 
the principle which operates in the case of entitlement 
to the legal rights of ius relicti(ae) and legitim*)
The estate may not be able to satisfy even the restricted 
claim, however, and the spouse will tales all, by virtue 
of 3 .9 (2 ), with the result that no estate will remain, 
upon which the children's rights could operate* The 
size of the estate available for legal rights, however 
(and eventually the size of the intestate estate, to 
which they will have the first claim in terms of 
3 *2 (1 )(a)) will be swollen by the e x te n t  of the surviving 
spouse's /
1 . The r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t  on p r io r  r ig h t s  was in c r e a se d  from 4% 
to  7%, from 1 , 8 . 8 1 . ,  by i n t e r e s t  on P r io r  R ights ( S o . )  Order, 
1981 , (:n o . 8 0 5 ) .
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re d u o tio n 'to  £15,000, w  t o  t h e  Gtm
w h ic h  1$  a p p l i c a b l e  a t  t h e  tim e *  The o f
r e p r é s e n t a t i o n  b y  t h e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  wae n e t  th o u g h t  
m eeoB cary  o r  d e m is a b le *  i t  b e in g  e o m K W re d  t h a t  
t h e  r ig h t®  o f  m o o o G ^ ie n  e x te n d e d  t o  them  b y  th e  
1 9 %  A.ct* en d  - p a r t l o u l o r l y  b y  t h e  1 % 8  A ot$ i n  t h e  - 
ea tm toB  o f  th e jz ^  %mremta ( a t  f l r e t  rem ove* ao i t  
w ere*  fro m  t h e  d e c e a s e d )  w ere  e u f f l e i e a t *  The 
o w v lv im g  opo%se*B r i g h t  l a  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  an y  am oeta  
r o o o lv o d  b y  Itim  o r  h e r  im & er th e  h ead im g a  A w id /o r  B 
p r e v l o u a ly  m n tlo a m d #
I f  t h o  d o o o a ao d  h w  b e e n  e w v lv o d  b y  o u eh
o h lld rm x  o r  imamo* t h e  r i g h t  of' t h e  s u r v i v i n g  $ p o w e  
let t o  £15*000 #" a $ 9 ( 1 ) ( a )  a M  (b )*
I n  0 * 9 (1 )  a ls o #  p r o v i s i o n  i@ m a #  f o r  p a r t i a l
I f  t h e  m m r i w r  3uw h a d  b e q u e a th e d  t o  
o r  h e r  b y  t h e  d o c o a a o d  a  le g a c y *  t h o  m aoim t o f  
t l i a t  l e g a o y  i a  t o  b e  d e d a e to d  fro m  i)ho a im  tfh io h  t W  
apenm # w w M  h a v e  reoe lvW k othm TV lae* im  t e r m  o f  
(&#9(1)(%) o r  (b )#  A l t e r n a t i v e l y  $ i t  i e  o o m p o to n t 
f o r  t h o  opoim e t o  rm ioam oo th o  lo g a o y #  I t  i o  
d i f f i o n l t  t o  0 0 0  w h a t a d v a n ta g e  t h e r e  w o u ld  b e  i n  
t a l d n g  t h l a  o o w a e *  um leB a t h e  l e g a c y  waa n o t  a  o a a h  
s-im hi%t w as perhap%9 a  s h a r e h o M in g  im & oompmiy w h ic h  
t h e  s p o u s e  d i d  m ot w l^ h  t o  rm ta iia  m iâ  y e t  one  w h ic h  
o o a M  n o t  r e a M l y  b e  $)oM im  v ie w  o f  t h e  a t a t e  o f  th e  
a to o k  m a rk e t  a t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  t im e *  m id w h ic h  wao l i k e l y  
t o  d o o ro a o o  i n  v a lu e  fro m  th o  w o r th  w M oh I t  h o ld  a t  
t h o  d a t e  o f  d e a th *  a t  wM,oh. p o im t (m » 9 (6 ) (b ) )*  i t o  
wo3)th w ou ld  b e  o o o o r ta lh o d  f o r  t h e  p a rp o a o o  o f  d o d u o t io n  
t h e  p r i o r  r i g h t  t o  th o  m o n e ta ry  m m * L o g a e ie a  
o f  a  q m a llfy im g  # m l l i n # i o w e  o r  t o  t h e  fu z m i'M re  m d  
p lm % lo h in g a  a r e  ig n o re d *  w i th  t h e  r o o u l t  t h a t  t h e  
a p o w o  may r o o o lv o  h im /h e r  sum o f  £ '2 5 * 0 0 0  o r  £15*000 
( im d e r  t h e  q i m l i f l o m t i w  t h a t  t h e  e s t a t e  i a  a i% f r io ie n t Iy  
l a r g e  t o  p r o v id e  t h e  e n t i t l e m m t *  W . a l s o  u n d e r  t h e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no o t h e r  l e g a o i e e  o f  a  
ty p o  /
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typo to be taken acooimt in the computation)* 
and* In em (%>prqp3?iaW case* tho house and farnloTtlnga* 
tW flret-mentiomoâ r l# i t  hol% exigible tmdor tho 
syetem of p rio r rights (o#9)$ m& tho la t te r  right® 
by vi.rW0  of prior rlgate or l>y virtue of the terns 
of the doooAsed's tootamm&tary dlopositien* disposing 
only p artia lly  with hi# ostato#
By moama o f  th o  rule%^ l a i d  d o w  i n  s * 9 (1 )$  t h e  
amotmt to Wiloh tho apouao ia entitled  is  readily 
e a l e a l a t e d *  I f  i t  oxooods t h o  i n t e s t a t e  o a t& to *  th a n  
tho survivor i s  entitled  to  t W  whole In testate oatato 
(by a#9(2))* md that m  important %mlDt to bo motaâ#
Thus* Ÿfhore thoz-o is a pmztial iatootaoy* tho 
% )rior i t  m u st ho  o t r e a o o d  a g a in *  a r e  e x i g i b l e
on3y out of #m in testate  eatW^o and cannot eaoroaoh 
upon the toatate part thereof in order to mWa:o up tho 
figure of £^ 5*000 or _£i5*000# There is  no outrig;kt 
omtltlommt to #mt mm# The A%11 figure w ill bo 
gramtod only If it cam ba met out of tho intoetata 
estate# I f  tho xAolo inWatato estate 1® not 
Goxiaamod b y  t h e  n a t i o f w t l o n *  o r  p a r t i a l *  a t te m p te d  
eatiaftmtlon* of the claim* the aim duo la bo3?ne 
ratoc#ly by the heritable md move A le  of tho
estaW# . (s#9(3))# In a eaae of p a rtia l Intmtmy* 
i t  w o u ld  b o  p o a a lb le  f o r  a  e p o w o  t o  c la im  p r i o r  
rights out of the i&teatate eetato* and them to claim 
legal right# o%%t of tho # a ta to  part of the eetato* i f  
M/eho wae diaaatiafled with tho toataMontary %)rovieions#
In omoh 0 0 8 0 * the entltlomont to the prior right* 
( w h e th e r  A* B$ o r  0 )  i o  e o ld  t e  W  e x i g i b l e  " o u t  o f
the Imteatato estate#"
%r a # 1 (2 )$  r e f e r o n o o o  t o  m i i n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e  m?e 
d o o l w e d  t o  b e  e o m e tra o d *  f o r  th o  puzpoooo  o f  i w t  I
of tlie Act* as referomoes to "so mwh of tho net 
intestate estate as remajjm after the satisfaction of
th o a e  /
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those rights»’* "those rights" being legal rights and 
prior rights* If it were not for the provision 
contained in s*9(6)(a) that » for the purposes of s.9,
"the expression "intestate estate" means so much of 
the net intestate estate as remains after the satisfaction 
of any claims under the last foregoing section"» the 
situation with regard to the pa?io;eity of the prior 
rights inter se would be confusing* As it is» the 
chronological order of the setting-out of the prior 
rights would appear to correspond with the order of 
priority in satisfaction of the rights* Hence» the 
right to the dwellinghouse and furniture must first 
be satisfied» if possible and appropriate according 
to the rules» out of the (intestate) estate* In 
other' words» the house cannot be sold in order to 
provide the estate with sufficient funds to satisfy 
the monetary right under s#9* In any case» the 
question would probably not arise» since the recipient 
would be the same person in all cases» and it would 
be open to him or her thereafter to realise the price 
of the house and/or the furniture » if cash was 
preferred* It is only after the claims to house 
and furniture have been dealt with that the amount 
available to meet the claim under s.9 can be seen*
The most important aids to comfort and continuity are 
the house and contents » and it is right that attention 
should first be addressed to these# fhe uses to 
which /
1* (note: as mentioned» the right to the furniturewill arise if the furniture falls into the Intestate estate» whether or not the dwelling house in which it is situated is a ’qualifying^ dwelling house under 8*8(1) and (4) or whether» though being a ’qualifying’ dwelling house » is not the dwelling house chosen by the surviving spouse to satisfy his claim under s*8(1); on the other hand» all the furniture chosen or taken must come from one dwelling house alone* (s*8(3))
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which they are then put are entirely for the decision 
of the surviving spouse,
fhe result of the statutorily-imposed scheme 
of devolution of property on intestacy may he a 
greater generosity to the widow than she might 
receive under her husband’s will» in which he is 
entitled to dispose as he wishes of his heritable/Iproperty and one-third or one-half as the case may 
be» of his moveable estate. However» it is the 
husband’s choice whether he dies testate or intestate - 
thou^» possibly he may not realise fully the effects 
upon the division of his estate of his death intestate. 
On the other hand* perhaps even that freedom may beptaken away* because» as Olive & Wilson note a wife 
may be able to create an intestacy (fmd thus open up 
her entitlement to prior rights» which are generous) 
by renouncing her husband’s testamentary provision for 
her, provided that there is no destination-over to a 
third party* If there were a destination-over, the 
intestacy (desired by the wife) would not result.
In Kerr, a husband by his will left his whole 
estate of £1120 (which was entirely moveable in 
character) to his wife. He made no destination-over 
to another party. Since there was a child of an 
earlier marriage, and presumably, though not ostensibly, 
because of the danger of reduction of the si&e of the 
estate by a claim for legitim (which claim was made), 
the widow renounced her testamentary provisions and 
averred that her husband had thereby died intestate, 
and that she was entitled to prior rights under the 
1964 Act, the effect of the satisfaction of which would 
have /
1, or even the whole, if there have been inter vivos discharges of legal rights by the w ife" '15 iT “cïïiTdren, See 0, & W# pp*705"-?07; fisher v* Dixon (1840)2 D ,1 1 2 1 ,2, p . 701* citing Kerr, Petr. 1968 (Sh,Ot,) 6 1 ;article (196$) to j.b.S* 4 (McDonald),
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have Won to the Upon the oonot3A,;otioa
o f  ** t h a t  " in to e tm to  e s t a t e "  m eane f^ io miwh
o f  t h e  e a t a t o  o f  a n  : ! j i t e s t a to  w  i e  imdiapOMod o f  b y  
te^tamoatmfy diwpmition A o  8uooo^&od^ and w w  held 
entitled to pria::" rights**
03W w M w  a v m T c ê  t h a t #  b y  t h e  w i l l #
ahe W d  ïmde it imopemble# tmd thmt Intostaoy wma 
t W  ^iwitable agaamlt#
T M  M^h;stl.tuto (y\J,Bryd.en'} 3?ef erred
ifltk to :RK^fWBor ' )nal4*B article eited
aWv## ami also to i%Gton’s doi%^ b% on the
%ga?e0d with oo%meol fo%' the ifidw that# "It 
la# m #  t W  who created % #
Intootaoy# but the testator# %' to provide
for the event %vhio3i %%ai$ he^penod"# <%nd oonoltided. %mt 
waa entitled to prior lighte a%)d to the office;* of 
oxeoatcoj' Im terme of 8*9(4)# %d^ loh o%etonâ8 that right 
to a apouee taking tha Whole of tho laWat&to
ootat# 'UBdor a #9(2) (that lo# after act lorn of
t W  ri#Kta to #10 dwe3.11a$hotUE5c;: amd/or fwaiture# if 
either or W#: wae appllaablo# aW. if reriaindor of 
Uhe estate did not^oxoeod f)8#,000 or ;^ 4#000 was the 
0050 iimtmaoe*.)
H la  ro a :a o ) il%  w as t h a t #  a l th o u g h  t h e  a o r m i l  
m e m in $  o f  "am im te e ta te '" ' ’*ig) on# who ham dli&d w i th o u t  
l e a v in g  a  o f  t h e  1964- A c t la tro d m o o a
t h e  n o t i o n  o f  " a  p a m o n  wlio h a a  d i e d  le a v lm g "  ( e e t a t o )  
"imdi:@poaed of by toatemomtaiy dj,%>oaltiG-a"# m d  while# 
on a broad viciiw the hwhmid had not "died" laavlmg 
e s t a t e  u M ia p o s a d  o f#  t h a  m s u l t  w h ic h  h a d  o o c iw e d  tm o 
t h a t  o s t a W  lm d3.apoaod o f#  tm d i n  a  a e n e e  t l ie  
# o # a s e d %  a o t i o a  o r  im a o t lo n  i n  mg^ziag no  pTiOvle.ioa 
for the ooomwoaoo of the evont %fhloh Mpponod was . 
t h #  o a w o  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  hoooW ,ng " im d ie p o s e d  o f * .
’f  W  /
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Œlie Sheriff Principal was of the same opinion, 
and refused the appeal.
He rejected the argument that "Mrs. Kerr vras 
entitled to reject the benefits of the will, but 
nothing which she did after her husband’s death could 
affect the fact that his will had disposed of his 
estate," Alternatively, and with no greater success, 
it was argued that, even if the widow’s action plunged 
the estate into intestacy, her rejection could operate 
only upon that part of the estate which did not vest 
in the daughter a morte in name of legitim.
Sheriff A, G* Walker said, at p,63, "In my opinion, 
the question of whether or not a deceased’s estate has 
been left undisposed of by testamentary disposition 
cannot usually be decided by reference to the terms of 
the disposition alone, The whole circumstancoB 
following upon the death must usually be looked at,
A complete failure of beneficiaries, for example, may 
prevent the estate being disposed of under the deed, 
and the results of decisions made after the death by 
those beneficiaries who are entitled to claim legal 
rights may have similar results, 'fhe effect of the 
definition of "intestate" in s,3G(1) of the 1964 Act 
is, in my opinion, that there is intestacy when there 
is no will at all, and also when there is a will which 
becomes wholly 03? partly inoperable,"
He considered also that the Act itself (cf# proviso 
to 8.9(1) and s,9(6)(b)) "contemplates the possibility 
that the benefits u n d e r  a testamentary disposition may 
be renounced, and that, when renounced, they will 
form part of the deceased’s intestate estate out of 
which the prior rights of the surviving spouse will 
be payable."
Sheriff Walker also pointed out, though legitim 
vests a morte, that right which vested might or might 
not be va3.uol0ss. Although legal rights in the main 
(except for the abolition of teroe and courtesy) remain 
much /
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mucli the same as they were before 1964, there is one 
great difference, which the Sheriff emphasised - that 
they are postponed to the new prior rights*
a child is entitled by way of legitim only 
to so much of the net moveable estate as 3?emains after 
the widow’s prior rights have been satisfied.**"*
fhe prior rights which existed before 1964 
depended for their operation on the fact that the 
deceased had died without lawful issue* (Intestate 
Husband’s Estate (Scotland) Acts, 1911 to 1959^).
It would ax^ pear that a testator will yet be safe 
to favour, by testamentary provision, whom he wishes, 
if /
Nowhere in the course of the four statutes comprised undez? that h e a d  is the word "issue" defined; however, the question came for judicial consideration in the case of Grant v* Munro 1916 1 8*L*'I?*356, in which the deceased had left grand­children, but no children. Agents for both parties were in agreement that the term "issue" was not a term of art in Scotland*The Sheriff (Substitutes Oampbell) c o n c lu d e d  after perusal of authority, that the word should not be construed so as to include grandchildren*The interlocutor was recalled by the Sheriff (Principals Mackintosh) who stated, at p.342, "fhere has been a long series of oases ***,which settle conclusively that, according to the ordinary use o f  language, the words "issue" or "lawful issue" in their ordinary and primcrcy sense mean descendants of whatever degree* I am therefore bound to hold that the question whether a man who has died leaving grandchildren can be said to have died without leaving issue is not really open, and that the widow’s claim in this case must fail, unless she can shew that the word as used in the present context signifies something different from its o r d i n a r y  wide meaning*"The Sheriff also noted that* in the Intestate Moveable Succession (Sc*) Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict.c*25)$ the word "children" was used to indicate immediate descendants and the word "issue" to denote descendants of any degree* Of* Walker Prins.II, p.1806, description of legatees, and authorities cited at footnote 5* (However, contrast permission to represent in legitim which is of relatively recent date; Succession (So*)Act, 1964, S.11*  Representation in doad’s part was competent /
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if he ensures that that part of his estate over which 
he is entirely free to dispose is bequeathed to one 
who will receive no benefit from renouncing the 
provision xfith a view to "scooping the pool" by 
creating an intestacy, within the ratio of Kerr, by 
claiming prior rights and taking in consequence the 
whole estate perhaps# In other words, a bequest to 
a party other than his wife (and, other than his 
children, to guard against complications if he has 
not been quite scrupulous in dividing his estate into 
that part which is liable to be taken in name of legal 
rights, and that part over which he has freedom to test) 
should be safe, and should result in the carrying into 
effect of his Intentions# Of course, it is unlikely 
that bequests in favour of his spouse and ohildren 
would be entertained by him, in any case, if he is 
anxious to leave to his family as little as possible of 
his estate* If, on the other hand# he wishes to prefer 
his children to his wife within the framework of the 
law, he must use groat care and thought* If he wishes 
to prefer his wife to his children, and his estate is 
moderate, he might dispense with elaborate schemes, 
and die intestate*
II legal Rights after 1964
Glaims to legal rights arise in intestacy (after 
satisfaction of prior rights - 1964 Act, s*10(2)), 
partial intestacy (if a n y th in g  remains after satisfaction 
of prior rights out of the intestate part of the estate - 
c f  * s#9(2)) and  in testacy, where the terms of the will 
in /
competent in terms of the Intestate Moveable Succession (Sc.) Act, 1855, a,1, quoad the deceased’s collaterals and descendants, but not quoad ascendants end their collaterals*In Munro’s case' "the" ’grandchildren received benefit from the decision in that they became entitled thereby to claim dead’s part (not legitim) from their grandfather’s estate, which, but for the decision, would have fallen to the widow in its entirety*
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in  th e ir  favour are rejected  by the widow(er) and/or 
the ch ildren , 03? where the te sta to r  has made no 
provision for them or him or her*
It has been seen that renunciation of a provision 
in her own favour by a widow may result, provided 
that there is no destination-over which operates to 
prevent the occurrence of intestacy, in the grant 
to her of prior rights and possibly the consequent 
exhaustion of the estate, leaving the children’s 
claim to legitim (and of course her ow3i claim to 
lus relictae, though that would not matter in the 
circumstances) valueless .
A n o th e r  aspect of the case of K e r r  is this: if
the children x'oject testamentary provisions (having 
no destination-over) in their favour, that which they, 
or some of them, have rejected will fall into intestacy 
and devolve under the head of legitim, without 
complication, provided, presumably, that the widow 
is satisfied with her provision* If she, noting the 
children’s attitude to the will, also rejects her 
testamentazy provision (which again lacks a destination- 
o v e r ), a partial ov total intestacy will have been 
created within the term.s of 8.36(1) ajad within the 
ratio of Kerr* If the estate is small or moderate 
in value, the children,, by their attitude, so 
enthusiastically adopted by the widow, may have both 
deprived themselves of testamentary rights, and made 
much less their share of th e  estate in name of legal 
rights, since the widow, by virtue of her entitlement 
to prior rights, may talce the whole (intestate) estate 
under that claim* However, unless the will made 
mention only of the wife and children, there would 
remain some portion of testate estate., which could 
be /
1 . Kerr Petr,. 1968 S .l .T , .  (S li .O t.)  61 .
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be sought by both spouse and children f o r  l e g a lArights , but the amount available for division might 
be very small. Ihe claims of other legatees except 
those to whom heritage had been bequeathed, might be 
excluded# I f ,  on the other hand, only the wife 
and children were mentioned in the will , or other 
legatees had predeceased, and a total intestacy 
resulted, the children might by their action ’sign 
away’ both their testamentary and their legal rights# 
However, in that case, it is difficult to envisage 
a situation in which the ifidow and children would be 
at one in the rejection of its terms# It is more 
likely that one, or the other, would be sufficiently 
dissatisfied with the terras of the will to wish the 
intervention of external control in the division of 
the estate.*
(Dhe point which then arises is - if the widow 
retains her provisions in the will, but the children 
reject their provisions in favour of legitim, the 
value of their testamentary provisione f a l l s  into 
intestacy: can the widow claim any balance remaining
after satisfaction of legitim under the head of the 
prior right granted to her by s#9? (Any entitlement 
would be the monetary prior right under s#9, since 
the children are unlikely to let slip into intestacy - 
and thus into the hands of the widow - any legacy of 
house or furnishings.)* fhe example is theoretical, 
since there is unlikely to be any balance remaining, 
if the children have made a decision baaed on cox'rect 
arithmetical calculatione.
Where the widow’s "engineered" prior right 
entitlement stems from rejection of her own testamentary 
provisions alone, or in conjunction with rejection by 
the /
cf.. discussion (G.& W # pp,#708-710) of the case of Naismith v. Boyes (1899) 1 P* (E.h* ) 79*
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t h e  children (w hose mistake that is), 8 . 1 3  does 
not rule in explicit terms that testamentary 
provisions and prior rights are incompatible, yet 
possession of both might bo thought inconsistent 
(cf.s *1(1)(b))with the prior and co-existing 
common law* However much it may be stressed that 
the prior rights of ss*8 and 9 are exigible out 
of the intestate estate, it has been seen that the 
interpretation section (36) permits, by its 
definition, 'intestate estate* to apply to the 
intestate part of an estate which is partially 
testate and partially intestate.
It remains noteworthy, therefore, that while 
it used to be stated with confidence that, on the 
one hand, a widow could impugn the will in order to 
obtain legal rights, and, on the other, that prior 
rights are exigible out of the intestate estate 
only - and no connection was seen between the two 
statements - these rules must now bo read subject to 
the ratio of Kerr, and the definition o f  "an intestate" 
contained in 8.36(1). fhe effect of rejection of 
testamentary provisions in favour of legal rights may 
be, incidentally or with that intent, an entitlement 
to prior rights. In a suitable case, it would appear 
competent for a widow to "engineer" an intestacy, 
which was never intended by the deceased to occur 
although he may have displayed insufficient foresight 
in his will, and this produces an interesting 
refinement upon the nature of testamentary freedom or 
lack of it.
fhe old rights of iue relictae, ius relict! andW f............. ............. .
legitim remain,. Among the principal changes is the 
introduction of representation in legitim (s. 11(1) 
and (2)) . A representative may now be reqxii.red to 
collate if he or his parent whom he represents 
received /
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received from the deceased any advance which is 
subject to collation (s.11(3)),
/[Further, by the new s.lOA the right to legitim
has been extended to the illegitimate* The presence
of an illegitimate child or his "issue" (defined In
8,36(1) as "lawful issue however remote", thus
excluding illegitimate issue, and ensuring here, as
elsewhere in the Act, that the illegitimate may
receive benefit from the estates of their parents,
but not in the estates of remoter ascendants) renders
the division of an intestate estate tripartite (after
satisfaction of prior rights) if the deceased left a
surviving spouse but no surviving legitimate child -
8,11(4), The rights of the former are equated, of
course, with those of the latter - s.lOA (that is,
the presence of a legitimate child neither excludes
the illegitimate nor makes the division four-fold).
The general extension by the 1964 Act, s.23(1)^ of
equivalent rights of succession in the estates of the
adoptive parents as always pertained to a legitimate
child in the estates of his natural parents, ensured
that there was no doubt as to the adopted child's
right to legitim. The adopted person lost all rights%in the estates of his natural parents^*
Legitim can no longer be discharged by ante­
nuptial marriage-contract (s,12). It can be discharged 
p0 stnuptially only with the consent of the child which 
will /
1, introduced by the L,R,(Miscell*Provs*)(Sc*) Act, 1968, s,2; see also generally 1964 Act, s.4 as amended by 1968 Act, s,1,2, see also L*E, (Hiscell.Provs,)(Bc,) Act, 1966,
B ♦ 5  •3* apart from certain transitional provisions - L,R, (Hiscell*Provs*)(Sc.) Act, 1966, s*3. ("For all purposes relating to - (a) the succession to a deceased person (whether testate or intestate), and (b) the disposal of property by virtue of any inter vivos deed, an adopted person shall be treated aschild of the adopter and not as the child of any other person" 1964 Act, 8,23(1)*)*
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will occur inter vivos by his acceptance of 
alternative provision or mortis causa by election to 
talie testamentary provisions instead*
There is no representation in prior rights, nor 
in ius relicti(ae) nor in succession to the free estate 
where the deceased would have succeeded under s*2(1)
(d) or (e) as parent or spouse of the intestate (s*5(1))«
The method of distribution of the legitim fund 
where there is representation is described in s*11(2).
The division is per capita if all those entitled to 
participate in the division are related in the same 
degree to the deceased. If they are not, the 
division is per stirpes. with the result, for example, 
that a sole surviving child of the deceased would take 
half of the intestate estate available for division if 
his deceased brothers and sisters had left issue, and 
the latter would talce the other half share equally 
among them# (s*11(2)(a) and (b))# These are the 
rules governing representation in legitim# The similar 
provisions of s#5 und 6 govern the rules of representation 
with regard to the remaining intestate estate dealt 
with in Part I of the Act.
In other respects, the rules governing ius relicti# 
ius relictae and legitim are the same as they were 
formerly* The greatest substantive difference is 
that those rules do not operate now until the prior 
rights of the surviving spouse have been satisfied.
The latter rule (subject to the ratio of Kerr) does 
not apply in testacy, with the result that, in that 
sphere and in this respect, matters have not changed 
greatly, apart from the improvement in the position 
of the Illegitimate child*
Generally, the criterion date for ascertainment 
of the existence of relations entitled to claim, of 
valuation /
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valuation of the estate subject to legal rights
(subject to certain exceptions), of vesting of legal
rights and the commencement date for the payment of
interest (the rate of w h ic h , upon legal rights, is
normally the rate earned by t h e  estate, though settled
at 4% by the 1964 Act in the case of the monetary
right under s.9 - see s#9(1)(b)) is the date of death1of the deceased* Meston notes that interest is not
payable on the prior right to house and furnishings,
nor on "the value of the rights of succession to theofree estate", and that "The rate of Interest" (upon 
the ascertained amount of t h e  legal rights) "is 
flexible, taking account both of prevailing rates and 
of the interest actually earned by the estate in this 
period*"
Though s. 13 h a s  removed doubts upon the 
construction of deeds, with regard to choices between 
legal and testamentary rights, those in right of the 
testamentary provisions may not wish to accept those 
provisions, and re m a in  free to reject them* This is 
the untouched cornerstone of entitlement to legal rights
R e n u n c ia t io n  by a spouse o f  legal rights after 
the testator’s death does n o t  alter the tripartite 
nature o f  the division of the estate, o r  i t s  bipartite 
nature, whichever would have been the case had there 
bean no renunciation* The division i s  the same, but 
the renounced ius relictae(i) g o e s  to augm ent dead’s 
part, as do the shares of legitim o f  any children who 
renounce them^: inter vivos renunoiationa in the case
of children go to augment the shares of those children 
who do n o t  renounce, and, in the case of renunciations 
by the spouse, render the division after the death of 
the /
1. p.115.2# at p.43*3* fisher v. Dixon (1840) 2 D.1121,
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the predeceasing spouse bipartite, that is, a 
division between legitim and dead’s part. The spouse 
who has discharged his/her right inter vivoa is treated 
as dead, or as never having existed.
Ill The Disposal of Dead’s Part After 1964
If the right of the surviving spouse to claim 
statutory prior rights (I'fhether before or after 1964) 
and to claim legal rights are regarded as claims or 
quasi-debts upon the estate rather than as rights 
of succession in the estate of the predeceasing spouse, 
then it can be said^ that, "At common law, the relict 
had no rights of intestate succession as such."
She could not participate qua widow in the 
division of dead’s part, though it is possible she 
might be able to do so qua cousin of the deceased*
Dead’s part-(that is, in its intestate connotation, 
rather than in its meaning as that part of the estate 
over which the testator has complete freedom to test 
and may have tested) being the free intestate estate, 
after satisfaction of pre-1964 prior rights, and of 
legal rights, and now, after 1964, having the name 
and meaning of "intestate estate" as defined in s*1(2) 
of the 1964 Act - consists of the heritable and moveable 
estate of the deceased after satisfaction of those (post 
1964) prior rights and of legal rights. Before 1964, 
only moveable estate fell into this category. Now all 
estate not required to satisfy those rights of spouse 
and children (and thus perhaps including a second 
dwelling house which would not fall to the surviving 
spouse under s#8, and any other heritable rights not 
disposed of by will, there being no longer any legal 
rights/
1 .  Naismith v ,  Boyes (1899) 1F .(H .L.)  79#2* per Olive & Wilson, p.716#
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rights exigible out of heritage) is so classified 
(see 8*1(1) - assimilation of heritage to moveables), 
and devolves according to the rules set out in Part I 
of the 1964 Act (being ss*1-7) and any othenflse 
pertinent "enactment or rule of law in force 
immediately before the commencement of this Act which 
is not inconsistent with those provisions*"*^
Professor Walker comments that, the existence of 
heirs-at-law being inconsistent with the new scheme 
of things, the need for rules concerning collation 
inter haefedes disappears, "though the doctrine has 
not been abolished*"^
The statutory table of those entitled to succeed 
to the free intestate estate does not differ greatly 
in its order of priority from the common law rules 
governing identity of, and order of, the heirs in 
mobilibus * with one notable exception* For the first 
time, the surviving spouse, qua spouse, enters the list 
of those having a right to succeed* Basically, the 
scheme retains a preference first for descendants, 
then for collaterals, and then for ascendants* Failing 
all possible heirs, the free intestate estate or 
"intestate estate" or dead’s part - which might, in 
that case be the whole net intestate estate, on the 
hypothesis that there were no olaimEUits to prior and/ 
or legal rights - falls to the Crown as ultimus haeres*^
As before, each category is exhausted before the 
next category is considered, but there is an exception 
to this rule* Where persons of the class of the 
deceased’s collaterals and either or both of the 
deceased’s parents survive, half of the free intestate 
estate falls to the "collaterals" category, and half to 
the /
1 * s*1(1)(b)*2* Walker, P r in s .I I ,  1757# 5* 1964 Act, 8*7
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t h e  p a r e n t s »  I n  e a c h  c a s e  t o  b e  d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y  
b e tw e e n  o r  a m o n g  t h e  m em bers o f  t h a t  c l a m #  -  s * 2 ( 1 ) ( b ) *
I n  d e t a i l ,  t h e  o r d e r  l a ; -
S * 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) £ -  c h i l d r e n ,  w h e t h e r  l e g i t i m a t e  o r  I l l e g i t i m a t e  
( i S # 4 ( i )  o f  1 9 6 4  A c t  I n o t  o r i g i n a l l y  a  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h a t  A c t ,  b u t  s u b s t i t u t e d  b y  
t h e  b , R #  ( M l S 0 e l l f P r o v s * ) ( S ô * )  A c t , ,  1 9 8 8 #
8 * 1 ,  a m i  h a v i n g  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  
t o  t h e  e s t a t e s  o f  t h o s e  p e r s o n s  d y i n g  o n  
o r  a f t e r  H o v e i a b a r  2 5 $  1 9 6 8 ) $  a n d  t h u s  b o m  
o f  a n y  o r  n o  m a r r ia g e  ( o r  l e g i t i m a t e d  
c h i l d r e n )  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ;  i f  t h e r e  i s  a n y  
o n e  p e r s o n ,  o r  i J i o r e ,  l a  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  
h # / s h e  o r  t h e y  s h a l l  to J ;c e  t h e  w h o l e  
’ i n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e * ,  a s  d e f i n e d #
I n  e a c h  c a t e g o r y ,  t h e  s u o o e s s io n  I s  o p en  t o  r e p r o B e n t a t l v e s  
o f  a n y  member o f  t h a t  c a t e g o r y ,  who h a s  p r e d e c e a s e d ,  I n  
a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  © #5(1) e n d  0 *6 ( 1 )*  
(b)*"" p a r e n t e # )  end  c o l l a t e r a l s ,  I f  b o th  a r e
p r e s e n t ,  s h a l l  h a v e  th e  ’ I n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e *  
d i v i d e d  e q u a l ly  b e tw e e n  t h e  tw o c l a s s e s ,  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  l i a s  b e e n  no a n sw e r 
f r o m  ( a ) *
( 0 ) 5-  c o l l a t e r a l s ,  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  c h i l d r e n
u n d e r  ( a ) ,  a n d  s u b j e c t  t o  ( b )  a b o v e ,  s h a l l  
t a k e  t h e  w h o le  * i n t e s t a t e  e s t a t e * #
the parent(s) of the deceased shall take 
the whole * intestate estate * $ if there ie 
no answer from  ( a ) ,  (b) or (c)*
It can be seen that the inclusion of p a r o n t ( s )  in 
class (b) ±B a re-afflmation of the previous statutory 
(Intestate Moveable Buoc*(Ee#) Acts, 1855 and 1919) 
im provem en t I n  t h o l r  p o s i t i o n *  T h e i r  common law  
position vras inferior to that of collaterals, in 
acoorclanco with the general policy that, if possible, 
t h e  /
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the estate should not ascend*
(e)î- where the classes (a) - (d) are empty, 
the surviving spouse of the deceased 
shall have right to the whole 'intestate 
estate * *
It is interesting that the right of the spouse to 
succeed should be postponed to that of the parent(s)# 
Despite changing views, the principle that the estate 
should remain "on its own side of the family, whence 
it came", whether that be the male or the fe m a le  side, 
obviously prevailed over the principle that the estate 
should ascend only if no other path was open# Of 
course, in many estates, the table of succession to 
the 'intestate ©state* will be irrelevant, because' 
the spouse (and ohildren) will have taken the whole 
estate in satisfaction of prior (and perhaps also of 
legal) rights; if the estate is sufficiently large to 
Ijermit the provisions of s#2 to operate, many may have 
considered that the surviving spouse would have 
received ample provision out of the estate#
(f):- failing members of all previous categories, 
uncles and aunts of the deceased (whether 
maternal or paternal) form a class, and 
shall take between or among them, the 
whole 'intestate estate'*
(g);~ similarly, falling all others, the 
survivin.g grandparents of the deceased 
(whether maternal or paternal) form a 
class, and shall take, between or among 
them, the whole 'intestate estate'#
(h):- failing all prior-ranking claims under 
(a) - (s), the collaterals of any grand­
parent (maternal or paternal) talce, 
between or among them, the whole 'intestate 
estate * «
(i) /
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(1);- "where an intestate is not survived by
any prior relative, the ancestors of the 
intestate (being remoter than grandparents) 
generation by generation successively, 
without distinction between the paternal 
and maternal lines, shall have right to 
the whole of the intestate estate; so 
however that, failing ancestors of any 
generation, the brothers and sisters of 
any of those ancestors shall have right 
thereto before ancestors of the next more 
remote generation".
No vestiges remain of prejudice against the 
maternal relatione *
Reference is made to "The Buccession (Scotland)/IAct, 1964" H.O* Meston where is set out clearly the 
effect upon the survivor's prior rights, of a legacy 
or legacies specified in the imperfect ox' incomplete 
testamentary document*
It has been noted already that the monetary prior 
right may be claimed by the survivor under deduction of 
any legacy (or the whole x‘ight may be claimed if the 
legacy is declined) (Proviso to s*9(1))$ but that the 
survivor, in making such deduction, need not take account 
of a legacy of furniture or of an interest in a 
qualifying dwelling house* The important point is 
that it i s  not only in total, but also in partial, 
intestacy that the spouse's prior rights may arise, 
and that, unless the will of the deceased had disposed 
of his house and furniture to a third party, his widow 
would not lose her prior right to those items of his 
estate /
1 » pp.27-28 and 36-37#
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estate# Had the testator 00 dlepoeed of them* hovmvor# 
the widow 3aake mo complaint# slme# by legal
rights az'o exigible no lomgey; out of heritage, and 
px'ior rlghta are e%l#hle only o%%t of that part of 
t h e  e a t a t e  'hw dlepog$ed o f  b y  te s ta m e m ta ry  d lsp o B itio m '*   ^# 
Great power Is plaaod in the Wmda of tho titular 
mmer of the matrimonial homo and# to a lei^ aer extent 
(beoaiwe of t M  wailaMlity of a olmlm of legal rl#ite 
oxigihlo out of the movoahlo oatato) the titular oimor 
of the eontaata thereof* Thia io the area most in 
meed of refo3%%&*
P r o f e s s o r  M eoton ro m ark a  t h a t  i f #  w  l o  p o s s ib l e *  
th e  m tc v lv o r  h a s  b e e n  o r d i n a r i l y  rB g^idont i n  moz'O th a n  
ono d w e l l in g  h o u ae#  t W  vmh^o e f  t h e  b e g t e a t  t o  h im  
07* h e r  o f  th o ^ o  h o u a o s  a n d  t h e  f a r a i t u r o  t h o r a l a  n e e d  
not he dedmoted from the mirvivor*^ olnlm to % e  m(metar;i 
r i g h t  t o  f  1^000  o r  €25 $000$ m  th e  o a a a  may he#  T h is  
oeoma ram a^rkahlo*  By a n  am W ;e  d i o p o a i t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  
m d  a ommlng oomhlnatlo3i of toetmoy m d  jbztem'kaoy* a 
hiDshmnd a n d  f a t h e r  e o ti ld  b e n e f i t  g i^ e a t ly  hliGs w if e  t o  
t h e  p r e j u d i c e  o f  h i s  o h i ld r e n *  who m ig h t f i n d  t h a t  
t h e r e  w ae l i t t l e  o r  n o th in g  u p o n  W hich t h e i r  r i g h t s  
t o  l e g i t im *  a n d  im d o r 5 * 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) #  ootAld o p e r a te #  The 
r i g h t  t o  l o g l t l m  o m m o t o p e r a t e  t o  o u t  do%m a  b e q u o e t  
t o  t h e  Midmf* o r  t o  en y  o t h e r  p e r  eon# o f  h e r i t a b l e  
property# cmd# on the other hard* the oroation of 
I n t o a t a o y  b y  t h e  o l e o t l o n  t o  tWco l e g a l  r i g h t s  may 
m e re ly  In o r o a e o  t h e  f w d  w a i l a b l o  t o  t h e i r  m o th e r  i n  
marne p r i o r  r i g h t s  w orn w!^ere sh e  may t o
doduQt s o m e th in g  I n  view of legaoioo bequeathed to h o r* ^  
U n le s s  t h e  e s t a t e  l a  l a r g e *  t h e  b e t t e r  oom re# m ig h t bo  
t o  a c c e p t  an y  to ^ tw rn rn ts ry  p w v i s l w  i n  t% ie ir f a v o u r ,
T he /
1* 8#8* o#9* ond interpretation of "intestate estate"
08 fo u n d  I n  0 * 3 6 ( 1 ) ,2 ,  Of# K e r r  P e t r *  emd d ie m w a lo m  - t h e m o f *
S e e  a l e e  M w to n #  pp#36*@7#
638*
T he a u th o r  g o w  on  t o  e a y  (p # 3 7 )  t h a t  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " le g a c y "  c o n ta in e d  I n  $ * 9 ( 5 ) ( b )  (1*8#
t h a t  I t  " in o lu d e e  w y  poymamt o r  h m o f l t  t o  w h ic h  a  
s u r v i v i n g  opoi^no hooomoa e n t i t l e d  b y  v i r t u e  o f  m y  
t e a ta m o n ta r y  d l a p o n i t i o n " )  1$ v e r y  emd w o tild
om braoe m ore th a n  w h a t i n  n o r m a l ly  # io u n ;h t o f  an a  
" le g a c y " #  ia e lu d lm g  p e rh a p #  m m rrlag0"#oon .trao t p ro v iD lo n e  
ta lc in g  e f f e c t  o$ï d e a th  ( m w th e r  a e p o o t  o f  t h e  qp,er;;r 
"When mid a t  w h a t p e lm t d e e a  a  d lB p o s lt lo m #  o r  a
o f  W r i t a i i # *  o r  a  tm m m fw  # f  p r o p e r t y  
buaom e a  t e e ta m o n ta r y  d l e p o o i t l o n  I n  n a t u r e  i f  n o t  
I n  fo rm ? " )  and# m oat im p o r ta n t  m d  e l g a l f l e a n t #  # m t  
p a r t  o f  a  e p e o l a l  d o o t l n a t l o n  I n  a  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  
h e r i t a g e  w h ich  w i l l  b e n e f i t  t h e  w i f e  a f t e r  t h e  W e b m d ’s  
d e a th   ^#
P r o f e s s o r  H e a to n  o c m a ld e re  tZ iat t h e  vgilim  o f  
t h a t  3 .o ^ o y  ( v a l im d  me a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  d e a t h  o f  t h e  
d e o o a a e d  ^  m * 9 (6 ) (h ) )  m ig h t r e q u i r e  t o  h e  d e d u c te d  
fx'om th e  m o^aetary r l# & t*
Ome of the noteworthy ooneoqueaoea o f the
A ot l a  t h a t  t h e  w idm f <# who may h o  a  e eo o n d  i r lfo *  
porhspc» and mot r^^lated to  tho ohlldrom o f her 
huehm nd e x c e p t  h y  t h e  a t e p '^ r e l a t i o n a h i p  #» may f a r e  
h o t t e r *  i n  h e r  W $ h m d * $  Im to a ta o y #  thm a d o  t k a  
oblldron, im leas the ^mshmnl had iio  qualify ing interoBt 
in  heritage aM the furniture belomiod to  the widow* 
an d  may f m a  b e t t o r ,  i n  i n t w t a o y  ( o r  evem I n  p r n ^ i a l  
I n t e e t e n y )  t h a n  s h e  m ig h t  w h ere  h e r  h u a h a n d  l o f t  a  
w ill#  bequeathing mil to  her* end th w  leaving the  
OOW0 O o p e n  t o  t h e  o h i l d r e n  t o  o h a l lo n g e  th o  w i l l #  a  
p r o c e e d in g  p r o b a b ly  t o  t h e i r  b e n e f i t #  a n d  c e r t a i n l y  t o  
t h e i r  b e n e f i t  i f  t h e  e e t a t e  e o n ta in e  l i t t l e  o r  no  
h # r l t& g e  /
1» see èMM* .W» 645-668.
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h e r i t a g e •
I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  w i d o w  a l s o  
m a y  r e n o u n c e  t h e  w i l l ,  a f t e r  d u e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w i t h  
h e r  s o l i c i t o r  u p o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
h e r  p r i o r  a n d  l e g a l  r i g h t s  w i l l  e x c e e d  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
t h e  e s t a t e  r e m a i n i n g  a f t e r  t h e  c h i l d r e n ’ s  c l a i m s  t o'I
l e g i t i m  h a v e  b e e n  s a t i s f i e d *
T h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  r e f u s a l  t o  a s s i m i l a t e  h e r i t a g e  
t o  m o v e a b l e s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  l e g a l  r i g h t s ,  w h i l e  e n d o w i n g  
w i t h  a p p r o v a l  t h a t  a s s i m i l a t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  i n  s * 1 ,  h a s  
m e a n t  t h a t  c a r e  m u s t  b e  t a k e n  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  b u r d e n  
o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r i o r  r i g h t s  ( h o u s e ,  f u r n i t u r e  a n d  
m o n e y )  m u s t  t a x  ( i f  o n l y  n o t i o n a l l y )  t h e  m o v e a b l e  a n d  
h e r i t a b l e  p a r t s  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  % fh ic h  
t h e y  b e a r  t o  t h e  w h o l e  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  ( m o v e a b l e )  
e s t a t e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  l e g a l  r i g h t s  i s  a n  a c c u r a t e  
r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  ( m o v e a b l e )  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  w h o l e  
e s t a t e  l e f t  b y  t h e  d e c e a s e d *  A f t e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
p r i o r  a n d  l e g a l  r i g h t s ,  h e r i t a g e  a n d  m o v e a b l e s  a r e  
t x ' e a t e d  a s  o n e  e s t a t e ,  a n d  d e v o l v e  w i t h o u t  d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e i n g  m a d e  b e t w e e n  t h e m *  M o r e o v e r ,  f r o m  a n  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  a l l  p r o p e r t y ,  h e r i t a b l e  
a n d  m o v e a b l e ,  v e s t s  n o w  i n  t h e  e x e c u t o r ,  b y  v i r t u e  o f  
c o n f i r m a t i o n  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  d i s p o s a l ,  b y  s . 1 4  
o f  t h e  1 9 6 4  A c t *
I f  n o  d i s t i n c t i o n  a t  a l l  w e r e  t o  r e m a i n  b e t w e e n  
h e r i t a b l e  a n d  m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
s u c c e s s i o n ,  a  p r o b l e m  m i g h t  a r i s e  u p o n  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  
b y  t h e  w i d o w  o f  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  w i l l *  l u r e  r e l i c t a e * 
s h e  w o u l d  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  c l a i m  o n e  t h i r d  o r  o n e  h a l f  
o f  /
1 * S e e  g e n e r a l l y  M e s t o n ,  p p . 5 6 - 3 9  a n d  e x a m p l e s  
t h e r e  c i t e d *2 * e x c e p t  w h e r e  t h e  r i g h t  i t s e l f ,  s u c h  a s  t h a t
u n d e r  s . 8  t o  t h e  d w e l l i n g  h o u s e ,  i s  t o  a n  i t e m  
m a n i f e s t l y  h e r i t a b l e :  t r e a t m e n t  o f  m o n e yBurrogatum, Meston, p*29*
640,
o f  t h e  w h o l e  e s t a t e ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  h o u s e *  P a r t i c u l a r l y  
i f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  w a s  t r i p a r t i t e ,  a n d  u n l e s s  t h e  e s t a t e  
w e r e  v e r y  l a r g e ,  a n  a m i c a b l e  d e c i s i o n  u p o n  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  m i g h t  n o t  b e  r e a c h e d ,  
a n d  i t  m i g h t  b e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  h o u s e  t o  b e  s o l d  
a n d  t h e  p r o c e e d s  d i v i d e d  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  m o v e a b l e  a s s e t s *  
A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  p o s s i b l e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s ,  t h e  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  o f  s u c h  a  s e e m i n g l y  h a r m l e s s  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
w o u l d  b e  e n o r m o u s e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  f r e e d o m  o f  t e s t a t i o n  
o v e r  h e r i t a g e  a n d  t h e  d e v i c e  o f  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  
h e r i t a g e  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e f e a t  l e g a l  r i g h t s  w o u l d  d i s a p p e a r  
( p e r h a p s  n o t  a  b a d  r e s u l t  b u t  o n e  w h i c h  w o u l d  d e s e r v e  
d e t a i l e d  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a n d  l e g i s l a t i v e  
t r e a t m e n t  i n  i t s  o w n  r i g h t )  e x c e p t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
h e r i t a g e  m i g h t  b e  s a i d  p e r h a p s  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  w h o l e ,  
o r  p a r t ,  o f  t h e  d e a d ’ s  p a r t  o f  t h e  e s t a t e *  T h e  
M a c k i n t o s h  C o m m i t t e e ,  f o r  t h a t  r e a s o n  ( e n c r o a c h m e n t  o n  
f r e e d o m  t o  t e s t )  a n d  f o r  o t h e r s  ( f o r  e x a m p l e ,  s p l i t t i n g -  
u p  o f  f a r m s  t h r o u g h  s a l e  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a g r e e m e n t ,  
a  s u p e r a b u n d a n c e  o f  h e i r s )  r e j e c t e d  c o m p l e t e  a s s i m i l a t i o n  
o f  h e r i t a g e  t o  m o v e a b l e s *
THE E F F E C T  OF A DEO BEE OF J U D IO IA L  S E P A R A T IO N  UPON  
THE S U G C E S S IO N  TO PR O PE R T Y
W h i l e  i t  i s  t r i t e  t o  s a y  t h a t  n o t h i n g  c o n t a i n e d  
i n  t h i s  P a r t  w i l l  a p p l y  t o  t h o s e  w h o  w e r e  a t  o n e  t i m e  
s p o u s e s ,  b u t  w h o  h a d  b e e n  d i v o r c e d  b y  t h e  d a t e  o f  d e a t h  
o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r  ( a l t h o u g h  i t  h a s  b e e n  n o t e d  t h a t  
c l a i m s  f o r  t e m p o r a r y  a l i m e n t  w i l l ,  a n d  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  
a l i m e n t  m a y ,  b e  c o m p e t e n t  b y  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e )  
a n d  a l s o  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  1 9 6 4  r u l e s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  i n  
i n t e s t a c y  a n d  p a r t i a l  i n t e s t a c y  w i l l  a p p l y  o n l y  t o  
t h o s e  s p o u s e s  w h o  h a v e  b e e n  c o h a b i t i n g  u p  t o  t h e  d a t e  
o f  d e a t h  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r ,  o r  w h o  h a v e  s e p a r a t e d  
c o n s e n s u a l l y  o r  j u d i c i a l l y  ( t h o u g h  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
o f  /
o f  t h e  l a t t e r  o a e e a  may h a v e  a  b e a r in g  upon  t h e  
ro q u lre m e m t o f  0 * 8 (4 )  ao  t o  t h e  o r& ln a iy  re a ld o n o o  
b y  t h e  s u r v i v o r  I n  a  d w o ll i t ig  houmo l a  w h ic h  th e  
p r e d e c e a s e r  h a s  a  r e l e v a n t  l a t e r o m t   ^# a n d  i a  thea®  
o a e e a  a l s o  t h a t  p r o p e r t y  w h ic h  i s  h i e  a n d  t h a t  w h ich  
l a  h e r e  w i l l  b e  m oro c l e a r l y  d e f in e d ) *  t h e r e  i a  a  
s p e c i a l t y  t o  b e  n o te d  i n  t h e  o a # e  o f  th o s e  j u d i c i a l l y  
se p m ra tM *
M o n tlo n  h a s  boon  made o f  th e  d o v lo o  o f  th e  
" p r o t e c t i o n  o r d e r "  a v a i l a b l e  t o  m a r r i od woman u n d e r  
t h e  C o n ju g a l  H ig h to  (S o # ) Amendment A ct*  1861# 8*1^#
T h ia  o r d e r  l a  o b s o l e t e  now* t h e  n e o e a e i ty  f o r  i t  mo 
lo n g e r  e x i s t i n g  l a  v ie w  o f  t h e  c h a n g e a  i n  m a tr im o n ia l  
p r o p e r t y  law * an d  t h e  b r o a d  R e p a r a t io n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  opoueoa  w liloh  now o b t a i n s  * b u t  t h e  1861 A ct w h ic h  
c r e a t e d  t h e  d e v io o  a l s o  p r o v id e d  ( i n  8 * 6 ) t h a t  a  woman, 
who h a d  o b t a in e d  a  d e c r e e  of r e p a r a t i o n  a  m onaa q t  
th o r o *  o r  a  p r o t e c t i o n  o r d e r  (e # 5 )$  s h o u ld  h o v e  c o m p le t#  
pow er o f  d l e p o a o l  o v e r  a l l  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  t h e r e a f t e r *  
amd# lix a A d ltifm #  t h a t  u p o n  h e 3? d e a th  i # % t m ÿ e # mxQli 
a o q u i r e n d g  a h o n l i  p a s e  t o  h e r  own ( h o i r e  e n d )  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e #  w  i f  h e r  h u a b en d  h a d  p r e d e e e a e e d  h e r*
T h e re  a r e  many l i m i t a t i o n #  upon  t h e  eo o p e  o f
t h e  r u l e #
111 th e  f i r s t  p l a c e  # th e  p r o v i s i o n  a f f e c t #  g c g u irg m ja
o n ly *  and  d o e s  n o t  e x te n d  t o  t h e  w ho le  o f  th e  w i f e ’ s  
e s t a t e #  I n  t h e  se c o n d  p la c e *  a in o e  t h e  A c t o f  1861 i n  
i t s  /
1# The f a o t  o f  s e p a r a t e  ? m b l t a t lo n  o r  t h e  r tn ts o n  f o r  I t *  how ever*  i e  n o t  r e l e v a n t  as lo n g  a#  t h e  e u r v i v o r  waa o r d i n a r i l y  r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  d w e l l in g  h o u se  i n  w M eh t h e  deoGaGO& h a d  a  q u a l i f y i n g  i n t e r e s t *  a t  t h e  d a t e  
o f  d e a th  o f  t h e  d e o e a e e d *  T he ro e id o n o e  t h e r e  o f  t h e  e u r v l v o r  i #  t h e  im p o r ta n t  p o i n t  #- t h e  p re e e n o e *  or a b se n c e #  f o r  w h a te v e r  re a e o n *  o f  th e ^ p r o d e o e a e e r  ie not taken Into account* (o f*  a *8(6)(cl) and 8 # 8 ( 4 ) ) #
2 #  S e e  O h a p t e r  1 #  S .L .C .  Memo. No« 5 4 »  5 . 1-5  # 5 * 5 * 5   ^ p r o v i s i o n a lc o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  no l o n g e r  be com pe ten t  f o r  a d e s e r t e d  
w i f e  t o  a p p l y  f o r  a p r o t e c t i o n  o r d e r .  No s p e c i f i c  m en t ion  o f  
any change t o  be made to  the  s u c c e s s i o n  a s p e c t  ( s . 5,  -  p r o t e c t i o n  
o r d e r ;  s . 6 .  -  d e c r e e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n ) .
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its terms confined its effect to decree obtained by 
the wife, it does not regulate the acquirenda of 
husbands holding decree of judicial separation, nor 
is there any other similar statutory provision to 
govern their case. Further, in order that the provision 
may operate, the wife must have died intestate. If 
she does not, and the husband objects to the terms of 
the will, he may renounce the will and claim ius relicti 
out of the whole of the wife's moveable estate* lue 
relicti is a right which was not part of the law in 1861, 
but the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1881, 
which introduced it, did not restrict (or enlarge) its 
operation in this case, nor did the Act of 1964#^ 
Intestacy remains a prerequisite for the operation of 
the provision of the 1861 Act* Leaving aside questions 
of policy, the particularity of the rule of the 1861 
Act, s*6 renders it unsatisfactory*^
In other respects, and in circumstances which are
not /
1# The Act of 1954, in its final form, made no specificreference to the Act of 1861$ See, however, discussion infra. , of the curious results ofthe inter acIjTon of the two Acts in this matter of the succession to the acquirenda of a judicially separated spouse*2» See criticisms, 0. & W$, pp.690/691; see alsoarticle by Dr. Olive 1964 J,R.266-2/1 (a commentary upon the first edition of Professor Heston's 'The Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964*) The rule of English law is contained in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973» s#18(2)(that if while a decree of judicial separation is in force and the separation is continuing either of the parties dies intestate as respects all or any of his or her real or personal property, the property as respects which he or she died intestate shall devolve as if the other party to the marriage had then been dead)» Oretney Principles of Family Law, 3rd edn. p.172 notes that this rule does not prevent a spouse applying to the court as spouse for reasonable provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (1978)* Judicial separation in any event is a remedy the popularity of which is declining*
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not those specified by the Conjugal Eights Act, the 
fact that spouses have been separated by judicial decree 
has no direct effect upon the rules which govern the 
succession to their property* As with those who have 
separated consensually, the survivor*'s prior right to 
the house under s#8 may be barred by reason of lack 
of "ordinary residence" there, but that is an exmuplo 
of mere specialty of circumstance, not of a substantively 
different body of law in use to govern the parties* 
succession.
Special Destinations: The Joint or Comion Ownership
of the Matrimonial Home, and the Consequences Thereof
This subject is central to any discussion of 
matrimonial property, and for one very important reason: 
the matrimonial home is the most permanent, and valuable 
asset of the spouses, in terms of money and of health, 
comfort and happiness* Any system which leaves rights 
in relation to this item of property vague and inequitable 
is incomplete and lacking in an essential point, however 
well it may deal with questions of the ownership and 
rights over corporeal moveables in the house, or parties' 
earnings, or their rights against each other in consistorial 
or other litigation. Special destinations relate to 
heritable property, the Act's provisions concerning them 
relate to heritable property, and, in the vast majority 
of cases, the only heritable property which the spouses 
own is the matrimonial homie *
It may be said with confidence that heritable 
property, jointly owned or owned in common, is always 
productive of greater difficulty and problems than 
property owned by a sole proprietor* Even where the 
owners are not related to each other, or are not spouses 
(that is, have no inter-relating ties and duties, and 
inter-dependence, beyond that arising out of the joint 
or common ownership of heritable property) problems may 
arise /
644*
arise, particularly with regard to the sale of property* 
Half of an undivided house is not a saleable proposition*^
A statement of the rule, oversimplified perhaps, 
is that joint owners of property do not have each a 
separate interest in that property, but share the one 
item * pro indiviso'* Neither can sell the property 
inter vivos nor dispose of it mortis causa by 
testamentary disposition* The share of the predeceaser 
accresces to the survivor* Only by joint decision 
and consent may the property be sold* Fortimately, 
the majority of examples, with one important possible 
exception, of this type of ownership of property are 
to be found among parties, such as trustees of a club 
or association, who have no personal interest in the 
property in question.
The proprietors of property held in common, on 
the other hand, have greater freedom of action. Each 
holds a pro indiviso share, but over that he has 
unhampered ability to deal. Accordingly, he may sell 
his fraction of the property (if he can find a buyer 
willing to take it; the latter may do so with a view 
to investment, rather than personal occupation) &md 
dispose of it by will. Moreover, it is of the essence 
of the concept of property held in common that, if the 
property has not been divided, (that is, notionally 
not physically) any proprietor is entitled to demand 
that it shall be so divided* Once division is made, 
he will ovm a pro indiviso share, which he may sell, 
ox* burden, a s  he wishes* If this i s  impracticable, 
then there will be a sale of the whole property, and 
the co-proprietors will share the proceeds in their 
respective proportions. ("Common interest" in 
property is distinct from this. An example would be 
the interest of riparian proprietors in a river running 
through the land of each*) Under the Presumption of 
Life Limitation (Sc.) Act, 1891, 8.4, there was provision 
to /
1 . though see S tee le  v# Oaldwell 1979 S*L*T.228, i n f r a .
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to allow property held in, coiamon to be eold if oiio 
of the oo^proprlotor# ham dioappoarod* Who Aot of 
1891 was repealed in.Its entirety by the ProBimptlOB 
of Death (Go*) Aet* 1977* ^h# later Aot contain#
no exactly equivalent provision, "but perhaps the 
point is covered by #*2(2)(b)$ which empowers the
court, in gr^ reting decree, to determine any qiKjetion 
relating to any Interest in property which arieoa ao 
a consequence of the death of the mlaeing person.*
I'ho easonea of the difference between the two 
types of ownership is, that, while, In both oaaec, 
the item of estate la an undivided whole (at least in 
the first Instance in the case of common property) in 
the ease of joint property, all proprietors share the 
one title to the whole, whereae in the case of common 
property, "each owner has hla own separate title to a 
fraction of the undivided w h o l e I n  neither case 
is the property physically divided (so that it is possible 
in both instance# to say that they hold it £ro i%^.vlsq), 
but in the former case both possession and right of 
property are undivided, whereas in the latter, though 
phyaioal possession, may be undivided or may, by 
agreement or by action of division, become divided, the 
right of property will be divided, thus each proprietor 
will have right to a certain fraction of the lands, Pthough no right to any "identifiable" part until division"* 
(Walker, Prins*!! pp*1500*01),
i f r o f o b ^ o r  /
1 * Walker♦B Prlnoiples, IX #1300*2$ Possibly it is this ability of one phrase ^ proi|id:lylaq - to comprehend two meanings, the one siiople, gZeraT^'and, superficial, and the other technical and when used in that sense, being intended to carry certain conséquences, which has resulted in confusion# It is commonly said that spouses, in the situation envisaged, hold "joint, pro indlvj,ao shares", a phrase which is confusing wltiiouE^fmrEler e:;q>lanation or definition# The following is an extract from "latin Maxime and Phrases", 3rd. èâ#, by John Troyner (1 8 8 5), at p#4695-
"Pro I n d i v i s e " ; in  an u ndiv ided  manner; in  common.
646.
1Professor Walker remarks upon the confusion of 
terminology found in earlier authorities, and makes
reference to the case of Mags, of Banff v. Ruthin 
Castle, Ltd#^
In that case, l.J.Clerk (Cooper) at p.67/68 says:- 
"The difficulty of this subject is partly a terminological 
one, due to the differing senses in which the word 
"joint" and its approximate synonyms can he, and have 
been, employed* A similar perplexity has been 
introduced by the same cause into the law of obligations* 
(G-loag on Contract, 2nd ed*, p.199; Coats v* Union Banlc 
of Scotland "(1929 S*G.(H.L.)114))"5 and into the law 
of succession (McLaren on Wills (3rd ed*) vol*l, p.633)*
In the law of property, the case of Schaw v. Black 
"(16 R*336)" affords an instance in which Lord Einnear 
describes as a "joint owner" a person whom Lord Shand 
describes as a "pro indiviso proprietor" and an "owner 
in common."
I  have found no more exact summary of the law than 
that contained in G-loag and Henderson’s Law of Scotland, 
3rd ed*, pp.489^90* and with these learned authors I  
use the term "joint" to describe the class of right 
typified by the ownership of co-trustees, and the term 
"common" to describe that typified by the ownership of 
two or more persons in whom the right to a single 
subject has come to be vested, and each of whom is 
entitled by his separate act to dispose of his separate 
share."
Now, it will be seen (Hay*s Tr* v. H.*s 1rs. 1931 
8.C*329; Perrett’s 1rs* v* P* 1909 B.C.322) that, unless 
a contractual element is present in the case, where a 
title is taken in the name of both spouses, the tendency 
is /
1. Prins. II p.1260, fnote 1.
2 .  1944  8 . 0 . 3 6 ,
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is to consider that, while the "donee" spouse takes a 
pro indivise indefeasible share in the property upon 
registration of the deed yet may perhaps not evacuate 
the destination of that share to the surviving spouse, 
the "donor" spouse may freely alter the destination.
The latter power is a function of ownership in common 
of a pro indiviso share; the former disability resembles 
that of a joint, not a pro indiviso holder in common.
The confusion is lamentable; possibly the term pro 
indiviso should be dropped from the language, and 
reference made simply to "joint" or "common" property, 
the meanings and consequences of each being clearly 
defined.
Moreover, in this context, husbands and wives are 
almost universally spoken of as "joint owners", whereas 
their powers with regard to the property - unless a 
contractual arrangement is established - smack rather of 
coïcmion property. The category of spouses is absent 
from L. Cooper’s exposition (at pp.68-69) of joint 
property:-
"8o far as has been traced, there is no instance of 
a joint right in the strict sense having been held to 
exist except in persons who were inter-related by virtue 
of some trust, contractual or quasi-contractual bond 
"(which would explain "Perrett")" - partnership or 
membership of an unincorporated association being common 
examples - and it seems to me that such an independent 
relationship is the indispensable basis of every joint 
right. The distinctive feature of the right of such 
joint proprietors is the jus accrescendi, which excludes 
the possibility of separate shares in the several joint 
owners, and still more emphatically excludes the 
possibility of severance of the tie, except, of course, 
by dissolution of the relationship on which the joint 
ownership rests. Finally, the considerations of public 
policy, which in cases of common ownership justify the 
rule that nemo in commun!one invitus detineri potest, 
have no application to the entirely different situation 
created /
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created by joint ownership."
Another source of confusion is that, in dispositions
to husband and wife, frequently a destination is taken
to the survivor with the result that, unless either/)party competently evacuates the destination by the 
terms of the deed rather than by the rules of joint 
property, an event similar in effect to the operation 
of a jus accrescendi arises.
Thus, where husband and wife together hold property, 
it is frequently found that they are spoken of as 
"joint fiars", having pro indiviso shares in the 
property in question* At first sight, at least, it 
would seem that a confusing hybrid type of title to 
property results. The term "joint fiar" is used, and, 
on the death of the predeceaser, that half share (the 
usual fraction in this case) pertaining to him or her
accresces to the survivor in the manner of joint
property. (A pro indiviso share of property held 
in common, in the absence of any special destination 
not evacuated, will devolve according to the rules of 
intestacy or the will of the deceased owner.).
Yet, on the other hand, it is envisaged, apparently,
that either may be able, in certain circumstances 
(though not in Perrett below), to evacuate the 
destination by testamentary disposition, which is a 
power characteristic of the holding of property in 
common.
pIn Perrett*8 Trs. v. P. property was t the en in 
the naiaes of both spouses in circumstances in which 
each paid one-half of the purchase price, and the 
title was taken in favour of them jointly and to the 
survivor /
1* (H a y ;)  1964 A c t ,  s .  1 8 (2 )  and  s . 3 6 ( 2 ) .
2 .  1909 8 .0 .3 2 2 *
survivor, and to tlie heirs of the survivor, and their 
assignees whomsoever. In that situation (of equal 
monetary contribution) it was held that s subsequent 
testamentary settlement could not evacuate the 
destination.
At p *328, per L, Einnear is found the sentiment - 
"I t a k e  i t  to be perfectly well settled law that when 
a right is taken to tifo persons jointly, and the 
survivor and heirs of the survivor, the two disponees 
are joint fiars during their lives, but upon the death 
of the first deceaser the survivor has the entire fee 
to the exclusion of the heirs of the predeceaser. The 
law is so laid down in every one of our institutional 
writers, and is supported by the authorities, and the 
rule applies to joint fiars who are husband and wife 
in exactly the same way as to other persons," In 
Walker v, Galbraith^, the point is also clarified by 
li, HcLaren’s assertion at p,350, that, "In my opinion 
t h e  assignation gave equal rights to the husband and 
wife, the subject being vested in them jointly, with 
benefit of survivorship," These comments envisage 
orthodox joint property, i t  seems.
In Walker, the spouses had acted jointly and with 
consent of both in executing a mutual settlement which 
was hold to have evacuated a pre-existing destination 
in an assignation of a long lease of heritage. They 
had acted in the manner required of joint owners of 
property, which, indeed, they were considered to be. 
Lord McLaren felt that, in such a situation, the 
question whether revocation had talien place was subject 
to substantially the same rules as the question whether 
there had been revocation of a previously-created 
specific b e q u e s t  by a later general settlement, and was 
a /
1 .  ( 1 8 9 6 )  2 5  E . 3 4 7 ,
a mattsr arable to the iatemtiom of the
p a r tie s*
l a  the  oomto:}d) o f jo la t  p roperty , intcm tlem  igs 
cortaln].y  re levan t*  Imt th# la ten ticm  tfould z'oquiro to 
bo an expression  of the  joint wlll^ of bobh p a r tie #  
before it oould bo carried into effect in any matter* 
w h e th e r  rovo^gtatlon o f  a  epeoii& l d e s t i n a t i o n  o r  iw y 
o th e r *  a f f o o t im g  bh# p r o p e r ty  o f  w bioh  t h e  p a r t l o #  
were joint proprletore* (Bla:%oe that i(i3 the rule with 
regard to joint owners* the aeoortainmant of intertion 
l8 mot enough, though it happen# that It will suffice, 
if the intention# are oomeistent with each other* but 
that l8 only so beoauac th&t 1# tho mubstonco of the
Although there i;a taD% of "joint fiars", them 
are also view# that a one-half pa^ o d^i,vle|p ah&re of 
the property l0 e^ irrleà to aac'h autcmatieeJly
upon th e  r e g is t r a t io n  of the disposition ^ # Admittedly
the proviaiomm of the Suaoe#eion lot (##16(2) and 
proviso  (%) to  a#ÿG(2)) oono^rning tho e f f e c t  o f non^ 
evacuation and évacuation of @pooial destinations 
(not the circumstance# in which evacuation is eompotout) 
the vecting of the property in the axoeutor doe# 
not concern specifically thl# problem of tho typo of 
pro%)orty-hoM l% imdortaken by huabuud and wife %%?- the 
very oomon dlraotion to their 8o3.1ol*:or that they wish 
t h e  p r o p e r t y  t o  b e  * i a  j o i n t  n a m e s \  b u t  t h e  r u l e s  
therein oontalnad aevurtholee# will be applied to that 
situation#
2The t o p i c  i s  much c o n f u s e d ,  a n d  th o s e  oouooquoiiooo 
w h ich  OUR bo  d ia o o v o r c d  t o  f lo w  fro m  t h e  r i g h t  o f  
p r o p e r t y  i n  t h o s e  cauom partake to o  l i b e r a l l y  from  
b o th  /
1* Hmy'8 T r#  v ,  H*#a T ra+  1931 ü . 0*529*2. And now see  I 98 I A ct,  8 .1 9  : where a spouse b r in gs  an a c t io n
f o r  d i v i s i o n  and s a le  o f  a mat. home owned in  common, the  
c o u r t ,  hav ing  regard to  fa c to r s  such as con d u ct ,  need and 
s u i t a b le  a l t e r n a t i v e  accommodation, may r e fu s e  d e c r e e ,  postpone  
d e c r e e ,  or grant decree s u b je c t  to  c o n d i t io n s .
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both sources for a clear conclusion to emerge#
In the nomal circumstance (which is becoming almost
standard practice), in which a title is talien in
"joint" names of husband and wife, each will have a
pro indiviso share in the property, a share which becomes
immediately defined (and therefore resembles a right
of common property) because the title to the property
is taken "equally between them," thus giving each a 1one-half share pro indiviso therein# The usual 
dispositive clause in this case is, "To %♦ and Y# 
equally between them and to the survivor of them and 
to their respective assignees and disponees and to the 
executors of the survivor whomsoever," a destination 
which itself suggests the ability of each to dispone 
or assign independently of the other, yet contains, 
in addition, (presumably if that power is not exercised) 
a special destination to the survivor# In turn, this 
brings into application the sections of t3io 1964 Act 
which pertain to special destinations* However, in 
certain circumstances (where there is a contractual 
element - P e r r e t t )  mortis causa disposal of a share 
in the property to a third party, in oontradiction of 
the destination in the disposition may be held 
incompetent* Inter vivos alienation of a share must, 
by reason of its nature, be 3?are - but if the spouses 
could not reach agreement, would a division and sale, 
as found in the case of owners in common, but not so 
in the case of joint owners, take place to resolve 
the difficulty? If they truly are joint owners, joint 
consent to the sale would be needed# Where one party 
was obstinate, an Impasse would be reached#
Ownership of a pro indivise share, on the other 
hand, suggests the ability to sell or burden as the 
(comnion) /
Hay’s Tr# v* Hay’s Trs. 1951 S#0#329: See generally’Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland’s 0# & W# Chapter 10# "Property, Historical" and particularly pp.299, 501, 306 - 308#
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(common) owner wishes. Once again, the unsatisfactory 
and self-contradictory nature of "joint pro indiviso 
owner" o r  "joint fiars" who, it transpires, hold "pro 
indiviso" shares, becomes apparent. If the "joint" 
destination was a gift to the wife, (not a contractual 
arrangement) then it is irrevocable but it would appear 
that the husband/donor may ch an g e  his mind to the extent 
of the destination of his share to the survivor - Hay’s 
Tr* V . Hay’s Trs. 1951 8 .0 .5 2 9 :  contrast Steele v .  
Oaldwell 1979 3.L.T.22S, infra. If he can do so mortis 
causa, alienation inter vivos would also seem  competent 
either by disposition of his half share, or insistence 
upon division and sale (a function o f  common, not 
j oint ownership)*
One of the difficulties which may arise some years 
after a title has been taken in names of both spouses 
concerns the construction of a will which takes no 
account of the special destination. To clarify matters, 
a most welcome presumption was inserted in the Succession 
Act, in s.50, to the effect that where a testamentary 
disposition is executed after the commencement of that 
Act, it shall not have the result of evacuating a special 
destination (always assuming that the destination was 
such that it could competently be evacuated in that 
way - a proviso which itself leaves many questions 
unanswered) "unless it contains a specific reference to 
the destination and a declared intention on the part of 
the testator to evacuate it."
It is clear, therefore, that, to be effective, a 
purported revocation iiiust first be competent in t h e  
circumstances (if in c o m p e te n t, no am ount o f  purported 
revocations i n  the clearest o f  terms can evacuate t h e  
destination /
1. See generally Gloag and Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland 8th edn. (1980) p.662.
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destination) and second be express# Not unless both 
requirements are fulfilled can a subsequent revocation 
or evacuation overrule a special destination in a 
disposition or other deed previously executed*
The second requirement is clear: in what
circurastances may the first requireiaent be fulfilled? 
Presumably, if the title is talien in common, and each 
spouse, or other co-proprietor, has a one-half pro 
indiyisp share in the property, each, by reason of the 
existence of the holding of property in common, may 
dispose of it by will, to the exclusion of the other*
Where the title to a valuable house is taken by husband 
and wife equally in order to guard against the possibility 
that otherwise the owner might predecease intestate, 
leaving a house the value of which exceeded £50,000 
or the current limit at the time and that the house, as 
a consequence, might require to be sold - if, for some 
reason, the spouses considered that there would be an 
advantage in intestacy in the circuBistances of their 
case - a certain trust between the parties would be 
necessary, for it would be competent for either to 
dispose inter vivos or(?) mortis causa to another 
recipient his or her share therein*
The housing right under s*8 arises, of course, 
only in cases of intestacy, or, in partial testacy, 
where the house is comprised in that part with regard 
to which the deceased died intestate* However, it 
may be that a husband might die intestate, but possessed 
of heritage containing a special destination (not revoked) 
in favour of someone other than his wife or "his 
executors and representatives whomsoever", and in that 
case the heritage would not be treated as part of his 
intestate /
Steele v. Oaldwell (1979) suggests that if the parties are owaers in common, only testamentary disposal of a party’s share is prohibited7 It will be otherwise if there is a ’contractual* element - Perrett*s Trs# But in the ’normal* case of ownership In  common, between strangers, disposal of one’s share by will is competent (and in Hay’s Trs* the predeceasing wife’s settlement of her share was upheld)*
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intestate estate (s.56(2)(a)), but might vest in the 
executor for the sole purpose of being conveyed to the 
person entitled to it in terms of the destination, if 
the executor had been confirmed thereto (s.18(2)).
The unrevoked destination would reveal its innately 
testamentary nature. Such cases would be rare, but 
might occur. A similar provision exists to aid 
conveyance of the title to entailed property (of which, 
according to Professor Heston, there are still 1,000 
examples in Scotland) to the heir of entail next 
entitled* (8*18(1)),
To the discussion of the spouses* powers of 
disposal must be added the factors of *'Who provided 
the money for the purchase of the house?", "Were the 
contributions of each approximately equal?" or, in 
these modern days, "Is the contribution of the husband 
in payiaent of c a p i t a l  and  continuing payment of income 
towards mortgage repayments roughly comparable or 
greater in worth than the contribution of the wife in 
maintaining the running of the house, bringing up the 
children, and preventing the cost of domestic help from 
burdening the family budget?" (It has been estimated 
recently that the value of the housewife’s weekly work 
in the home is £?1). "Is it greater than the wife’s 
contribution in bringing in money from part-time 
employment in addition to performance of the tasks 
mentioned?"
Alternatively, though the wife might have made no 
contribution in money and the concept of contribution 
in kind was judicially discounted, "Was the half share 
in the house a gift from the husband to the w i f e ,  which 
must be regarded as irrevocable in teoms of the M*V/.P*- 
(Sc,) Act, 1 9 2 0 ,  8 , 5 ? " "If so, can the g i f t  be proved 
t o  have been made?" "Did the husband, in instructing 
his /
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his solicitor to take the dispositive clause in names 
of both spouses, understand the significance of one 
half shares pro indiviso, and did he act anirao donandi?" 
"If he did not, perhaps nevertheless a contribution 
in kind should be recognised?" "Did the couple have 
any special, perhaps tacit, agreement as to what was 
to happen in the event of separation or divorce? Did 
they, indeed, have any agreement concerning their powers 
to dispose of their shares by testamentary disposition?" 
"How can the existence of one half pro indiviso shares, 
suggesting ownership in common, be reconciled with the 
special destination, "and to the survivor", which would 
appear to cut down that ownership to a species of joint 
ownership, lmpox*tiiig no ability to divert the destination 
to anyone other than the survivor of the joint owners?
How can the terms of the disposition be reconciled with 
the terms of subsequent testamentary settlements, by 
one or both parties, if they are contradictory, even 
with the help of s.5 0 , which, after all, d o es  not define 
the oircimstances in which t h e  first of its requirements 
for the operation of the proviso (competency of the 
evacuation of the destination) may be s a t i s f i e d ? "
At present it would appear that, if the husband 
financed the whole purchase, his claim to repent (or 
to deny the significance of) h i s  generous extension of 
title to his wife can hardly be denied, if there are no 
special c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in the case, but the recanting can 
be effective only quoad the destination to his own one- 
half "pro indiviso" share. In Hay’s Trs,, th e  moneys 
to fund the purchase of heritage had been provided by 
the wife, though the narrative of the disposition bore 
that the p r i c e  had been paid by both spouses. The 
predeceasing wife’s settlement of her estate, including 
her one half pro indiviso share in the property, was 
upheld, but it was stated that, her husband being infeft 
in /
1 . Hay’s T r, v , h . ’s Trs* 1951 8*0.529#
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In hlo share, could not niter the doatlantloa 
therein*
The jizdloial oommoata arc illuminating* 
per L.P.Cooper (at p*555)%^ "A destination of the type 
h e r e  i n  q u e a b io n  a o rv a o  & d o u b le  p u rp o s e  ^  f l r ^ t ,  t o  
vest the heritable eühjaot# In the dlsponooa for 
certain rlg.at% snki Imtoreat^ and» aeoond^ to oporat#
&& a  g u a n l^ te a ta m e n ta r y  d i r e c t i o n ^  a l th o u g h  o f  c o u ra o ,  
atrl&tly speaking, a dontimation 1% a disposition 1# 
not a writing of a testamentary maturo at all***#***.*
I have****..had ’’(no)" doubt wlmtevox' that, or the 
recording of this dlapois^ itlon in July 19554 Mr* 31ay 
hooamo cm absolut o proprietor inf aft in a
.half^ j^ o share of t3ie subjoata» and that
nothiag that; Mr a. Hay ooiild thereafter do^ whether by 
ÈHÈ!-5Z &Z2Ë %E&ââ dood» eotiM poa8ib3.%r affect
a subject whloh wa&s thereafter part of the propfgrty of 
her hnaWmd.”
argimomt t3iat Tirs* 3Wy hm^ e^ been imal
t o  e v a c u a te  t h e  d a a t lD a t i o n  oven  l io r  mi-m s h a r e
d e p en d e d  u p o n  t h e  o x iB ta n c o  o f  a  a o n t r a o t u n l  ( " P e r r e t t " )  
element in the oa&e, which* since the dl#olo8ur@ that 
the wife, not both $ponsa8* had financed the p u rc h a se *  
waa lacking* 1,* Oooper felt* though with healtatloD 
mvl \\ritih a ploa fo33 judicial review of the mibjaot in 
a üültabla oa&# cited* that mitrlnelo evidence could be 
admitted to contradict the torme of the document* Cf* 
Fx'.II* 925* p*66o,fh.i.Hia LordBiiip alco pointed
out tl:at modern use of .a device orlgim&].ly intended to 
overcome the prohibition which naed to prevail "agalnat 
will 8 of herittw^' m03?o lilmly to be prodnotivo of 
l i t i g a t i o n  tli6m o f  advaatm ^;o t o  t h e  p a r t i e s .
Lord Aeith commatcd that It might be that the 
3%u8band* t h e  donoe* h a d  ho  p ro d o e e a a e d *  w ou ld  n o t  have  
b een  /
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been able to evacuate the destination of his own share 
"so as to disappoint his wife of the whole property if 
she had survived him," Reference was made to the case
of Brown’s Trustee v. B, 1945 3.0*488, but a decision 
on that point was not necessary for the case under 
consideration.- "The husband was inf eft at the date 
of the recording of the disposition in one-half of 
the property, and he held that half with all the rights 
of a pro indiviso proprietor save in so far as he might 
be barred from evacuating the destination-over in the 
event of his predeceasing his wife*" (p,555). When 
the financing of buying and maintaining a house is so 
complex and intermingled, and complicated by the concept 
of contribution in kind, what are to be the defining 
characteristics of a donee? And see p. 6 5 8-9,fn. 5, 
infra.
In Perrett's Trs. v. P. 1909 3.0*522, evacuation
was not permitted in a case where each spouse had
.made an equal contribution, in money terms, to the
purchase of the house. L.P.Dunedin, at p.523 said,
"(This aspect of the case concerns)" ....heritable
property, the destination of which was talien to the
two spouses jointly and the survivor of them and the
h&irs of the survivor, and to the purchase of which
each spouse contributed one-half. I thinli that was
a contractual arrangement - where each took the chanqe
of getting the half of the other, and accordingly I
thirüi that the property stands upon its own destination
and is not carried, and could not be carried, by any
testament whatsoever. The moment that disposition
was mutually delivered, as it was by the mere fact of
taking the destination as between these two people,
I do not t h in i i  this destination could have been altered/|except by joint consent of the spouses."
Professor /
1*. See also Walker v .  Galbraith (1 8 9 6 ) 25 R.?547
658*
AProfessor vaikor that the matter i$ one
of ImteatlOR* and that oertaim extraneous faotora may 
bo  takem into aooomtt*^*
It la latereatlag that Profoeaor walker atreosoa 
tho oontraotual element wW.oh la aeon la Porrott* (md 
im Ohalm@r^0 Tra* v$ T h o m s o n a  oonoopt whloh 
might be oap&ble of extension to suit modern views of 
marital property and roapoB8ibilltlG&* it the date 
o f  P e r r e t t *  o f  e o u m e *  t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  e le m e n t  w ould  
be fowd dimply in the oqmil eontribntiozi* and
the result would bo that neither party to the contraot » 
la the abaonoe of eontraotual provlalone; to the contrary* 
would have %xmer to ^^ evoke the dOE;tinmtl.on# The aam# 
reanlt could be applied to % wider oonoept of the factor# 
whlob oonotltnted the oontraot betwow the partie#*
Am been Muggemted, there might also bo a 
q u e s t io n  o f*  o r  a n  a l l e g a t i o n  o f#  g i f t  b y  huabcm d t o  
w i f e ,  I t  m ig h t be th o u g h t  t h a t *  i f  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  t o  
d o n a te  and  f a c t  o f  d o n a t io n  c o u ld  b e  p ro v e d  (perhaps;; 
a  d i f f i o u l t  t a j a k ) #  t h e  h w . e b e n d  h a d  : m e , d e  t h e  w i f e  a  p r e ^ ^ i e a t  
b y  p i iro h a a in g  t h e  p r o p e r t y  e n t i r e l y  o u t  o f  h i s  own 
r e c o n r o e 8 ^ \  w h ile  i n s t r u c t i n g  h l a  s o l i c i t o r  t o  ta k e  t h e  
t i t l e  /
1, ?rin8*II, p*i992*2* See the oaeea there cited by the author* including Perrett* Murray*# Rxeoe* v* Geekie 1929 S#0»635*B ry d en * è  0»B* v# B .* e  T re*  (1 8 9 8 )  25 R#708* O londonw yn V* Gordon (1875) 11 Kaopli#(E#I.*)53* Kinto’s Trs* v# H* (laga) 1 p.sa, HorrlBom*# Trm# v. M, (1905) 7 P.810*5* 1923 a*a*2?i*4* m d  he cito$ In addition Rononfc Tre. v* î[ainin$ 1919S$C*49'?, Taylor*g v* Bnmton 1939 3*c,#4, a M3haBâ*B Tre* v* 3,*8 Tra* 1966 B*L*T*306*5, Gan the resource# of one spouse over be entirely hi# o^m or her own? That which one party ie able to buy or own (without Belling to pay billa; or #ave 1# dependent upon the contribution* In cash or kind* of the other party* Bven that whloh is bequeathed by & third peruon solely to on# wpouna* remain# unsold or by virtue of the general state of tho fmAily budget for which both apowm# are rwponelhle* A beqüeat may require more th$m ^houae room’* If* forexample* it l#'a oar. It will make demande upon resource#*w h ich  /
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title thereto in the names of both, and that any 
subsequent testamentary or other settlement made by 
him and purporting to revoke the destination (or 
ignoring the existence of the destination) would 
contravene the rule, introduced by the N.W.P. (So,) Act, 
1 9 2 0 , s.5 5 that donations inter virum et uxorem are
irrevocable, except when made within one year and oneAday of the sequestration of the donor , However,
where the arrangement at the time of purchase was not 
stated to be that of donation quoad the wife, there 
would be the problem of proving animus donandi in the 
alleged donor against a presumption (admittedly not 
strong in the husband/wife situation^) which favours 
a construction other than donation but then again, in 
all cases in which the name of the wife was not inserted 
in /
which may ostensibly be the husband’s but may in truth be the family’s. However, under our present system, the object would belong undoubtedly to the legatee spouse.Is there not a folly - and perhaps an unreality and an, injustice - in a system of matrimonial property which is based to a certain extent (though not wholly - see aliment and rights on death) on separation of property? Is it possible that a (limited) communie bonorum might be fairer? (Chapter 7*)*1, "'.The case of Hay’s Tr, v, H, *s Trs, 1951 8,0,529 would tend to refute this argument. The gift of one half share was held to be irrevocable, but the donordid not thereby lose her freedom to alter the destination to her own remaining one half share. Such a r e s u l t  accords with the general principle that disposal at will (and testamentary changes of mind) are of the essence of ownership, and any less power would greatly have detracted from a donor’s right of p r o p e r t y  in his/her own share. D e s p i te  th e  te rm s  of the destination, it would seem that we do not find here an all-embracing gift, and throwing together of fortunes, but rather a more restricted one than the destination suggests. It would be otherwise if the relationship were contractual - Perrett’s Trs. v, P. 1909 8,0,522,2, 0, & W,, pp*2 9 0 -2 9 1 .
In the diapoBltlom* bmt a new diepoæltlon was later 
drawj^ i up* the grant©r of the dia$positioa would refpilre 
to explain the miiïge# If not wliloh lay behind
the tlmowwoa pliraaei* "In eonBl&eratlom of the 
f a v o u r  m id a f f o o t i o n  w h loh  %' h a v e  f o r  and. b e a r  to ^ ;a rd #
XY* my end* Imleed* if her name waa inzîorteà
in the first disposition* W t  she waa not mentioned in 
tho ml„Bsiveo of l^urohaee* another ex;planatory note 
(though not #0 fulsome) mimt have bean lasertecl i%*L the 
disposition ifHileh b#oomeAi the subatitute for the 
ml98ivee* as the eoatraot between seller smd purohasor#
Pre^ISS^ mithoritlee <m& rale# oomoernltig the effect 
of later general ^attlemomte on prior special deatlaationa 
of property are to be foimd in the Xb^ i^moiples II* 1991 
jgt j ig i* *  The g e n e r a l  p re s u m p tio n  waa a g a i n s t  subsoque: 
revocation* imleas the later deed wa$ markedly at odda 
with the earlier dOBtlmatlon* or unie## the gramter* 
o%pree#ly or by very eloar Implioatioa* doolared liia 
intention to evacuate the former pro vis lorn* A g;eneral 
olau&e* uaoally placed at the o&d of a will* to the 
effect that the taatator "hereby revoke# all will# and 
testamentary writing# hitherto exeouted by him"* w o u M  
not normally bo hold to hove evaouated a apeoial 
destination In 8omo other âoe&^v Obviously if the
t o r e !  8 0 t t l e m o a t  p r e c e d e d  th e  s g e e i a l  d e s t i n a t i o n *  
the la t te r  ooaldl not be dlaplaced^#
1# (of* 0* & W** p#292 where they quote Praaor* II*
9 2 5  *,**"The reoitala i%ji deed# between huabmid and wife go for very little*##") The truth behind the w ordo may bo  l a i d  b a re #  Uoe g e n e r a l l y  ? r # I I *  916 
jet 8W * (ÙhopeV) upom D o n a tio n #  I n t e r  V irm i o t  U xorom , "m pT925* he etatOB that just auoh a daod for "lovo and favour" ia mot comolUBivo against proof of its balng am onerous deed"* and cités the eases of Chisholm V* L%<ly Brae ii#613? (1569) and Countesa of Oxonfoid, V, the Vlaooimt H*613S (1664)# Fra#or notes that it is wi#e to keep evidence of oaoroaity* (Fr*ll* 
9 2 5 )# Ho't-mvor* It would appear that the onus is upon him wlBhin^ ; to prove omoroeity in am ostensibly gratuitous deed»2» Murray*# Bxeoa, v* Geekie 1929 $«0*633#3# e e e  g o m o ra lly *  V al3i#r*  Z ^ lm u lp lo #  IZ *  p#1834#
In view o f these doubts * the provision o f #,30 Is  
a l l  the more woloame* though Profoasar Walker pointa 
out that In It#  termm i t  does not êlwtlBgalhh between, 
th o s e  d e s t i n a t i o n s  o r a a to d  b y  t h e  t o a t a t o r  and  th o n e  
created by a th ird  pro^wmbly tlio
testator was able to evaluate* In the latter situation* 
ho sta tea  the opposite proaumptlom applied* in the 
gexioral oaae* with the e ffo o t of favouring ov^iouatiom 
by ge)%eral settlement * mid it would tlioreforo
that* in  the absence of statutory direction, that 
ru le m&#t s t i l l  apply#
lioivovor, the situation can be envisaged in which 
a proaporoufï future fatimr#'ln'^&aw* whmi e^ nr-angsing the 
provision which him daughter wa# to have om marriage 
might make a gift to hla firkuro mom.4%W,m^ o.f heritage* 
or the money to buy it* and insiat a# & condition of 
the gift that* though the title would b@ taken in the 
name of the future husband alon-e* on hie death it 
to fall to the futin^e wife (prog;umably a &&peolal 
destination would be inserted in the deod* rather than 
% 'elifm oe p la c e d  s im p ly  on t h e  p ro v e n  w r l t tm ii  c o M :l t lo n s  
of gift) If eho survived him* or* alternatively* that 
the title iBhould be taken In both nameo with the uoual 
survivorship olou#o* %n earlier time#* thie might 
have been done at the eame t:*jae w  suoh «mtO'wtmptial Rgireement am might be convenient might be made regarding 
iBâ and/or the ^qdminls%% if the
date wee before 1920# It le difficult to see upon 
what bai^is the later fouo,d lü:& to4
'3I t  i% worthy $f thatf the
not to favour the oontinuod uae of special destinations. 
At /
1# Of* Brow n’s  T r# v# B# 1943 3 ,0 * 4 8 8 *2# I I *  1991% Boe a la o  R ay’ s  T r* v* n**#  T r ^ ,  1951 5 ,0 * 3 2 9  p e r  L*P*Ooop®r a t  p*334#
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A t  p . 1 9 9 1 ,  i t  i s  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e i r  p o p u l a r i t y  o w e d  
m u c h  t o  t h e  e a r l y  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o n v e y i n g  h e r i t a g e  
b y  w i l l #  T h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  a c h i e v e d  t h e  s a m e  e n d ,  
t h o u g h  t h e  d e e d  i n  w h i c h  i t  w a s  e m b o d i e d ,  w a s  n o t  
r e g a r d e d  a s  a  d e e d  o f  t e s t a m e n t a r y  c h a r a c t e r *
I f  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  b y  w h i c h  t h e  p r o p e r t y  i s  h e l d  
i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h a t  o f  j o i n t  p r o p e r t y ,  i n  i t s  
p u r e  f o r m ,  t h e r e  c a n  b e  n o  q u e s t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t y  
h a v i n g  t h e  p o w e r  t o  e v a c u a t e  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n .  T h e  
w h o l e  p r o p e r t y  w i l l  b e c o m e  t h e  s u r v i v o r ’ s  o n  t h e  d e a t h  
o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r ,  v e s t i n g ,  i t  i s  t h o u g h t ,  w i t h o u t  
n e e d  o f  c o n f ir m a tio n  ^ a s  i t  W i l l  i f  i t  i s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  
t h e  d e c e a s e d  D I D  h a v e  p o w e r  t o  r e v o k e  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n ,  
b u t  d i d  n o t  e x e r c i s e  t h e  p o w e r .
D i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  i f  t h e  u s u a l  " h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e "  
c l a u s e  i n  a  d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  e v i n c i n g  
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r t y  i s  h e l d  i n  c o m m o n ,  o r  b y  s o m e  
p e c u l i a r ,  h y b r i d  t y p e  o f  h o l d i n g  w h i c h  t a l c e s  s o m e  o f  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  e a c h *  C e r t a i n l y  s . 5 0  p r o v i d e s  
g u i d a n c e  a n d  h e l p ,  b u t  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  s e c t i o n  
’ b e g s  t h e  q u e s t i o n *  w h e t h e r ,  o r  i n  w h a t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
r e v o c a t i o n  m a y  b e  m a d e .  T h i s  i s  a  l a m e n t a b l e  l a c k .
T h e  l a t e s t  c a s e  h a s  s h e d  l i g h t  u p o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  
i n  i t s  p u r e l y  l e g a l  a s p e c t ,  b u t  t h e  r e s u l t  i n  a  b r o a d e r  
p o l i c y  a s p e c t ,  m a y  b e  t h o u g h t  n o t  t o  b e  s a t i s f a c t o r y .
PI n  S t e e l  v .  O a l d w e l l " ,  t h e  s p o u s e s  c o h a b i t e d  i n  
a  h o u s e  t h e  t i t l e  t o  w h i c h  w a s  t a l œ n ,  i n  1 9 6 ? ,  i n  
n a m e  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  a n d  t h e  s u r v i v o r  o f  t h e m  
a n d  t h e  e x e c u t o r s  a n d  a s s i g n e e s  w h o m s o e v e r  o f  t h e  
s u r v i v o r .  T h e  w i d o w  p u r s u e r  a v e r r e d  t h a t  s h e  h a d  
p r o v i d e d  a l m o s t  a l l  o f  t h e  p u r c h a s e  p r i c e .  T h e  h u s b a n d  
a t  f i r s t  p a i d  t h e  p r e m i u m s  o n  a n  e n d o w m e n t  p o l i c y  o n  
h i s  /
H e s t o n ,  p . 8 5 ,  w h e r e  t h e  a u t h o r  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  n e e d  
f o r ,  a n d  f u n c t i o n s  o f ,  s , 1 8 ( 2 )  a n d  5 6 ( 2 ) ( a ) .1979 8 .L .T , 228.
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life but th0 wife whem the huebmad Boon fell 
beïiind with payments* too3iC for paymonta
(out of her own wages)* and the eMmmont policy was 
put\n her mama# Im 1972* t W  huaWnd put the wife 
out of tho hoaee, amd 1% 1973 purported to dispone 
his share of the houao to a third party* The dlapoGisloa 
r^ goordod* The wife did mot oonsomt to kho 
dlapoBitlon* and Indeed w w  Ignorant of It* She 
wished to return to the houiK,e a M  ehe ooaeldored it 
%)foWblo thut Bhe would mirvlve h#* hwbsmd*
The third party (first defender) mdvertioed th# 
hoime for e;ale in 1974* It %'feB pwoht^aed In
good f a i t h  b y  t lm  aeoomd @md t h i r d ,  d e fe a d e r a *  who th e n  
o o o u p le d  t h e  h o u se*  T he d i s p o s i t i o n  I n  t h e i r  f a v o u r  
wae recorded i& December* 1974*
Upon the death of the Weband in 1976» the wife 
oought reduction of the later disposition#* on the 
ground ttat the destination limited each proprietor 
n o t  o n l y  I »  - t i « s f c m 8 a l ; r # ; - y «  I r a t  a l w  in  IM SB
&l&po8ltle%8 of the eubjeeta*
That crgumeut failed $ It was held that the 
s u r v i v o r s h i p  o la u a #  o o u M  a f f o o t  o n ly  a  te m ta o o n ta r y  
disposition*
%3ie flmt defender ttrgwd tlmt did not
apply* oomteWed #mt the parties;’ owner ship wag;
not joint* but Qoimoa\ Furtlior* the rule in Perrett 
applied to tostaz^ iontary deede, Howewz\ If each
party had an imfe#ter@d power to dlepoBe, each had 
tho power to diopoee for value#
Alternatively# the key to rprr&t^ was the 
o o n t r a c t i m l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  d e w t in a t lm i  t h e r e  a g re e d  
u p o n  /
1# en imcportant point which to hi%ve beenaoeop'Wd by L#Allaabrldgo and by Ooimael for the pursuers 8oe #*233*
Upon* Here* tim wife had bmme the
finanoial hmXhm* tW  arrangeaient with th# 
sooioty waa BWh th a t tW  humhm^ id had the $oI# 
reversionary in terest*
Hosx^ovar* $iaoe tha pi%rohmaera aotcd Im good 
faith* they wero entitled to the eeeurlty of the 
reoorda*
Ooimsel fo%* the puriguer argi^ ,od tZiat 
WW3 not 80 limited to teetamomtary dl^ p^oaltiozia; 
and om the ’oomtraot’ argument replied that tho prop&r 
towt waa to aBOcrtala who had supplied the purohaee 
prieo* Thlw was eui wmsiml oa^o of pmrohaso mot of 
% w h o le  houBo b u t  o f  a  one h a l f  p r o  i ia d lv io o  a h a re  
W)joat to a airvivorahip doatlfmtloa narrated In
th(% dlcpoaltion» tmd ou^ h^t to Imve plaaeê tho %mrehwo%'8 
upon inquiry#
I t  1# hard mot to  Byapathieo w ith  th e  w ife*  I.ord
Allambri(%o ho3.d limited to
teatsmontary dlapoeitlon## upon an examl^mtlozi of the 
a u th o ritie s , and "in oomforwlty with the legal concept 
of a pro iailvleo oiiare In property* that when two 
pari'joiiKi have joi^ itly ooa tribu ted to the purchano of 
h e r i t # l e  property mid #tkea the t i t l e  to  I t  la  th e ir  
joint namg# with a epeolal degtlnation to the aurvivor* 
the only roatriatilan on disposai of their reapmetlve
aharoG la that neither o&m Olspo## of hi# or her share■i'by mortis oanea &%#*" - Re%# the parties each took 
a one half pro Indiviso chare (a# ownnra In common, 
proBumably) m d no au tho rity , imolWlng 
infringed the f a l l  exoroiao of th e ir  in to r  vivoe 
powere a$ opposed to th e ir  tOBtameatary powora*''#  ^ A 
oomparlaon was drawn with mutual vrilla (q*v»guï^), 
liord All,^mbrif%e oonmMeriag 'tlmt the oomtraot there 
i s  /
1* p*252*2* p*251#
5» Such f a c t s  now must be raad a g a in s t  the background o f  the  
1981 A ct. See N ich o ls  and M eston, Cha^pter 6 , P r o te c t io n  o f  
Occupancy E ig h ts  a g a in s t  D e a lin g s .
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i s  t o  l e a v e  t h e  e s t a t e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t y ,  w h a t e v e r  
t h e  e s t a t e  m a y  c o n s i s t  o f  a t  d e a t h ,  a n d  n o t  t o  f r e e z e  
t h e  p r o p e r t y  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  m a i l i n g  t h e  w i l l  a n d  
c o v e n a n t i n g  n o t  t o  d e a l  w i t h  i t .  H i s  L o r d s h i p  n o t e d  
t h a t  L . P . C o o p e r  i n  H a y ’ s  T r s *  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  
c o n t r a c t u a l  e l e m e n t  i n  P e r r e t t  h a d  s o m e t h i n g  o f  t h e  
q u a l i t y  o f  a  m u t u a l  w i l l *  T h i s  w a s  h e l p f u l *  " I t  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  w h i l s t  t h e  s u r v i v o r s h i p  d e s t i n a t i o n  
w h e r e  m u t u a l  c a n n o t  h e  a l t e r e d  o r  e v a c u a t e d  h y  
t e s t a m e n t a r y  d e e d ,  i t  c a n n o t  h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  f r e e z i n g  
t h e  a s s e t s  o f  e a c h  p a r t y  a n d  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e m  f r o m  
d e a l i n g  f r e e l y  w i t h  t h e i r  o w n  p r o  i n d i v i s o  s h a r e s  b yA
i n t e r  v i v o s  d e e d  d u r i n g  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  l i v e s * "
O b i t e r ,  L o r d  A l l a n h r i d g e  t h o u g h t  g i f t s  t o o  w o T x ld  h e  
u n e x c e p t i o n a h l e ,  s o  l o n g  a s  n o t  t e s t a m e n t a r y  g i f t s *
T h e  ’ s o l e  r e v e r s i o n a r y  i n t e r e s t *  a r g u m e n t  d i d  
n o t  a t t r a c t  h i m ,  a l t h o u g h  h e  w o u l d  h a v e  a l l o w e d  p r o o f  
b e f o r e  a n s w e r *  I f  t h e  w i f e  h a d  m a d e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  i t  c o u l d  w e l l  h e  a r g u e d  t h a t  s h e  s h o u l d  
h a v e  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  P e r r e t t * h a d  i t  b e e n  h e l d  t o  
a p p l y  t o  i n t e r  v i v o s  d e e d s **'•' " WJ*tiCTf*l WIMTIM».*.* MW*# «###*'" «II#**
P r o o f  /
1* p*252.2. p*232* The quotation given above (p*664 ) continues, "* * * *by mortis causa deed* Each person, however, has a pro indiviso share which he or she can d i s p o s e  of inter vivos, by gift or for value, and that share is always subject to the claims of the owner’s creditors* Such a conclusion is consistent with the ratio of Perrett’s Trs*, which in my view clearly only applies to a t t e m p t s  by one of the pro indiviso owners to evacuate the survivorship destination by mortis causa deed and thus defeat the 3?ight of the other to t a k e  the deceased’s share" (support drawn from Ersk*Inst*IIX, viii*55, a n d  Beil’s Gomms* 1,62)* But the view as to gifts was not necessary for the disposal of t h e  present case*
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before paaawor would al&;o havo allowed
upon the qui@j3tlon whothor the olrouma^taneo# should, 
hfiv'o p l a c e d  th<@ d o f e M o r  pu3?oha#ors on  In q i.iiry *
The ruIoAg of contriWtloa, Ixitontlom» oontraet#
gift 4^ If Indoad they omn ho tormod rule# when they
&ro merely guidea» and porhmp# outdated amo@ ™ are
insufficiently prooieo* and it la to be hoped that,
in the review of %3ie owaorehip of heritable property
hy Rpoueeo (or at loaBt of the ownomTiip of the
matrimonial home,_ if not the owmershlp of héritage
oimod. as on inventaient and bought out of fimde, of
either apouee# w t  qu^llfylmg as "fw ily funds" or
"family property", yet to he defined) the moaning and
offeo't of Aspooial deggtiK'mtions» their iafltienoo ami
the power to watmaW them# will he elewly out*
It lo oubmltted^  ^that hoj^ %^ Eirtmera ohot:ild ho oi-morB
of the xiiatrlmonlal home and that the iRRioilbion Into2the Im-f of a ohupter worn theix^  rights of
oocmpatiom w l  diepOBol (and upon the rlghta too of 
t e n a n t  apowe^a^) l a  sm iT a n to è#
special destinations (though #hQ administrative effect# 
touch the ahbstantivo efforts at certain poimto), #*18(2) 
empowers the sxcmttw to oonfi,rm to the nubjeot-^mattor 
to wMoh the (Wetlmation relates in order to ti'auBfor 
it to the party entitled to it In t^rme of the 
destination# if in fact the granting of title to the 
aubatitute Is aeooo^ary# Th# aooeaalty for #«18(2) 
lies in the provlciom of o*56(2)(a)$ that heritable 
property bolon^^g to th.o deooamed and aubjeot to a 
Gpeeial (Watinatlon which has not been evacuated by 
hi%% (almaya provided that cvaouation was competent 
in the olronm#tan&eB) shall not bo treated uG part of 
the doeaaaed’w eateto» If the dooeaBed wa$ entitled 
t o  /
1* C h a p te r  7#
2 . See now, o f  c o u r s e ,  1981 A c t .
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to revoke the destination (see discussion), and did 
do so, the property concerned would form part of 
his estate* Thus, unless the deceased had evacuated 
the destination, and had acted competently in doing 
so, the executor could not confirm to the heritage, 
and, as in certain circumstances, some form of 
conveyance or grant of title to the substitute is 
necessary, 8*18(2) solves this problem by providing 
the required (limited) authority to the executor to 
act in this regard. The section, in its words,
"(if such conveyance is necessary)", recognises that 
in certain cases the intervention of the executor 
may not be required (and may even be inappropriate 
and ineffective*)
The nub of the matter is the manner in which the 
substitute under the usual survivorship clause (’to 
%* and T* equally between them and to the survivor 
of them*) is affected by these provisions* It would 
appear that the one half pro indiviso share of the 
predeceaser in such circumstances vests autoraatically, 
without need of further conveyaxice, in the survivor*
Such automatic vesting is extremely neat, and 
means that the minimum of expense is involved* The 
su3?vivor, when he/she comes to sell the property, will 
simply narrate the circurastances in the new disposition, 
by which he/she became sole proprietor.
If, on the other hand, the destination is other
than one of simple survivorship, s.18(4) ensures that 
the docket procedure s p e c i f i e d  by s*15(2) (and Schedule 
1) shall apply, and ensures also that the protection
afforded by s*17 to persons acquiring title from the
executor /
1 * See Heston, p*85, where he states that his opinion has changed from that which he held in the first edition of "The Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964", and see his reference to A*d.McDonald (1965) 10 
J.L.S.73.
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executor or from a person deriving title directly 
from the executor extends to cover the case, by 
stating; that the provisions of those sections ( 1 5  and 
1 7 ) shall apply to property which has vested in the 
executor by virtue of s*18(1) and/or (2).
PROVISIONS IN  m iU R E  I P  NOT IN  FORM
The provisions of a marriage-contract may be at
least partially testamentary in nature, and the rights
of parties in matters of succession, as in other
matters, may be referable to the terms thereof* It
remains possible fon? spouses by such a cont3?act to
renounce in advance their rights under common law
and statute, although they can no longer ante-nuptially1disinherit possible future children « Upon this
aspect of rights of succession, attention is directed?to Principles of the Law of Scotland; D#Malker"*
It is strange that a marriage-contract provision
in lieu of other rights of succession is treated as a %debt^ whereas prior and legal rights and other rights 
of succession in intestacy under s»2 of the 1964 Act 
are postponed to other (commercial) debts"^ '^# Legal 
rights /
1. 1964 Act, s.12*2* Prins*11, 1994 e;b seq«5* Walker’s Prins*Tf ^ D^9 where is cited the case of Countess Galloway v. Stewart (1905) 11 S*L*T* 188*4. See earlier discussion upon the status of legalrights as debts or hybrid intermediate claims, and the view that their nature is rather of a debt or a claim (albeit postponed) than of a right of succession; statutory prior rights and rights under s.2, however, apply only in the case of intestacy or cjuoad the intestate part of a partially intestate es'EuFe, and 8*2 3?ights at least are said to be exigible out of the net intestate estate which means, the estate remaining after satisfaction of "estate duty and other liabilities of the estate having priority over legal rights, the prior rights of a surviving spouse and rights of succession" (s*56(1)), although 8*8 and s.9 make reference only to "intestate estate*" 3*9(6)(a), however, cuts down the definition, 
so  /
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x û g i i t s ,  b e i n g  e x i g i b l e  a s  w e l l  i n  t e s t a c y  a s  i n  
i n t e s t a c y ,  a r e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  b e q u e s t s  or l e g a c i e s ,  
a n d  t h u s  acquire t h e i r  i n t e r m e d i a t e  p o s i t i o n *
I t  h a s  b e e n  s e e n  t h a t  s p e c i a l  d e s t i n a t i o n s  i n  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  o f  h e r i t a g e  m a y  h a v e  t e s t a m e n t a r y  e f f e c t ,  
i f  n o t  r e v o k e d  o r  n o t  c o m p e t e n t l y  r e v o k e d «
T e m p o r a r y  ,â 1  i . m e n t
A m o n g  r e l a t e d  t o p i c s  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  
e n t i t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  w i d o w  to t e m p o r a r y  a l i m e n t  a f t e rA
t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  d e a t h  •
I t  i s  a  h u m a n i t a r i a n  r u l e ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  common 
l a w  a n d  p r e s e r v e d  b y  t h e  1 9 6 4  A c t ,  s * 5 7 ( 1 ) ( c ) ,  
a l l o w i n g  t h e  e x e c u t o r s  t o  o f f e r  r e a s o n a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  
h e l p  t o  t h e  w i d o w  w i t h i n  t h e  six-month p e r i o d  
i m m e d i a t e l y  f o l l o w i n g  u p o n  h e r  h u s b a n d ’ s  d e a t h ,  t h o u g h  
a l l  t h e  o t h e r  ( c o m m e r c i a l )  d e b t s  d u e  b y  t h e  e s t a t e  
m a y  n o t  b e  a s c e r t a i n e d .
In e a r l i e r  d a y s ,  w h e n  i n c o m e  a n d  w e a l t h  m o r e  
commonly t h a n  n o w a d a y s  s t e m m e d  f r o m  t h e  l a n d ,  t h e  
temporary a l i m e n t  w a s  p a y a b l e  t i l l  t h e  n e x t  t e r m  o f  
W h i t s u n d a y  o r  M a r t i n m a s  a f t e r  t h e  d e a t h ,  b u t ,  a s  C l i v e  
a n d  W i l s o n  comment, t h e s e  d a t e s  n o w  h a v e  l e s s  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  /
s o  f a r  a s  i t  affects t h e  m o n e t a r y  p r i o r  r i g h t  u n d e r  
8 . 9 ,  t o  p 'T b  i n t e s t a t e  estate,  A s  f a r  a s  s . 8  i s  
c o n e e r n e a “ t h e r e  i s  g u i d a n c e  i n  t h a t ,  b y  s . 1 4 ( 5 ) ,  
i t  i s  s t a t e d  t h a t  a n y  r u l e  r e q u i r i n g  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  
p a r t  o f  an e s t a t e  t o  b e a r  a n y  particular d e b t  o f  
t h e  d e c e a s e d  s h a l l  r e m a i n ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  a  s i m i l a r  
p r o v i s i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  h e r i t a g e  
t o  m e e t  t h a t  part o f  the E s t a t e  D u t y  ( o b s o l e t e )  
r e f e r a b l e  to i t  ( s . 1 9 ( 5 ) ) :  p r i o r  r i g h t s ,  l e  g a l  
r i g h t s ,  a n d  r i g h t s  of s u c c e s s i o n  u n d e r  8.2 rank 
i n t e r  se_  a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  A c t  a n d  a b o v e - .
Earlass v. B.’s Trs. 1916 8.0.741, 1916 2.8.L.T.
2 5 .  b r s k .  I ,  6 , 4 1 ,  C h a p t e r  4 ,  C l i v e
a n d  W i l s o n ,  p p . 6 9 2 - 6 9 4 .
ai{?;nif;lomice for the widow, and the ailment, If paid, 
will bo paid, moat probably for a aixwmonth poriod 
after the Imsbandle death* Thoroafter the oxecntora
will be more oertaln of the oxaot al#e of the free 
eatato, all debts and claim a sitppoaadly having been 
tendered* and are entitled t o  make payments out of 
the estate*
It would seem that an indigent husband, whose 
olxmimetsmces would qualify him for aliment under 
#P» (So*) Act* 1 9 2 0 , 8*4 would also be entitled to 
this temporary relief out of the ©state of the deceased 
s p o u s e «
Additional Help for the Widow
So much has been said about the unfairness of
the present system of property***holdlng, and the
possibility of the manipulation of the rules of testate
and intestate succession that It 1b well to remombor
that a widow who has been the victim of her .husband he
cunning in arranging his financial affairs eo as to
leave her inadequately provided for, or as poorly
provided for as he could by his actions and words
dictate, has yet an equitable remedy against the
executors or against the ultimate recipients of her
Ime'ba:ad*e generosity* She may claim from him or them
a continuing aliment* This will bo treated as a debt
of the estate for which the capital of the estate may 4be liable *
The sige of the mfard will be what is I'eaeonable
"in the circumstances", and its duration iflll be usually 
that of the lifetime of the widow* or for ae long as
she is in need of the award* Olive and Wilson note 
that /
i. See generally Anderson v, Gx'ant (1899) 1 3?«484; Howard's Exoc. v .  H.'e O.B, (1894) 21 H,787; ïoung T. ï.'s I’rs, (1906) 14 8.1,2.125; Olive and Wilson pp.Syi—696; Oliap'bar 4.
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that, unless there is a specific renunciation in 
advance of the award, by the widow, neither acceptance 
of inadequate testamentary provisions nor the 
rejection of poor (or non-«existent) testamentary 
provisions in favour of perhaps less than adequate 
legal rights, will preclude a claim for continuing 
aliment,
This possibility softens the potentially harsh 
effect of the property-owning husband*s Investment 
in heritage, and disposal of it by will to others 
than his wife, or of his making other legitimate 
but uncharitable use of the present law of succession* 
It can do nothing to aid the wife, whose husband has 
made valid inter vivos alienations of property to 
friends, with the result that his estate at death is 
no reflection of his wealth at mid-marriage. ho 
concept except that of inter vivos, leather than mortis 
causa, rights in the estate of the other spouse could 
araeliorate that situation* A man may well be poorer 
at his death than throughout his life, whether by 
accident or design, and, if the latter, whether by 
strategy to defeat his wife*s claims or in the belief, 
honestly held, that only the poor die rich* Unless 
new rules as to rights of disposal of "family property" 
and "non-family property" are formulated, a man cannot 
be prevented from doing what he wishes with his own 
property during his life.
The largest question, though, is this: is there
any logical or equitable basis for the expectation of 
a wife or husband that she/he will take a certain 
"indefeasible" share in the estate of the predeceaser, 
if the parties by their own wish have not made suitable 
testamentary provision for each other, and if there is 
on death or (better) during life a fair division of 
property, either according to revised xules of 
ownership /
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oxmea?ship5 altered in the light of changed ideas of 
the rights of the parties and of the value of their 
contributions to the family prosperity, or according 
I to a more "rough and ready", "fifty-fifty" division,
which should be capable of allowing the weaker economic 
party, the widow, to maintain herself through the 
prudent investment of property which, instead of 
"devolving" upon her, rather "crystallises" at the 
dissolution of marriage (by death or divorce) into 
her own separate property, from being "family property", 
in a similar manner to that in which a floating charge, 
when compans^  winding-up proceedings are commenced, 
h' "crystallises". Perhaps that is all which, in cases
of testacy where t h e  marriage has been ’in community’,k-,;’ 4VI: the survivor should receive.
1* i.e. ex communione, rather than g  success ion© And see discussion of different situations - ’Succession*, Chapter 7*
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P r e l im in a r y  Pomment
Although d e f e c t s  in the law may he identified 
hy  a  general study of the Scots rules now in operation, 
the Buhjeet of matrimonial property i s  one which i s  
proving to he o f  interest and controversy in other 
legal systems, and a  review o f  rules and attitudes 
found in other countries, whose experience may he 
relevant in that the social structure w h ic h  they 
serve i s  similar, m e e tin g  like a s p i r a t i o n s  and  
comparable problems, may be i n s t r u c t i v e . ’An
Excur.sus on the Bantu Customary Union*, though 
valuable indeed in its c o n te x t^ ,  i s  o f  l e s s  interest 
to th e  British student. It may be that a new c o n c e p t  
o f  family property will b e  of greater use^ than a  
careful e n g r a f t i n g  of new rules in places where the 
old fabric of our ’system* of matrimonial property is 
shown to b e  threadbare or defective*
Hence i t  i s  proposed to make a short study of 
relevant property provisions in t h e  laws of South 
Africa, Louisiana, France, th e  Scandinavian Countries, 
and England# In Chapter 7 will be  found a 
brief comment on the new rules in operation in 
Australia and How Z ea la n d ^ *  W ith  t h e  exception of 
t h a t  part o f  the discussion pertaining to the law 
o f  E n g la n d , in respect of w h ich  p r im a ry  sources are 
also available, reliance has been placed upon 
secondary sources, w h ic h  may not reflect the latest 
position /
The South African Law of Husband and Wife, H*E* hahlo (3rd e d n # 1 9 6 9 ), Chapter 2, 'M a r r ia g e  and the Hon-European: W ith  an Excursus on the Baatu Customary U nion* *See infra Chapter 7: and cf. Sc .Law Oomm.Hemo* No*41 (April 1978) "Occupancy Rights in th e  M a tr im o n ia l  Home and Domestic Violence", Part VII, which i s  concerned w i th  r i g h t s  of possession (not yet o w n e rsh ip  ; see Family P r o p e r ty  Memorandum yet to be c i r c u l a t e d )  i n  respect of f u r n i t u r e , p l e n i s h i n g s  and other household moveables*And see also "Belgian Choices", Chapter 7*
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position* The explanation is offered that the 
p u rp o s e  of the re v ie w  is the gathering of ideas, 
and not the systematic treatment of t h e  relevant 
rules of a legal system in the degree of detail 
w h ic h  has b e e n  accorded to t h e  law of Scotland*
SOUTH AFRICA
Authorities O ite d
"The South African Law of Husband and Wife", H*H*
Hahlo (3%d edn# 1969) ("H.ahio")* (4th edition p u b l i s h e d  
19751 account has b e e n  taken of changes, but page 
references are to 3 rd  edition except i fh e re  otherwise 
mentioned)«
"Wille’s Principles of S o u th  African Law", I*T*R.
G ib so n  (6th edn* 1970): Chapter XII, "Married Persons"
( " G ib s o n " ) ,
"Maasdorp’s I n s t i t u t e s  o f  South A f r ic a n  Law", Volume 
1 * (T he Law of P e r s o n s )  (9th edn* (O.G.Hall), 1968)
("Maasdorp" )(,
It is w e ll-k n o w n  that South African law  belongs 
to that c i v i l i a n  family of legal sy s te m s  l i n k e d  by  
a common Roman foundation* Also a f a m i ly  member i s  
the law of S c o t la n d ^ , though it has b e e n  subject to 
common law  influences, and the law of Louisiana, 
next to be c o n s id e r e d .  As f a r  a s  South Africa is 
c o n c e rn e d , remarks will be confined to the law as i t  
a f f e c t s  t h e  w h i te  p o p u l a t i o n ,
pIn his * S u rv e y , Historical and  Oomparative*, ' 
P r o f e s s o r  Hahlo reminds his readers that the first 
D u tch  s e t t l e r s  came to the Gape in the l a t t e r  half 
o f  the seventeenth century, and that naturally the 
law  w h ich  th e y  brought w ith  them reflected the law 
o f  /
1 # See D*M, Walker, t h e  Scottish Legal System (4th edn*), p*69*2* Chapter 1, pp*9/6*
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o f  H olland a t th a t date* Marriage had been  
’s e c u la r is e d * * a u n iv e rsa l oom m m lty  o f  property  
regime was In  o p era tio n , d ivorce a v in cu lo  on  the  
g ro u n d  o f  ad u ltery  or o f m alic iou s d e se r t io n  was 
reco g n ised , and the o b lig a t io n  represented  by  
b e tr o th a l cou ld  be enforced s p e c if ic a l ly *
Subsequently , th e remedy fo r  breach th e re o f  was 
reduced to  a claim  fo r  damages* The Union o f  
South A fr ica  was e s ta b lish e d  in  1910, and r e su lte d  
in  much s ta tu to r y  amendment o f  t h e  common law and 
o f Acts passed  b efore the Union* T h ere  a p p e a rs  to  
have been a movement to w a rd s  u niform ity  between  
p rovin ces • In  1935, tw o fu r th er  grounds o f  d ivorce  
w ere  in trod u ced , namely, in cu rab le in s a n ity  fo r  a 
period  o f  seven y ea r s , and imprisonment f o r  a period  
o f f iv e  years " a f t e r  a d ec la ra tio n  o f  h a b itu a l 
cr im in a lity "  ^  *
Most in te r e s t in g ,  from  th e  p o in t o f  view  o f t h is  
d is c u s s io n , i s  t h e  M atrimonial A ffa ir s  A c t ,  Ho*57,
1953, which seems to  have been th e r e s u lt  o f  tw en tie th  
century r e je c t io n  o f e a r l ie r  n o tio n s , not so much, 
a s  Hahlo says^ , o f  th e id ea  o f  community o f  p rop erty , 
a s  o f the h u s b a n d ’ s  e x c e ss iv e  m arita l power* This 
r e a l is a t io n  came n o tic ea b ly  la t e r  t h a n  i t s  Bobts and 
E n g lish  co u n terp a rts , and was prompted la r g e ly  by  
the / '
1 * S ee , e*g*, the changes made in  the m atrim onial law o f  N a ta l, d escrib ed  b y  P ro fesso r  H ah lo  at p*11*("In  accordance w ith  "the o f f i c i a l  p o lic y  o f  g rad u a lly  e lim in a tin g  s ta tu to r y  d if fe r e n c e s  between 
N a ta l  and th e o ther provinces***")*2* The D ivorce Laws Amendment A c t, Ho*32, 1935# The g ro u n d s  o f  d ivorce continue to  be based "squarely  on g u i l t  and n o t ,o n  marriage breakdown, on f a u lt  and n o t  on fa i lu r e  * "(Hahlo, 4th  edn* p*562)# I n  the 4th  edn*, a t pp*22-2?, the author con sid ers t h e  ’g u ilt*  and th e  ’breakdow n* approaches, and does n o t  appear to  b e  opposed to  the la t t e r .  Many South A frican, d iv o rces are undefended and "an undefended d ivorce alm ost in v a r ia b ly  i s  a d ivorce b y  con sen t, a c t iv e  or passive*"  (4 th  e d n * , p*24)*3. 9*9.
t h e  o o n e lu e io n s ,  p u b l i s h e d  I n  1949$ o f  t h e  Women’s  
L e g a l  D i e a b l l i t l e e  C om m leelon , w h ic h  I n c lu d e d  among 
I t s  m ember8 M rs# B e r th a  So lom on,
E a h lo ^  d e e e r lh e a  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  A c t o f  1 9 5 3  
t h u a : -
"W hile  r e t a i n i n g  eo m m m ity  o f  p r o p e r t y  a n d  p r o f i t  
and  l o e o ,  a n d  th e  m a r i t a l  po im r$  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  
A f f a i r e  A c t o o n f e r e  u p o n  t h e  w if e  a  m odicum  o f  ia d e p e n d o n t  
l e g a l  o ap m o lty *  w i th  a  o o r re e p o n d ln g  d lm l im t io n  I n  
t h e  m a r i t a l  p ow er o f  t h e  h u ab o n d "*  T h le  d o e s  m ot 
so u n d  n o t a b l y  ’ l i b e r a l ’ o r  e g a l i t a r i a n ,  and  in d e e d ,  a s  
E a h lo  e n b e e q u o n tly  d w o r l b e e  I t ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  d i s p l a y  
n o  v e r y  b o ld  r e f o r m in g  s e a l#  The r e s u l t ^  o f  t h e  A c t ,
88 am ended I n  1962 an d  1966$ i s  t h a t  a  m a r r ie d  woman 
i n  S o u th  A f r i c a  ( I f  s u b jo o t  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  law  and  
n o t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  h e r  own m arrj*ago#*oon trao t) 
h a s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  h e r  oim  e a r n in g s  an d  s a v i n g s ,  a n d  may 
o p e r a t e  a lo n e  a  b u i l d i n g  s o c i e t y  s a v in g s  a e o o im t o r  
b a n k  a o e o u n t#  E e r  own h e r i t a g e  (" im m o v eab le  p r o p e r t y " )  
b r o u g h t  b y  h e r  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  o r  a c q u i r e d  b y  g l f b ,  
i h h e r l t a n o e  o r  p u ro h a e e  o u t  o f  h e r  own m oney , i s  s a f e  
fro m  " a l i e n a t i o n  an d  l iy p o th e o a t io n  b y  t h e  h w b a n d " #
Upon d i v o r o o ,  a  c o u r t  l a  em pow ered t o  moke i n  f a v o u r  
o f  t h e  I n n e o e n t  a p o u ae  a  m aln tenm noe o r d e r  a g a i n s t  t h e  
g u i l t y  sp o u se #
Upon t i l l s  s k e tc h y  fram ew ork  ( t h e  w h o le  o f  c o u r s e  
i s  d e a l t  w i th  f u l l y  th r o u g h o u t  P r o f e s s o r  H a h lo ’a  b o o k ) ,  
t h e  f o r e i g n e r  lo o k s  a sk a n c e *  The v e r^ ' b r e v i t y  o f  
P r o f e s s o r  H a h lo ’ a  a p a c e  summary r a l e e e  e u a p lc lo n #
Many q u e a t io n e  a r e  n o t  onm w ered, o r  e v e n  p o s t u l a t e d  
t h e r e ,  an d  I n d e e d ,  l a t e r  I n  t h e  d l s c u e c io n  i s  fo u n d  
t h e  /
1# P r o f e e a o r  E e h lo  I 'c f e r a  t h e  r e a d e r  t o  H ra# S o lom on’ea u to b io g r a p h y ,  "Tim e Bemembered" (1 9 6 8 )  u p o n  h e rs t r u g g l e  f o r  women’s  r i g h t s #2# p#10*3* Hahlo, jbid* 6ee a lso  Maaedorp, ppe^l'*^^#
m
t h e  ceatem oe;## "T h e re  I s  mo q u e s t io n  o f  l e g a l  
e q u a l i t y  b e tw e e n  huebm id  and  w ife  im  S o u th  Afrlo&m
E e h lo  comm ente"' " S o u th  A fz^o& ’ a oom im m ity o f  
p r o p e r t y  and  p r o f i t  en d  l o s s  may w e l l  b e  t h e  o n ly  
f u l l - b l o o d e d  u m iv e r a a l  oommumlty a y e tem  l e f t  Im t h e  
W oeterm  ( I n  t h e  4 t h  e d i t i o n ,  " S o u th  A f r i c a
i s  one  o f  t h e  l a s t  b a e t lo n a  o f  t h e  o r th o d o x  o o rn m n lty  
o f  p r o p e r t y  e n d  p r o f i t  a n d  lo s e * "  T h a t
may b e  so#- P e r h a p s ,  howevm ?, t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
p r e v a le n c e  en d  p o p u l a r i t y  i n  s o u th  A f r i c a  o f  t h e  
m a r r ia $ 0 '» o o n tr a e t  r e f l e o t e  v ie w s  u p o n  t h e  s u i t a b i l i t y  
f o r  m odem  o o n d itl^ m a  o f  t h e  B u b s ta n t iv e  oornmonmlmr 
r u l e a ^ *  I M ilo  d iv id e o  m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  re g iia e a  
i n  m c ie t e w e  t o d ^  i n t o  t h r e e  o a t e g o r i e a ; -  sy s tè m e  
o f  c o m p le te  e e p a r a t i o n ^ \  t r a d i t i o n a l  o o m m m ity  
p r o p e r t y  /
1* p#11* end  t h e n ,  "The huebm id  re m a ln e  l e g a l l y  t h eh e a d  o f  t h e  fa m ily #  N or h a s  S o u th  A f r i c a  eo  f a r  b e e n  o o n e id e r in g  a n y  m a jo r  r e fo rm a  i n  I t e  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  re g im e # "  ( p .1 1 ) ( 1 9 6 9 ) *  H ah lo  n o te s  t h a t  S o u th  A f r i c a  i s  t r a i l i n g  b e h in d  o v e r s e a s  d e v e le p m e n te ,  b u t  re m a rk s  ( f n * 4 8 ,  w hen e o im e n t in g  on  t h e  German and  P re n o h  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  t h e  l e g a l  e q u a l i t y  o f  h u sb a n d  and  w i f e ) ,  "C o m p lé té  e q u a l i t y  l e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a  c h im e ra " *  From  t h e  4 t h  edn# ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  t h e  e o n te n o e  q u o te d  i n  t h e  t e x t  i@ e x o ie e d *
2# p#11#3# O o n t r a e t  L o u ia la n a ,  3 ^ r ^ # H ah lo  n o t e s  t h a tm a r r i a g e - o o n t r a o t a  a r e  p o p u la r  i n  Q u e b e c , w h ich  h a s  a  com m unity  o f  m o v ea b le s  a n d  a o q u e e t s ,  an d  a rg u e a  (p # 1 2 , fn * g 1 )  t h a t  t o  aome e x t e n t  t r a d i t i o n  m uat a f f e c t  p a r t i e s ’ b e h a v io u r  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  m o zT ia g e - o o n t r a o te *  O e r tm in ly  t r a d i t i o n ,  a n d  e x a m p le , an d  f a a ï ï io n  w i t h i n  a  c e r t a i n  o i r o l e  o r  o o e io -e ô o n o m ie  g r o u p ,  i e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a  b e a r in g  o n  e o n d w t ,  w h a te v e r  t h e  c o n te n t  o f  t h e  law  w M oh l e  b e in g  
^ a v o id e d ’ #4* I n  eome o m e a  (e*g#  E n g la n d , A n e t r a l l a ,  HewZ e a la n d )  t h e r e  m ig h t b e  s a i d  t o  b e  a  new s u b d i v i s i o n :  " c o m p le te  s e p a r a t i o n  w i th  ( o o n é id e r a b l e )  j n d l o i o l  d i s o r e t i o n " #  8eo  s u b s e q u e n t  d is o n s a io n #  H ah lo  d lB o n a e e a  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  v a r i o n s  a y e tem a  a t  
pp*13*16*
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property systems ( u n i v e r s a l  or partial), and 
" d e f e r r e d  community" or p a r t i c i p a t i o n  sy s te m s  *
He is a c c u r a t e  when he  states that a u n i v e r s a l
community regime "takes the idea of partnership of 
h u sb a n d  and wife t o  i t s  logical conclusion in the 
economic sphere", hut adds a phrase which m ig h t he 
thought to he out of place i n  a  modern discussion, 
when, i n  noting the common resort of the middle and 
upper classes to t h e  marriage-contraot, he s a y s  that 
com m unity  of property and p r o f i t  and  loss is not 
popular i n  South Africa, despite "its obvious 
a d v a n ta g e s  from the wife’s point of view if the 
m a r r ia g e  i s  financially a s u c c e s s " ,  The i d l e ,  
money-seeking wife is almost as familiar a c h a r a c t e r  
as h e r  male counterpart, t h e  Victorian fortune-hunter, 
b u t  perhaps both are more difficult now to find*
The a im  must surely be to f i n d  a sy s te m  of matrimonial 
property which w i l l  deal as fairly as possible with 
the average husband and wife.
Hahlo explains t h e  g e n e r a l  rejection b y  the 
wealthy South African of the common law on the basis 
that, if the husband does not prosper, " h i s  financial 
ruin w i l l  be h e r s " .  Second, the wife’s position at 
common law w i th  regard t o  t h e  management of t h e  
property is h u m i l i a t i n g l y  woak^* The husband, 
e q u a l l y ,  w h e th e r  for reasons of conscience or self 
or business protection or a mixture of these reasons, 
prefers /
1, Pf12, (a clause withdrawn from  t h e  4 t h  edn,).And see i n f r a .  (elements in a breach ofpromise claim),2# The S o u th  A f r i c a n  m a r r ia g e  p a r t n e r s h i p  i ncom m unity  appears t o  resemble the Scots communlo bonorum (Chapter 1): Hahlo comments "As^Tor "aF"she w if e ) "  is concerned t h e  partnership,i n  t h e  words o f  Fir* Justice Oliver W en d e ll Holmes, •begins only at its end*,"
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p r e f a r B  t o  e x o lu d e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  oommumlty*^ The 
r o B u l t  l a  t h a t  t%iie p r l n o i p l o  o f  a o p a r a t i o n  o f  p ro p e r ty '^  
e x i s t a  I n  S o u th  A f r i c a ,  i n  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  o r  
% m & erly i%  ’e y 8tern ’ o f  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  law  
o h o aen  b y  a o  many*
S i 3 œ a L J H S j £ s f e t e J M ® £ - â l . J s i ^ ^
Law i n  G r o a to r  p o t a i l
I n  S o u th  A f r i c a n  low * dam ages may b o  o b ta in e d
f o r  /
1# I t  ooems t h a t  35^ o f  a l l  m a r r la g e a  e o n t r a o to d  i n  S o u th  A f r i c a  a r e  ’ o u t  o f  com m unity ’ * R a h lo ,  p * 2 8 3 , fn * 1 $  n o t in g  t h a t  w  a n t é n u p t i a l  o o n trm o ts  a r e  r a r e  among t h e  B a n tu  en d  p o o r e r  W h lto e , " i t  1$ f a i r  t o  ooùo li^âe  t h a t  miomg t h e  m id d le  a n d  u p p e r  o laB B ea  m a r r ia g e  o u t  o f  o o iim m ity  i s  t h e  r u l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  e c m e p t lw "  I n  t h e  4 t h  o d l t io m , h e  o u b a t i t u t e a  a  aea te m o e  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a b o u t h a l f  o f  t h e  4 1 .0 0 0  w h ite  m a r r ia g e s  o f  1972  w ere  w i th  a n t e - i m p t i a l  e o n t r a o t*  I n  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  f o o t n o te  ( 4 t h  ed#*$ p#20$ f a # 1 0 5 a ) $ h a h lo  o o n e lu d e e  a f t e r  a  b r i e f  oom eider& tiom  o f  t h e  N o rd ic  O o u n tr ie e  ( l i t t l e  o o a t r h o t im g - o u t  o f  t h e  re g im e  p r o v i d e d ) ,M eat G erm ain  ( e l m l l a r ) ,  F ra a o e  (w h o re  t h e  o p t i o n a l  re g im e  o f  o o m m m lty  o f  g a in a  l a  n o t  p o p u la r )  an d  Q uebec (w h e re  t h e  p e r e e a ta g e  o f  p e ra b n e  p r e f e r r i n g  t o  o o n t r a o t  o u t  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d  m o d em  (1 9 7 0 )  o o m m m ity  o f  ga lm e e y s te m  l a  h l # i  b u t  f a l l^ jo g )  t h a t  " I t  w ou ld  Beam t h a t  im le e s  i t  i s  e n t i r e l y  o u t  o f  tu n e  # j . th  p37mrai%lng s e n t im e n t  w h a te v e r  a  eom^itagy o f f e r s  a s  t h e  l e g a l  re g im e  w i l l  b e  a e o o p te d  b y  t h e  m aaa o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  % 7ithout q u e ry # "T h is  aeem e e q a a l i y  t r u e  o f  E n g la n d  (w h e re  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  m uet a b a o rb  a  masA^lve j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  a n a  i n t e r f e r e n c e )  an d  o f  S c o t la n d  (w h o re  s i l e n c e  
aeem e t o  b e  t h e  r u l e ) *8* T hough i n  a  m ore e a t i e f a o t o r y  fo rm , p e r h a p s ,  a a  e p r im g in g  fro m  m a r r i s ^ e - c o n t r a c t s  w h ic h  p re s u m a b ly  a r e  made o r  a l t e r e d  t o  c u l t  p a r t i e # *  r e q u ir e m e n t#  en d  c ir c im e tm ic e B , a n d  t h e  p r o v i a i c n e  o f  w h ic h  a r e  s p e c i f i c *  O o n t r a e t  O l iv e  a n d  W ils o n , p*289$ u p o n  t h e  S c o t t i a h  p o s i t i o n  $ "The p re e o m t law  l a  e a s y  t o  a t a t e  b u t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a p p ly " *
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4f o r  b r e a c h  o f  prom im e o f  m arrlm ge  * By oomaemt o f  
both paz'tiea, tW oontmot of c%aGonm%.t may be brought 
t o  a n  end* I t  w i l l  t e r m l m w  a l-iu#  o f  o o n ra o ,  on  
t h e  d w t h  o f  o l t M r  p a r ty *  A  ^more o l a W r a t e  body  o f  
rule# them existe I n  Boote oomoernlmg the
valid ity  of omwo# for -%fl#dr#fal f%*om the 
an d  t h e  Im f o f  eDgmgemmt g e m m l l y  Im alu d im g  t w  
maolmtim of property d l#u te#  w le l%  thmrofmm^, 
appeam to h a v e  beam developed.* Relevwt faotore 
may pertain mot only to oimeemt, or eo%M,wt$ W t 
also to  *#3y other valid
Damagoo m ay b e  ewmrded ogeim et! th e  d e f e n d a n t  
( th o u g h  .Halilo s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t e  w e  n o t  
t o  make w m rd e  m g e ln a t women o r  m im ore) I f  i t  em i 
bo  show n th a r t  t h e  l a t t e r  3mm u m j w t l f i a b l y  r e p u d i a t e d  
%m o o n t r a o t  o r  b y  oomdmot h u e  om aged th e
p l a i n t i f f  t o  r o B l le *
An w a r #  may ho  smdo u n d e r  # e  h e a d  o f  
a e  w e l l  a s  fo .r  a o W a l  la e m m ia iy  lo e e *  T h e m  1# 
o o m a id o ra h lo  jW l o i m l  d l s o r e t i o m  w  t o  quemWm#
S in .ee  dam ages mey h e  B ivm . f o r  w ouM od f e e l l m g s ,  t h e  
a c t i o n  1$ fE^ oem m  *’a  o o m p e e ite  ome* o o :^ > r iB l%  b o th  
ê e l i o W a l  /
1# A.0 to the poultiom In England (eueh aotlono ere m<longer oompotout hut rule# to reeolvo ;^ >roperty d i e p u t e e  o x i i f t ;  m#e -
2# P$#tapB #ii;: 1%) a false ImpmsBlom* There 1$ no wwom to ouP'-^ ORo t:-at Soote Imr would laok am rnimwer* Lo'.'r vor o%l,raor&imary the oireumstmoes tW erga^ i. ^ "'"'0* It ie imtermtlng that Profowor Olive eo©ch 4^w hie trea'Wemt of the Buhjeot (0*& V* pp* 24-25) ly  referri% to a ^merel g&$lde formulated % Prafeamor .Hahlo*3* Oomtraet Olive (0*& W* P*29 "An engagement ae amoh has mo imtrlmoulal effeotm# The .normal rule# of property law apply"#) In fact, the aeeto and South Afr^ .om rule# aeem similar# See Eas^ lo,0* & W# P P # 2 9 -3 0 , V & lker# % in e *  I# $  %)p*235m2]4* Seq» gmerally Eahlo, pp*45-50*
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4delictual and contractual elements," The successful 
plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed in respect of 
any  expenditure reasonably incurred in contemplation 
of t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  and  f o r  "the loss of the pecuniary 
advantages of t h e  promised marriage and the prejudice
to the plaintiff’s future life and prospects of
Pmarriage"#" Hahlo re m a rk s  that while the loss of a 
marriage to a wealthy man is a factor to be taken 
into account, matters should not be taken to extremes, 
and she who has been ’jilted* b y  a millionaire cannot 
c la im  one-half of his estate, or whatever would h av e  
fallen to h e r  by marriage-settlement* S he is not 
entitled to claim that she be placed in the same 
position as she would have enjoyed had the marriage 
t a k e n  place* Recompense for effort used in v a i n ,  
re im b u rse m e n t of money s p e n t ,  and  r e s t i t u t i o n  of 
goods are acceptable claims still, it is t h o u g h t, but 
modern thinking tends to dismiss as outmoded and, 
inappropriate, or despise, or leave o u t  o f  account, 
marriage /
1* Hahlo, p * 5 2 , ascribing to English law a n  influence here. In Scotland, the award may also contain an element in respect of solatium for hurt feelings (Walker, Prins* I, 236) sSBT^ fiough perhaps commonly regarded in Scotland as an action in contract, Professor O liv e  (0, & W* p.23) notes that the action "has delictual elements", although nominally for breach of a contract. I n  South Africa, the modern view seems to be that breach of promise per so does not am ount to injuria, "Loss of face'^in these circumstances i s  not a contemporary notion,
2 ,  p , 5 3 .
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marri age-inspired ’expectations* of a financial4nature •
The measure of damages jgx delicto depends upon 
the hurt to the plaintiff, ’the social position of 
the parties’, ’and the g e n e r a l  b e h a v io u r  of the 
defendant’ which may be such as t o  mitigate or 
increase the award*
Damages for seduction w i l l  be  competent if the 
defendant, after making a promise to marry the 
plaintiff, has seduced her^*
Damages for breach of promise will not be 
recoverable if the plaintiff, expressly o r  by implication, 
waives the right to them, nor may they be recovered 
from a married man i f  his marital status was known 
to the plaintiff^* Damages (for monetary loss only) 
may be awarded (if o th e r w is e  justified) against a 
deceased defendant’s representatives^# The plaintiff 
must prove the engagement and generally, though not 
always, must provide corroboration# In certain 
cases/
1 # Such considerations are b y  no means unlcnown in Scots law, however (see for example 8 troy an. v# M oV /hirter (1907) 9 S*L#T# 242) but the eases tend to be early twentieth century, or older# Indeed, as Professor Olive points out (O# & W# p#21), the action for breach of promise is now rare in Scotland*2* Of* old Sects irregular marriage b y  promisesubséquente copula* This form of irregular marriage, together witEuEa^ of marriage by declaration de praosenti, was abolished by  M a rr ia g e  (ScotlandT*Act, 8*$* Marriage in Scotland may still be constituted b y  cohabitation with habit and  repute#See generally as to seduction (in an English/Scottish conflict case) Soutar v# Peters 1912 1 8#L#T# 111.5# Of* English public policy cases of Speirs v« Hunt
1908 1 E *B #720, W ilso n  V# O a rn le y  1908 1 E .B*729: contrast Shaw v. 8# 1954 2 Q.B* 429*4# An action against the defender’s executor (but probably not by the pursuer’s executor) seems competent in Scotland: Walker, Prins* I, 235, andauthorities there cited*
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o a s e s  (o n e  o f  t h e s e  b e in g  a n  aw ard  o f  dam ages f o r
seduction) the sanction of c i v i l  im p riso n m e n t for 
non-payment o f  debt remains competent in South 
A f r i c a ^ , but it may n o t  be u s e d  t o  enforce an aw ard  
of damages for breach of promise^# There is a 
three year prescription of actions for breach of 
p ro m ise ^ #
R e tu rn  of Gifts
Hahlo divides engagement gifts into three 
categories* The first comprises arrha© spousalitia©$ 
given on t h e  condition o r  faith that the marriage 
will take place* Usually the engagement ring, and 
very often the ring o n ly ,  falls into this category*
The second comprises gifts of v a lu e  intended to 
benefit t h e  donee throughout his/her m a r r ie d  life 
" examples are a  house, a farm, f u r n i t u r e ,  family 
j e w e l l e r y ,  a life insurance p o l i c y .  Any permanent 
gift of value given during the engagement is presumedij-to have been made in anticipation of marriage"*
The third class contains " o u t - a n d - o u t  gifts of 
small value", such as are normally exchanged between 
engaged persons*
If t h e  engagement is terminated ’unlawfully* 
by one party, all gifts must be r e t u r n e d ,  w i t h  the 
exception o f  gifts o f  t h e  third category, w h ich  have 
been ’consumed, alienated or lost#* However the 
innocent /
•aR3ÉÊstw«#frja»
1* Bee Scottish position: Debtors (Scotland) Act,1880 (civil im p riso n m e n t abolished, except for taxes, fines, r a t e s ,  sums d ecern ed  , f o r  aliment) Civil Imprisonment Act, 1882 ( im p r iso n m e n t f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  p a y  a l im e n ta r y  d e b ts  a b o l i s h e d ,  b u t  special p r o v i s i o n s  made i n  respect of w i l f u l  failure to pay sums d ecern ed  for aliment) As t o  aliment, see Chapter 4#2* The Civil Imprisonment Restriction Act, No* 21 of 1942, s *4; Hahlo p#56, fn« 11 *
3* Prescription Act, No* 18 of 1943* (H a h lo , p . 56 )*  4* Hahlo, p*56*
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#  w h i le  h e l %  t e  #
m ade hg^ h lm /h w #  m ay m ta l m  # f W  a^eoelved#
# i e  v o l w  th#%  % e:e  dm % ee*^  ( a  m t l o m l
m m  1 #  t h e m  Im mo l l t l g a t l m ? ) #  im leem
# # # t  Im fuestâoii i i  m  .am&m.# # #  to lm  e# 
^ a t l y  t h e  d o m m e t W  # l o h  #
mohea #WL1 owpmaatloa 1# d m # w  fern the *
##00###*  t h o u A  m ig h t  h #
 ^ m w m iag e
q hie W t  the male aaew
#  m a t  m  # #  v ie w  t h a t  ’* # #  % # # #  who m l a w f o l l y
the mem*
$ W wê tm ^m w  l e l i l e  eeem e 
a w m  mmmemgimte tewae
(feiiowimg the 
# m l t e  dm m w la # ,$
p e rn #  # )  a h i v e | .
E
t h e  $<mee m .  t h e  m m iew fei* R them em e
w i th  t h e  em # 0 B i
t h a t  /I if  " "4* in * 13*
: . 5 '
W  S tttitts l  « 0
0 »
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t h a t  m  a r r h a # the v a lu e  o f  w h ic h  i s  g r e a t l y  i n  e x e e a s  
o f  t h e  dam ages d u e ,  s h o u ld  hO' r e W m e d  a n d .d am ag e s  
a o o e p te d ? ' What i s ' - t o  h a p p en  i n  the o a s e s ,  w h ic h  
s u r e l y  m u s t  b e  m any, i n  w h ich ' a  j u d i o i a l  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  dam ages w as n o t  s o u g h t  an d  t h e r e f o r e  i s  n o t  
a v a i l a b l e ?
.In. t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  evldenoe o f  intention t o  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  t h a t  iS : | ’’t h a t  a n  en g ag em en t a n d  m a r r ia g e  
w i l l  f o l lo w  i n  d u e  ■ o o u ree " , p re * e n g a g e m e n t g i f t s  
. a r e  I r re o o v e ra b le * ^ #
As to- g i f t s  made t o  t h e  e n g a g e d . c o u p le  b y  t h i r d  
p a r t i e s  on  t h e  f a i t h  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  the sam e r u l e  
a s  i s  fo u n d  in Bootland ( a n d  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  
sam e p r i n c i p l e ,  n a m e ly  o o n d ie : t id  c a u s a  d a t a  ,oausa^ 
n o n  s e o u t a ) a p p l i e s #  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  s u c h  may 
b e  r e c o v e r e d  fro m  t h e  d o n e e s  i f  the m a r r ia g e  d o e s  n o t  
t a k e  p lace® #
H a h lo  o o n o lu d e s  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n .b y  r e m a rk in g  t h a t ,  
u n l e s s '  a  o o n t r a r y  i n t e n t i o n  a p p e a r s ,  engagemenfe g i f t s  
a r e  : n o t , presumed t o  b e  r e t u r n a b l e  on  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m a r r ia g e #  "Onoe t h e  m a r r ia g e  h a s  t # e n  p l a c e ,  
en g ag em en t g i f t s  l o s e  t h e i r  s p e c i a l  . c h a r a o t e r  and  
beoom e s u b j e c t - t o  t h e  ordinary r u l e s  g o v e rn in g  .p r o p e r ty  
o f  t h e  d o n e e ■ T h ese  " o r d i n a r y  r u l e s " ' ,  a n d  th e  
q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r ,  i n  m a r r ia g e s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  common 
la w , en g ag em en t g i f t s  a r e  p l a c e d ,u n d e r  t h e  h e a d  o f  
j o i n t  e s t a t q *. w i l l  now b e  s tu d ie d *
The BoUth A f r ic a n .  B v ste rn , of. Gommimity o f , P r o p e r t y  
an d  o f  P r o f i t  a n d .L o s s
/
1# E a h lo ,  p . 5 8 ,  an d  a u t h o r i t i e s  ' t h e r e  c i t e d #  2# As t o  .S c o t la n d ,  s e e  S t a i r ,  1*7*7#5# P ',5 8 ,
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I f  t h e  S o u th  A f r i c a n  s y s te m  i s  p e r h a p s  " th e  
o n ly  f u l l - b l o o d e d  universal com m unity  system l e f t  i n  
t h e  W e s te rn  w o r ld " ^ ,  i t  m e r i t s  s tu d y :
O ornm m ity  oommences a t  t h e  e e l e h r a t i o n  o f. 
m a r r ia g e  e x c e p t  i n  c e r t a i n  o iro u m s ta m o e # ,  and  i s  
p re su m e d  t o  a m le ,  u n l e s s  t h e  e o u t r a r y  i s  shewn* 
Community i s  u n i v e r s a l *  I t  i s  eom m uuity  of p r o p e r t y  
a n d  o f  p r o f i t s  an d  lo s s *  I t  m a t t e r s  not that 
f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  h a s  not been equal"# B ach  
p a r t n e r '  owns one  h a l f  o f  t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e #  "W here 
e v e r y th in g  i s  owned a n d  owed i n  common# t h e r e  i s  no  
room  f o r  d e b t s  o r  r i g h t s  o f  p ro p e r ty '# "  T h is  g iv e s  
an a t t r a c t i v e  im p r e s s io n  ■ o f  c l a r i t y  a h d  f a i r n e s s #  
w h ic h  may b e  a n  a c c u r a t e , ,  o r  a  s u p e r f i c i a l # ,  r e f l e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  t r u e  s t a t e  o f  affairs*
I t  f o l lo w s  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  m  i n t e r # s p o u s e  
l i t i g a t i o n  i s  c o m p e te n t ,  f o r  e a #  i s  t h e  o t h e r  ( e x c e p t-  
t h a t ,  a s  H ah lo  n o t e s ,  t h e  w i f e  i s  the j u n io r - p a r tn e a c r ) ,  
an d  a l l ^  i s  h e l d  i n  common#
^ h a t  i s  t h e  l e g a l  n a t u r e  , p f  „ t h e  Com munity?
P r o f e s s o r  H ah lo  r e j e c t s  t h e  e a r l y  v ie w  t h a t  t h e  
j o i n t  e s t a t e ' i s  a  s e p a r a t e  p e r s o n a ^# N e i t h e r  d o e s  
t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  q ta n te -  m a tr im o n io -#, t h e  p r o p e r t y  i n  
t h e  f u n d  i s  i n  t h e  'h u s b a n d , t h e  w i f e ’s  r i g h t  m e re ly  
a r i s i n g  /
1* H a h lo , p # 1 i ,  n o t i %  t h a t  "Been, i n  t h e  g l o b a l  c o n t e x t ,  
t h e  Bouth A f r ic a n  l a w  of 'husband  an d  w i f e  i s ,  f o r  better o r  worse, trailing behind d e v e lo p m e n ts  overseas"# a# H ah lo#  P # a i0 *3* an d  t h e  h u sb a n d  the h e a d  and  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  (p # 2 0 9 )4# w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t io n  o f  c e r t a i n  a s s e t s ,  w h ic h  re m a in  . t h e  separate p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h  a n d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  . w h ic h  i t  , i s  a s  i f  t h e  s p o u s e s  h a d  b e e n  m a r r ie d  
o u t  o f  c b m u n ity .#5 . 9421%,
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arlalmg cm dissolutlom of the marriage , find favour 
with h:lm# H# say# that both im the Netherlands mid 
In Goi^th Africa t W  ooimmiity is "a apecles of 
oomdominium"# Asaot# are ’owmod* in equal umdividod 
Bh*:ireB, but thwo Bhama are "in&ioeolubly tied uP# 
Noithor spow# can by m t  dlapoao of his
or her share im the joint estate, though either spouse 
msy do (30 by will or other act mgg|is
I t  IG q u i t e  o l e a r  t h a t  th e  W a b a n d  i s  ad m i% d .e tra to r*  
A $l5ïplo example of the operation of the ayetom ia 
t h a t  i f  t h e  h u ah am l m eltw  t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y ,  ^ L ,\u te  
m a t r in o n i o ,  a  d o n a tio n #  "h e  h i e  mffL o& ,ta te
% ' /
i* Hahlo auotea Mr* Juatioe Van dem newer, in 
O M r h o lm r  v .  0# 19 4 ?  ( 5 )  S ,& , 294  ( 0 )  a t  297#" d u r in g  t h e  m ib e lB te n o e  o f  t h e  m a i r la g o  *** t h e  w i f e ’ s  oime3:*ship i s  i n  a  s t a t e  o f  # im pen$o* I t  i s  o r l y  a  e o n o e p tu a l  k ind , o f  (n a ie ro h lp  o r  q u a s i -  oimoj3ulU.p # * * %':yhloh booomem kia^itlo only %pon disno^uüiom. o?' the mm%Tiage *##"# dlaagreoing w ith , t h e  s t a f f '  » t  i f  i t  w as jn to m lo d  t o  o o w o y  t h e  lA oruing t  i t h e  v f l f e ’a  inte% *cot w w  o n ly  one 
o f  onn^ootaney# t n e  hu.sha'^^d a lo n a  ow ning  t h e  è o m m m lty,r\)GOjLvV V'O V.* rv 0 e u h o is te #  ' (O f# L o rd' j i i l o r h ’ i' Jov:* ;u u tiu \ :  -v(r<*30ment o f  t h e  G o o ta  An':r h e n m w ^  i n  th e  o a e e  o f  F r a e e r  v* W a lk e r837  a t  pp* 8 4 7 -8  (G ee p*?1t "It has h w j  craaonably oug; h / d that'^ ^iraae euMe to h eï^inYf^d sm a auppowdjhllwophie c:r-;one/', i. W&ta ru'iri^ iag atÙieaolution# that# #o from ahoporm g i v i a r  r i s e  to the3Io@ oW ti03\#  t l ;  w as t h e  e%j.ot0Roe o f  Uheme r i g h t o "  ( t h a t  l a #  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t l i e  'a u v lv in ^ ;  p a r tm e r  t o  one o i' ü 'a; é w e a h l o  e.^vUro .jiigc'q r e i io ta Ë ,an d  t h e  r i ( ; h t  o f  t h e  p rodA cofu$ i%  w i f e  t o  that 0)1© half *^hare to hoi'* )^©Dreeemtative/ © * their rlglrU t) malw e w h  a ola;^ JG after her death (p*7i) (vfith Ihe passing o f  , the lateatate Moveable 
S uoo easio n '^A o t#  1 8 5 5 ) )  "w h ich  b r o u g h t  th #  p h r a s e  o o m m u lo  I r t o  u ee#  At evem ta#  n o th in gelse %'ma W', fegel.iy oompreheuded imdor t)mt name exoapt the /*> referred to"*) Bee ali^ op p  #7 3 /7 4  m uw a#Eahlo# to t W  pouslbility of adeerae o:iT boode[^i6h©icK%") of* the laoidenta ofiT'^7iV Jfli ifi 'k ' — ■*‘ "
2 #
"oDmmon"# %:^roperty l a  s e e t a
6 8 8
by half of the value of the donation, and his wife's 
by the other half"
Which subnects fall into Community?
W ith o u t  need of transfer or delivery, all
property and rights oimed by each at marriage, and
thereafter acquired, moveable or immoveable, corporeal
or incorporeal, fall into the community* Heritable
estate situated abroad also is included, though if
the lex situs requires transfer into both names before
r e c o g n i s i n g  that the property is owned by both, the
p a r t n e r  i n  whom the title stands must ensure thatot h e  r e q u i r e d  transfer i s  effected*^ Otherwise, it 
d o e s  /
1* Hahlo, ibid*2m On occasxon, a conflict case presents such rules "in the round"# One such is t h e  case of Black v*B»s trustees 1930 B#L*{D* (notes) 32# %here, a Scotswoman, after marriage, executed a trust*^  s e t t l e m e n t  conveying to trustees heritable and moveable e s t a t e  belonging to o r  acquired by her. hater, the wife having succeeded to a share in a farm in Scotland, the husband brought action in the Oourt of Session seeking to have the deed set aside on t h e  g ro u n d  that it was null and void as contra*- vening t h e  law of the fransvaal, admittedly the matrimonial domicile at the date when the settlement was executed. The wife concurred in the action, w h ich  was defended by the trustees*By the law of Transvaal, a marriage lawfully contracted and not preceded by ante-*nuptial contract, carried into a universal partnership under the sole administration of the husband, all moveables wherever situated end heritage in the Transvaal, belonging to either or acquired by either after marriage*Lord Mackintosh held that the trust ought to be r e d u c e d  in so  far as it conveyed o r  purported to convey heritable property situated in the Transvaal, and moveable property wherever situated. The remaining provisions should be left v a l i d  and standing* His Lordship felt that it was for the lex situs at the date of execution of the trust- "deed"'9^5) to determine whether the wife had capacity to convey heritage to trustees, and Boots law placed no obstacle in her way.Had the law of Transvaal carried into com m unity all heritage anywhere, would the result have been the sam e? Capacity to grant deeds affecting heritage is referred to the lex situs* but is the reference to /
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doee not matter In which name the immoveable property 
stands. Indeed, heritage acquired during marriage 
stands in  the husband's name, while property brought 
to /
to the lex  s itu s  in  i t s  narrow sen se, or to the le x  situ^  including i t s  c o n flic t  rules? Is  there roo3ïT7or renvoi? As to questions o f matrimonial p r o p e r t y (a  "complex and to some extent uncertain  area of in tern ation al private law) where no property regime has been chosen, Boots law refers  property questions to  the husband's domicile (or now the matrimonial domicile -  what i f  none?)(A#E. Anton, Private International Law, pp*438-460) or, i f  a regime expressly or by im plication  o f law has been chosen, to the proper law of the settlem ent (Anton, p*431)* Yet in  matters of immoveable property (Anton, p*460 e t seq) -  i f  only for  reasons o f  e ffectiven ess -'"Ehe lex  s itu s  i s  dominant and the South African rule """stated in  the te x t seems to  recognise th is*  Moreover, Mr# Anton (a t p*395) points out that Married Womens Property (Scotland) Act, 1920, s*7$ provides that a husband domiciled abroad sh a ll have no righ t of adm inistration of h is  w ife 's  heritage in  Scotland# Since at that date a w ife 's  domicile followed  her husband, the provision  seems to apply now, though n either i s  domiciled in  Scotland -  Olive & Wilson, p#282, fn#98 and 99# Hence, no matter what the South African provision, a married woman's capacity to  deal with Scots heritage appears to
see Mr# Anton's moderate tone at p ,461, to the e f fe c t  that the lex  s itu s  should play an "important" though not n ecessar ily  a "dominating" ro le  here d ecision  as to what in tere sts  may be created and how assigned and terminated, adjudication among cred itors, e f fe c ts  of rea l d iligen ce)#  Mr# Anton at p *464 h im self considers th is  question, in  re la tio n  to  th is  case, and suggests that perhaps, in  a case where both spouses are fu l ly  aware of and have acquiesced in , the foreign  r u le s , the la t te r  should operate, and particu lar ru les (though n ot, i t  i s  submitted those o f Bouth A frica where, in  community, heritage f a l l s  in to  the jo in t esta te )  might conceivably deprive the w ife not only o f  capacity but a lso  of her r igh t o f ownership, so that a question of property anterior to that of capacity would arise* And see Olive & Wilson p*336* Bee also deference to the Transvaal lex  s itu s  i Bank o f A frica Ltd# v# Cohen 1909 F
9 E 7 R 9 .
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to the marriage by either partner usually will remain 
in that partner's nasue* In all oases, the heritage 
will form, part of the joint estate^*
"The salary if hi oh the h u sb a n d  e a r n s ;  the s h a r e s
and shirts which he purchases; the earnings of the
wife and the jewels which she inherits from her
mother; the tainted gains of gambling, fraud, theft
or prostitution; all alike fall into the common
estate* Hor does it malce any difference whether
the acquisition is made in name of the husband, ofpthe wife or of both spouses jointly"# The essence 
of the community is that, during its subsistence, 
all the assets of the spouses (except those mentioned 
below) are "tied-up"*
Exceptions include subjects given to either 
spouse by a third party, accompanied by a provision 
that they shall not fall into the community, and in 
addition, perhaps, that they shall not fall under 
the marital power (which they would, if the marital 
power had not been excluded expressly)# However, 
the income or fruits of the excluded property will 
fall into community#
Similarly, property excluded from the joint 
estate by ante-nuptial contract will not fall into 
the joint estate, though such exclusion is a practice 
now /
1* Such a rule (even to the extent of 'joint matrimonial home* only, as opposed to all property or all immoveable property) would remove many difficulties with which our present law (see e#g* Chapter 4, p.539 et seq and Chapter 5, p.643 Hi), or.proposed reforms (of# Memo Ho#41, 1 #14) has or would have to contend#2# Hahlo# p#213. (Upon the interesting subject of delictual liability of third parties (damages awarded falling into the joint estate) or of a third party and injured party's spouse, see Halilo, pp#213-217 4th edn#, pp#221-224)#
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now  r a r e *  I f  t h e  p a r t i e #  I n te n d  t o  b o  m a r r ie d  I n  
com m u n ity*
b o t r o t h a l  w e d d in g  B i f t e  t o  w ife "  
a r#  a  p o s a ib le *  b u t  b y  &# memao c e r t a i n *  exoeptl& m * 
a n d , e v e n  I f  th e y  fo r m  on  o x c o p t io m , * E a h lo  th ih k m  
t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  e r o d i t o m  a r e  m t  a f f e c t e d *
Among other ox&optio&e mro right# of a highly personal 
or lim ited Imtoreat a&turo;^^ oertaia l ife  poll&loo, 
a u à  eo rt& im  o t h o r  h o a e f i t e *  o o a to  a w a rd ed  a ^ n im a t 
t h e  p ro & o o d la g o  w h oro  t h e
morrleg# ooatinaoa# and immoveable property ' whiOh 
o n e  &P&UB0 h u t  w t  t h e  o t h e r  (p orh m p g f o r  re& oom # o f  
n a t i o n a l i t y )  l o  c a p a b le  o f  ow m ing#
Oommumity o f  m ^ so ta  m&et b o  aooompBDlod b y  
(3<yBWüMAa&3Lt%y Skjf %9%&%%ps>seti&(& K^B%%]L%w%%&4%Kk# (&%?
3)B58rV:%j3jL(K& 1?0 '&%%<& 48K3&&t%K%&:Ggr &j& &&
l 8  i h o f f e e t i v o  m  a g a ix w t  o r o d ito r o #  T h ia  lm o3 .M eo
%&%it%8*"aa%&&yt<L3al Ibs&lb&L a9350%w902%* %f3&3Lojh j&o%%& %&
0&i&3%g<Bi ()&& 3%38t%a;&0* 3P%)*%ti*Mga%%g)tKl4%]l (Sb&lbl&G*
llkowioe form auoh a oharge* elthough criminal 
p o a a lt lG #  @M fim em  m u st*  I t  1 #  ^ w o r a l l y  t h o u g h t ,  
h# mot omt of the guilty  ep#u&#*0 separata ootato 
( I f  a n y )  o r  o u t  o f  h lo / h e #  s h a r e  o f  th #  m om m um ity, 
amle&B the jo in t emtate received h#mofit from the 
orlme, or the huahanO. had hwm oonviotoi of an offenoo 
oonoemlm# the admimlatratioa of the jo in t aetatG^^ 
Blmllwly /
1* f o l lo w in g  o ld  Boman*Dut8& c u s to m  marn^emmwe*
m i a w ;  m # m *  <%3»,
4^ * !2%%S8Kq% zlot {l&l 3&N%3K&li8&& 3L%I# 3LI&&& a& Otf peursonsLl
3* Ik ih lo *  p*223  â â  ÜÉl* 8 # e  o le o  ûibB O iit p #101*^102; 
4*
a y a to m  o f  oommw&lty)*
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Similarly, damages in delict are considered to be 
due only by the spouse responsible, but this is not 
a point free from doubt, and it may be that the 
whole joint estate is liable^#
Terminâtion of 0 ommunity
The community is terminated by the dissolution 
of marriage by divorce or death, or by annulment of 
a voidable marriage, or upon the making of an order 
of boedeIscheiding (separation of property, perhaps 
temporary)*
OOn death^, the shares ±n the joint estate 
"crystallise"* D e b ts  referable to the joint estate 
are deducted therefrom and the remainder of the 
estate is divided between the suarviving spouse and 
the heirs of the predeceaaer# Collation may take 
place, if appropriate, between survivor and heir 
(usually child), before division, if the child has 
received from his parents during the marriage, an 
advance (for example, to set him up in business)*
In theory, the system is excellent in its 
simplicity /
1* This is not Hahlo's view (argued at length atpp*2 2 3 -2 3 4 * In the 4th edn*, however (at p*238), there appears to be a change of view: Hahlosuggests that the likely outcome will be that, during the subsistence of the marriage, the joint estate will be liable in full for a delict committed by either spouse, but that if the liability is not met, during that time, it must be satisfied by the guilty spouse alone after the dissolution of the marriage)» In most oases, however, damages due £x delicto to one spouse (even of a personal, i]SFurF%e%g* for defamation); though in terms o f  the Matrimonial Affairs Act, 
1 9 5 3 , daraages due to the wife for personal injuries of a physical nature are placed outwith the husband's control) seem to fall into cormmnity*2* Bee generally Hahlo, p*237 ^  seq»
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s i m p l i c i t y ,  m id p o s s i b l y  i n  p r a c t i c e *  i t  p r c a c n t s  
no  m ore p ro b le m s  th e n  w ould  n o r m a l ly  b e  e n c o u n te r e d  
In t h e  w in d in g -u p  o f  a  p rc c lo e e a a in g  sp o u s e * #  e s t a t e  
i n  a  a y e te m  o f  a o p o r& tio n  o f  p r o p e r ty #  The e u r v iv o r  
m u st make an  In v en to % y  o f  a l l  j o i n t  e s t a t e *  D e b ts  
p r o p e r l y  c h a r g e a b l e ,  b e tw e e n  th e  s p o u s e s ,  a s  a g a i n s t  
one  o f  them ^* i f  p a id  o u t  o f  t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e  by 
t h e  o x e c u t 'o r ,  m u st bo  c r e d i t e d  an d  d e b i t e d  a c c o rd in g ly *  
i f  a  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  immove&bleg l a  n e o G e s i t a te d  
I n  t h e  r e c k o n in g ,  I t  seem s t h a t  t h e  e x e c u to r  may 
t r a n s f e r  them  d i r e c t l y  t o  th e  p a r t i e s  e n t i t l e d  t h e r e t o *
The whole appears somewhat stellar to a Scots 
Scheme of Division for the u l t i m a t e  beneficiaries of 
a trust, or a oomplex estate* It appears also that 
the rights of the heirs may be postponed until the 
death of the surviving spouse "if the apousoe have 
massed the estate* conferring upon the survivor a 
fiduciary, usufructuary or other limited Interest
t h e r e i n *  a n d  t h e  s u r v i v o r  h&e a d ia te d H # ^  (&@gwi88oed?
adopted? accep ted ?)
It used to be that a widow* in a special 
ceremony &t the funeral* or by formal declaration 
within a reasonable time after the death* could 
romounce a l l  benefit and all liability under the 
oornimmity* but this* In Hahlo*# opinion* is probably 
obsolete*# Also possible* but bow rare* is the 
practice o f  continuing the community* a# between 
survivor and children* after the death of the 
predoooaalng spouse# This might be done by operation 
of /
1# t h a t  i s *  t o  be m et o u t  o f  h is /h e r  share o f  th e  
com m unity* n o t  o u t  o f  t h e  j o i n t  B s t a t c  b e f o r e
d i v i s i o n #2* H a h lo , p ,2 4 8 *
O p # e l t # *  p # 2 4 $ #  Of# L o u i s i a n a  p r a c t i c e *  i p f y a # 
T h i s  o p t io n  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  %o 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  h u s b a n d s  ( p o s s i b l y  a  n e c e s s a r y  dlG & dvam tage o f  b e i n g  c a p t a i n  o f  t h e  s h i p ) #
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Ao f  law o r  b y  ante-mxptia3. c o n t r a c t ,  b y  mutual will, 
or by will of the predeceaser, "adiated" (acquiesced 
in? concurred in?) by th e  s u r v iv o r *  Perhaps the 
n e a r e s t  e q u iv a le n t ^  would b e  a will made in Scotland 
b y  e a c h  sp o u s e  ( s e p a r a t e l y )  p r o v id in g  t h a t  t h e  e s t a t e  
shall b e  held b y  th e  s u r v i v o r  i n  liferent, a n d  that 
t h e  fee shall go to t h e  c h i ld r e n *  I t  seem s that 
t h i s  ty p e  of will i s  common i n  South Africa, as it 
also i s  i n  Scotland, but i n  South Africa, the o b j e c t  
i s  a c h ie v e d  b y  massing t h e  joint e s t a t e  b y  mutual 
w i l l #  Mutual wills are competent@ b u t  thoroughly 
u n p o p u la r  with the practitioner and the public, in 
Scotland* See Chapter 5 ,  p*598 et seq . in S o u th  
Africa, the c o u r t s  i n  su c h  circumstances and where 
there is d o u b t i n  interpretation prefer to find 
massing, usufruct or a fideicommlssum, than to find 
continued community*
I t  h a s  b e e n  s e e n  t h a t  s p o u s e s  may d i s p o s e  o f  
t h e i r  shares i n  the joint estate by  will^* The 
diaponer m u st not p u r p o r t  to d is p o n e  more than h i s  
prospective entitlement howevers the surviving 
spouse has right to one half of the joint estate 
(net)^* There are no legal rights exigible against 
t h e  /
1* "penal” continued com m unity  (sharing of profits, 
b u t  s u r v i v i n g  sp o u s e  a lo n e  b e a r in g  l o s s e s )  w herethe survivor had failed to comply with the law, by not having made a d i v i s i o n  of the joint e s t a t e  for the benefit of the parties' minor children#2* In South Africa as in Scotland; "Oontiimed community has practically vanished from the South African scene"* Halilo, p»2g1 (4th edn* p*2$6s "GOntinued community is  not obsolete in one law" (as evidenced by a number of "community continued by will" cases, including one of 1975$ namely Ex parte Jagger 1973 (2) S#A* 721 (1)) "but i t  is  hardly, i f  ever, established by antenuptial contract")* See generally as to it s  operation, Hahlo, pp*230-231*3* Be© Hahlo's deiScrlption (p*213) of the incidents of this matrimonial-type of condominium*4* Hahlo, p*237* (but not no1T'W*®S"1Ealf of each ofthe assets o f  the j o i n t  ©state)* D u rin g  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the estate, the s u r v i v o r  may perhaps dispose of his/her share in the net balance o f  t h e  joint estate 
(see pp* 237/238)*
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tW w r lac there the pamtootlom of
a right %o ailmmt out of # o  estate^# %/0toms
qcntaimins mmh remedies end oafcguard-K! might W 
&;aid perh#8 to W to 'joint
a d  ae'fmatmjxty notion#- at the 0'3ad rather than 
tw  oourae of the marriage ** a fine),» not a
I f  a #pou^ o^ dlo^ a 
in testate, #m aimlvo;^ #111 euocecd to tW estate 
of the predeeoaeer la  M M tiw W half aha&'O of 
the joiiit emtato (not) la  his W as of BuoGO^ sloa 
AC# 1934  as amm^ êod
At tW daté of âieeelûüleh, property gariwmcee
may he put foiwmNI, gmd %'edwss made Im suitaMo 
This la proh#ly a nooos-eary 
eoeaeloa aWpe may W tak<m te mitl^ gate (my 
hw#h effect# hro%ht mWmt by # 0  oommmlty rmlea, 
and to %met the aeedo -of the IMlvMuml q-aoe in so 
far B» thm# le pOBelhle or oompatlb3,o with the notion 
of a #e.mmmlty cy#tw* Eowwer# the courte
of the iRommwDuWh pérlo&i^  ow eo#?tm wo )%ant 
irelwîmm# to %13.ow r l^ t#  of reçonrae oa dlsaolation 
of the
TW p le ln tlff #o#ki% deoreo of jmdlelml 
I30pa3?m%om w i:;#  $how t h a t  oohW s^itatio 'm  W;Wi
#W dofeadwt wom3d bo Imtolorablo or dmgci'ouo, md 
that 'thle oitm tlon wmiB* bmught #ou t by the âefomdmit'e 
oenduot# %e ooWmot *re#l%'ad' la l^ askod
# a  /
1# P* ÿ'%3*2 $. uh#tor y * l3^m ; oy#tom -of#1 Property With Gomou%w;ôat Gom&semo&tion o f  Oalmab* ^S# E a h le »  Pe: ^23.4* "k%k# of boWe^ im the Bchlo»pp*2%<W»*5^  nmiè* p.# 249-# m#95a#
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to t h e  system of matrimonial offence, matrimonial 
offences being adultery, malicious desertion and, 
more often utilised in this context, cruelty or 
neglect^•
Apart from certain detailed consequences, 
decree of separation ipso does n o t  affect 
property rights* The ante-nuptial contract still 
regulates the position, or the community continues, 
and, although the plaintiff usually will s e e k  a 
change, t h e  initiative l i e s  on him# Where the 
marriage la in community, the plaintiff may seek 
b o e d e l s o h e id in g # which suspends, but does not 
terminate, the comumity# In this case^, community 
will revive upon resumption of married life# If 
m a r r ie d  o u t  of community, the plaintiff may seek to 
b e  relieved o f  "future benefits" due by him/her 
under the contract, but not of past benefits, and 
in that case cannot insist on performance b y  the
other spouse of duties exigible from him/her under
the contract^# Otherwise, if there w as an ante­
nuptial contract, the decree h a s  no automatic effect 
thereon* Subject to c o u r t  order (and, presumably, 
to the terms o f  the contract) each spouse is e n t i t l e d
to his ovm separate p r o p e r ty *
The /
1# See examples c i t e d ,  Hahlo, pp*327/8*2# As was seen above, boedelscheiding may be granted also during cohaba-tatToïiinipon o f  waste ormaladministration of the joint estate by t h e  husband* Insanity of the husband doom not found the rem e d y , nor, by Itself, (that is, presumably, not followed b y  judicial separation and plea for boedelscheiding) the husband's desertion and living''%n'adultery (Hahlo, p*13B)* The effect of t h e  remedy of boedelscheidin^ is normally to dissolve the coï03mmityi''''™b^  character asa remedy linked to that of judicial separation, it merely suspends the community* (Hahlo, p*534)* 3* H a h lo , p*33G*
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The guilty hwbœd my he ordered to pay
providM that the praepBctlve ayeclplmt 
Bhomg t h # t  a h a  req u irc ss  s u p p o r t#  "hm flm g r e g a r d  t o  
h e r  mwme *#*# m d  # 1 1 1  t y  t o  T he aw ard
t o M a  t o  b e  l ,a r g o r  o n  s e p a r a t i o n  # iam  o n  d lv o r o a # ^
TW propwtlom of of oe#lme& Imoomo# lo%momtiomod, Wt$. ae Im aootlmd"'# that figure omnot 
h e  t e k e a  t o  ho a  d e f i n i t e  rm le  o r  t o  h w o  r e c e i v e d  
dof jj&lte apprwiBl.* OlWomf^  atatoe that "If %3:^o 
g u i l t y  h w W n d  h a s  no t h e  o o w t  may o M w
t h e  wife# In Ilou of alimony# to retain t lm  property 
eW brought Into the oo^maMty evm I f  such 
p r o p e r t y  e o w t l t # # #  t h e  %W1$ m t o t o # ' '  
judicial aopwatloa iB offeotlve on oatiefm tioa of 
certain reqalremmte# the to%m of a
e e p a r a t l o n  a g re o m e a t h ev o  mo e f f e c t  a a  rogm M e 
creditor# # o%mept perhap# on oredltm*# awwe of the 
fact of mparatlo# and IW tomo^ Wt w ill bind the 
pa:!?tlo@ t h e r e t o #  p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e  te rm #  d o  n o t  
&t /




1am ount t o  an  In te r -o p o u a ©  d o n a tio n #  t h a t  th e y  do  
not (purport to) effect a change of status, ami 
t h a t ,  a t  t h e  t im e  of o x e o u t io n  of t h e  a g re e m e n t,  a
court would have boon justified In granting juclioial 
separation#’^ If all the requirements justifying 
aw ard  o f  deom*ee o f  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  a r e  p r e s e n t ,
an extrajudicial, deed of s e p a r a t i o n  may be converted 
into a  j u d i c i a l  decree of separation^#
The e u e c e e e f u l  p l a i n t i f f  l a  e n t i t l e d  t o  a s k  f o r  
m  " o r d e r  f o r  f o r f e i t u r e  o f  bemefita"# I f  h e  claims 
su c h  /
1# that is, (Hahlo, p#351î oeo generally Ohaptor 25, " P r i v a t e  Separation") (oluoo th e  act camaot be a  t r u e  d o n a t i o n ,  h a v in g  b e e n  made f o r  t h e  p u rp o s eof separation* and not antog dopaqdi - "out of cheer liberality) that Seitaer "of the apouaoa "raoelvoa aubstantially more than ho or she would h m m  r e c e i v e d  had a judicial d e c r e e  of separation boon m ade"#2# The provincea of the Gape and the Tranavaal differ here, the latter not insisting that olrcumatanceo 
j u s t i f y i n g  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  b e  p r e s e n t*  S ee  Hahlo, p*p48# and p#354# Hoi^ mver, althoujgh Professor Hahlo prefers on principle the Gape approach, ouroly the preseooo or absence of'gauaq would be d i f f i c u l t  to aocertain, if m e  % o u e o o  w e re  e p p o ae d  t o  d iv o r c e  and  c h o s e  mover to convert the d e e d  i n t o  d e c r e e  of j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t io n #  It appears t h a t , in d i s p u t e , I n  p r a c t i c e ,  there la mot a  great d i f f e r e n c e  I n  ap p ro a c li#  I f ,  h o w e v e r , d i s p u t e  d o e s  n o t  a r i s e ,  who is to adjudicate u p o n  juitac.aug^? A t t r i b u t i o n  of legal eonsoquonecB to voEmlary separation (without specified reasons t h e r e f o r )  i s  becoming 
common (D iv o rc e  ( B c o t lm d )  A c t ,  1 9 7 6 , $ * 1 ( 2 ) ( d )  a n d  ( e )  a n d  i n  B o u th  A f r i c a  ? but in Scotland also there is to ambivalent judicial a t t i t u d e  to contracta t o  live apart (Boo Ghapter 4, ■ Walker, Prims*!,26?#
F i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  a f t e r  s e p a r a t i o n  w i l l  be e n f o r c e a b l e :  an a g re e m e n t t o  live a p a r t  will n o t ) #3# H a h lo , p#355*
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such an order, the court may not refuse to grant it# 
Under this order, the defendant will lose all past 
and future financial benefits derived from the 
marriage, and this whether the marriage was in or 
out of community^* (forfeiture of future, not past, 
benefits may be ordered in judicial separation)*
I t  is competent for spouses to agree upon 
financial arrangements and to have t h è s e  incorporated 
i n  the decree of divorce# With regard to separation, 
parties may agree upon maintenance a n d /o r  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s  and  have their agreement included in decree# 
W here a voluntary becomes a judicial s e p a r a t i o n  (as 
above) the financial property and custody a r ra n g e m e n ts  
will be repeated in decree, if they are such as the
court would deem suitable had it been called uponoi n  the f i r s t  instance to regulate these matters '*
If no property agreement is made, the position is as 
follows #
Where the marriage is in community, t h e  plaintiff 
may choose to seek an order of division o f  the joint 
estate or an order of f o r f e i t u r e  of b e n e f i t s #  It 
seems t h e  court may r e f u s e  neither# If no specific 
order is made, the decree of divorce o p e r a t e s  a s  an 
order for division,*^ a n d  th e  net joint estate i s  
divided b e tw e e n  the parties# If t h e r e  is no 
a g re e m e n t u p o n  division, a l i q u i d a t o r  is appointed 
to /
1# This does n o t  apply to divorces granted on the grounds of i n c u r a b l e  insanity -Of# Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1938, 8 * 2 (2 ) ;  (however, s e e  now Divorce (Scotland) A c t ,  1976, s#1(2)(b); it appears that, given the more flexible approach to orders f o r  ^nanoial provision (a#5s-" *##* either party t o  the marriage m ay, at any time prior to d e c r e e  being granted, apply t o  t h e  oourt for any one or m ore of the following orders #**#"), special provision for insanity cases has been r e n d e r e d  unnecessary#)2# Hahlo, ibid#(p 3Cf) - 3# Hahlo, p ^ 8 #
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to effect tlie division, n o r m a lly  by public sale#
In effect, the order for forfeiture is carried 
out in conjunction with a division of the joint 
estate, with the result, as Professor Hahlo pointsAout , that there may be still an equal division, 
if the guilty spouse has contributed more than the 
innocent spouse, since the guilty spouse then 
forfeits nothing* (The guilty, but not the innocent, 
spouse must forfeit benefits derived from the 
marriage)* (A normal division of joint property 
pays no regard to contribution, which is the beauty 
of the scheme, and solves the problem of arguments 
as to criteria to be adopted in the assessment ofpcontributions in cash and kind , and would answer 
grievances (at least of the 'non-eaming spouse ', 
the property being joint) if no such assessment were 
attempted"^ ) ^ An clement of mathematical calculation 
will be involved, therefore, in advising the plaintiff^^* 
However, the court retains a discretion as to the 
amount which the guilty spouse must forfeit, or may 
order a particular res to be forfeited to the 
plaintiff^* Here, too, a liquidator may be appointed*
Where the marriage is out of oomunity, in the 
absence of a forfeiture order sought and (necessarily) 
granted, each spouse taîces his/her own separate 
estate including any provisions due to him/her under 
the ante-nuptial contract* If a forfeiture order 
exists, the defendant must restore all benefits 
received and property given (to the defendant by the 
plaintiff), and forfeits benefits and property yet 
to /
1* P*430*2* Of# English, Australian and Hew 0aaland Systems, Chapter 6 infra and Chapter 7*3* Of* Scotti'iïï'""'Systom, Chapter 5(1)*4# See Gribson, p*130*5# Hahlo, p*430
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/ït o  come to him/her in terms of the marriage-oontract # 
According to Hahlo, the convorae applies, and the 
defendant may r e o o v e r  any property made o v e r  by  
defendant to plaintiff in the ante-nuptial contract*
"In the result, I f  there have been r e c i p r o c a l  
iettlementa, the plaintiff recovers t h e  excess in 
value of his settlements over those made in his 
favour by the d e fe n d a n t#  This is in accordance 
w i th  the rule o f  modern law that the defendant may
not be penalised beyond the actual financial benefits
which h e  has derived fro m  the marriage#,"^
Although divorce ie  held t o  put an end  to  "the 
reciprocal duty o f  support" which e x i s t e d  during 
marriage, there i s  provision  in  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  A ffairs  
A c t ,  1953, f o r  the court to make a maintenance order 
a g a i n s t  the g u i l t y  spouse i n  favour o f  t h e  innocent 
spouse* Such an order may be varied , rescinded or 
suspended on good cause shown.^  *
The diligence of the fo rm e r  w ife  in augmenting 
her income is not in i t s e l f  good cause for variation,w'l  ... ^  *
nor i s  the plea by the h u sb a n d  that his com m itm ents 
in respect of a new wife and family render him less 
able to pay t h e  order in r e s p e c t  of the first marriage* 
A t t i t u d e s  ( a s  s o f t e n e d  by experience and practical 
considerations) seem  similar to those found in 
Scotland* "As a r u l e ,  the c o u r t s  a r e  not very 
sympathetic /
1 , Gibson n o t e s  that the injured party may claim 
a l s o  the return o f  any pre-marriage or 'during marriage* (p re s u m a b ly  allowable) g i f t s  made to the defendant*2. p*435 (4th edn*, p*440)* The plaintiff, by choosinga forfeiture order, elects restitutio in integrum* Contrast effect of a forfeiture order on a'marriage in community, aupa^ a , w h ich  does n o t  seem tobe i n  accordanoewith the second sentence of the quotation here, but perhaps the explanation liesrn the g e n e r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  approach t o  property, 
m a r r ia g e  and division*3 *  8*10* See G ibson, p*151*
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s y m p a th e t ic  to the case of the second wife* T h e i r  
attitude la that t h e  h u sb a n d  must not feather his 
se o o n d  n e s t  a t  t h e  e x p e n se  o f  h i s  f i r s t  w i f e  a d d  
family* However, as often as not, t h e  c o u r t s  have 
in practice no choice but to effect some reduction*
H ot m any men c a n  p r o v id e  a d e q u a te ly  f o r  tw o f a m i l i e s * ”^
I f  not p r e v i o u s l y  terminated i n  te rm s  of the 
o r d e r ,  the obligation to pay m a in te n a n c e  ceases 
upon t h e  death o r  remarriage of the payee* It i s  
possible that the p a y e r 's  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  after h i s  
d e a t h  may b e  under o b l i g a t i o n  to c o n t in u e  p a y m e n t, 
e s p e c i a l l y  w h e re  t h e  court o r d e r  w as b a s e d  upon an 
a g re e m e n t b e tw e e n  p a r t i e s ,  i n  te rm s  n o t  e x p r e s s ly  
d e n y in g  that point, but also i n  th e  absence of s u c h  
a g re e m e n t ( t h e  A c t b e in g  s i l e n t  on  th e  m a t t e r ) ,  
a l th o u g h  H a h lo  p o i n t s  o u t  t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  c o n se q u e n c e  
t h a t  a  d iv o r c e d  w ife  ( a  w i f e  who h a s  d iv o r c e d )  i s  
t h e n  i n  a b e t t e r  position t h a n  a  widoxf, f o r  i n  South 
A f r i c a  a r i g h t  o f  aliment out of t h e  e s t a t e  is 
( o th e r w i s e )  unknow n*^
T h e re  i s  no judicial pow er to make a n  e q u i t a b l e  
a r ra n g e m e n t w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  u s e  and occupation of 
t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  home after divorce; If marriage i s  
o u t  of com m unity , it w i l l  revert to the sp o u s e  i n  
whose name t h e  l e a s e  o r  title stands, and if t h e  
m a r r ia g e  i s  i n  com m unity , end  t h e  home i s  p a r t  o f  
t h e  joint e s t a t e ,  th e n  it i s  dealt w i th  i n  accordance 
with t h e  r u l e s  governing d i v i s i o n  o f  j o i n t  e s t a t e  on  
d iv o r c e *  W h ile  t h e  m a r r ia g e  s u b s i s t s ,  e a c h  sp o u se  
h a s  a  r i g h t  o f  o c c u p a t io n ,  an d  p e n d in g  t h e  outcom e 
of t h e  divorce action, t h e  c o u r t  may by o r d e r  
r e g u l a t e  /
1* H a h lo , p*44G*
2 .  H a h lo , p#447  (a n d  3 2 3 )
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1r e g u l& te  t h e  o c c u p a t io n  o f  t h e  home «
PThe Property O onseouencec  o f  D e a th
W here th e  m a r r i a g e  l a  i n  oom m im ity , t h e  
c o m m m lty , e x c e p t  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c im a ta n c e a ,^  i s  
d i s s o l v e d  b y  d e a t h #  A n t e - n u p t i a l  d e b t s ,  n o t  p a id  
d u r in g  t h e  a u b a ia te n o e  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e  ( d u r in g  
m a r r ia g e  a  d u e  c h a r g e  o n  t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e ,  t o  b e  
p a i d  b y  t h e  h u s b a n d  a s  a d m i n i s t r a t o r ,  w h a t e v e r  
t h e i r  o r i g i n  a n d  b y  e i t h e r  p a r t n e r  in o u r r e d ^ ) m u e t  
b e  p a i d ,  t h e  p a y e r  b e in g  e n t i t l e d  t o  c la im  h a l f  t h e  
p r i c e  o f  t h e  d e b t  f ro m  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e 's  e s t a t e ,  
th o u g h  t h e  fo rm e r  i n c u r r e d  th e  d e b t ^ #  F o r  d e b t s  
i n c u r r e d  s t a n t g  m a t r i m o n i o # t h e  h u s b a n d  o r  h i s  
e s t a t e  i s  f u l l y  l i a b l e  t o  c r e d i t o r s ,  ( th o u g h  th e  
h u sb a n d  h a s  a  r i g h t  o f  r e c o u r s e  a g a i n s t  t h e  w i f e )  
and  t h e  w i f e  o r  h e r  e s t a t e  may b e  s u e d  o n ly  t o  
t h e  e x t e n t  o f  a  o n e - h a l f  s h a r e ^ ,  a n d  n o t  a t  a l l  
( e x c e p t  a s  r e g a r d s  d e b ts  i n c u r r e d  b y  h e r  w i th  c o n s e n t  
o f  /
1# H ah lo  ( 4 t h  e d n # ) p#435#
2 #  S e e  G ib s o n , p p # 1 2 1 - 1 2 3 #  S e e  a l s o  H a h lo , O h a p t e r  
15 ( " T e r m in a t io n  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t y " ) *
5 .  i n f r a  ( " p a c ta  s u c c e s s o r i a " )4* m o ,  p#223$
5 *  H a h l o  ( p p * 2 4 6 - 7 )  e x p l a i n s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  som ew hat 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p o i n t  a n d  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  m a y  b e  t h a t  su c h  d e b t s  I a t  t e r m i n a t i o n ,  t r u l y  r e v e r t  t o  t h e  s p o u s e  w h o  i n c u r r e d  t h e m ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  a n d  w ith o u t  b a d  f e e l in g #  th e y  a r e  m et o u t  o f  t h e  j o i n t  
e s t a t e ,  a s  t h e y  w o u ld  h av e  b e e n  i f  p a id  b e f o r e  t e r m i n a t i o n .  I n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  
' e x t e r n a l *  a s p e c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t o r  m a y  c l a i m  o n ly  fro m  t h e  p a r t y  who in c u r r e d T th e  d e b t#  (G ib s o n , P .I H I ) #6 # Upon th e  h u s b a n d 's  d e a t h ,  h i s  e s t a t e  i s  l i a b l e  f o r  th e  d e b t  a n d  o n ly  i f  i t  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s a t i s f y  
t h e  d e b t  c a n  t h e  w i d o w  b e  su e d  f o r  h e r  h a l f  s h a r e .  (G ib s o n , i b i d * ) #  I n  f a c t ,  i n  m o d e r n  t i m e s ,  c l a i m s  m u st b e  l o S g e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e  a n d  a r e  
p a i d  b y  t h e  e x e c u t o r ;  o n ly  i f  t h e  h u s b a n d  i s  t h e  
s u r v i v o r  c a n  t h e  s u r v i v o r  b e  s u e d  p e r s o n a l ly *  B y  
I n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  t e x t ,  i t  i s  n o r m a l  t o  l o d g e  t h e  
c l a i m  w i th  t h e  e x e c u t o r #
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of her husband or as a trader^) if she elects to 
re n o u n c e  on her husband's death her interest i n  
the community# On the assumption that the joint 
estate is solvent (if it is not, it should be 
surrendered by the executor, or he may "realise and 
distribute it as if he were the trustee in an 
insolvent estate, subject to the right of the 
creditors to sequestrate the estate"^), the balance 
is divided b e tw e e n  surviving sp o u s e  and "successors" 
of deceased# The latter category varies in 
composition according to whether the deceased died 
testate or intestate#
If t h e  predeceaser died intestate, half of his 
estate (that is, one quarter of the joint estate) 
falls to his heirs on intestacy, "the surviving 
spouse receiving a préférant share which varies 
according as the deceased leaves descendants or 
n o t" # ^
If he d ie d  testate (leaving a will, without 
other deeds of a testamentary nature, such as a 
marriage-contract with testamentary provisions or 
a mutual will), the will will rule# If he has 
purported to dispose of his wife’s share in the 
joint estate, or part thereof, the survivor must 
decide whether to insist on retention of h e r  c m  
property or to take her benefit under the will# 
M a t te r s  may be complicated by the provisions of a 
mutual /
1» If sh e  has pledged her own credit (as a public trader, for example), she may be sued in full, and t h e n  she may have r e c o u r s e  against the husband# The starting-point is that "As a r u l e ,  postnuptial debts bind b o th  spouses personally and have to be paid out of t h e  joint estate" (Hahlo, p#244)#2# Gibson, p.122#3# G ibson, ib id *
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m u tu a l  w i l l  w h ic h  may p r o v id e  f o r  ^ogdelho;ude$^pGh^p * 
a  c o n t in u in g  oom m im lty beW eom  s u r v i v i n g  sp o u s e  
a n d  o h i ld r e u *  h u t  G lh ao n  rem m rke t h a t  t h l a  I n t e n t i o n  
m uet h e  made v e r y  c lem *  " f o r  t h e  i^ahole eohem e o f  
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  e e tm te o  I n  S o u th  A f r i c a  1# 
a g a i n s t  t h a t
W here m a r r ia g e  w w  o u t  o f  oom m m ilty , t h e  
e e t a t e e  o f  e u r v lv o r  m d  p r e d e o e m e r  re m a in  e e p a r a to  
I n  p r o p e r t y ,  e n d  I n  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  d e h te *  B ln o e ,  a e  
n o t e d ,  t h e r e  l a  j o i n t  m d  a e v o r& l l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
W u a o h o ld  d e h to ,  h u t  t h e  w i f e  i n  # i e  g e n e r a l  o e a e  
h a s  r e o o u r e o  a g a i n s t  h e r  h u eh an d  i n  r e a p e o t  o f  
d o h t e ,  a  widow o b l ig e d  t o  p a y  ouoh a  d e b t  h a s  
re o o w B o  o g o in o t  h e r  h u e h w d * #  e s t a t e  th e r e f o r # '^
Any i m f u l f i l l e d  p r o v le lo n a  i n  th e  m a r r la B e ^ o o n tr a o t  
( h e n e f i t i n g  l e o e a o o l 'a  e e t a t e  o r  e w v l v o r )  $ o y  h e  
e n fo ro e d #
T h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  e s t a t e  l e  d i v i d e d ,  a s  t h e  c a s e  
may h e ,  a o o o rd ln g  t o  t h e  r u l e s  o f  I n t e e t a o y ,  " th e  
m r v i v i n g  epo im e o h t a l n i n g  a  p r é f é r a n t  S h a re "  o r  
I n  a o o o rd a n o e  w i t h  t h e  t e m ^  o f  t h e  s o l e  w i l l ,  m u tu a l 
w i l l ,  o r  te e tm m o n to ry  m a r r ia g e ^ ^ o o n tra o t  p r o v i e i o n e ,  
G ih a o n  d o e s  n o t  Im d io a to  e x t e n t  o f  te e ta m m ita r y  
f r e e d o m , h u t  d o e s  m ot e u g g o e t t h a t  i t  i s  f e t t e r e d  Im 
a n y  w@y a t  a l l ,  evem  o n  t h e  E m g lleh  m odel#  The 
t e x t  im  a i l e m t  om t h e  m a t t e r  a t  t h a t  p o i n t ,
$W)8 0 # e m t l y , ^  a f t e r  m otim g t h e  g r a d u a l  o h o l i t io m
i n  /
1# G ihaom , p#12g#  H ah lo  a l s o  ( p p #2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ) (a n de e e  a l s o  m apra )  m o te s  t h e  r a r i t y  o foom tim uim g o o m m m ity ,
2* G ihsom , B #i23#3# G lhaom , I b id #4# A t p * Ê / g u R m ^ t e r  XXIV: s u o o e m io m ) Bee a l s o  H a h lo ,  p$325  "T h e re  l a  mo l e g i t i m a t e  p o r t i o n  o r  w id o w 's  s h a r e  im  o u r  la w , g u a ra m te e lm g  t h e  
o u rv iv lm g  # o u e e  o g a im e t d ie l z ^ e r l t e m o e " #
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in the South African' province a of the Homan notion 
of légitima portio » and making the proviso that a 
disinherited child (hut not a widow?^ ) has a claim 
for support,, superior to those of "beneficiaries 
under the will for their provisions,, he states that 
i n  South Africa "there is today complete freedom of 
testamentary disposition*"
Property Eights Arising From# and During# Marriage
Certain rules in respect o f  m a r r ia g e  in South 
Africa are variable b y  th e  parties, and certain rules 
are non-variable^#
The category of "invariable consequences" contains 
rules /
In intestacy, t h e  widow seem s well pnrvided* In community, in tetestacy, she appears to 'sweep the board* (as occurs i n  Scotland in smaller intestate estates: S u c c e s s io n  (Scotland) Act, 1964, as amended) In community, even where h e r  h u s b a n d 's  will is u n f a v o u r a b le ,  s h e  i s  assured of a better division than the wife living u n d e r  t h e  sy s te m s  of separation which are both brusque and u n s t r u c tu r e d #  Out of community (a 'structured* separation of property s y s te m )  perhaps t h e  philosophy, i s  that sh e  had every opportunity and h e lp  to arrange matters as she wished* T h ese  thoughts tend to u n d e r l i n e  t h e  v iew  that the legal rights and discretionary awards systems of Scotland and England are a belated equalisation attempt, and that their purpose could be effected with greater neatness and certainty* I n  many ways, the candid "joint division (take out what is put in, with help to the non-earner) or specific detailed thoughtful individual arrangement" approach is preferable to the blunt, haphazard effects of separation, a m e l io r a te d  p ie c e m e a l  by many pieces o f  modem legislation, l i n k e d  to no sy s te m  but that of judicial d i s c r e t i o n  and good intention#See Australia, Hew Zealand, England*Hahlo, Part 111 ( "The Legal O onse qu eu e  e s  o f  Marriage")*
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rules which would be expected, namely, the automatic 
change of status of the parties upon marriage and 
the incidents flowing therefrom (such as prohibition 
of marriage with another person d u r in g  the subsistence 
of the first marriage), the status of children b o m  
during or before the marriage, a n d , more controveraially, 
the privilege of the husband to have "the decisive 
say in all matters concerning the common l i f e  of the 
spouses" This i s  a  power which the s p o u s e s  cannot 
exclude by antenuptial contract, and by virtue o f  
w h ic h  th e  husband has the ri#Lt to decide where the 
matrimonial home is to be, and to set t h e  s t y l e  o f  
llfe^# It w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  that b e f o r e  t h e  abolition 
o f  th e  jus adminibtrationl s  b y  t h e  Harried Womens 
Property (Scotland) A c t ,  1920, only the c u r a t o r i a l  
p o w er was subject to e x c lu s io n  b y  p a r t i e s '  c o n t r a c t , 
and t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  h u sb a n d  a s  head of 
the family was not subject to such exclusion^# 3o 
it seem s t o  be still in South Africa, b u t  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  
power must b e  e x e r c i s e d  reasonably# Indeed, i t s  
e x e r c i s e  i s  c o n f in e d  b y  the re m e d ie s  w h ic h  the law 
g iv e s  t o  th e  wife if the husband i s  extravagant (h e  
may be "interdicted as a p r o d i g a l " )  o r  mean (allo'tiing 
her /
1# Op ♦cit.# # p*105 *
2 # LordPraser would recognise t h e s e  p o w e rs, as 
t o e  t o  t h e  S o o ts  o p a t  e t  w i n o w a  | a l l i a e tan d  rndeed, in Boots T aw , they atili e a W ,  though it seems rather b y  acceptance than b y  proud proclamation. As to standard of life,see Chapter 4 , and as to matrimonialhome, Chapter 4 , pp*353*364 (and Chapter "Location of Matrimonial Home"); of* Scottish Law Commission Memo Ho# 41, 0*18. and s.l . c .Memo.No.5 4, 
3# O f# p # 5 5 . 9 . 1 - 9 . 4 .
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M r  W  m e  h im  f o r  o r  fo im d ln g  ^
« M < m  o f  j u d l o l e l  m p a m t lo ic ) #  t h e  h m e s t  
a W W a ie n  o f  #%0 m d ,a tm e e  o f  t h e  p w e r
r e f l e o t o  w  e l d e r  v ie w  o f  t h e  r o  
% e  em m e l a  < m r r m # y  fm M ,0aab .w - I n  B rltm lm  
m d  Im w e t h e r  a o m m e t l im ,
% h l o  # # m  t h a t  " t h e r e  e m m t  W  e m l l y  
w  tÈne m  c# lm lem  W
2#
Tt le  not o low  wliethor mwh w  w  ocmpetent (hw.1% oo3iehlMMom (no*;’L'X>1ï!bm4 -  QÜ'; ô L ap k ^ r  ^ /#Infcro/ioo of tku (p#1D9) la  #%at aw% e%a o tlw  1*) oonpoto'it, ;^lhew,y: W&etWrWu) L'%'riu{',<' in vr <^ rL of voy.mun)ity$ am undort:d;lrx< b:/ t*(o 7iusTxmù to to W# wife a uf/oMly or ixomthly owit r'O houn#eepl%  alLüt-r^oo i'/ umcmforcovLln# Whilethe I duty in to perform Mr trm&itralo ia  Zj:TOa!:.,lKk!: the iuoklmg after(dfO o f  T ;u  narrisr/.;^" m g ^ Weaiimd iMOf; to pX',,poit tbn 3t\)r#eWM I f  tW hmh tfO do  uo% T M  d r U ; 4 1 #  (pp#uuO'i init b>; to, tko that Where t3v)d i s  tno lavhe m%y lo o k  #  t h e  w i f e 'Z'D''"* 3t\/Â7)f;n (05Jf!mpt f w t  bt.3 COr:W01 big L%t T.otriwiAlfTl Affolrn /'ot# 1953# u#Z) for support u octa;'' onforoo elfdri üiu wife*jui \?ife rî:%r:'7)lo<\ vvt of noe;;ibly weai th \;  dV>:y 1>5 T.Ofï' ILf; fviKiCQ %y.ybrd)v t o  Ai,.t,dnt,''io hlf-solt he?Ui':('%oM.$ bhouf^ :: theoion/7 ov::';.o7i If.TJ oMnxnWor bqe boom pU'Mleâ by the iîi'iwod%?.otiem w' rt,*k(%Wr2^  t# Wr e l # W 0 0 d  b y  M #  1%^ i \ i r r w t  w  h o u n e h o U  4 A W  puld %y hw* %0 olAl'îaLlem e f  i'ho wifeynavricd m&t $f (wâlm a oiWotlom %Zwrou \ifh  no tim eiV ' ## # . #  in *';0'\ro ho'-1 'n& in  'lot IM lgW :) to oohtriWeë la  imo3.%)ar# hat I f  I t  I t  to W%u>ouform#l# (p##i1&4i5) Bee #ee#%eh poeltlw #  obaptm;* 4D if f e r m c 'U ' %io I n  e f  ex p rem t
iTO'hupB At 4 iU jT i)) % t ? : w  "ij
o ip Y e  o f  n o x u a l
I m e r o m in ^ iy  on  I w  W fe rm #Lmr CrPU.ileQlemj; W@#* W w w w :- .....................  . :r - ■ ■ I........- - ■ I «^*9$ ^# * 1 3  i % h  W u * (p * lY ) "*.## m  i t  i a  m #  e w e '  t o  h:'iW  %U0 0 # W Ü W  W  t M  %
P* I V #
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l e m t  p e rh a p s  t h e r e  A o u M  b e  w a to h es*
o r  a  d i v i s i o n  o f  r e o p o w l b l l l t l e B *  m â  l a  som e
l e g a l  o y a to m o , Im d eo d , t h e r e  h w  b e e n  a  w h o le h e a r te d  
a t t e m p t  t o  make i m r k A l o  a  "tw o  oaptmlmm" re g im e ^ *
f lo w s  fro m  m m W & m a
"Bpoim eo a r e  um dor a  d u t y  t o  l i v e  t o g e t h e r ,  
t o  a f f o r d  o a A  o t h e r  t h e  m a r i t a l  p r l v l l e g o B ,  m id 
t o  b e  f a l # : O i l  t o  o ao h  o th o r$  t h e  h tm b an d  l a
w i th  a  homo#Ide h i e  w if e  ll 
w if e #  t o  l i v e  l a  I t  o m  b e  s e w  t h a t  t h i s
v ie w  o f  m a r r ia g e  l a  Im  w x p a th y  w i t h  t h e  B o o ts  
o o a o e p t  o f  m a rr lm se #  m â  (Im  # m e r e l  m d  a t  p re a e m t)  
t h e  d u ty  o f  M h e r m o #  a n d  a l lm e a t#
i n  B o u th  A f$ lo a #  t h e r e  l a  a  d u t^  o n  e a c h  t o  
support the other^# a duty depeadlug <m olrowmtaaeea 
h u t  fal3.1m@ m ore o f t e n  upom t h e  M m bend t h a n  % )oa 
the wife end the "support" to he 
jmolAide a ll thlmga reaawahly to M 
meoeeeitlw of life-# and porMpe luxurlee# for the 
w ife #  a n d  t h e  e m t e  o f  l l t l g a t l x m  h ro u # L t b y  o r  
e g a ia m t h e r#  Im o lu d ln # #  a t  l e a s t  I n  H a h lo * a  o p in io n #  
mon-o<meietorlal litigation^# muet he related to 
the parties' otmdard of llvi% * The manner of 
p r o v i d in g  s u p p o r t  i s  a m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  h u e h m d 'e  
dleoretiom* "jw long w  he éow not 
that 1$ humiliating or o#i03ewiee mweam>imhle# the 
wife has no eauae for oomplaint"^* I t may be that 
the wife mma a duty to aoooimt to her hwbmWL forÆthe m m a g e m m t o f  the houeAeeplmg allwamo^ # I f
i f  Bee# e#g*2# H ah lo #  p#105#3* Bee# f o r  so o tla m d #  M*W*P# (B o*) A c t#  1$20#  e#4# O h a p te r  4#  Memo# Mo#22# 2*12(? ro p n # 2 )$  F a o a l t y  H eap o w e#  pp*^ir^*
g# P*109* Bee a i e o  G iW on#6* À0  t o  w i f e ' s  " a g o w y  o f  r e ô e e e i '^ "  andg e n e r a l  a u th o r i '%  i n  r e e p o o t  o f  n e o e a e i t l e e #  s e e  P $3 9 /4 0 #  m d  E A lo #  p*110  ( i ^ r a ) |  
seem s a i m i l a r  w  # B tw hlA  app3.1ea a t preeeat In Bootland^
710
t h e  h im band  p r o v id e s  m iA  a n  m llow em oe, e n d  I f  t h e  
m a r r ia g e  l e  o u t  o f  oo:egmmid.ty# e a v ln g a  b e lo n g  t o  
t h e  huohgm d, im le s e  h e  1$ sh o im  t o  h o v e  g iv e n  t h e  
am rln g e*  e x p r e s s l y  o r  b y  im p lio a t le m #  t o  h e r#  I f  
t h e r e  l a  oom m m ilty# e a v ln g e  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  jo l& t  
e s t a t e *
Though t h e  t i t l e  t o  t h e  m a tr lm o a i.a l  home 
a to a d  i n  n a $ o  o f  t h e  h u e h a n d , h e  oanm ot e j e c t  t h e  
w i f e  w i th o u t  p r o v i d l %  m o H k o r r o o f  o v e r  h e r  h e ad *  
D i f f e r e n t  t h i n k i n g  p r e v a l l a  fro m  t h e  " s tr& m g e re"  
approm oh i # i o h  a P P H e o  i n  B o o tla n d ^ #  a n d  w h ich  l a  
now t h e  e u h j e o t  o f  o r i t l o l i m ^ #  R a th e r  a r e  " t h e  m e r i t s  
o f  t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  d i a p u t e  r e l e v a n t ^ *  H ow ever# t h e  
h u e b w d  a d m l n i o t r a t o r  I f  m a r r ie d  I n  o o m m m ity  
m d  q u a  ow ner i f  m a r r i e d  o u t  o f  o o m m in ity  ( t h o u #  
t h e  i f i f e  may b e  ow ner o f  t h e  h o u s e )  'a l l o c a t e  
o r  h y p o t h e c a t e '  t h e  home w i th o u t  t h e  w i f e ' s  k w w le d g e  
o r  /
1# Bee Maelmre v M* 1911 B#0#200 and Millar v* H*1 $ 4 0  B*G#5S# H ow ever * a s  w as p o lm te d  o u t  l a  MaoImM# t h e  p a t r i m o n i a l  ( o r ,  I n  t h a t  o a e e #  l e a s e )  a e p e o t  o f  t h e  q n e e t i e n  wee t o  W  d le tim g u iO h e d  
fro m  1 ^ 0  m a tr im o n ia l#  o r  a l i m e n t ,  a e p e o t*  E e n o e , t h e  w if e  e o u ld  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c o m p la in  i f  i t  p ro v e d  
t h a t  (b y  v i r t u e  o f  h i e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a r re n g e m e n te )  t h e  3m$Samd w m  n o t  a f f o r d i n g  h e r  a d e q u a te  s u p p o r t*  M o re isv er, w h ere  t h e  m a r r i a ^  i e  o u t  o f  o o m m m lty , a p a r t  fro m  t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  home r u l e #  ""Wie h n e h a n d  h a e  n o  h o t t e r  r i g h t  t o  o e e n p y  h i e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r t y  th a n  m y  s t r a n g e r ,  o r  v i c e  v e r s a * "
(E # 3 x > , p * m 5 )*2#  B e o t t i e h  Law G om m ieelen , M m o* M o * 4 l, "O oonprncy  R ig h t s  i n  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  Home an d  D om eotio  Violeme", Propn*1: "a epowe who no p o e e e e e o ry  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  home (e# g #  a s  0%mw o r  t e n a n t )  e W n ld  b e  g iv e n  a  p e r s o n a l  t o  o c c u p y  t h e  home e n f o r o o A l e  a g a i n s t  t h é  e p o u ee  who h a s  m o h  p o a e e e a o ry  r i g h t s ,  a n d  s h o u ld  n o  lo n g e r  h e  t r e a t e d  b y  le w  a s  a  m ere  p r e e a r io n a  p o s s e s s o r " *  see now 1981  Act.
3 ,  A p h r a s e  n e e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  w lfe -o i ;m e r 'o  " r i # t "  t o  e j o o t  h h e  hueband*  As H a h lo  m o te o , t h e r e  i s  no  A m e r io w ^ s tv le  "h o m ea te ad  lo g ie la t io n ^ !
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or ooraoixt ’* Buoh 'matrimonial* rights as there 
are in the home for the spouse in whose name the 
title o r  th e  lease does not stand, do not p r e v a i l  
against third parties K
With regard to inter-spou.se litigation concerning 
money o r  property, spouses married out of com m unity 
may sue e a c h  other in contract o r  d e l i c t *  or with 
regard to property* or apply for the other's 
sequestration# I n  marriages in com m unity* there 
i s  o n ly  one e s t a t e *  h u t  s in c e  th e  w if e  h a s  h e r  
earnings and savings protected hy t h e  Matrimonial 
Affairs A ct* 1953# 8*2* sh e  may sue i n  order t o  
protect that property from the husband's interference 
(and he*  as noted earlier* if i n  need, may sue to 
compel h e r  to support him and the household out of 
that protected property)# Bo too, she may su e  i f  
h e  w i l l  not s u p p o r t  h e r  out o f  the j o i n t  estate#
As at 1975$ spouses m a r r ie d  in community could not 
sue e a c h  o t h e r  i n  delict, (and see f u r t h e r  i n f r a ') .
While t h e  m a r r ia g e  subsists, prescription is 
suspended#
There is one invariable consequence of marriage 
w h ic h  is unknow n in Scotland* and  t h a t  is the 
prohibition of donations b e tw ee n  spouses stent® 
matrimonio (a prohibition s tem m in g , a c c o r d in g  to 
Hahlo, from Roman Law* and with the aim* n o t  so much 
of p r o t e c t i n g  c r e d i t o r s ,  but lest married persons 
b e  /
!.. H ah lo  c o n t r a s t s  E n g l i s h  H a t r im o n ia l  Homes A ct*1967 ( a s  now amended by  the Domestic Violence and M a tr im o n ia l  P r o c e e d in g s  Act* 1976)* Bee 
i n f r a *
712
be "kissed o r  oureed out of their m oney”^ )#  The 
prohibition comes to an end only upon dissolution 
of the marriage by death or divorce, (not by 
judicial or voluntary s e p a r a t i o n )  but donations 
m o r t i s  causa and divortii causa are competent^, 
provided that in the latter case the divorce i s  
im m inen t#  A prohibited donation may become 
c o n f irm e d  b y  t h e  donor having died without changing 
h i s  mind upon the matter* or b y  e x p r e s s  confiriiation 
in his will* and  if so it receives v a l i d i t y  
r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  fro m  t h e  date on w h ic h  i t  w as m ade*^
Where t h e r e  i s  an  " i n  community" m a r r ia g e  * the
general lack of separate p r o p e r t y  m akes the giving 
of g i f t s  d i f f i c u l t , ^  and it is in the many " o u t  of 
com m unity" marriages t h a t  the rule m o st often arises#
The spouses may contract w ith  each other* but may 
not make donations inter se #  "The p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  
donations b e tw e e n  spouses e x te n d s  to every t r a n s a c t i o n *  
whatever i t s  fo rm  o r  character* b y  which one of the 
sp o u se s*  gratuitously and s o le ly *  or at l e a s t ,  mainly* 
out of m o tiv e s  of l i b e r a l i t y ,  confers a n  economic 
b e n e f i t  upon the other spouse* w i th  the r e s u l t  that 
the giver becom es poorer and the receiver richer"^#
This i s  a w id e  definition, and would comprehend 
many /
1 # Hahlo * 0 c h o sen *  English-inspired quotation* p*125# Of# i n  Scotland, (except that the aim was to protect third parties rather t h a n  the donor spouse) j u d i c i a l  ratification of d e e d s  made b y  wives, i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  ( a  s a f e g u a r d  t o  a  t h i r d  party who adopted the deeds, against t h e  p l e a  that the w if e  had executed it u n d e r  fear of h e r  husband, which plea could not then (on adoption) be stated, Fraser, H usband and Wife,1,819 £t seq and supra#
2.3. As to the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i n  w h ic h  t h i s  may* or may n o t*  h appen*  s e e  H ahlo*  p p * 1 4 3 -6 ; G ibson*  pp* 
99 -100#4# b u t  a purported severance of goods or renunciation o f  r i g h t s  in the community would be a p r o h i b i t e d  donation(Hahlo, p#124)* (Only ante-nuptial marriage contracts are allowed since t h e  abolition o f  the use o f  post-nuptial contracts in Hatal In 1956#Bee i n f r a ) *5# H a h lo ,  p#124*
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many actions and transactions * including releasing 
or taking o v e r  t h e , ; o t h e r d e b t »  and abandonment 
o f  f a v o u r a b le  r i g h t s  u n d e r  a  m arria g e « "C o n tra o t#
" S a le s "  b e tw e e n  spouses where no p r i c e ,  o r  an  
i l l u s o r y  price, is paid, are p r o h i b i t e d  dohatiqns, 
o r  the d i f f e r e n c e  between the sale p r i c e  and the 
t r u e  v a lu e  is a p r o h i b i t e d  donation# Bo also are 
arrangements which use the intermediary o f  a trustee 
to confer benefit on the other spouse#
It appears from the l i s t  of " E x c e p tio n s  and  
quasl^ezceptions" that some degree o f  hair-splitting, 
careful definition end qualification, is employed i n  
order t o  e x c lu d e  a benefit from the category of 
donation# F o r  e x a m p le, the g iv in g  o f  a donation 
r e q u i r e s ,  i t  s e e m s , the parting w ith  an a s s e t  and  
so gratuitous work undertaken for t h e  other i s  not 
a donation# Similarly, if.the donor does n o t  become 
poorer ( a s  by donating a res aliéna) and/or the donee 
does not become richer (as by giving the donation to 
charity o r  t o  help indigent r e l a t i o n s )  or even, it 
appears, where the fee of the gift, as i t  were, is 
to go to a child of the marriage on the death of the 
donee, a prohibited donation does not result^# 
Prenuptial gifts (unless delivered after marriage 
through no fault o f  a t h i r d  party) are competent^# 
Harriage-settlements contained in antenuptial 
contracts ( a s  being '%n consideration of m a r r i a g e). 
are competent "irrespective o f  w h e th e r  payment or 
d e l i v e r y  is made before or during m a r r i a g e and 
though post-nuptial contracts are no l o n g e r  
p e r m i s s ib l e  In any part of B o u th  Africa, i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t ,  s t a n t e  m a tr im o n io # one te rm  o f  a  
m a r r ia g e  /
1# H a h lo , p .126 #  se q * p .is iS T
3 # hahlOf p.128, and s e e  4-, H ahlo, p#129*
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m a r r i a g e - o o n t r a o t  m ig h t b e  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  a n o th e r ,  
p r o v id e d  that the substitute was of approximately 
e q u iv a l e n t  v a lu e *  I f  n o t ,  t h e  d l f f e r e n o e  w ou ld  
am ount to a d o n a tio n #
W h ile  a wife may not give her husband the 
benefit o f  a l i f e  policy, he may so  benefit her^ *
A g a in , w here  g i f t s  a r e  m ade, n o t  o u t  o f  p u re  
desire to give th e m , but a s  an e q u iv a l e n t  o r
consideration for a gift made by the o t h e r  party^ 
or in r e m u n e r a t io n  o f  services rendered, they will 
be allowed, as they also will b e  i f  made for 
"business reasons", o r  where they w ere  wedding 
anniversary or birthday presents,^ o r  w e re  of 
small am ount (including the * d o n a tio n *  made by the 
h u sb a n d  i n  a l lo w in g  h i s  w i f e  t o  k e e p  s a v in g s  fro m  
th e  /
1# I n s u r a n c e  A ct*  Ho#g? of 1943$ ss#41-43 (cited by H a h lo , p*139)# Of# Scottish haw Oommiesion Eeport on the Harried Women *8 Policies of A s su ra n c e  (Scotland) Act 1880 (Scot# haw# Oom#No#52; Omnd#
7 2 4 5 , duly, 1 9 7 8 ) which recom m ends that th'# 1880 A c t b e  e x te n d e d  t o  p o l i c i e s  e f f e c t e d  b y  ;ÿ;; woman f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  of h e r  husband o r  children (and in d e e d  t o  those by f u t u r e  s p o u s e s  for futttra s p o u s e s  and c h i l d r e n  -  i n c l u d i n g  lllegitimata andadopted c h i l d r e n ) #  NOW M .¥ . ' s  P o l s . o f  Ass. (8c^ Act, 1980.2# "Eaoiprooal donations are unassailable in:'#b far a s  t h e y  are of approximately t h e  sam e va,luc" $
(H a h lo , p # 1 3 D #  ( R e c ip r o c a l  d o n a t io n s  b e  o f  a p p ro x im a te ly  t h e  same v a lu e "  H a h lo ,  '4 th  edn#P * 1 5 6 ; .
3# " p r o v id e d  th e y  do n o t  e x c e e d  t h e  b o u n d s o fmoderation, having r e g a r d  t o  the means and  s o c i a l  standing of t h e  p a r t i e s " #  (H a h lo, p#138)# A t least su c h  a r u l e  would p r e v e n t  in m o st c a s e s  the occurrence o f  p ro b le m s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  intention underlying t h e  g i f t  o f  very v a lu a b le  presents (for e x a m p le , o f  j e w e l l e r y )  d u r in g  m a r r i a g e ;  o f#  O h a p te r  1, pp#2 1 - 2 3  (the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y  and possible im m u n ity  from attachment b y  the d o n o r 's  creditors o f a paraphernal g i f t  made stmrtc m b gjw D lo ),
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the housekeeping money and ineluding also the use 
of f u r n i t u r e  and ears, and, depending on the 
eiroumatanees, t h e  other spouse's house)# "If 
it w e re  otherwise, spouses would he enoouragod to 
keep meticulous accoimts of their mutual dealings, 
to the detriment of t h e i r  relationship" "%ven 
taking into a c c o u n t  the numerous e x c e p t io n s  and 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  the prohibition seems at odds with 
the general conception of m a r r ia g e  an d  the behaviour 
o f  married persons# It has been seen t h a t  a  
monetary c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  working w i f e ,  m a r r ie d  
out of com m unity , is not e n f o r c e a b le  by action: 
neither c a n  any contribution she makes be struck 
at aa a p r o h i b i t e d  donation*^ (It i s  otherwise 
w h e re, w h e th e r  the marriage i s  i n  o r  out o f  com m unity , 
t h e  d u ty  o f  s u p p o r t  l i e s  on  t h e  w if e ) *
l i k e w i s e , a  r e a s o n a b le  h o u s e k e e p in g  a l lo w a n c e , 
and o rn a m e n ta l  g i f t s ,  su c h  as clothing and  jcMllery, 
made by t h e  husband and "induced b y  regard -foW his 
own p o s i t i o n  r a t h e r  th a n  b y  s h e e r  l i b e r a l i t y '* ^
(" D o n a tio n  r e q u i r e s  a donatory Intent", t h e  main, 
though n o t  necessarily the s o l e ,  m o tiv e  b e in g  
liberality or ' d i s i n t e r e s t e d  b e n e v o le n c e ' ^ )^  i n  order 
that s h e  be dressed " i n  accordance w i th  h i s  s t a n d in g " ^ ,  
a r e  /
1 .  H a h lo ,  p .1 3 3 *2. op.cit*, p*113* A t p*124, Professor H ah lo  suggests ï h a T B h e  'gift* to her husband by a w if e  m a r r ie d
i n  com m unity  o f  h e r  e a r n in g s  o r  s a v in g s  p r o t e c t e d  by the 1933 Act is n o t  a  prohibited donation, since (see p.* 188) the protected p r o p e r t y  re m a in s  community p r o p e r t y  (and c a n  be attached f o r  com m unity  debt)* Moreover (p*112) the w ife  i n  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  can be compelled to u s e  such p r o p e r t y  f o r  t h e  s u p p o r t  of the family*3* O p .c i t ,*  p * 1 3 2 . (a p h r a s e  omitted fro m  4 t h  edn*)*
'  .TS:f , % a p t e r  1 ,  p * 2 8  ( t h e  im p l ie d  p u rp o s e  o f  p in -m o n e y )  #4* Hahlo, p*130#3 ,  Of* " p in -m o n e y " , s u p r a * G h a p te r  1 ,  p p .2 ? -2 8 *
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mm mot wgwded aa prohibited êomtlon##
#ie genermi offe#$ boWeom % M  mpome$$ of 
a pmhlMtad éoœtiw la SB follow:#* ## comtmct 
of domatlw le voidable# at the imtmee of the 
dom or #  m y  tim o #  # o  m w  ly lm ^  u p o n  tW
revoking apow# to show # #  a prohibited domatiom 
h m  taken plm## Mowovw '*tho offaot of the 
prohibition on the trmefer delivery# oemelom or 
o t h e r  m ot b y  w h ic h  i f  ( # #  ê o n a t lo m )  '% ao  o m rr lo d  
out" he that 1$ is void or voidable# or valid 
h #  lowln# the # m r  wl# a elelm agaiast the donee 
for the e w l o W w t  glvm to the domee* All depen# 
m  the *3wl#lem% aaWre* of t M  m e t % A l o h  the 
dome # m  endow# with the hemefit#'^
With^ e^ eptlome pertmimlhg to life wewanoe 
p o l i o l w » ^  .p r e h l h i tM  d o m m tlo w  h a v e  mo e f f e c t  mpem 
the rl#:ta of the Oomor*e omdltor#* %e a general 
ale# the oreêltom have the mmo rights ogoimet the 
dome# mpwm which the dmw apowe wmM hove had# 
W d  /
1* B eh io #  p e ig g #  m d  s e e  g m e m l l y #if one j^ owe paya a debt which the other owe to a third party. latter mmt reggarê the &ebt m di^ #eher#&# hut the flMt apowo may m o w e r  fro m  t h e  e o ë m â  e p o w e  t h e  em otm t p a id *  2* $ 0 0  the epwinl prlvll##8 aooorded to life poliolem whether the m m w ie #  l a  Im or mit of oou'.îWîity# Mehle. OM#ter 2i#"Jhfj& her t h e  m w r i ^ e  l o  i n  b r  o u t  o f  oom m im ity# the msmital power Me boom ezoluded or the provlelom of the Imawamoe Aet# ae#27 of (w*99^ )^ "out ewoae the mormltli# proprietary rights emd . t i o m  o f  epo im oe#" (p * 3 lO )*  (B w  a l e e  Ae t o  l i f e  p o l i e i e e  i n  S o o t t l #
\ a l  j ^ o p w t y  I w " #  m e  pp*  210  e t  s ^ .  and248 2 I  s e q .
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1h a d  l i e  r e v o k e d  t h e  g i f t s *"  H e n c e ,  t h i s  x m u s u a l  
a n d  c o m p l e x  body  o f  r u l e s  m u s t  b e  s e e m  p r i m a r i l y  a s  
a  p r o p e r t y  r e g u l a t o r  ( o r  a  f u r t h e r  buttress o f  
t h e  /
Hahlo, p*141 (and see pp# 141-143), 9?hese rulesmust be applicable only to "out of community" marriages, Ihe nub of the matter seems to be that, i f  the donation is prohibited, (and if the antecedent act was a pure donation between spouses), the property in the gift does not pass, and hence a creditor of t h e  donor may attach the subject o f  donation in the hands o f  the donee. I f  omership has passed (as where the donation has c o n s i s t e d  o f  money, used by the donee to purchase a res from a t h i r d  party, which rea la delivered to the donee b y  t h e  third party - îTwhich ease the 'res becomes the d o n e e 's  property (Hahlo, p#139)), the donee may n o t  retain t h e  r e s  as against t h e  donor spouse or his c r e d i t o r s ,  aSS a personal claim b y  the creditors 
l i e s  against the donee for t h e  gift o r  I t s  value. W here th e  gift was o f  money, "the creditors may claim it fro m  the donee, i n  so far a s  t h e  latter is still enriched t h e r e b y " # (Hahlo, pp. 141-2),M o re o v e r , i f ,  where t h e r e  has been no ju d ic ia l  separation, the donor spouse i s  sequestrated, the esta te  o f b o th  spouses v e sts  in  the tru stee , who i s  e n t i t l e d  to reta in  such property acquired by the solvent donee from the donor, in  respect o f which the donee has no t i t l e  va lid  against the cred ito rs . Hence (see  above) property in  the g i f t  may not have passed t o  the donee, or i f  p r o p e r t y  has passed, the donee may have no  good t i t l e  against the creditors*  I f ,  however, f o r  example, t h e  donee has paid out o f  separate esta te  a "substantial portion o f t h e  price" , "the cred itors are confined to a personal action  against h e r  f o r  the sum donated, in  so f a r  a s  she i s  s t i l l  enriched th e r e b y * "  (Hahlo, p*142)# Where the g i f t  was o f money, the esta te  may claim against the donee " i n  respect of t h e  la tter*e  enrichment"* Contrast S co ttish  bankruptcy ru les as they a ffe c t  spouses, C h a p te r  2 (cruder and  le s s  d eta iled  than 
fo u n d  in  many systems -  of* p#153, fn#4) * I n  Scotland, donations between spouses are irrevocable  (subject to  the protection  o f cred itors by t h e  'sequestration  t-ith in  a y e a r  and a day* rule : seep.110 (M,W$?# (Sc#) Act, 1920,3.50* andalthough there i s  a presumption against donation, i t  operates le s s  strongly as b e tw e e n  husband and w ife , where " g ifts  are not u n l i k e l y "  (0*& W#, p*291)#
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the p rin cip le  of separation o f  property) a ffectin g  
those who have chosen the princip le o f separation  
t o  govern the property consequences o f  th e ir  
marriage
R u le s  W hich Hav Be Excluded by M a r r la g e - 0 o n t r a c t
PI h e  m arital power o f  the South African husband 
co n sists  o f the f a m i ly  headship, already noted, t h e  
power over the w ife 's  person, which includes 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f h e r  in  l i t ig a t io n ,  a n d , perhaps 
most important, t h e  power o v e r  the w ife 's  property.
Ihe power last-m entioned e x is ts  even i f  the marriage 
i s  o u t  o f community, u n l e s s  there has been exclusion  
of t h i s  aspect o f the m arital power# , ( I f  the 
marriage i s  i n  com m unity , t h e  husband administers 
the j o i n t  esta te)#  She power f i r s t - m e n t i o n e d  
(o f  the pat er f 8311 l ia s  ) c a n n o t  b e  excluded by paction  
(being one o f  t h e  "invariable c o n se q u e n c e s  o f marriage"), 
but the subsidiary or n a r ro w e r  powers over p e r s o n  
and property may be completely excluded, "giving the 
w ife the same p o sitio n  i n  law as i f  she were 
unmarried"#^
Professor Hahlo comments^ that "the m arital 
power /
1# though c o n ta in i n g  c o n s id e r a b le  sign ifican ce  and b e n e f i t  f o r  creditors* Unfettered i n t e r - s p o u s edonation may be a temptation for  the p arties  and a  share f o r  o u t s i d e r s  # A d eta iled  system of ru les upon donation i s  surely a proper partner of a regime o f s e p a r a t i o n  o f p r o p e r ty #  (See however o u t l i n e  o f  pre-1920 p r in c ip le s , 0* & W# PP*533-*337) when i n t e r - s p o u s e  donations were revocable, revealing features not u n l i k e  those found in  South A f r ic a n  law)*2# Of# Scots jus adm inietratlonjs; Hahlo him self (p*14?) liS ln s ‘*^ rF’W''fEellbman law jus m e r i t i *
3# p # 1 4 8 .4# ibid#
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power i s  not a neceaaary corollary of oom m unlty 
of property", and th a t, though oommunlty of 
property he excluded, the marital power may he 
l e f t  in  the huehand* Ihe important question for  
those of other leg a l systems to  ask i s  -  "Is i t  
p ossib le  t o  have a system of com m unity  o f property 
and of p ro fit  and lo ss  without vestin g  a marital 
power i n  e i t h e r  p a r t n e r ? "  "low are we to  provide 
f o r  two captains on the b r id g e  i n  a manner which 
w il l  e n s u r e  that the ship (ow ned b y  both in  equal 
shares) i s  steered sa fe ly  and e f f ic ie n t ly ,  and 
upon a course determined by agreement?"
Aa to the pow er over h e r  p e r s o n ,  one most 
im p o r ta n t  c o n se q u e n c e  thereof remaining today i s  
that the wife c a n n o t  e n t e r  into a contract without 
the husband's consent# On the o t h e r  hand, i f  the 
contract is one of em ploym en t, and if t h e  e m p lo y e r 
is w i l l i n g  to em ploy her without hex* h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s e n t, a court w ould  not b e  likely to interdict 
the e m p lo y e r fro m  taking the wife i n t o  employment# 
Under the Matrimonial Affairs Act, 1933, the wife's 
e a r n in g s  are safe from the hu sb an d #  IDhus, Hahlo 
concludes^, as in the case o f  wives m a r r ie d  out of 
com m un ity , the o n ly  "rem edy" for the husband m ig h t 
l i e  i n  the possibility that i f  the employment was 
such as to involve neglect o f  the f a m i ly ,  the wife's 
conduct might am ount to a  matrimonial offence^#
The r i g h t s  over p r o p e r t y  are far-reaching^#
The husband, by v irtu e  o f h is  m arital p o w e r , may 
enter in to  contracts pertaining to  the jo in t esta te  
(or t h e  w i f e ' s  separate e s ta te , i f  community, but 
not t h e  m arital power, has b e e n  e x c l u d e d ) , Without 
the /
1# See p#149*2* In t h e  4 t h  edn# (pp#134/155), Hahlo appears to t h i n k  t h i s  u n l ik e ly #3 ,  G ib so n , p p # 1 0 3 -1 0 8 ; H a h lo , p p # 1 5 0 /1 5 1 #
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the w i f e ' s  knowledge o r  eoneent, the husband may 
s e l l  the property o r  b u rd e n  i t  with debt, and in  
many instances the e f fe c ts  of these contracte, 
p a rticu lar ly  those concerning h eritab le property, 
may continue a fter  the d isso lu tion  o f the marriage, 
To a great ex ten t, the w ife 's  power of decision  
stante matrimonio i s  merged or submerged i n  his#
I t  follow s that a w ife , whose husband enjoys 
the m arital p o w e r , cannot contract gen erally , o r  
s e l l  o r  b u rd e n  property, n o r ,  without her husband's 
w r i t t e n  consent, become i n t e r  a lia  a t r u s t e e  in  
bankruptcy or a company d irector (though, having 
obtained h is  consent, sh e  may act th ereafter in  su c h  
capacity without the need to  obtain h i s  consent for  
each transaction  involved i n  the carrying o u t  of her 
d u ties) nor i s  sh e  competent t o  discharge debtors#
A contract purportedly entered in to  by  the w if e  
without the husband's consent i s  regarded in  a 
s i m i l a r  manner to that of a d e fe c tiv e ly  c o n s t i t u t e d  
contract in  Soots law, w ith  the d ifference that the 
other contracting party i s  bound u n t il  and unless 
the husband repudiates the contract* The contract 
i s  inchoate and a w a i t s  repudiation or r a t if ic a t io n  
b y  the husband# There i s  not locus pgen lten tlaèV  ^  »*int mm ......................................................
to  both parties# I f  the husband f a i l s  expressly- ■ 
to  take e i t h e r  course, h is  conduct may amount to  
ta c it  repudiation or ra tif ica tio n #  The o t h e r  party 
need not " w a it  for  ever"* I t  i s  p ossib le  for a 
w ife a fter  d isso lu tio n  o f  m a r r ia g e  h erse lf  to r a t ify  
a contract which i s  personal to her o r  pertains to 
her s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e #  R a t i f i c a t i o n  b y  the husband 
r e su lts  i n  va lid a tion  of the contract, the r i g h t s  
and l i a b i l i t i e s  th e r e u n d e r  arisin g  to  and b y  both 
p a r t i e s  ( " t h e  husband must f u l f i l  t h e  ob ligations  
which h i s  w if e  undertook")# Repudiation means that
"the contract f a l l s  away""^ # I f  the h u s b a n d 's
repudiation /
1# Bee g e n e r a l l y  Hahlo, pp* 152-133'
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r e p u d i a t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  a f t e r  t o t a l  o r  p a r t i a l  
p e rfo rm m o G  o f  t h e  o o n t r a o t  b y  t h e  w ife #  t h e  
h w h a n d  may r e c o v e r  t h e  m oney p a id  o r  t h e  o h je o #  
t o l i W M d ,  b y  M s a a »  a n a  m«Qt T O stoi’e
t o  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  m y  a im  p a id  b y  h im  t o  t h e  w ife #  
" b u t  o n ly  i f  e n d  i n  e o  f a r  m  t h e  joint e e t o t e  or 
t h e  w i f e 'a  a e p e r a t e  e a t a t e  ( i f  a n y )  h a e  M e n  
e n r i c h e d  th e r e b y # " ^  P r o b a b ly  t h e  r a l e  d o e s  n o t  
8 # p ly  t o  duo  (o o m m m lty )  d e b t s  r e s t i n g  ow ing  p a id  
b y  t h e  w ife #  " w i th o u t  f r a u d  o r  d u r e a a  om t h e  % r t  
o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r # "  A lie m a tio n e  b y  t h e  w i f e  w i th o u t  
t h e  h u a b m d 's  o o n e o n t c a r r i e s  n o  p r o p e r l y  t o  t h e  
t h i r d  p a r t y  im le a e  o r  i m t i l  r a t i f i c a t i o n  b y  t h e  
h u o b m d  o f  t h e  p u r p o r t e d  c o n t r a c t #  a t  whictx p o i n t  
t h e  c o n t r a c t  bocom ee " v a l i d a t e d  w i th  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  
e f f e c t " # ^
A w i f e ' s  d c r a t l o  m o r t io  c m o a  o f  a  a o p a r a t e  
a a e e t  d o e e  n o t  r e q u i r e  h e r  h u e b a n d 'e  o o u o e u t#  b u t  
o im e r a h ip  d o e s  n o t  p a a e  u n t i l  h e r  d e a th ^ #  E ach  
t e a t  u p o n  h l e / h e r  a h a r e  o f  t h e  j o i n t
e s t a t e #  o r  u p o n  M e / h e r  s e p a r a t e  am aeta#  a s  t h e  
c a s e  may be#  Oommamlty i e  d l e e c l v e d  b y  d ea th '^ *
On d i a e o l u t i o a  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  b y  d e a th  o r  
d iv o r c e *  o r  u p o n  th e  p ro n o u n ce m en t o f  I m t e r d i o t ^  
t a k i n g  /
1#^  H ah lo*  p# 1 9 3 #2# H ah lo*  % M d#
3# E a h lo *4* 8 e c  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l #The hUBband'e dealings .SFSSTtae joint estate, or w i t h  h i e  w i f e ' s  s e p a r a t e  a c t  ate h e radmlmletrator izmy reverberate# howver, after d le a o lu t lo m #5# te rm e d  " b w d e l s c h e l d lu g "  i f  m a r r i e d  I n  co%*^muity*a n  i a t e r C i c t  a g a i n s t  h i s  m anagem ent o f  h e r  a C n a ra tce s t a t e  t h e r e a f t e r *  b e in g  a v a i l a b l e  i f  m a rr le c l o u t  o f  o m m m i ty  b u t  w i t h  m a r i t a l  p o w e r: w h e re  a  re g im e  pr<yAdOB a  m a r i t a l  po im r*  o r  a  " o a e - c a p ta in "  r u l e #  i t  l a  com ion  t o  f W l  am " e a r l y  d l e e o l u t l o n "  rem edy  i f  t h e  c a p t a i n  p r o v e s  re O k lc e a #  iu c o m p e te a t  o r  d ia h o u e e t#
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taking from the Imehwd hi# powr of admlmlstratiom 
o f  h i e  w if# * #  p r o p e r ty #  t h e  m a r i t a l  p o w er l e  
tmmlmmted# iw elvm ey of %e hwbmd does net 
d e p r iv e  M m  o f  M e  m a r i t a l  pow er*  I m m i t y  o r  
pMâlgmlity^ plw es hie pm#r Im ahg^ ymee# Wt 
ee &#S remtem the wife he fu ll power*
The hmmhmd^ s ewmter w ill WMml#w the joint 
emtete w$ I f  appllemhle# pw elbly #%e w ife's 
aepw^t# estate# w  $W w y ##Iy  #  tw  oew t to  
Im ve h e m e l f  m p w e m d  w  W m l n l a t w  t h e  j o i n t  w  
her eepmrete wtmte# w  # p ly  #  he wpelmWd 
Of hw  Wehmê*^ property affaire
I t 1$ m%mlelmg # #  my eheuM mbmit 
velimtmrlly %e ewh m ey##m* rmWLmemt ef that - 
In epem tlm  la  @e#lmd hefem 1%0$ md 
reader la rowcfured to flM that P m f w m r  Bahio 
%me deveWd Ohu'pW  ^ i1 aM 12 ef Me hoek #  
"Bafe#mrde"# ernrnmmFlw md
l o r d  F r a # # r  e e w l& e m d  t h a t  # i 0  W e W m â 'e  
ewate:^ e f M# wife warn a m^ratery gg  ^ 4 .
Em hle l a  h h m t*  w h i l e  e tm hlm g % a t  t h e  e w a te s i^  o f  
m m W w  a h d  t h a t  e f  a  m a r r ie d  w m m  t o
p w e r  w e  s i m i l a r #  W  a M a #  " % t  # e r e w  
t h e  # f  a  m in e r  W M $ #  t h e  I m te m a te
e f  t h e  m lm er# t h e  m a r i t a l  p e m r  w r m a  p r i m a r i l y
iMWii1* M otatm  kuoim d e e  he # e  Iw  e f  w. .^ o lo r 'e  T a #  1 9 0 2  1 % * # # $  worms v . Be w a M o r (1 ;,B 0) #  i .# j* o h * % l* )  B u t m e t t e  t h e  i m  o f  
:w^uiT^md*2* r.oa p*1!y&*3# O f* O a l l f e m l m  e u m # :8 y  o f  w  m  m  lamglw 1%2 #*g4 l*4* a #  t o  # e  e u m tm iy  o f  :^,K^  c & m r w i f e  t o d a y  m d  é l f f i e u l t l e #  o f  Im W i'p ro  o f  t w  1920  Act#see Bumma# p*i11* %oIcfxter Olive im h ie eoxitrlhuWdd m p K *  (9*  VeiAj.%3' I i w )  t e  "IM epem & oaeee n d  D é v o lu t io n :  T he Im W .lan tlem a  f o r  a e e tla m d "ed *  J e w  P* f 'r a o v  ( iW B ) «A véetitoe  ( D e s i r e d  R efo rm  16  (p # 1 5 6 ) )  F 'n b  fm a v i l i t  W e b 'u n i m o u ld  me le m g w  
b e  r e g a r d e d  m  e m m W r o f  M e  m in o r  w ife #  "Ther e g a r d e d  a a  m% a d u l f  *
Se® a l s o  S . L . C . C o n s u l t a t i v e  Memo.No.5 4 t ^ . 1 - 6 . 4 .
the Interests of the husband"#
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1
One of the principal and most significant 
differences between the tvfo is that the husband 
"is not l i a b l e  in damages to his wife if he 
diminishes the joint estate by flagrant 
m a la d m in is t r a t io n #  E ven  if he deliberately destroys 
property forming part oi the joint estate, she has 
no claim for damages against him"#^*^
The common law restrictions on t h e  husband's 
power will be noted briefly^ ?^ the husband cannot 
restrict t h e  personal freedom of the wife ( a f t e r  
dissolution o f  t h e  marriage) by any contract which 
he enters into (as by a contract i n  restraint of 
trade to w h ic h  he and his wife d u r in g  marriage were 
subjected) unless she was a party to the agreement, 
nor may he maltd donations "in deliberate fraud of 
h i s  wife or her heirs"# She may a s k  the court 
for a separatio bonorum (boedelsoheiding )^ if the 
husband's behaviour is "bad, inefficient or prodigal"^, 
if the parties were m a r r ie d  in community, and for 
an interdict a g a i n s t  h i s  subsequent a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  her estate if the p a r t i e s  were married out of 
com m unity  but with marital power# The w i f e ' s  
contracts /
1* Hahlo, p*1$3*2* Hahlo# p#156| and authorities t h e r e  cited#3# but h i s  c o n d u c t may justify a separatio bonorum# see below*4# See in detail Hahlo, pp#136-159#5* p#158* A t p.165 in t h e  4 t h  edn#, H ah lo  suggeststhat boedelscheiding as a remedy, unless l i n k e d  with a  uecr^'"'o?"3^ioial s e p a r a t i o n ,  i s  infrequently r e s o r t e d  to, and is "on the road to obsolescence"# As a n  a l t e r n a t i v e , "the husband's administration of t h e  joint estate c a n  b e  suspended and a curator appointed"# The w if e  may be made ouratrix#6# " d i s h o n e s t ,  foolish or s p e n d t h r i f t "  are the words used in the 4th edn*#
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cwtmoW i f  the Wmbmd's powar hm
b e m  e m lu d e d * . o r  i f  # #  w W  l a i t h  h im  c # m w t* _  w  
i f  # e  # o # m o %  Im  q w s t i w  W m efltm *  W t  # w  
1 # 0 $ #  w m # ,  h e r  w  j o i n t
0 # # $ ^ #  A # i r #  b y  tA w e  " 'o m t m o t "  w l #
the wife tw  e # # e  w  the jeimt estate hm
W m  m y  m e e m r  * #  w r l # m #  ( f r m
t h e  h w h m d  i f  t h e  p a r t i # #  w m  im  o cm m m lty*
fm m  t h e  w if e  i f  w t  e f  o tm m m ity #  w i #
m m i t a l  p m m r)#  % r t h w $  ' ' i f  # 0 '  h m h m d  km#wi%%y 
# e e # 8  um der M a  w ife * #  m m u th e M m d
he m et W %@Wn to Mv# m tifieâ  i%#"^
The w ife's wmtmeta fw  hweehoM 
M i l  W  u p h e M  ( W ie th w  t h e  p a r t i e s  w e re  m a rn ,M  i n  
w  eut of #wh omtmots himd both
partie#* m i pmmr emmet be oxeludM
b y  pm etlem # l a  m  l n t # r o B t i %  d iB o h am lo n  o f  t h e  
l e g a l  bmmie e f  t h i #  r u l e *  H a h lo  f a v o u r s  t h e  v ie w  
that i t  i s  m Iml&mt of mmri## âri^ i^ng *@a 
a e o n  m  m eommen h o u e eh o W  i s  w tm M ie W d '*  m t W r  
# m  the Engligh opimiom that the power ateme from 
implied ogem^* In addition* $Aow the wife 
o w r lo m  /
1# Of* 1 9 th  o e n t w y  pow er#  t o  o o m tr
mue#" #2*3* AM #0# #lMoa* p*%t "The Mght la mot Weed omding her Weband* the wife w ta  ma Me egomt"* Of* Boottiah
Bee l y k f e m o r  H e h lo 'a  I m g  o M  e m i e l l w t  â ie m :$ e io n  o f  t h e  d i f f i e u l t i o m  o f  t k i a  p w t i o u i a r  m i e *  pp# 162^198*  I t s  o m tin m o d  o x ie t e a o e  i n  B o o tio m , i a  mo# applmdod by Profwser.Olivo (w e below)*It# in varloua # iw o  in vwiome legal,tiyotoLiO B o c # - w t  r e a d e r  i t  m ere  a t t r a c t i v e  * I n  Bgïgimïd* the mgeaey of nw eseity w&o abollehed by the Matrimoni&I .pmoeedinge md Property Act* 1970 0*41# W# them remim# a common household agwoy B#e "family Lmr"* dW # Briea Oran# 3rd eâ*
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carries /
Oonsider Hahlo'a query as t o  whether a subjective or an objective test should b e  applied to decide w h a t are necessaries, and his e v e n tu a l  conclusion that e a c h  case should be decided on its own merits, although the f a c t  that a household is well supplied with a particular commodity is a f a c t o r  to b e  taken i n t o  a c c o u n t  when deciding whether a purchase was reasonable* See also his distinction between the wife's power to pledge her husband's credit f o r  household n e c e s s a r i e s  (which he says includes anything "reasonably required f o r  t h e  common household or i t s  members") and those liabilities which fall under the head of the husband's duty to support, and which may extend to the provision of funds for objects u n c o n n e c te d  with h o u s e h o ld  management * In the first place, h o u s e h o ld  "necessaries" may include l u x u r i e s ,  and may "have nothing to do w ith  s u p p o r t " . There is no necessary equivalence b e tw e e n  'support* and household management, although they will often be l in k e d *  A h u sb a n d  may fulfil his d u ty  t o  support h i s  wife by providing her w i t h  a good a l lo w a n c e ,  and  yet i f  she "spends h e r  a llo w a n c e  on non-necessaries, she may still b i n d  h i s  credit in respect of necessaries" (p*173)# A t p*166,Hahlo n o te s  that in English law this is n o t  so* (sentence o m it te d  in 4th edn*) (continued at 1977 - Judge Grant's "Family law", p*24)* As to Scotland, see Professor Olive's persuasive opinion (0.& W* pp*2 3 3 -2 3 4 ) that t h i s  i s  a matter of ostensible authority, and the private financial arrangements of the spouses can form no defence to a demand from a trader w ho, in the circumstances, was entitled to assume that the wife had authority*(It is interesting that P r o f e s s o r  Olive r e f e r s  to t h e  South African position) S uch  a position, apart from being in accordance with the principles of the law of agency, is also in accordance with what might be termed a "matrimonial p r o p e r t y  policy", namely that third parties should n o t  b e  obliged to.talœmay enlist h i s  aidt o  fund a litigation ('support *) and yet she could not b in d  his credit therefor#As i n  Scotland, i f  t h e  w i f e ' s  a u t h o r i t y  a s  m a n a g e re s s  be revoked, sh e  may still bind him  i n  respect of necessities for herself and the c h i l d r e n ,  and  t h i s  is an occasion on w h ic h  the 'power t o  b i n d '  coincides w ith  the 'd u t y  o f  support**The wife's authority as manageress is t e r m in a te d  b y  dissolution of the marriage, b y  separation (by fault of the wife, th o u g h  if c o n s e n s u a l ,  the a u t h o r i t y  i s  c o - e x t e n s iv e  with the h u sb a n d  ' s  duty in the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  to support his w i f e , a criterion which it i s  thought m ust s u r e l y  cause 
u n c e r t a i n t y  /
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carries on o p e n ly  a public trade or profession In 
h e r  own name, she may make contracts and incur 
obligations i n  connection therewith*
A contract may be authorised by the court 
where the husband is absent or is in o a p a b le  of 
acting /
uncertainty among traders (existence of an adequate a llo w a n c e  i n  this case removes her pow er to bind his credit)) b y  order of the court (during marriage) if the wife proves to be a spendthrift, and (perhaps) by unilateral revocation by  the husband at wÜl, by notice to known traders# Hahlo himself' sheds a clear light on the subject by arguing that if t h e  parties are married o u t  o f  c'^ #munity, the M a tr im o n ia l  Affairs A c t ,  1953, s*3, Anders them j o i n t l y  and  severally liable for debts for household necessaries supplied to the. joint household, t h e r e  being no provision allowing the husband to revoke t h e  wife's authority; ;( of * Professor Olive's suggestion o f  a partneAhip approach to household debts instead of outdated notion of the pr.aeposi.tura. 0# %B*, (Scottish Family Daw) '*~%Iso"advocat.edby the same author in the chapter (Desired;,R eform  17, p.166) which he c o n t r i b u t e d  to ; 
" In d e p e n d e n c e  and D e v o lu t io n ;  The Legal I m p l i c a t i o n s  for Scotland" ed# John F* G ra n t  (1976) and where th e y  are married in com m unity , i t  .would b e  contrary to authority and principle "without rhym e or reason" for a  husband to b e  able; to deprive his wife o f  that a u t h o r i t y  w h ic h  is an i n c i d e n t  of marriage, held of right, as is the h u s b a n d 's  marital power w h ich  cannot b e  removed except for good reason and on court order. A husband's notice to tradesmen disclaiming liability should them%heir i n q u i r y ,nevertheless (p*1?4). P re su m a b ly  this would only be so in c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i n  which the husband was no l o n g e r  to be bound, the wife's authority having b e e n  revoked ( H a h lo 's  ex am p le s  b e in g  th e  wife's desertion or his provision o f  an adequate allowance (though see above) and not i n  ,any; cirou3Ustances, or at will, or this would detract, surely, from H a h lo'a earlier argument.
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1acting o r  is withholding his consent unreasonably # 
This may be a specific or a general authorisation, 
and if the latter, it is clearly a far-reaching 
remedy - "thus virtually emancipating her"#^*^
M a rr ia g e  Contracts
Regard should be had to South African rules 
and practice in relation to marriage-contracts, 
exercises in conveyancing (referable of course to 
substantive rules based on history, experience and 
policy) w h ich  were never ooimmn in Boot land except 
among a small class, and a r e  now believed to be 
very rare indeed*
Only ante-nuptial contracts are permitted#
The most common use of the marriage contract is to 
contract out of t h e  system of matrimonial p r o p e r t y  
above described# Ho special form is required to 
render the contract valid as between or among (for 
strangers to t h e  marriage relationship may be parties 
to the deed though this seems to be rare) the 
parties to it, but certain requirements must be 
fulfilled /
1# In "one-captain" systems, this too is an aid to tforkability commonly found#
And see remedies provided at an earlier stage of Scots law; e#g# "Exclusion o f  Jus Hariti by reason of a Ohange in Statur of HusbaSj**^ # p#43'''et sog#2# Hahlo, p.179# (but a less fundamental remeSy", p re s u m a b ly , (and perhaps often used in n o n -  contentious circumstances such as long-term absence?) than boedelscheiding or application to the court for autEoriWatibn'''lfo manage the estate if her husband becomes insane or i s  a d ju d g e d  a prodigal#3# As to statutory safeguards, see Ohapter 12# Topics affected i n c lu d e  protection of savings, e a r n i n g s ,  certain categories of immoveable property, if m a r r ie d  i n  community, and the wife's separate im m oveable property if not, and certain insurance policies: a deserted wife may obtain a court order to deprive her husband of his pow er over p r o p e r t y  acquired b y  her during desertion on nrima facie p r o o f  of d e s e r t i o n  and acquisition or"propertyJ Hone of the protective, reforming statutes were of very recent date at 1969, apart from the M a tr im o n ia l  Affairs Amendment Act, Ho#15 of 1966#
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fulfilled la order that it may stand against 
strangers *
The terms of the contract may b e  as the parties 
dictate, so long as they are not illegal, im m oral 
or contrary to public policy# Hence, parties may 
choose to have their property a f f a i r s  regulated by 
the rules of another legal system: they may exclude
the community rules completely or in part: they may
wish community of property, b u t  not of p r o f i t  and 
loss or (perhaps m ore likely) vice versa, or they 
may wish com m unity  o n ly  in respect of certain assets* 
Is it significant that none of the p e r m u ta t io n s  
which Professor Eahlo^ describes is that in which 
community /
1* p*2?4* (At p*2?7f he  writes "W hile  exclusion ofcommunity, with retention of the marital power, is a recognised (though today rather r a r e )  form of antenuptial contract, the opposite configuration - e x c lu s io n  of the marital power, with retention of com m unity  - seems to be unknown* " ) The same is true of Gibson, pp*112-115# Bee also Maasdorp, pp*48-51, et sop » A variant suggested b y  Maasdorp is that, tEougn it is said that exclusion of marital power is "generally accompanied b y  the e x c l u s i o n  of a l l  community, as well of property as o f  profit and loss", it is sometimes the ease that "community o f  p r o p e r t y  and profit and loss or of property alone being excluded", the marital power will not b e  excluded totally but will continue in a restricted form# Thus, "the wife's property w i l l  b e  secured to her "and the husband will not be permitted to alienate, mortgage, pledge "or in any o t h e r  way" deal with it, "oxther absolutely or except with his wife's written consent*"N e i th e r  the advantages of this half-way house, nor e v e n  the rang© of p o w ers  left to the h u s b a n d , are clear*E x c lu s io n  o f  marital pow er with retention of community is a possibility not specifically m e n tio n e d  by  Maasdorp: the significance or lack of i t  of t h eu s e  of the word "generally" above can provide only speculation# The tenor of t h e  writings seems to suggest t h a t  d i s c u s s i o n  has taken place rather upon the question w h e th e r  the marital pow er h a s  been e x c lu d e d  w here  community is excluded (which, it seems, it will not have been, in the a b se n c e  of an e x p r e s s  te rm  o f  exclusion) than u p o n  w h e th e r  exclusion 
o f  marital pow er and  community can h a p p i l y ,  or c o m p e te n t ly ,  co-exist#
So /
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c o m m m lty  o x lm ts*  b u t  t h e  m a r i t a l  p o w er d o e s  n o t?  
L ack  o f  c o m p a ra t iv e  m a t e r i a l  o n  t h l e  p o i n t  l a  
d i s a p p o in t in g #  ^
I t  /
Bo common la oxoluolon of "all three" - oomimmlty of property# of profit and loeo# and of marital power w that It eoeme that It has been M M  that an agreement to be married "by amt0*^uptlal contract" la to be construed aa an Intention to exclude thoae three elemente# (aibeoa# p*115# and authorities there cited)#Of the partlculw combination imder dlacuaalon Hahlo (at p*2?7) as ahmm acted# remerkc that It "aeeme to be W k n m m " #  la fa# 31# he states that a imlvereal partnership (^cletae cmmiw bqmoamm) # with equal rlghte of "'Mag hathe whole doeé not amount to a prohibited later- Bpouae donation) would be competent# and notes that auch eyetomo are not uncommon in Europe#exclusion of community with retmition of m S l m l  power (of# epoculmtlon (Ohapter 1)ae to the poeelbllity In Bcotlmd of separation of property with contrwttmlly^MChoeon retention of i p a  a d m i a l e % a t l o n l e  ) i s  ^ o o g n le o d #  b a t  % r o #5 3 c m '  ÿü p#S@@ 11'# cdm*) Eahlo auâaeta # a touch a remit la often the product of mlmmderotanOingor defective draftemsmchlp#See "Oommmlty Property: Bympoolum on Equal Rl^te#" latroductlcn: Egiml M.^ta for Women VorouB the Olvil Ooêe# Mack E# Barham# Tulane law Review#Ÿol* 48# No*3#Aprll# 1974# pp#5$0#*5Së# (Bee generally iwleima# infra)# Baring the courae of hie dlscwolon# the mtEor quotea Dr# Harriet Dag^tt ("Is Joint Oomtrol of Oomiunlty Frcperty Pcmiblè?"1 0  T u leb aw  Rev* 589  (1 9 3 6 )  1# "T he c m m im lty  p r o p e r t y  idea in the judgmemt of the writer and la the minds of a great portion of civlllacd eeclety# eviâmoed by the fact that they contlmm to live under It is# perhepB# the moat perfect marital property eyatem èo far devioed for imtolll$emt m d  falr^minded men emd women who regard the marital relation ee a permanent parimerehlp")# ao being of the opimlon that there could be joint control of the commmlty property#Barham*0 article warn written agaiwt the baoWroimd of the American *Eqpal Bi#it0 (Women)* debate and la comceœed with cowtlWtlomallty of the louielanlac eelectlOA of th# husband as head and master of the eommmlty* Ee euggeste "infomWl choice" of head of commmity# or as (in hie opinion# l e s s  p o p u l a r )  o p t io n s  " j o i n t #  smd j o i n t  mad s e v e r a l #  management" or hybrid cmmimity m d  separate "situatlomo"# Postmmiptlal cWage or variation of /
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I t  seem s t h a t  E a h io  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  a  
c im ia e  p r o h i b i t i n g  t h e  W ebem d fro m  o h a n g ln g  t h e  
f a m i ly  h<mo w i th o u t  t h e  w i f e ' s  co n ee m t ( a  'h e a d  
o f  t h e  fa m ily *  p o w e r) w ou ld  h e  v a l i d *  The w if e  
n e e d  m ot com ply  I f  t h e  h w h m d 'e  a o t l o n a  a r e  
g r o a e l y  im re a e o n a h le  o r  w e re  p ro m p te d  b y  h a d  fa lth * * ^  
O lm m ee  o o h o e rn ln g  c o n t r i W t i o n  t o  t h e  f a m i ly  b u d g e t  
may h e  o w p e t e n t  (a n d  w i l l  a lw a y s  h e  e u h j e o t  t o  
v a r i a t i o n  h y  t h e  c o u r t  o n  c h an g e  o f  o lro im et@ nG eo^)#  
h u t  a  o l a u a e  p u r p o r t i n g  t o  e x c lu d e  t h e  w i f e ' s  pow er 
t o  p le d g e  h e r  hm ehm xd'e c r e d i t  f o r  m e o e e a a r ie e  
/
2*
$3**VW^W, )*WWWiWOl Jf.Ww o u ld  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  L o u le la n ia n  myetem. mW e o m m m ity  id e a s #  W t  i n  a  fo rm  u p d a te d  ahd modified In the light of current thinking* Itt e r e e t i n g  t h a t #  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r s  a t  l e a e t #— T*r nw- ^  w V 'ÿ .«M 'BVN Tf. *Baihem oomaldere that partiea would ohooee the Wehwd a# managing partner*Bee alee Oynthia Baoee Wall# "Mmagement of the %<oulalana Gommanlty Property System# The Need for Reform" Tul*I##Rw* %1*48*(%#$) (a oontrihutlon to the eympoBlim mentioned ahève)# p*591# where la  proposed "à Modified Joint md Several Gontrol Plam"i —  equal powers of oomtrol e n d  mamagea "1'»% 4 "*#4 ¥^iTïf -4 Vi't* *Sjr o q a i r i n g  j o i n t  oonaem tp ro p e :i n  c e r t a i n  t r a a a e o t i o h e #  a s#  f o r  e sm ^x le#  th o s e  a f f e o t im g  t h e  home o r  h o tm eb o M  goode#  ao eo m o an ied  b y  f a l l  p o w e rs  i n  e a c h  t o  m aw m e o e p a ra  " u n d e r  a  m o d if ie d  j o i n t  c o n t r o l  p la n " *  E ffe i  t M r d  p a r t y  p r o t e e t i o n  w o u ld  W  n e o e a e a ry *I t  w i l l  b e  rem em bêred  t h a t  i n  S o u th  A f r i c a  vw\, ïmebmnâ'e power w  head of the family cmmot be 
d e n ie d  ( i n  1#T* n o  d o u b t  i n  p r a c t io # #  It i e  eom etlm oe dem led#  o r  s h a r e d ) *1* E e h lc #  P*275* (B ee  a  h i n t  o f  c h an g e  f o r  B o o t la n d :  
Hemo*No#4l# 6*21 ^  eee.* ( F a c u l t y  É e e p o m e #  pp*58  **o*44 # s q Êm e. , d  m h e d u le  IJc T T T A m erica A  "h o m ee te ad "
l2, ^ « l a t i o a ) #  See S.L.C.Memo* No. 5 4 ,9 .1 - 9 .4 .t generally a huoband's (or w ife's) promiae topay a weekly or l y  h o u s e k e e p in g  a l lo w m o e  l abeing "futile" i f  tM marriage lau u e m
oommuaity (Hahlo# P*111)* However# pree^.^—^  i f  the roqulolte jmteation were preaout# i t  would — -^-1^ a s  a u g g o e te d  h e re *
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p r o b a b ly  I s  n o t*
Hahlo thinks that oommimity of profit and loss 
may b e  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l  community# "Profit" 
includes earnings, from w h a te v e r  source, o f  either 
spouse, property purchased atanto matrimonio. and 
income of common and separate p r o p e r t y  arising 
during marriage# "Loss" includes household Oijrpenses, 
d e b ts  ('validly c o n t r a c t e d ' during marriage by 
e i t h e r  p a r t y ) ,  c o m m e rc ia l l o s s e s ,  and  e x p e n s e s  
a r i s i n g  from t h e  preservation and repair-of common 
p r o p e r ty #  Property of each marriage, and that 
w h ich  henceforth will be termed gratuitous aequirenda^ 
re m a in  separate, and repair costs i n  respect of 
s e p a r a t e  property are to be met by the owner
s e p a r a t e l y #  There is no liability for the o t h e r ' s  
u p t i i
I n  /
pa n t e n u p t i a l  debt or delict ♦
1* t h a t  is, a c q u i s i t i o n s  by  either after m a r r ia g e  f o r  w h ic h  the recipient gave no consideration: a s  t h i r d  p a r t y  g i f t s ,  legacies, e v e n  luck or good f o r t u n e  ( u n l e s s  perhaps j o i n t  p r o p e r t ywas used a s  entrance m oney, or s t a k e  f o r  a game of chance - of# Hoddinott v# H» 1949 2 E#B#406, diss* L# Denning at p*414 et sec*; and Ohapter y, "Gambling Gains"#) Bee generally Ohapter ?, 
"F a m ily  A s s e t s " ,2. See Hahlo, p#280# ("Old law")# (In universal community, antenuptial debts are charged on th j o i n t  è ^ t a t e , and although, in principle, e a c h  sp o u s e  i s  liable for h i s  own delict, much : c o n f u s io n  (Hahlo, p*226) surrounds t h e  q u e s t io n #  It s e e m s 't h a t ,  i f  matters are l e f t  u n t i l  after dissolution, the creditor may pursue o n ly  the delinquent spouse, and, if the damages w e re  paid during m a r r ia g e  out o f  th e  joint ©state, the • ■ o t h e r  has a right of recourse ( see supra; on dissolution a g a i n s t  the delinquenFI)However (p#279) " I n  S o u th  Africa _  com m unity  of profit and loss o n ly  i s  not a living institution" # I f  com m unity  i s  excluded, " a l l  t h r e e "  are excluded.
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In o l d e r  law, a wife might c h o o se  on dissolution 
(or during marriage, if her husband became insolvent) 
to have restored to her what she had brought to t h e  
marriage or to share in the 'profit and l o s s '  of 
t h e  marriage, thus entitling her to 'hedge h e r  bet', 
an e x c e l l e n t  arrangement for one partner, but one 
unlikely t o  receive general approval among legal, 
systems today#
In South Africa now, it seems that there, is 
o n ly  one  ty p e  o f  m a z r ia g e  c o n t r a c t  i n  g e n e r a l  u s e ,  
and t h i s  ■ e x c lu d e s  t h e  community of p r o p e r t y  and 
p r o f i t  and loss and marital.powar^# The details 
are regulated by marriage settlement* There i s  
r a r e l y  an y  clause pertaining to s u c c e s s io n ^ * T h e re  
a r e  normally no t h i r d  parties to the contract, and 
"community of p r o f i t  and l o s s  with i t s  s e v e r a l  
variante i s  never used"^* Sometimes, however, the 
marital power i s  retained* T h is  natural 
s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  o f  practice la interesting i n  itself^* 
Where many choices are p r e s e n t ,  p a r t i e s  prefer to 
b e  divested so far a s  is lawful of all aspects of 
community* As P r o f e s s o r  Hahlo n o t e s ,  t h e  
"potentialities" are not fully e x p lo i t e d #  (  "H ow ever, 
much can b e  done b y  marriage settlements") The 
advantage is that the phrases " 'married b y  antenuptial 
contract' or 'married out of community' have acquired 
a p r e c i s e , generally known m e a n in g " ^ , and of c o u rs e  
t h i s  /
1* Bee Hahlo, pp,279^80*2* See generally Hahlo, p#281*5* perhaps t h i s  is as w e l l ;  of* confusion created'in Scotland b y  the mutual will, temporarily in u s e ,  now rare* (Ohapter 5(2))*4* H a h lo ,  p*281*5* variation will b e  found p e rh a p s  i n  the d e t a i l s  o f  marriage s e t t l e m e n t s #6# Hahlo, ibid*7 .  H ahlo, 5 7 ^ 1 .
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# 1 ^  l a  W p w t m t  W #  #  #10 p a r t i e #  t M w e l v w  
m id t e  o r W i to m * '^
ÆL:aÊam
T M e  % w  e f  o o m W m t o m w m W y  o f
pmp030%y m# profit œ# lem# md # #  meml##! pww# 
Ea# apmrn mWlm# Mm #^g#w^ Mpmmte ma Me 
wpwat# MmMJllty fw  M# mw
#h# wifg WW w m a#ult$ "f#* w -
Ë e h lo  %M " m t m l  % w %  ' --'
im d e p e m ê m W  m im t W  r # #  #l% h 
% e  W # m m ê mmmime f m W y  ( #  #3b:-T)43il<i
M W W M # 8it % #  m%0 1$
of:^0W, mWm$$ mwh w  #& #m$w* 
mre mMe# m# Im etWa^  #m w, m%oh
m  eW & M  e f  h m m e « â  e $ # e  M f # )  m #  o w # . # e
$<> # e  m é  W m e W M ,*
ImteB#a#emo « #  Pm^Wbly
# #  * f% ni # e  ##&  ifM em wlf# mmlM
m% of oomwity m#y %# m #w ê# w  o W,l#m w  # #  
of %w % ## w  %,gl1ah oomW#$A# %r mm w of 
prlmW# wAWwWul # e  i# liW ly $o
a  m # h  o i# m g # e  m a # m  e f  h w  # e  v lO '^aw vla
%* I #  a  a d  o o n p lK ; w o l n t y ,  r-oxo%'C"'hr,ab1.y vm^ij m  u bnn.i. rî a ?  W '/w t*F o r  I t  iQ  f)toliovad. th r \h  U o p t'r t '/r^ n t
i r l l i  a o k  w iw # o r  t h e  o;v#eTU')r w woig' 'ô u t  o f  0 0 H '(v M ty , f f / t  %%o *',nm<or# ïii. n a t U ï r  e f  'r^cfWVfUaoho^A '  U o b k a , 'tk e  t m # h  o f  o.om%â $m ly a ro r tm # *hOR^mr^r, 3^.^  o f  %W e i w t l #  l l r j i W  o f  # u t y  o f  m tp p e rb  m # #  itc m o  uhuwb:^(>4 Ix. M Ë b lo #  B w  a l e o
B# BW  W v fo rw  f w  b m w h o M  # M ïB ,  m ilt h o w  w ê o r  t W  h e a d  o f  * s u p p o r t
3# P '.2 % #
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here husband in property m a t te r s .
E ach  may contract in respect oi his/her own 
property without reference to the other, and If 
one purports to alienate t h e  o t h e r ' s  property 
without t h e  latter*s consent, usually^ t h e  subject 
of t h e  transfer may b e  recovered fro m  t h e  third 
party, and the spouse first-mentioned may be 
required to pay damages to the o th e r *
There is no general liability for e a c h  other's 
d e b ts  * Hence, actions by  creditors against t h e  
sp o u s e  whose debt it was not, must establish that 
that spouse acted as t h e  other's agent in the 
transaction in q u e s t i o n ,^  For debts f o r  household 
necessaries, however, t h e  spouses are liable j o i n t l y  
and severally to creditor#* "although as between the 
spouses t h e y  have to be borne b y  t h e  husband" #
Spouses married out of both forms of community and 
marital power may contract with each other, provided 
that i n  doing so they do not infringe the "donation" 
r u le s * " '
Since there Is a rebuttable p re s u m p tio n  that 
the husband owns "everything i n  the common household", 
Hahlo suggests^ that it is wise to have attached to 
the marriage contract a schedule, listing those 
i te m s  which the wife has brought to the marriage*
Despite the fact that the spouses have decided 
to be m a r r ie d  out of community, and that post-nuptial 
marriage /
1. recovery by r©i vindioatio (not applicable to money an d  negFEiSleTHi^omente, and s u b j e c t  
t o  personal bar)*2* "However, s in c e  t h e  spouses in fact b e n e f i t  b yeach other's p r o p e r t y  and income, it has been h e ld  that t h e  wife has an i n d i r e c t  pecuniary interest i n  h e r  husband's contracts", and p re s u m a b ly  vice varaa: Hahlo, p.*285*5# Bee generally Hahlo, Chapter 19*4# t h e  praesumptio Hucxana: H a h lo , p*285, fn* 15*
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maxTlag© c o n t r a c t s  are not competent, still they 
may agree to go into partnership with e a c h  o t h e r ,  
o r  acquire property "In joint ownership", or 
"pool all or part of their resources*"^ This 
is a  state of affairs which may arise b y  inference 
o f  o l ro u m s ta n c e s  a s  w e l l  a s  e x p r e s s ly *  I f  I n  
t h i s  v e n tu r e  t h e r e  has been a p p ro x im a te  equality of 
contribution, 'equality will b e  p re su m e d '
W here t h e  sp o u s e s  agree, in t h i s  way, by 
p r i v a t e  paction, to h o ld  property in joint names, 
the manner and d a te  o f  division w i l l  b e  in accordance 
with the r u l e s  of c o -o w n e rs h ip  g e n e r a l l y  (as by
parties' agreement), an d  w i l l  n o t  be governed b y  the 
r u l e s  which affect joint estate i n  com m unity*^
Inter-spouse litigation in delict is competent, 
and, in the absence of a master and servant 
relationship, importing liability, neither is liable 
f o r  t h e  o t h e r ' s  d e l i c t *  A c t io n  may l i e  b e tw e e n  
the s p o u s e s  i n  contract, o r  u n d e r  any other head*
A wife has full power t o  sue, and liability to b e  
su e d # ^
Where community i s  excluded, b u t  marital pow er 
is not,^ each r e t a i n s  h i s / h e r  own e s t a t e ,  and the 
wife's e s t a t e  cannot b e  attached b y  the husband's 
creditors, but the husband a d m in i s t e r s  t h e  wife's 
e s t a t e  /
1 * Hahlo, p *286 *2* though Hahlo n o t e s  (p*256, fn*26) that English and A m erican  courts are more kindly disposed to the ♦equality* approach* It might well be  im a g in e d  that 8*A* courts, operating a system which is specific and d e ta i l e d ,w o u l d  b e  impatient o f  individualistic d e v i a t i o n s  redolent o f  m is u n d e r -  s t a n d in g  a n d  v a g u e n e s s ,  an d  l a c k i n g  p r o o f ,  w i th  w h ic h  Beats end  English courts are familiar, and i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h ic h  t h e  E n g l i s h  a n sw e r h a s  b e e n  a  widening of judicial d i s c r e t i o n *
5# H a h lo ,  p*287*4# Bee H a h lo , p*2S8*5* See g e n e r a l l y ,  Hahlo, pp*288/9*
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estate, the wife being entitled to much the sarae*^
re m e d ie s  a s  would have b e e n  available, had she been
married in community. The usual statutory 'out of
co m m u n ity ' rule of joint and  several. liability
c o n c e rn in g  household necessaries applies*, Inter-
spouse litigation is competent, but the wife, in
n o n - c o n s i s t o r l a l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  m u st a p p ly  t o  t h e  c o u r t
for appointment of a curator ^  litem or for venia
agendi * Upon the question whether the spouses
may contract with each o t h e r  Professor Hahlo doesonot commit himself*
It appears that m a r r ia g e  settlements (which 
resemble gifts, but are not struck at as prohibited 
donations) come into being by virtue of stipulation 
therefor in antenuptial contract, and that they are 
not confined to use in marriages out o f  community*
In the ease of marriages 'in' community, the spouses 
may a g re e  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  sum , o r  I te m  o f  p r o p e r t y  
shall b e  d e d u c te d  fro m  the joint estate and made over 
to one s p o u s e  before division takes place o r  t h a t ,  at 
t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  m a r r i a g e ,  a  c e r t a i n  a s s e t  may b e  
held b y  one p a r t n e r  outside t h e  community* The 
parties t h e r e f o r e ,  whether m a r r ie d  ' i n '^  o r  'out', o f  
com m unity  /
1* F o r  example, an interdict is a v a i l a b l e ,  t o  prohibit h i s  f u r t h e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of her p r o p e r t y  (of*,'in oomrâunity*, boedelsoheiding).2* p*290* Bee furtEeF^ W^ '^ ffie'^ s^uSjeot, pp.* 161-2*The text d i f f e r s  little in the 4 t h  edn*5# Of* joint property example supra * and partnership v e n tu r e s *  P re su m a b ly  su c h  p a r t n e r s h i p s  w ou ld  b e  r e q u i r e d  to have some b u s in e s s  o r  p r o f i t  motive, n o t  o n ly  t o  q u a l i f y  a s  a  p a r t n e r s h i p  ( a t  l e a s t  according to B o o ts  law; ( P a r t n e r s h i p  Act, 1890); 
o f*  "Property-owning i s  not a trade* Mere r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  capital assets la n o t  a t r a d e " ,  G lasgow  Heritable Trust L td *  v* Oommisaioners of Inland R evenue 1954 B*0 * 266, per L*P. Oooper at p*284*) but also to f o r e s t a l l  those who, p o s t ­n u p t i a l  l y ,  i fo u ld  have their property a f f a i r s  treated as 'in' com m unity# Y et i s  t h e r e  an y  l i m i t  on  t h e  number /
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o o m n m lty  appear to enjoy considerable freedom to 
tailor the r u l e s  to suit their circumstances*
H ow ever, at least as regards " in "  oommunlty 
Variations, Hahlo r e m a r k s ,^  " I n  modern p r a c t i o e  
none of these things Is ever done#"
W here t h e  s p o u s e s  c h o o se  t o  h e  m a r r i e d  o u t  o f  
com m unity , t h e  precise regulation o f  what is t o  b e  
the separate property of each may be contained i n  
the terms of a marriage settlement# Since marriage 
settlements are "gifts in c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of m a r r ia g e " ^  
(and marriage has been said to be t h e  highest 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  known to the law^) t h e i r  provisions do 
not am ount to prohibited d o n a t i o n s. By m aking  u s e  
w i th  f o r e t h o u g h t  o f  t h i s  exception o r  indulgence o r  
right, t h e r e f o r e , the i n e q u a l i t i e s  and h a r s h n e s s  of 
a s y s te m  o f  separation may be ameliorated, if wished# 
G i f t s  may be conditional upon the o c c u r r e n c e  o f  an 
event (for e x a m p le, the birth of a c h i l d  o r  widowhood^) 
o r  /
number or type (e*g# matrimonial home) o f  properties w h ic h  may b e  held j o i n t l y ?  The a n sw e r perhaps i s  that what w ould  r e s u l t  would be 'joint property*, n o t  'm a t r im o n ia l  joint property* i n  its treatment a n d  division ( s e e  above) and so  such p o s t n u p t i a l  a t t e m p te d  c irc u m v e n t  io n s  w ou ld  f a i l  i n  t h e i r  purpose#
1 .  p ,2 9 0 ,  fn ,5 6 #
2# p .2 9 0 #3# of* Walton's d i s c u s s i o n ,  'Husband and  Wife', p#I7B and p r e c e d in g  pages# (D o n a tio n s  i n t e r  virum e t  uxorem  before the 1920 Act),4* TEIbTTF"se e m s, i s  an  old fo rm  of settlement, and was termed d o n a r i e  ; as t o  th e  c o n f u s io n  s u r r o u n d in g  the w o rd s " E o w r y ,  "dower", see Ohapter 1 , pp* 18 and 1 9 , fn,3« A widow who received no  "aowrie" at the c h u rc h  door was e n t i t l e d  u n d e r  a  statute of Alexander XX (cap#22, sec #5) t o  a provision ( " f o r  h i r  dowrie", interpreted at fn# 3 as ' f o r  her Dos* ( E n g l i s h  meaning) o r  ' f o r  her dower and presumably meaning 'instead o f  o r  ' i n  lieu of o r  'belatedly') of a t h i r d  of h e r  h u s b a n d 's  lands*
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o r  may b e  e i ib j e o t  t o  t h e  o o n d l t i o a  t h a t  t h e  i te m  
shall r e v e r t  to the husband on t h e  predecease (or 
the predecease without issue) of t h e  w ife * ^
hniess a pow er of revocation of a marriage 
s e t t l e m e n t  la r e s e r v e d  b y  the p r o m is o r  $ the 
s e t t l e m e n t  beoom es i r r é v o c a b l e  a t  m a r r i a g e ,  an d  i s  
e n f o r c e a b le  a o o o rd in g  t o  i t s  te rm s*  The p ro m is e e  
sp o u s e  m u st also h a v e  carried out h i s / h e r  d u t i e s  
u n d e r  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  en d  m ust n o t  h a v e  f a i l e d  t o  
o a r r y  o u t  an y  o f  t h e  * fu n d a m e n ta l  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  
z m rr ia g e *  ( th o u g h  o o n s e n s u a l  s e p a r a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  
i n  Hahlo*a opinion b e  categorised as s u c h  failure^) 
i n  o r d e r  t o  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  claim h i s / h e r  p r o v i s i o n ,  
b u t  i f  the provisions o f  t h e  settlement are not 
carried o u t  stante matrimpnlo, t h e y  may be e n fo rc e d  '(«mi# i ^  ^
o n  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  ( u n l e s s  t h e  w i l l  o f  
t h e  p r o m is o r  b e q u e a th s  t o  th e  p ro m is e e  t h a t  w h ich  
w ou ld  h a v e  b e e n  due u n d e r  t h e  m a r r ia g e  s e t t l e m e n t ,  
i n  w h ic h  c a s e  t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  c la im  i s  e x t in g u i s h e d * )
A t h i r d  p e r s o n  may becom e a  p a r t y  t o  a n
antenuptial c o n t r a c t ,  and male© a n  enforceable (and 
i r r e v o c a b l e ,  u n l e s s  an  e x p r e s s  r i g h t  o f  r e v o c a t i o n  i s  
r e s e r v e d )  p ro m is e  t o  c o n f e r  b e n e f i t ( s )  on one o r  b o th
spouses *
An i n t e r e s t i n g  s a f e g u a r d  i s  E a h l o 's  s u g g e s t io n  
t h a t  "The h u s b a n d , i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  may n o t  d e f e a t  
h i s  wife*a e x p e c ta n c y  o f  a s e t t l e m e n t  u n d e r  a n  
a n t e n u p t i a l  /
8 e e  g e n e r a l l y  " M a rr ia g e  S e t t l e m e n t s " ,  HahlO! 
pp*290"#293*2. In j u d i c i a l  separation or d i v o r c e ,  an o r d e r  o f  f o r f e i t u r e  o f  b e n e f i t s  may b e  made ( s e e  
s u p r a ) w h ich  w i l l  r e l i e v e  t h e  promisor i forder i s  made against t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se *
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a n t e n u p t i a l  c o n t r a c t  b y  f r a u d u l e n t  d o n a t io n s  t o  
t h i r d  p a r t i e s " * ^
Ittso lg e aB sr^
On t h e  iu a o lv e n o y  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  a  
m a r r ia g e  o u t  o f  e o m m m ity , t h e  e e t a t w  o f  b o th  
a p o u a e a  v e n t  i n  t h e  " M a s te r " ,  an d  a u b a e q u e n t ly  on  
t h e  a p p o in tm e n t  o f  a  t r u a t e e ,  i n  t h e  t r u e t e o  i n  
b a n k r u p te y ,  e n d  t h e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  s o l v e n t  e p o u ee  i s  
th e n  r e s t o r e d  t o  h im /h e r  p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  
c a n  e a t a h l l a h  % a t  t h e  p r o p e r t y  i s  t r u l y  h im /h e r  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty ^ #  An in v e n t o r y  o f  t h e  I te m e  
h reu # % t t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  b y  t h e  s o l v e n t  e p o w e  l a  
p r o o f  t h a t  t h a t  ep o u ee  owned th o s e  
i te m s  I m m d l a t e l y  b e f o r e  t h e  m a rr ia g e *
E a h lo ^  d la e u a e e e  t h e  eve% s#preom t p ro b le m  o f  
w l f e / o r e d i t o r  c o m p e t i t io n  ( w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  r e g a r d  
t o  m a r r ia g e  e e t t l e m e n te ) #  I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t ,  i f  
t h e  h u sb a n d  b e f o r e  h i e  e e q u e s t r a t i e n  h a s  n o t  
f u l f i l l e d  h i e  ( a n t e n u p t i a l  s e t t l e m e n t )  o b l i g a t i o n s  
t o  h i e  w i f e ,  s h e  e m m o t o la lm  th em  i n  c o m p é t i t io n  
w i th  h e r  h u e b a n d ^ s  " o th e r "  o r e d l t o r e ,  b u t  i f  h e  h a s  
f u l f i l l e d  eu ilh  o b l i g a t i o n # ,  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r r e d  
v e s t a ,  w i t h  t h e  s o l v e n t  sp o u se * #  o t h e r  e s t a t e ,  i n  
t h e  M a s te r ,  m d  th e n  i n  t h e  t r u s t e e  i n  b m k r u p to y ,  
b u t  m u st b e  r e l e a s e d  b y  t h e  l a t t e r  i f  the se ttlem ent f a i i s  
u n d e r  t h e  te r m s  o f  t h e  I n s o lv e n o y  A ot# 1 9 g 6 , s * 2 1 ( 2 ) ( b ) $  
H ow ever /
i #  p # 2 9 2 « T h is  i s  one  o f  t h e  m o st d i f f i c u l t  o f  p ro b le m s  i n  m aim im o n ia l p r o p e r t y  la w ; Row a r e  in n o c e n t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t o  b e  s a fe g u a r d e d ?  (O f* 
e # 0 * p r o v i s i o n s  o f  a n  an'WLwwavoidanoe n a t u r e  r e l a t i n g  t o  p ro m d lv o ro e  a l i e n a t i o n s  g D lv * (8 o # )  l e t #  i9 y S $  s# 6 ,  and  g e n e r a l l y  O h o p te r  ? )*2# S e e  H a h io , pp#293*»‘^ 9S*3 .  8 e e  a l s o  s u n ra .4*  p*295*
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However, the settlement might subsequently^ he set 
aside a s  a "disposition without va3.ue" if made 
more than two years before sequestration hut at a 
time (a m a t t e r  to he proved hy the trustee) when 
the i n s o l v e n t  * s  liabilities exceeded his assets, 
o r  made w i t h i n  that two year period, the insolvent 
being unable to show that at the t im e  in question 
h i s  assets exceeded h i s  liabilities^*
If struck at as a disposition without value 
liable to he set aside (and set aside), the solvent 
spouse can have no claim therefor in competition 
w i th  the Insolvent 'apouse * a * other * creditors^ «
For claims of a general nature arising between 
spouses, t h e  solvent spouse's claim is n e i t h e r  
p r e f e r r e d  nor p o s tp o n e d  to the claims of "other* 
creditors^.
X^ acta, SuccesBoria
The existence of paotq successoria (clauses 
regulating the s u c c e s s io n  to the estate of each or 
both) are exceptions to t h e  general unenforceability 
of "agreements relating to the inheritance of a 
living person"^* Such arrangements can be varied 
o n ly  /
i* that is, the property must be restored (albeit perhaps p e n d in g  determination of t h e  question w h e th e r  t h e  transaction was a disposition without value) if it is established that t h e  property was acquired i n  terms o f  a m a r r ia g e  settlement. The trustee may protect the interest© o f  creditors by s e e k in g  interdict to r e s t r a i n  t h e  s o l v e n t  spouse from disposing of t h e  subjects in the interim, but only i f  he can provide a prima f a c i e  case t h a t  t h e  antenuptial contract was SaAT m'aTa"! and that, immediately after the s©tt].emenF%he'Tn©oXvênt settlor's liabilities exceeded his assets*
(H a h lo , p . 295)#2 .  8 s*  26  and  27# S ee  E a h lo ,  p*296# Of# M a r r ie dWomen's Property (Scotland) Act, 1920, s*5 and g e n e r a l l y  Ohaptor 2*5# s#26(2). Hahlo, ibid*4* As to Scotland, See Chapter 2#5* H ahlo, p .299#
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Of# a i m  ( W t l o ,i lg # p f :n r r m o 0  o f _o o m m m ity  # # # p t  I n  tbm  m e w e a t  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  o f  j o i n t  e a t a t o  h y  m u tu a l  w i l l  o r  a d im tl tm  h y  a w v l w r  o f  w i l l  o f  # M o o o m a # r)  (B e#f im "* ppiia o o ln g  2* ST'U p # # n r x /  * y \
,::oo go n o r.ik lly  F d ^ lo *  O W # tW  20*4* T W  #0%%^ 1#  g a ld q d  %  # e  e w e  p r l ithorn# 7:*6g?.77(% #@ w h l# .  I t  may W  p e r
t o  m llow  r o # i a t r a t i # m  p o ^ tm m p tlm lly  o f  a #  p t lm l  c m m tm o t ( w o  W ) lo #
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t h e  third party m u st he obtained before variation 
i s  made* V a r i a t i o n  has b e e n  a l lo w e d  u n d e r  this 
h e a d  (by permission of the c o u r t )  where an  obligation 
under a m a r r ia g e  settlement has become impossible, 
or where the circumstances of the parties have 
changed* Despite some judicial d e n i a l  of the 
existence of judioial pow er to a l lo w  a l t e r a t i o n  f o r  
good cause (as by t h e  Court of the Orange Free State) 
Hahlo considers^ that th e  practice has become 
established, and is desirable*
Variation may be effected also by "last will" 
o f  the parties^# Here, th e  clauses of a testamentary 
nature in the antenuptial contract or settlement must 
be studied* If the clause i s  t r u l y  contractual •» 
pactm successorim revocation or alteration is 
p o s s i b l e  o n ly  by m u tu a l  will, but if it is 
" t e s t a m e n t a r y  in character, having fo u n d  its way i n t o  
the contract, as it were, b y  accident",^ either spouse 
may revoke o r  alter it b y  his/her own "last will"^#
A study of South A f r ic a n  law  and practice 
c o n c e rn in g  marital property is illuminating, and 
provides examples of com m unity  and separation systems, 
and o f  those systems in operation aide b y  side i n  the 
same jurisdiction* The popularity of the use of the 
marx^iage^contract to exclude com m unity  rules may be  a 
significant indication of the regard w ith  which these 
rules are held by the more fortunate members of that 
society (though whether as to the concept o f  community 
or /
1* p*306*
I*  P P *306-509*
4* Of, the p ro b le m s  (in Scotland) of mutual wills (Ohapter 5 ( 2 ) ) ,  and also destinations in titles to heritage
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or as to the marital power or as to both* is not 
clear)* while the theory and application of marriage 




"Updating Louisiana's Oommmity of Bains"* Robert A* 
Pascal, Professor of Law* Louisiana State University, 
Tul,I,,Eev* 1974#"?!; Vol.49* 555 (oit#d "Pascal"). 
"Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law
and Social Change"* Mary Ann Glondon* Professor of 
Law* Boston College Law School* Tul.L.Rev. 1974-75 
Vol. 49* 21# (cited "Blendon"* and referred to 
throughout this comparative Chapter* being an article 
concerned not with the Imi of Louisiana* but with the 
rules of other systems),
"Judicial Dissolution of the Marital Oommmity in 
Louisiana"* Wayne J, Lee* Tul.L.Rev, 1974-75* Vol.49 
167#
"Community Property; Symposium on Equal Rights" - 
papers there delivered: Tul.L.Rev# 1973*^ 74. Vol#48*
560 et sea*
It appears that* in Louisiana* there are opinions 
that* in matrimonial property matters* discussion is 
desirable and 'updating' of the existing system may 
be imminent.
Pascal chooses to use the expression "matrimonial 
regimes" (instead of "conjugal association" used in 
the Louisiana Covil Code)* defining them as "those 
plans of order between husband and wife particularising 
the manner in which they shall share (if at all) end 
control their assets and liabilities"^# There is 
complete freedom to contract out of the Louisiana 
system /
1 , p .555.
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system within the ‘basic framework of public order 
and decency, "Thus * spouses must be deemed to have 
contracted tacitly the community of gains to the 
extent they have not contracted expressly against 
it"^, The theory* therefore* resembles that of 
South Africa* but the practice does not* for in 
Louisiana the majority choose to live under oomimity.
In addition to its general authority (with 
regard to marriages in community) the Civil Code 
(1870)^ seems to out down contractual freedom to a 
certain extent in the matter of 'dowry' (Arts* 2337** 
81)* 'paraphernalia' (non-dotal separate property of 
the wife where the regime chosen contains an element 
of community by way of dowry or otherwise) (Arts, 
2383-91)* and the separation of property by marriage 
contract, The Code specifies also the property 
Consequences of separation a mens a et thorp and of 
the wife's acquisition of a judgment bringing to an 
end the conventional regime#
Hot all debts incurred etante matrimonio are 
community debts s those incurred "by or in the interest 
of one spouse alone" are exigible from the separate 
property of that spouse. In sum* "the community of 
gains emerges as a marriage contract under which the 
spouses agree that certain of the revenues of each 
spouse* the products of their labor end industry and 
certain of their acquisitions shall form a special 
mass within the patrimony of the husband and subject 
to his control"^# Debts incurred by the husband 
during the subsistence of the marriage for community 
purposes are dischargeable therefrom. On dissolution* 
the wife is entitled to one half of that special mass 
if she will accept full personal liability for one 
half /
1* 9 ,5 5 6 .2, of# Spanish origins (?,* p*559)# 3» p.561.
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If of mimxty debts* "or if she wi]
liability for those debta under benefit of Inventory" - #
T he o o m n m ity  o f  g a i n s  I s  n o t  a  p a r t n e r s h i p  
(Art# 260?)#
During the oommimlty* the oredltora of the 
WebaRd (whether 'separate' o r  'oommmity') may 
e n f o r o e  t h e i r  d e h te  a g a lm e t t h e  h a a b a n d 'e  p a tr im o n y *  
%Thioh inolWLea* hy virtue of the oommumity of gaima* 
b o th  'o o m m m ity ' m&â 'h u A m a ad 'e  s e p a r a t e '  a a o e to t  
#%0 oreditore of the wife (of nooeeaity* Im v iw  of 
the manner of mamagemmt of the Oommmity* her 
'e e p a r m t e ' c r e d i t o r s )  may a t t a c h  h e r  pa trim em y*  which* 
until dieeolution of #ie oomnWLty* oonelat# only of
P r o f e e e o r  D a so a l*  h a v in g  
b a c k  fro m  t h e  eyetem *
"modem womea remalm euffielently ettuoed to 1 
molemt wledom to permit the oommmity of galne to 
remain the "legal" matrimonial regime without alteration
of its  hwlo atruotare"*
/
1* 9*5 s e e  i& fraÆ*g* Oomtramt "Lcmieana Wives# Law Reform to Their Reooue"* Judi^ T» Younger (Dean of Bolloge of Law* 8yraop#e Wlverelty mad at the date of her ertiole* Profeeêôr o f  Law an d  A a a o o la te  Dean* E o lm tra  U r l v e r e l t y  s c h o o l
 -----------       _ ^ _ 3 O0 i% m * M f m . l aw h ic h  t h e  a u th o r  h i g h l i g h t s  a a p e e t e  o f  L o u is ia n a  law  w h ic h  i n  h e r  o p in io n  a r e  d e f io lw a i t .  o u td a t e d  a n d  d l e t a a t e f u l *  (e * g *  a t  p»5y$  «; " P l a i n l y  t h e  Oode* a f t e r  o a e t lm g  th e  h u a h m â  i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  f l m m e l a l  p r o v i d e r  
h e  w if e  i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  d e p e n d e n t*  s h o r e s  up  t h e
mtir  p o w e rs  o v e r  her looser etmtus i t  glvea a few In terme of net impact* these do not put hër on a with her Mehmd# In applying the Bode the courte widen the gap"#) Oertalhly jud lol^  attitudes om% be atartllng la  their fraWmwe* In the context of a dleouaelon of the extent of the w ife's duty to follow t l i e  h u a h m d #  Y oim ger q u o te s  a s  r e c e n t  a  e a s e  an  P o w e ll  V# P ,  ( 1 % 3 ) ( 1 g 2  8o*2d  6 0 9  (m * A p p # 2 a  O it* 1 9 6 g ) )  aa follows:#* "the husband hue an absolute right to /
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To support h i s  view* P a s c a l  atatoa t h a t  t h e  
wife who does not oontrlWto la money to the marriage# 
mwerthelosg wdor the basic Ifoulslamlom ^otom has 
re o o a m ia e d  h e r  e f f o r t s  " m  vzlfo# m o th e r  a M  p r i n c i p a l  
ottemdmt to the family's cultural aoode# social life# 
and Its obligations la kind for works of me] 
s o c i e t a l  o e w e m " # '^  Y oim gor m g g e s t s ^
L o u ls lm iim L  /
1
t e l l  his wife If she my work *## md emy time a mam can't refuse to allow his %fife to work In a cocktail Icimge# I think the Institution of mwriw%, ia destined for the rocks#" I t  appeared that the onus of provlmg the jw tlflo h illty  of the fact of her working was held to lie  on the wife# Ho dcuht the caee wa# selected for Its  usefulness in  the argamemt# and perhaps the nature of the lowrlng statué or even Injurious to the s raputatlom) )aw have had am effect# There is  no means of knowing whether such an attitude is  prevalent among the Loaiolmian judiciary# It is  mot thought that there ere may recent examploa of such blamtmese in Bcotlamd (though see the judioial attltudee of tW last cemtory revealed in Ohapter i@
e,g.ahar:p v« E m W &  m#0t#Rep*10 not# inMemo* 2*1S) ajid in Bcctl<md certain of
n t e  o f &C0 ee#«it »erh
Waq ■
. w ou ld  e v e n  t h e  B c u th  A f r i c a n  m a r i t a l  pow er# f i r s t #  c o m p u la o ry  a s p e c t#  enco m p ass s u # i  a
commentators are cver"#loyal to their sex*t h i s  c e n tu r y #  t h i s been the
I d e a  o f  m a m a g e  am a  affectloma e%*ode# it is aeg
traditional role of the middle end upper claee wife* Imcreasingly# at least among the middle claae.# that role M e  ahmmk# or has W e n  taimn on in addition to fu3.1 or part#»time employment# To that extent# note must be taken of a suggestion that separation of property la that moat in time with trends* "When the decline of hmieewife^marriage is combined with theendures until of assets# mota/wifi or*
P a t r i m o n i a l  % o p é rt^ %  A C o m p a ra tiv e  B tn d y  o f  'Lmf and Social Shamge" Mary Ann Blenlen# Professor of 
Law# B osW k B o l le g e  Law S c h o o l#  T n la n e  Law R ev*7o l*  49# m # 1  (H ovem W r 1 9 7 4 )*On the other hmd# true cemmmlty of property# rather than mnch*4Kermldod separation# would have bean of greater benefit to British wives of the Victorianan d  E d w a rd ia n  e r a s #Still & #mre Is a clamow for recognition of c o n t r i b u t i o n  In k in d  see B n g la n d  c f*Australia (Family Law Act# 1975; qumtlSoation of maintenance /
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Louisianian judiciary*© view of t h e  Louisiana wife 
is that of "a witless dependent",
The system o f  community of gains safeguards 
the wife's capital at marriage, and her acquisitions, 
by donation or bequest thereafter, while permitting 
her a sure c la im  in her h u s b a n d 's  subsequent prosperity, 
and  a limited liability in his m is f o r tu n e ^  # Usually 
the husband has the greater, or more prolonged, 
opportunity for career advancem en t and he must 
c o n t r i b u t e  "to the general family fund" gains a r i s i n g  
therefrom, as must the wife if she i s  in p a id  em ploym ent
The p r i n c i p a l  s o u r c e s  o f  d i s s a t l s f a o t i o n  l i e  i n
the inability after m a r r ia g e  to  c h an g e  the terms of 
t h e  r e g im e ,  and  i n  the " h i s t o r i c ,  basic concept that 
the community of g a i n s ,  during i t s  existence, ia part 
of t h e  husband's patrimony alone", ; '
The /
maintenances 8*75 provides a l i s t  o f  s p e c i f i c  (a n d
e x c l u s i v e )  factors to be taken i n t o  acpount^by the court# i n c l u d i n g  ' ’ "" ( j )  the extent to which t h e  p a r t y  w hose maintenance is u n d e r  consideration h m  contributed t o  the income, e a r n in g  c a p a c i t y ,  property and  f i n a n c i a l  resources of the other p a r t y ;  " . ■**(k) t h e  duration of t h e  marriage and the extent to w h ic h  i t  h a s  affected the e a r n in g  capacity ipf "the p a r t y  w hose m a in te n a n c e  Is u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ;  "See a l s o  e v id e n c e  of an o p en -m in d ed  a t t i t u d é & i n  "(h) the e x t e n t  to which the payment o f  maintenance to the party whose m a in te n a n c e  i s  under consideration would i n c r e a s e  t h e  earning capacity of that p a r t y  by enabling t h a t  p a r t y  to u n d e r ta k e  a course o f  eduoat3,on o r  t r a i n i n g  or to establish h i m s e l f  o r  hefqplf 'in a b u s i n e s s  o r  o th e r w is e  to obtain a n  adequata^^noome;" and " ( 1 )  the need to protect t h e  position of ,a woman who wishes only t o  continue h e r  role a s  a wife and m o th e r ;  "
The Heif Z e a la n d  M a tr im o n ia l  P r o p e r t y  A c t ,  1976i n  8*18 d e f i n e s  " a  contribution t o  the marriage partnership" as conduct falling within "all or any" o f  eight categories thereafter l i s t e d #  Bee generally Ohapter 7*2» p.576 ( a s  Ibsen's Torvald of H er a )  *1 ,  She h a s  a  c h o ic e  -  s e e
S
748
The latter problem ia t h e  more important. In 
Louisiana, c e r t a i n  acts affecting the o o m m m ity  assets 
(mainly immoveable assets) require the consent of t h e  
w if e *  but i n  other m a t t e r s ,  the administration i s  within 
the husband's discretion, and t h e r e  is no  a r e a  of 
management o f  com m unity  assets in which the w ife  i s  
competent to act alone#
I n  P r o f e s s o r  Pascal*a opinion, the options, i f  
change is desired, are, f i r s t ,  full power of each 
spouse atante matrimonio to a d m i n i s t e r  the com m unity 
assets (and full power o f  all types o f  creditor to 
attach f o r  all types of debt, com m unity  aa well as 
separate assets^) or, second, a requirement of j o i n t  
action /
Pascal, basing his opinion on h i s  v iew  o f  human nature, is not i n  favour of t h i s ,  but reports that the systems i n  use i n  A r iz o n a ,  California, Id a h o  and Washington are approaching this position (by legislation dated 1972-1975)♦ lounger enlarges upon t h i s *  i n  California, e i t h e r  spouse may be manager of the community;' in Arizona, there is equal management and  control and pow er to bind t h e  community, to be e x e r c i s e d  separately e x c e p t  i n  certain oases w h ich  r e q u i r e  joint action; in Texas, each has solo management of the community p r o p e r t y  w h ic h  he  o r  sh e  would have owned if single, unless t h e  s p o u s e s  *mi%* 
t h i s ,  in w h ic h  case t h e r e  is joint management and c o n t r o l  and over t h e  remainder of t h e  property there i s  joint control; in Hew Mexico, there must b e  joint action i n  respect o f  heritable property, but each h a s  p o w er o v e r  com m unity  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y  ( e x c e p t  for commercial community personal p r o p e r t y  i n  respect of w h ic h  t h e r e  i s  a presumption i n  favour of the husband's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ); in W a sh in g to n , e i t h e r  may control o o m m m ity , a s  t h e y  c o n t r o l  separate, p r o p e r t y ,  but under certain restrictions in the form of a r u l e  t h a t  c e r t a i n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a r e  in c o m p e te n t  w i th o u t  t h e  o t h e r ' s  c o n s e n t .  Bee a l s o  C y n th ia  B hoss W a l l ,  
Oommunity Property Bym posium , p.5 9 5  s e q .  Upondivorce, i n  Louisiana, and California^ there is equal d i v i s i o n ,  regardless of f a u l t  o r  need:, i n  Arizona, Idaho, BTevada, Mm Mexico, Texas and Washington ( t h e  other com m unity  states) t h e  aim  of "doing justice in the circumstances" i s  relevant i n  division.( B le n d o n , p.67# fn.144)#
\
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action or consent in every act concerning the 
community assets (giving, if joint action were 
prescribed, power to the creditors to enforce their 
debts out of community or separate estate and, if 
consent only was required, power to enforce their 
debts out of community estate or the separate assets 
of the 'initiating* but not of the 'consenting' 
spouse)^ or, third, to leave "one captain on the 
bridge" as at present, but to allow parties before 
marriage to designate that captàin, and to alter 
their decision on that aspect after marriage (If 
permission to choose the captain was given, but 
probably not if permission to change the captain 
also was given, Pascal suggests that renunciation 
of the community by the "unoontrolling" spouse could 
be allowed). This he considers 'the worst of all 
possible plans' both from the point of view of third 
parties dealing with the spouses and from that of 
the spouses with regard to each other.
Pascal's own solution is to allow to each spouse 
full administrative control over those community 
assets acquired by him during comanunity, and sole 
liability for oomBiunity debts incurred during that 
period, but upon dissolution of the community, to 
give to each spouse the choice of accepting or 
renouncing a one-half share of the community assets 
and liabilities acquired and incurred by the other.
Such a solution would accord with Louisiana thinking oat least t it is not a feature common in other systems .
The /
1. In neither case would renunciation of the community of gains be allowed#2# It is no longer found in France. It seems it may still be found in Sweden, by means of a pro- Bodelning marriage settlement, if such is regarded as binding on the parties* Bee also Holland; of* B*A. "order for forfeiture of benefits."
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The solution of joint action or notion w ith  
consent he f e e l s  is too cumbersome though c o - o p e r a t i o n  
m ig h t be necessary and tolerable in transactions of 
great im p o r ta n c e *
Y ounger advocates for Louisiana joint management 
of community property (the husband to lose h i s  s t a t u s  
as "head and master" ) and separate management of 
separate estate, and t h e  income thereof*
Pascal rightly stresses that the spouses " s h o u ld  
present as simple a legal posture as possible in the 
presence of third parties", and that t h e  aim s h o u ld  
a lw ay s  be for security and validity of transaction* 
"Being m a r r ie d  m u st not be made an occasion for 
inconveniencing third p e r s o n s  in their normal dealings 
with husband and wives in daily life". In h i s  own 
favoured scheme, "the spouses", as far as the public 
was concerned, "would appear as if single persons, 
each having his own patrimony". The scheme h a s  
attractions, but as its creator h im s e l f  admits, it 
does not allow the " h o u se p e rs o n "  great control over 
the salary earner's salary. T h is  i s  an important 
objection, for most females are 'housepeople* at 
some p o i n t  in their lives, although f e w e r  spend a l l  
their l i v e s  in that category.^
A right to some f i x e d  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the salary 
earner*© income P r o f e s s o r  Pascal c o n s i d e r s  should be 
p r o v id e d  by the substantive law, and not by the terms 
of a private marriage-oontract. He suggests that a 
rule be formulated in te rm s  of which, if one spouse 
was found to earn l e s s  than perhaps 2(Xf? of the joint 
combined /
Of. proposal to make actions f o r  aliment during cohabitation of s p o u s e s  competent in Scotland. S c o t t i s h  Law Commission Memo .H o . 2 2 , Propn.39. See generally proposals for change in Scotland, Chapter 7.threshold to b e  f i x e d  to suit the customs and aspirations of a particular society*
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d  ImcomoB o f  tW  s p o w e # #  h e / s h e  s h o u ld  b e  
entitled to demaW of the other the helwee neoeea 
t o  moke u p  t h a t  p r o p o r t io n » ^
I n  g é n é r a l ,  P a e o a l
33*
go#
T h e re  a r e  o t h e r  e o u ro e e  o f  â ie o o m te n t  
t h e  eyatem #  A t p r e e e n t ,  A e r e  l e  a  p ro e im p tlo m  I n  
f a v o u r  o f  t h e  o l m s e l f l o a t i m  o f  o b j e c t a  me o o m m n ity  
a e e e tB ' i m t l l  t h e  o o m tre ry  i s  p ro v e d #  P a s c a l  m ? # e  
t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  a  d e o i s l o n  b a s e d  u p o n  a  p re p o n d e rm o o  
o f  ov ldem oe f a l l i n g  a g ro e m e n t h y  t h e  p a r t i e s * '^  T h e re  
i s  a  g e n e r a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  b e tw e e n  s p o u s e s #  
T h e re  i s  i n e q u a l l i ^  I n  t h a t  a  w i f e ' s  e a r n in g s  d o  n o t  
e n t e r  oom m m ity#  w h e re a s  a  W s b m d * e  e a m in g e  mum 
so #  P a s c a l  w o u ld  w eioem e a l s o  * p r o t e o t i o n
f o r  w iv e s  "
the préjudice of her Intereat in the 
gains", and th is to he provided not so
to the aggrieved spouse of the right immeme 
sue the other spouse or a fide third party# 
d lfflon lties arise with regard to "the commingling of 
a s s e t s # " ^
In Lonislana, although
1» This tears some sim ilarity to the ohmngeeadvocated in Ohapter ? for Bootland; "Bepaa^ion
2 ,  O f# Of # #*B# definition of
3 *
? t jM atrim onla#L ,#w w ,(Hew Zealand), or definition of ^Family Assets^ or 'household chattels* aee per L# Diplook In m ttitt  V* P# 1969 2 All Ë#m, 585, at p#410,and Professor Otto Ka^ n Freund's criterion of fgmily ^80, (see Ohapter 7 ), And see definition of aSSrsets" for the purpose of new proposed sohem e f o r  B o o t la n d  O h a p te r  7#
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the other w ith  "basic support and a s s i s t a n c e " , ^  the 
husband carries a greater burden, and, to a standard 
in keeping with his ability, must furnish his wife 
with "all the conveniences of life"#^ Similarly, 
each parent must a l im e n t  his/her children in 
accordance with his/her means. (It does not appear 
that t h e  principal obligation l i e s  on the father) #
These duties of support are exigible only on proof 
of need by the obligee, but there can be no 
contracting-out of them*
A certain freedom is allowed to spouses to 
regulate these matters (as to m anner of implementation) 
for themselves by marriage contract#
If t h e  w if e  brings to the marriage a dowry, t h e  
revenues thereof "constitute h e r  contribution to t h e  
marriage expenses"^* If she brings no dowry, then 
she must contribute to t h e  e x p e n s e s  in accordance 
w i t h  h e r  income, but e v e n  if h e r  income i s  greater 
than her husband's, sh e  n e e d  not contribute to the 
extent of more t h a n  30% of h e r  income. When computing 
the income o f  t h e  spouses, that arising from community 
assets is deemed to be t h e  husband's. O n ly  after 
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  property will t h e  law e x p e c t  the w ife  
to b e a r  all t h e  expenses of the marriage if need be, 
Professor Pascal points out^, and he criticises t h e  
5 0 % rule: in the absence of contrary provision, why
should not the spouses be expected to contribute to 
t h e  h o u s e h o ld  expenses "in proportion to t h e i r  
respective total incomes from b o th  separate and 
com m unity  s o u r c e s " ?  Pascal considers that the spouses* 
duties /
1# L o u is ia n a  Civil C ode, 1 8 7 0 , Art.119#2 .  A rt#  1 2 0 .3 .  A rt*  2389# "She need contribute no m ore u n d e r  matrimonial regimes law. The h u sb a n d  th e n  m ust bear all expenses b ey o n d  the r e v e n u e s  o f  th e  dowry", Pascal, p.583»
4 .  A rt#  24-35# p . 584#
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duties to  oaoh other in  th is  matter should he equally  
onerous*^ Joint and several l i a b i l i t y  should e x is t  
only fo r  ordinary fam ily e x p e n se s*  b u t  not for other 
marriage expenses f o r  which the contracting spouse 
alone should be l ia b le ,  quoad th ird  p a r t ie s ,
In oonclusion Professor Pascal ou tlin es what he 
f e e ls  should be t h e  nature of a matrimonial regime.
I t  s h o u ld  provide regulation  by law of m a t t e r s  in  
respect of which the spouses have fa ile d  to  make, or 
have chosen not to  make, th e ir  own arrangements^, 
and I t  should be in  harmony with views c u r r e n t l y  held* 
I t  must s a t is fy  both the 'sharing* and the 
' In d iv id u a list * asp irations of married persons. 
Marriage he considers ia  a sta te  in  which (or a fter  
which* as i t  transp ires) a sharing o f gains i s  
appropriate, and  t h i s  sharing ought to  talce place a t  
the d isso lu tio n  of the common l i f e ,  as long as the 
spouse "without revenue", for  reasons o f human d ig n ity , 
i s  provided "with a minimum, to  be under h i s  orni 
con tro l, from the incom e of the other". T h ese  are 
important p o i n t s , w ell-expressed: the system of
*##paration o f Property with Ooneurrent Compensation 
of Gains * put fow ard in  Ohapter 7 f o r  S c o t la n d  i s  in  
syiapathy with them to  some ex ten t, but the central 
feature o f that system, a s  can be seen from the t i t l e  
given to  i t ,  i s  th at, w ithin a system o f separation, 
with i t s  advantages o f c la r ity , independence of action , 
and protection  o f th ird  p a r tie s , compensation to  the 
non-owning, non-eaming or economically w e a k e r  spouse 
i s  made continuously throughout the marriage.
A u sefu l review o f the substantive matrimonial 
property ru les o f  Louisiana w ith  regard to  d iv is io n  
i s  /
1* or that the r igh ts and ob ligations o f  each should be 'equalized at the greater obligation* (p .584).2# There i s  h e r e ,  th erefore , a w illin gn ess to  allow se lf-r e g u la tio n .
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is to be found in an article, "Judioial Dissolution 
of the Marital Oommunity in Louisiana" by Wayne J*
L e e ^ .
"Marriage in the Louisiana legal system carries 
w ith  it t h e  creation of a community property regime, 
with t h e  h u sb a n d  appointed by law as the head and 
master"
The community i s  one of property and/or liabilities 
acquired and/or i n c u r r e d  during t h e  marriage# The 
interesting feature here is that, although c o n t r a c t i n g -  
out is c o m p e te n t, use i s  rarely made of this facility^# 
As i n  South Africa, there can b e  no post-nuptial 
contracting-out (unless t h e  parties were not m a r r ie d  
in Louisiana, in which case one year's grace for 
d e c i s i o n  i s  allowed'^ )#
D i s s o l u t i o n  o f  the com m unity takes p l a c e  upon 
t h e  occurrence of any of the following e v e n t s  : death,
d i v o r c e ,  separation a m ensa et thoro, or upon a
successful action by t h e  wife for separation of p r o p e r ty ^ #  
However, upon d i s s o l u t i o n ,  the wife (or h e r  heirs) 
must choose one of three courses of action#
She may a c c e p t  the community unconditionally 
(thus t a k i n g  half of the assets of the community, but 
at the same time undertaking responsibility i n  her 
separate estate for half of the d e b ts  of the oommunity, 
s h o u ld  the community fu n d  be insufficient to satisfy 
them) , sh e  may renounce the community (thus r e n o u n c in g  
all interest in the community estate, but being judged 
a c r e d i t o r  f o r  the value of her separate dotal and 
extradotal effects) or she may accept t h e  community,
" i f i th  b e n e f i t  of inventory" (by so doing, protecting 
h e r s e l f  /
1# Tul.L.Hev# 1974-75, Toi#49# 167*2# Art # 2404#3# contrast South Africa; of, France*
4# A r t .  2 3 2 9 ,5# a f a m i l i a r  device in com m unity  s y s te m s  - cf. South Africa, trance, Sweden.
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hwaolf from pemwml i f  owmimlty
e s t a t e  i s  fo im â  t o  b e  I m o l v e n t *  y e t  p r w e r v l n ^  h e r  
r l# t  W m hare :W tW mot aemeta, i f  myasmot# remolm #f$w of
%o# diaGolutlon of the oommmity* the parties 
"Woome oornmmom Im Imdlvlelmm"* md the mmct stop 
l a  " P a A l t l m " *  w  j u d l e l a l #  The
volwtai^ pm tltloa (dlvlelom of Imtereete) 1# 
p e a m lm lh le  t h e r e  I s  m g rw w m t m d  I 'A ere  a l l
p a r t l o e  o o m e r m â  mm o f  a $ e  m â  p m m e n t*  <mê j% % âiolal 
p a r t i t i o n  1$  w e d  w hom  # e r o  Im d l e a # # e m m t  o r  w here  
there are Waw$ or aWont* oo*mmera# The latter 
m ethod*  i t  eppem ea# 1#  lo n g  m â  a o ^ ^ lo x *  m d  a t t o w t o  
mm- made 'by p r a e t i t lo m o r m  t o  w o l d  i t s  w e *
Artlolo 1ÊB9 of # . 0  Oivll Oode atmtoo*#^  %o 
omo ow h# oo^elled to hoM pmperty with mother* 
WLeae the oomWmt ham Mem a$ieeo& up<m$ myomo 3ms 
a r l# t  to dmmd the divioloa of a thing WM Im 
ommom* b y  t h e  m o tlo a  o f  p a r t i t i o n * "  L e e  o o x m m ts  
# a t "Th# right to partitim  arlaea from the state 
o f  im d lv l& e â  o w m r n r e h l p *  œ â  i s  Im g p m e o r ip t lh lo  a e  
lm $ m the property la held 1# It aema*
oltlmg; AA*1504# BiagToly th is mmt he r m d  Wbjeot to the am.iea o<moer%%i% the olromaetonoee Im  which dlesolutlw  oowm . elmoe otMrwlme tho proMMtioa of natMmmlml 3^party altération%mulé not he ohuerved Im every parmoular? (The d lm o lu t im L  m tloH  m eM  mo mmm tioa o f  m  a c t i o n  %" ^w*hnrd for séparation of w>p0fty: peihapo ho Im hie ImtëMeta#; la  thia m?Da* * :ii p r o p e r t y  r u l w  a n d  p r o p e r t yr u l o n  M cot* 0 f .  Im B o o tlm m *  oe^mon p r o p e r t y  (each holng u?)lo to mllemate him/her and todWRtmd <tlvlal(m and sale) oM joint property (the property hoix^ f,; vested la  or rll$  aomwaoing to tW owvlvor(u}* and mot jnatlf am a#i<m of dlvi,eien md nuie fem e#  w  dl ,olutiom of the l0#gal relatlom&hip'OD whl-# i t  is  bwed"# (Bœo# MoeA-l* S»#0$ fa*1* m& S3ee 6#5$)# Of* Gloa# œâ  Bmâemm. (y #  #d#) , . (though the pweago la  t h o u g h t  t o  W  t e e  w id e ly  .drawn b y  the- a o o t t l a h
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though, that the p arties may agree that there w il l  
be no p a rtitio n  for a certa in  time*
Before d isso lu tio n , the husband's powers o f  
adm inistration o f the property are so great as to  
resemble ownership thereof* The w ife 's  p roprietoria l 
righ ts therein  are thus 'im perfect' or suspended, yet 
nevertheless th is  i s  not an example o f a deferred  
community system such as found in  Sweden and Germany, 
b u t  a true community, such as those in  existence in  
South A frica and France, and to  which t h e  S cottish  
communlo bonorum aspired*
The theory o f p artitio n  i s  th a t , once i t  i s  
made, the items o f  property a r e  regarded as having 
b e e n  always t h e  exclusive property o f t h e  owner, but 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  ar ise  because, i f  t h e  ru les of adm inistration  
s tant a matrimonio and during com m unity  have been 
observed, th ird  p arties  have acquired r igh ts by v irtu e  
o f transactions entered in to  with t h e  co-owner spouse 
authorised to  a c t , and these r i g h t s  are upheld* T h is  
i s  u nsatisfactory  in  lo g ic , and y e t ,  a s  Lee com m ents, 
no other ru le could p rev a il, i f  during community one 
spouse i s  to  be  vested with powers of a d m in i s t r a t io n *  
Perhaps then the former n o t io n  s h o u ld  be  c r it ic is e d ,  
although i f  i t  be held t h a t  righ ts in  community 
•c r y s ta l l is e '  a t d isso lu tio n , h a v in g  been ' f l o a t i n g '  
b efore, w ould  th is  resemble too c l o s e l y  ideas o f  
deferred /
Law O om m ission* Hemo*Eo*4l, 6*61, fn*3#)s*» "Ho o ne  i s  bound to remain i n d e f i n i t e l y  associated  with another or o t h e r s  in  the o w n e rsh ip  of common property* Any one o f  the proprietors may, even against the wish of the o t h e r s ,  i n s i s t  on  a d i v i s i o n  of t h e  p r o p e r t y * T h zs r i g h t  to  have the property divided i s  a necessary incident o f  common property, and i t  i s  i n  law im possible to  create common property and  at the sam e time to  exclude t h i s  right" ( s e n te n c e  c r it ic is e d )*
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w ouM  i t  m ot b o  l i k e n e d
W ith  r e g a r d  t o  m o v eab le  p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  a c t i o n  
p a r t i t i o n  "may no%f" (e lm o o  th e  Oode o f  O l v l l  
1 9 # 0 ) "b e  b ro u g h t  a e  m% In o id e m t t o  t h e  
a c t i o n  d i s s o l v i n g  t l i e  o o im im lty  o r  a a  a  s e p a r a t e  
a c t i o n  I n  t h a t  p a r i s h "  ( p r e e im h h ly  o n ly  a f t e r  
d l s e o l u t l o n  I n  t h e  f i r s t  a c t i o n  h w  W o n  g r a n te d ) #  
W hore t h e r e  i s  iz m o v e a h lo  p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  a c t i o n  o f  
p a r t l t l c m  o f  ( a l l )  "Me o o m m m ity  p r o p e r t y  may h e  
b r o u g h t  I n  t h e  "T en u e"  w h e re  t h e  Im m oveahle  p r o p e r t y  
o r  a n y  o f  i t  i e  s i t u a t e d *  T he c o n f l i c t  p ro h le m e , 
i f  a%W# a r i e lm g  a r e  n o t  d la c u e B e d , heyom d a  s t a t e m e n t  
i^fhlch i n d l e a t e a  L e e 'a  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r e a t  o f
t h e  l e x  a i t u #  i n  t W  muw
W here a n  a c t i o n  f o r  p a r t i t i o n  i a  r a i o e d ,  t h e  
ju d g e  s h o u ld  "prom oim ce ### i n  a  o c m m ry  Kammer*""^
I moam* t h a t  h e  s h o u ld  a t t e n d  t o  t h e  r e q u e s t  f o r
t z t i e n  a s  qi
p ro fe ro m c e  o v e r  o r d i n a r y  l i t i g a t i o n #  I f  p a r t i t i o n  
l a  j u d i c i a l ,  i t  l e  im u a l  ( t h o u ^  n o t  m eooaeary#  im le s e  
t h e  c o u r t  CO d i r e c t s )  f o r  a  p u b l i c  Im re n to ry *  o r  a t
l e a s t  a  d e s c r i p t i v e  l i s t #  t o  W  d rm m  u p ,  i t e m i s i n g  
an d  v a lu lm g  a l l  ccimim% ity p r o p e r ty # ^
T he l i  
p a r t i t d
1# P#1?0# it seems that attack at any point mayb e  c o m p e te n t#2# T he is v e m to r y  i #  c o m p ile d  h y  a  n o t a r y  a p p o in te d  
h y  t h e  c o u r t#  o r  h y  m ore t h a n  o n e  (o n e  i n  e a c h  p a r i s h  i%% w h ic h  t h e  co m m m lty  h a s  p r o p e r ty ) #  %t a  p u b l i c  docum en t o n ly  i n  t h e  s e m e  t h a t #  u p o n  
r e q u e s t#  t h e  n o t a r y  m u st m k e  a v a i l a b l e  a  co p y  t o  t h e  p e r s o n  re q m ^ '^ tin g  i t :  a  p i :(h lish e é  l i s t  o f
t h e  m a t e r i a l  w e a l th  o f  a  œ r r l a g o  w o u ld  h a r d l y  ho  c i v i l i s e d *  L ee n o t e s  th a t ;  n e i t h e r  t h e  O i v l l  Oode n o r  t h e  Code o f  O l v l i  F ro c e d o re  s p e c i f y  t h e  n o t a r y 's  p o w e rs  t o  a o a r c h  o u t  o o m m m ity  a s s e t s  h e l d  h y  a n  " im co o p ea^ a tlv e  sp o u s e " *  F o r  d e t a i l s #  s e e  Leo#
a y a tem  i a  o p e ra t io n ^
g  exam^
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partition, but is not oonciuaivo# Lo© notes that 
"this lix>Goaclusive nature can create p ro b le m s" #  
nevertheless, much c re d e n c e  Is given to the inventory 
and c e r t a i n l y  frivoloUC attack would lengthen a  
lengthy procedure # Lee suggests that parties be 
allowed a certain t im e  in w h ich  to "traverse" ( a t t a c k )  
the i n v e n t o r y ,  after which the inventory could be 
challenged only on fraud, but he does not describe 
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  rules p r e s e n t l y  in operation# Surely 
t h e  "inconclusive n a tu r e "  muet mean that attack may 
be made o n  certain grounds? If not, t h e  n o t a r y  
t a k e s  on  the mantle o f  a judge, let a final l i n e  
must be drawn som ew here*^ The a n sw e r lies probably 
i n  the rules concerning onus of proof, outlined below*
Then follows the accounting# In the partition, 
account must be taken o f  debts owed by the community 
t o  husband or wife,
The separate estate of each spouse i s  itemised# 
There are three c l a s s e s  of property, therefore: the
h u s b a n d 's  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  w i f e ' s  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r t y  and community p r o p e r t y ,  The position about 
onus of proof ia that t h e r e  i s  a presiuEption t h a t  all 
property possessed by the s p o u s e s  at the t im e  of 
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  com m unity  is com m unity  property# 
Hence the b u rd e n  o f  proving t h a t  an i te m  i s  s e p a r a t e  
property l i e s  on  t h e  party so  averring#^ "Gratuitous 
a c Q u ire n d a " are h e l d  n o t  to be com m unity  a s s e t s ,  n o t  
i s  property brought to the marriage b y  the p a r t i e s ,  
o r  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  during the marriage by u s e  of 
su c h  p r o p e r t y , ^
The n e x t  s t a g e  i s  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  c la im s  made
b y  /
1 ,  Bee L e e , p p . 1 7 2 /173#2# A r t ,  2405# ( 1 8 7 0 ) ,3# Lee, p,174s t h i s  i s  a less full-blooded system o f  community th a n  fo u n d  i n  South Africa, therefore and  perhaps f o r  that reason more acceptable to the majority?
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b y  husband o r  w if e  for reimbursement from the 
community of m oney advanced to it or uaed for its 
benefit# There may b e  problems of proof, the wife- 
creditor, i n  view o f  her lack of administrative 
c o n t r o l#  e n jo y in g  a n  a d v a n ta g e  h e r e  i n  t h a t  sh e  
n e e d  show  o n ly  t h a t  s h e  h a d  s e p a r a t e  fo n d s  wW.oh 
w ere  delivered to t h e  h u sb a n d  "or expended for the 
benefit of t h e  oom m on lty " .  T h e re  I s  a presumption 
t h a t  the fo n d s  benefited t h e  oom m onity , rebuttable 
b y  t h e  h u s b a n d . There is no such beneficial 
presumption i n  respect of th e  h u s b a n d 's  separate 
f u n d s .  The husband m u st show t h a t  his funds w ere  
used to en h an ce  th e  v a lu e  of the community, and  a l s o  
"that the com m unity  was s t i l l  e n jo y in g  t h e  benefit 
at t h e  t im e  of its dissolution", IThere t h e  benefit 
has b e e n  the o t h e r  way - by community to e i t h e r  
spouse - "the other spouse, n o t  the commuaity, has 
a claim f o r  h a l f  o f  the increase in value of
b e n e f i t e d  separate estate ", there being no need to 
reimburse the com m unity  ^ "since only one spouse has 
suffered any detriment"- #^
As i s  usual in com m unity  systems where th e  
husband is t h e  captain on the bridge, the law allows 
to t h e  wife a measure of protection of her interests.
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  a c t i o n  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  
a l r e a d y  mentioned, t h e r e  i s  th e  possibility of t a k i n g  
out aa i n j u n c t i o n  against the h u s b a n d 's  aliénation 
of or encumbrance of o o m m m ity  p r o p e r t y ^  ( a remedy 
now /
1 ,  L e e ,2* A r t ,  SW B ,3# Lee, p,.1?5# As t o  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  principle o f  "Retroactivity" s e e  Lee, p p * 1 7 5 -1 7 7 ,4, This remedy appears to b e  l i n k e d  t o  o r  ancillary to actions for s e p a r a t i o n  o r  divorce# C o n s id e r  Sc,1,0.Memo,Ho,41 ( s u g g e s t io n s  to protect non- owning sp o u se  i n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home) w h ic h  at 6*21 at s e q . i s  concerned t o  devise rules preventing alienation o r  b u r d e n in g  of the matrimonial home without consent of the non-omer ("the n o n -o w n e r 's  veto /
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#  h m h m d s  b y  G o #  e f  O l v i l  P m w 4 w 0 $  
19# )*  mà m œ e #  W mla# %#
t o  0 #  m i tMse& parM em *
# i #  m% W #f W t w ly  m  proof
O f p o w W #  # « t  I w e #
%iew m  wuM  W im effeoi##* w
w d umWMmMe* # e  w #  m qum tm tlon  
m # be o f m#* # 1 ^  property $ wv#$bl$
md wWLeh # #  êefmMw# &w p e» r
lm  W t  " o f  m i #  $ W  o I ^ W #  " # a
w m w M # w  t#  pomeemlom#"" # e  
(##M%r) i#  é l m # #  mim of the phyBieal w m #ol 
0 v «  t h e  V & ew  t w  w m %  & bmlmoem;;#
t& w #* w  of mimilw $W a#fo^am% oma
"hm# # $  mm#$ w  hmm I t  mW.ml#W0& % #W 
B heria  I f  a w w ity  1# pmvMe# %y a m iM
TW weAümee# of %Me êevioe le  m strlo teâ  
i t  m#" %# % ###$) % # e  fm t t h #  # e  
wife* w i l l  # #  o#z^w #y 1# ##$oïwê%  hem »  #%.#
#  # # l y  f w  I t #  Tlr/AT# w #  f w # # r  
upm # 0  Mebmâ i^gÿ tmmamotiom# im W
wm am ity pmjgwty tw  pwi#d cr .imolm# with the 
ImlMaMw o f # #  fw  oepgm^tiw w  awwee#*^
I t  e e m e  % # $  t h e  h w h am #  m m t a w m m t  f o r  h im  
i n t w m i m # ! # #  # $ h  t W  o w m m i t y  p r o p e r t y  o n ly  w  
f r m .  t w  # & #  o f  f l l & #  # f  # e  m i t  I b r  d l v o r a e  o r
v e t o " ) *  Im r e # o m % #  # o  P a e u l t y  o f  Law . 
o f  G lu& ue^ # u $ g e o to d  t h e  % #  o f  t h e  o x in tlu r*  d m rlo e  o f  a  n w  f o a )  .iU ) tc 4  t o  a
T rop0% ty  & o # o W p #  ( l# e #  o f  o h o r n  m otio# '"  1 #  t h e  "M aw hio^dLol
P rO W '^ tT  R n r ; W t W " )*  se e  now 1981 A c t .
% # ' B o o t t ic ï"  la .  a0yr»t©/i p i  D lv # (W $ )  Ao%$ i# 7 6 $  a#6#
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acpm rm tiOB# " O h v lo w ly *  h u E b m d s  aw are  e f  
% e  Imrnlmmmo o f  #  p o e e lh l#  s u i t  f o r  d lv e r o o  o r  
B o p a r a t lo n  m d  earn # m l r  oom W ol t o  t h e i r  owm 
a d v a n ta g e *
Bowmmr# Im volimtary p artltlow , whore the 
wife aimpeo# frmd* the Louis Ima oowta hwo 
Imposed % fMuolaiy duty on the hwhamd (to got forth 
a l l  m a t t e r #  W bloh a r e  % * elev m t) am# L ee  e u g g m t#  '' 
t h a t  t h i s  m l ^ t  h #  o x te M e #  w l%  p r o f i t  t o  t h e  o a o e  
"w h e re  # e  w if e  o a n  show  e o n t r m r w e l a l  t% *m #ao tlong  
a t  a  t im e  whom t h e  W ohsm # h a #  romsom t o  know o f  t h e  
Im m edleoy  o f  m m u lt  f o r  o e p w a t lo m  o r  d iv o r c e * "
S u r e ly #  th o u g h #  t h e  o p p o r ta m lty  for 
m d  s o l f '- l m t e r o a t M  a o t l o a  e x lo t o  f o r  t h e  mma%er of 
t h e  p r o p e r ty #  th ro W ^ ^ u u t tb #  m a r r ia g e ?  P re a im a h ly #  
aa in other eyatema (for example* Frawe)* It le for 
moh oonduot that #e remedy of eeparation of property 
e x i s t e *
g l a l a l s i
Whim the Iweatorlee have heem made up* am# 
a o o o im te é  f o r  t h e  e p m a e e *  " t h e  meteapy d lv M o e  
t h e  rem alm im g aoeeta e q u a l ly *  t h i s  d lv ie le m  p r w id lm g  
t h e  b a e l e  f o r  t h e  m o W r y 's  m g g e e t l o a  f o r  t h e  
dletrlhutlom of the oemomity effeoW* The euggeeto# 
p a r t i t i o n  w i l l  h e  'hom ologate#* '-^  w l e m  m y  o r  a l l  o f  
t h e  o h je o t io m e  o f  e i t h e r  o r  b o th  p a r t i e s  mro m w te im e #  
(h y  t h e  c o u r t ? )  i n  w h ic h  # a ao  # e  m o tm ry 'e  p a r t i t i o n  
w i l l  h o  a d j u s t # #  a o o o rd lm g ly #
% & yeloaI d l v l a l o a  o f  m m # 8  l a  f w o w e #  h y  t h e
105* Y e t I#oe f a v w r a  mom# p r o t e e t io m  f o r  t h e  ,_ m ln l$ t r a W r . an d  a e e e  a  e e r t a l n  m e r i t  1#  t h e  u l e  (w h ic h  m llow o o h a l l e n g e e  i a  r e e p o o t  o f  o o t io n o  t h a t  d a te *  o n ly  on  t h e  g ro tm d  o f  f r a u d # ),* a
%%o;; d e f l) ie d *  h j#  m em ilng* p r e e w a h ly *  ap p ro im #  h y  
j w r t i e a  (a*%& b y  t h e  c o u r t *  iH' j u d i c i a l  p a r t i t i o m ? )
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Code, but if this is inappropriate, t h e r e  may be 
sal© and division, Partition may be partly in kind 
and partly by "licitation" (general a d ju s tm e n t  o r  
equalisation by paym en t of money), This i s  a m a t t e r  
within the discretion and f o r  the discretion of the 
court#
If sale is decided upon, it takes place in th e  
form of public auction, following publication of 
prescribed advertisements # There seems to b e  no
general r e q u i r e m e n t  that there b e  a reserve p r i c e  #
The spouses themselves may bid, and if a spouse who 
is owner of a one half share in the item i s  successful 
in the bid, he would pay to the o t h e r  one half of the 
auction price#
Oommunity creditors, ev en  if unsecured, are 
rred tc 
community /
p r e f e e o separate creditors* Even if the
1# Lee, p*186# This may be so, but Pascal states that the Code nowhere provides for the ranking inter b o  of "oommunity" and "separate" creditors, since""" creditors are not directly affected by the matrimonial regime of the spouses*In quos t i o n # If separate creditors, they may look to that spouse's whole
_ affects (see Pascal, pp*55G-557)# Itaffects only the spouses directly# And s e e  Pascal's spirited clarion call (Ultima Verba# pp*58S-587)î "Marriage and the marriage regime''"of t h e  spouses should have t h e  very least possible effect on the actual and potential patrimonial relations between the spouses as i n d i v i d u a l  persons and t h e  general public# As much as p o s s i b l e ,  a  matrimonial regime should not change the mode in w h ic h  the s p o u s e s  and 
t h i r d  p e r s o n s  deal with each other# The regime, as much a s  possible, s h o u ld  have its effects only b e tw e e n  the spouses themselves# As to the world, the spouses should b e  as if unmarried* Although the author has not departed so far fro m  t r a d i t i o n  i n  his recommendations, i t  might b e  well to consider w h e th e r  third persons should e v e r  have to stop to c o n s id e r  t h e  m a r r ie d  or single state of t h e  persons with whom they a r e  dealing, much less t h e i r  matrimonial regimes# The matrimonial regime should be a matter o f  p r i v a t e  o r d e r  i n  the strictest sense." And at p#584s "For the sake o f  an orderly legal science, the effects of contracts must be kept between the parties#"
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oommunity a s s e t s  are ©Aansted^ the c r e d ito r s  s t i l l
have a personal cla im  a g a in st the huahaM , and a g a in st
the w i f e ,  i f  she hae accepted  the co m m m ity  u n c o n d itio n a lly
R e sc is s io n  o f  P a r t it io n
A p a r t it io n  (vo lu n tary  or j u d ic ia l )  may be rescin d ed  
on t h e  grounds o f  er ro r , l e s io n ,  v io le n c e  or fraud#
®heso a r e  l e s s  l ik e l y  to  occur where p a r t it io n  has 
been j u d i c i a l #  I f  t h e  error i s  m e re ly  one  o f  
in advertence or o m issio n , m atters can be remedied b y  
amendment or supplem ental p a r t it io n #  'fhe 'le s io n *  
must be "of m ore th a n  one f o u r t h  p a r t  o f  t h e  va lu e o fpt h e  property" b efore  i t  w i l l  found r e s c i s s io n ,  and 
the remedy may n ot b e  a v a ila b le  i n  j u d ic ia l  p a r t it io n s# ^
An a c t io n  to  re sc in d  a p a r t it io n  p rescr ib e s  i n  
f iv e  years#
C le a r ly , t h i s  i s  a system  accep tab le  and workable 
i n  L ou isiana  , but in  S c o t l a n d ,  unused to  in v e n to r ie s  
and  a c c o u n t in g  and p a r t i t io n , so m e th in g  l e s s  complex 
might b e  thoughtto b e  the w ish  o f th e  m ajority  ( i f  
change i s  d e s ir ed ) and in  t h i s  resp ect t h e  s y s te m  
advocated i n  Chapter 7 would co n ta in  advantages In  
t h a t ,  com pensation having taken p la ce  during m a r r i a g e ,  
d iv is io n  at term in ation  would be more straightforw ard^?  
e a c h  /
i#  L ee, p,187# Bee s u p r a  2# 4 r t# 1 5 9 S #3» Bee p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  no s e t  p r ic e  need be reached  
i n  auction#4# Lee a t p#18B o u t l i n e s  h is  p rop osa ls fo r  reform#(Che absence o f  advocacy o f r a d ic a l change su g g ests  perhaps th a t h is  view  i s  th a t  e i t h e r  t h e  sy s te m  g e n e r a l l y  i s  w e l l  su ite d  to  L o u i s i a n a 's  n e e d s  (o f#  P a sca l;  Bee Y ounger and W all) or t h a t i t  i s  so  e n tr e n c h e d  th a t amendment i s  l ik e l y  t o  be  more 
b e n e f i c i a l  t h a n  r e v o lu t io n #9# 3?his i s  s o m e th in g  o f  a g en er a lisa tio n #  Hot a l l  cou p les w ould  choose concurrent com pensation o f  ga in s and th ere would s t i l l  be t h r e e  c a te g o r ie s ;  B e p a r a tc  property o f  each and f a m i ly  a sse ts*  See O h a p te r  7# In v en to r ie s  m ig h t be necessary#
764
each party would ta],ce his/her separate property and 
a one-^ half share of family assets#
Sources
file Modern F re n c h  Law: Professor A#0olomer ( C h a p te r  IV 
of "Comparative Law of Matrimonial Property" ed* Albert 
K l r a l f y  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
fhe Status of Women i n  Prances D a n ie ls  Alexandre 
20 American J o u r n a l  o f  Comparative Law (1972)#
La Oommunante Conjugale N o u v e l le :  Rene Savatier*
A t the beginning of t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  century^ 
financially and in other ways wives i n  F ra n c e  were at 
a g r e a t e r  disadvantage th a n  t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t s  in 
S c o t la n d * ^  Since t h e n ,  there have b e e n  im p o r ta n t
changes, many of them of r e c e n t  d a te *
When speaking of the French system of matrimonial 
p r o p e r t y ,  it is the statutory system (community of 
moveables and acquests) to which reference is made*
It has b e e n  said that only 2 W  o f  French couples 
choose /
1# Professor O lendon  ( "Matrimonial Property: A Oomparative Study of Law and Social Change") describes the differences of approach which existed in 19th century F ra n c e  # fhe South favoured the dotal system based on  Roman Law, and the N o r th  the com m unity  of moveables and acquests# ffihe latter system was adopted b y  the Oivil Code, 1804 to govern those cases n o t  governed b y  private m a r r l a g e ^ o o n t r a c t  # Bee 
m u l.L # R e v . 1 9 7 W 5  V o l# 4 9 , p # 2 1 . U nder t h e  d o t a l  system "Ownership was d e te rm in e d  b y  the m a r r ia g e  contract, which d e s ig n a t e d  which property would b e  s e p a r a t e  and which would c o n s t i t u t e  the dowry" »W ith  r e g a r d  to the dowry, at p#27, t h e  husband's l i m i t e d  powers of administration Professor G lendon  l i k e n s  to those of a common law trustee# On the other hand, the h u s b a n d 's  c o n s e n t  was necessary for the w i f e ' s  acts relating to h e r  own estate#2# since o n ly  approximately that percentage choose to make a marriage contract (O o lo m er, p#81)*
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Choose not to have their financial affairs governed 
b y  th e  g e n e r a l  law *
O r i g i n a l l y ,  t h e  c o m m o n  f u n d  I n  F r a n c e  w a s  n e i t h e r  
a  c o m m u n i t y  o f  p r o p e r t y  a n d  p r o f i t  a n d  l o s s  ( " f u l l -  
b l o o d e d "  o n  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  m o d e l )  n o r  y e t  m e r e l y  
a  c o m m u n i t y  o f  a c q u e s t s #  I t  r e s e m b l e d  t h e  f o r m e r  
m o r e  t h a n  i t  d i d  t h e  l a t t e r ,  f o r  t h e  f u n d  c o m p r i s e d ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  m o v e a b l e  a c a u l r e n d a * m o v e a b l e s  b ro u g h t  b y  
t h e  s p o u s e s  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e #  I t  i n c l u d e d  a l s o  
i m m o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  f o r  v a lu e  d u r in g  t h e  
m a r r i a g e ,  b u t  n o t  h e r i t a g e  a c q u i r e d  g r a t u i t o u s l y ,  
n o r  h e r i t a g e  owned b y  e a c h  a t  m o rriq g e #
M anagem ent w a s  i n  a l m o s t  a l l  r e s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  
h u s b a n d ;  c e r t a i n  p r o t e c t i v e  d e v i c e s  e x i s t e d  f o r  t h e  
b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  w i f e .  D i v i s i o n  w a s  ( a n d  i s )  m a d e  a t  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  o o m m n ity *  P r o f e s s o r  O o l o m e r  
a r g u e s ^  t h a t  t h e  s y s te m , a s  d e v i s e d  i n  1 8 0 4 ,  " w a s  an  
a d m i r a b l e  p i e c e  o f  w o r k  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  i n  a l m o s t  
c o m p l e t e  harm ony w i th  t h e  s o c i a l ,  e c o n o m i c  and  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  F r a n c e  a t  t h a t  p e r i o d .
B u t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  h a s  n o t  s t o o d  t h e  t e s t  o f  t i m e , . , # "
R eform  commenced at the beginning o f  t h i s  c e n tu ry #
B y  t h e  l a w  o f  J u l y  1 3 ,  1 9 0 7 ,  t h e  w i f e  b e c a m e  m a n a g e r  
o f  h e r  own p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  th r o u g h  h e r  own s e p a r a t e  
e m p l o y m e n t ^ #  A f t e r  t h e  p a s s i n g  o f  t h e  l a w s  o f  J u l y  1 3 ,  
1 9 3 8  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 2 ,  1 9 4 2 ,  t h e  w i f e  c o u ld  c o n t r a c t  
w ith o u t  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  c o n s e n t  an d  a u t h o r i t y #  H o w e v e r ,  
t h e  h u sb a n d  a s  h e a d  o f  t h e  com m unity r e t a i n e d  t h e  
a d a i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  e n jo y m e n t o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  t h e  w i f e ,  on  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y # $ h u s ,  
t h e  w i f e ' s  p o w e r s  e x t e n d e d  o n l y  o v e r  t h e  r e v e r s i o n a r y  
i n t e r e s t  /
1 #  O o l o m e r ,  p # 8 2 #a# O f #  M # V # B #  ( S o # )  A c t ,  1 8 7 7 ,  2 ,3 #
3 #  O o lo m er, p * 8 2 #
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I n t e r e s t  i n  h e r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  an d  t h i r d  p a r t i e s
w e re  fo im d  t o  b e  w ary  o f  c o n t r a c t i n g  v f l th  a  w i f e  
w i th o u t  t h e  h u s b a n d 'a  ooneem t*
F v o u t u a l l y ,  b y  t h e  law  o f  J u l y  1 3 ,  1965$ t h e  
F%^noh l e g i s l a t u r e  d e c id e d  upo n  a  e y e te m  o f  com m unity  
o f  a c q u e e te  a lo n e  i n  p r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
e y e tem ,'^  i n  o r d e r  t o  m ee t t h e  dem and f o r  re fo rm #
(Bhe p o e i t l o n  now i s  t h a t  a  m ore l i b e r a l  o r  m odem  
a p p ro a c h  t o  t h e  r o l e a  and  r i g h t e  o f  th e  a p o u ee e  e x i s t s  
I n  t h e  g e n e r a l  I m f ,  a n d ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  l a  freed o m  
t o  t h e  a p o u ee a  t o  m o d ify  ^ o a e  r u l e s  s t i l l  f u r t h e r  
t o  s u i t  t h e i r  own u e ed a *  O e r t a i u  b a s i c  r u l c a  a lw a y s  
apply*'"*
S in c e  1% 5$  t h e  w if e  may c h o ce o  W r  o c c u p a t io n  
an d  u n d e r ta k e  t h a t  em ploym ent w i th o u t  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s e n t#  The a a rn im g a  s h e  r e c e i v e s  a r e  h e r  " r e s e r v e d
p r o p e r ty "  i f l t h  w h ic h  s h e  may do a s  ehe  p l e a s e s ,  a n d  
" r e e e r v o d  p r o p e r ty "  a l s o  w i l l  b e  an y  p r o p e r t y  w h ic h  
sh e  a c q u i r e e  w i th  t h o e e  e m m ln g a * ^
T h e re  n e v e r  w as a n y  d o u b t  a b o u t  t h e  Im e b a n d 's  
r i g h t  t o  c h o o se  h i e  own em ploym ent# The q u e e t io n  
w h ich  m u st b e  a n sw e re d  le x  do h i s  e a m lu g s  becom e h i s  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  a l e c ,  o r  m u st th e y  go  i n t o  t h e
im m ity  f u n d ,  a e  m uet t h e  e a r n in g s  o f  t h e  L o u is ia n a
and?
The p ro b le m  a p p e a rs  t o  b e  s o lv e d  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o
/
1# O olom er (p * 8 3 )  u o te a  t h a t  no^^one th o u g h t  o f  a d v o c a t in g  t h e  Dower Bye tern ( o f#  a ie a & o a , f a *  ( a b o v e )  t h e n  lo n g  i n  d e c l in e #2# A r ts #  214^220#3# Wife's earned income amounts to T^iong. reserves, o v e r  w h ic h  s h e  h a s  pow er o f  a d m i n i s B a t I w l ) u t , 
i f  the marriage i s  in community, she is subject to c e r t a i n  r e s t r i o t i e n s  m c o n c e r n in g ,  f o r  e x a m p le , t r a n s f e r s  o f  t i t l e ,  g i f t s  "an d  e v e n  c e r t a i n  l e a s e e "  
Bee A le x a n d r e ,  p#S50*
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t h e  r u l e s  o f  o o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  e x p e n s e s  o f  m a r r i e d1l i f e ,  r u l e s  w h i c h ,  a s  P r o f e s s o r  O o l o m e r  s a y s  ,  h a v e  
t w o  a s p e c t s ,  t h e  f i r s t  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  r i g h t s  a n d  
l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  i n t e r  s e ,  a n d  t h e  s e c o n d  
g o v e r n i n g  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t r a n s a c t i n g  
w i t h  o n e  o r  o t h e r  o r  b o t h  o f  th e  s p o u s e s #
In  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  p r i v a t e  p a c t i o n ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n
i s  d e m a n d e d  f r o m  e a c h  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  m e a n sPo f  e a c h ,  b u t  " t h e  w if e  m a y  s u p p l y  h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
b y  s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  h o m e  o r  u n r e m u n e r a t e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  h e r  h u s b a n d ' s  o c c u p a t i o n # " ^  P r o f e s s o r  O o l o m e r ' s  
c o m m e n t  u p o n  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  A r t i c l e  " p r o v i d e s  
t h a t  a c c o u n t  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  o f  h e r  w o r k  a t  h o m e  o r  
o f  h e r  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  i n  h e r  h u s b a n d ' s  w o r k ,  a s  i n  
b o t h  c a s e s  s h e  m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  s a v e s  h e r  h u s b a n d  e x p e n s e  
o n  s t a f f
As i s  u s u a l ,  t h o u g h ,  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f a l l s  o n  t h e  h u s b a n d ,  a n d  h e  m u s t  p r o v i d e  h i s  w if e  w i t h  
" t h e  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  l i f e " ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  h i s  s i t u a t i o n #  
O o l o m e r  d e d u c e s  f r o m  t h i s ^  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d  c a p a b l e  o f  
s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  h o u s e h o ld  c a n n o t  d e m a n d  fro m  a  n o n - s a l a r y  
e a r n i n g  w i f e  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  fro m  h e r  s e p a r a t e  c a p i t a l ,  
a n d  t h a t  a  m a r r i a g e - o o n t r q c t  c o u l d  c o m p e t e n t l y  e x o n e r a t e  
t h e  w i f e  b u t  n o t  t h e  h u s b a n d  f r o m  m a k i n g  a n y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t o  t h e s e  e x p e n s e s #  I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r ,  h o w e v e r , t h a t  a  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  w i l l  b e  e x p e c t e d  f r o m  a  s a l a r y - e a r n i n g  
w i f e ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  h u s b a n d  b e  n o t  i n d i g e n t # ^
W ith  r e g a r d  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  O olom er r e l a t e s ^  
t h a t ,  b e f o r e  1 9 6 5 ,  s u p p l i e r s  c o u l d  r e s t  a s s u r e d  t h a t  
i n  /
1 # p # 8 6 *  ( t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y #
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
2 .  A r t #  2 1 ^ -*3 .  A le x a n d r e ,  p . 5 9 1 , m aking  r e f e r e n c e  t o  A r t .  214-.
4 .  p p . 8 6 - 8 7 .9 .  p . 8 6 .6 .  C o n t r a s t  M .W .P ,(S c .)  A c t ,  1 9 2 0 , s . 4 .
7 .  P . 8 7 .
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In every case of a debt incurred for household 
expenditure, they could sue the husband f o r  the 
whole amount# T h is  gave theâ i i i  most cases 
sufficient remedy and safeguard, u n l e s s  the husband 
was a man of straw#,^  On the Matter of the welding o f  
t h e o r y  t o  facts h e r e , ^  the F re n c h  courte favoured the 
t h e o r y  that the husband had im|liedly authorised the 
w if e  to act for him, an I m p l i e d  authorisation which, 
b y  Article 220 o f  the law of S e p tem b er 22, 1 9 4 2 , was 
transformed into a legal power the w ife #  Although 
under t h e  theory of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the husband was
l i a b l e  ; in certain situations, tÉ# wife a l s o  was liable%in h e r  separate estate* for example, u n d e r  the system 
of separation of property, there w%s joint and s e v e r a l  
liability; arrestment of the rescued property of 
the wife , ("even when they had treatèd with the h u sb a n d  
i n  prison"^) was competent, and in tÈ e  husband's 
in s o lv e n c y ,  l i a b i l i t y  fell on the w ifà^  even if she 
had contributed already her due proportion of the 
h o u s e h o ld  expenses# -
A,According to Oolomer , this position\could not 
fall to provoke c r i t i c i s m ,  in that i t  upset the balance 
between the powers of the spouses and, paradoxically, 
"assured the creditor's better p r o t e c t i o n  under the 
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  sy s te m  th a n  u n d e r  t h e  com m unity 
sy s tem *  "
"The change" (of 1965) "is quite clear and bf 
capital importance"* #^ The new Article 220 has put 
an /
1# a s  to which, see below, at last sentence o f  
p a ra g ra p h #2# O olom er, p # 8 7 ; Of* Hahlo, p*163 (that the m odern 
v iew  r e g a r d s  t h i s  as a legal incident of m a r r i a g e ,r a t h e r  th a n  agency-based# It "flows from" the face of the establishment of a common household),
3* O o lo m er, p*87#4# p*88#5* Oolomer, p#88#
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an end to the wife's " d o m e s tic  mandate"# There Is
now joint and several liability in every case forid e b ts  o f  that nature , and each spouse has capacity 
to incur them # There is a proviso to the effect 
that joint and several liability will not arise in 
the case of "expenses which are obviously excessive 
having regard to the standard of living of the couple, 
the u t i l i t y  of the transaction and the bona fldes of 
the o t h e r  contractor"# M o re o v e r, the contract of 
h i r e - p u r c h a s e , to im p o r t  full l i a b i l i t y  on both 
spouses, must be entered into with consent of both 
spouses#
F i n a l l y ,  on  the subject of the improved status 
of married women, Oolomer considers^ the subject of 
the "Management of the money and moveables in the 
separate possession of each spouse"# The new Articles 
r e l e v a n t  in this connection are A r t i c l e s  221 and 222#
Article 221 provides that each spouse no m a t t e r  
which sy s te m  of p r o p e r t y  applies i s  entitled to open 
a deposit o r  securities account without consent of 
the other, and will be deemed to have pow er to operate 
on it (which presumption is rebuttable) \
A r t i c l e  222  s t a t e s  t h a t  a  sp o u se  who a lo n e  
p e r fo rm s  an act o f  administration for the use or 
d i s p o s a l  of a m oveab le  article i n  his separate 
possession (money and securities in the personal 
account of one spouse being considered moveable 
property "privately possessed"^) is deemed to have 
a u t h o r i t y  /
1# "actes ménagers"* See Alexandre, p.650*2# Article 220, alinéa 2 ; Oolomer, ibid,
3 ,  p p ,8 8 -9 0 #  ^4# "The partner is not left without protection# The h u s b a n d , f o r  example, can object to a transaction which h i s  wife proposes, provided that he can prove that it does not lie within her p o w e rs"# Oolomer, 
P ,8 9 #5 # Oolomer, p .89,
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authority so to act, in relation to bona fide third 
parties* The provision does not extend to moveab3.es
the n a tu r e  of which suggests that t h e y  are the o t h e ri  " Pspouse's property % or to household furniture * The
Articles c a n  be seen to be in sympathy w i th  each other#
I n  many sy s te m s  o f  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y ,  i t  m ig h t b e
said that the aim is autonomy w i t h i n  a framework of
in te r d e p e n d e n o e
The Statutory B ystem  o f  Matrimonial Property in France
Under the sy s te m  in f o r c e  i n  France (not amended 
b y  private agreement), which Oolomer d e s c r i b e s  now as 
"a corjiiflunity sy s te m  limited to after-acquired p r o p e r t y " , 
each spouse has complete a u t h o r i t y  and control over 
the property possessed by him/her at marriage (that is, 
over his/her separate property)* However, these 
rights are encumbered b y  duties or liabilities, falling 
on the husband as on t h e  w i f e ,  unknoxm to systems of 
s e p a r a t io n #  The p o w ers  o v e r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  may 
be  taken away b y  t h e  court where the spouse finds that 
he/she "lS| in a lasting fashion, unable to exercise 
f r e e  w i l l " ^  or w here  the community o r  family fu n d  i s  
i n  danger through the m ism anagem ent o f  his own p r o p e r t y  
b y  t h e  ow ner o f  i t ,  as b y  squandering it o r  allowing 
i t  t o  perish# I t  can w e l l  b e  u n d e r s to o d  that, since 
the com m unity  fu n d  benefits by savings from the income 
arising from separate p r o p e r t y ,  such provisions are 
necessary*
U n le s s  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a p p o in t  a  j u d i c i a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r  /
4
1* See Article 1404*2# i* e $  t o  such furniture a s  r e f e r r e d  to in A r t i c l e215 (prohibition o f  unilateral d i s p o s a l  b y  one partner o f  " th e  r i g h t s  w h ich  assure the family's lo d g in g  and furniture" - O olom er, p . 8 5 )#3* Of# C h a p te r  7 f o r  Scotland, a System o f  "Separation o f  P r o p e r t y  with Concurrent C o m p en sa tio n  of Gains"?4# p#90#5# through in cap acity?
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administrator, "the dispossessed partner keeps the 
right to dispose of the bar© reversion of his or her 
property, so that it is only the rights of administration 
and  use which are transferred"**^  The plaintiff 
spouse must apply the revenue received to meet household 
e x p e n s e s  and  t h e  s u r p l u s  f o r  t h e  c o m n m ity  good*^
The d i s p o s s e s s e d  sp o u se  may a p p ly  f o r  r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
in his rights, showing t h a t  the reasons f o r  his original 
judicial dispossession no longer e x i s t . ^
Articles 1430-1432 are concerned with possible 
'meddling' b y  one spouse i n  the administration o f  the 
other's property*. The notion of mandate is used#
I n  t h e  absence of special m a n d a te, use and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
are allowed, b u t  alienation is not* Meddling in t h e  
f a c e  o f  o b j e c t i o n  by the o t h e r  spouse w i l l  r e n d e r  th e  
m e d d le r  l i a b l e  for all t h e  consequences of t h e  meddling 
and "answerable f o r  the whole income without limit".^ ’^
If one spouse entrusts t h e  other w ith  the administration 
o f  h i s / h e r  separate p r o p e r t y  (special m a n d a t e t h e  
mandatary is not obliged t o  give an accounting for the 
income unless required to do so in terms of the special 
mandate* W here the law ^  presumes the mandate (as 
above, allowing administration and enjoyment, b u t  not 
disposal) the m a n d a ta ry  "is answerable f o r  the accrued 
r e v e n u e s  and  a l s o ,  f o r  th e  l a s t  f i v e  y e a r s  o n ly ,  f o r  
those which he has ex p en d ed  fraudulently, o r  neglected
to collect*"^ In t h e  case o f  judicial dispossession,
where one spouse is charged with the administration of 
t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  the o t h e r ,  the foszmer is 
a n s w e ra b le  f o r  t h e  conduct o f  his s t e w a r d s h ip .  The 
object o f  d i s p o s s e s s i o n  i s ,  i n  Professor Oolomer's 
words /
1 * Oolomer, p*92*2# Oolomer, ibid*
3 .  A r t i c l e  1¥55T4. Article 1432*5 .  A r t i c l e  1432#6. Oolomer, p.92*
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words, " to  restore to the oom m m ity  th e  use of the 
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  sp o u se  when h e  o r  s h e  d o e s  
n o t  molce good u s e  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  p ow ers o f  o w n e rsh ip
V Îo r  i s  u n d e r  a  l a s t i n g  iu o a p a o i ty  o f  e x e r o i s i n g  them#."
W here t h e  o o m m m ity  fund i s  concerned, and w here  
the w if e  is not a salary-earner, her consent i s  
necessary f o r  certain operations concerning the coimion 
f u n d ,  hut i n  general the husband re m a in s  the head of 
t h e  com m unity# W here t h e  w ife  i s  a  s d l a r y ^ e a m e r ,  
h e r  e a r n in g s  fo rm  a  r e s e r v e d  fu n d  and  s h e  h a s  " th e  
same p o w ers o v e r  h e r  r e s e r v e d  p r o p e r t y  a s  t h e  h u sb a n d  
o v e r  t h e  o r d i n a r y  o o m m n ity  p r o p e r t y " , ^  T h is  m eans 
t h a t  t h e  h u sb a n d  r e t a i n s  h i s  s u p e r i o r  p o w e rs  i n  r e s p e o t  
o f  a  common fu n d  d e c r e a s in g  i n  sis^e# P r o f e s s o r  
Oolomer r e p o r t s ^  that, because of t h e  in c o n v e n ie n c e  
w h ic h  i t  w o u ld  entail, "co -m an ag em en t" (that i s ,  a 
requirement of consent of both spouses f o r  e v e ry  
transaction concerning t h e  common fund - a true "tw o 
captain" system) was not suggested b y  the legislators 
of the law of July 13, 1%5.
The wife's position, i t  seemshas Improved to 
the extent that the requirement o f  h e r  consent to 
t r a n s a c t i o n s  has become the r u l e  rather than the 
exception*
Generally, the husband has pow er to administer 
(management of p r o p e r t y  and collection o f  income); 
i n  /
1# p#92#2* op#clt*, p#93# But the 'reserved property* falls witSn the community (Art,1401), There is therefore ordinary com m unity  p r o p e r t y  p r o p e r t y  and t r u l y  s e p a r a t e  (over w h ic h  e a c h  spouse has f u l l  control),3# e # g . w i th  regard to Stock Exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s  -  
0 # ,  p*94#4* 0#, Ij^ id* Glendon notes that the husband, by thelaw oFTuly 1 3 , 1 9 6 5 , is liable for n e g l ig e n c e  ( " f a u l t " )  i n  management whereas in past years he was liable only f o r  fraud.
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1 x1. r e s p e c t  o f  " a c t s  o f  d i s p o s a l " ,  l i i s  p o w e r s  a r e  
much more limited* The hue hand retains the right
( p r e v i o u s l y  e n j o y e d )  t o  d i s p o s e  m o r t i s  c a u s a  o f  h i sr ►!* ïNWK8,'«KB?;tS*n'^S’^S«»
full s h a r e  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  f u n d ,  a n d  c o n t i n u e s  t o  
•be prohibited from malclag mtgg tM qb glftb of
c o f f i ï a u n i t y  p r o p e r t y  without the w i f e ' s  c o n s e n t *
Ho longer (hy reason of Article 1%4) may he 
dispose o f  for o n e r o u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  or encumber, 
community property without the wife's consent, 
where that community property is heritable*^
Transactions relating to "business concerns 
belonging to the community" * a n d  " n o n - n e g o t i a b l o  
partnership rights and chattels whose transfer is 
subject to registration" m a y  not be undertaken by 
the husband alone. Neither spouse may dispose Punilaterally of the matrimonial home or furniture*
Apart from these exceptional oases, the husband 
r e t a i n s  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  a n d  right of sole a c t i o n *
"The husband retains the right to sell freely company 
shares, credits and foundation shares, no less than 
chattels whose transfer is not subject to registration, 
that is, chattels other than vessels, boats and 
aircraft*"^ One problem which prevents further 
extension of a "two-captains rule" is the urgency of 
Stock Exchange transactions* If a useful investment 
is not to be lost, there is not time for lengthy (or 
even speedy) consultation between co-owners and 
prospective /
1 *  Oolomer concludes ( p * 9 5 )  that t h e r e  is joint management of immoveable property*
2 *  Article 2 1 5 #  If one s p o u s e  purports t o  sell, the other h a s  one year in w h i c h  t o  bring a n  action to h a v e  the transaction reduced* It would be interesting t o 'k n o w  how m u c h  prejudice or inconvenience this causes, in practice, to third parties*
3 #  O o l o m e r ,  P f 9 5 *  In other w o r d s  "the principle *««» remains t h a t  of free d i s p o s a l  by the husband of 
t h e  common property."
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prospective co-investors, it is argued. (Nevertheless, 
investment co-operation is not unknown in other spheres 
of life).
The husband's rights are conditional upon 
exercise of them without fraud, and it appears now 
that the wife can contest allegedly fraudulent 
transactions during the continuance of the community.*^
Separation of property is competent if there 
has been such a degree of xoismanagement as to "imperil" 
the interests of the non-managing partner. If the 
wife declines to take such a step, she may apply to 
b e  appointed head of the community in her husband's 
s t e a d . ^
Last /
1. See explanation, Oolomer pp.96/97*2. Moreover, when a wife is appointed head of community in a suitable case, she becomes head in her own right, and not in the capacity of a representative or agent. Her powers over the community property are "in the background, as it were, in reserve", but t h e y  exist. (Oolomer, p.98). Is it competent for the spouses b y  marriage-contract to agree that the wife and not the husband shall be principal administrator? (Hot competent in South Africa).There can be an agreement to administer jointly (Art. 1 5 0 3  - "la clause de la main commune"), or each may invest the other with power to act for him/her (Art*1504 - "la clause de representation mutuelle") or they may adopt "la clause d'unite d'adsiinistration" (Art. 1505) which gives to the husband the pow er of administration of his wife's separate property* (Bee generally Oolomer, p#104et 8eg# an d  below, a t  3 .7 7 9 e t  s e q ) .  The former Article 1 3 8 8  "forbade any attack on the acknowledged rights o f  t h e  husband, as head o f  t h e  community".(0.,p#108). Some points remain unclear* F o r  example, (0., ibid.). can Article 1505 be adapted to malce the wîTe™administrator of her husband's separate property? Perhaps t h e r e  is doubt about the point: yet if substitution of wife for h u sb a n d  w here  the l a t t e r  i s  incompetent or ill (as well as if he is acting mala fide) is a notion "able to be entertained, why ahouTd“’not"The parties' w is h e s  rule at the outset?
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Last in the wife's new armoury i s  the weapon 
given to h e r  "to enforce her p a r t n e r ' s  financial 
liability to her",^ and this whether or not sh e  h a s  
taken any of the protective measures above d e s c r ib e d #
The husband i s  answerable for mismanagement # "It 
i s  clear that t h e  i d e a  that t h e  Ifieband is "lord and 
master of the community" h a s  finally been abandoned; 
he retains his place as head of the community, but 
instead o f  exercising a right. he fulfils a function 
in the interests of both husband and wife#"^
It seems t h a t  F re n c h  law has established as 
refined a system of community property, principally 
u n d e r  the management of one partner, as is possible 
w h ile  r e t a i n i n g  that g e n e r a l  notion* That is not to 
say that another v e r s i o n  o f  community o f  property or 
limited community - such as a requirement of co-operation 
in transactions p e r t a i n i n g  to all immoveable property, 
and to certain specified m o v ea b le s  - could not be 
adopted with profit i n  o t h e r  systems#
The wife (whether or n o t  substitute head of 
com m unity ) can b in d  the com m unity  fund for household 
debts and for the delicts of either the community 
will be liable*
However, with t h e  exception of contracts for 
household n e e d s  and i n  respect of the education of th e  
c h i l d r e n ,  the wife's contracts do not bind t h e  community, 
unless undertaken with the husband's consent# Under 
A r t i c l e  217, though, either party may apply for the 
authorisation of the court for a transaction with 
regard to which the consent of the other spouse w ould  
normally /
1# 0#,pt97* ("at l e a s t  a t  the dissolution of thecommunity")*2* Op#cit., p#983# ana (since 1965) not (and unlike the law o f  Scotland), under the head of "household agency" but in her 
ovm right*
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normally be required, " i f  the latter is u n a b le  to
act freely, or i f  bis refusal is not justified by
the Interest of the family*" Can this provision
be construed in such a way as to p e rm i t  the wife
to seise t h e  initiative and, u n d e r  t h e  wing of t h e
Article, "push a transaction through" without her
husband's consent end against his wishes? Professor iOolomer appears t o  think that this may be so - but 
what would be the sense i n  placing the wife's 
undoubted powers of management over the common fund 
b e h in d  a screen w h ic h  can be drawn aside only in 
certain situations, if she can at any time invoke 
Article 217 to divert the course of her husband's 
management? Oolomer says, "In-these conditions" 
(meaning the existence of the wife's separate powers 
o v e r  the community) "and b a s e d  on art#217$ sh e  must 
be able to o b t a i n  the j u d g e 's  authorisation to carry 
out an act of disposal or administration which her 
husband has vetoed without any so u n d  reason"^# If 
this means that, while the husband re m a in s  head of 
community, any sensible s u g g e s t io n  by the wife cannot 
be rejected out of h an d  by the h u sb a n d  w i th o u t  the 
wife having recourse, if she wishes, to Article 217» 
the result may be admirable on a criterion of equality, 
but is h a r d l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  in the l i g h t  of the notion 
of t h e  husband's headship, which is then seen as a 
poor t h i n g  indeed#
T h e re  i s  the less b o ld  interpretation that the 
Article simply means that, regardless of whether 
husband or wife is head of com m unity , he/she c a n n o t  
be h in d e r e d  by unjustifiable veto o f his/her actions 
by t h e  passive partner, and may apply to the court for 
assistance (a remedy, therefore, perhaps more useful 
to /
1# p p # 9 9 /1 0 0 .2# p#100#
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to t h e  husband), b u t  Oolomer favours t h e  bolder 
approach, being of th e  opinion that th e  law of 1965 
has reinforced earlier e x p e r t  views themselves 
supported by decisions, that, with court authority,
"the wife could perform an act of administration and 
e v en  of disposal o f  the common p r o p e r t y #
Could it not be argued that, if a system of 
community is chosen, a system of co-operative action 
in all cases where not impractical is the most 
suitable companion?
This is highlighted by the discussion of the wife's 
powers over her reserved property, which arc different 
yet again. A setting-out of t h e  rules concerning t h e  
various types of property found in a French home would 
seem to b e  a desirable addition thereto #
The present position concerning earnings from 
separate occupation and property purchased therewith, 
is that each spouse may do as he/she wishes with that 
property, although, a s  has been seen, each owes a 
duty to make a  suitable contribution towards the 
family budget # The property w h ic h  the wife p u r c h a s e s  
out of h e r  earnings or t h e  savings therefrom i s  termed 
her r e s e r v e d  property, and she has the same r i g h t s  
over that property as t h e  husband h a s  over the ordinary 
common property* The liabilities as well a s  the 
privileges attach thereto: the husband has access to
Article 217, and he can have set aside fraudulent actions 
b y  her*^ The wife in the course of her managing 
reserved property may render that p r o p e r t y  liable in 
delict# The husband may seek a judicial separation 
o f  /
1* 0 #, p *99*2* The community benefits fro m  the savings from  separate p r o p e r t y :  there is a link between thefortunes of the d i f f e r e n t  categories* P re su m a b ly  I t  is in this light that "fraud" must b e  I n t e r p r e t e d #  See supra* •
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o f  property* It 1b no longer competent for the 
w if e  to choose to renounce the community# She must 
participate in the partition, a state of affairs 
which prompts Professor O olom er to remark,^ "At last, 
from now on, he I s  assured of his share of the 
reserved fund #*#"
The wife I s  free to seek her own occupation, and 
debts arising t h e r e f r o m  attach t o  her reserved property 
only, unless the husband has become involved in that 
occupation, or "by entering a declaration I n  the 
c o m m erc ia l r e g i s t e r ,  he deliberately gave his agreement 
to trading by his wife",^ or had g iv e n  expressly his 
a g re e m e n t t o  the a c t  p e r fo rm e d  by hi a wife#
Problems remained* These concerned, as ever, 
the difficulty of showing which i te m s  of property 
could properly be r e g a r d e d  a s  reserved property* The 
presumption of Article 1402 is that all property, 
moveable or immoveable, is a community acquest I f  not 
proved to be the separate property of either spouse*
By A r t i c l e  224, this is said to be the rule to be 
applied, not only via-a-vis the husband, b u t  vla-a-vis 
third parties* The burden of proof, therefore, lies 
u p o n  th e  party who u r g e s  t h a t  property i s  separate o r ,  
according to O o lo m er, reserved#^
In E n g la n d  end Scotland, as the wife's pow ers 
i n c r e a s e d ,  as greater becam e the b e n e f i t s  c o n f e r r e d  
on  h e r  by t h e  M a rr ie d  Women's P r o p e r ty  Acta, so did 
her liability increase# As the Frenchwoman's 
emancipation has advanced, w hat h a s  h a p p e n e d  t o  the 
safeguards in past years granted to her t o  offset 
e f f e c t  o f  her husband's powers?^
F i r s t  /
1. p*101*2* Oolomer, ibid*3# This is the "general positions see further, Oolomer,pp*101-102*4* a*, p*102.
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First, and perhaps most important, the wife and 
her representatives can no longer renomioe the 
commimlty*^ This is proper in view of the wife's 
new powers over the oommmity, and "Is the end of 
the paradox b y  which a wife retained her reserved 
p r o p e r t y  w h i l s t  r e p u d i a t i n g  th e  o o m n m lty  t o  w hose 
debts sh e  may have contributed*"^
T he h u sb a n d  too may now s e e k  a judicial separation 
of property*
W hat P ow ers do the Spouses have to  iWce their own
Certain r u l e s  a r e  f i x e d , ^  but beyond that 
framework, there is great freedom to regulate one's 
own affairs (ranging from modification and "individual 
tailoring" to adoption of a s y s te m  of separation of 
p r o p e r t y  I n  so far as not contravening any o f  the 
fixed p r i n c i p l e s )  and stante m a tr lm o n lo  "there is a
certain am ount of power to change marriage a g re e m e n ts  *
The spouses may adopt a system of j o i n t  management 
of com m unity  p r o p e r t y ,  including reserved property*
J o i n t  and several liability r e s u l t s * ^  This is the 
decision to place tvio captains on the bridge# It has 
the advantage of simplicity (at least so far as spouses* 
rights and liabilities) and the disadvantage of 
cu m b ro u sn ess#  However, u n d e r  this s y s te m , "qcts of 
preservation of a s s e t s "  may b e  made b y  either spouse#
The /
1» Contrast Louisiana, supr^*2# C#| p.102* As to the ''statutory mortgage", see0 *, p *10p «3# As P r o f e s s o r  Oolomer says (p#105), there is "aminimum o f  independence" (bank a c c o u n ts  ; management o f  separate moveable property: separate occupations)and "a mlnlmm of interdependence" (family home and f u r n i t u r e ,  h o u s e h o ld  debts)#4* C o n t r a s t  Louisiana (see Pascal, @*557) and  S o u th  Africa*5* "la clause do la main commune" ** Art* 1503*
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Of t h i s  e f f e c t  p r o v e s  t o  O o lom er that 
t h e  h u ahm d . "boom d e p r iv e d  o f  h i s  W a d a h ip  o f  
t h e  o o iim m lty *  o r  o f  w h a t re m a ih o d  o f  I t  tm d o r  t h e  
new o tm tu to s :^  eyatem* Heit%%er i n  3 k )u ia lm m  n o r  I n  
B o u th  A f r i c a  h a s  m toh a  a t #  W e n  poi% d.tte& $ am i I n  
B o o t lm d  I n  t h e  n l m t o o n t h  o o m tm y , whom i t  wme 
th at t h e  ilag ; # g # l  ana jM  
m ig h t o o m p e to n t ly  b e  e x c lu d e d  "by m a r r l % 0 ^ o o a t r a o t$  
t h e  s t a t u e  o f  th e  hmebmid a e  p a t e r f a m i l i a s  re m a in e d  
e e o u re $  a n d  t h l e  may e t l M  h e  eo$ a lth o u g h ^  o x o a p t i n  
ig ter o f  e h o io e  o f  t h e  f a m i ly  Wm#$ t h e  p o i n t
wlikely to ariee mi Ay T h e  te m o r
w(jeor Qolomer*0 witlng eeem to euggeat that# 
i n  t h l e  eyatem #  t h e  u n i l a t e r a l  i^ow er o f  a o tlo z i  h a v in g  
been taken from the hwband# nothing r@mal%ie of the
of hie statue of head of the oommimity# ^
A *halfV fay h o u se  '  l a  " l a  o la w m  d a  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
mutuelle"#^ Mther may the oommon property
( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  r e s e r v e d  p r o p e r i ^  f o r  u n d e r  b o th  " l a  
main oomame" and "repreeentatlon mituelle" # #io 
d i v i s i o n  o f  common p r o p e r t y  i n t o  o r d i n a r y  an d  r e e e r v o d  
(common) p r o p e r ty #  d o e s  n o t  o o o u r )  b u t  " A e t a  o f  
d i s p o s a i  o a n  o n ly  b e  p e r fo rm e d  w i th  t h e  ornm on o o n a e n t  
o f  t h e  t%'To eponaaa"^^ A gain#  t h e  h n a b an d  l o s e s  
pre*#emlnent /
1" C o n t r a s t  ^ i f r i o a .2. A r t#  1504#3. Thla eoems a desirable proviso (aeo oom&enta at 0## p#10B# a s  W  w h e th e r  i t  o o n ld  b e  ^ m iv e d )  f o r  no  W o  p e o p le  d i # l a y  a n  i d m t l o a l  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  d ie ]
I" *U, /AR
Of p r o p e r ty *  (P o e e  t h i s  i n e l M e  t h e  apendg. oapital? Freammbly it miet# 
in com e a n  n o t  of m d m in ia tm tW & f O olom er d e f i n e s  ' a c t a  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t io n *  a s  t h o s e  pertaining to the onltivation of the land# eelling of oropa and oollootion of Income from the oommoa p r o p e r t y  ( f a n c t i o n e  i^&ioh r e q u i r e  clearly t r a n s l a t i o n  into aaodow (end urban) terme) (noting (p*95) that w h e re  t h e  h u sb a n d  now c a n n o t  t r a n s f e r  eommon p r o p e r t y  without hie wife's oenmmt he ommot alone oolleet the capital arising from mmh tranaaotlona# a useful© A m itlen  /
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pre-eminent role. This is a more flexible and 
convenient regime t h a n  'la main commune', and it 
safeguards third parties, for they may look to the 
whole property, common and separate, provided that 
the a n te c e d e n t  'act' was one o f  administration to 
satisfy debts in c u r r e d '* # (Under the system o f  "la 
main commune", there is joint and several liability 
where the 'act* concerned a common asset and waspcarried out b y  common agreement )*
Despite all the reformist ideas and rules, it 
remains competent for the spouses to choose "la 
clause d*unite d 'administration"which gives to 
the h u sb a n d  power to administer his wife's separate 
property. The wife a lo n e  has power of disposal of 
her s e p a r a t e  property, b u t ,  a s  in the old system, 
may dispose of, and secure her transactions only 
with, the rights of reversion of her separate property^ 
(thus rendering herself to third parties not an 
attractive person with whom to do business) "except 
for the requirements of h e r  occupation*"^
T h ese  three clauses are p u t  "at the disposal 
o f  t h e  spouses"*^
How th e n  i s  a  sy s te m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  t o  b e  i n s e r t e d
into /
p r e c a u t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  d u r in g  d i.v o ro e  p r o c e e d in g s )(of. Scotland, Div* (Bo#) Act, 1976, s . 6 ) ;  the p r e v io u s  law  s t a n d s  u n c h an g e d  a s  t o  d i s p o s a l  b yway of gift and  the law of 1965 was concerned with d i s p o s a l s  f o r  value (p#95 and  s e e  generally above)•
1 * " l a  main commune" does not differentiate betweenacts of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and acts of d i s p o s a l " .2. 0*, p.106,5* A rt*  1505#4. In F re n c h  law, "there exists a c o r r e l a t i o n  b e tw ee nthe life interest i n  the s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  and the powers of the husband". Bee Oolomer, pp.107—108.5* 0., P.107#6 . The question of how f a r  th e y  may b e  extended o r  tampered w i th  i s  d i s c u s s e d  b y  Oolomer at p.108#
AIn to  th e  F re n c h  regimes?
Spouses m a y  opt fo r  t h i s  system  (though i t  seems 
th a t not many do: Oolomer su g g ests  th a t i t  does n o t
a c c o rd  w i th  t h e  F re n c h  v iew  o f  m a r r ia g e  a n d  h a s  
n e v e r  been "promoted", t h e r e f o r e ,  to  be a g e n e r a l
property  system ) though th e p rescrib ed  r u le s  remain*^
It is interesting to consider a French view of 
the S c a n d in a v ia n  middle way - "the system of participation 
in after-acquired property" - presented to the French 
people*^ as a system which "functions as a separate 
p r o p e r t y  /
1* A sep ara tion  system  i s  not so much a system  as n ot a system : paraphrase o f  Bene S a v a tie r , l ed r o i t ,  1*amour, l a  l ib e r t é ,  q u o te d  b y  Oolomer 
a t  p .1 0 9 .2# e . g . ,  as to  household d eb ts , the m atrim onial homeand f u r n i t u r e  # Though th ese  might be in se r te d  w ith  p r o f i t  in to  th e S c o t t is h  system  o f  sep ara tion  (a n d  are advocated indeed in  Chapter ? ) ,  th ere  are oth er  c la u se s  which r i n g  f a l s e  i n  our e a r s  -  fo r  exam ple, Oolomer says th a t Art# 219 (p erm ittin g  e ith e r  spouse to  s e e k  j u d ic ia l  a u th o r isa tio n  to  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  o t h e r  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  c e r t a i n  p o w e rs )  may apply# and a lso  Art# 2 2 0 - 1 ,  w h ic h  a llow s  "the judge to  d ec id e , a t t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  one o f  th e sp o u ses , th a t  the o t h e r  may no  lo n g e r  p r o v is io n a lly  d isp o se  independently  o f  h i s  p r o p e r t y " . T h ese  p r o v i s i o n s  seem s u i t a b l e  f o r  a system  which keeps i t s  r o o ts  in  oommmity o f  p r o p e r t y ,  and i n a p p r o p r i a t e  fo r  one i n  w h ic h , in  th eory  a t any  r a te ,  n e i t h e r  spouse h a s  an in te r e s t  i n  th e  p r o p e r t y  o f  th e other*3* i n t r o d u c e d  as an op tion  b y  th e law o f  Ju ly  13 , 1963* The scope f o r  p r i v a t e  ch o ice i s  w id e, w id e r  in  a sen se than th a t  open to  th ose whose p erson al law i s  E n g l i s h  or S co ts  because th ey  who have an u n fe ttered  c h o i c e ,  l a c k  g u id a n c e  and  exam ple  a n d  th e  e n c o u ra g e m e n t g iv e n  b y  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  o t h e r  ' t a i l o r -  made* m a rr ia g e-se ttlem en ts , co n ta in in g  a c h o se n  m atrim onial p r o p e r t y  reg im e*  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a p a th etic  independence and a  d isregard  o f  su c h  m atrim onial p roperty r u l e s  a s  do e x i s t  seem to  have ch a ra c ter ised  th e  a t t itu d e  to  t h e  Scot t o  th e  f in a n c ia l  a sp ec ts  o f  h i s  marriage* F o l k l o r e  lead s u s  t o  b e lie v e  th a t  th e French are p r a c t ic a l , hard-headed and money­co n sc io u s , and t h e  m atrim onial property  r u le s  do n o th in g  to  d is p e l the b e l i e f #  Oolomer (p*109) says  th a t t h e  French conception  o f  marriage i s  th e union  o f  two p eo p le , combined w ith  "at l e a s t  some degree  o f  a s s o c ia t io n  o f  m a ter ia l i n t e r e s t s . "  I t  w i l l  be r e c a l le d ,  however, th a t on ly  about 2C% o f  French  cou p les choose to  make a m arria g e-contr a o t*
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p r o p e r t y  s y s te m , "but l e  l i q u i d a t e d  a s  a  oom m im ity 
sy s te m * "  The ' s e p a r a t e n e s s ' o f  a l l  property, 
w h e th e r  owned a t  m a r r ia g e  o r  a o q u ir e d  b y  an y  mean# 
t h e r e a f t e r ,  i s  s e c u r e d  i n  t h e  c l e a r e s t  o f  te rm s  
b y  A r t ,  1569# Upon d i s s o l u t i o n ,  " e a c h  of the sp o u s e s  
h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a  s h a r e  o f  h a l f  th e  n e t  v a lu e  o f  
t h e  a f t e r - a c q u i r e d  p r o p e r t y  b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  o t h e r ,  
m e a su re d  b y  the valuation both of t h e  o r i g i n a l  
f o r t u n e  and the final fo r tu n e # " '^  This " F ra n c o -  
German r e g im e " ,  o r  F re n c h  re g im e  a f t e r  t h e  German
s t y l e ,  re m a in s  o n ly  one o f  th e  o p t i o n s ,  a s  d o e s  t h e2sy s te m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  ,  a t t e m p ts  t o  introduce 
i t  a s  t h e  g e n e r a l  o r  s t a n d a r d  sy s te m  h a v in g  b e e n
unsuccessful to date*
Upon divorce ( s t a t u t o r y  sy s te m  of matrimonial 
p r o p e r t y )  t h e r e  is e q u a l  participation i n  acquisitions 
and e q u a l  l i a b i l i t y  i n  debts ( o f  the oom im m ity) # I f  
t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  a l b e i t  e q u a l ,  t f i l l  l e a v e  
t h e  p l a i n t i f f  i l l - e q u i p p e d  f i n a n c i a l l y ,  a  p e n s io n  
o f  n o t  more t h a n  one t h i r d  o f  the defendant's income 
may be allowed to him/her* I t  is s i g n i f i o a n t  that 
i n  r e s p e o t  o f  maintenance a f t e r  d i v o r c e , q u e s t io n s  o f  
r i g h t  and  w rong  are r e l e v a n t ;  a l im e n t  a f t e r  s e p a r a t i o n  
may be granted w ith o u t  regard to c o n d u c t#  ,
On d e a t h ,  as on divorce, in F r a n c e , a 'b a l a n c e  
s h e e t*  o f  common a s s e t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s  i s  d raw n up, 
end  d i v i s i o n  i s  made* If the d i v i s i o n  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
f o r  the maintenance of t h e  s u r v i v o r ,  t h e  latter may 
c la im  a g a i n s t  t h e  e s t a t e  f o r  m a in te n a n c e .  I n  i n t e s t a c y *  
d e p e n d in g  u p o n  th e  p r e s e n c e  o r  a b se n c e  o f  p r i o r  
r a n k in g  /
1, but d u r in g  marriage " th e  system operates a s  i f  t h e  spouses had m a r r ie d  u n d e r  th e  s e p a r a t i o n  of 
p r o p e r t y  sy s te m "  -  Art# 1569#2, that i s *  " c o n s e n s u a l  s y s te m s " .3# See Glendoa* pp*67/68 (D iv o rc e  in the ease o f  M, 
e t  Mme # M e n n ic r)  *
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ra iü c ln g  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e  widow may h a v e  i n  a d d i t i o n  a  
r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y  o r  o f  l i f e r e n t  i n  p a r t  o f  t h e  
d e o e a s e d 's  e s t a t e #  I n  t e s t a c y ,  t h e  F re n c h  sp o u s e  
r e t a i n s  g r e a t  free d o m  w i th  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  he  mey 
e x c lu d e  an y  c ladm  o f  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  t o  h i s  h a l f/Is h a r e  i n  t h e  com im m ity p r o p e r t y ,  th o u g h  i t  seem s 
t h a t  h e  may n o t  e x c lu d e  t h e  claims o f  h i s  children.
I n  sum, t h e r e f o r e , half o f  t h e  com m unity  estate* at 
t h e  l e a s t ,  will fall to the s u r v i v o r  (b y  r e a s o n  o f  
th e  laws g o v e rn in g  eomaimity, n o t  b y  r e a s o n  o f  the 
Im fs  g o v e rn in g  t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n ) .  I f  t h e  s p o u s e s  
h a v e  tw o c h i l d r e n  a  sp o u s e  h a s  free d o m  t o  d is p o s e  
o n ly  o f  one-third^ o f  his e s t a t e  (that is o f  h i s  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  and  half s h a r e  o f  co m m u n ity ).
A p e c u l i a r i t y  o r  s p e c i a l t y  o f  t h e  F re n c h  law
o f  testate succession i s  that the h u s b a n d , desirous 
o f  benefiting h i s  w i f e ,  may, i n s t e a d  of bequeathing 
t o  h e r  t h e  w h o le  o f  the f r a c t i o n  i n  r e s p e o t  o f  w h ich  
th e  law allows him  complete freedom of testation, 
give h e r  t h e  l i f e r e n t  of all h i s  p r o p e r t y ,  o r  the 
l i f e r e n t  o f  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  t h e r e o f , and a r i g h t  o f  
p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  remainder. The children may have 
the liferent c o n v e r te d  t o  an  a n n u i t y ,  p r o v id e d  that 
they give s u f f i c i e n t  security therefor, and that the 
p r o p e r t y  supplying t h e  l i f e r e n t  i s  not t h e  h o u se  of 
t h e  s u r v i v o r  sp o u s e  o r  i t s  furnishings. Glendon 
com jaents u p o n  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  t o  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  fro m  
t h e  F re n c h  " t r a d i t i o n a l  c o n c e rn  f o r  h e i r s  i n  t h e  
bloodline o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d " * ^  th o u g h  i t  i s  h e r  v iew  
t h a t  th o  F re n c h  w id o w 's  r i g h t s  i n  r e s p e o t  o f  h e r  
h u s b a n d 's  /
Of. t h e  c e l e b r a t e d  c o n f l i c t  c a s e  o f  De Niçois v* Curlier [1 9 0 OJ A,0.21. (moveables); ( 1900J 2 Ch.410 ( im m o v e a b le s )#2, quotité disponible; G le n d o n , p.70 ( p p , 6 8 -7 1 )$3* S c o t t i s h  W a te rs h e d : 8 u c c ,  ( 8 c , )
A c t ,  1 § 5 4 .
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husband's half share of t h e  oom m m ity  caunot he 
s a i d  t o  h e  ae  g r e a t  a s  t h e  A m erican  w id o w 's  r i g h t s  
in h e r  h u s b a n d 's  estate# Of c o u rs e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
l i e s  in the fact that the (French) widow has "already 
r e c e i v e d  h e r  half of th e  com m unity" -  that i s *  o f  
t h e  net coxamunity, a f t e r  paym ent o f  com m unity  debts* 
and* i n  a p p r o p r i a t e  c a s e s *  a f t e r  t h e  com m unity  h a s  
b o rn e  t h e  c o s t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  a l im e n t  f o r  h e r*  f o r  a  
n in e  m onth  p e r i o d  f o l lo w in g  t h e  d e c e a s e d 's  d e a t h .
T h is  i s  i n  a d d i t i o n *  p re su m ab ly *  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  c la im  
a g a i n s t  t h e  e s t a t e  f o r  m a in te n a n c e *  e a r l i e r  m e n t io n e d ,
The F re n c h  S y s tem  o f  'P a r t i o j p a t i o n  i n  A f te r - A c q u i r e d  
P ro p e r ty *
I t  h a s  been seen t h a t  i n  France* t h e  s t a t u t o r y  
s y s te m  is one o f  community o f  a c q u e s t s  (certain 
f e a t u r e s  of w h ic h  c a n  be  m o d if ie d *  b y  m eans o f  adoption 
of l a  c l a u s e  de l a  main commune* de representation 
m u tu e l le  * or d *uni;l?e d * administration) % but t h a t  set 
o u t  f o r  sp o u se s*  c h o ic e  i f  t h e y  p r e f e r  a r e  tw o o t h e r  
sy s te m s*  nam ely*  t h a t  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p ro p e r1 ;y  and 
t h a t  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a f t e r - a c q u i r e d  p r o p e r t y ,
S p o u se s  c a n  c r e a t e  t h e i r  own system *  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  o f  a  o o m p u lso ry  o h a ra o te r #
The Code o f  1958 p r o v id e d  f o r  Germ any a matrimonial 
property re g im e  o f  t h e  type commonly known as "deferred 
community" # As i n  F ra n c e  * s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  limits 
imposed b y  m a n d a to ry  r u l e s *  spouses may a l t e r  t h e  
s t a t u t o r y  schem e to s u i t  t h e i r  needs# M oreover*  i n  
addition* the Oode s e t s  out two r e g im e s  * t h a t  o f  
separation of property an d  that of u n i v e r s a l  com m unity# 
N e i th e r  com m unity  o f  a c q u e s t  n o r  com m unity  of m o v eab le s  
and  a c q u e s t s  i s  an y  l o n g e r  a n  o p t io n  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  
Code* and  e a c h  r e q u i r e s  p r i v a t e  a g reem en t*
It can b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  approach adopted is 
remarkably similar, the common p a t t e r n  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
principal (statutory) sy stem *  options the r u l e s  o f  
which /
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Which are set out, and freedom for private agreement 
a u b j e o t  t o  compliance with c e r t a i n  compulsory r u l e s ,
The statutory system of France is now no longer an 
"official" o p t i o n  i n  Germany* b u t  the G e r m a n  s t a t u t o r y  
system (since the law of July 13* 1965) has become 
an "official" option in France.
U n d e r  the "French r e g i m e  after t h e  German S t y l e " ,  
the 'separateness' o f  q l l  property* w h e t h e r  o w n e d  a t  
m a r r i a g e  or a c q u i r e d  by any m e a n s  thereafter, i s  
secured in t h e  clearest of terms by Article 1569*
U p o n  d i s s o l u t i o n ,  " e a c h  o f  t h e  spouses has t h e  r i g h t  
t o  a  share o f  half the net value o f  t h e  after-acquired 
property b e l o n g i n g  t o  the other, m e a s u r e d  by t h e  
valuation b o t h  o f  the o r i g i n a l  fortune a n d  the final 
fortune*"^
Valuation i s  m a d e  o f  the property which e a c h  
spouse possessed at marriage, and has acquired 
subsequently in its state at marriage or at date of 
acquisition, and a t  its v a l u e  a t  date o f  dissolution# 
Liabilities are deducted* I t  m a y  b e  t h a t  t h e s e  
e x t i n g u i s h  the fund, in which case t h a t  spouse's ' f u n d *  
is ignored thereafter. In other cases, t h e  remainder 
is accounted t h e  original fund or f o i t u i i e  *
The final fund or fortune i s  t h e  v a l u a t i o n  o f  
all property owned by each spouss at the date of 
dissolution (by death, d i v o r c e ,  judicial separation 
o r  "liquidation" b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by mismanagement or 
misconduct by one spouse, or by confusion in affairs), 
T o  this s u m  i s  a d d e d  "fictionally"^ t h e  value of a l l  
inter v i v o s  gifts by the s p o u s e ,  n o t  c o n s e n t e d  t o  by 
t h e  other s p o u s e ,  t o g e t h e r  with " t h a t  which h e  m a y  
have /
1  * A r t . 1569* 2# 0., p.Ill#
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1have fraudulently transferred". Valuation of 
property owned at dissolution is made in its state 
and at its value at the date of dissolution, and of 
gifts and fraudulent transfers in their state at the 
date of gift or transfer and at the value which they 
would have had at the date of dissolution* Undischarged 
debts are then deducted, and the remainder is that 
spouse's final fortune.
If the final fund exceeds the original fortune,
"the difference represents the net remaining after- 
acquired property and provides ground for participation* 
Where each spouse has after-acquired property, it 
appears that there is set-off between the parties and 
only the remainder provides "a basis for partition."^
The "creditor" spouse has then a claim to one 
half of the "debtor" spouse’s surplus assets, and this 
as a general rule is a claim which is settled in cash, 
unless the spouses can reach agreement upon settlement 
in kind, or unless the debtor spouse can establish to 
the satisfaction of a judge that it would be very 
difficult to settle in money# Oolomer explains^ 
that it was thought not appropriate for the creditor 
to be able to demand any particular assets in 
satisfaction of his debt, for this is a system of 
participation in value, not of participation in a 
common fund (the theoretical basis being that there Is 
no common fund), and that it would not be right if 
the /
1• a mysterious phrase, ,Professor Oolomer rightly remarks Xp“.d11) that in these provisions one can see the recognition of the interest which each partner stante matrimonlo has in the property of the other at dxssoîutîoHT'lm interest which may exist in a system of separation (though see the Scottish rules of testate succession - Chapter 5(2)) but is not recognised (see the Scottish rules of intestate succession - Chapter 5(2))*2. Oolomer, p.111•5* 0 * , i b i d *4* i b id .
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the cred itor spouse could demand» f o r  example| a 
fam ily heirloom,^ part of the orig in a l property of 
the o t h e r  $ a  demand which he/she could not make under 
the system of community o f  acquests*
pProfessor Golomer*a description  of the cred itor’s 
remedies where the debtor*s a ssets  are in su ff ic ie n t  
to s a t is fy  h is  claim (which eventuality  allows the 
cred itor spouse to  bring under review g i f t s  and 
fraudulent transfers "beginning with the most recent 
tran sfer" ), although in  i t s e l f  c lea r , does not explain  
i n  what way the remaining sum could be in su ff ic ie n t ,  
fo r , however meagre, p re s u m a b ly  i t  can be halved and 
i f  non**existent, there i s  no claim*^ On the other 
hand, some account would have to be taken o f objectionable  
transactions since othertfise the sy s te m  w ou ld  not soften  
greatly  the harshness of the sy s te m  of separation and 
absence of community fund^* I t  would appear that the 
cred itor /
1* 0 * ,  9 * 1 1 1 .2 . pp.111/112.3* g?he answer i s  that the qmount due "on paper" may not be able to  be s a t is f ie d  out o f t h e  debtor’s a ssets  p h ysica lly  p r e s e n t*  I n  th is  aspect l i e s  an e sse n tia l d ifferen ce between systems such a s  th is  and systems of separation* I f  there i s  no property out o f which prior righ ts are ex ig ib le ,  what rem edy  can be g iv e n  in  Scots law ?4-. for the system "functions as a separate property 
s y s te m , b u t  i s  liqu idated  as a com m unity  sy s te m "  (O .p.llO ) (Query do not such s y s te m s  o n ly  function at liqu idation?) In the absence of sp ec ia l ch oice , the statutory sy s te m  in  Prance i s  not one of separation but one of community of acquests* However, a fter  liq u id ation  (able to  b e  obtained on the occurrence of "exactly t h e  same ev en tu a litie s  and conditions as those in  w h ic h  he can r e q u e s t  separation o f  p r o p e r t y  u n d e r  the community system" (0*, p .112), "the s p o u s e s  are n atu ra lly ’* (emphasis added) "governed by the s e p a r a t i o n  of property sy s te m * "  ( 0 . ,  ib id . ) .Sea Chapter 7 -* System of Separation with C o n c u r re n t  C o m p en sa tio n  of Cains*
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cred itor spouse cannot impugn transactions to which 
he consentedt ' In addition, i f  the property in  
question was acquired by a bona fid e  th ird  party 
for va lu e, the transaction cannot be reviewed* I t  
seems, th erefore, that transactions with mala fid e  
t h i r d  p a r tie s , or g i f t s  to th ird  p a r tie s , can be 
reduced by the court.^
I s  i t  true to say that the German and 
Scandinavian regimes are the systems o f  the future?
G K H m rr 
Sourcea
German Laws P r o f e s s o r  E.D.Grane (Chapter V , k i r a i fy  ) •
The German O i v i l  Codes Ian B* F o r r e s t e r ,  Simon I,.
G o re n , Hans"*Michael Ilgen* (as amended t o  January,
1 9 7 5 ) ,
The system which obtained in  Germany u n t il  the 
m id»*-tw entie th  century was one which resembled the 
S c o t t i s h  and English nineteenth c e n tu r y  sy s te m s  b e f o r e  
reform* In Germany, h o w e v e r , the w ife i n  name remained 
ow ner of h e r  heritage and moveables, but the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
t h e r e o f  f e l l  to  the husband. Professor Gran© n o te s ^  
that a sim ilar system i s  in  operation s t i l l  (1972) in  
S w i t z e r l a n d  (w h ic h  i s  n o t  altogether surprising  
perhaps s i n c e  women’s s u f f r a g e  i s  a n o v e l  concept to  
the S w is s )  but th a t, on t h e  other hand, A u s t r i a  has 
used t h e  "new" sy s te m  of deferred community, th o u g h  
perhaps not by that nam e, s in c e  1811#
Since the u n ifica tio n  of Germ any did n o t  take 
place u n t i l  1871, the h istory  of matrimonial property 
law b e f o r e  t h a t  date i s  characterised by the var iety
of /
1 # O nly  on d isso lu tio n  by divorce can an echo of t h i s  be s e e n  in  Boots law -  I)iv*(Bc*) Act, 1976, a .6#
2 .  p .1 1 7 .
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of different systems in operation in different parts
of Germany at different times* Wide powers of 
choice existed* Parties were free to choose the 
regime which they preferred, which perhaps would he 
on© in accordance with the local custom in their 
own part of Germany# One system became the statutory 
regime^ and the others were optional contractual 
regimes^# There was power to parties to opt out 
of the statutory regime, or to change their minds 
about their chosen system, whether statutory or 
contractual, by postnuptial marriage-^ -contraot, although 
the provisions of the latter were not effective to 
bind third parties unless known to them or registered 
in a local matrimonial property register* Grane 
notee^ that that system was sufficient to prevent 
abuses, which is an interesting opinion*
The history leading to change in 1958 is described 
by Grane^ and Glendon^. Until 1955, Germany had 
a system of separately owned property, broadly bpealcing, 
but the husband had wide powers of administration and 
enjoyment of the wife’s property, under exception of 
the Torbehalts^ut (property designated as such by 
marriage^contract, donation or bequest, together with 
the wife’s earnings from her separate employment, and 
articles for her personal use)* In 1955# for technical 
and constitutional reasons,^ Germany became a system 
of /
1* that is, (Gran© pp*115-116) (German Civil Code, 1896s Guterstand der Verwalfimg und Butzulessimg) retention by the wife of title to her moveable and immoveable property (hence giving it protection, especially in the husband’s bankruptcy) but administration thereof by the husbands rules acceptable to the spirit of the nation and the times * The husband could not dispose of the wife’s immoveable property*2* of* F re n c h  approach*3* P*116 (supported by references «■ p # 1 6 9 , fn*12),4* pp*118-119*5. PP#3%'^ *-2#6* Glendon* . ? it was necessary in terms of theBasic law of May 22, 19^ 9^, arts*2(1) and ( 2 )  to seek and enforce equality and equal rights, and separation was favoured ## Gran©,
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o f  full separation o f  property* This period was a 
"Oode-less" five y e a r  hiatus of judge-made law*
German jurists then looked to the laws of its 
neighbours, Austria and Sweden, and. found there 
t h e  notion of division (between the partners) of 
the material benefits of the marriage on the 
dissolution thereof* Grane relates^ that the 
Federal Ministry of Justice and a Bub Committee on 
Hatters of Family law, both concerned with the 
reform o f  the law here, considered that a full-bloim 
com m unity  system, as was becoming prevalent "especially 
in the Spanish-speaking and the Socialist countries"^ 
did not protect the wife adequately against th e  
d a n g e ro u s  effects of t h e  husband’s b a n k r u p tc y ,  in 
"swallowing up" her share in the community, and 
chose an Auatro/Bwedish/Swisa system, under which, 
s t a n t e  matrimonio, each partner has power to dispose 
of his/her own property (subject to certain limitations), 
and t h a t  u p o n  dissolution o f  t h e  marriage, t h e  gains 
of e a c h  shall be computed, and he/she who h a s  fared 
l e s s  well shall have a c la im  t o  one half of t h e  sum 
b y  which the other spouse’s gains exceed his/her own^*
The l a t t e r  suggestion was n o t  accepted i n  its 
e n t i r e t y  b y  t h e  legislature* In view of t h e  difficulty 
of tracing t h e  origin of property, t h e  division 
advocated on death w as that, where the survivor had 
b e e n  disinherited b y  the predeoeaser, t h e  former should 
take what was allotted to him/her b y  his/her statutory 
right of succession, and i n  addition should take one 
quarter of the total estate^*
H e re  /
1. pp*1 1 9 -1 2 0 *2* see fn*27i P*1?0 -  r e f e r e n c e  made, with citationof authorxty, to the laws of Spain, Ohile, A r g e n t in a ,  Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Par'àguay*2* Bee now German Oivil Oode Arte* 1363, 1364, 1371,
1 3 7 2 , 1 3 7 8 ; G rane  f n * 3 0 ,  p*171*4* German Oivil Oode, Art* 13/1(1)•
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H ere  a g a in  P r o f e e e o r  G ra n e '6  " i n s i d e r "  commente
are Interesting, He r e l a t e s  that wealthy îmehends 
took the opportunity afforded "by t h e  legislature's 
t r a n e i t i o n a l  a r ra n g e m e n ts  t o  o p t  f o r  a  re g im e  o f  
separation and "to escape t h e  new r e g im e, which 
t h e y  c o r r e c t l y  u n d e r s to o d  a s  a  d e t e r r e n t  a g a i n e t  
d iv o r c e *
The new system cam© into o p e r a t io n  in (W est)
G erm any i n  June, 1958# In 1966, t h e  German 
D e m o c ra tic  R e p u b lic  followed the general s o c i a l i s t  
t r e n d  in embodying a  oommmity sy s te m  in i t s  Family 
Oode é
The Federal Republic’s Oode o f  1958 allows 
oontraotlng-out^ of the general s y s te m , which i s  
described^ i n  the following termsi- "The husband’s 
and the wife’s property s h a l l  not becom e joint property 
of the spouses; this shall also apply to property 
acquired b y  either spouse a f t e r  m a r r ia g e *  However, 
t h e  gains obtained b y  t h e  s p o u s e s  d u r in g  their m a r r ie d  
life s h a l l  be compensated upon t h e  termination of the 
community o f  gains*" As P r o f e s s o r  Grane p o i n t s  o u t ^ ,  
the definition d e m o n s tr a te s  that th e  te rm  "community 
of gains" i s  a m isn o m er; rather, the term "compensation 
o f  gains" i s  appropriate# Such a system is often, 
called a system of " d e f e r r e d  co m m u h ity ", 
(^ URewinngemeinaohaft) and the German/Bcandinavian 
model has b e e n  described b y  many^ as the matrimonial 
property s y s te m  of the future*
D u rin g  marriage I the spouses do not enjoy 
unfettered freedom of administration o f  t h e i r  own 
property* Of the.'Whole property of one spouse, o r  
/
1* G.| p*iai*2 ,  RGB §1263(1 )*
2* 3 1 2 6 2 (2 )#4# p  #122 ,5* O f, G le n d o n , p*41, fn*62*
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the items of household plenishing and equipment 
b e lo n g in g  to one spouse, he/she may not dispose 
( I n c l u d i n g  m o r tg a g e , p le d g e  o r  en o u m b ran o e , o r  
"modification o f  its contents (Inhaltaanderunf) " ) 
except with the consent, express o r  im p l i e d ,  of 
the other spouse * W ith o u t consent, any such 
purported contract is inchoate, and w i l l  be null 
and v o id  if consent i s  refused. Judicial consent 
may b e  given, and w i l l  suffice, if the other spouse 
is unable or unjustifiably unwilling to give consent,^ 
,qnd (in t h e  case of transactions concerning an entire 
estate) if in addition "consent is u r g e n t l y  needed"^#
Borne at least o f  th e  s t r e n g t h  of th e  provision 
appears to have been taken from the rule by the 
g e n e r a l  construction that it im p o r ts  a s u b j e c t i v e  
t e s t  and that the ignorance of t h e  third party that 
h i s  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t n e r  i s  d i s p o s in g  of h i s  w ho le  
estate would r e n d e r  t h e  transaction unobjectionable* 
P rim a  facie t h i s  interpretation w ould  appear t o  open  
up a path for much litigation and difficult decision^*
M o re o v e r , the term " h o u se h o ld  items" does not 
appear to include h e r i t a b l e  property, and of c o u rs e  
i t  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  t h e  p ro b le m s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  r i g h t s
i n  t h e  matrimonial home which are t h e  m o st important#
both in terms of unhappiness and  i n  terms, o f  m o n e ta ry  
v a lu e  *
W here /
1# a common p r o v i s i o n  - perhaps e v e n  a n e c e s s a r yconcomitant - i n  every case or sy s te m  in which consent, o r  joint action, i s  r e q u i r e d *  Of# Sc*L* Oom.Hemo*Eo#41 # 6 ,2 9  (court t o  be em pow ered to dispense w ith  consent of occupant spouse to a transaction eoneerning t h e  matrimonial home# where ■ inter alia consent u n r e a s o n a b ly  w i th h e ld )  *
2# 'S r S o  #™pvT33 *3* Of# the sanguine opinion of Grane upon the freedom o f  spouses to make postnuptial agreements (German O i v i l  Oode# 1896 into effect 1900): these h o w ev erare not e f f e c t i v e ,against t h i r d  p a r t i e s  u n l e s s  known to them# or registered in a local matrimonial property r e g i s t e r .  (Grane, p.116)
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W W »  #  w m a m t  l a  a  m mttmr
ww#e he/shc shmïd hmm cbtWm# mmwt# tw  0#er spowe &e #  #mke # e  mmWle# pmvlécd hy
the laeffecMwmeai^  cf # #  Hmy
#e$#l0ms » e  immwweâ# Ew le  a thlrû
pm$y %c Mow #L##w M# pumhmo w lll o:g&amt or 
barely êlmlml#! # e  eellor*# property? Eow âom W 
kmw with w A o ln #  the ï etmW# of %W melier?
Eow fm  1$ Igmormm m # f  *, to th# #W i party?Eow le  omewt evMwoe&T Ew Im iW W e^temoq 
guarmtoeâ to th# third party? there we Woü#talmo w  wo ahlp# t^hoae ^uoatlem mot #I#a# 
melm m l ho momerW #^
GmipoMatloa take# pimoo won élm olutlm  of 
t h e  f o r  & w m œ  o t h w  them  d e a th #  m l  m e a t
oomoaly w  âiwroe*^* Upon oMer of aivomo# me 
wmee at this point beoom#' orWltor m l tw  o#er 
heoomw deWor* ’%er# 1# # l l t  la  # .tle  Wt merely a statutory debt om
dlvwm 1^  a different matter fr «  that of
ollmwt ("mllmow") which 1$ IW oâ to oomAmt md 
mlpaMllty* Dlvlalom of pmporty la mot wart fmm 
/
1* 13622# I t  D ?i;oum  t h a t  t h e  p;Awl#len m y  h #  Im rokod  b yt W  dlu%>oelmg e p e w e  q360# BW-iXd %io h e  p o m e m l l y  hwrod from #o'. Grmm m%g<goat^  (#*125) that" I t  ahoi.%M M  i m f f i o l w t  a e  a  r u l o  t o  l o t  'Ww o t h e r  opeme mue the third party* for re#<wilvory of the property to the Mopomlm#5# A t\nswr le ellolteâ #*125)# I^ aokof to # w # t o  Im the mmmer of ay l t l i m  r n ' i i e .  $ h lr&  p a r t y  i m o e w o o  l o  w  d e f e m o *m o  w e '  % : % *4*  G loM om  oo^%,ionto (p#41  m d  p # ?2  ^  e # o )  t h a t  t W  "oommmity'" amWre of the G o a m  r@#Se W o o m a  #parwt ou dlvwoe; It 1# net w o n  during mmwloge# or m  death ImtomWW*5* (#e galmr W l %  # 0  dohtw m d  the loser the wadltor) G*#
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/Iassessment of conduct «
The dates for valuation of property are as 
follows:- initial property (owned at m a r r ia g e  or 
acquired thereafter) is valued at the d a t e  "when 
the statutory regime began to govern the marriage" 
or the date of acquisition* final property 
(belonging to either at t e r m in a t io n  of m a r r ia g e )  is 
valued at the d a te  o f  dissolution of marriage^*
The attractiveness o f  such schemes can pall 
when difficulties of proof are encountered# and 
these must always be anticipated if possible. In 
Germany# there is a  presumption in favour of the 
accuracy, a s  between the spouses, of an inventory 
and valuation comprising the initial p r o p e r t y  and 
subsequent acquisitions of each.^ Unless such an 
inventory has been m ade, "the final property of 
either spouse shall be deemed t o  b e  his or her gains 
That spouse will not be heard to say that part of 
his ’final property* I s  ’initial property*. Gran© 
suggests that this rule i s  one which was made, by  
practical men who realised t h a t  the maiding of 
Inventories of property i s  n o t  spontaneous human 
conduct, nor even perhaps likeable, and the rule 
appears to favour the wife, usually the weaker party 
in /
1 .  Of. approach taken b y  law Faculty# University of Glasgow* in com m ents upon 8 c  .law .C om  .Memo .H o . 2 2 ,’Aliment and Financial Provision#At p .129, Professor Grane notes r ig h tly  that th is  may be lo g ic a l in  p r in c ip le , but may have outrageous resu lts*  A l i t t l e  thought w i l l  demonstrate how good a harvest might be reaped b y  t h e  adulterous w ife who# b y  her behaviour, has brought to  an end a  short-term marriage with a s u c c e s s f u l  b u s in e s s  man. (Bee d i s c u s s i o n  at p .129).2* §1376 BOB.3. §13?7(1)#4 .  5 1 3 7 7 (3 ) .  Bee generally Grane, p.128*
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1in economic terms#
Once m ore Is found t h e  distinction b e tw e e n  
onerous gains and gratuitous acquisitions# The 
latter are taken to form part o f  ’initial property’
It is clear t h a t  it is in the financial interests 
of each spouse upon dissolution to have as great a 
proportion as possible of his property placed on 
t h e  pile of ’i n i t i a l  property*#
By the same token# gratuitous alienations 
("designed to harm  the other spouse’s interests") 
are deemed to be part of the d o n o r  spouse's ’final 
property’ # Grane explains^# however, that the 
c o m p e n s a tio n  claim cannot exceed t h e  net final property 
of t h e  d e b to r  spouse# Redress can yet b e  obtained 
because the creditor spouse may seek from the third 
party donee^, e v e n  if bona fide# the subject of the 
donation or its monetary equivalent, by taking 
against him  an action of unjust e n ric h m e n t*  As to 
"other fraudulent acta", only those known to the third 
party to be i n  prejudice of the other spouse’s interests 
are reducible^# I n  this way justice may be done 
between the spouses, but it seems rough justice, or 
no /
1. G.| ibid» Glendon (pp.73*74) also notes that theaim iSist have b e e n  to make as much property asp o s s i b l e  available for division, ("Mlince the legislature s u r e l y  knew that married couples do not customarily make inventories of their belongings **#") and that, in m o st commmlty s y s te m s ,  other evidence (that is, besides t h e  production of an Inventory) that an item of property is not an acquest is admitted*2» in general "deemed to be part of the initialproperty", since the other did not contribute t h e r e t o *  § 1 3 7 4 (2 )  BGB, G ra n e , p*128#3 .  p*128* § 1 3 7 8 (2 )  BGB* See a l s o  G le n d o n ,4, W hat would be,the rights of a p a r t y  further removed? 5# §1 3 9 0 (1 ) and §1390(2) BGB r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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1no justice, to strangers to the marriage*
W h eth e r o r  not an inventory of initial property 
hae been made, each sp o u s e  is obliged to make an  
inventory of final property#
The d e b to r  spouse may refuse to satisfy the 
c la im  for compensation i f  he/she feels that the 
case falls within the definition o f  "gross inequity", 
but this expression does not include, it is thought, 
considerations of t h e  morality of t h e  behaviour of 
the spouses# That which is relevant is the f a i l u r e  
o f  the debtor spouse "to perform the economic duties" 
arising fro m  the marriage#
In addition, there is a defence of "set-off",
that is, set-off of benefits received by the creditor
spouse from the debtor spouse during the marriage
against the compensation claim arising# This is
p e r m i s s ib l e  only where the debtor spouse Intended
that this should be the result in t h e  event of
dissolution involving c o m p e n s a tio n , but there is a
h e l p f u l  presumption w h ic h  operates in the donor’s
favour, to t h e  effect that such intent will be
p resu m ed  where the benefit exceeds " t h e  limits of%normal gifts b e tw e e n  sp o u s e s " * ^  Moreover, the claim 
must be made by t h e  creditor spouse w i t h i n  three years 
of notification of the dissolution of the oom m m ity  
and "in any c a s e "  within thirty years thereafter*
There is provision f o r  postponed payment i n  case of 
hardship (under payment of interest and  possibly on 
d e p o s i t  /
1# The view has been put forward that i n  general t h i r d  parties should be entitled to rely on w h at they see, or on how matters seem . Yet if compensation w as l i m i t e d  t o  the extent of the other’s final property, of w h ic h  h e  had been disposing regularly (and perhaps on some basis resting in law evasion) it might be a right w o r th  little.
2# Grane, p.129#3* BGB 1380# Contrast South African prohibition of post-nuptial gifts#
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deposit of security) and provided that the creditor 
spouse’s interests are not prejudiced*
Upon divorce, gains are calculated as at t h e  
date of initiation of p r o c e e d in g s ,  not as at the 
date of their c o n c lu s io n *
A further protection for a spouse against 
unjustifiable or meo-operati'fe behaviour by the 
other is the remedy of a n t i c i p a t o r y  compensation, 
for which a claim may be made in oases of s e p a r a t io n ^  
or where t h e  other spouse has disposed of his entire 
estate, or has reduced it in an  attempt to preclude 
a claim f o r  compensation^ or where the spouse refuses 
to divulge information concerning his/her property: 
that is, in c i r c u m s ta n c e s  where there have been "repeated 
violations by one o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  of the economic d u t i e s  
arising from the^marriage, provided that his culpability 
i s  established"*^ A s y s te m  of s e p a r a t i o n ,  upon 
finalisation of the order for anticipatory compensation, 
r u l e s  t h e r e a f t e r # ^  D e p o s i t  o f  security may be 
ordered in an action o f  divorce or n u l l i t y  o r  in one 
for anticipatory compensation, to guard against 
prejudice of the claimant's rights*
Effect of Death Upon Property
It has been seen that different principles 
apply here*
The /
1* in circumstances i n  which the claimant spouse is entitled under German law to l i v e  apart, but not where b o th  spouses are so entitled: in the lattercase divorce could b e  sought on t h e  ground of "objective disruption of the matrimonial r e l a t i o n s h i p "  *2* §1375 BGB* This is a crucial area of possibleweakness in such a systems even i n  the Scottish system of separation, some safeguards are necessary; Divorce (Sc*/ Act, 1976» 8*6*
3* §1386 BOB: G ra n e , p * 1 3 l#4* Of* similar 'safety valves* i n  South Africa, France, Sweden (Boskiltnad;
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The basic (Auatro-Pruseian inspired) rules o f  
intestate s u c c e s s io n  are that the s u r v i v o r  takes 
one q u a r t e r  o f  the deceased’s estate if he/she takes 
w i th  descendants, and one h a l f  If he/she takes with 
the deceased’s parents, siblings, nephews and nieces, 
o r  grandparents*^
T h u s , i n  t h e  n o rm a l c a s e ,  w here  t h e  d e c e a s e d  
l e a v e s  c h i l d r e n ,  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  sp o u s e  w i l l  t a k e  one 
h a l f  of the estate (being one quarter with i n  
addition one q u a r t e r  of the e s t a t e  i n  name o f  
c o m p e n s a tio n  o f  g a in s )  and  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  i f  t h e r e  
are no c h i l d r e n ,  but t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s  as 
mentioned* The s u r v i v o r  is e n t i t l e d  a l s o  to all 
h o u s e h o ld  e q u ip m en t and wedding presents i f  t h e r e
are no c h i l d r e n  and such as he/she may r e a s o n a b lyo %require i f  c h i l d r e n  survive Grane points o u t^
that in many eases much of th e  e s t a t e  may c o n s i s t
o f  h o u s e h o ld  chattels*
If the spouses have c h o se n  to c o n t r a c t  o u t  o f  
t h e  s t a t u t o r y  re g im e  i n t o  a  sy s te m  o f  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r t y ,  the s u r v i v o r  i s  entitled o n ly  to t h e  basic 
s t a t u t o r y  right of i n t e s t a t e  succession, being one 
h a l f  o r  one  quarter as th e  cas© may be*
I n  this area, t h e r e  has been c r i t i c i s m ,  on  t h e
g ro u n d  /
1# Additional benefit to the extent of one quarter of the estate was given in the 1958 changes? §1371(1)BGB* T h is  w as prompted by the view (G,, p#120 - supra* ) t h a t ,  w here  the marriage was dissolvedby "death, it would be too d i f f i c u l t  to a s c e r t a i n  parties’ initial property#2* §1932 BOB,3* p#135* Of* "The S u c c e s s io n  (Scotland) A c t ,  1964"(2nd ©d*) Michael Heston, p*27 "The great social significance of these rights lies in the fact that in the large majority of intestacies, prior rights willexhaust the estate and ensure that the surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, even although others may have nominal rights of succession*" At p * 1 3 , "The figures clearly indicate the need for the law of intestate succession to be relevant to the small and very small estate rather than to the large estate*"
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groim cl t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v o r  h a s  r e o e iv e d  o v e r - g e n e r o u s  
t r e a tm e n t  at t h e  expense of t h e  remainder of t h e  
de c a as ed * a f ami ly •
Testate S u o o e a a io n .; Harriapre-Oontraots
I t  seems that German spouses may " f r e e l y "od i s i n h e r i t  each other, The right t o  the statutory 
share (that is, t h e  rights guaranteed on intestacy) 
may h e  e x c lu d e d  a l s o  h y  r e n u n o l a t i o n  o r  h y  " in d ig n i t y " * ^
In all these cases, h o w e v e r , it w ould  appear 
that t h e  disappointed spouse may demand h i s / h e r  b a s i c  
share i n  testacy, w h ic h  is one half of that w h ic h  
w o u ld  have been due to him/her as a statutory h e i r  
on i n t e s t a c y  ( b u t  w i th o u t  the additional one q u a r t e r  
share as described above). T h u s , depending upon  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  children, the s u r v i v o r  will r e c e i v e  
one eighth o r  one q u a r t e r  share, together w i th  the 
compensatory debt due in divorce and nullity* Why 
the s u r v i v o r  s h o u ld  receive the compensatory claim - 
thought not to be appropriate i n  the case of d i s s o l u t i o n  
b y  death intestate^ - i s  not clear* Moreover, t h e  
grammatical /
1* for example, s t e p c h i l d r e n ,  w ho, although t h e y  may s e e k  fro m  the s u r v i v o r  in case of n e e d ,  the c o s tof education, c a n n o t  a s k  more t h a n  th e  additional q u a r t e r  share, and g e n e r a l l y  have now "lost ground" a s  against the s u r v i v i n g  spouse* (G ra n e , p * 1 3 6 )*  Professor G rane  ’ s  own solution would have b e e n  a l i f e r e n t / f e e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  (b a s e d  on t h e  f id e ico m m issu m  of Roman Law)* As t o  the Scottish s y s te m , see Chapter 5(2)* R e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  alteration of t h e  rules of intestate s u c c e s s io n  i s  p ro p o s e d  i n  Ohapter 7*2* b u t ,  as i n  Scots law, this i s  n o t  the right which i t  appears to be: s e e  consequences below#3# Fraud^ forgery, falsification of will, d u r e s s ,  h o m ic id e ,  as e n u m e ra te d  by  G ra n e , p#138s of# t r e a tm e n t  i n  Soots law of "the u n w o rth y  h e i r "(Chapter 5 ( 2 ) ) #4* b e c a u s e  (according to G ra n e, p*120, " i t  would be too d i f f i c u l t  i n  many c a s e s  to  find out what the respective property of e a c h  sp o u se  had been a t  the b e g in n in g  o f  the marriage*")*
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ig re m m a tlo a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  Ime l e f t  o p en  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the s u r v i v o r ,  if the gains of the 
d e c e a s e d  w ere  few  o r  n o n - e x i s t e n t ,  m i^ h t e l e c t
inetead t o  forego t h e  compensatory debt, and takeg %instead the rights in i n t e s t a c y ,  H ow ever the
q u e s t io n  w as decided by a ruling of t h e  Federal 
Supreme Court in 1964, i n  favour of the strict or 
n a rro w  interpretation.
W ith in  the l i m i t s  o f  "mandatory rules of law 4and e t h i c s " ,  German spouses may a l t e r ,  ante-nuptially 
o r  po8tnuptially, t h e  statutory schem e of matrimonial 
p r o p e r t y  t o  s u i t  t h e i r  own n e e d s .^
I f  /
1# § 1 3 7 1 (2 )  BGB: G ra n e , p p .1 3 9 /1 4 0 .2$ Of# the principle of Approbate mid R e p ro b a te  o r  Election in B o o ts  law*3 .  T h e re  a r e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  German la w , co m p lex  t o  a  stranger to the system, applicable where t h e  s u r v i v o r  has been bequeathed a l e g a c y ,  o r  has b e e n  t r e a t e d  b y  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r  i n  s u c h  a  way a s  to g iv e  h im /h e r  a s m a l l e r  share o f  t h e  e s t a t e  than h e / s h e  would have b e e n  entitled to i n  intestacy o r  on complete d i s i n h e r i t a n c e .  See G rane  ("Modification of Statutory Succession") pp#140-143#4 .  §1408 BGB# G #, p#144#3# O n ly  t h e  o p t i o n a l  e x tre m e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  and  o funiversal community (and o f  course the norm  o f  ♦deferred community’) are available now* w ith o u t  special provision# Grane notes (p#146)(¥.Muller - Fraietela - "F a m ily  Law and The Law o f  Succession, 
i n  G erm any"# 16 Inst, & Comp# L*Q* 4 0 9  (1 9 6 7 )  a tp.425 states, th o u g h , t h a t  i n  the usual ease th e  statutory regime applies, because no special particularised regime is chosen#) t h a t  separation 
re m a in s  p o p u l a r ,  especially among t h e  b e t t e r  e d u c a te d  and wealthier ( a n  interesting p o i n t ;  and o f#  South Africa) and  w here  b o th  spouses are s e l f -  s u p p o r t i n g ,  b u t  remarks r i g h t l y  that the m o tiv e s  
u n d e r ly in g  s u c h  a choice may not a lw a y s  b e  simple or r e f e r a b l e  to uncomplicated criteria*
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If t h e  alternative re g im e  desired is n o t  one 
to h e  found i n  t h e  O ode, t h e  spouses m ust th e m s e lv e s  
specify b y  marriage s e t t l e m e n t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  w h ich  
th e y  w ish #  The deed must be e n te r e d  into when b o th  
parties (or t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e (s )) are p r e s e n t  
and must be effected b y  "notarial agreement"# The 
n o t a r y  o r  other representative may be t h e  agent o f  
both# W ith o u t registration of t h e  agreement in the 
local court marital s e t t l e m e n t s  register (or private 
kn o w led g e  of the third party, a t  the time of 
contracting w i th  t h e  spouse), the deviations from 
t h e  statutory scheme w i l l  n o t  affect third p a r t i e s , ^  
and generally "(T]h© application" ( f o r  registration) 
"m ust be made b y  b o th  spouses, each of them being 
under a d u ty  to cooperate;"^ The R e g i s t e r  i s  a public 
d o c u m e n t, and publication of the e n t r y  will be  ordered 
t o  be made i n  a local newspaper#^
Choices Available Under t h e  Oode
The choice of "oom m unity" u n d e r  t h e  German Oode 
i s  t h a t  of u n i v e r s a l  community, and two sets of rules 
exiet^ to govern this option, one concerned w ith  t h e  
case w here  i t  i s  agreed that administration of t h e  
common p r o p e r t y  w i l l  b e  b y  one sp o u se  only, and one 
applicable t o  th o s e  who wish joint a c t i o n  t o  be  the 
rule#
Property /
1# The Bame applies to the effect of a subsequentsettlement a l t e r i n g  the first# See generallyupon  t h i s  subject, G#, pp#145/146#
2# Grane, p#145# The duty to co-operate is aninteresting feature and one w h ich  might be thoughtto b e  necessary f o r  the working of a system inw h ic h  registration plays so im p o r ta n t  a  part#3# Does this m ean notification of the e n t r y  m e re ly  o r  of t h e  details thereof? If the latter is meant, s u r e l y  t h i s  w ould  be unacceptable to many? 4# Grane, p#14? et s a g #
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Property of each spouse at marriage, and 
property subsequently acquired, form t h e  common fund# 
This means that, on marriage, entries in land registers 
become incorrect, and must be "rectified"*^ Outside 
the common fund (Goaamtgut) is Boiidermt* which 
P r o f e s s o r  Gran© translatée as specific property^, and 
over t h i s  each spouse has unfettered right of 
administration* Examples are claims to alimony, to 
what appears to be an approximate equivalent t o  the 
Soots claim for s o l a t i u m * in respect of personal 
injuries, rights of usufruct, copyright, "claims not 
subject to attachment" : all in all, items o f  p r o p e r t y
which "cannot be transferred by a legal transaction*"^
In addition, t h e r e  is the Vorbehaltsgut. the 
reserved property, which Gran© states has i t s  origin 
in the n o t io n  of paraphernalia# Here, i t  signifies
gratuitous acciuirenda* and such property as t h e  spouses 
agree shall not form part o f  the common fund, and any 
property purchased therewith or exchanged therefor*
Her© too the ow ner spouse has full right of 
a d m in i s t rat 1 on * ^
W ith  r e g a r d  to (greeam tgut* neither spouse may 
dispose of an i te m  n o r  insist upon partition#
In the a b se n c e  o f  explicit choice by  th e  spouses, 
j o i n t  administration i s  presumed* The spouses may 
p r o v id e  f o r  e i t h e r  t o  b e  s o l e  a d m i n i s t r â t  o r / t r i x , but 
notification /
1* This is explained b y  G rane i n  a  few  words - "titleto land is t r a n s f e r r e d  off t h e  l a n d  register, so the new entry giving a j o i n t  t i t l e  to b o th  spouses w i l l  be of a m e re ly  declaratory character#" (p*14?) but, at least as m a t t e r s  stand at present i n  Scotland, automatic common ownership of the matrimonial home, i f  accepted i n  principle, would be difficult to put i n t o  practice# Of* Ohapter 7* 2 ,  p . 148#3# Of* Swedish " p e r s o n a l  r i g h t s " #4 .  I b id *5# îEe""presumption h e r e  i s  that there is no reservedp r o p e r t y ,  unless notification thereof is made in t h e  m a r r ia g e  settlements r e g i s t e r *
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notification thereof must be entered in the m a rr ia g e  
settlement register* "This i s  a very clear rejection 
of t h e  patriarchical concept embodied in t h e  law 
before the Reform*"^
The effects of joint and sole administrationprespectiveXy are, as w ould  be expected, that t h e  
spouse having sole right of administration will 
transact, sue and be  sued alone, and his/her actions 
w i l l  import no personal liability^ on the other spouses 
in a joint administration, there must b e  concurrence 
by each j o i n t  administrator«
In sole administration, consent of t h e  "passive" 
partner ( o f ,  if necessary, judicial consent) i s  
required i n  important t r a n s a c t i o n s  -  f o r  example, 
d i s p o s a l s  of t h e  entire j o i n t  p r o p e r t y ,  o r  disposals 
o r  undertakings to dispose o f ^  land, or t r a n s a c t i o n s  
concerning ships, or gifts of u n u s u a l  size* In j o i n t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  there i s  a  d u ty  upon e a c h  spouse ’to 
c o n c u r  i n  necessary actions’, and  again t h e  c o n s e n t  
o f  th e  court may be  substituted for t h a t  of the s p o u s e .  
An inchoate contract will result where c o n s e n t  has 
n o t  been obtained (in c i r c u m s ta n c e s  not j u s t i f y i n g  
application for judicial consent) unless or u n t i l  
ratification b y  the other spouse t a k e s  place* I n  
sole /
1* G*, p.148* Contrast South Africa* As to France,Colomer writes ( p # 9 8 )$ " I t  is clear that the idea that the husband i s  "lord and master of t h e  community" has finally b e e n  abandoned; h e  retains his place as head of th e  community, but instead of 
e x e r c i s i n g  a right* he fulfils a f u n c t i o n  i n  the interests of ¥otiTlxusbaixd and wife* ^ ~Freviou8ly, German law held the husband t o  be head o f  the com m unity ; the wife’s c o n s e n t  w as necessary only rarely - notably I n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  pertaining to im m oveable  p r o p e r t y ,2, Bee list of r e l e v a n t  r u l e s ,  G#, pp#148/149*3* Whether i n  j o i n t  o r  i n  sol© a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e r ei s  full liability f o r  debts upon e a c h  spouse quoa^h i s / h e r  shares in the com m unity  fund*4* for German law draws a distinction h e r e .
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sole administration, the passive spouse, w hose 
consent to a transaction was required and  was not 
obtained, may take action against the third p a r t y  
involved* "Ho such right is provided for under 
joint a d m i n i s t r â t  i o n , w here  i t  was not felt to be 
necessary"# However, in an irregular transaction 
(that is, one lacking the necessary consent) "any 
i n c r e a s e  i n  joint property" resulting therefrom "must 
b e  returned to the third party, i n  conformity w ith  
the r u l e s  on  u n j u s t  e n r ic h m e n t" .^  Ijhren under 
universal community, i t  seem s that i t  is competent 
for either spouse to r u n  an in d e p e n d e n t  b u s i n e s s ,  a n d , 
in respect of transactions and litigation connected 
t h e r e w i t h ,  it will not be n e c e s s a r y  (or proper, 
presumably) for t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  to give his/her 
consent*^
There is joint and s e v e r a l  liability for debts*
I n  cases of j o i n t  administration, each is liable to 
the e x t e n t  o f  his/her e n t i r e  p r o p e r t y  ( i n c l u d i n g  
B o n d e rg u t and Vorbehaltsgut) f o r  debts c o n c e rn in g  the 
common fund, subject to a ' r e c k o n i n g ' at dissolution 
according t o  the rules of liability i n t e r  so# I n  
sole administration, th e  s o l e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  i s  liable 
in h i s / h e r  whole estate for debts of the other 
affecting the common fund, subject to 'r e c k o n i n g ' a t  
dissolution*
D i l ig e n c e  is used against the s o l e  administrator, 
o r  against b o th  if t h e r e  i s  j o i n t  administration*
1# G ra n e , p*149*
2# § 1 4 3 4 , §1437 BGB# G *,3# It i s  Strang©, t h e r e f o r e / u o  read (&*, P#150) that "If one of t h e  s p o u s e s ,  who d o e s  n o t  have power or s o l e  power o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i s  running an independent business, a judgment against him w i l l  in p r i n c i p l e  be sufficient for e x e c u t io n  against the joint property" ( §741 - ZPO: Code ofOivil Procedure)*
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BojategaBt-ca:
If the sole administrator ‘becomes bemkrupt, the 
common fund ie a n sw e ra b le *  The common fund will 
not be affected by the bankruptcy of the passive 
partner# In j o i n t  administration, "the joint 
property may, upon application by any creditor o r  by 
e i t h e r  spouse, become subject t o  independent bankruptcy 
proceedings"*^ Where bankruptcy proceedings have 
been taken, both against the fund and against the 
separate property of one spouse, the fund must first 
be l ia b le * " ^  P r o f e s s o r  Grane appears to consider*^  
that this position is an Improvement upon the previous 
rule under which the husband's banlcruptcy would have 
repercussions on all h i s  wife’s property, but as the 
author himself implies, the improvement i s  only to 
the extent that it is conceivable now that the wife 
may have p la y e d  some o r  all of the active p a r t  in 
the management of the parties’ financial affairs.
On the o t h e r  hand, where spouses are prepared to 
live under a sy s te m  of u n i v e r s a l  community, with sole 
adï|inista?ation by husband or w i f e ,  no other consequence 
than that described i s  fair to creditors#
Termination of (Universal) Ooimunitv
( U n iv e r s a l )  Oommmity comes to an end upon post­
nuptial agreement to that effect by the s p o u s e s ,  or 
by violation by one spouse of h i s  duties under the 
rules o f  community or upon inability of one to manage 
h i s  affairs, "or if one spouse’s interests are 
e n d a n g e re d  by the other’s i n d e b te d n e s s "*
Between /
1* §236(a) KO (Bankruptcy Oode) G*, p#150 2* a result referable, presumably, t o  the essential ’ j o i n t n e s s ’ ,  a n d  consequent potential danger end potential advantage, of universal community# "In p r i n c i p l e , creditors of each spouse may demand s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e i r  claims out of the joint 
p r o p e r ty " *  § 1 4 3 7 ( 1 ) ,  § 1 4 3 9 (1 ) BGB# G#, p#149*
3# G*, i b i d .
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B etw een  termination and liquidation, joint 
a d m l n l a t r a t i o n  a lw ey e  o b ta in s #  A t l i q u i d a t i o n ,  
n e t  p r o f i t s  a r e  d iv id e d *  On d i v o r c e ,  t h e  In n o o e n t  
o r  l e e e  g u i l t y  p a r ty ^  may demand r e s t i t u t i o n  o f  w h a t 
h e  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  com m unity# T h is  i e  b o th  
crude (at least i n  i n s a n i t y  cases), and  quite o u t  
o f  k e e p in g  w i th  German l e g a l  t h i n k i n g  e la e w h e r e ,  
which, r i g h t l y ,  i t  is submitted, h a s  d raw n  a distinction 
betiireen  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  c o n d u c t  an d  d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r l y
On d e a t h ,  t h e  German oom m m ity  r u l e s  p ro d u o e  an  
interesting v a r i a n t^ *  t h e  p re d e o e & s e r ’ s  s h a r e  i n  
t h e  com m unity  i s  part of h i s  estate, and  d e v o lv e s
according to the ordinary rules of succession, b u t  
t h e r e  i s  a  " c o n t in u e d  com m unity" betvToen t h e  s u r v i v o r  
and  t h e  h e i r s  o f  the deceased* " It seem s t h a t  t h i s  
n o t i o n  is t r a c e a b l e  t o  Germanie-Hordic tradition*'^
T o d a y , h o w e v e r , s p o u s e s  m u st d e c l a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t h a t  t h e y  w is h  c o n t in u e d  com m unity  t o  a p p ly  i n  t h e i r  
case*
I f  t h e y  do s o ,  and  i f  t h e  s u r v i v o r  d o e s  n o t  r e f u s e  
to continue the com m unity , t h e  com m unity  s h a r e  o f  th e  
p r e d e c e a s e r  w i l l  form p a r t  o f  th e  continued com m unity , 
and  w i l l  be a d m in i s t e r e d  b y  the s u r v i v o r  u n d e r  t h e  
'sole a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' regime, t h e  descendants t a k i n g  
the p a r t  o f ,  o r  r e p r e s e n t i n g ,  t h e  o t h e r  (deceased) 
sp o u se #  The r e m a in d e r  o f  t h e  deceased’s e s t a t e  w i l l  
d e v o lv e  /
1# o r  p e t i t i o n e r ,  i f  innocent, i n  a case of dissolution o f  t h e  marriage on  a n  "objective" (p re s u m a b ly  n o n -  culpable) ground such as i n s a n i t y  o r  "incurable 
d i s r u p t i o n "  G*, p#131 b f  c o n ta g io u s  d i s e a s e #2# Of. Grane, p*131*3* n o t  unknown e ls e w h e re  -  o f*  South A f r i c a ,4. cf* embryo of a  s i m i l a r  i d e a ,  i n  Scots la w , before 
t h e  I n t e s t a t e  M oveab le  S u c c e s s io n  (8 c * )  A c t ,1833# S ee  O h a p te r  1 ,  pp#73"*74#3, Grane, p#131*
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T h a t  contimxed somunity is no longer the rule in 
the absence of specific agreement is significant*
I t  Is suggested that this also is an aspect of 
German matrimonial law/law of succession^ which 
Scots law would do well to ignore*
SchluBselgewalt (praepositura)
U n d er the new Code o f  1958, the German 
equivalent of the wife’s praepositura^ was retained*
It is interesting to see not only the differences 
hut also the similarities between systems  ^For 
example, to date, there has been seen in France,
Louisiana /
1# Of* South Africa - supra*2* In the conflict of ïàwï"(Ü#, p*133 )$  continuedcommunity has been classified c l e a r l y  as a matter of matrimonial property law, and n o t  as a mattax’of succession (o f*  Be licols v* C u r l i e r  11900Â*G*21î In re Martin [19001 p*211 (simitar problems o f  classification addressed t o  our own courts)) and u n d e r  German conflict rulesh a s  been referred to th e  law ‘of the husband’s 
n a t i o n a l i t y  at marriage *3* Ëhown'"as"'"W& : "the po w er o f  the keys" *4* Bee geneÆn!y''"ÏEF'''^p^ al by P r o f e s s o r  Grane at pp*163'-167, of t h e  German position against the background of o t h e r  systems discussed, and his interesting summary o f  different matrimonial property systems, past and present (from Greece to Sweden)* e*g* (p*167) " I n  Spite o f  the difference between t h e  regimes of community o f  acquests and separation coupled with a mutual interest, it is re m a rk a b le  that b o th  jurisdictions have connected the idea of compensation w ith  the time of l i q u i d a t i o n ;  in both systems, it i s  at the end rather than d u r in g  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  regime that significant effects come to light*" He adds, "It remains to b e  seen whether this construction, especially to the extent that it modifies the rules of succession, will stand t h e  trial to w h ic h  i t  will be s u b m i t te d  by social evolution and l e g a l  practice * " See also pp#163/4* The S c o t t i s h  sy s te m  - if a system at a l l  - forms an a t t e n u a t e d  version of a system o f  "separation coupled with a mutual interest", the mutual interest being evidenced rather by the rules of intestate than of testate succession*5- S c h l u s s e l g e w a l t  removed by reform  o f  1 9 7 6 .  See p . 81 0 ,  f n , ^ .
810
L o u is ia n a  and Germany, special treatment of 
acqulrenda*^  the requirement of consent for important 
transactions where there is o n ly  one captain on the 
bridge, and (see also South A f r i c a ), provision for 
t h e  cutting s h o r t  of community on grounds of 
maladministration by one, o r  violation of a p a r t y ’ s 
duties u n d e r  t h e  regime# Similarly, it i s  common to 
f i n d  some fo rm  o f  agency o r  mandate i n  t h e  wife, 
th o u g h  this, wisely, i t  is submitted, i s  giving place 
t o  t h e  n o t io n  of joint authority and j o i n t  and 
several liability for household debts#
As amended by the 1958 Oode, the German rule was 
that the husband shall be liable in respect o f  the 
w i f e ’ s  contracts i n  her domestic sphere, "except 
where a d i f f e r e n t  conclusion i s  imposed by t h e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s", and i n  the husband’s insolvency, t h e  
wife a l s o  i s  liable therefor The h u sb a n d  may l i m i t  
or exclude his wife’s rights h e r e ,  b u t  such limit or 
exclusion w i l l  b e  annulled by a court if shown to 
have /
1# See also E a s t  Germany ( § 1 3 (1 )  and ( 2 )  FGB), where tangible property, proprietary rights and savings acquired stante m a trim o n io  by one or both spouses through worFor IneoBefrom work ("income from work" i n c lu d in g  pensions, s c h o l a r s h i p s  "or similar recurrent payments") xa held t o  form th e  common fund, b u t  the p r o p e r t y  of each acquired b e f o r e  marriage i s  not included, nor a r e  donations acquired d u r in g  marriage, or property i n h e r i t e d  b y  e i t h e r  sp o u s e  d u r in g  marriage n o r  (an Bast German p e c u l i a r i t y )  " to k e n s  of d i s t i n c t i o n "  lAuBzeiohmmg) # which Grane explains (p#159)"refers to^ 'prises and awards g r a n te d  f o r  m e r i to r i o u sperformances###" (Also e x c lu d e d  from t h e  East German o o m m m ity  is property " u se d  b y  one spouse only for satisfaction of personal n e e d s  o r  f o r  t h e  exercise of h i s  profession")* See f u r t h e r  "East Germany", infra, com m encing at p# 8 1 2,
2* §1337(1)BGB*
3 . P o s i t i o n  now ; -  BGB 1357: each  spouse  may c o n t r a c t  f o r
n e c e s s a r i e s  and each  sp ou se  has r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  underth e  c o n t r a c t .
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have been effected without proper reason*
I n  G erm any, am e l s e w h e r e ,  d i f f i e u l t y  h a e  b e e n  
e a o o im te re d  I n  d e te r m in in g  w h ic h  t r a n e a e t io m e  p r o p e r l y  
belong to the domoetlo sphere* Third parties are 
entitled to rely on the erletenee of the agency; 
only i f  the limitation or exclusion i s  registered in 
the marriage eettlemente register or ie personally 
known to them will the spouse he protected against 
t h i r d  p a r t i e s * ^
Moveables designed for the use of one spouse 
rather than the other are preenmed to belong to that 
spouse#^ "For the benefit of the husband’s creditors 
and the wife’s creditors it shall be presumed that 
moveables in the possession of one spouse or both 
spouses belong to the debtor* This presumption shall 
not apply when the spouses live separately and the 
moveables are in the possession of the spouse who is 
not the debtor #**"\
These rules ensure that the creditor need not 
concern himself unduly about the propea^ system which 
is in operation to govern the parties*"^ If the
non -debtor /
1 # §1337(2) BGB* G rane  § P*134# now applies to either spouse#2* §1442 BGB* Grane (see generally pp*134-6) statesthat a newspaper statement is ineffective without registration of withdrawal of mithority, or proof that it had been read by the creditor# Moreover* it might found a divorce by the wife by reason of thé injury to reputation* Of* Bocttish position* su p ra #3# (pRwS(2) BGB* as amended). However* jewellery may be proved to belong to the husband* or to nave been bought as am investment (which latter circumstence presumably rebuts the presumption - but to whom then does the jewellery belong? Of* queries at Ohapter 1* pp,2i-22#)4, §1362(1) BOB as amended, See generally Grane’streatment of the subject at pp,136-138* (under the heading* "Statutory Presumptions in Attachment and Bankruptcy Proceedings"),3, a  feature which Pascal stresses is greatly to bo desired in a  system.
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non-debtor spouse a v e r s  that his/her property has 
been wrongly attached for the other spouse’s dobt,^ 
that spouse must prove his/her title to the property 
in dispute «
EAST GERMAHY
(S saa e* -o £ « L S il» )
Since 1966, E a s t  Germany has had as the general 
system in use a system o f  community of acquests;
"in this i t  follows soviet and other socialist laws#"^
One interesting c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the East German 
s y s te m  i s  that marriage settlements a r e  permitted,
(and l i t t l e  f o r m a l i t y  i s  required) but property 
"designed to serve t h e  needs of f a m i ly  life" must 
remain in com m unity* Grane considers that "This 
r u l e  is remarkable in that it m akea the community 
regime mandatory f o r  certain. property needed for the 
upkeep o f  the f a m i ly  Perhaps i t  is remarkable
t h a t  su c h  a rule i s  not more commonly to be fo u n d
In the g e n e r a l  case, the land r e g i s t r y  authorities 
m u st e n s u r e  that title to land ("through purchase, 
barter or foreclosure") is taken i n  the name of both 
spouses, n o t  o n ly  i n  the name of the (married) 
applicant* Hence t h e  matrimonial home if owned w i l l  
stand /
1. It w i l l  be recalled t h a t ,  during the subsistence of the marriage, the German statutory regime i s  one  o f  separation of p r o p e r t y ,2 .  G *, p . 1 5 8 .
5 ,  G . ,  P .1 5 9 .4. Cf, Be# If, Com. Memo. Wo.41, 7*32 (suggestion that spouse having ’occupancy rights’ in th e  matrimonial home s h o u ld  have a r i g h t  to us© and e n jo y  t h e  household f u r n i t u r e  and plenIsEIn^r%ev0n) where owned by th e  o t h e r  spouse) (and Faculty Comments, to the effect that t h e  m ore satisfactory approach w ould  be to give rights of ownership to b o th  spouses i n  ( d e f i n e d )  family assets); Law* Com, Ho.66 (family Law: Third Report on  family Property) (1 9 7 8 ) 3 .5 9 *  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  " u se  and e n jo y m e n t order" i n  respect of "household goods" (broadly d e f in e d  - 3*104).
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1stand in Tooth names# Disposals of houses require 
joint action I hut in other cases action may he j o i n t ,  
or h y  one partner with the other*s approval, and 
third parties are protected unless they have know ledge  
of the p a s s i v e  s p o u s e d is a g re e m e n t#
W here a d e b t  is personal to one spouse, t h e  
creditor has access both to personal and to community 
property, but must first seek satisfaction out of 
personal property# If community p r o p e r t y  i s  attached 
for personal debt, the n o n * d e b to r  spouse may seek 
"anticipatory termination of the community, i f  this 
i s  n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  s p o u s e ,  
o r  o f  m in o r  c h i l d r e n ; " ^
Upon termination of marriage b y  divorce or 
n u l l i t y ,  the responsibility of making a j u s t  and 
amicable division of community property ( e a c h  spouse 
being entitled to claim a one h a l f  share thereof) 
l i e s  in t h e  f i r s t  place upon t h e  spouses t h e m s e lv e s , 
a notion which seems e m in e n t ly  sensible# If t h e y  
c a n n o t  do s o ,  the court must make the d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  as 
i t  sees fit i n  t h e  circumstances#^ At this point, 
it seems that a strictly e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  i s  not i n s i s t e d  
upon, and indeed (IS’UB 359(2)), in a suitable ease, 
one s p o u s e  may s e e k  m ore t h a n  a  one  h a l f  s h a r e ,  and 
might e v e n  be granted the entire j o i n t  ©state#
from t h e  date o f  ju d g m e n t o r  a g re e m e n t, the 
p r o p e r t y  so  allocated becom es the separate p r o p e r t y  
of each fo rm e r  s p o u s e ;  i f  the s p o u s e s  delay f o r  
more /
1* Of# p r o p o s a l s  b y  Scottish Law Commission, Memo#Ho #41 * Occupancy Rights i n  the M a tr im o n ia l  Home*#
2# G #, P+1G0#5# i t s  r e m i t  i n c l u d i n g  distribution, change in title, o ompene at ion #4# an  unequal division might b e  indicated if one sp o u s e  h a s  car© of d e p e n d e n t c h i l d r e n  o r  if one s p o u s e  c o u ld  b e  s a i d  t o  h av e  made no  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the joint p r o p e r t y ,  th r o u g h  w ork  i n s i d e  o r  o u t s i d e  th e  home# (G#, p#160)#
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m ore t h a n  one ye& r bo s e e k  su c h  ( j u d i c i a l )
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  th e  ( m o v e a b l e )  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  
p o s s e s s i o n  o f  e ao h  i s  th e n  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h #  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  w i t h i n  t h a t  t im e  
l i m i t ,  a  s p o u s e  m a y  c l a i m  a  s h a r e  ( u p  t o  o n e  h a l f )  
i n  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  o t h e r ,  i f  h e / s h e  
" h a s  m a t e r i a l l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  o r  
m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u s e * s  p r o p e r ty " * ^  ‘f M a  
s h a r e  i s  n o n ^ a s s i g n a b l e  ,  n o r  g e n e r a l l y  " i n h e r i t a b l e "  
b u t  t h e  c o u r t  i n  i t s  d i s c r e t i o n  m a y  o r d e r  t h a t  i t  
d e v o lv e  i n  w h o le  o r  i n  p a r t  t o  su c h  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  
d e c e a s e d  c r e d i t o r  s p o u s e  " a s  a r e  n o t  s t a t u t o r y  h e i r s  
o f  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e " * ^  P o s t * « t e r m l n a t i o a a  a g r e e m e n t s  
a s  t o  t i t l e  t o  l a n d ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  b e  e f f e c t i v e ,  m u s t  
b e  e x e c u t e d  n o t a r i a l l y #
P r o f e s s o r  G rane  n o t é s  t h e  w ide  d i s o r e t i o n  g iv e n  
t o  t h e  B a s t  German C o u r t  i n  m aking  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
t h e  oom m unity p r o p e r ty # ^  I n d e e d ,  i f  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  
o f  t h e  c o u r t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w id e  t o  p e r m i t  t h e  g r a n t
o f  a l l  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  p r o p e r t y  t o  o n e  s p o u s e ,  a s  
a p p e a r s  t o  b e  t h e  c a s e ,  a l t h o u g h  e x c e p t i o n a l ,  t h e  
s y s t e m  c o u l d  th e n  b e  th o u g h t  t o  b e  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  a  
s y s t e m  o f  d e f e r r e d  com m unity : h e r e  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e
c o m m u n i t y  q t q n t e  m a t r i m o n i o  * b u t  no oom m unity on 
t e r m in a t io n *
As i n  o t h e r  r e g im e s ,  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  f a l l i n g  s h o r t
o f  d i v o r c e  o r  n u l l i t y  m a y  b r i n g  t o  a n  en d  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  
a n d  /
1* G*, p .1 6 1 #2# G *, p # 1 6 1 .5# Of* sy s te m s  o f  ^ s e p a r a t io n *  w i th  w id e  j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  u p o n  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  o r  
( l a w  C o m m i s s i o n  f h i r d  R e p o r t  on  R am lly  P r o p e r ty  1 9 7 8 ) i f  n e e d  ( f o r  a  r i g h t  o f  u s e r )  a r i s e s  *
E n g l a n d ,  A u s t r a l i a *  I t  i s  te m p t in g  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  p re s u m p tio n  o f  j o i n t  o w n e rsh ip  an d  u s e  w h ic h  a  commun!t y  sy s te m  p r o v id e s  w h i le  t h e  m a r r ia g e  s u b s i s t s #  R ig h ts  o f  
d i s s o l u t i o n  en d  on  m a r r ia g e  em erg en cy  a r e  t h e  r i g h t s  
w h ic h  m a t t e r *
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and  t h e  c o u r t  w i l l  make d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e  same
im aim er as upon  divorce* Upon resumption of 
c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  commmity resumes automatically, 
unless excluded b y  t h e  parties^* In o t h e r  eases, 
restoration o f  community property i s  subject t o  an  
agreement i n  w r i t i n g " S u b j e c t s  acquired in the 
interim f a l l  into t h e  com m unity , unless the parties 
provide to the contrary* A dictatorial attitude is 
taken in the case of land* If land is acquired, 
"the l a n d  register becomes incorrect and must be 
a d j u s t e d ;  t h e  sp o u s e  r e g j . s t e r e d  a s  s o l e  o%mer m ust 
c o '^ o p e ra te  *
On death, the survivor i s  entitled to a share 
equal t o  that of each descendant, and, in an y  case, 
to not less t h a n  one quarter*^ If there are no 
d o s o e n d a n ts  w i th  r i g h t s  o f  i n h e r i t a n o e ,  t h e  sp o u se  
i s  s o l e  h e i r ,  b u t  w i l l  r e c e i v e  o n ly  a  one  h a l f  s h a r e  
i f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s in g  sp o u s e  was u n d e r  a  d u ty  t o  p a y  
alimony to his/her p a r e n t s , e in o e , i n  that c a s e ,  
"the p a r e n t s  w i l l  compete w i th  t h e  s u r v i v o r  a s  
s t a t u t o r y  /
1* a v a i l a b l e  on o o m p la in t  b y  one sp o u se  g e n e r a l l y"if such a step i s  necessary i n  the i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  complaining s p o u s e ,  o r  o f  m in o r c h i l d r e n " ,(G#, p*161) and p a r t i c u l a r l y  appropriate if there has b e e n  cessation of cohabitation* # i t l e  to joint property m o v eab le s  r e v e r t s  t o  the a c q u i r e r  and title to l a n d  "must b e  r e ^ ^ t r a n s f e r r e d  b y  n o t a r i a l  a g re e m e n t"  # ( b u t  b o th  apparently are subject to th e  *wide judicial discretion* r u l e ) *2* $ 4 4 (2 5 (2 )  RGB* G*, ib id *5* ^44(2)(5) m s *  G*,4* 3 4 5 ( 5 ) BGIGB* G*, pT1E5* O th e r  sy s te m s  seem  t oapproach w i th  a l i g h t e r  h e a r t  t h e  p ro b le m s  andcomplexities involved i n  a joint ownership o f  heritage rule. Of* Sc*Ii*0om»Hemo*Ho*41 and  faculty R e s p o n s e, Sehed*1*3* that i s ,  o f  the com m unity  estate, p re s u m a b ly ;  If com m unity  h a s  terminated previously, does e i t h e r  spouse have an i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  estate of the o th e r ?  
i n  Scots la w , the e s t r a n g e d  spouse s t i l l  may claim l e g a l  r i g h t s , subject to t h e  provisions o f  the 
C o n ju g a l  R ig h ts  (B o*) Amendment A c t ,  18G 1, e .6 , Chapter 1, p*?7.
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1s t a t u t o r y  h e i r s ;  " I t  I s  o p en  t o  th e  p r e d e o e a e e r  
t o  t e s t  o th e rw is e * ^
As upon t e r m in a t io n  by divorce the survivor 
may c la im  a  c o m p e n sa to ry  s h a r e ^ ,  i f  h e / s h e  h a s
contributed * m a t e r i a l l y *  t o  th e  property of t h e  
deceased*
WEB BOAmiHAVIAE 00W ÜRIE8
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H a t r im o n ia l  P r o p e r t y  Law i n  Denmark* I n g e r  M* P e d e rs e n
(19G 3) 28 H .L .% ,1 3 7  ( 'P e d e r s e n ') *
D a n ish  an d  N o rw eg ian  Law* (A General Survey edited b y
Whe D a n ish  O om m ittee on Comparative Law), Chapter IV
(Pamlly Law) and Chapter V ( S u c c e s s io n ) # 1965# ( "D.
an d  H* Law)*
As t o  N orv;ay, s e e  a l s o  Whe S t a tu s  o f  Women i n  Norway
Heffermehl* A m eric* Jo#  of Oomp* Law (20), 1972, p#630*
%he /
1* 1 0 (2 )  EGP&B* &*, p*1G 2,2* The to n e  o f  t h e  b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  s u g g e s t s  (p * 1 6 2 ) t h a t  
i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h i s  r i g h t ,  th e  s u r v i v o r  h a s  h o  c la im *  W here th e n  i s  the com m unity? Of* re m a rk s  a b o v e ,
5* Wais i s  w here  the r u l e s  of succession and  o f  m a tr im o n ia l  property c ro s s *  G rane  (p*162) n o te s  t h a t ,  from  1966, the s u r v i v i n g  spouse now has a  combination o f  succession and matrimonial property r i g h t s  * He com m ents, "A t a  t im e  when m a r i t a l  p r o p e r t y  r e l a t i o n s  h a v e  a  te n d e n c y  e v e ry w h e re  t o  b e  t e r m in a t e d  upon  d e a th  and to give way to r u l e s  o f  s u c c e s s io n  governing 
t h e  r i g h t s  o f  s u r v i v i n g  spouses, the tw o political e n t i t i e s  on German s o i l  a r e  m aking  ah  a t te m p t  t o  compensate surviving spouses f o r  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  th r o u g h  r i g h t s  b a s e d  o n  m a tr im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  c o n c e p ts * "  B e e ts  law  a c h ie v e s  t h i s  en d  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  i t  r e c o g n i s e s  th e  end *■ i n  the c o n v e n t io n a l  m anner of a  sy s te m  of separation, th ro u g h  the rules of s u c c e s s io n ,  and  r a t h e r  th ro u g h  th e  rules o f  i n t e s t a t e ,  th a n  o f  t e s t a t e ,  s u c c e s s io n ,  !Dhe r u l e s  o f  te s ta te ^ ' s u c c e s s io n ,  th o u g h  lo n g  p r e p a r e d  t o  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  c la im  o f  th e  s u r v i v i n g  f a m i ly  a g a i n s t  t h e  e s t a t e ,  y e t  a l lo w  t o  t h e  t e s t a t o r  ( s i n c e  the abolition of t e r c e  and c o u r t e s y  b y  the B u c c e s s io n  (Sc*) A c t ,  1964) t h e  e x e r c i s e  of free w i l l  w i th  regard to h e r i t a g e , (See Chapter 3(2))#
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The t r a d i t i o n a l  sy s te m  i n  Denm ark heia "been one 
o f  oom m m ity  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  b u t ,  i n  oommon w i t h  many 
o t h e r  oom m unith s y s te m s ,  i n  i t s  e a r l i e r  s t a g e s  
( u n t i l  1 8 8 0 ) ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  common fund. "  
and  ev en  o f  t h e  w i f e ' s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  i f  t h e  
parties b y  private paction had decided that t h e  w if e  
s h o u ld  e n jo y  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  l a y  w i th  t h e  h u sband#  
Thereafter, sh e  became e n t i t l e d  to u s e  a s  sh e  w ish e d  
h e r  own e a r n i n g s ^ ,  and  i t  came t o  b e  r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  
c e r t a i n  a c t s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  com m unity  p r o p e r t y  
r e q u i r e d  the w i f e 's  consent#
Ju d g e  P e d e r s e n  s t a t e s  t h a t  q u e s t io n s  o f  
m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  h a v e  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  " a t  
B o a n d in a v ia n  l e v e l " , ^  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
g r e a t  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t h o u g h t ,  and  la w , on  t h e  m a t t e r ,  
i n  D enm ark, F i n l a n d ,  l o e l a n d ,  Norway an d  Sweden#
T h ese  c o u n t r i e s ,  sh e  s a y a ,^  th o u g h  d i f f e r e n t  
t e r m in o lo g y  i s  em p lo y ed , " a l l  h a v e  l e g a l  re g im e s  
g iv in g  t h e  sp o u s e s  d u r in g  marrl.a^ e^ an equal r i g h t  to 
a d m i n i s t e r  an d  d is p o s e  o f  p r o p e r t y  a n d  ^  11;$ d i . s s o l u t i o n  
( e i t h e r  b y  d e a th  o r  divorce) a h a l f  s h a r e  of any  
p r o p e r t y  owned by  them# " In 1965, t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
r e g u l a t i n g  A c t i n  Denm ark w as t h e  D a n ish  M a tr im o n ia l  
Property A c t ,  1925 (and i n  Norway, the A ct (n o # 1 )  of 
May 2 0 t h ,  1927)*
A g e n e r a l  s t a r t i n g ^ p C i n t  i n  N o rw eg ian  a n d  D a n ish  
m a t r im o n ia l  law  i s  t h a t  'm an an d  w ife  a r e  and
t h a t  t h e y  s h a l l  r e a c h  t h e  n e o e s s a r y  d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e rn in g  
th e  /
iatiCrty
1* Of# P ra n c e  and  t h i s  w as a l s o  t h e  p a t t e r n  i n  sy s te m s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  (E n g la n d , Scotland): "TheS w ee t O h e a t Gone" 'P r o t e c t i o n '  g iv e s  way t o  ' Equality ♦ (M » A # G len d o n ) #2* As e a r l y  a s  1875, t h e  q u e s t io n  w as d e a l t  w i th  a t  t h e  S econd  G e n e ra l  S c a n d in a v ia n  L a w y e rs ' O o n fe ren o o  (P e d e r s e n )#  Sussm an (G pouses and  T h e i r  P r o p e r ty  
u n d e r  S w ed ish  Law 1965 (12) A m eric# Jo#  o f  Ooi%>#Lew p#555) says that the Swedish Marriage Oode, 1920, was " a  product of pan^'Nordic co-^operative legislation"# 5* PP#157/15a#
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l i f e  o f  t h e  f e m l ly  i n
I n  Bm m W c# t h e r e  1% w m m m lty  e f  p r o p e r t y  m m ed  
m% a #  w e l l  m# r i g h t
W  $ h m ^  # » e l m  A e w  % m # l t h e  y iw r r c m c e
m  m m m t ê l s e e l v w  # t e  m a r r ia g e # ^
M v e  m  ###%.! A # #  t o  
t W l r  f l u m e l m l  - a f f e lm #  e a c h  apc im e  adalm lnie% *^ 
h i e  w  h e r  e # $  a w # # a  m i  mcy Im e w  & # # #  w l # ^ o #  
t h e  ü im w a t  e f  %M c tw r-# " ^ ' G rm # '
# e  #«3;W owed %  %W Germm. m f e r m m  t o  t h e  
u e a M l m w l w  m o d els  .B W ieraw  c m e M e m  t h a t  # e  D%#eh 
« a W h l e #  m m -  c lo m e ly  t h e  M w d le  «m m pl##
I n  p w m a # : alw%- i s  p w w  W  c w W a a t  m t  o f
% #  e W # # o v  W t  me 1# rm de e f
/
1 # D# w d  W* Lm , f#?1, where a lso  la  ibcfa c t  that Im thnc:e wwW L#g there fewp w l t l v e  provlm len^s t h e  nnf^T lM  11 f u " ,md luTf 4* wiJ.eh 4e e^ lnt Âktlnly to  be fmmd In the L) eonoeraig^ pamperty* Atp*%, tne rffrt;:3rk Im rmue thot 'oheee aremnlthup 'wtmon Iw * nor 'o lv ll lm *  t^f/^Wno*2* & c o r ta u n ity  o f  p re # m /ty  m  t m l l  w  o f  u r e f i t  m d
l o n e ,  t h e r e f a : r e  ^  o f#  M uhlo , S o u th  A fid-e#;
, „  , ,  , ,  . ,5» u r a t h ,  e iv o r o e #  ms n  ' Ly w  u e r m e l"  ( j u a l a z a l  w  ^ ^ I n l n t r a t l v e ) ,4# ''n d e v # # n , p#159#5# lu lro ilucvU , im  195S*0 * are uM er 'jo in t  e e ta W(lieffer, iOM., %}#653)* cheiee la  U n ited  ## p w tle a  cmi3i;vü croatm tW lr  mm system ,i foreignIn Dmwark, the n<.Y' o lnot to llv oiridw  m ayeta# e f  w  o, ;y*AwC)4 wxdwI'blob eerWlR property mhall W "while otherpropnrty or tbo r^##oodM o f aepevalo mhall1)"': (b v w m i;;;/  % :v^oporty'\ A r w u / ,  ;L i \ ( i^ o th wa^yi'uu), thvt uf o oy-ton of 'richto  Aawlvo3* ma %ho o f thea;v.(h rh'jÂf'v;; th%' Mptu  ^ Wd kV'ou fWLAuaity(  v'l l a ,  " th e  '''^ " 'w r' bo-' t M / h   ^ 'I'r'U? vhf'Yi\b'Ot*ty eM  the p o jo jh lllty  o f  -aluW*; lai the poc*re,)>rlop e f  %bn w^ <n3,o o f th e p^vpt.rly" V# mil M* I'M'!, p*w^) (See o above wpwu t"? > )olnt thatth'k 'oomtont o f  l i e  mXoB geveaW%)(; (llnl^r.lhuwlon upon d i r r e i u t i o a  w  o% r^yono) 1$  l i k e l y  w  liuoh m ore l.rr^ ujzhj/ul' tium ,#vem W tW  eymtw)*
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t h a t  power#
Bach spouse during marriage has freedom to 
administer his/her " h o d e l"  (estate); the notion of 
j o i n t  administration o f  the common fund was d i s c a r d e d  
as a general rule, as being productive of difficulties 
for t h e  spouses and for third parties*
An interesting f e a t u r e  of the Danish system is 
t h e  freedom of action with regard to a spouse's own 
property, w h ile  t h e  marriage subsists* N e i t h e r  spouse 
is liable for t h e  debts of t h e  other, u n l e s s  h e / s h e  
was in v o lv e d  in the transaction or upon undertaking 
specifically responsibility* In this respect, t h e  
N o rd ic  and t h e  Germanic systems resemble each o th e r*  
Under Dutch legislation, on the o t h e r  hand, a debt 
(Incurred for t h e  community by one spouse) may b in d  
t h e  property of the other spouse, th o u g h  it "does 
not create a personal liability for t h e  other spouse*"
Under t h e  N o rd ic  system, though, each partner i s  
liable f o r  debts for household purchases, regardless 
of w h ic h  spouse i n c u r r e d  them# The husband i s  l i a b l e  
f o r  p u r c h a s e s  by t h e  wife "for her own n e c e s s i t i e s " , ^  
but the w if e  i s  not so liable for p u r c h a s e s  by the 
h u sb a n d  /
Postnuptial changes of m ind can b e  given effect to generally only b y  approval 'b y  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y  * * The choice of regime (which must be restricted to a choice among the options offered, and p a r t i e s  are not free to choose a f o r e i g n  or in d iv id u a l ly * "  tailored regime) must be written, and registered i n  a public register# A bsence  of registration renders the contract i n v a l i d  i n  D enm ark, but not in Norway* It i s  stated that gifts o f  value between spouses or engaged persons must also be so recorded*Further, "in other respects the r e q u i r e m e n t  of proof with regard to transactions b e tw e e n  spouses is s p e c i a l l y  rigid*" (D# and N* Law, p p * 5 4 /5 5 )«  Generally, however, the whole seem s to c a r r y  the mark of free an d  easy Scandinavia*1* T h is  a g e n c y  operates o n ly  if the p u r c h a s e s  are reasonable, having r e g a r d  to t h e  standard o f  l i v i n g  of t h e  p a r t i e s  * (D* and N*Law, pp*5 1 /5 2 )*
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husband for his own use# In Denmark, the liability 
of each partner f o r  household debts arises w h e th e r  or 
not th e  spouses are living under the oommunity system.
The system belongs t o  the genus "deferred 
oommunity regimes"# "The d i f f e r e n c e  between this 
system and a system of separate property is that 
the spouses r e c i p r o c a l l y  are given certain rights 
over the property of the other spouse# Borne of 
these rights may be exercised during the marriage, 
others only become of importance when the marriage 
is dissolved e i t h e r  b y  death or by separation o r  
divorce or when the estate is divided at t h e  request 
of on© of the spouses or after mutual agreement#"^
In th e  interests of justice and to give substance 
to the " r i g h t s "  which are given, there must be 
limitations u p o n  freedom of action, and the broadest 
limitation is that neither may administer his/her 
own property in such a way as to cause undue injury 
to the other spouse's interests#^ Aa in other 
systems, there are special rules concerning t h e  
matrimonial home# If the t i t l e  to the house stands 
i n  t h e  name of one spouse, he/she i s  not empowered to 
s e l l  or encum ber it, n o r  to let it (if to do so  w ould  
terminate i t s  use as the family home) w ith o u t  consent 
of t h e  o t h e r S i m i l a r l y ,  if title to heritage u s e d  
a s  business premises in a joint b u s in e s s  venture 
u n d e r ta k e n  by the s p o u s e s  stands in the name of one 
spouse, consent of t h e  other spouse must be obtained 
before /
1# D# & H# Law, p#32# In Scots law, upon separation o r  divorce, an award o f  aliment or a  periodical allowance may be a  l i k e l y  result but is not guaranteed# far l e s s  are any property rights guaranteed, and on death, legal rights and  prior rights are of l i t t l e  benefit, i f  there i s  nothing upon which they may operate* A man is not prohibited from divesting h im s e l f  of h i s  property before death#
2# 1925  A c t ,  P a ra# 1 7 #5* Of# proposals of So#Xaw.Com# i n  Memo#No#41#
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b e f o r e  sale, encum brance  or l e a s e  thereof*
What is the position o f  t h i r d  parties? In t h e  
case of the matrimonial home, im le s s  t h e  marriage 
c e r t i f i c a t e  is registered i n  t h e  R e a l  Property Register, 
t h e  transaction, carried out without consent, may be 
reduced o n ly  i f  the third p a r t y  did n o t  act in good 
faith* The aggrieved spouse must p ro v e  t h e  t h i r d  
party's b a d  faith* P e d e rs e n  points out that i t  is 
usual t o  inspect a house b e f o r e  buying i t ,  and the 
fact that i t  was being used a s  a f a m i ly  home should 
put a t h i r d  p a r t y  on  his g u a r d ,  and  would r e b u t  the 
i n f e r e n c e  of good faith i n  the t h i r d  party*
F u r n i t u r e ,  'articles bought f o r  t h e  personal u s e  
o f  children*, and a r t i c l e s  used by the o t h e r  spouse 
for h i s / h e r  work cannot b e  sold b y  the ow ner spouse 
w ith o u t  consent of t h e  other*^ Good faith again 
protects the t h i r d  party, b u t  i n  this c o n n e c t io n ,  it 
i s  f o r  the third party to prove his good f a i t h #
As in many s y s te m s, abuse of d i s c r e t i o n  in t h e
administration o f  property will j u s t i f y  t h e  seeking 
of a d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  community, a s  also will b a n k ru p tc y ,  
unlawful c e s s a t i o n  o f  cohabitation, the begetting of 
an illegitimate child with r i g h t s  of inheritance, or 
t h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  the existence at marriage of such a 
child^* The common thread running th r o u g h  all these 
o a s e s  is the danger or potential danger to t h e  
petitioning spouse's interests*
Moreover, upon dissolution and division, at 
w h a te v e r  /
1* Of* Hemo*lo#41, and Faculty Response (University 
o f  Glasgow) Bohed* 1*2* Of# generally Memo#No#41, Part VII: 'The F u r n i t u r e ,  Plenishings and Other Household Moveables* Bee also Law Commis8ion, T h ir d  Report on Family P r o p e r ty  (1976)f o rd e rs "  f o r  use and  enjoyment? 5*55 ft s e a .  England ( i n f r a ) *5* P * , p#141#
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whatever time, If it emerges that there has been 
a b u s e ,  causing "considerable lose of assets", the 
other spouse may make a claim for compensation»"^
The p r i n c i p l e s  on  w h ich  d i v i s i o n  i s  made a r e
the same whether d i s s o l u t i o n  has b e e n  brought about 
b y  death or by  divorce or b y  any o t h e r  qualifying 
e v e n t#  "The s h a r e  o f  a  d e c e a s e d  sp o u se  b e lo n g s  t o  
hie o r  h e r  h e i r s » "
Judge P e d e rs e n  gives practical example© of 
d i v i s i o n  of various estates»^ In t h e  first place, 
t h e  net estate of e a c h  sp o u se  is calculated, and 
one h a l f  of t h e  h u s b a n d 's  net e s t a t e  is placed in a 
separate c o lu m n , together with one half of h i s  w i f e ' s  
net estate, and a sum e q u iv a le n t  t o  h i s  own d e b ts  »
These three figures are ad d ed  together, and t h e  
resulting sum i s  te rm e d  the h u s b a n d 's  n e t  e s t a t e .
The same calculation i s  made i n  the w i f e ' s  c a s e ,  and 
t h o s e  sums a p p e a r  t o  bo  th e  sums a b l e  t o  bo  c la im e d  
b y  each respectively, on d i s s o l u t i o n  of t h e  m a r r i a g e , 
u n d e r  t h e  s y s te m  p r o v id e d  b y  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
E s t a t e s  A c t*  (%n P e d e r s e n 's  e x a m p le , t h e  g r o s s  
a s s e t s  of each combined were 70,000 k r o n e r  (h u s b a n d , 
5 0 ,0 0 0 : wife, 20,000), an d  th e  r e s u l t  o f  making the
calculation o u t l i n e d  above was t o  g iv e  each spouse 
29,000 k r o n e r ,  sums w i th  th e  a d d i t i o n  to which of the 
d e b t s  of each (h u s b a n d , 10,0001 w i f e ,  2,000) amount 
t o  70,000 kroner* This amusingly neat r e s u l t  a t  
f i r s t  s i g h t  seem s t o  have b e e n  effected b y  mathematical 
s l e i g h t  o f  hand: on  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  i t  can b e  s e e n
that t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of equity (or e q u a l i s a t i o n )  has b e e n  
brought /
1* Of», e * g * , t h e  Bast German claim t o  s h a r e * on the 
b a s i s  of having contrlbuted^ia^irlally to t h e  o t h e r  spouse's p r o p e r ty *  P e d e rs e n  (p»142) remarks that such r u l e s  stress " th e  duty o f  each spouse to consider t h e  o t h e r  when h e  is exercising his power© over hi©  own p r o p e r ty #  "2 » at pp » 142"*144 *
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brought in by the requirement that each © h a ll 
surrender on© half of his/her net estate to the 
other, and i n  this way the less w©ll«^endowed spouse 
(wife) la compensatedI and o n  the o t h e r  hand, the 
o t h e r  spouse (husband) is e n t i t l e d  t o  be indemnified 
in f u l l  f o r  h i s  (larger) d e b ts # ) #
I n  practice f h o w e v e r , Pedersen s a y s  that a 
simpler m ethod  is used, in w h ich  the h u s b a n d 's  and
the w i f e ' s  a s s e t s  are massed, a s  are t h e i r  debts,
and t h e  latter are deducted from t h e  former to produce
the net community e s t a t e # from t h i s ,  the husband i s
e n t i t l e d  to a sum to cover h i s  debts, and to one half 
of t h e  n e t  community estate (calculated aa above b e f o r e  
taking out h i s  debt indemnification), as also i s  
t h e  w ife #  The result is t h e  same, aa followst**- 
each spouse is e n t i t l e d  to 29,000 kroner n e t , ^  "and 
w i th  funds to cover t h e  full amount of hi a o r  her 
l i a b i l i t i e s # "  P e d e r s e n  s t r e s s e s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  i s  
l i a b l e  u n d e r  t h e s e  s y s te m s, for t h e  d e b ts  of t h e  o t h e r , '  
and c o n t r a s t s  t h i s  w i th  the D u tch  sy s tem *
I n  /
1# or, more properly, to a 29,000 kroner share oft h e  oommunity estate, w h ich  in t h e  n o rm a l c a s e  w i l l  b e  satisfied by a mixture o f  cash and  corporeal moveables o r  h e r i t a g e  # There a r e  two stages i nthe s e t t l e m e n t  of property on the dissolution of com m unity# One is 'calculation of share* and t h e  other 'd i s t r i b u t i o n  of assets'# O n ly  once  calculation of share is effected does it seem that entitlement to a s s e t s  c a n  b e  decided and satisfied#2# I n  Denmark there is oom m unity of a s s e t s :  i n  H o l la n d ,there is community of assets and of liabilities*Under the Danish s y s te m , though, is n o t  each affected by the other's debts and is paying for them? He/she who has incurred a smaller sum o f  debt w i l l  not 
r e c e i v e  a  l a r g e r  sum o f  oom m unity# I n  t h e  si% e of h i s / h e r  ultimate share, h e /s h e  i s  h e lp in g  i n  
t h e  payment of t h e  o t h e r ' s  d e b t s ,  b u t  perhaps i n  v ie w  of the l a c k  of m eth o d , o r  record-keeping, in m o st m a r r i a g e s, and of t h e  fact that (he) who c a m s  m ore may i n c u r  m ore debt, t h e  a r ra n g e m e n t effects a ro u g h  j u s t i c e #  O n ly  the debts outstanding at 
d i v i s i o n  appear, but s u r e l y  other debts previously I n c u r r e d  lie h id d e n  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  assets f i g u r e ?  Strictly speaking, th o u g h , i t  i s  true t h a t  i n  Denmark it i s  the 'positive* w h ic h  i s  shared*
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I n  b a n k r u p tc y ,  the bankrupt sp o u s e  will retain 
all his/her assets to s e t  against h i s / h e r  l i a b i l i t i e s #  
t h e  solvent spouse m u st contribute half of his/her 
net e s t a t e  to t h e  bankrupt s p o u s e ,  but retains the 
r e m a in d e r  o f  h i s  n e t  e s t a t e  and  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p a y  
h i s / h e r  own d e b ts *  and these sums a r e  out o f  reach 
of th e  bankrupt s p o u s e 's  c r e d i t o r s , ^  T h is  seems 
exceptionally n e a t*  th o u g h  it demands altruism from 
the solvent sp o u se#  i n  th e  Scots system of separation* 
e x c e p t  w here  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  im m ix tu re  of funds or t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  of separate property has been departed from
the spouses* t h e  b a n k ru p tc y  of one does n o t  affect 
t h e  wallet of the other*^ In Holland* Pedersen
points o u t  t h e  solvent sp o u se  must undertake liability 
for half of t h e  other spouse's debts* T h is  liability 
may e x h a u s t  h i s / h e r  whole e s t a t e  and may exceed also 
his/her s h a r e  i n  t h e  oom m unity* a l th o u g h  the latter 
could be  renounced# " T h is  risk for spouses i s  in 
Holland c o n s id e r e d  an inherent e le m e n t of the 
community p r i n c i p l e *  w h ic h  can be avoided b y  
matrimonial s e t t l e m e n t  only" T h is  is not so i n  t h e  
Nordic s y s te m s  * and i n  Germany too* Judge Pedersen 
notes "a sp o u s e  will n e v e r  have to pay more t h a n  
h a l f  th e  value of I i i s  property at t h e  end of t h e  
m a r r ia g e #
In nullity* there is divided as community p r o p e r t y  
o n ly  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  d u r in g  m a r r ia g e  b y  e a c h  sp o u s e  
" th r o u g h  w ork  and thrift"*
The /
1# A c c o rd in g  to P e d e r s e n  (p#132)* attempts b y  the 
h u sb a n d  t o  p l a c e  e v e r y th in g  i n  t h e  name o f  t h e  wife (to d e f e a t  creditors) a r e  "strongly d is c o u r a g e d "  *but t h e r e  is no mmplifIc at ion o f  t h i s  statement*3# Bee generally* Ohapter 2 (B a n k ru p tc y )  *
5 .  1*** p . W #4# p#,l46#
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The new r u l e  o f  g r e a t e s t  im p o rta n o e *  th o u g h *  i© 
that w h ic h  allows t h e  court t o  depart from t h e  
principle of equality* if t h e  community assets have 
been a c q u i r e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  b y  one spouse b e f o r e  
marriage o r  g r a t u i t o u s l y  during marriage* b o th  subject 
t o  t h e  p r o v i s o  t h a t  equal division would result i n  
c l e a r  injustice*^ Discretion has entered* therefore* 
th o u g h  a  sp o u s e  I s  y e t  a lw a y s  e n t i t l e d  t o  one h a l f  
o f  o n e ro u s  ( 'work and thrift*) a o q u ir e n d a . ^  and t h e  
let s t a t e s  t h a t  " th e  new r u l e  is t o  be u s e d  c h i e f l y  
w here  th e  m a r r ia g e  h a s  lasted a s h o r t  time o n ly  and 
no f i n a n c i a l  com m unity  o f  an y  im p o r ta n c e  h a s  b e e n  
e s t a b l i s h e d * " ^
Judge P e d e rs e n  th e n  c o n s id e r s ^ ' w h e th e r  c o n d u c t 
ought to b e  a  relevant factor i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p r o p e r t y  on  divorce * By * c o n d u c t *
Is n o t  meant g u i l t  o r  in n o c e n c e  of m a tr im o n ia l  offence# 
P e d e r s e n 's  examples a r e  of cases ivhere one sp o u s e  h a s  
c o n t r i b u t e d  much m ore to t h e  community ( i n  pecuniary 
te rm s  alone?) than t h e  other* o r  where t h e  b reakdow n  
o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  h a s  b e e n  b r o u g h t  a b o u t m a in ly  b y  th e  
s p o u s e  w i th  t h e  s m a l l e r  e s t a t e *  8he r e j e c t s  th e  
s u g g e s t io n *  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  p r o o f  
an d  p a r t l y  because of t h e  potential and u n d e s i r a b l e  
l i t i g i o s i t y  o f  su c h  a  w id e n in g  o f  d i s c r e t i o n #  The 
D u tc h  c o u r t s  are p e r m i t t e d  no  d i s c r e t i o n *  and  th o u g h  
t h e  German courts have a c e r t a i n  l a t i t u d e  t o  allow 
one s p o u s e  t o  r e f u s e  t o  p a y  h a l f  o f  h i s / h e r  s u r p lu s *  
i f  t o  do so  w o u ld  c a u s e  s e r i o u s  i n j u s t i c e  ( a s  e v id e n c e d  
i n  /
1 * P# * p*14?* H ere  a g a in  i s  s e e n  t h e  closin g  of g aps*  t h e  g ro w in g  a p p ro x im a tio n  o f  e f f e c t  i f  n o to f  a t a r t l n g » p o i n t  a m o n g  sy s te m s  #2# P e rh a p s  " a c q u e s t s "  is t h e  c o r r e c t  e x p r e s s io n  but " a cqulrenda" i s  u s e d  a s  a te rm  o f  art th r o u g h o u t  tSls^Txesïli t o  d e n o te  property a c q u i r e d  a f t e r  
m a r r ia g e #5* The D a n ish  M a tr im o n ia l  Law O om m ittee  recom m endedo n ly  s p a r in g  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  new r u l e  i f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
h a d  s u b s i a t e d  f o r  f i v e  o r  m ore y e a r s *
4 *  p  # 1 4 7 / 8 #
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me mm I M #
M w e m t 
much ma m m m t
in  partlm l& r by w # e #  by #oum  hmrlm$ # e  
smaller eatmta of hM/Wr #.e
o f f # #  e f  t h l #  (Im  i9 # 5 )  w #  w t  th em  clear# ^
r ^ # y  1$ n #
l a  # * # # $ # &
w  %  d l w w e #  b y
W  w pw atiw  In DœmA and 
"Mmim# I f  # e w  le
related  matters 
chlldrm,* thm  Im 
Lf "Wm a ,peu#m  
# w  "i&at they am net able te  eomtlmua the m rrlage 
heem%#e of pmfmmé #md lm%l% él#agre#imt"# Im 
evm lea# Is  wquimd In th a t a apmiee may 
M pm rm tiam  Wcm&a# o f  f a l l u r #  h y  # i e  o thm ^ 
#pm#e In  h la/hw  dmtl## (to allmemt or$ for wm#l0* 
Im m o w e  w W ra  a w  mpmm# h a s  hecam e a  h e # y  d r i n k e r )  
*f "# e  m rrlage may W ##M to h# dea^treyed 
e^e of pmfemmd pmvided $W epeuee
#&o 3@^ a#e#W the wpai'atlom 1$ m# tihe cmm at 
Im other (mw W lw)* dlvew# mey he
Imedlmtely M t i#  D#ma& the apeme hmyl% # r i # t  
te  dmmd élveme dammâ Imeteaâ*
After mpmratlom* the dm#" to  eo h # lt eewee* %h# 
eetaW Is  divided* md the right# of inherits 
each in  tW esta te  of the ether fall## 
f w  /
i#!*3#
B u t $ 0 #  G vm if *2# D . & E_ * N*. p * # %% #  Im^ J 'c  p a r t i e #  may o f  eo u< ^e  #0 am  ^
h # # # * "  e*!»^  ,#J& Ik m m A #  t W r e
srimg 1^
 .....................................................      —  hm r#" # v m  t h e  p r a t w t  o f  %W c t k w 'V l fd i v e w #  l a  e4^n6,*^qjwü 1 y e w a  m # p ,io b iv o ly *  D# & m* m m * ^#49#
them  t h e  n e r l o d s  m m  i i
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few exceptions the marriage is practically no longer 
existing".^
The grounds o f  divorce in Denmark and Norway 
are factual separation (for four years (Denmark) * o r  
for three years (Norway)), m a l ic io u s  desertion (two 
years), incurable insanity (for three years without 
hope of recovery), adultery, cruelty, b ig a m y , 
im p riso n m e n t for two years o r  more, e x p o s u re  of t h e  
o t h e r  spouse to contagion w i th  venereal d i s e a s e s  
without consent, and disappearance of one sp o u se  for 
t h r e e  years* (separate procedures " a  ju d g m en t of 
p re s u m p tio n  o f  death i n  D a n ish  law has t h e  e f f e c t  
that t h e  surviving spouse may marry anew without 
t h e  disadvantages for the surviving spouse resulting 
from a  divorce#"^).
On death, the s i t u a t i o n  i s  complicated, as in 
other systems, by t h e  fact that t h e  survivor is entitled 
n o t  only to his/her share of community, but also to 
a share i n  the predeceaser's share of community*
In intestacy, the survivor i s  entitled to the 
whole of the predeceaser'e estate, if there i s  no 
issue, and to a one third share if there i s  issue*
In testacy, the survivor h a s  a r i g h t  to not l e s s  than 
one half of his/her entitlement on intestacy* These 
rules a p p ly  whether o r  n o t  the spouses lived under 
com m unity*^
The survivor i s  entitled to c la im  personal 
b e lo n g in g s  and articles acquired f o r  children's use, 
and has a preferential money claim (1965s 12,000 kr*)
"Including /
1* D* & N* Law, p*49/50* Financial support is due only if s p e c i f i e d  in the d e c re e *  However sexual intercourse w i th  another w ould  be adultery j u s t i f y i n g  divorce * The spouses clearly cannot re-marry nor indeed b in d  himself to marry and the separation w i l l  lapse and the marriage r e v i v e  if cohabitation resumes#2* D* & N* Law, p*50*5* Pedersen, p*148*
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"including his ovm share of the community, his 
separate property and any sums inherited from the 
d e c e a s e d 's  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty # "  "As t h e r e  a r e  many 
s m a l l  e s t a t e s  t h i s  p r o v is io n ,  w i l l  b e  o f  c o n s i d e r a b le  
p r a c t i c a l  importance*"^
It seems that i n  D enm ark, and  i n  N o rw ay ,^  t h e  
c o n c e p t  of continuing oommunity remains* A s o l v e n t  
surviving spouse may take p o s s e s s io n  of the w h o le  
community estate if th e  co-heirs a r e  children of 
the m a r r ia g e  o r  t h e i r  i s s u e , end may be  e n t i t l e d  i n  
certain circumstances t o  t a k e  possession if t h e  c o ­
h e i r s  are stepchildren* W here t h e r e  a r e  no c h i l d r e n ,  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of continuing community may b e  excluded 
by t h e  w i l l  of the deceased* I n  the c a s e  o f  
continuing com m unity , d i s t r i b u t i o n  need not take place 
until t h e  re-marriage of t h e  s u r v i v o r ,  o r  a b u se  o f  
powers b y  h im , or death of t h e  s u r v iv o r *  D i s t r i b u t i o n  
when i t  occurs takes place i n  t h e  m anner d e s c r i b e d ,  
"except t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  sp o u s e  o r  his estate ie 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  all d e b ts  o f  t h e  com m unity  e s t a t e  # "
D i s t r i b u t i o n  of property
Since in Germany there is no 'community* in the 
traditional s e n s e ,  b u t  s im p ly  a sharing o f  * s u r p l u s  '  
n e i t h e r  sp o u s e  can lay claim t o  any particular p ie c e  
o f  p r o p e r ty ^  belonging t o  t h e  o t h e r .  " I n  Holland 
the community estate is distributed i n  accordance w ith  
t h e  /
i. See D* & N* Law, O h a p te r  T, Law of Succession,especially pp*59-61* Of* H.O.Meston, 'The S u c c e s s io n  (Scotland) Act, 1964*, (2 n d  ©d*) p#12 "*#* the let was framed w ith  the medium t o  s m a ll  estate in m ind" and p*15i "The figures clearly indicate the need for the law o f  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s io n  to b e  relevant to the small and very s m a ll  estate r a t h e r  than to the large ©state"#
2* Bee D* & N* la w , p # 5 3 /4 *3* though the t r a n s f e r  o f  particular items in l i e u  may b e  o r d e r e d  i f  serious i n j u s t i c e  o th e r w is e  w o u ld  r e s u l t  (P., p*1g1)#
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Athe rales eoacerning d e c e a s e d  persons* e s t a t e s * "
In Denm ark too t h e r e  must b e  distribution of physical 
property - i f  necessary, by judicial decision*
When dissolution and distribution come about 
during th e  lifetimes of t h e  spouses, the commonest 
solution is that effected by amicable arrangement*
Falling such agreement, a b a c k g ro u n d  framework of 
rules exists t o  resolve disputes*
Where resort la had to judicial decision, there 
is a valuation^ of all community - property, and either 
spouse may 'take over* a particular item at that 
valuation (by using t h e  money previously c a l c u l a t e d  
t o  be his/hera?)* Where both wish t o  'buy* the 
article, preference is given to the spouse who 
originally acquired it# This rule has given rise 
t o  oomplaint, because whether the m a r r ia g e  has b e e n  
'in* or 'out of*  oomunity, i t  i s  found m o st often 
to be  the husband who has b o u g h t th e  b u lk  o f  t h e  
property#^ Thus here again, discretion has entered, 
and  the courts may use that discretion in t h e  case of 
the matrimonial hom e, the holiday hom e, the h o u s e h o ld  
furniture, business undertakings run m a in ly  b y  one 
spouse though acquii'ad b y  the o t h e r ,  and s i m i l a r l y  
items of property used for t h e  trad© o r  p r o f e s s i o n  o f  
one  sp o u s e  th o u g h  acquired b y  th e  other*
Although Judge P e d e rs e n  draws a d i s t i n c t i o n  
between ' s h a r e  c a l c u l a t i o n '  and ' d i s t r i b u t i o n  of assets',
t h e  tw o appear to be interlinked* In h e r  example of 
a 29,000 kroner entitlement of each spouse, t h e  
entitlement i s  f i r s t  calculated, and i s  then satisfied 
as c i r c u m s ta n c e s  permit* Sale of assets i s  rarely 
ordered /
1* P # ,  p .1 4 9 *2* perhaps at a somewhat low  level, Pedersen indicates
(p # 1 5 0 ) ,3* However, here, all t h a t  i s  at stake i s  p r i o r i t yof p r e f e r e n c e  in a basically equitable d iv i s io n #Contrast systems of s e p a r a t io n *
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 ^ w i l lo r d e r e d  'ty  M ie e e u r t#  
o f
o o m p o o it lo n  o f  t h e  e e a m m i ty  fim d#  i f  a  e p o w e  
e l e o t o  t o  t a k e  a e # e w  t h e  v a lu e  o f  %'^hioh oxoeod# 
h i o / h o r  B hm re, th m t spm m e m u #  p a y  t h e  b a la n c e  
a: %# #
to whom IB 
m the better claim to t3 
Tf vmlu# tW roof eweede 
^ epouae'a e m tltle m e m t#  under t h e  above r u l e  
may pay the balance to the other#
W here d l e e o l u t l w  oomea a b o u t  b y  d e a t h ,  t h e  
ew vlvor'e wiahee aa to a partioulor item o:^  
al^foye prmyail over those o f the eo-helre, even i f  
the Item origim ally belonged to the deoemeed epouee* 
A g a in , t h e  e u r v i v o r  may e x e e e d  h i e / h e r  e n t i t l e m e n t ,
to the wbate#
aermen'e oomolwioa la that the real
D lie© in the mctmt to ;^hioh it 
t h e  o l m i l a r l t l e # ,  r a # »  th a n  t h e  d l f f o rm o e m *  
the W toh, Dmleh and Gemwm eyeWme* three
ey e tem e  giv< ei#al pmfom of administration^.
f## M »*Bw w w  u m m ie a io n *
Ltv t o  p r o v id e  ao eam
E e .2 lom  f o rjAW « ï'fmefeÿre m a  Doau matri f  the marriageattalne the age'^ of e i# # e n .*wlehing to depart from a ayetem of a t r a t i w  a o le ly ^ b y  t h e  h aeb an d *  hma a v o id e d  t h e  "tw o  oaptm lm a om t h e  h r l % e "  d i f f i e a l t y  b y  a  novel m d  Imgemioue molutloa dworlWd felioltouely by Prof earner r^ teman (Le Droit dee Paye BaS; P r o f e e e e w  G# Dat^man., . K i r a i f y *  O h a p to r  I I I !
" d # a s  b a te m m  w e e  d e w  o e p l t a i n e a ,  m ai de ooneert"# It 1$ a aye tern of oommmlty of m3 amaete exeept thow of "egeolal" (for example#Each epoumo haa freeam!p e re o m a l)  " b h a r a o te r " *  
a o t i m  /
O J . '
b u t  8tr@8B t h a t  t h e y  m uet n o t  e q u e n d e r  t h e i r  e e t a t e e #  
T hey  a le o  -  a l th o u g h  t o  a  v e ry lm g  e x t e n t  -  e m p h a s ise  
t h a t  f a m i ly  a s e e t s ,  su o h  a© t h e  d o m e e tlo  home o r  th e  
family f u r n i t u r e ,  must he a d m lu le te r e d  w i th  due regard 
t o  t h e  I n t e r e s t ©  o f  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u s e  an d  t h e  o h l l d r e n  
of t h e  m a r r ia g e *  , The fundamental principles all 
express the idea t h a t  t h e r e  is a oom m unity o f  interests 
between th e  spouses, and all three regimes have fo u n d  
it inequitable f o r  one spouse at th e  dissolution of 
the marriage to k e ep  all his o r  h e r  assets w ith o u t  
allowing t h e  o t h e r  a s h a r e In all three s y s te m s , 
Pederson notes that there i s  l i t t l e  litigation on 
m a t t e r s  o f  property* T h is  i s  true of sy s te m s  of 
s e p a r a t i o n  /
action i n  respect o f  h i s  own p e r s o n a l  property*J o i n t  c o n s e n t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  s a l e  o r  encumbrance of t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home o r  furniture, for the making of gifts of extraordinary nature o r  8 i$ e  and  f o r  t h e  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  o f  c o n t r a c t s  o f  caution to guarantee a  sole d e b to r  otherwise th e n  
i n  t h e  o o w s e  o f  t h e  s p o u s e 's  b u s in e s s *  G e n e r a l ly ,  th o u g h ,  a third p a r t y  may p resum e that a sp o u se  
i n  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  (w h e th e r  p e r s o n a l  o r  com m unity  p r o p e r t y )  h a s  c a p a c i t y  t o  a c t  i n  r e s p e o t  o f  it* for boixa. f i d e  third p a r t i e s , t h e  appearance o f  a u t h o r i t y  ^ E o a o F l H l l  suffice, b u t  t h e  theory i s  t h a t  e a c h  sp o u se  a d m in i s t e r s  o n ly  t h o s e  community i te m s  w h ic h  h e / s h e  contributed* D e b ts  i n c u r r e d  b y  t h e  s p o u s e s  b in d  t h e  com m unity* T h e re  i s  separate a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t h in  j o i n t n e s s *  V iew s o f  p r u d e n t  administration can d iv e r g e  and one wonders how the sy s te m  works i n  practice* B o th  p a r t i e s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  matrimonial e s t a b l i s h m e n t  * Balteman a d m its  t h a t  e a c h  runs t h e  r i s k  o f  r u i n  th r o u g h  t h e  u n w ise  t r a n s a c t i o n s  of t h e  o t h e r ,  b u t  c i t e s  i n  defence t h e  r e q u ir e m e n t  of joint consent f o r  certain transactions, and t h e  r a r i t y  of the t r u e  s q u a n d e re r*  Y e t t h e  Dutch s p o u s e  does seem to b e  l e s s  w e l l  p r o t e c t e d  in t h a t  r e g a r d *  Balteman (ibid#* p * 7 7 ) w r i t e s  "Le s e u l  v i c e  g ra v e  d u  s y s te m s  e s t  de  n 'a v o i r  p a s  p ré v u  de  
rem ede c o n t r e  l e s  en g ag em en ts  d u s  a  1 ^ e s p r i t  de  d i s s i p a t i o n  on  d e  f r a u d e " ,  b u t  F e d e r s e n ,  l u  summing u p ,  g e n e r a l i s e s  p e rh a p s  u p o n  t h a t  p o in t*P,158,
833
s e p a r a t i o n  a l s o ,  b u t  f o r  fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t
reasonst
The t r e n d  in Denmark has b e e n  towards greater 
protection o f  th e  f a m i ly  assets and g r e a t e r  emphasie 
o f  the "community of interests established by 
marriage#" This is s i g n i f i c a n t , as is her point 
that simplicity i n  m a tr im o n ia l  property systems is 
o f t e n  bought at the expense o f  the wife#
Source©
"B pouees an d  The3n7 P r o p e r ty  u n d e r  S w e d ish  L aw ",
Howard 8# Sussm an* 196g (1 2 )  Am erio# Jo #  o f  Oomp#
Law, p#555  ("G uesm an")#
" M a rr ia g e  or Ho M a rr ia g e  # The D i r e c t iv e s  for the 
Revision o f  Swedish F a m ily  Law# " J*W#F#Bundberg#
(1 9 7 1 )  2 0  I#0#Ii#q# 223# (" S u n d b e rg " )#
"The S t a t u s  o f  Women i n  S w eden", (k m v o r W a l l in  1972 
( 2 )  A m eric# Jo# of Oomp# Law, 622#
The Swedish Marriage Code* 1 9 2 0 , with am endm ents, 
forms the basis of a discussion o f  the Swedish system #  
I t  g o v e rn s  m a r r ia g e s  e n te r e d  i n t o  on  o r  a f t e r  1 s t  
J a n u a r y ,  1921 #
1The God© p r o v id e s  a h a l f  way h o u s e  between a 
s y s te m  o f  f u l l  c o m m m ity  and  one of complete s e p a r a t i o n ,  
As i n  D enm ark, et ante matrimonio e a c h  sp o u se  is 
p r o p r i e t o r  and  administrator o f  his/her own p r o p e r t y  
"and e a c h  ie l i a b l e  o u t  of h i s  p r o p e r t y  f o r  t h e  
satisfaction /
1# I n  the 1970*8 attention has been directed t o  
t h e  r e v i s i o n  of t h e  Gode#
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action  o f h la TMra I s  power
to  oo%iit3mot out o f the ©ystem*
The commmity oommleta o f th# mmAatory, W t 
a$ yo t o m tr lW tlo a  o f emoh. mpomso
3^m lm  a mmmom fw â  
thou{^h ImvlBlhl# w t l l  (or omly moogmlmMe^^hen) 
asp iration  takoa p im o , om tlw  ooowreno# d o # h , 
â iv o m o , n u ll ity , jW lolm l eepw atlom , or olrm m atm oea 
jim tifylm g d loeo lu tlon  o f owm m ity# The proocae o f 
dlgaolutlom  (" w  oew n tlm lly  m m ^ udlolal pm oeâwe"^) 
la  tom eâ
,#Am aâ& m Sââ ^ e a tw  part o f m
property, m â oomprlae #o&# ow ed at 
m rrlm #  w d w # lr o d  #m roaft#r* Bowovw, they 
w e  ''In t w  mlr", m thor thm  tm g lh le , boommo them  
l e  m  o w m m  f tm d  & & # &
l e  only a cla im , which oryeta llim m , m# I t  wore, a t
claim  %t that point Woomee a 
m ê # 0  mm&imlty le  divide#* In rnodoam toamlmology, 
th is  i e  "deferred oommmilty"*
However, oor#.:W property » y  ho doolem â by 
m rrlag# settlem ent ©opwmte pmper%y m& gm tm ltoue 
M « lg s a i^  <*» fremsa ia  # im  t îw s is )  œ y  not b« 
teamed part o f the g lfW m & k a # #  U  the torn# o f %W 
domatloa or hequw t s ta te  th&t the domeo or hmefioiaag^ 
ek a ll take the h m e flt  m  aeperate property*
Buhjeot to  the terms o f ep eo la l egw em w t, property 
e u W t i W t e ê  /
8 w « m , p*554* Bumdberg (p*223) dworlhw th# attitude of BwMleh Inw to #m Immtitmtiom of ma%Tiw w  %ewgeols" (that i#& #owlmg a eoaoeœ for emawio fw tow  wtterm) mA ''llheml"(that Im, âwmrtlmg froa the "mligim&e" md adhcrlmg to the ewmler oomeptlom of morriage ** yet net so mioh am to entertaim, at leaet In itia lly , e^amy'' â iv o r o o ) #2* Of* e ll  $y%3tome previously oowiAored*
" #  p*5S4*# ;xi'3 :.\iau, p*!>55#I
© ubB titu tG d. f o r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  l a  a l s o  r e g a r d e d
as separate, but the Income from separate p r o p e r t y  
is giftoratt©goda.
Legal rights of a personal nature a r e  
giftorattagoda only insofar as this is compatible 
with t h e i r  essential character,^
Similarly e x c lu d e d  a r e  contracts o f  personal 
service, and certain rights under policies of life 
assurance, and, in most oases, em ployee  pension 
r i g h t s , b e c a u s e  of t h e i r  inalienability by t h e  
employee# Bights t h e r e i n  o f  s p o u s e s  (^aat or present*^) 
upon bodolning# arising because of t h e  e m p lo y e e 's  
death, d ep en d  upon  t h e  terms of t h e  particular contract 
of e m p lo y m e n t- lin k e d  insurance*
Bussman points out^ that d i v i s i o n  of p r o p e r t y  
a t  b o d e ln ln g  in v o lv e s  only t h e  giftorattsgods #. but 
collateral m a t t e r s  such as liability f o r  debts, 
compensation, damages and s u p p o r t  may affect separate 
p r o p e r t y  an d  p e r s o n a l  r i g h t s  a s  above described*
These two categories t o g e t h e r  with ^iftorattsTOds 
form t h e  t h r e e  types of property (that is, from 
a /
1* Thus generally the r i g h t  o f  a n  author or artist to u n p u b l is h e d  work is n o t  included i n  b o d e ln in g .though royalties from published work i s  g i f t o r a t t s R O d s * L i f e r e n t s  (in deference to t h e  miHes 6T'"tHe”""tes t a t o r )  and leasehold r i g h t s  (in deference to the landlord) are not regarded as falling w i t h i n  t h e  category of giftorattagods * nor are included at bodelning u n l ^ s  "%ie iSdlor d  'has waived his veto powEFor u n l e s s  bodelning has o c c u r r e d  on  the death of the lessee sp o u se  b e c a u s e  th e  estate is entitled to assign t h e  lease to a  tenant r e a s o n a b ly  s i m i l a r  to the deceased irrespective of landlord consent* Likewise, the bodalning consequent upon judicial s e p a r a t i o n ,Evorc'e or n u l l i t y  may include the lease o f  heritage u s e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  o r  p r i n c i p a l l y  as the domestic home, b e c a u s e  t r a n s f e r  between spouses i n  such a c a s e  is a l lo w e d ,  irrespective of l a n d l o r d  c o n s e n t ,  though Bussman is unsure w h e th e r  that leasehold r i g h t  should o r  s h o u ld  not be regarded a s  R i f t o r a t t s g o d s  
2* 8 * ,  p . 5 5 8 ,3* B , i b i d .
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a  'm a t r i m o n i a l '  p o i n t  o f  v ie w )  known t o  S w ed ish  law *
The limitations upon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  are greatest w ith  
regard to g i f t o r a t t a g o d e # hut property i n  none of 
t h e  categories is held i n  common* The incidents of 
ownership a r e  more restricted where giftorattagoda 
are concerned, h u t  t h e  ow ner spouse remains nevertheless 
t h e  ow ner thereof*
This means t h a t ,  though title to heritage appears 
to he taken as evidence of o w n e rsh ip  in t h e  spouse 
i n  whose name it stands, the usual p ro b le m s  arise 
w i th  regard to title to moveable p r o p e r ty *  M oveable 
property i s  p resu m ed  t o  belong to the debtor s p o u se  
(to a id  third parties and creditors?), b u t  this 
p re s u m p tio n  may be rebutted# As in Scotland,
" N e i th e r  exclusive possession n o r  exclusive use 
effects a t r a n s f e r  of t i t l e  between the spouses*" If 
the husband provides the housekeeping allowance, he 
i s the owner of savings th e re f ro m *  However, if one 
spouse provides for t h e  other, property for the other's 
"special needs", and delivers the same to him/her, 
the latter becomes sole owner of that property*^
Hhere spouses do own p r o p e r t y  i n  common, t h e i r  
r i g h t s  i n  the common p r o p e r t y  depend upon their 
contributions* W here t h e r e  is/are i n  addition 
another co-owner(s), o r  where one spouse is c o -o w n e r  
with o t h e r s  (strangers to the marriage), h i s  rights as 
an 'ordinary* co-owner are overlaid by h i s  r i g h t s  and 
liabilities i n  respect o f  his spouse w i th  regard to 
giftorattegoda > if the property i n  common is part of 
t h a t  s p o u s e 's  R i f t o r a t t s R o d s *
W here one sp o u se  provides t h e  funds to make a 
p u r c h a s e  /
1* Such p ro b le m s  and situations o r  v a r i a t i o n s  t h e r e o na r e  familiar, and  s e r v e  t o  u n d e r l i n e  the difficulties 
w h ic h  all sy s te m s  encounter w ith  regard to marriage and moveables*
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purchase taken in t h e  name of both, or contributes 
to a purchase made by the other and taken In the 
other's name, does this constitute a gift of the 
money used, or of the property bought? Only a 
lower court authority was available to Suasman, and 
that decision favoured the latter* view *
The limitations upon freedom t o  a d m in i s t e r  t h e  
goods are twofold - " th o s e  aimed at protecting t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  I n t e r e s t  t h a t  s p o u s e s  h a v e  i n  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  
property b e c a u s e  of the glftoratt claim, and th o s e  
aimed at promoting spousal consultation over c e r t a i n  
proposed t r a n s a c t i o n s  #
Thus, a spouse must a d m in i s t e r  t h e  g i f t o r a t t s R o d s  
i n  s u c h  a way that they w i l l  n o t  b e  unduly diminished 
to the d e t r im e n t  of the o t h e r  spouse'^  and, as a result, 
a t  bodelning# the o t h e r  spouse may claim compensation 
for t h e  o t h e r ' s  m is u s e ,  and may h a s t e n  bodelning. by 
citing such abuse o r  m is u se  as a ground for b r i n g in g  
t h e  community to a (premature) end Cboakillnad)# 
C o m p en sa tio n  likewise i s  due t o  a spouse whose partner 
h a s  u s e d  h i s / h e r  giftorattegods to obtain p r o p e r t y  
which w i l l  n o t  b e  s u b j e c t  to d i v i s i o n  a t  ^ o d e ln in g ,
" o r  i f  h e  has paid certain ty p e s  of d e b t s  i f i t h  
a l f - b o g a t ta g o a s ,» ^
Second, a l i e n a t i o n s  o f  immoveable p r o p e r t y ,  o r  
h o u s e h o ld  goods, o r  c h i l d r e n 's  goods, or goods 
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  i n  h i s  woi^c, a r e  i n v a l i d  
u n l e s s  t h e  c o n s e n t  of the other sp o u se  h a s  been 
obtained# The rule operates well i n  the case of 
im m oveable p r o p e r t y ,  w here  t h e r e  is a sy s te m  of 
formal c o n s e n t  and registration, and t h o s e  e n t r u s t e d  
with /
1* Bussman, p#g60#2 ,  " N e i th e r  may d im in i s h  h i s  o r  h e r  p r o p e r t y  th ro u g h  a c t s  " d i s l o y a l "  t o  t h e  o t h e r " ,  W a l l i n ,  p*G25#3* Bussman, p*560| s u c h  r u l e s  are t y p i c a l  o f  'd e f e r r e dcomunity^ s y s te m s, and h i g h l i g h t  an  important d i f f e r e n c e  between su c h  systems, an d  the systems ofseparation, to w h ich  often th e y  a r e  likened or which atante m a tr im o n io # th e y  a r e  often said to be#
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w i th  the r e g i s t r a t i o n  of the new transaction must 
e n e n re  $ b e f o r e  permitting registration, that th e  
consent of the other sponse has been g iv e n  
(However, in the case of moveables, the good faith 
of the t h i r d  p a r t y  will b a r  réduction#) Where 
t h e r e  is u n j u s t i f i a b l e  refusal,^ the court may 
substitute its consent for that of the reluctant spouse#
&u88man e m p h a s is e s ^  t h a t  b e f o r e  t h e s e  s a n c t i o n s  
c a n  operate, there m u st b e  b o th  m isu se  and " a
substantial resultant diminution** i n  the value of 
the maladministrator *8 giftorattsgods # and it seem s 
that m a la d m i n i s t r a t io n  per s e  i s  s e e n  o n ly  where a 
spouse u s e s  gif tor at t a gods t o  im p ro v e  the value of 
property not included at bodelning# Within t h e s e  
limitations, there i s  considerable fre e d o m  o f  action# 
Sussman’s view^ is that personal rights, on becoming 
alienable, are subject to the same duty of car© as
For ante-nuptial and post-nuptial debts, each 
spouBC i s  l i a b l e *  H l a /h e r  go o d s and  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
%my /
1# Such r u l e s  are n e c e s s a r y ,  and in outline a lw ay s  appear reasonable, y e t  in practice many additions and  p r o v i s o s  may b e  r e q u i r e d ,  t o  s e r v e  t h e  en d s  o f  justice and  clarity# Upon whom does l o s s  fall if t h e  registration a u t h o r i t i e s  err? P re su m a b ly  the b o n a  f i d e  t h i r d  p E irty  i s  p r o t e c t e d  b y  t h e  p u b l i c  î w E  oF*r© gist rat ion# I s  a b s o lu te  liability laid upon the authorities? I s  this reasonable? Of# R e sp o n se  o f  Faculty o f  law, U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G lasgow , t o  8o*If#Com#Hemo#MOi41 (especially at Bdaed*1, Faculty Memorandum) «2# that is, "if no reason f o r  the refusal i s  fo u n d "GB6 * 6# 'to what extent does t h i s  mean that anabsurd reason is "no reason**, and that th e  courtmay adjudicate upon the a b s u r d i t y ,  or good sense, o f  the stand taken by  each spouse? P r o b a b ly  su c h  d i s c r e t i o n  in t h e  c o u r t  i s  a necessary e le m e n t in a schem e o f  this type, and such schemes are a necessary part o f  a system t h e  rules o f  which on occasion demand consent of both f o r  a  transaction# 5. P.5&1#4# p , *562 #
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/Imay be attached# ks in Denmark, neither is 
liable for the debts of t h e  other, th o u g h  there Is 
joint and several l i a b i l i t y  for household debts,^ 
for joint contracts and (*although the wife enjoys 
a privileged position w ith  respect to such debts')
"fro m  one spouse's assuming l i a b i l i t y  o n  a debt 
p r e v i o u s l y  undertaken b y  the other alone
l*he vexed question o f  proof of t i t l e  (especially 
to moveables) i n  a separation or q u a s i - s e p a r a t i o n  
system has been mentioned# Swedish law has adopted 
the inventory device# T h ere  i s  a  ( r e b u t t a b l e )  
p r e s u m p tio n  that a f o r m a l ly  executed inventory, 
prepared and signed by s p o u s e s  i s  an accurate record 
of what i t  contains except "in execution or b a n k ru p tc y  
proceedings b r o u g h t  within one year a f t e r  i t  was dram 
up", and for false declarations there are s e v e r e  
criminal penalties* nevertheless, Sussman notes^ 
that the i n v e n to r y  i s  rarely u s e d ,  o r  rarely, used, 
i n  good faith, and i s  inadequate for i t s  purpose*
Apart from the general enjoinder not t o  prejudice 
the rights of the other spouse through maladministration 
of property, there are other, more specific rules, su c h  
as the prohibition upon irrevocable appointment of the 
other spouse to act as administrator of the granter'a 
property and upon a g re e m e n ts  between the spouses to 
a d im in u t io n  in t h e i r  obligations to support one 
another or the children or to deviate fro m  rules of 
the substantive law reflecting " e t h i c a l  or social 
principles"# I t  is competent for spouses t o  make 
their /
1# though generally - except In the case of pension rights of a spouse who has defaulted in the payment of a l im e n t  (w hen the o t h e r  spouse may attach them) - personal rights a r e  n o t  subject to 
c r e d i t o r s '  claims#2# though see infra# ,3$ Sussman, p#5S2"#
4# p#$63#
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t h e  m a t t e r  usually will be decided by factors 
affecting the breadwinner^a em ploym ent ( t h e  breadwinner 
being usually b u t  not necessarily, t h e  husband), and 
thus "it is therefore conceivable that a wife's" (or 
p o s s i b l y  a husband's?) "refusal to accompany her 
husband" ( h i s  wife?) "to t h e  place where his" (her?)
"work requires him" (her?) "to live m ig h t be deemed 
neglect of duty#"
The obligation to aliment i s  exigible from each 
spouse in cash and/or in kind, according to what is 
considered to be an appropriate contribution from 
t h a t  spouse» Oonduct i s  relevant in the matter o f  
aliment, because, after judicial separation, it will 
be extremely unusual for t h e  principally g u i l t y  
spouse to b e  awarded support, and, on divorce, su c h  
an award would seem  to b e  incompetent»^
In order that an appropriate ©mount may b e  
decided upon, each spouse i s  under an obligation to 
give the other necessary information c o n c e rn in g  h i s /  
h e r  finances»^ Where it appears that one h a s  
" m a n i f e s t l y  exceeded" h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  h e  i s  
given a " l i m i t e d  r i g h t "  t o  recover t h e s e  payments*
It is competent for spouses t o  a g re e  upon these 
matters i n  detail in m a r r i a g e - s e t t l e m e n t s  »
T he /
i* QfB 11s26, S econd  p o i n t , th o u g h  a t  p*566, fn* 1^8, Bussman quotes Schmidt (p*144) as being of the view that only those guilty of u n co n d o n ed  adultery h a d  been held i n  practice a b s o l u t e l y  b a r r e d  from s e e k i n g ,  and b e in g  granted s u p p o r t  (1965)#G e n e r a l ly  i n  divorce, "a spouse's r i g h t  to judicially decreed support payments is determined on the 
b a s i s  of h i s  need as balanced against t h e  other's c a p a c i t y  t o  pay, evaluated i n  the l i g h t  of the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  of the particular oasé| " (Suseman, p»566)*2» Of# 8o»Daw»Oom»Memo.Wo»22, 2 .2 0 9 ;  F a c u l t y  
R e s p o n s e, pp*47-49»
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T he a l im e n ta r y  p a y m e n ts  (w h ich  in c l u d e  p ay m en ts  
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a  s p o u s e 's  " s p e c i a l  n e e d s " )  may he  
e n f o r c e d  j u d i c i a l l y  ev en  w h i le  t h e  spouses cohabit 
th o u g h  i t  seem s t h a t  advantage is n o t  commonly 
t a k e n  o f  t h i s  provision*
As a n  exception to the g e n e r a l  r u l e  w i th  regard 
to debts, joint and several liability f o l lo w s  contracts 
for h o u s e h o ld  or children's e x p e n se s*  T h is  agency 
covers d a i l y  n e c e s s i t i e s ,  but not larger-soale 
expenditure s u c h  a s  that of r e n t a l  o f  a n  apartment*
The c o n c e p tu a l  b a s i s  is a g e n c y , though implied 
c o n s e n t  may fo u n d  joint and  several liability in 
c o n t r a c t s  o u tw i th  t h e  normal sc o p e  o f  ag en cy *
H ow ever, t h e r e  is not t r u e  j o i n t  and several 
liability because, i n  the first p l a c e , t h e r e  i s  a  
time limit of tw o years i n  w h ich  a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  w if e  u n d e r  t h i s  h e a d  c a n  be  r a i s e d ,  t h e  h u sb a n d  
alone being liable t h e r e a f t e r ,  and, in t h e  second 
place, t h e  wife's goods i n c l u d i n g  goods acquired 
( o th e r w is e  than th r o u g h  b o d e ln in p ) after dissolution 
o f  m a r r i a g e ,  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o r  b o s M l l n a d  a r e
protected against c la im s  under the agency,
Creditors t h e r e f o r e  are entitled t o  r e l y  upon  
the general r u l e  that d e b ts  f o r  n e c e s s a r i e s  bind 
b o th  spouses, b u t  they may not so r e l y  i f  t h e y  did . 
have knowledge o r  should have had k n o w led g e  t h a t  t h e  
subject of t h e  t r a n s a c t io n  was n o t  i n  the p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e  /
1* an important and interesting p r o v i s i o n :  of*Scottish p o s i t i o n ,  C h a p te r s  4 and 7 ,  and Memo*Wo*22, 2*178 at seq * * P ro p n # 5 9 , and Faculty R e sp o n se  pp*41-4S *2* as also is p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  by the w ife  d u r in g  




Property transfers b e tw ee n  spouses are presumed 
g e n e r a l l y  t o  be  g i f t s #  I n t e r - s p o u s e  g i f t s  do n o t  
bind c r e d i t o r s * ^  u n l e s s ,  as m e n tio n e d  above, the 
gift t a k e s  place b y  v i r t u e  of a p r o v i s i o n  in a 
m a r r i a g e - s e t t l e m e n t ,  i n  which case it must be 
p u b l i s h e d  in the press#
However, "customary donations" (such as birthday 
p r e s e n t s )  o f  a sise appropriate to the parties' 
resources^ are valid w ith o u t  formality, and transfers 
up t o  a  c e r t a i n  m o n e ta ry  amount"^ o r  r e p r e s e n t i n g  n o t  
m ore t h a n  h a l f  o f  t h e  d o no r s p o u s e 's  a n n u a l  s a v in g s  
from income are v a l i d ,  provided that certain 
formalities are observed, and t h a t  the d o n o r  was 
c l e a r l y  solvent (having s u f f i c i e n t  fu n d s  to satisfy 
t h e  claims of all c r e d i t o r s )  at t h e  time of t h e  
d o n a tio n *  Any e x c e s s  i s  a t t a c h a b l e  b y  c r e d i t o r s .
T h is  sum i s  r e g a r d e d  " a s  a n  ad v an cem en t a g a i n s t  t h e  
r e c i p i e n t  spouse's g i f t o r a t t " * and " a s  em bodying  a 
legislative ju d g m en t o f  the y e a r l y  money value of a 
w i f e 's  s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  hom e"# Both points are 
i n t e r e s t i n g *
The onus of proving t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  g i f t  is
appropriate ( o r  alternatively that a t r a n s f e r  i s  not 
a g i f t ^ )  lies upon th e  s p o u s e s  and not upon the creditors#^
A p a r t  /
1# except i n  t h e  two cases set o u t  below#2* Of# South Africa where the law of inter-spouse donations has reached p e rh a p s  i t s  most detailed point of d ev e lo p m e n t - see above,5# gooo crow ns (c#& 5 0 0 ) (1 9 6 5 )*4 .  i n  which case th e  parties must show t h a t  the transfer was not a g i f t  (thus necessitating the rebuttal o f  the presumption), and that reasonable compensation was received b y  th e  transferor spouse* "There is no r e q u i r e m e n t  that the spousal a g re e m e n t in v o lv e d  be  w r i t t e n ,  b u t  the b u rd e n  imposed by th e  presumption 
i s  nonetheless a heavy one" (Sussman, p#569)#5# "Were t h e  r u l e  o t h e r w i s e , the loophole created w ould  effectively d e s t r o y  all r e s t r i c t i o n s  on  i n t e r - s p o u s a l  
g i f t s "  Bussman, p#%9 fn*174*
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Apart from these two exceptions, gifts not
effected by m a r r i a g e - s e t t l a m e n t  may be reduced by 
creditors*^ ïSven those so effected are subject 
to r e d u c t i o n  if made w i t h i n  on© year of the donor'spb a n k ru p tc y *
These p ro b le m s  are ubiquitous* One of the 
r e s u l t s  w h ic h  a  summary o f  t h i s  ty p e  c a n  a c h ie v e
i s  f i r s t ,  the laying b a r e  o f  those situations w h ich  
in many systems are a s o u rc e  of difficulty i n  the 
attempt to p ro d u c e  a  fair and w o rk a b le  regime, and 
then the ascertainment o f  the v a r i o u s  remedies or 
treatments adopted*
A t [bodgM a s  d iv i s io n #
Generally speaking, th o u g h  t h e r e  are exceptions, 
property a c q u i r e d  by e i t h e r  spouse after t h e  
'determinative day* (that of finalisation of decree 
of divorce, nullity, judicial separation, application 
f o r  boskillnad* o r  death) is r e g a r d e d  as separate 
p r o p e r t y  o f  th e  spouse* "Boskillnad", as Sussman 
pointe o u t ^ ,  "is p u r e ly  economic"# The application 
f o r  b o e k i l l n a d  i n  no way necessarily imports o r  
r e q u i r e s  /
1* In Swedish law, the donee w i l l  be l i a b l e  t o  the c r e d i t o r ,  i f  the cremator c an  show that, at t h edate o f  gift, t h e  debtor was unable to pay t h e  debt t o  him, o r  had otherwise been shown to be insolvent, f o r  the debt, up to the amount o f  the gift (less th e  value o f  any compensation paid for i t  and l e s s  any diminution in value o f  th e  subject of gift n o t  attributable to t h e  donee's bankruptcy, "even though the emhCt amount o f  the deficiency has not b e e n  calculated", but not i f  the creditor, has 
b eg u n  p r o c e e d in g s  t o  r e c o v e r  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  g i f t ,2# Of* Scottish positions M#¥#P* (Bo*) Act, 1920, 6 ,5 #
5 .  P ,5 7 1
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r e q u i r e s  a  o e e a a t i o n  o f  c o h a b i t a t i o n #  B a n k r u p t c y  
o f  one s p o u s e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  g ro u n d s  o f  r i s l c i n g ,  
o r  c a u s i n g  I d im in u t io n  o f  o n e 's  p r o p e r t y  i n  p r e j u d i c e  
o f  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e ,  w i l l  fo u n d  an  a p p l i c a t i o n #
A b o d e ln in g  o c c a s i o n e d  b y  n u l l i t y  i s  r e s t r i c t e d
i n  t h e  s u b j e c t s  t o  b e  d i v i d e d  t o  o n e ro u s  a c o u l a i t a # 
P r o p e r t y  o im ed b y  e a c h  p a r t y  a t  m a r r ia g e  and
g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u i s i t i o n s  a r e  d e e m e d  t h e  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h # ^  B o d e l n l n g  a t  d e a t h  t a k e s  p l a c e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  s u r v i v o r  and  t h e  h e i r s  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d #
" i s  . ,» # e s s e n t i a l l y  a  c l o s i n g  o f  bo o k s0a s  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i v e  d a y # " ® *  T h e  o n ly  c a s e s  i n  
w h i c h  B o d e l n i n g  w i l l  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e  a r e  t h o s e  i n  w h i c h  
n e i t h e r  s p o u s e  i s  p o s s e s s e d  o f  g l f t o r a t t s ^ o d s  ' a t  
t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  e v e n t  i n v o l v e d # * ^
A s s e ts  a r e  v a lu e d  a t  t h e  d a te  o f  B o d e ln in # # a n d ,
o n  t h e  ' c l o s i n g  o f  b o o k s ' p r i n c i p l e ,  a l l  a s s e t s  a n d  
l i a b i l i t i e s ,  th o u g h  n o t  p e r t i n e n t  t o  g i f t o r a t t a g o d e  
a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c l o s i n g  in v e n to ry #  ( V a lu a t io n  
may b e  b y  a g re e m e n t b e tw e e n  p a r t i e s  so  lo n g  a s  
r e a s o n a b le  a n d  n o t  i n  e x c e s s  o f  th e  f a i r  m a r k e t  v a l u e ) #
A s  i n  D e n m a r k ,  d i v i s i o n  m a y  b e  b y  a g r e e m e n t  o f  
p a r t i e s  and  t h e  " s e q u e n c e "  a f t e r w a r d s  d e s c r i b e d  g i v e s  
t h e m  a  g u i d e ;  i f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  i s  
n e c e s s a r y ,  i t  i s  p r o v id e d  i n  t h e  p e r s o n  o f  a  
o v e r s e e r "  w h o  w i l l  u s e  t h e  r u l e s  o f  "se q u e n c e "#
W here d i v i s i o n  i s  p u r e l y  c o n s e n s u a l ,  p a r t i e s  h a v e  a  
l a r g e  m ea su re  o f  f re e d o m , and  a r e  n o t  bound  t o  m a k e  
a n  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n ,  th o u g h  t h e i r  s c h e m e  m u s t  n o t  
p r e j u d i c e  /
1# O f *  N orw ay, above*
2# G ussm an, p*575*5# Sussiaan, p # 5 7 1 : though (p#57$ f n # 1 9 l ) ,  theholding o f  a r e s i d e n t i a l  leasehold alone, e v e n  without Elftorattagode9 w i l l  found B o d e ln in g  on divorce, nulIxiyToF^udicial separaEîoii•
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p r e j u d i c e  c r e d i t o r s #  W h e n  b o d e l n i n g  i s  c o m p l e t e d  
( b y  e i t h e r  m e t h o d ) ,  i t  i s  f i l e d  i n  th e  c o u r t ,  a n d  
n o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  h a s  b e e n  d o n e  i s  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  
p r e s s  a n d  e n t e r e d  i n  t h e  m a r r ia g e  r e g i s t r y #  I n  
t h e  p e r i o d  b e tw e e n  t h e  " d e te r m in a t iv e  d a y "  and  
b o d e ln in g # e a c h  sp o u s e  r e t a i n s  pow er t o  a d m i n i s t e r  
h i s / h e r  p r o p e r t y ,  b u t  i s  l i a b l e  t o  g iv e  a n  a c c o u n t  
o f  h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h e r e o f  a t  b o d e ln in ^ # I t  
may b e  t h a t  c iro u m s ta n o e s  j u s t i f y  t h e  p l a c i n g  o f  
t h e  p r o p e r t y  (u p  t o  th e  am ount t h e  o t h e r  may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y  e x p e c t  t o  r e c e i v e  a t  b o d e l n i n p ; )  o f  
one sp o u s e  u n d e r  " s p e c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n "  f o r  t h a t  
p e r io d #  (A s i m i l a r  e n t i t l e m e n t  i s  open  t o  h e i r s  
a g a i n s t  t h e  s u r v i v o r , b u t  n o t  t o  th e  s u r v i v o r  w h o  
i s  o th e r w is e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  t h e  C o d e  o r ,  i n  a  b o d e ln in g  
o n  d e a t h ) #
T h e  " s p e c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n "  may b e  o v e r t a k e n
b y  b a n k ru p tc y  o f  t h e  sp o u s e  w hose goods a r e  in v o lv e d ,
and  th e  s p e c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  th e n  w i l l  g iv e  way t o
b a n k ru p tc y  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  B o d e l n i n g  w i l l  t a k e  p la c e
b e tw e e n  t h e  b a n k ru p t  e s t a t e  and  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se#
E x c e p t i n  t h e s e  two o a s e s ,  c r e d i t o r s  may a t t a c h  a
s p o u s e ' s  R i f t o r a t t s  goods d u r i n g  t i l s  p e r i o d  i n  th e
o r d i n a r y  way* U n d e r  s p e c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e y  m a y
a t t a c h  t h e  goods " o n ly  i f  b o th  s p o u s e s  a r e  l i a b l e  on
t h e  d e b t  I n v o l v e d  o r  t h e  p r o p e r t y  s o u g h t  i s  i n  s o m e1m a n n e r  s p e c i a l l y  a n s w e r a b l e  f o r  i t * "
I f  b o d e l n i n g  i s  n o t  c o n s e n s u a l ,  th e n  t h e  o v e r s e e r  
w i l l  e f f e c t  p a r t i t i o n  a c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  
s c h e m e  p r o v id e d  b y  th e  C o d © *  ( " S e q u e n c e " ) *
The r u l e s  o p e r a t e  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w a y :-
P e r s o n a l  e f f e c t s  u p  t o  a  r e a s o n a b le  am ount a r e  




Debts ^ Out of his/her own giftorattsgods $ 
each spouse Is entitled to take sufficient to cover 
his/her debts which are "Included in the bodelnlng" «
If this exhausts his/her glftorattsRoda* his/her 
separate property is answerable, but there liability 
ends (except that the creditors may wait to find 
whether the d e b to r  spouse receives a n y th in g  from th e  
bodelnlng from the other spouse), because, as i n  
D enm ark , it is an article of the re g im e  that neither 
spouse shall be liable (at least d i r e c t l y ^ )  for th e  
other's debts# F o r  non-Bodelnlng debts, a spouse's  
separate property i s  p r i m a r i l y  liable#
W here t h e r e  is j o i n t  and s e v e r a l  liability i n  
respect of a d e b t ,  and one spouse i s  unwilling to 
bear h i s  share, t h e  o t h e r ,  on giving s e c u r i t y  for 
payment of the debt, is entitled to receive the 
r e q u i s i t e  amount from t h e  share o th e r w is e  d e s t i n e d  
for the other sp o u se  a t  bodelnlng* and thereafter i s  
alone liable on the debt*
P e r s o n a l  Privileges# O ut of t h e  r e s i d u e ,  amnwr     ^ ^
surviving spouse and the innocent p a r t y  in divorce 
o r  separation is entitled to " n e c e s s a r y  household 
goods and p r o p e r t y  necessary for t h e  continuation of 
his occupation even if t h e  other shares at t h e  
b.odelnlng are thereby diminished,"^ and may include 
property belonging to the other spouse, provided 
that compensation i s  given therefor, and the s u r v iv o r  
in a bodelning on death is entitled to have the 
residue made up to (1965) 6000 crowns (c#€i600), unless 
the deceased left h e i r s  "who a r e  not a l s o  issue o f  
the s u r v i v o r , "  (most commonly s t e p c h i l d r e n  of 
the /
1* But see "Oreditora" infra*2# that is, the spouse *(peïïi’tl o n e r )  who has s u f f e r e d  "grave i n j u r y "  b y  the conduct o f  the other#5. 8*, 9,575#
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the survivor)^ » The rights are personal* "and mayonot be exercised b y  creditors o r  heirs*"
Compensation# Compensation is due to the 
o t h e r  spouse (out of 'combined p u t a t i v e  residue*) 
where one spouse has been allowed to t a k e  out of his 
giftorattBgodB the wherewithal to m eet a d e b t  for 
which non-bodelning property is p r i m a r i l y  liable, 
where one spouse has used his giftorattegoda to 
increase the value of non-bodeI n l n g  p r o p e r t y ,  o r  has 
unjustifiably diminished the value of his glftorattsgodg 
or, on the other hand, when he has u s e d  separate 
property to increase the v a lu e  or enlarge his 
KiftorattsRods (in which case he receives compensation 
fro m  h i m s e l f  - out of t h e  p u t a t i v e  residue of his 
own giftprattsRods)*^
The c la im  to compensation, like t h e  claim to 
p e r s o n a l  p r i v i l e g e s ,  may b e  m et o u t  o f  t h e  c r e d i t o r  
spouse's own net giftoratta goods# "The r i g h t  may 
also be satisfied if the spouse liable on the claim 
has, after t h e  d e te r m in a t iv e  day, i n c u r r e d  new debts 
that he c a n  n o t  pay, or ev en  i f  he has e n te r e d  into 
b a n k ru p tc y ^ "  »
à /
1# It seems that t h e  claim may be satisfied o u t  o f  (up to t h e  value of) a spouse's gmi'glftoratts g o o d s , even though t h e  other spouse.^  and hence h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  may fare accordingly less well at bodelning*2# fcj♦ , P # 5 |6 #3* and c o m p e n sa tio n  h e r e ,  i f  'combined putative r e s i d u e ' is insufficient, may be taken from up to half t h e  value of t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e 's  separate property, which i s  not required t o  meet d e b ts  ( 8 # ,  p .5 7 6 ) .4# Such rules and calculations tend to make a nonsense of the assertion t h a t ,  d u r in g  marriage, there is no com m unity  of p r o p e r ty #  Almost certainly t h e y  would not appeal to those used to the b l u n t  simplicity o f  true separation o f  p r o p e r ty #  Almost certainly, E n g l i s h  law (though not p e rh a p s  Scots law) would prefer a judicial d i s c r e t i o n #
5 .  8 .$  # # #
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A spouse who feels that he has a claim for 
compensation must state it at hodelnimg; a claim 
thereafter put fo rw a rd  is out of time# The personal 
privileges are personal to the c l a im a n t, hut the 
deceased's estate or a bankrupt estate can claim 
compensation*
Division* After these balancing factors have 
been taken into account, division is made* That 
which is envisaged is a n  equal division of the 
putative residue of the giftoi^attagods remaining, 
though the spouses may agree upon other f r a c t i o n s #
I n  that case, however, because creditors and heirs 
a r e ,  as it were, "at the ringside lo o k in g  o n " , and 
s i n c e ,  as Sueaman re m in d s  u s ,  th e y  to o  have a n  
i n t e r e s t  i n  the outcome of the "bgdelning, t h e  creditors 
" a c q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  m eans t o  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s # "
Damages and S u p p o r t# W here a  claim for either 
o r  b o th  of t h e s e  may be competent, the value(s) 
thereof are computed, and  s e t  a g a i n s t  t h e  debtor 
spouse's s h a r e  a t  bodeliiing# If t h i s  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t
to meet t h e  olalm(s), the creditor s p o u s e  may make 
the claim(s) i n  the f u tu r e # ^  However, the creditor 
spouse's c la im s  are here preferred to those of the 
debtor spouse's c r e d i t o r s #
Residential /
1# Bee r e f e r e n c e s ,  Sussman, p . 5 7 7 , fn ,2 5 7 *2# Bussm an (p # 5 ? 7 t fn # 2 5 8 )  e x p la in s  t h a t  th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  an  w a r d  o f  dam ages may h ave  a  p u n i t i v e  c h a r a c t e r  ( a s  i n  a d u l t e r y ) ,  b u t  p r i m a r i l y  
o p e r a t e s  t o  offset any h a r s b n e s a  p ro d u c e d  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  case by a strict a d h e re n c e  to th e  division, r u l e s  o f  bodelning# Such awards a re  not c o m p e te n t in jïïKoïaî separation but a r e  c o m p e te n t in divorce, n u l l i t y  and death b o d e ln in g s * where t h e  marriage was annullable at the™d'at¥"ox death* S u p p o r t  claims are "once  f o r  all" ("en 
g an g  f o r  a l ld ^ ) ,  and  a r e  a l s o  a  m eans o f  corrective"*A possible right to periodical payments o f  aliment is a different r i g h t *
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If the home is a 
" r e s i d e n t i a l  leasehold" (not generally assignable), 
no money value is a c c o rd e d  thereto, but on separation, 
d iv o r c e  o r  n u l l i t y  ^ o ^ e ln in & s  t h e  l e a s e  i s  g r a n te d  
t o  the spouse s t a n d in g  i n  greatest n e e d  o f  i t * ^
A non-residential leasehold, if inaliénable, is non- 
bodelning p r o p e r t y .  If alienable, i t  is v a lu e d  and 
comes w i t h in  t h e  bodolning calculation as part of 
the giftorattagods of t h e  leasee spouse.
A f t e r  these stages, i f  appropriate, are passed, 
t h e  value of each spouse's share, as calculated, is 
satisfied, and it w o u ld  appear from  t h e  foregoing 
t h a t  th e  shares will be satisfied p a r t l y  out o f  
corporeal moveables and p a r t l y  out of cash# As in 
D enm ark, a  sp o u s e  who i s  e s p e c i a l l y  a n x io u s  t o  r e t a i n  
a  p a r t i c u l a r  i te m  o f  h i s  own ^ i f t o r & t t a g o d s  may do
i f  n e c e s s a r y  u p o n  paym ent o f  c o m p e n sa tio n  t o  
t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  f o r  t h e  v a lu e  w h io h  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  i n  
e x c e s s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s p o u s e 's  s h a re *  A s i m i l a r  
l a t i t u d e  i s  allowed, i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  of human n a tu r e  
an d  i t s  w him s, i n  t h a t ,  w here  one sp o u se  owes 
c o m p e n sa tio n  out o f  his separate estate t o  the other 
s p o u s e , he may c h o o se  those ' i te m s  which a r e  t o  m eet 
t h e  c la im .  To make u p  h i s  s h o r e ,  a  s p o u s e ,  o r  h i s  
heirs, may keep such of his (ow n) goods as he w is h e s ,  
provided that t h e y  have not b e e n  assigned specifically 
to t h e  other s p o u s e ,  and " to  o b t a i n  such p r o p e r t y  a s  
i s . n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of his o c c u p a t io n ." ^  
I f  one  spouse has amassed a l a r g e r  supply of 
R i f t o r a t t s g o d s  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  (h o u s e w ife  m a r r i a g e ) ,  
and  /
1* What are t h e  r i g h t s  of t h e  l a n d lo r d ?  As to the d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  S c o t la n d ,  see Be* h.Com.Memo* Ho* 4 1 ,  P a r t s  I I I , I V  and  V*2* T h is  r i g h t  i s  available in a bpdelning on death, o n ly  t o  t h e  'b o d y  h e i r s '  o f  tS a  d e c e a s e d ,  an d  i s  
r e s t r i c t e d  to r e a l  p r o p e r ty  specially d e f i n e d .3* Bussman. s a y s  t h a t  t h i s  r i g h t  is r e s t r i c t e d  i n  a death b o d e ln in g  to the s u r v i v o r .
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an d  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  i a  a g r e e d ,  i t  w ould  seem  t h a t  
one s p o u s e  w o ta a  r e c e i v e  many o f  t h e  g l f t p r a t t s g p a g  
owned and acquired b y  the o t h e r ,  and in t h e  n o rm a l 
e a s e  t h i s  w i l l  am ount t o  a  good ( u n d e r s t a t e d )  m etho d  
of e q u a l ! 8a t i o n  o r  general co m p e n sâ tio n *  " * ,*  such
passage o f  t i t l e  a s  i s  n e c e s s a r y "  is made* Moreover, 
c e r t a i n  s p e c i a l  r u l e s  ( a s  e . g .  t h e  6000 crow ns r u l e  
u n d e r  'personal p r i v i l e g e s *  damages and compensation 
rules) ^ make t h e  tool a finer in s t ru m e n t*
When b o d e ln i& g  i s  c o m p le te ,  t h e  p r o p e r t y  a l l o t t e d  
t o  e a o h  sp o u s e  i s  th e n  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h  
sp o u se *
Non-Equal Partition
N o n -e q u a l p a r t i t i o n  a t  B o d e ln ln g  may a r i s e  n o t  
s im p ly  fro m  a  d i v i s i o n  o f  th e  w ho le  ( i m t a t i v e  r e s i d u e  
o f  g i f t o r a t t s g o d s ) i n t o  u n e q u a l  p o r t i o n s ,  th o u g h  t h a t ,  
a s  h a s  b e e n  s e e n ,  i s  c o m p e te n t , so  lo n g  a s  t h e  r i g h t s  
o f  c r e d i t o r s  a r e  n o t  prejudiced, but may b e  th e  r e s u l t  
o f  forethought, su c h  a s  t h e  provision b y  m a r r ia g e - ,  
s e t t l e m e n t  b e f o r e  bpdelning ( o r  in a n t i c i p a t i o n  t h e r e o f )  
that all, o r  p a r t  o f ,  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  one  spouse s h a l l  
b e  deem ed t o  be s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty #  In t h a t  way, th e  
o t h e r  sp o u se  is renouncing all, o r  p a r t ,  o f  h i s  share 
i n  com m un ity , b e c a u s e  t h e  o t h e r  i s  t h e r e b y  r e l i e v e d  
o f  t h e  d u ty  t o  make any c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  com m unity#
I t  i s  c l e a r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  s p o u s e s  i n  Sw eden may 
o p t  out, at t h e  l a s t  m in u te , o f  th e  s t a t u t o r y  system 
o f  " d e f e r r e d  community"* "One sp o u se  can also make 
a  m a r r ia g e  s e t t l e m e n t  g i f t  t o  t h e  o t h e r  b e f o r e  t h e  
d e te r m in a t iv e  d a y , b u t  su c h  a  g i f t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  
t h e  n o rm a l ly  applicable r i g h t s  o f  th e  d o n o r  * s  creditors* 
The sp o u s e  c a n  n o t ,  h o w e v e r , e f f e c t  th r o u g h  m a r r ia g e  
s e t t l e m e n t  d e v i a t i o n s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e s e  m a n e u v e rin g s  
w i t h in  /
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w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  h o d e ln in ^  sch em e , m id a  
" r e n im o ia t io n "  b y  m a r r ia g e  s e t t l e m e n t  a c c o r d in g ly  
d o e s  n o t  g iv e  t h e  r e n o u n c in g  s p o u s e 's  c r e d i t o r s  an y  
s p é c i a l  r i g h t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  o t h e r  spouse*" '^
"Agreed" b o d e ln in g s  may have special significance 
f o r  creditors# Thus w here  one spouse re n o u n c e s  at 
t h a t  time a l l  or part of h i s  right t o  his h o d e ln in g  
share, hie creditors acquire " s p e c i a l  rights" against 
t h e  other spouse, who Is th o u g h t  to  have r e c e i v e d  a 
gift fro m  h i s / h e r  spouse*^ At hodelnlm:# parties 
are free to d e p a r t  fro m  t h e  statutory rules and  to 
d i v id e  t h e  g i f tp r a t tS E O d s  a s  th e y  please*
Bre-hodelning a g re e m e n ts  i n te n d e d  to b e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  s t a t u t o r y  b o d e ln in g  d i v i s i o n  depend 
for t h e i r  continuing validity upon  the time a t  which 
they w ere  made* If valid, there o c c u r s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  
an  agreed bodelning# G e n e r a l ly  s p e a k in g ,  t h e  closer 
i n  time i s  t h e  agreement to b o d e ln i n g # th e  m ore l i k e l y  
i s  it to b e  r e g a r d e d  as b in d in g  on th e  parties to I t #  
E ven  i n  such a c a s e ,  t h e  c o u r t  may m o d ify  t h e  agreement 
if i t  c o n s id e r s  i t  t o  b e  "manifestly u n r e a s o n a b le  # " 
T h u s , p r e - m a r i t a l  b o d e ln ln g  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  n o t  
r e g a r d e d  a s  b in d in g ;  p o s t - m a r i t a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  
im m e d ia te ly  preceding an e v e n t  which will b r i n g  in 
i t s  t r a i n  b o d e ln in E  w i l l  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  b i n d in g  u n l e s s  
" m a n i f e s t l y  u n r e a s o n a b le " f o r  a sp o u se#  Post-nuptial 
a g re e m e n ts  w h e re  s u c h  an  e v e n t  i s  n o t  c l e a r l y  a b le  t o  
b e  /
1* 8., 9,579.2# Gee g e n e r a l l y  on t h i s  com plex  t o p i o ,  B . , pp#579*581 * I t  seem s t h a t ,  a lo n g s id e  th e  r u l e  p e r m i t t i n gspousal free d o m  o f  c o n t r a c t  t h e r e  are s p e c i a l  r u l e s  g o v e rn in g  m a r r ia g e  s e t t l e m e n t s  and  th e  r e s u l t  i s  confusing, at least t o  the o u t s i d e r #  The r u l e s  upon compensation, damages and 6000 crow n entitlement r e p r e s e n t  deviations l e g i s l a t i v e l y -  
i n s p i r e d  a s  d e s i r a b l e *
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be f o r e s e e n  are of doubtful a p p l i c a t i o n *  Buck 
agreements are not subject to the special rule 
permitting judicial modification* If the death of 
one spouse occurs before the "contemplated judicial 
separation or divorce", t h e  agreement becom es null*
Many w r i t e r s  h a v e  e x p re s s e d  v ie w s  on  t h e  m a t te r*
Sussman notae^ that t h e r e  are r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon what%s p o u s e s  may do b ÿ  m a r r i a g e - s e t t l e m e n t ,  w h ich  do n o t  
exist to f e t t e r  s p o u s e s  ^  o r d in a r y  free d o m  of contract 
i n t e r  s e ,  and t h e  l a t t e r  freedom he f e e l s  " i s  not 
l i g h t l y  to be o v e r r id d e n "  * Busemon therefore favours 
the v ie w  t h a t  spouses c o m p e te n t ly  may make such an 
agreement long i n  advance o f  th e  e v e n t , i n  t h e  a b se n c e  
o f  s t a t u t o r y  p r o s c r i p t i o n ,  and  s u g g e s t s  amendment o f  
t h e  Ood©*^
Creditors
After b o d e ln in g * c r e d i t o r s  re m a in  entitled to 
p u r s u e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e b to r  s p o u s e , and also to have 
b o d e ln in g  re d u c e d  i f  t h a t  d e b to r  sp o u se  h a s  re n o u n c e d  
w h o lly  or in part h i s  right t o  t h e  s h a r e  w i th  w h ic h  
s t a t u t e  p r o v id e s  him  i n  b o d e ln ln g .  I f  t h e  d e b to r ,■*' WIMKUM.WI.H'.raHlèHW ItMWifiHWH» *
who h a s  e f f e c t e d  such renunciation, is unable to 
d i s c h a r g e  an  a n t e -b o d e ln ih f^  d e b t ,  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u se  
w i l l  b e  l i a b l e  therefor to the extent of " th e  e x c e s s  
he  h a s  r e c e i v e d  i#less h e  can show that directly a f t e r  
b o d e ln in g  t h e  d e b to r  h ad  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  m a n i f e s t l y  
sufficed to satisfy the d e b ts  he t h e n  h a d * "^
BimilarXy, in bodelning on death, when t h e  s u r v iv o r  
i s  a  d e b to r  and  re n o u n c e s  h i s  b o d e ln in E  r i g h t  i n  
fav o u z ' o f  t h e  h e i r s ,  t h e  h e i r s  a r e  l i a b l e  ( j o i n t l y  
and  s e v e r a l l y )  as above*
F u r t h e r  /
1* p . 581*2 *  "
3
* •  *S e e  " A p p r s l a a l " ,* Bus am an, p. 581 *
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further, if the debtor ("having "in marked degree" 
re n o u n c e d  his right") is made bankrupt within one 
y e a r  of registration of bodelning* the creditors 
are e n t i t l e d  to demand rescission of the bodeXning* 
and there is a new bodelning between the b a n k ru p t  
©state and the other spouse*
If the benefit of bodelning is the other way 
(that is, renunciation by heirs of a deceased debtor 
in favour o f  the survivor), the two remedies last- 
mentioned are not available to creditors, who, 
however, i n  that case, "have  even sharper remedies*"
Insolvency at bodelning will entitle creditors
to render the d e b to r  spouse bankrupt, and bodelning
will take place between the non-bankrupt spouse and
the b a n k ru p t  estate ( o r  presumably between two
b a n k ru p t  estates)* "The b a n k ru p tc y  o f  an insolvent
spouse - in no way prejudices the r i g h t s  o f  th e  solvent Pspouse'"", because the spouse, i f  solvent, may satisfy 
any claims w h ich  he may have out of his own 
giftorattsgods, though this may affect injuriously 
the c r e d i t o r s  of the o t h e r ,  since there may be a 
smaller o r  nil passing of estate from solvent to 
Insolvent sp o u se  at bodelning*
Rights o f  Engaged P e r s o n s  on D e a th  of One Party
Engaged p e r s o n s  under Swedish law have r i g h t s  i n  
e a c h  other's estates, o r ,  m ore accurately, th e  woman 
has a c la im  f o r  m a in te n a n c e  out of the fiance's 
e s t a t e ,  i f  the engagement was in b e in g  at the t im e  of 
h i s  death, and i f  the claimant had b o r n e, or expected 
to /
1# Sussman, p#582# It cannot be denied that the Swedish Code has used i n g e n u i t y  and  th o ro u g h n e s si n  thwarting p o s s i b l e  schem es of an anti-creditor nature, o r  'neutralising* actings which would have the effect of being a n t i - c r e d i t o r .  But see effect of insolvency below*2* Bus small, p * 5 8 2 .
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to bear, a child to the deceased and if the claimant 
i s  in need of maintenance* The maintenance can 
extend to one h a l f  o f  the deceased's estate, m  "a 
k in d  of compensation for the right to half o f  the 
man's property that would have accrued to the fiancé© 
had the two been actually married*"^ "Departing 
from the equality principle, but reflecting the pn o rm a l econom ic  an d  social situation o f  the parties", 
there is no equivalent r i g h t  f o r  a fiance*
One criticism o f  the Swedish system which 
Bussman puts fo rw a rd  is the exclusion o f  "personal 
rights" fro m  evaluation and distribution at bodelning* 
E ven  if these are p r o p e r l y  r e g a r d e d  as inalienable, 
could they not b e  to k e n  i n t o  account (showing t h e  
t r u e  r e l a t i v e  wealth o f  t h e  parties), yet be returned 
i n  e v e r y  case to the ow ner o f  th e  r i g h t ( s ) ?
D i f f i c u l t y  w ou ld  arise, h o w e v e r, w here  t h e  personal 
r i ^ t  w as o f  g r e a t  o r  i n c r e a s i n g  v a lu e
Bussman /
1 * ¥ allin, p * 626 *
3* Bee Bus small'a d i s c u s s i o n  of the upphorsratt(author's composer's o r  a r t i s t 's  r i g E F t o n m p u b l i s h e dwork) (p*5B3) and of pension r i g h t s , especially i n  v ie w  of t h e  growing importance of the l a t t e r  t o  the family budget* Ha advocates (at 1963) am endm ent# W r i t in g  i n  1971i Sundbarg (p*228) explains that " p e c u l i a r  co m prom ises"  b e tw e e n  the "property relationship" and the " a l im e n ta r y  relationship" have resulted i n  the situation that, w here  the b e n e f i t  o f  a state p e n s io n  is to be allocated, equal shares are to be given to the widow and to one divorcee ( " i n  need of support at the t im e  of th e  d i v o r c e " )  but not to more t h a n  one  divorcee* T hus o n ly  two persons can s h a r e  the f u n d ,  no m a t t e r  how frequent had been the husband's m a r r i a g e s # ( U n t i l  1962, the rule h a d  b e e n  that "each d iv o r c e e  h a d  earned h e r  s h a r e  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  the num ber o f  years sh e  had endured the marriage*") At divorce, the divorcee m u st ensure that she receives a decree stating t h a t  sh e  will be e n t i t l e d  to share in t h e  p e n s io n ,  but sh e  cannot obtain this unless sh e  show s that, at t h a t  date, she stands in n e e d  of, and i s  
e n t i t l e d  /
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Sus aman c r i t i c i s e s  a l s o  the p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
ow ner of corporeal move able a w hioh  are sought to be 
a t-baohed  toy c r e d i t o r s  a tg n M  m tr lm o n l .o  l a  r e l i a n c e  
of t h e  presumption that such goods b e lo n g  to t h e  
d e b to r  sp o u se *  He a rg u e s  t h a t  t h e  d e v ic e  o f  t h e  
i n v e n t o r y  has n o t  proved to be s a t i s f a c t o r y  in 
Sweden, b u t  c o n f e s s e s  t h a t  h e  i s  unable to solve 
t h e  p ro b le m  of "personalty w i t h i n  t h e  common household." 
T h is  problem is present always: why should n o t  i te m s
of domestic use b e  deemed jointly owned b y  the spouses, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of m o n e ta ry  contribution^ and b e  
attachable for t h e  debts of e i t h e r ,  in t h e  same w ay 
t h a t ,  i n  many c o u n t r i e s , including Sweden, there is 
joint and several liability for household debts?
The area of post-marital inter-spousal contract 
w i th  the aim of m o d ify in g  the s t a t u t o r y  p r o p e r t y  
order b y  means of O r d in a r y "  contract or b y  m a r r ia g e  
s e t t l e m e n t , i s  also u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  partly "because
t h e s e  tw o types of inter-spousal agreements can c o v e r
P  %much the same g ro u n d "  # " Sussman's suggested solution-'^
is /
entitled to, alimony from the husband. I t  appears that o n ly  in a b o u t of Bwedish divorces is an award of alimony made# If the first divorcee s u c c e e d s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  this, t h e  odd r e su lt  i s  that the benefit of the p e n s io n  will be shared b e tw e e n  t h e  f i r s t  and l a s t  wives# This appears strange, 
b u t  i t  w i l l  b e  rem em bered  that, when English divorce law was a b o u t  t o  be changed, one of t h e  greatest anxieties of those opposed to the "C asanova*  8 charter" was t h e  property effect upon the c a s t - o f f  w if e  i n  j u s t  su c h  matters as p e n s io n  r i g h t s #1. Of# haw Commission, T h ir d  R e p o r t  on Family P r o p e r tyBook T h re e  : t h e r e , th o u g h , proposals are limited to a recommendation that a spouse may apply t o  t h e  court f o r  a u s e  and  enjoyment order* (See E n g la n d  infra. ) *"*ic SaîF' .41, Part VII.See also, proposals contained in C h a p te r  7#2# 8 # ,  p#585*5# p*58G .
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is that there s h o u ld  he only one type o f  post-marital 
oontraet b e tw e e n  spouses, w h ic h  should bind the 
parties thereto if made in accordance w ith  t h e  general 
rules of contract, and should not require s p e c i a l  
s o l e m n i t i e s ,  but s h o u ld  be  able to be modified by 
t h e  court if it a f f e c t e d  t h e  "property order" or t h e  
claims or partition at bodelning and was show n to be 
" m a n i f e s t l y  u n r e a s o n a b le "  for the petitioning spouse*
Bussm an a d v o c a te s  t h e  adoption of the n u l l i t y -  
b o d e ln in g  r u l e  (which restricts t h e  subject-matter 
of Bodel# w h i le  not altering the basic rule of equal 
shares) in divorce, especially where the marriage 
has been of short d u r a t i o n  and t h e r e  are no c h i l d r e n .
He suggests that the rights o f  a surviving spouse 
should be greater, both in monetary terms and in 
the s e n s e  that they sh o u ld  be leas " c i r c u m s c r ib e d " , 
an d  that, regardless of the e x i s t e n c e  of other relations, 
the s u r v i v o r  s h o u ld  have a n  absolute right to the 
statutory minim um, which should be "large enough to 
ensure that the marital home is n o t  s p l i n t e r e d  '
through an application of the e q u a l  partition principle*"^ 
He is concerned also that if s p o u s e s  agree by m a r r i a g e -  
s e t t l e m e n t  that all the property of one shall b e  
deem ed separate, the other, if th e  survivor, has no 
rights i n  that separate p r o p e r t y  if the predeeoaser 
has left "body hoirs", and recom m ends that t h e  survivor 
should b e  entitled to a certain p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the 
p r o p e r t y  so  rendered separate, o r  at least to a liferent 
i n t e r e s t  t h e r e i n ^  #
Upon the point that t h e  husband's savings from 
income are not s u f f i c i e n t l y  protected for t h e  benefit 
o f  /
1. S., p#588: of* Soots r u l e s  of intestate s u c c e s s io n(especially p r i o r  rights: Sue©.(So*) Act, 1964,88*8 and 9s Chapter 5(2))#2* T h is  would infringe parties* freedom but w ould  n o t  perhaps be unreasonable, n o r  indeed uncommons of# 
G erm any, franca, Scottish legal rights o n  testacy#
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of the wife (particularly a non aalary-eamlng wife), 
Bussm an d o e s  n o t  f a v o u r  th e  oom pulm ory t r a n s f e r  b y  
h u sb a n d  t o  w if e  ( o r  y lq e  p re e u m a b ly )  o f  a
certain proportion t h e r e o f  every year*^
Finally, t h e  author w onders w h e th e r  the giftoratt 
scheme is fitted to today's realities# "One might 
say that t h e  1920 Code, with its concern over separate 
and  i n h e r i t e d  property, is strongly directed t o  the 
p ro b le m s  of propertied spouses# The problem i n  
Sweden today is t h e  adequate t r e a tm e n t  of the f a m i ly  
of moderate m ean s#"^ Stmdberg in d e e d  d i s m is s e s  
préoccupation with q u e s t io n s  o f  marital property a s  
indicative o f  what a Bwedieh s t u d e n t  w ou ld  term 
"squirrel mentality'*# " I n s t e a d  the modern Swedish
m ind  concentrates on  the accumulation of c la im s  against 
su c h  bodies as insurance companies or the State#"^
In Sweden, there seems t o  be a growing 
determination to take from the specialties o f  the 
married state* I t  appears that there is no difference 
in t h e  treatment of the legitimate and t h e  illegitimate 
c h i l d  in, f o r  e x a m p le, matters o f  maintenance or 
i n h e r i t a n c e  # The result is that "the re fo rm e  which 
have t a k e n  place have c e r t a i n l y  deprived parents o f  
the idea that they are doing something for the b e n e f i t  
of their children when th e y  m arry*
How /
1* Contrast suggestions f o r  S c o t la n d ,  Chapter 7*Separation o f  P r o p e r ty  with concurrent compensation o f  G ain s#2# This is n o t  peculiar to Sweden# The S u c c e s s io n  (Sc#) A ct* 1964, was born p a r t l y  out of c o n c e rn  for the widow of the deceased of s m a ll  o r  medium estate# Note also G le n d o n 's  point t h a t  although the German and Scandinavian sy s te m s  have b e e n  h e r a l d e d  a s  t h e  s y s te m s  o f  t h e  future, i n  an era of marriages of (perhaps) s h o r t e r  d u r a t i o n ,  where there are fewer children, and th e  wife i s  accustomed t o  work, "it is separation of assets, not deferred com m unity , w hioh  will draw the spotlight#"3# B u n d b e rg , p#224#4# Bimdberg, p #22? #
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How, though the author notes that that was 
not the case at the time of the Oode (1920/21), it 
does seem strange to the Swedish way of thought, 
that "those who depend on marriage for their living 
s h o u ld  b e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  in s u r a n c e  i n  c a s e  s u p p o r t  i s  
no  longer forthcoming after t h e  marriage has b e e n  
dissolved
The nub of Bmdberg's a rg u m en t i s  that today 
in Sweden, b e c a u s e  of t h e  existence of a 'd e v e lo p e d  
W e lfa re  S t a t e ,  few  p e o p le  a r e  d e p e n d e n t o n  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s  i n  f i n a n c i a l  em ergency# T h e i r  f i n a n c e s  
a r e  u n d e rp in n e d  b y  th e  S t a t e  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  
u n em p lo y m en t, s i c l m e s s ,  o ld  a g e ,  o r  d e a t h ,  o f  t h e  
b r e a d w in n e r ,  and  t h e  S t a t e  w i l l  provide much help 
i n  t h e  education o f  c h i ld r e n #  In such a c o n t e x t , a  
p r i v a t e  law sy s te m  of rules may b e g in  to look 
inappropriate and i r r e l e v a n t # ^
M o re o v e r , m a r r ia g e  i t s e l f  a p p e a rs  o u tm o d ed , 
according to Sundbarg# "Socialist id e o lo g y  i n  Sweden 
always took a n e g a t iv e  v ie w  o f  th e  b o u r g e o is  c h u rc h  
m a r r ia g e  and  f a v o u r e d ,  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  
É& m a r r ia g e  o r  f r e e  p a r t n e r s h i p  b a s e d  on
c o n s c ie n c e # "  This fo l lo w e d  the Bolshevik p a t t e r n  
i n  Russia i n  t h e  1920*a, "and s u r v iv e d  the later 
t w i s t s  and  t u r n s  i n  com m unist id e o lo g y # " ^  Bine© 
t h e  m id -1 9 2 0 * s , according to B u n d b e rg , there h a s  been 
♦a now radicalism* which dem ands that " s o c i e t y 's  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  /
1# I b i d # Of# O h a p te r  4  (A lim e n t) .2# 3 rrB c#l#0om #M em o#N o#22,
3# Btmdberg, p#230* As t o  t h e  communiât i d e o lo g y ,  s e e  "The S t a t u s  o f  Women i n  t h e  S o v ie t  U iiio n " , A l i c e  E rh -B o o n  T oy (1 9 7 2 ) (2 0 )  A m e rio . Jo #  o f  Oomp*La%f, p*662; " M a tr im o n ia l  Property in Soviet 
&8WÜ, 1967 (1 6 )  I# O .I ,,Q , p # 1106 ; " B o o ie t  F a m ily  la w  i n  t h e  i i g h t  o f  R u s s ia n  H i s t o r y  a n d  M a r x is t  T h e o iy "#  (1 9 4 6 )  56 Y a le  h#J#26#
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transformation Into a Socialist Welfare State be 
t a k e n  to its logical o o n o lu s lo a #  " Aliment should 
y i e l d  p l a c e  t o  s o c i a l  a e o u r i ty *  A d u l t e r y ,  b ig a m y , 
and  even Inceat have lost, o r  are losing, t h e i r  
s tig m a * ^  M e n tio n  m u st b e  m ade, h o w e v e r , o f  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Swedish electorate in the election o f  
September, 1976, gave t h e  lie t o  some o f  those 
sentiments b y  sh o w in g  a d e c id e d  swing to the r i g h t  
and  a disonchantmont w ith  a n  e x p e n s iv e  full-scale 
s o c i a l i s t  W e lfa re  State.
S u n d b e rg  g o e s  so f a r  a s  t o  s a y  t h a t  the i d e a l s  
o f  Christian, marriage a r e  n o t  r e l e v a n t  to the new 
p r o p e r t y  legislation i n  Sweden# The " h e l p f u l "  
sy s te m s  a r e  th e  Communist sy s te m  o f  th e  1 9 2 0 * s , and 
t h e  Roman law o f  marriages s t r a n g e  b e d fe l lo w s #  "In
t h e  brave new d i r e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  Socialist S w ed ish PGovernment t h e r e  l u r k s  a Romen-Hussian a p p ro a c h # "
Marriage, a c c o r d in g  t o  the Minister o f  Justice 
i n  t h e  Protocol on J u s t i c e  D e p a rtm en t Matters (15th 
August, 1969) should b e  a "voluntary cohabitation 
b y  in d e p e n d e n t  persons", having t h e  r e s u l t s , inter 
alia# t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  b e  no m a in te n a n c e  payments 
after divorce, and t h a t  th e  limitations u p o n  freedom 
o f  a c t i o n  o v e r  a party's own property should be l i f t e d  
(w h i le  l e a v i n g  i n  b e in g  t h e  r e q u ir e m e n t  o f  j o i n t  
c o n s e n t  i n  relation to t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home and  
f u r n i s h i n g s ) *  The legal-economic c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  
m a r r ia g e  s h o u ld  b e  r e s t r i c t e d #  T h rough  s o c i a l  
b e n e f i t s ,  th e  s p o u s e s ,  having e n jo y e d  p r e v i o u s ly  
legal e q u a l i t y ,  w ou ld  h a v e  t r u e  economic independence*^ 
"*.* free m a r r ia g e  is o n ly  t o l e r a b l e  i f  marriage i s  
deprived of most o f  i t s  l e g a l  c o n se q u e n c e s  *
It /
1# Sundberg, p#231# 
p . 233*3* W o II in , p#628*4# Bundberg, p#235#
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I t  c m  p roW W ly  b e  em ld  t h a t  t h e  v lW B  o f
m# e#reB#0& $m m rly 19?0*m$
w euM  h&M' W œ  siptmM# %# B r l t i a h  m a j o r i t y
o p lm iw  i&t # #  m m  w i c e # ^  W t  m w  t h e r e
« 0  ml#a that a ew taln of B rltlA
%?w3,d Ww m tm d# te  # e  wrngmA# ^
' ' e t a h l e  e r n e  #  # #  (  m â  é u M w )
wMËh tWa# #ie am mamie# ew %e wek 
& le imuld mom; that the imMmt# ef "mmwmrrlage" 
w e u lâ  W g lm  WP^or-;bio # e  i r n d d m w  e f  m w M a g e , 
mWi %Wt# &a effect ». DWre wmM he me malternative W mwi%## Meet rdmtieWhlpa# aoomer 
w  %at#r» mmld We## $e external regulatlm#
I t  l a  W m l t t W  Im p r im e lp M #  # 1 #  i #  n e t
I n  p ^ r t l w l a #  a r e w  ( Ê w  e m m p le#  
dememM e v i e l e w e )  t h e  # m m t # f  m r tm lm  m #  l e # l  
r l # #  m #  W  le d #
1* P e r t  % I I |  $ m iw i th  #%i(WLeelem 'by nee#! Kuem *e A e t i w  G roup*I t  m e w  # m t  m lm ig u ld e  a  m r r l a # #  muâd l i w e e  r a t e  I n  B r i t a i n ,  e o M M t a t i m
a
...............................  _ _.  i d e aWl* W # # e ; e \  W e ) j w  A m tw *
TW  e ta t& e tW  )"^et A L ifjitia# ,o f  em%r@e# T he p a r t i e #  e i w e ^  w  <4h o i ,  mmrrled r^aepoctmbility# A v#3%yi a r  I  t l w  furuCLÿ a tm e tu R O , o o ^ 'o w  r t r u e tu w *  **U p r o p 4*7 t y  ie  that, ualln ü* 1051 only 07f Wozw\ an u &* 40 w e m  oatri% »d , 1W 1 t h e  y x r e p e r t iw  i.%w ' ' t f  ,  # tA  
B W  i# ' V^q:*%.# artlelw n.Tt-*o th.i) in Mufxien wheW.tatlem ie  w ry ee? „'ieu nnd en,i ttU v of birtlu'. mre l l lo # t iw t e  ( ^ *  .q rpY r*) f.fd  l u  v:PÜ' tO eee&iY M i » eiea' i o r w  frea enwnml» ome wwld wleh t o  A/'< Û , l l ÿ  t k u  3^%*epe3?ei(Au c e w t l t i m g  p r i o r  t ethei^© oh o e# in # ' e e h a b itm & io n  I w t e a â  o f  %4#&>ee w arn  g iv e n  f w  P r m e e  mM^im an y  a i c o  -  $Aa » t u 'i 4 o t i c a  w ere  m tow]()n3('ahl# *w md w hahitrtlm  Wfem eeoiAA mem pwular in Contimemtal Mw#eihiJXi 111 V}?ii;nxï%%  M atrim on ia l Homes (F am ily  P r o t e c t io n )  ( S c . )  
A c t ,  I 9 8 I :  c e r t a in  r ig h t s  are c o n fe r r e d  on c o h a b it in g
p a r t n e r s .
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EW&MNB
Sources
Bromley, P#H* 'Family Law* (4th. and 5 th  edus #)
Oretney, S#H* 'Principles of Family haw* (2nd and 3rd 
edns.)
Klralfy, A* Oomparative law of M a tr im o n ia l  Property, 
Bd* A# Kiralfy# Chapter VI, 'English Daw' #
Passingham, Bernard. Law and Practice in Matrimonial 
Causes*
The history of English law in this area, at 
least in the 19th and 20th centuries, is similar 
t o  that of Soots law* The similar late 19th c e n tu r y  
pattern of development has been traced in Chapter 1*
As a result of these s t a t u t o r y  changes, there 
existed until the middle of t h i s  century, a system of 
separation of property* "By extending the equitable 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  the separate e s t a t e ,  the Married Womens 
Property Acta replaced t h e  t o t a l  incapacity of a 
married woman to hold property at common law by a 
rigid doctrine of separate property*" K i r a l f y  notes 
that /
1. Family Law (4th odn*) P.M.Bromley, p.355# Seealso upon the reasons for the choice of separation, Cretney, pp.223-5* The final blows for separationand equality w ere  the Law Reform A c t ,  1935, 8 * 2 , and the Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act, 1 9 4 9 * (The 'restraint in anticipation' was a restriction inserted in a marriage settlement preventing a woman from having control over - and u n w is e ly  using (principally, it w as feared, for t h e  benefit of her husband) - the capital of h e r  preserved estate).Kiralfy says (see g e n e r a l l y ,  pp*182-185) that the importance and status a s  equals of women in the M id d le  âges was a f e a t u r e  o f  the lives of single women or widows (femes s o l e s ) , not of t h e  lives of married women (femes covertes)#
4th& t fæom theæ e prea&u## f##» re^o&m#
B ^ fora t h e  fl# o &  o f  ref##m i& g fa m ily
I&# ie g ie lm tio m *  i9#9*4993^  &1& & % thw lty &&
th e e #  m a tter #  wm# th e  teæmB o f  th e
M*V*P* A $t* 4882$ e#47^^3 #h&8h e m t i t le a  a  eem rt 
;8%&8S:W&32dL3k9f
4* ,:C 1% T 'J ,('IJ'^ %} lul.p'A' i^lUX/Ura"/) s»u \:t^vuz\ ) ':: f  r-t h n  .\<irj »;û / '', 'i im  w-^tA.I r v r  rt fA ii .)lïtvü ^v.voe/L.'^' u;w\u t b r r c  1)0 o:A
;ta:Æ «4ii "'>■ <>" a a îi'^ ;a u v :; i a: j^i'uaik‘'.:a» "aU;i!%;”">.% nyo^n[*,:i :ip. t i i e  X^OiA V%1^% va" ; (>'K '^rÎ3/# ' A rl;.;a
"wltjh t h a t  w  0 %hn i w i  t i w l w  e w e r  o f  th e  w ^ ;et im w o  j:ui(m# M a t t a t lm i  wm@ p ia o o 4h y  # f % #  w e  t om odify  th e  g o w r a l  i f  th e  Wamo^^aD):'OaBoeable*^ W  t W  o ia f o v u r t^ ie  33*Tfiff &2k /vw MU'fU'-ro' wa$t o  h e  r o n i i t t o A  s o  w  t o  w o ?  *%%: AK^  eo .if;ik io h  o f  th e  Ateneye.1 W% # # ly  I f  Uhv ( .e w t  l a  th e6hounhv i t  wC i t *\'he eo! ' i m i w  wo#M  have t ) ia t  o f
fieri. e M  wuh"* f u t  h ,w o jBCl^&eàü^he B i l l  1$ # #  o u t l i t  t w  %U)ilreL/ i ^ r Appe mâl % 11$ ami
2* ee*^e;L*f^tiuo'' U xlty  Of ''RJ :^#24 (*\f i9 ? 8'u:;) ÎL u t \ ) J   ^ b ' ÛÎX nt; / , .^ to v i l le' 1^ 'v ',u>)3 Ï A  'j /I  ^ '% 'r  'I'ty  r *,n i )  r^ to n u  '1(1 “'% i'' )UMî f‘. f ).  ^ ‘ v ! ^  V ' /  , *.'fvC ('r^^etOty m";#) (^ irJ^  VA t ' ('Ï/C ' '  ' ' A 'V r l ' \ ï  Uuvb LV* t h e  iF$w 3ini* t'eeh i'"o'.wj<Wo êlmcAerlor.fifry 
t o  'v /eim *' $ w i l l  ho%;,» u< e, ,, '»4, ;> u  t h e  o l ê  weylii\t  l a  t.'-' "f j 'j  # w% 'O feW x: V* ,»r'V , %.Lx*i 11 *t ' I f
hfr  f t« ,v .i ,- a « d * a  } y u : ; u . n ? ; , ' v ;  ,{ür;ifa»A .î ,P.nL ,L ',' ' - C ' . i i S S I l S ^ t e
- & % '. 2 9 \ u : ,  *«*s%.K%ivWn^  1)^"''^.. 1^ .^,/*,^':^;'' r. f'WeWl%e:,o r  vrj'ore <-; ' i . %' . w t  W
r w e g a l e e ^  (v r A w  Pi^ T (e% \ w ^ a kaotioa l3^  imm4i'4,6?y Khr âeereo n'^wolute;% M k  T# [ i 9 R J  3 V I  t h emppIiOEmt h m  eiaao p^reperv Wjumtmmto$»èera em% aot $ h m  he or #here Wie partim
h w e  /
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s u r a m a r i l y  a n d  w i t h i n  i t s  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  d e é ' i d e  " a n y  
q u e s t i o n  b e t w e e n  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  a s  t o  t h e  t i t l e  
t o  o r  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y * ’ ,  a n d  t h i s  c o u l d  b e  
a p p l i e d  t o  a n y  s p e c i e s  o f  p r o p e r t y *  H o w e v e r  % i f  i t  
w a s  d e c i d e d  j u d i c i a l l y  t h a t  t h e  d i s p u t e d  i t e m  b e l o n g e d  
t o  o n e  5 a n d  i f  i t  h a d  b e e n  d i s p o s e d  o f  b y  t h e  o t h e r $ 
t h e  A c t  o f  1 8 8 2  w a s  u n a b l e  t o  s u p p l y  a  r e m e d y   ^ t h o u g h  
t h i s  p r o b l e m  w a s  s o l v e d  b y  t h e  M a t r i m o n i a l  C a u s e s  
( P r o p e r t y  a n d  M a i n t e n a n c e )  A c t ^  1 9 5 8 $  w h i c h  p e r m i t t e d  
a  c o u r t  t o  make a n  o r d e r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  sp o u s e  
e n t i t l e d  t h e r e t o ,  t h a t  p r o p e r t y  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t e d  
t h e  p r o c e e d s  o f  d i s p o s a l ,  o r  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  sum#^ 
f i l e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  f a r  f r o m  s a t i s f a c t o r y  b e c a u s e  t h e  
a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e  c o u r t s  i n  a p p l y i n g  s * 1 7  v a r i e d  
c o n s i d e r a b ly ,  from  t i m i d i t y  ( e x p l o r a to r y  a s  t o  t i t l e  
o n l y )  t o  b o l d n e s s  ( ta lc in g  u p o n  t h e m s e l v e s  a  d i s c r e t i o n  
w h i c h  /
h a v e  n e v e r  b e e n  m a r r i e d  n o r  h a v e  h a d  a n  a g r e e m e n t  
t o  m a rrv  ( u n l e s s  t h e  o i r e u m a t a n c e s  m e r i t  d e c r e e  o f  n u l l  i t  y  ) ; u pon  d e a th  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s in g  sp o u s e  $ t h e  s u r v i v o r  may w lsE ^^o  ' e 's t a B i Æ  tü à t ;  c e r t a i n  ' 
i t e m s  o f  p r o p e r t y  d o  n o t  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  e s t a t e  
( q u i t e  a  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t  from  t h a t  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  
I n h e r i t a n c e  ( P r o v i s i o n  f o r  P a m l l y  a n d  D e p e n d a n t s )
A c t ,  1 9 7 5 ,  i o  c o n c e r n e d ) *
A p p l i c a t i o n s  u n d e r  s * 1 ?  may b e  m a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  
p e r i o d  o f  t h r e e  y e a r s  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  o f  d i s s o l u t i o n  o r  a n n u l m e n t  o f  a  m a r r i a g e *  ( M a t r i m o n i a l  P ro c e e d in g s  and  P r o p e r ty  l o t ,  1 9 7 0 ,  s . 5 9 ) *  f h i s  a l l o w s  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  p r o p e r t y  a rg u m en t i n  o ir c u m s ta n o e s  w here  p r o p e r t y  a d j u s t m e n t  i s  p r e c l u d e d  b e c a u s e  o f  
r e - m a r r i a g e  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a n t s  m o r e o v e r ,  t h e  p o l i c y  
o f  t h e  M#0»A* i s  t h a t  lump sum a w a rd s , i f  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  s h o u ld  b e  made a t  t h e  t ii i iê  o f  d e c r e e  an d  n o t ,  e x c e p t  i n  s p e c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e  t h e r e a f t e r *  ( G r e t i i e y ,  2 n d  
e d , ,  p . 2 1 5 ) *
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  e * 1 7  a p p l i c a t i o n  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  an  o r d e r  f o r  s a l e ,  w h e re a s  " T h e r e  i s  no pow er t o
o r d e r  a  s a l e  u n d e r  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n ” * (0*, 3 r d  e d * , p*270)
P a s s i n g h a m ,  p * 1 9 0 #
8 6 5 '
w h i c h  ’’t r a n s c e n d s  a l l  r i g h t s  l e g a l  o r  e q u i t a b l e ” ) ,
Pa n d ,  i n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  b o l d  a p p r o a c h  was d i s a p p r o v e d *
I t  w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  1 8 8 2  A c t  c o u l d  n o t  b e  s t r a i n e d  
f u r t h e r  t o  m e e t  m odem  d i l e m m a s ,  a n d  t h e  p h r a s e  
’’f a m i l y  a s s e t s ” ,  i n  s o  f a r  a s  i t  m i g h t  h a v e  a n y  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  t i t l e  
( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  u s e ) ,  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  f a v o u r * ^
I h e  o n ly  l i g h t  w h i c h  s h o n e  w a s  t h a t  c a s t  b y  t h e  
H a r r ie d  W omen's P r o p e r t y  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 ,  c o n c e r n i n g  s a v i n g s  
f r o m  t h e  h o u s e k e e p i n g  a l l o w a n c e  a n d  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  
t h e s e ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c o n t r a r y  a g r e e m e n t ,  b e l o n g  
t o  e a c h  s p o u s e  e q u a l ly # ^  U n t i l  1970^ t h e r e  w a s  much 
c o n f u s i o n  /
1* p e r  h .  D e n n in g , H in e  v* H ln e  1962 1 W*h*R*1124
a t  1 1 2 7 / 2 8 ,  q u o t e d  b y  P a s s I n g h a m ,  i b i d ;  s e e  t h e  
u s e  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  a  c o n f l i c t  c a s e  H e
B e t t i n s o n ' s  Q u e s t i o n  1 9 5 6  O h * 6 ? *2* P e t  t i t  t  V *  P #  1 9 7 0  A * 0 * 7 7 7 ;  and  s e e  0 1  s  s i n g  v*
0 *  1 9 7 0  2  A l l  B # 2 . 7 8 0 »  F reem an  ( p * 8 5 )  s a y s  t h a t
t h e  t e e t h  o f  s . 1 7  w ere  e x t r a c t e d  b y  t h e  H o u s e  o f  
l o r d s  i n  P e t t i t t #
3 *  S e e  h o w e v e r  n o w  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  :
J o h n  G ,  H o  S B  M a r t y n ,  ” f h ©  m o d e r n  l a w  o f  F a m ily  P r o v i s i o n ” ,  p p * 4 / 5 *
4 #  A c c o r d i n g  t o  K i r a l f y  ( c i t i n g  H o w a r d  v #  D igby  ( 1 8 5 4 )
2  G 1 » ^ F # 6 3 4  a t  p . 6 5 4 )  a t  c o m m o n  l a w  a  w i f e  m i g h t  
r e t a i n  s a v i n g s  f r o m  a  c l o t h i n g  a l l o w a n c e #  H e  s a y s  
t h a t  m a n y  w o m e n  w o u l d  w i s h  t o  s e e  t h e  h o u s e k e e p i n g  
f u n d  ’’t r e a t e d  a s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  w i f e ” ,  b u t  m a k e s  
g e n t l e  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h i s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  
h u sb a n d  o f t e n  " h e lp s  o u t ” h i s  w if e  i n  e x p e n s iv e  
w e e k s ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  why h e  s h o u ld  n o t  s h a r e  i n  l e s s  e x p e n s iv e  w eeks# S h o u ld  h e  h a v e  money 
r e t u r n e d  f o r  t i m e s  s p e n t  a w a y  f r o m  h o m e ?  F r e e m a n  
( p p * 9 6 /9 7 ) s u g g e s t s  t h a t ,  b e f o r e  1 9 6 4 ,  a  w ise  w ife  w ou ld  e n s u r e  t h a t  n o th in g  re m a in e d  o f  th e  h o u s e k e e p in g  
m o n e y *  H e  r e m a k f e  ( p  * 9 6 )  t h a t  " I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t h i n k  o f  a  m o r e  i n e p t  p i e c e  o f  d r a f t i n g  t h a n  t h e  1 9 6 4  A c t ” * P r o  f  e s  a  o r  Eahn^dPreund (  ( 1 9 7 0  )  5 3  M * L  * R  # 6 0 1 ,  
a t  p . 6 0 4 )  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  m e a s u r e  a s  " i m p o r t a n t  b u t  q u i t e  i n a d e q u a t e ” ,  a n d  u s e s  t h e  a d j e c t i v e  " l o p s i d e d ” 
b e c a u s e ,  a s  h e  p o i n t s  o u t ,  t h e  h u s b a n d  o f  a  t h r i f t y  
w i f e  c a n  m a k e  ( a n d  k e e p )  t h e  s a v i n g s  s i m p l y  b y  g iv in g  h e r  l e s s  " h o u se k e e p in g " #  " T h is  i s  one  o f  t h o s e  s c r a p s  o f  r e f o r m  w h i c h  c a n  o n l y  be j u s t i f i e d  a s  p a c e  m ak ers  f o r  m o r e  s y s t e m a t i c  m e a s u r e s # ” S e e  a l s o  0 # M . S t o n e  1 "H .W .P .A c t, 1964" (A H o te  on  S t a t u t e )  27 M .B.H . ( 1 9 6 4 ) ,  
P # 5 ? 6 ,  and  a n a l y s i s  a n d  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  A ct b y  
B r o m l e y ,  p p • 5 6 2 - 5 6 5  #
5 *  M a tr im o n ia l  P r o c e e d i n g s  a n d  P r o p e r t y  A c t ,  1 9 7 0 ,  s . 5 7 ,  
w h ic h  /
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c o n f u s i o n  a b o u t  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  " im p ro v e m e n ts" m a d e  
b y  one s p o u s e  upon  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  o t h e r s  t h a t  
i s ,  c o u l d  s u c h  im p ro v em en ts  b e  s a i d  t o  g i v e  t h e  
" im p ro v e r"  a  b e n e f i c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  p ro c e e d s  
o f  s a l e ?  P a ss in g h a m  e x p l a i n s ,  th o u g h , t h a t  th e  
d i s c r e t i o n  g i v e n  by  t h e  1 8 8 2  A ct c o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  
a id  t h e  n o n - p r o p r i e t o r  sp o u se  i n  g iv in g  h i n / h e r  
p o s s e s s i o n  o f ,  f o r  e x a m p le , t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home 
u n t i l ,  p e r h a p s ,  s u i t a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  accom m odation  
h a d  b e e n  f o u n d , t h o u g h  s u c h  a  r i g h t ,  a l th o u g h  
e n f o r c e a b l e  b e t w e e n  s p o u s e s ,  w a s  h e l d  n o t  t o  h a v e  
e f f e c t  a g a i n s t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s , - ^  T h a t  a u t h o r i t y  w a s  
f o l lo w e d  b y  t h e  p a s s in g  o f  The M a tr im o n ia l  Homes A c t ,  
1 % 7 ,  w h ic h  d id  p r o v id e  s e c u r i t y  a g a i n s t  t h i r d  
p a r t i e s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o ,  and  n o t  i n  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r ,  
t h e  b a s i c  common law  r i g h t  o f  a  well^^^behaved w ife  
t o  /
W hich g iv e s  t o  t h e  " im p ro v e r"  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a  s h a r e ,  o r  an  e n la r g e d  s h a r e ,  i n  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  property  ( r e a l  o r  p e r so n a l) , to  w h ic h  h e /  sh e  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  a n  im provem en t i n  money o r  money's w o rth *  The im provem ent must be s u b s ta n t ia l ,  and t h e r e  must be no agreement b e tw e e n  th e  spouses t o  a  d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t #  S ee  J a n s e n  v# J*  ( b e f o r e  
t h e  A ct) -  1965 j^*478*1# S ee  a l s o  t h e  w id e  p o w ers g iv e n  b y  t h e  1970 A c t ,8S#4 and  5$ d i s c u s s e d  i n f r a #2# b e e  V# l e e  1952 W here b o th  é p o u se shad con trib u ted  t o  t h e  p u rc h a s e  o f  t h e  h o u s e ,  b u t  i n  p r o p o r t i o n s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s c e r t a i n ,  th e  1882 A c t c o u ld  b e  o f  u s e  i n  a u t h o r i s i n g  t h e  c o u r t  to  d i v id e  the i n t e r e s t  t h e r e i n  a s  i t  th o u g h t  f i t #5# R a t i o n a l  P r o v i n c i a l  Bank l t d #  v# A in sw o r th  1965 A*0*1175, o v e r - r u l i n g  B endall v .  H o W h irte r  1952 2 Q*B#4G6, and  o t h e r  c a s e s .  S ee  F re em a n , pp#90-*9 1 , Etnd " B q u i ty  D e s e r t s  t h e  W ife "  M a rg a re t  B u c k le y  
20 0 *I,#P# (1 9 6 7 ), p . 144 (concerned w i th  t h e  r ig h ts  i n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home o f  th e  d e s e r t e d  w i f e ,  and  w r i t t e n  b e f o r e  t h e  M atrimonial Homes B i l l ,  t h e n  
u n d e r  P a r l ia m e n ta r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  becam e law*"^
t o  a  r o o f  o v e r  h e r  h e a d
867.
1
U n d e r  t h e  1 9 6 7  A c t  ( w h i c h  g i v e s  i t s  b e n e f i t s  
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  t o  h u s b a n d s  a n d  w i v e s ) ,  w h e r e  o n e  
s p o u s e  i s  e n t i t l e d  b y  c o n t r a c t  o r  o t h e r w i s e  t o  
o c c u p y  a  d w e l l i n g h o u s e ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  i s  n o t ,  t h e  
l a t t e r  m a y  n o t  b e  e v i c t e d  b y  t h e  f o r m e r  w i t h o u t  
c o u r t  o r d e r *  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i f  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  
n o t  i n  o c c u p a t io n ,  t h e n ,  w i th  p e r m is s io n  o f  th e  
c o u r t ,  h e / s h e  may e n t e r  and  o ccu p y  t h e  h o u se*  T h a t 
s p o u s e ' s  r i g h t s  o f  o c c u p a t i o n  a r e  r e g i s t r a b l e  ( u n d e r  
h a n d  O h arg es  A c t ,  1925* o r  l a n d  R e g i s t r a t i o n  A c t ,
1 9 2 5 * a s  a p p r o p r i a t e )  a s  c h a r g e s  on th e  la n d *  "The 
c h a rg e  t a k e s  e f f e c t  on t h e  h u s b a n d 's "  ( o r  w i f e 's )  
" a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  m a f r i a g e ,  
o r  t h e  conm encem ent o f  t h e  A c t  ( 1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  1968 ) 
w h i c h e v e r  l a s t  h a p p e n s * " ^  W h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  
m a tr im o n ia l  hom es, t h e  n o n -o w n in g  sp o u s e  may h av e  
r i g h t s  o f  o c c u p a t i o n  i n  b o t h ,  b u t  c a n  h a v e  r i g h t s  
a g a i n s t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  o n l y  a s  t o  o n e *  "The i m p o r t a n c e  
o f  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  su c h  a  c h a rg e  i s  t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c e  
i t  e n s u r e s  t h a t  t h e r e a f t e r  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  no s a l e  o r  
m o rtg a g e  o f  t h e  d w e l l in g  h o u se  by th e  s p o u s e  i n  whom 
t h e  l e g a l  e s t a t e  i s  v e s t e d  u n l e s s  t h e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  i s  
d i s c h a r g e d  o r  th e  o t h e r  s p o u s e  c o n s e n ts * " ^
T h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  A c t  i s  e x t e n d e d  o n ly  t o  
t h e  c a s e  w here  t h e  sp o u se  s e e k in g  i t s  eiid  h a s  no r i g h t  
i n  /
1 * S e e  p e r  L *  D enn ing  i n  G u ra ss  v *  G* 1 9 7 0  P # 1 1 ,
a t  p p * 1 6 -1 7 , q u o t e d  b y  J o s e p h  J a c k s o n ,  " M a t r i m o n i a l  
F i n a n e e  a n d  T a x a t i o n " ,  p p  * 2 2 4 - 5 ♦2 .  B ro m le y , p # 5 9 2 , R e g r a t r a t i o n  h e r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
h a s  t a k e n  t h e  p l a c e  o f  i n j u n c t i o n ,  and  t h e  A c t  " u s e s  t h e  m a c h i n e r y  o f  p u b l i c i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  t r a n s f o r m  th e  i n t e r n a l  r i g h t  o f  e n jo y m en t i n t o  
a  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t i t l e "  (" R e c e n t  L e g i s l a t i o n  on 
M a t r i m o n i a l  P r o p e r t y " ,  O t t o  I C a h n - F r e u i i d  (1 9 7 0 )  59 
H * L • R , 6 0 1 ,  a t  p ♦6 1 0 .  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  a u t h o r  * b 
c o m m e n t s  a n d  c r i t i c i s m s  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  1967 
A c t ,  a t  p p *611-615 )*5# P a s s l n g h a m ,  p#197* Of* B c . L a w  C o m .M e m o * h o *41,
6  *5 1 - 3 4 : F a c  * E e s p  ♦ ,  p p .5 5 * " 6 0  and S c h e d # I  * .
im the hut a-mmmt#
t h u t ,  l a  m oame o f  j o W ;  ow m em hlp^ eaol% # G u a e  hami 
a ,ht # f oc^i#atloa$ mud i f  %W hehmrlow o f one 
apowo Ms %e#u Wm cow# uay
gp#we to  vacate the heme I* c f  the
s im ila r ly  $ i f  â lw ro e  *-( cq plaee$ there 
i s  m rem edy» heeaum e o f  t h e  ' ' t r e n ^ j f e r  e f  p ro p < ^rty ” 
^^rw ielw # o f 1$?0 Act*
I n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  s h a l l  t a k e  a  houa#  
euhjmot to  the egaitm hl# therein: o f the other
# e u e e , I t  1$ meoeagary th at h j/th ey  aW lI ham  
motloe o f th a t #q%%ltmble Im terwt# lie/th ey  1^ %/We 
deem od t e  h a v e  o w h  m o tle e  i f  r e # a t r a t i o m '.h ^ m  tm ken 
p la c e #  ^
B itW r i#poaao m#* ap^ g^ ly to  tW  oourt (m*i(2))
"for m  oM #r eafemlm## m g tr io tln g  or
thee# r i# tg $  the emmlae
hy e i t h e r  «^peae# o f %h# % to  ecm w  d%^elllng 
ho%%m*^  im #e#3f.lmg with moh am the
ow rt m%et oomml&er a l l  the olrowat^mcem of tW oae<g» 
eomdmot towards each other md 
to  the need<a= o f the ::'roouu$a» md th e ir  flmemolml 
resourow  m d t#  %# u<:;L(%g o f mmy oh llâren  mW. to  a l l  
/
4# oo '* h%, « e o i  h y  H atrim sm ieuf *iropcr(;^ f 4cr$  'N7(;*
; \ ' c  'n 1 ' " { ' ''' A y [  ' '4 '/"*" I ) n,,,: i1 / f  » o n * 7 r /7 ) ,2# ,V t:/: n'^aV ' /  A} !v ,.h  'V uj-nb 'O  \ 'r  > " vAi ; fy,'.r t ' ' ^ »\* 1 r -( ' 'h^y>'‘ At)n ! Y:PyA'A \ r<l ' M J
f w'" ,.<% ,' '4 , , ,  K /w , c .% (2 )a  Dn-ri i , .  L^in i 1 ? /8  '» /% ^ i W U ^ A ^ e i r u  .
E ow w W ÿ l b  'ja tb ' V# T* 4975 mz 'Wie#0hatru$% l4^n %) i t  wa:3 h o M  th o .t  t h e  o e w t
w u M  m ot ” ” KoiW n3i:o'" t h e  r l^ c h t o f  u  humhaua^^ m m o r  t o  ^/<o i t  o o u M  oq/^ ** ' l a t e ”W  fh-^f hü -Unr?*'’" n o t  ; i,h.^Ba'i'C Ov ul. ik,q: jo-Jh  ixUMUdo I'! jC ' ,  )#2 0 9 $
e^oerv im i^  w m t o  \ to** :ny, t% th f  n% 'foot 4 w i# io m  b y  t h e  Jouo.UAo Y jn lo  %(u anG 
.la tr .V 'o m lm l IToeee&lmg:# I W * ,
3 . Dut s e e  W i l l ia m ’s and G ly n ’s^Bank L td . v .  Boland ( 1 9 8 I )
^  r ^  q % L h \  A.C. 487.  •''■^ •4/ jL pt^#\.ALw ^ p t L C J '  , ' DP' / ' r. 7ht> -Sex €nnu.itM, fe>'*keSL., p. U-SX t Jue rv»^ ‘«,«vt Cy Aa^  Act fjax, to i^ »eciujfex-jtn(7K tf> A. p^JTVtX* tJlt* 6nut^ tt£V ot^Lw p»Æ^*4<î--^ »-fcy /ic^ MU'CAt- to , %Lw^> SU-CXv a tu a. L-tit*<A, pcrs jJn'ffV AiOU fWl iaSU-o Uftli XU-ûXv CUa I U-#tA-d-dT- , rT&ta C#  ^ <Uu duJZ tujLuU>- V* ft A L?rTl i A uf . . L^  . U I'Slt-U Ct tA-CJ» , . A«w)) LcJTVt) A\_g *g ^  A'f,^
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the oirouiastancea of the case. There may he ancillary 
orders affecting matters such as payment of money by 
one to the other in recognition o f  the right to 
o c c u p y , d u t i e s  t o  e f f e c t  r e p a i r s  a n d  t o  m ee t m o rtg a g e
repayments, and severance o f  the "professional” or 
"trade" part of a matrimonial home fro m  the "dwelling" 
part thereof#
These rights come to an end upon death o r  
divorce unless, in the latter event, before decree 
absolute passes, the court has made an order which 
keeps the rights in being# Whether d u r in g  marriage 
o r  a t  t h e  p o i n t  o f  d iv o r c e  t h e  r i g h t s  h a v e  b e e n  
recognised, i t  is vital t h a t  the rights of occupation 
should have been registered, and in t h e  c o r r e c t  
Register (notice or caution under Land Registration 
A c t ,  1 9 2 5 , or Land C harge  Glass F under Land Charges 
A c t ,  1 9 2 5 )# E ven  a  r e g i s t e r e d  c h a r g e ,  h o w e v e r , d o e s  
not p r e v a i l  against the ow ner spouse's trustee in 
b a n k r u p tc y ,  n o r  a g a i n s t  h i s  c r e d i t o r s ,  i f  h e  h a s  
assigned to them the house under t h e  terms o f  a deed 
of arrangement. "Even i f  the c o u r t  has ordered th e  
r i g h t  t o  continue after the husband's death, t h e  charge 
w i l l  also be void if the husband's estate is insolvent"#'^ 
I t  i s  open to the wife ( p r o b a b ly  to facilitate financing 
a r r a n g e m e n ts ) ,  t o  a g re e  t h a t  h e r  c h a rg e  w i l l  b e  p o s tp o n e d  
t o  * a n o th e r  c h a rg e  o r  i n t e r e s t '*
Thus, Paaaingham e m p h a s is e s  th e  importance of 
registration w here  title stands in the name o f  one 
spouse and where "there are signs of matrimonial 
discord", and of the t im e  cu e  seeking o f  a c o u r t  o r d e r  
c o n t in u in g  th o s e  r i g h t s  i n  b e in g  w here  d iv o r c e  o r  
n u l l i t y  /
1 .  B ro m le y , 5th edn#, pp#485-6# Freeman (p#92)comments that this f a c t o r  distinguishas t h e  Act's provisions from  the "homestead" laws as fo u n d  i n  many states of America and i n  Few Z e a la n d .
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n u l l i t y  l i t i g a t i o n  i s  p e n d i n g *  K i r a l f y  p o i n t s  o u t " 
t h a t  r e g i s t r a t i o n  i a  u n l i k e l y  u n l e s s  a n d  u n t i l  a n  
em erg en cy  a r i s e s  ( a a ,  f o r  e x a m p le , t h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  
t h e  o w n e r ' s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  s e l l ^ ,  a n d  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  
B r o m l e y ' s  comment t h a t  a  w if e  h a s  l e s s  t o  f e a r  f r o m  
a  p o t e n t i a l  p u r c h a s e r  t h a n  fro m  a  m o rtg a g e e  a s  sh e  
i s  m ore l i k e l y  t o  h e  aw are  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  a c t i v i t i e s  
Kfith r e g a r d  t o  s a l e  th a n  t o  s e c u r i t y  a r ra n g e m e n ts  i s  
a p t ^ ) *  I t  l a  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t ,  i f  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  t o  
d e p e n d  u p o n  r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  th a n  u p o n  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  
o f  v i t a l  m a t r i m o n i a l  a s s e t s  by  b o t h ,  a u t o m a t i c  
r e g i s t r a t i o n  u p o n  m a r r ia g e  i s  b o th  m ore e f f e c t i v e  and 
m o r e  /
1 * at w h ic h  point t h e r e  w i l l  be a r a c e  b e tw e e n  the t h i r d  p a r t y  p u r c h a s e r ,  and  th e  s o l i c i t o r  a c t i n g  f o r  t h e  sp o u s e  w is h in g  t o  r e g i s t e r *  9 e e  g e n e r a l l y  L»0#W*P#RÔ*42, 1 ,4 4  and 1*104-106#  The LawC o m m iss io n 's  proposals c o n ta in e d  t h e r e i n  (1971) in c lu d e d  s u g g e s t io n s  t h a t  t h e  1 % 7  A c t b e  araended t o  'b x te n d  an d  s t r e n g th e n  a  s p o u s e 's  r i g h t s  o f  occupation i n  r e s p e c t  of a matrimonial home w h ic h  
i s  i n  t h e  name o f  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u s e "  ( 1 *1 2 5 )*2* He n o te s  t h a t  t h e r e  may be no-one to advise h e r  to r e g i s t e r *  T h u s ,"w h en  t h e  m a r r ia g e  d o e s  b r e a k  down, t h e  p r o p e r t y  may a l r e a d y  b e  m o rtg a g e d  and  h e r  registration will come too late unless sh e  can 
p r o t e c t  h e r s e l f  b y  c o n t in u in g  t o  p a y  t h e  m o rtg a g e  i n s t a l m e n t s  h e r s e l f " * (Outgoings ( r e n t , rates, mortgage p ay m en ts  ) t e n d e r e d  b y  the spouse i n  o c c u p a t io n  shall b e  as good as if made b y  the o t h e r  spouse - 1967 A c t , 8*1(5) Of* So .Law Com/Memo .Ho*41, 5s91, 4*11, 6.58)* " H e re in  l i e s  t h e  w e a k n e s s  
o f  t h e  A c t  w h ic h  w i l l  g iv e  e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t i o n  o n ly  when a n  a u t o m a t i c  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  w i f e ' s  r i g h t  o f  o o o u p a tio n  becom es a  common p r a c t i c e # "  (B ro m le y , pp#999**4)# P r o f e s s o r  E a h n -F re u n d  (The J o s e f  U nger M em oria l L e c tu r e ,  2 9 th  J a n u a r y ,  1971; 
M a tr im o n ia l  P r o p e r ty ;  W here Do We Go From  H e re ? , p*16) n o te s  t h a t  t h e  1967 A ct m a k e s  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  w i f e ' s  r i g h t  t o  o c cu p y  th e  m a tr im o n ia l  home a r i s e s  upon  m a r r ia g e  and  n o t  " th r o u g h  a  m a tr im o n ia l  c a t a s t r o p h e " *  Y et f o r  t h e  p r a c t i c e  t o  m a tch  th e  p r e m is e , a u t o m a t i c  r e g i s t r a t i o n  w ou ld  s e e m  t o  b e  
a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  *
more tactful. 
T h e /
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1. Of* Sc .Law Com .Memo .Ho .41, 6 #31 -34, and Faculty Response (University of Glasgow), pp.53-60, and Schedule I.2 . As to  C o n v ey an c in g  p ro b le m s  p o s e d  b y  th e  A c t (a n d  i n e q u i t a b l e  effects against t h e  husband as e.g. b y  t h e  wife's obstinate r e f u s a l  t o  remove a charge though she "was in no danger of being deprived of a roof over h e r  h e ad "  Wroth v# Tyler 19731 A l l  E .11,897; of# F a c u l t y  R esp o n se  to Memo#Ho*41, Sched.I), see "C onvey ing  the M a tr im o n ia l  Home - some Problems Facing Solicitors and t h e i r  C l i e n t s " , D .G .B a rn s le y  27 O .L .P . ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  p . 7 6 .3* Matrimonial Homes and  P r o p e r ty  B i l l ,  ( 3 / 2 / 8 1 ) ,  contains i n  Part I certain amendments t o  the 1Ç67 
A c t ,  vis:- c e r t a i n  amendments w here  a matrimonial home is held on trust? where the matrimonial home i s  m o r tg a g e d, this shall not affect the spouse's r i g h t  to  o c c u p y , b u t  ( h e r )  r i g h t  o f  o c c u p a t io n  against the m o rtg a g e e  shall not be higher t h a n  that of the former spouse unless u n d e r  ( s e c t i o n )  clause 2 of the (Act) B i l l ,  the rights of o c c u p a t io n  are a c h a r g e ,  a f f e c t i n g  th e  m o r tg a g e e , on  t h e  e s t a t e  o r  i n t e r e s t  m o rtg a g e d ; where the matrimonial home is held on t r u s t ,  th e  o c c u p y in g  sp o u se  shall b e  entitled to be made a p a r t y  to an action b r o u g h t  by  the mortgagee to e n fo r c e  his s e c u r i t y  i f  the c o u r t  sees no special reason against i t ,  and is satisfied that t h e  a p p l i c a n t  may be  e x p e c te d  t o  make su c h  p ay m en ts  
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  m o r tg a g o r 's  l i a b i l i t i e s  a s  m ig h t a f f e c t  th e  outcom e o f  p ro c e e d in g s ?  c e r t a i n  c h an g e s  are made t o  the r u l e s  regarding registration o f  c h a r g e s ; t h e  power to the c o u r t  t o  order transfer of R e n t A ct t e n a n c i e s  is to  be  exercisable in cases of judicial s e p a r a t i o n ;  th e  c o u r t ,  i n  ordering t r a n s f e r  o f  t e n a n c i e s, may make an order of joint and several l i a b i l i t y  f o r  obligations due at the date o f  the order w here  otherwise t h e  obligation would have fallen on one party o n ly ,  a n d , i f  such an order is made, t h e  c o u r t  may direct that e i t h e r  spouse shall be liable t o  in d e m n ify  the other i n  w ho le  or i n  part a g a i n s t  a n y  paym ent made? t r a n s f e r  o r d e r s  may b e  made on granting decree of d i v o r c e , n u l l i t y  o r  judicial separation o r  subject to rules of court at any time thereafter, b u t  n o t  if, after the grant o f  either o f  th e  tw o decrees T r r s t - '^ ^ n t i o n e d , the applicant spouse has r e - m a r r i e d ;  rules of c o u r t  shall r e q u i r e  the c o u r t  to give t h e  l a n d l o r d  an opportunity of being heard? the A ct of 1967 a s  amended applies as between a h u sb a n d  and wife n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h a t  t h e  marriage in question was entered into under a law  which p e r m i t s  p o ly g am y .
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Tlie law Commission: Family law
Third Report on Family Property : The M a tr im o n ia l
&
H o u seh o ld  Goods'^
The latest thoughts of the Law Commission on 
the s u b j e c t  of family property in English law are 
contained i n  t h i s  report* (S^cL-ts*. t.c . Aj©.as“ —
The report i s  the t h i r d  in a series* The FirstpReport recommended c o -o w n e rs h ip  of the matrimonial 
home and strengthening of o o o u p a tio n  rights, rights 
of use and enjoyment of the household goods, and 
a n  e x te n s io n  o f  r i g h t s  o f  f a m i ly  p r o v i s i o n  r e n d e r in g  
u im e o e s s a ry  in the v ie w  of the Commission any system 
of f i x e d  rights of i n h e r i t a n c e  * A d d i t io n a l  (fixed) 
s h a r in g  o f  assets rules on d e a th  o r  divorce (com m unity  
of property) also w ere  deemed to he u n n e c e s s a ry *
The proposais o f  the Second Report on Family P r o p e r ty ^  
w ere  Implemented as the Inheritance ( P r o v i s i o n  f o r  
Family and Dependants) Act, 1973^*
I n  t h e  T h ir d  R e p o r t ,  th e  Law C om m ission  m akes
proposals with regard to (1.) C o -o w n e rsh ip  o f  the 
M a trim o n i.a l Home; (2 )  E ig h t s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  O o o u p a tio n
o f  the Matrimonial Home; and (3) Use and Enjoyment o f  
the Household Goods*
The R e p o r t  c o n f irm s  t h e  e a r l i e r  p r e f e r e n c e  fd h  
c o -o w n e rs h ip  o f  the hom e, and sets out proposals (in 
the English context) for the implementation of su c h  
a  r u le - ^ .  The d e v ic e  i s  a d o p te d  o f  a p p e n d in g  t o  th e
proposals at the end o f  th e  discussion of each part 
a draft B i l l ,  with accom pany ing  Explanatory Rotes, 
t h e  /
1* Law Oom*Ho#86 (15th June, 1978)*2* A Hew A pproach* Low Oom*Ho*52 (1 9 7 3 )5* F a m ily  P r o v i s i o n  on Death* Law 0om#lfo*61 (1974)4. Bupra#5* a c o n s id e r a b le  amount o f  innovation andcomplexity was inevitable.**” (0.13). (Hence, w here  there was a choice between adaptation and innovation, t h e  fo rm e r  was chosen).
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t h e  B i l l ,  i n  t h i s  a r e a  o f  r e f o r m , b e in g  te rm e d  t h e  
M a tr im o n ia l  Home8 ( 0 o -o v m e re h lp ) B i l l *
Book 2 o f  t h e  R e p o r t  s u g g e s t s  am endm ents t o  t h e  
M a tr im o n ia l  Homes A o t ,  1 9 6 7 $  t o  im prove  r i g h t s  o f  
o c c u p a t i o n  i n  t h e  home ( " M a tr im o n ia l  H o m e s  ( E i g h t s  
o f  O c c u p a tio n )  B i l l " ) *  T h ese  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  
in d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  c o - o w n e r s h i p  reco m m en d a tio n s  *
n a t u r a l l y ,  b o t h  s e t s  o f  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  d e s i g n e d  
t o  f i t  i n t o  th e  E n g l i s h  c o n te x t*  I n  S c o t l a n d ,  
c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e s e  s u b j e c t s  h a s  e x p r e s s e d  i t s e l f  i n  
( a )  S c o t t i s h  Law O om m ission Memorandum Ho*22: F a m ily  
Law . A lim e n t a n d  F i n a n c i a l  P r o v i s io n  a n d  ( b )  S c o t t i s h  
L a w  C om m ission  M e m o r a n d u m  E o # 4 1  ; F a m ily  Law* O ccupancy 
R i g h t s  i n  t h e  M a t r i m o n i a l  H o m e  a n d  D o m estic  V io le n c e  
(1 9 7 8 ) a n d  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  E a r l y  I n  1 9 8 1 ,  a  B i l l  was 
i n t r o d u c e d ,  n a m e ly , t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  Homes (F a m ily  
P r o t e c t i o n )  ( S c o t l a n d )  B i l l  ( 5 / 2 / 8 1 ) ,  w h i c h  i s  c o n c e r n e d  
t o  s t r e n g th e n  o c c u p a n c y  r i g h t s  o f  s p o u s e s  a n d  
c o h a b i t i n g  c o u p l e s ,  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  l a w  r e l a t i n g  t o  
m a t r i m o n i a l  i n t e r d i c t s , and  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t r a n s f e r s  
o f  t e n a n c i e s  d u r in g  m a r r i a g e  a n d  on d iv o r c e  a n d  i n  
c e r t a i n  c a s e s  b e t w e e n  c o h a b i t i n g  c o u p l e s  a l s o . ^
Book 5 o f  t h e  R e p o r t  i s  o f  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r e s t  
p e r h a p s ,  i n  t h a t ,  w h i le  many w o u ld  a c c e p t  t h a t  t h e r e  
s h o u l d  b e  c o -o w n e rs h ip  o f  t h e  hom e, t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
r i g h t s  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  h o u s e h o ld  goods i s  one  w h ich  
i s  d i s c u s s e d  l e s s  f r e q u e n t l y  and  one w h ic h  g iv e s  an  
o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  t h e  a i r i n g  o f  v i e w s  o n  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y ,  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  a n d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  s o m e  s p e c i e s  o f  
com m unity  /
1 .  A new B i l l  h a s  b e e n  in t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h e  H o u s e  o f  
L o rd s  e a r l y  i n  1981 ( 5 / 2 /8 1 )  (M a tr im o n ia l  Homes and  P r o p e r ty  B i l l ) ,  i n te n d e d  t o  im p lem en t t h e s e  am endm ents; P a r t  I I  i s  in te n d e d  t o  im p lem en t t h e  
Lmf C o m m iss io n '8 R e p o r t  on  O rd e rs  f o r  8 a l.e  o f  P r o p e r ty  u n d e r  th e  M a t r i m o n i a l  C a u s e s  A c t  1 9 7 3 *
2 .  Now i n  f o r c e  as M a tr im o n ia l  Homes (Fam ily  P r o t e c t i o n )  ( P c . )  
A c t,  1981.
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1com m im ity o f  p r o p e r t y  *
B y  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  t e r m  ' h o u s e h o l d  g o o d s ' ,  t h e  
Law O o m o iss lo n  m eans t h e  c o n te n t s  o f  t h e  home and
g oods ( i n c l u d in g  th e  c a r  o r  o t h e r  f a m i ly  v e h i c l e )Pu s e d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  h o m e  .  T h e  R e p o r t  
a d v o c a t e s  t h a t  a t  a n y  t i m e  d u r in g  t h e  m a r r i a g e , 
u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  a  s u b s i s t i n g  d e c r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  
s e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  c o u r t  o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  s p o u s e  
s h o u l d  h a v e  pow er t o  make a n  o r d e r  " g i v i n g  h i m  o r  
h e r  t h e  r i g l i t ,  a s  a g a i n s t  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e ,  t o  u s e  
and  e n jo y  th e  h o u s e h o ld  goods" The p r o p o s a l s  do 
n o t  e x t e n d  t o  in c lu d e  g o o d s  w h i c h  a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  a  h i r i n g ,  h i r e - p u r c h a s e  o r  c o n d i t i o n a l  s a l e  
a g re e m e n t,  A d r a f t  " M a tr im o n ia l  Goods B i l l "  i s  
p r e s e n t e d .  The Law O om m ission , a l th o u g h  d o u b t f u l^  
a b o u t t h e  m e r i t s  o f  a  schem e o f  c o -o w n e rs h ip ^  o f  th e  
h o u s e h o l d  /
1* I n  f a c t , i n  t h i s  R e p o r t ,  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  i s  
a v o id e d ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  p o s tp o n e d , ( 3 '7 ) .2 . 0 ,2 2 ,
5 ,  0 ,2 1 ,  T h is  rem edy  w ou ld  b e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  r e l a t i o nt o  m o b ile  hom es an d  c a ra v a n s  w h ic h  a r e  n o t  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  la n d  and  t o  h o u s e b o a ts  ( P a r t  V ) ,4 ,  on t h e  g r o u n d s  1 ) t h a t  " h o u se h o ld  g o o d s  a r e  num erous and  l i a b l e  t o  r a p i d  change  " ; t h e r e  w ould b e  p r o b l e m s  o f  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  o f  t r a c i n g  fu n d s  $ 
w h e r e  o l d  h o u s e h o ld  g o o d s  w ere  s o l d  o r  p a r t  e x c h a n g e d  f o r  new i te m s  and  2 )  t h a t  a  p re s u m p tio n  o f  c o -  o w n e rsh ip  w ould  n o t  h e lp  a  sp o u se  fro m  a  p r a c t i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v ie w  i f  t h e  o t h e r  rem oved them  and  s o ld  th em , 
l e a v in g  t h e  f i r s t  w i th  a  r i g h t  t o  a  one h a l f  s h a r e  o f  t h e  p ro c e e d s  o f  s a l e ,  a  s h a r e  w h ich  i n  money te rm s  w ould  n o t  be  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  t o  a l l o w  r e p l a c e m e n t  
o f  t h e  i t e m s .On th e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t  c o u ld  b e  a rg u e d  1 )  t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  c o re  o f  h o u s e h o ld  goods re m a in s  c o n s t a n t  and  m ost p e o p le  know w h a t i s  m ean t b y  t h e  term ? 2 ) th e  s i t u a t i o n  e n v is a g e d  s u r e l y  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  r a r e  ( t h o u ^  s e e  re m a rk s  i n f r a  a b o u t t h e  em ergency  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e m e d y ) , O n ^ e r E i in a t io n  o f  c o h a b i t a t io n ^  i t  w ou ld  b e  a  c o m fo r t  f o r  t h e  n o n - e a r n e r  t o  b e  s u r e  ( s h e )  knew w hat w e r e  ( h e r )  r i g h t s  $ a n d  t o  know t h a t  sh e  w as e n t i t l e d  t o  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  a n d  
p l e n i s h i n g ,
5 , 3 . 5 .
t o  b g) w i l l i n g  t o  
f w t h o r  t h o u # t  t o  o u c h  #  B u g g o o t l w #  I t  l a  
p o e c l b l e  t l i a t  a  U e rk lu g  P%H&r m y  oamrm^a o p ia io m *  
" H o w e v e r ^  t h j ^ r e  a r e »  I n  o n e  v l w ^  r e f o r m s  f a l l i n g  
g ! w r t  o f  e o ^ o w i w r s h i p  b e  p u t  i n t o
e f f e c t
T W  n o w  % a k 0 #  t w  v i e w  t h a t  I t o
I m  t h i s  o m n  W ^ t  b e  a o M o v e d  I s y  m o a n a  o f  t h e  
p r o v l e l o m  o f  #  p r o c e d u r a l  r e m e d y  w ^ i i e h  w o u l d  o i W b l e  
t h e  a # g r i o « d  e p o i m e  t o  a p p l y  t o  t h e  o o w t  f o r  m .  
o M o r  o o m f o r r l m g  m r i g h t  o f  w e r  r & t W r  t h m i  b y  t h e  
a d o p t io % %  o f  thiu: b r o a d e r  r e m e d y  o f  t o  t h e  e p o i m e
l a  o c o i & p a t l o a  o f  t h e  h o m e  a  r i # h t  o f  m ^ e r
i m t i l  t h e  o o w t  o r d o M  o t l m r w l o e #  B u o h  a  r l o ; h t  o f  
' t w w  a r i s i n g  b y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  l a w  w o t i l d  i n  l t $
t r a i m  t W  r o q o l m m ^ ^ m t  o f  a  p % ' w l a e  s t a t u t o r y  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  I i o i m a h o M  F ; o o d #  m u d  t h e  O o m m lm o ia m  f e e l e  t h a t  I t  
K f o u l d  n o t  h o  p 0 8 $ i b l o  t o  d w l ^ o  a  d é f i â t  l o r n  w h i c h  
w t m l d  b e  b o t h  o l e a r  a n d  c e r t a i n  o m  t W  o m e  h a n d  
a u f f l o l m i t l y  e m  t w  o t h o r  t o  m e e t  ^ t h e
l 3 : i f l n i t e l y ^ « r y l n $  o l r o u m t w o e a  o f  w e r y  k i n d  o f  
im37riase'*'^  Im amy went» Im- the ernwgenoy s^ituation 
1#  w h l o h  t h e  p r o p o # % % ;8  w e m 3 A  b e  o f  g r w t e a t  u a e $  a #  
m p p l l o a t i o g  t o  t h e  o o w t  w a l ê  m l m o #  o  i  m i y  b e
h o r w o r »  t W  rem edy w ou ld  f.. ; b e  l i m i t e d  
t o  e r ; c 3 t : D / : c y  r / i r x 3 * .  I t  e o u M  W  ^ am  a
p r d o r . , t l O D u r y _  ^ c i m p l y  t o  p u t  m z  e n d  W
m iO v % '’; a l m t y ^ 4 ' ^ '  \Jide d i s c r e t i o n  would b# g iv e n  to  the 
o o w t  t o  g r w i t  o r  w lt^aho ld  an  crde$:i.A #ai4 iet t h e  Wok*^ 
groimd of a d efin itio n  of Muee^mM ^oodm tw  
court would "epoolfy. preeleely  the good% to  w^ i^eh i;he 
e rdw  warn to
O rd e r#  /
1» 3*7» . ^0$ 3 *2 5  ^ v iew #  (3*#.) om . n # t a  o f  co^owaorm bl^) o f  W m m h e ld  mood#*.
3# 3#28#4$ 3*$2$
bi*
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Orders may be made that one spouse should be 
e n t i t l e d  t o  the use a n d  enjoyment of h o u s e h o l d  g o o d s  
In the possesaion or control of either, such goods 
being specified In the order# If the goods are in 
the possession or control of the applicant, on order 
may be made to the effect that the other shall not 
remove them, or If in the possession or control of 
the latter, that the respondent shall deliver them 
to t h e  a p p l i c a n t ,  and in e i t h e r  c a s e  t h a t  the 
respondent s h a l l  not s e l l  or o t h e r w i s e  d i s p o s e  o f  
any goods comprised in the order*
The order may contain exceptions (in favour 
of the respondent)$ conditions and supplementary 
provisions (on such matters, for example, as 
responsibility for servicing and insurance of the 
faioily car).
Orders would be seen as making suitable rules 
for t h e  time being, The court in E n g l a n d  has 
sufficient powers to make orders concerning use and 
enjoyment of goods, jjc the case of the grant of 
divorce, nullity or judicial separation or of family 
provision on death# Hence the orders here envisaged 
would continue to apply for so long as the marriage 
subsists or until a  decree of j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  is 
granted# It should continue notwithstanding the 
filing of a divorce nullity or judicial separation/Ipetition. Obviously, though, the order might not 
b e  needed for so long a  period: t h e  court should
have power to moli:© orders 'until further order’ or 
for such period as it thinks right# (It becomes 
clear that this is a remedy very much in the English 
tradition of judicial discretion)# The order would 
terminate by operation of lai'f on the death of the 
ai)plioant /
1 *  5  # 4 4 —4 5 , The c o u r t  s h o u l d  h a v e  no p o w e r  t o  m a k esuch an order while a decree of judicial separation is in force or after the termination of marriage by decree of divorce or nullity#
8774
applicant or of the r e s p o n d e n t*  The court has 
pow er u n d e r  the 1975 A ct to order transfer o r  
settlement of p r o p e r t y  o f  the deceased f o r  the 
benefit o f  the s u r v i v o r  where it considers that 
the will o r  the law of intestacy does not make 
reasonable provision f o r  the s u r v iv o r *  Similarly, 
u n d e r  the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, the court 
has wide discretion to make financial provision by  
means of awards of lump sum o r  periodical payments 
o r  b y  t r a n s f e r  o r  settlement o f  property when 
granting decree of d i v o r c e , nullity or judicial 
s e p a r a t i o n .
The court may vary o r  discharge i t s  earlier 
o rd e r*
T h ir d  Parties
Where a hire $ hire-purchase or conditional 
s a l e  agreement^ is in force, t h i r d  parties will 
have r i g h t s  s u b s i s t i n g  when a h o u s e h o ld  goods o r d e r  
is made; t h e s e  should not b e  d i s t u r b e d .  The 
articles w h ic h  are the subjects of such a g re e m e n ts  
should n o t  be p r o p e r  s u b j e c t s  for the m aking  o f  an  
order. Similarly, ( h o u s e h o ld )  goods b e lo n g in g  t o  
a t h i r d  party s h o u ld  n o t  be proper subjects f o r  the 
m aking  o f  an order*
What s h o u ld  h ap p en  in cases where, at t h e  t im e
o f  m ak ing  t h e  order, the t h i r d  p a r t y  h a s  no interest2in t h e  property but later becomes involved a s ,  f o r  
exam ple  /
1 * See i n  greater d e t a i l  d i s c u s s i o n  of Goods on Hire, Hire-Purchase or Conditional Sale, contained i n  Part VI of the Report*2. It is i n t e r e s t i n g  that the Commission d i v id e s  the discussion into part (a) (rights of t h i r d  parties existing at the time when t h e  court is about to make a n  order, and part (b) r i g h t s  of third parties subsequently acquired* In the result, the proprietary rights of t h i r d  parties i n  b o th  cases are held supreme, b u t  the approach ta lce n  to the discussion is noteworthy nonetheless*
8 7 8 *
example, if (the husband) sells ox* gives to him goods 
specified in the o r d e r ?  The Law Commis si on proposes 
that the third party, whatever his state of knowledge, 
should t a k e  th e  goods free of (the wife's) rights*
The rights essentially are p e r s o n a l*  T h is  accords 
with remarks made in Chapter 7 infra about t h e  
desirability of protecting t h i r d  parties from the 
internal disagreements, and arrangements of spouses 
concerning property* On the other hand, although 
there would be no consequences w ith  regard to the 
(new) ownership of the property specified in the order, 
the C om m ission  e n v is a g e s ^  that n o t  only a spouse, but 
also a third p a r t y  in know ledge  of the existence of 
the order, who acts in breach or knowingly complies 
w ith  a breach, as t h e  case may be, should make lump 
sum compensation to the aggrieved spouse. A penalty 
for disobedience (civil contempt) might b e  made also, 
or solely, if that was the only order the court th o u g h t  
i t  a p p r o p r i a t e  to m ake.
Sales and disposals w ould  b e  prohibited d u r in g  the 
period b e tw e e n  application for and determination of 
t h e  order* The respondent, or third p a r t y  i n  Imowledge 
of the position, may be required to make compensation 
if the court considers that an order would have been 
mad© i n  respect of the goods in question*
Should there be a remedy if t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  
removes the goods before t h e  other has had o p p o r t u n i t y  
to apply for an order? The Oommisalon t h i n k s  that 
if a prejudicial transaction took place within three 
m onths o f  the order, the spouse f i r s t - m e n t i o n e d  m ig h t 
reasonably be required to make compensation* The 
aggrieved spouse may make application for an orthodox 
order or for compensation as seems appropriate*
P r o b a b ly  these proposals would be w o r k a b le, but 
t h e y  /
1 . 5 .6 2  e t  sea; 3 .6$,
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they seem cim bersom e and they a r e  dlaoretion-hased# 
Antl-avüidanoe p r o v i s i o n s ,  though, in any system are 
by nature cumbersome* It i s  suggested that joint 
ownership and partnership authority (Chapter 7) 
would provide a neater and more comprehensive solution#
A very wide d i s c r e t i o n  i s  given to the court 
in fixing the sise of compensation* ((The wife) 
would be entitled to use the compensation money as 
she wished, and p r o p e r t y  bought with it would b e  
separate property#) The court would be expected to 
t a k e  into account t h e  n e e d s  of the applicant ( " r e p l a c e ­
m ent value") and loss through loss of use, and even 
t h e  motives of the d i s p o s e r ,  a factor which if used 
surely would i n t e r m i n g l e  property and  financial matters 
and moral behaviour rather more closely than now is 
favoured# The guideline given to the court in the 
matter of awarding compensation would b e  very general 
i n d e e d ,^
The proposals would extend to be of potential
application to all valid and voidable, but n o t  toPvoid, marriages# This seems a' sensible approach#
In nullity the court has powers to grant ancillary 
relief*
Jurisdiction
The High C o u rt and c o u n ty  courts would have 
concurrent jurisdiction to a p p ly  t h e  scheme#
Concurrent jurisdiction exists already in the cases 
of other, existing, linked remedies u n d e r  th e  M.W .P. 
Act, 1882, the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 and th e  
D o m e stic  Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings A c t ,
1976* Oases could be heard, therefore, e i t h e r  b y  
the Family D iv i s io n  of t h e  High Court, or by a c o u n ty  
court /
1# 3 .8 5 *2. of. outline approach Scotland; N u l l i t y  (Chapter 7).
8 8 0 #
court, upon which no financial limit as to jurisdiction 
would he imposed# Transfers between courts would be 
competent, and in accordance with present English 
practice# Section 17 applications and applications 
for use and enjoyment orders would not be mutually 
antagonistic or inconsistent, and applications could 
be heard together# Similarly, applications under 
the 1967 or 1976 Acts c o u ld  be heard at the same time 
as an application for the new rem ed y .
Jurisdiction would not be conferred on the 
Magistrates' C o u r ts  to h e a r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  « T h e re  i s  
not y e t  a "fully integrated system of family c o u r t s "  
and magistrates* courts should continue to hear 
maintenance claims, and should not decide questions 
of property rights, whioh, in any case, according to 
evidence, infrequently accompany such claims.
The Law C om m ission  has d i s c u s s e d ,  with thoroughness 
and sympathy, and w i th  the aid of consultation, over 
a period of years, a s u b j e c t  o f  c o n te m p o ra ry  c o n ce rn #
It has reached a conclusion which is essentially 
English, discretion - based and in harmony with its 
(discretion-based) approach w here  the rules of 
termination of marriage b y  divorce or death touch 
p r o p e r t y  m a t te r s #  The solution proposed is not 
necessarily suitable f o r  Scots law where there is 
freedom ( e s p e c i a l l y  since so  little is said in the 
Divorce (Scotland) A c t ,  1976 about the p h i lo s o p h y  or 
practice of allocation of p r o p e r t y  on divorce) to s t r i k e  
out on a p a t h  of its own, eschewing d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
solutions w h ic h  traditionally have not found favour 
in o u r  systematic approach#
Common Law Rules of E n g l i s h  Law Goncerning M a tr im o n ia l
L e a v in g  /
1. 5#159* Of* Chapter 7(^c) "The New R em ed ie s ;The C o u rt* "
2 .  And s e e  f u r t h e r  L.C. 115 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ja u to m a t ic  c o -o w n e r sh ip  o f  the  m a tr im o n ia l  home.
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Leaving aside questions of settlement of property 
on divorce or other catastrophic event, the basic rule of 
E n g l i s h ,  a s  o f  B o o ts ,  la w , h a s  b e e n  t h a t  m a r r ia g e  p e r  
s e  h a s  no  e f f e c t  u pon  t i t l e  t o  p i 'o p e i l jy :  t h e  o r d in a r y
r u l e s  o f  o w n e rsh ip  a p p ly #  E a rn in g s  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  
earner, u n l e s s  the fu n d s  are pooled, i n  which case 
each acquires "a joint i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  w h o le  fu n d # "^
Acquisitions b e lo n g  t o  t h e  purchaser, w h e th e r
bought w i th  t h e  purchaser's own money o r  from d ra w in g s
fro m  the "common purse", but i n  t h e  l a t t e r  case,
"investments representing joint savings - w i l l  re m a inPp a r t  of the spouses* joint p r o p e r ty » "  Bromley 
commenta^ that o w n e rsh ip  o f  presents g iv e n  to a spouse 
b y  a stranger t o  th e  marriage depends upon the donor's 
i n t e n t i o n #  Thus, u n d e r  the useful s#1? of t h e  1882 
A c t ,  wedding p r e s e n t s  can be divided b e tw e e n  the 
s p o u s e s, or r e t a i n e d  b y  the spouse from w hose s id e  o f  
the f a m i ly  they came, by o r d e r  o f  the court*
W here d i v i s i o n  o f  property between the spouses 
is called f o r ,  t h e  English c o u r t s  have attempted t o  
ascertain t h e  parties' implied i n t e n t i o n  i n  the matter# 
T h is  is a delicate task, for o f t e n  parties do n o t  
e n t e r t a i n  /
1# Jones V# Maynard 1951 Oh*572. The principleg o v e rn in g  joint bank accounts is that, provided that there seems to have b e e n  a general p o o l in g  o f  resources, then, irrespective of c o n t r i b u t i o n  and  drawings, each is entitled to one half thereof i f  the account is closed, and d i v i s i o n  made s t a n t e  matrimonio5 i f  the account Is not closed', Th^n, on We'^eaEEFof t h e  predeceaser, t h e  balance aocrues 
t o  the survivor. (Bee e.g. Kiralfy, pp.206/207; O re tn e y ,  pp.165/164). The position i n  Scots law 
i s  less simple; an effort t o  ascertain contribution is made. It is suggested that jointtitle to heritage w ould  be an  improvement b u t  t h a t  joint b an k  accounts are a baclcward step. (Bee Chapter 7)#2# Bromley, 5 th  edn*, p.447#5# p .4 4 8 .
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ientertain any clear intention upon the point , andoKiralfy interprets*^ the attempt as an endeavour to 
formulate "rules which they find just". Thus, he 
remarks, "the result i s  increasingly beginning to 
resemble the kind of ooimunity of property division 
on d iv o r c e  whioh one e n c o u n te r s  i n  Continental E u ro p e  * "
Some consideration has been given to the matter 
of rights of occupation o f  the m a tr im o n ia l  home#^ij-Questions of title to the matrimonial home ' depended 
in English law first upon  th e  name in which the title 
stood /
1 * See e.g. Bromley, p . 577 : "As t h e  majority of theHouse of Lords held i n  Pettitt v .  Pettitt, if the spouses d i d  not apply their minds at all to the q u e s t io n  of how the beneficial interest in a particular piece of property should be held when i t  was bought, the court cannot give effect to an agreement w hioh  they never entered into even though it is satisfied that they would have made it had they thought about it. In other words, i t  can impute t o  them  an intention which t h e y  probably never had but it cannot impute to them an agreement which they clearly did not make. This n i c e l y  reflects ingrained principles of English la w , b u t  its application here" that is, to the m a tr im o n ia l  home "is unfortunate because the opposite rule would have been much more l i k e l y  to work justice."
2 .  p . 1 9 9 .5. See also explanation; "His, Here or Theirs? The Spouses' Rights in the M a tr im o n ia l  Home" Professor D .G .B a m s le y ,  An I i% u g u ra l  L e c tu r e ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Leicester. (1974)#4.* A good exposition of English r u l e s  t o  d e te rm in espouses* r i g h t s  of ownership i n  the matrimonial home, i s  contained i n  L.O.W.P.Ho.42, "Family Property Law", 
i n  detail at 1*28-1.44, and  i n  summary at 1 .49-1.51 #As to beneficial joint t e n a n c y ,  severed joint t e n a n c y ,  and  b e n e f i c i a l  te n a n c y  i n  common, s e e  1 .8 0 -  1*81# (See also generally 1.78-1*79). There i s  a later Law O om m ission Report (1978) - Third Report on Family Property: The Matrimonial Homo (0o -o w n o rsh ipand Occupation Rights) and Household Goods* See
s u p r a . See a l s o  L.C. 115 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
I f  there my that th la  d iê m%
r e f l e c t  t h e  t r u e  e tm ta  o f  tim m  I t  h a d  t o  h e
#W#a tW t the le#3 . ewmw MM m  for the
other* md #im  h r w # t la  awh d lf A ou lt mâ 
m # # l# fw to ry  matter# m  proof o f %e
o f f o o t  u p e n  l a t m t l o n  o f  o o m t r l h u t l m  ( o s p w i a l l y  
o o m tr lM t lo m  Im k l M )  hae hem m w t lw o é #
I t  #p#Gcm that Wier# both le ^ I  t i t l e  m& 
hoM flolal Im tewet II# 1% ome thorn #%mt
# o m e teltw  the wWl# p m ow # o f mAe# Wh«e 
l e g a l  t i t l e  1 1 m  Im m%e* a #  h m e f l e l m l  I m tw e o t  im  
t h e  o th e r *  th #  X u, W m e  t h e  w h o le  p ro o w # # #  W here
the W m eflelal m # 1@ almre#» meem to
h e  ao eo rd am o r ,# o n tr lW tl< m *  a t  l e m t  w h e w
eomtriMtlome w e M m tiflahlo* I f  mll_ 1# eo)dl%eiom# 
equal &lvlelom m y he tW beet la  mesmal
olmmmtmwoa* *%wh %'flll Mve a rx  
howe md ita  fm m ltw e In ^&lohWt u ' %#m the lega l 
w  /
Aa to  '^ ad equitable laW w et*  eee
2* 3.iX'%'CÏ\''n/:ing*# o o a o e#  o f  "joint wm twe" le  w efm l ^T'py). Bix* .K lra l% * a  d lw m w lo m  a t  w *^K > #203* m d  mt3# On t h n  q u o n tlo m  W m tW r epoam ealu  the heme &rè jelm t te$%vut3 to  the em w lvw ) or temumte 1% f o r W  woorAiuf; to  DM w il l  ofthu dtv.earud o>» Ihn i^uiw o f 'ta te  wcec^iuloa}ÎS ,1%; * o.'/dV,} 3,h ''I; ILiJ ir  ' 'jG 'ilc  t.;i d:Vv1«lr)nXt/9,% «'D-'U d iota  lih© upoaewLh'X"/i X'ù jo in t  tcu )^3)t'3 Im lux'nwal ohar##ii: ly. ^nb.d/.tr.d thut thi:i v'" mda rrjAlnatfa-iduwontu'* py'\nciplf'a o f 'VUi' ' Imf"* 3j& theuDpvXOL'unt Gu the 4tn ed itio n , %lw refer# totMo err o f  Ru @WL Thompeom Î9?2Uh.O/\ f%n2 U; NlcHolenu 19/4 1 in  whichteuanoior in  oo:iuou, %,ot j<'/ ;\ü, teziWfOlee were hoM to  hlCf. or clIZbrTittin  ^ ü t l î l  tM t "1%$0f%o oafi.ju jwYt.k^o w i l l  he dôno W  holding%h#t tno vpuu.K'S L(V;c D. jotuv iat%x;fb; ; » ^(In  dfi'i'.ii-"::;, vLlfa rid  1 ' the
A% #i,IUfU-G *Of*A * W %ïfMI 'U^ ?’Û »fe i'teL  1^ l i f lkept* the îmehamd WugW property)*
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1o r  equitable title is vested*" It is in cases o f  
marital 'imrest that difficulties arise*
At common law in England a wife has a right 
(which may c o m p e te n t ly  he t h e  s u b j e c t  of a binding 
contract between them) to lo o k  t o  h e r  husband for 
m a in te n a n c e ,  and, if he d e s e r t s  her, to remain i n  
th e  m a tr im o n ia l  hom e, u n l e s s  h e r  c o n d u c t i s  su c h  a s  
t o  deprive her of that right t o  maintenance# Hence, 
if the husband has legal title and all equitable 
i n t e r e s t  in t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  hom e, t h e  wife's r i g h t s  
are contained not o n ly  in t h e  Matrimonial Homes A c t ,
1 9 6 ? ^ , b u t  i n  t h e  common law  a ls o #  S i m i l a r l y ,  w here  
t i t l e  and i n t e r e s t  l i e  i n  the wife, Brom].ey notes'* 
that t h e  wife's d u ty  t o  cohabit will protect the 
husband, u n l e s s  b y  h i s  conduct, h e r  duty is d is c h a rg e d #
(On dissolution o f  marriage, the Act's protection ceases.^ 
I n  terms o f  s*7, t h e  c o u r t  on pronouncing decree of 
divorce o r  nullity, may transfer a Rent Acts t e n a n c y ,  
b u t  n o t  another type o f  tenancy* "The p r o v i s i o n  -  
seem s not w e l l  related to t h e  powers now enjoyed b y  
t h e  Divorce Court to o r d e r  t r a n s f e r s  and settlements 
of p r o p e r ty * " ^ #  If t h e  spouses a r e  joint t e n a n t s  o r  
tenants i n  common, upon dissolution of marriage, either 
can. insist (since t h e  purpose of the trust h a s  failed) 
upon division and sale* It seems that, although a 
wife may be entitled to  remain in her h u s b a n d 's  h o u s e ,  
she will probably not be e n t i t l e d  to r e t a i n  all his 
furniture in a d d i t i o n  to that w h ich  she herself b o u g h t .
" I f  she has not forfeited t h e  right to be maintained, 
she /
1* Bromley, p#386*2m e*g* adultery - contrast Scotland* (The E n g l i s h ­w om an 's a g en c y  o f  necessity was abolished by  t h e  Matrimonial P ro c e e d in g s  and Property Act, 1970, s *41 # See O r e tn e y , p . 273)*5* and  Domestic V io le n c e  and M a tr im o n ia l  P ro c e e d in g s  
A c t ,  1976, infra#4. 4th edn* I5* O r e tn e y ,  3rd edn., p . 213#
s h e  m is t  bo  l e f t  w i th  t h e  m eans o f  a u b s ia te n G e ;
I t  th em  becom es a  q u e s t io n  o f  f o o t  l a  e a c h  e a s e  
w h ere  t h e  l im e  l a  t o  h a
T he M a tr im o n ia l  Eomea A c t w i l l  a p p ly  w here  one 
op o u s#  I s  t h e  eo m ti’a o t u a l  a n d  them  t h e  p r o t e o t e d  
t e n a n t  ( q o m tr o l l e d  o r  r e g u l a t e d  temamoy)"^# H m o e  
th e  1967 A c t h m  g iv e n  t o  a  d e e e r t e d  epm m e th #  
p r i v i l e g e  o f  b e in g  r e g a r d e d ,  f o r  t h e  p u rp o e e e  o f  t h e  
R e n t A o te ,  a a  b e in g  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  d e a e r t im g  t e n a n t  
epouee#  A o o o rd im g ly , o n ly  o n  t h e  o o m d itlo n e  g e n e r a l l s  
a p p l i c a b l e  may th e  d e e o r t e d  ep o u ee  b e  rem oved#^
W here th e  tem anoy  l a  o o m tr a o tu a l  o n ly #  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  o o n t im ie d  paym en t o f  r e n t  b y  th e  d e s e r t e d  w i f e  "w ill 
n o t  b e  t o  v e a t  t h e  te n a n c y  i n  t h e  w i f e  i f  t h e  l a n d l o r d  
l a  im aw are  o f  t h e  c h an g e  i n  o i r o u m e ta w e e #  an d  i f  h e  
t r e a t s  t h e  i^dLfe m e re ly  a s  h e r  h n e b a n d 'a  a g e n t#  W here 
h e  i s  aw are  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n #  " i t  i a  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  f a o i  
w h e th e r  h e  l a  o o n t ln n in g  t o  t r e a t  # e  W .fe  an h e r  
h u o b a n d ^ a  a g e n t  ( i n  w h io h  o a e e  t h e  hnebancl w i l l  re m a in  
t h e  l e g a l  t e n a n t )  o r  w h e th e r  h e  h a s  a o o e p te d  h e r  a a  a  
new tm w m t ( i n  lAfhloh e a r n  t h e  w if e  w i l l  becom e a  new 
c o n t r a o t u a l  t e n a n t* ) " ^ *  The la n d lo r d #  b y  s e r v i n g  a  
n o t i c e  to  q u i t  u p o n  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  who h a s  a  s t a t u t o r y  
r i g h t  t o  s t a n d  I n  p l a c e  o f  t h e  t e n a n t#  w ou ld  m e re ly  
" c o n v e r t  a  c o n t r a c t u a l  te n a n c y  i n t o  a  s t a t u t o r y  o n e ” ; 
e q u a l ly #  i t  i e  i n  t h e  i n t e r e e t a  o f  t h e  w ife #  i f  s h e  
w ie h e e  /
1# B rom ley#  p#.g89# s e e  W* f *  w* 1951 2  T#l,*R*113g*The c a s e  e n v ia a g e d  i e  t h a t  o f  d e s e r t i o n  w i th o u t  
o r  b e f o r e  t h e  o c o u r re n e e  o f  come j u d i c i a l  a c t  o f  d i e  s o l u t io n #2* S . l ( l )  an d  8 * 1 (5 )#  P r i o r  t o  t h e  A ct#  t h e  o o u r ta  h a d  h e lp e d  t h e  w i f e  b y  r e g a r d in g  h e r  o o o u p a tio n  a s  a  s p e o ie a  o f  o o o u p a tio n  b y  t h e  h n e b an d  O ld  G a te  E e t a t e a  L td#  v* A le x a n d e r  1949  2 A l l  R*R#822*
(O o m trao t S c o t la n d #  C h a p te r  4# put see now 1981 A ct.)5» Upon t h i s  e n b jc o t  g e n e r a l l y  (a n d  w i th  re g a rd , t o  t h e  S c o t t i s h  p o s i t i o n )  Bce Oom*Memo*No*41# P a r t  IV#4* B rom ley# 4 t h  edn## p#399#
S'. Ai f# pucAuc OjLAjtuj^ly J-tA^cu^cJe^ f fee. 'H.tTLtA^ ' A a x  X ‘
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4wishes to remain# to meet the paymoata# eilmee non**
payment of rent 1$ a ground of removal* It Is open
to hor to try to recoup the money from her hashand#' ^   ^b u t  t h l a  may h e  a h  0 ] # t y
7^ 8 In the ease of o%mer-oooupled houeoe# the 
protection given by the 1 % 7  Act will end, In the 
general oaoe# on diaaolution of the marriage# In 
terms of $#?# however# a court ie empowered to 
trcmafor a protected or etatutory tomanoy from 
one spouse to t W  other at the date of decree 
absolute# and w here  t h e  e p o u e e s  are joint t e n a n te »  
"to extinguish the interest of one o f  them and voot 
the tenanoy exoluBlvely la the other*
Until 1970$ the courte* powers ia the sphere 
of the property eoaeequeaoea of divorce resembled 
those them available ia Boot],and and mow littlef4ohaaged; la divoroe# aullity and meparatloa''^# oa 
award of a periodloal allowaaoe and/or a lump 8um 
might he made to the lamooeat party* Beoeime of 
laok of powers with regard to capital assets and 
to achieve fairneue# " % e  courte developed the leaf 
of property rights ao ae to give both epoueeo some 
l a t e r e a t  i a  " f a m i ly  a s a e t e "  # $ # #Tho c o u r t* o  a m c ie ty  
to /
1* Of# Memo# No#41* 5*31$ 4*11# 5#38 (p ro p o e o d  o f  o o o u p y la g  ep o u ae  t o  mW%e p aym en t o f
% a t  o r  B u i l d i n g  B o o i o t y  r e p a y m o a te ) *  see now ig e i  A ct.2* B rom ley# p # 3 9 9  ^ d  fa* 1 3 *3* And o oe  now M a t r im o a i r l  Homes a n d  P r o p e r t y  B i l l-  D w e ll in g  E o u jo  ë o h je o t  t o  B e a t  A c te  e tc *  ( I J o K ^ k le  2 )*  T he Mornoi'aadum t o  t h e  B i l l  e x p la i a e  t h a t  o la im o  1 ( 8 )  p r o v id e s  t h a t  w here  a  m a tr im o n ia l  home I s  h e ld  on  t r u s t #  t h e  sp o u s e  w i th  r i g h t s  o f  o o o u p a tio n  h a s  a  r i g h t  t o  s t e a d  i a  t h e  t r u s t é e s *  
e h o eê  a s  r e g a r d a  paym en t o f  r e a t #  e to *  w h io h  l a  t h e  sam e aa  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a ta n d  i n  t h e  o t h e r  e p o u a e 'a  
a3zoea*4*. O f , Memo»2To#41# P a r t  IV* I t  may b e  th o u g h t  t h a t #  l a  r e o e a t  y e a r s  # E a g l ie h  law  h a s  b e e n  q u io k e r  t o  a a t l o i p a t e  a o o l a l  a é e d a *  The " d l e o r o t io a a r y "  p a th  c h o s e n  may n o t#  o f  o o u rae #  b e  t h a t  m o a t s u i t a b l e  f o r
B o o t s  l e w *  And s e e  now 1981 Act -  N ic h o l s  and Mes t o n ,  C h a p te r ''4,
5* l a  B o o tla a d #  n e i t h e r  i a  n u l l i t y  a o r  a e p a r a t l o a  a r e  a w ard s  o f  lum p aume a h d /o r  p e r i o d i c a l  a llo w a a o e a  
G om peteat#
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t o  g iv e  b o th  p a r t i e s  a  s h a r e  i n  su c h  w i n d f a l l  g a in s "
( a r i s i n g  f r o m  i n c r e a s e  i n  m o n e ta ry  v a lu e  o f  t h e  
m a t r im o n ia l  hom e, t h e  'o l e a r e e t  exam ple* o f  th e  
'f a m i l y  a s s e t ' )  "undoub ted ly  l e d  t o  some d i s t o r t i o n  
o f  o r t h o d o x  c o n c e p t s  o f  p r o p e r ty  la w ." ^  S i n c e  t h e  
M a tr im o n ia l  F ro o e e d in g s  and  P r o p e r ty  A c t ,  1 9 7 0 , (now 
M a t r i m o n i a l  C a u s e s  A c t,  1 9 7 3 $  P a r t  I I )  an d  th e 2a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a  l i b e r a l  t r e n d  i n  j u d i c i a l  u s e  th e r e o f #
" I  t  w i l l  n o w  r a r e l y  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  l i t i g a t e  
q u e s t io n s  o f  p r o p e r t y  law  on  th e  b reakdow n  o f  m a r r i a g e ," ^  
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  th e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o w ers make th e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  t i t l e  ' l a r g e l y  i r r e l e v a n t * , b u t  i n  q u e s t i o n s  
a f f e c t i n g  s t r a n g e r s  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e , a n d  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  
i n h e r i t a n c e ,  O re tn e y  c o m m e n t s ,  t h e  r u l e s  re m a in  
r e l e v a n t ,
The "New D e a l"  F o r  E n g l a n d
The f i r s t  s t e p s  w ere  t a k e n  i n  th e  l a t e  1960 * s  
a n d  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 ' s .  A f t e r  Law G o m m i s s i o n  and  o t h e r  
d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  a n d  m u c h  p u b l i c  d i s c u s s i o n ,  two i m p o r t a n t  
B i l l s  w e re  p a s s e d ,  and  b o th  came i n t o  f o r c e  on 1 s t  
J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 1  * T h e s e  w ere t h e  D iv o rc e  R eform  A c t ,
1 9 6 9 / ’ whl< 
a b ey a n ce  /
6 9 /'^ ' h io h , th o u g h  p a s s e d  i n  1 9 6 9 ,  was h e l d  i n
1 .  O r e tn e y ,  3 r d  e d n . , p . 2 1 9 *2* S ee  W a c h te l v *  ¥* 1 9 7 3  F  a m  # 7 2 *3 ,  O re tn e y ,  ib id *  D o ing  j u s t i c e  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s  h a s  r e s u l^ e ^ T in  a  f l o o d  o f  i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e l a t e  t o  one a n o th e r  a n d  t o  g e n e r a l  
p r i n c i p l e  *4* b r o u g h t  t o  f r u i t i o n  b y  a  p a th  b e g i n n i n g  a t  " p u t t i n g  a s u n d e r " , R e p o r t  o f  A rc h b ish o p  o f  C a n te r b u r y 's  G ro u p , p u b l i s h e d  1966 ( " P u t t i n g  A su n d e r; A D iv o rc e  
L a w  f o r  C o n tem p o rary  S o c i e t y " , S*P*0«K#§ 1966)? "R eform  o f  t h e  G rounds o f  D iv o rc e  * T h e  F i e l d  o f  
C h o ic e "  ( 1 9 6 6 ) .  Law C om m ission (O m nd*3123); P r i v a t e  
M e m b e r ' s  B i l l  ( i n t r o d u c e d  f o r  th e  se c o n d  t im e  1 9 6 8 / 6 9 , th e  f i r s t  a t t e m p t  h a v in g  b e e n  t h w a r t e d  b y  l a c k  o f  t im e :  R o y a l A s s e n t ,  O c to b e r ,  1 9 6 9 ) s e e  B e rn a rd
P a s B i n g h a m ,  t h e  D i v o r c e  R e f o r m  A c t ,  1 9 6 9 ,  C h a p t e r  I ,  I n t r o d u c t i o n , D is c u s s io n s  o f  t h e  A ct a r e  t o  be fo u n d  i n  " T h e  s e a r c h  f o r  a  R a t i o n a l  D iv o rc e  L a w "  M#D*A*Freeman, 1 9 7 1 , 24 0*L *P.178* and  "The D iv o rc e  R efo rm  A c t 1 9 6 9 " , J e n n i f e r  L e v in  (1 9 7 0 )  33 H*L*R# 632.
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at)eyaace until the passing o f  its sister Aot$ ®he 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property A c t ,  1970*^ 
which^ it had been promised* would accompany the new 
d iv o r c e  provisions into the family law  of England#
Certain other provisions of relevance here were inserted 
in t h e  Law R eform  (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act* 4970*
The whole is embodied now in t h e  Matrimonial PCauses Act* 1975 $ which came into force on 1 s t  January* 
1 9 7 4 . (1975  8 .I .M o t1 9 7 2 )
S e t t l e m e n t s
A n te ^ n u p t i a l  and post-nuptial marriage-contracts 
are not common in England* b u t  marriage " s e t t l e m e n t s " ,  
of various t y p e s ,  in terms o f  which property is 
transferred by the spouses t o  trustees, occur* ICiralfy 
comments that t h i s  device ensures impartiality in 
administration,^ and inspires the confidence of third 
p a r t i e s S u c h  are practically unknown in Scotland, 
and /
1 # H e re ,  th e  history included the Law Commission's Reports on Financial Provisions in Matrimonial Proceedings (Law Com#Ho#25) and on Abolition of Proceedings for Restitution of Conjugal Rights (Ro#25). It was passed with great haste in May,
1 9 7 0 , when the General Election of that year was imminent - see Bernard Passingham, "The Matrimonial Proceedings end Property Act, 1970", Chapter I*Intro due ti on #2* 21 an d  22 E l l g . I I ,  c .1 8 #9# and may provide another possible answer to the " d u a l  control on the bridge" problem*A# See interesting discussion by Klralfy at pp*191«197) which includes at pp#195/4, a statement upon rights of creditors (over and above those stemming from the English bankruptcy laws), against "m isu se  of settlements" to defraud creditors (mala fides not being of necessity an item of proof, iTbeing sufficient to show that t h e  creditors "would inevitably suffer" as a result of the settlement)# See L#P#A. 1925, 
8 8 *1 7 2 / 1 7 5  (wife's good faith a sufficient answer in ante-nuptial, b u t  not in p o s t -  nuptial arrangements,IheT"reason being that an ante-nuptial settlement is made for the good consideration of marriage, whereas a p o s t - n u p t i a l  settlement is voluntary and the wife's good faith i s  regarded as immaterial)* These fraudulent settlement rules apply even after the death of the debtor b u t  t h e  b a n k ru p tc y  r u l e s  apply only during t h e  
d e b t o r 's  lifetime# Kiralfy, p # 1 9 4 .
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a n d , B la e e  & s i m i l a r  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h i n k i n g  I s  h b a e& t, 
i t  may b$ t h a t  t h e  a d o p t io n  o f  an é q u i v a l e n t  w o u ld  b e  
a l l o n  and  o f  l i t t i #  h e lp *  T he n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  may 
b e  b o t h  a  l e g a l  and an e q u i t a b l e  I n t e r e s t  l a  p r o p e r t y  
i& otrango to ue*^
?#r the mot of mpoueea in pnrohaBing
to g e th e r *  w i th  o o m tr ib u tio n m  fro m  b o th ?  a  h o u s e  i n  w h ic h  
to live* or tho puroh&me of a houae by one# followed 
by the taking of title In joint names* or variations 
on theme faota* will b# regarded in Engliah law ao a 
settlement* In the latt&r example* the purohmmlmg 
mpomae would bo regarded mm making a donation^ to the 
other of on# half of th# vain# of the houao* and it 
c o u ld  n o t  bo  d im poaod  o f  t h e r o m f te r  w i th o u t  th #  d o n o o 's  
oom m ont a lo o *  o n  t h e  o t h e r  hand* t h e  o r d in a r y  rmlom  
of common ownership in Englimh l&w (upon which thero 
1® n o  p r o h l b i t i o m  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  h&eb&mda mmd w lvo@ 79  
a l l m m  /
1* S e e  O roknoy* p p * 1 v i / 2  "m i t  im o n l y  b y  s h o w in g  the oxist^no# of such a truet that a wife omn be hold to have a propsi^iotary intoreat in a matrimonial homo* the legal ^skatc of Which 1# voBt^d In her huAamd"# 3.ogal ootate "earrlemwith it the %a,-' hm7%i#.@l ■Urter’f'Pt:". fhs presimption will bo dlopioood Lh?j mmrt prwwaeew i n g  the prenui^ptlona of "aT'/euoo"'f'(y:] m d  rooultlng trust** that thoTG baa been an ori^ln^T imtont to ho].d jointly or "mn ori* ;lnal eommon l a t e n t o r  tfWre^ the oWrt a tmnt "in the aboêmoo ofovidonom of a i : i ; r c S ) 3 # ^ m d  for mason# of "juotloe 
and g o o d  o o m a o lo n o # " *  Aa t o  d e t a i l # *  # # #  O r e tn e y *  
PP*1$3'w 1#0 an d  p p * 1 6 0 # 4 % *  8 e a  m l#o  3^romloy* pp*7 /  8#
2 * a > \  B o o t t l a h  a p p r o a c h :  O h w # r 5 ,  p .  6 4 3 ,  e t  s e q .
g* T he f a c t  o f  t h e  r e l a t l o w h i p  h a e  o a u c e d  L Ï^ b iem a  
o o n o e r a in g  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t h e r e t o  o f  th o  r i g h t  
o f  a  j o l a t  t e n a n t  t o  "ecvo%'" en d  c r e a t e  a  to n a a o y  in oom w m * Pomcibly there is euoh m right (Kiralj^y* p#198) (Oretmy* pp* 161/2* etaWo # m t  èithor epouee* where there is a joint tenmoy* may #$vw* to eremte 
a  t e n a n c y  im  oozm oa#^
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allows free disposal of t h e  'beneficial share without 
consent of the other co-owners "But the value of 
the beneficial interest can only be realised b y  means 
of a s a l e ,  and the court may forbid such a sale, on 
the application o f  the other spouse, a s  where an
u n f a i t h f u l  w i f e  p u r p o r t s  t o  make a  g i f t  o f  h e r  h a l f -ii n t e r e s t  i n  the matrimonial home to her l o v e r , "
The point which Klralfy is a n x io u s  t o  make clear is
t h a t *  upon a sufficiently substantial change of
circumstanceB, such as to render the initial arrangement
as envisaged, inappropriate, t h e  court, before the 1971
changes, had power to alter the terms o f  the settlement.
Thus, the whole interest in the home might be given
to the husband, "0orrespondingly, an innocent w ife
who contributes to the purchase o f  the home may bePawarded sole title against a guilty h u s b a n d " ,
(Variation on behalf of/to benefit the 'guilty* was 
not n e c e s s a r i l y  precl u d e d ) T h e  judicial powers of 
" v a r i a t i o n "  seem  to have been at common law far-reaching, 
Klralfy almost casually reports that "There a p p e a rs  to 
be no reason why a will s h o u ld  not constitute a 
"settlement" liable to variation, as w here  a husband's 
parents have left generous bequests to his wife without 
anticipating a d i v o r c e ,
The M a tr im o n ia l  P ro c e e d in g s  and  P r o p e r t y  A ct* 1970$
8,4" /
1é Klralfy, p *195 *2, Klralfy, ibid,3* Under the Matrimonial C au ses  Act, 1965, s*17(2), the court could "settle" p r o p e r t y  of a * g u i l t y  * wife, but not of a  'g u i l t y *  husband# Klralfy notes that although this provision did violence to "the ordinary p r i n c i p l e s  of the law of p r o p e r t y " ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  it was intended to be u s e d  as a vehicle 
f o r  "restoring the original financial position o f  t h e  p a r t i e s "  (w h ich  point h e  d e m o n s tr a te s  am ply b y  reference to the case of Oompton v* 0, and Hussey 1960 :|^ ,201) and not as a vehicle f o r  punishment(p,196). The sexual inequality seems s t r a n g e  and was removed b y  the 1970 Act, s , 4  (see b o d y  o f  text), 4 .  i b i d .
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'*^1$*4 permitted a court* In earn## of divoroo* nullity 
m d  ju&lolal ##peratlon$ at deoroo* or at any tlmo 
thereafter (before or after #oroo ob%Mte) to order 
trmn^fer of property from one iBpowe to awthor or to 
or om bWiolf of m ohlM of the to order the
of a mettlemmt of property %  the eraWhilo 
o^mor to the other party md/or the ohlldron* to order 
m v a r i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  b e m o f i t  o f  t h e  p u r t l e e  o r  e i t h e r  
of them and/or the if m y  antenuptial or
poBt-miptlal Bottlmamt (l$wludih|g a #mttlomont by will 
or oodloil) or to make an order "oxtingulohii% or 
roduolngg the Imtoreet of either of t W  partlea to the 
marrlagge i m d w  m y  $ w h  gottlement*^' The eld of 
oonveywol% ooimBOl may he oou#t jjEi the drafting of 
su o h  m l t o r n a t l v e  I n a t r u m e î i t ,  m d  4#er@ o may W  d e f e r r e d  
until oxecutloa o f  the Inetrwwmt#^ Oomeideratloaa 
to h# home la mlad by the oomii* in the ezwolso of 
their powem imder soot Iona (2$3 md) 4* oontmlaod 
im B#5#^ V^trimtloB (aWl* it wouM aeem? muWtltutlon 
of a mow eettlememt)# K i m l #  motea^, mmy 
"Olimimatiom from hemeflt" of a spoMBe %=arho would 
o th e r w is e  h a v e  h o n o f i t e d  fro m  a  a o tt le m e m t*  T he mew 
or varied aettlmemt i# mot protected* by virtue of 
t h e  fro m  a t t a o k  b y  c r e d i t o r s : ,  who^
itwoke the Bahkmpte^ lot* 1914, 
to hmre the aettlemeat reêueod^* Where there le a 
io im t  /
1* Gaumw Aot* 1973* a#24»2# 1970 let* a*29$ 1975 'ot,.^#gO#3# imfra# ' . Tho v i w K u I m t  Beotloma of the 1975Aot are 8B*23#24 ea * , h#
4» ?»197.9* w o r  o f  e o t t l o r ^  & ' : w *  o<! I n  h fw kvnrW y i n  th e  . y*0(uvil owe to iho oettio ^ubt it m y  datewiUUm 10 yomro of lh\" rrhlmg of Ur: nolgonoral oaae" * *t f, t tihe ranoUyle reo trio ted to **) ret AuWi" postnuptial eettlemonte and dooe mot «tend to anténuptial mettlemomta or Bettlemomta for va3,u# and la good faith# e* 1970 Aot# a#23; 1975 &#$ e#39#
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j o i n t  tenancy or a tenancy in common, in English 
law either party can insist upon sale# However, 
if the matter is sufficiently contentions, application 
c a n  h e  made t o  t h e  c o u r t  u n d e r  t h e  Law o f  P r o p e r ty  
A c t ,  1 9 2 5 , S . 3 0 ,  an d  th e  c o u r t*  i n  i t s  d i s c r e t i o n  may 
refuse t o  o r d e r  a sale If i t  would be inequitable t o  
do s o ,  o r  i f  a  t r u s t  p u rp o s e  i s  s t i l l  t o  b e  d is c h a rg e d #
EPFEOT OP DEATH ON PROPBRTY OF 8P0U8E8 IN ENGLISH LAW
A, IHSESTAOYatMwvm-n .lémiewAnmttiittu.iluemfÊW»
E n g l i s h  la w , i n  common w i th  German law  a s  r e c e n t l y  
c h a n g e d , and with Scots law  since 1964* now has r u l e s
o f  intestate succession which tend to b e n e f i t  t h e  
surviving spouse rather m ore than they benefit the 
c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  marriage*
I n  te rm s  o f  the Administration o f  Estates A ct*
1 9 2 5  (as am ended by the I n t e s t a t e s '  Estates A ct*  1952 
an d  b y  t h e  F a m ily  P r o v i s i o n  A ct*  1966)*  a  s u r v iv in g  
spouse i s  e n t i t l e d  to a cash sum of ^ 2 5 ,0 0 0 ^ ', i f  t h e r e  
i s  i s s u e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  * and to  &55$000^* i f  t h e r e  is 
no issue ( " t h e  statutory legacy")#
I n  a d d i t io n *  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  there is i s s u e  * t h e  
s u r v i v o r  t a k e s  all "personal c h a t t e l s "  (including 
d o m e s tic  eq u ip m en t*  o a rs *  j e w e l le r y *  c l o t h e s  and o t h e r  
s i m i l a r  items* but n o t  business a r t i c l e s ^ ) * and  i f  there 
is issue* he/she enjoys the liferent of one h a l f  o f  the 
remaining estate # He/she is e n t i t l e d  to a one h a l f  
share of t h e  capital value of the balance* i f  there is 
no  i s s u e  b u t  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  h a s  l e f t  p a r e n t s  o r  s i b l i n g s  
or t h e i r  i s s u e  * and  t o  t h e  whole t h e r e o f  if t h e r e  is no 
i s s u e  /
1 . Oretney* 3 rd  edn* p*241#2. F a m ily  P r o v i s i o n  (Intestate Succession) O rd e r  1977*3# F a m ily  Provision (intestate Succession) O rd e r  1977*
4 ,  1 9 2 5  A ct*  8 ,5 5  ( i ) ( % 9 ,S' /V(TLO fù-(Tt> e ^A ^  îuM jlz^^  7 %  u-<-c^ Pu ^
f c L ^ U f  ( i L i J ^ h x M  fu.CC^.A&^(rU jC>yèht^^ S j .  f l ? t
h j o . a s r ;
i t t r u ^ U ^ ' S  / ~ < w  , 4  € S t , . , p .  7 .
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i s s u e  and  th e  d e c e a s e d  h a s  l e f t  o n ly  r e l a t i v e s  m ore 
r e m o te ly  related#
I f  t h e  deceased is th e  s u r v iv in g  p a r t n e r  of th e  
marriage* t h e  issue w i l l  t a k e  all t h e  benefit of the 
estates failing issue, t h e  spouse's parent(s) will 
take* e q u a l ly  between th em , o r  all to one* if o n ly  
one s u r v i v e s : f a i l i n g  parents, the o r d e r  i s : -  f i r s t *
s i b l i n g s *  t h e n  g ra n d p a r e n ts *  th e n  u n c le s  and  a u n t s :  
all of whom failing* the e s t a t e  p a s s e s  as b o n a  vacantia 
t o  t h e  Grown* although O re tn e y  n o te s  that "as a 
m a t t e r  o f  g ra c e " *  t h e  Grown may make p r o v i s i o n  o u t  o f  
the estate f o r  " " d e p e n d a n ts "  (w h e th e r  k in d r e d  o r  n o t ) " * 
and o t h e r  persons f o r  whom t h e  deceased might have 
made p r o v is io n *  and  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  Grown may make 
a paym en t t o  t h e  deceased's m is t r e s s *  who* n e i t h e r  in 
English n o r  i n  Scots law* h a s  any c la im  to the deceased's 
estate under the rules of intestate succession#
G re tn e y  com m ents^ t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  t h e  s u r v i v o r 's  
r i g h t s  w i l l  e x h a u s t  the e s t a t e  $
W ith  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s io n  t o  t h e  
e s t a t e  o f  a  p a r e n t  o f  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i ld *  o r  t o  
the e s t a t e  o f  t h e  child, r i g h t s  o f  p a r t i e s  shall b e  
th e  some a s  th o s e  a r i s i n g  h a d  th e  c h i l d  b e e n  b o rn
legitimate
Under the Intestates' E s t a t e s  A ct* 1952 (Schedule 
2) * th e  s u r v i v o r  may r e q u i r e  t h a t  h i s / h e r  share i n  t h e  
estate be t a k e n  i n  the form o f  th e  matrimonial home (be/ 
sh e  /
1 ,  Of* c o n f l i c t  c a s e s  I n  r e  B a r n e t t  1902 1 O h .84?*In r e ,  Musurus 1936 2 All E.H.1566* G-oold Stuart's T r s ,  V . H c P h a il  1 9 4 ?  S * L ,T .2 2 1 .2 ,  p . 2 6 0 .3. Ibid. Of* Heston* The S u c c e s s io n  (Scotland) A ct* "1 9 ^ *  2nd e d * . p#27  and  G ro n e , su-pra,*4 .  F a m ily  Laïf R eform  A ct* 1969$ 8 ,W , I n  a p p r o p r i a t e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  th e  " i s s u e "  o f  th e  illegitimate child may have r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s io n *  P re su m a b ly  " i s s u e "  in t h a t  c o n te x t  i n c l u d e s  illegitimate issue* B ut see Heston
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she having b e e n  resident therein at the time o f  the 
deceased's death), paying the difference in value, 
i f  applicable* K i r a l f y  commentthat the administrator 
o f  t h e  e s t a t e  w ou ld  be  l i k e l y  to  a r r a n g e  t h i s  i n  an y  
e v e n t .  However* i t  may b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e a l i s e  t h e  
v a lu e  o f  t h e  h o u se  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  paym ent o f  d e b ts #  
The administrator can g iv e  a good t i t l e  t o  a purchaser 
f o r  v a lu e  and  s i n c e  t h e r e  m ig h t b e  a&o v e r y  good  c a s e  
f o r  damages against t h e  administrator " f o r  needlessly 
selling t h e  hom e", if the n e ig h b o u rh o o d  contained 
s i m i l a r  houses of l i k e  p r i c e ,  Klralfy suggests'^  that 
"a more effective remedy w ould  be t o  a s k  the c o u r t  t o  
i s s u e  an i n j u n c t i o n  t o  p r e v e n t  the administrator 
disposing o f  the home w ith o u t  cause, thus avoiding t h e  
upset of moving and the b r e a k in g  o f  sentimental ties 
w ith  t h e  home*" Surely in many cases th o u g h , p r o v id e d  
that statutory in s t r u m e n t  keeps abreast o f  c h a n g in g  
house values,^ and especially w here  the deceased has 
left no issue, the s u r v i v o r  w i l l  take the h o u se  as 
p a r t  o f  h i s / h e r  s t a t u t o r y  le g a c y ?  I t  i s  n o te w o r th y ,  
h o w e v e r, that i n  Soots la w , the r i g h t  to the h o u se  
(at present to t h e  m o n e ta ry  value of £5 0 ,000) is a 
specific p r i o r  r i g h t , an entitlement i n  addition t o  
the r i g h t s  t o  c o n te n t s  and  t o  a c a s h  sum^ #
As /
1 , . . p . 210*2* p . 211#3* The ' s t a t u t o r y  le g a c y *  am ounts now t o  £25,000 i fthere i s  i s s u e ,  and £53,000 i f  t h e r e  i s  n o t#  Ineither c a s e ,  the s u r v iv o r  t a k e s  t h e  personal chattels an d  i n  t h e  fo rm e r  c a s e ,  a  l i f e r e n t  o f  one  h a l f  o f  the b a la n c e  of the estate and in t h e  l a t t e r  case, one h a l f  of t h e  b a la n c e  absolutely* The survivor takes t h e  w ho le  b a la n c e  if there i s  no issue and  the r e l a t i o n s ,  i f  a n y , are m ore remote th a n  p a r e n t  o r  s i b l in g *
(O re tn e y *  p . 259 ; F a m ily  P r o v i s io n  ( I n t e s t a t e  S u c c e s s io n )  
O rd e r  1977#)4* 8 u c o * (8 c * )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 , s s * 8  an d  9# The c a s h  e n t i t l e m e n ti s  an e n t i r e l y  separate r i g h t ; the right to furniture
and  p l e n i s h i n g s  i s  t o  t h e  f u r n i t u r e  and  p l e n i s h i n g s  
o f  a  d w e l l in g  h o u se  t o  w h ich  s# 8  a p p l i e s #  I f  t h e  i n t e s t a t e  estate contains the furniture and plenishings 
o f  /
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As in Scotland, so in England, a husband had 
no claim upon the acquisitions of his deceased wife 
obtained after separation# The rule in Scotland, 
which has been criticised, rests upon the Conjugal 
Rights Amendment (Scotland) Act, 1861, 8*6# Until 
1 9 7 1 $ the position was the same in England, but by 
the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970,
8.40, sexual equality here was achieved? if there 
had been judicial separation, neither spouse could 
claim in the intestate succession of the other*
Section 40 has been repealed and overtaken by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, 8*18(2)* which is in 
similar terms, and which states:- "If while a decree 
of judicial separation is in force and the separation 
is continuing either of the parties to the marriage 
dies intestate as respects all or any of his or her 
real or personal property, the property as respects 
which he or she died intestate shall devolve as if 
the other party to the marriage had then been dead."
The provision therefore treats the spouses equally, 
and removes the difficulty of ascertaining which items 
of property had been acquired after decree.^ A spouse 
may still apply for a reasonable provision under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act,
1 9 7 5 , however.^
In /
of two or more such dwelling houses, the survivormay elect (within 6 months of the date of death of the deceased) which set of contents (she) wishes to take* Within the same period, (she) must elect which dwelling-house to take. (She) may choose to take the contents of the house not chosen. The survivor will be entitled to contents even where the circumstances are such that (she) receives only the monetary value of the house (Meston, p.34), The section (8) applies "to any dwelling house in which the surviving spouse of the intestate was ordinarily resident at the date of death of the intestate" (s*8 (4)) (provided, of course (Heston, p.29) that the interest in the house belonged to the deceased spouse),1, See Chapter 1 and Chapter 5*2. Discussed infra, "Family Provision"« Such a (separated) spouse may""apRy for * reasonable provision* in the sense of maintenance, but not for the fuller award potentially available to other spouses (8*1(2))#
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In cases of death in a ooimon calamity, the 
presumption is the logically impossible one that/Ieach died first «
Where there is partial intestacy, a spouse 
must set off his/her provisions in the will against 
the statutory legacy, but not against any other 
right of intestate succession, and not against inter 
vivos gifts
B. TîSSÏAOX
The law of England has always prided itself upon 
the freedom of testation which it allows,^ and n o v e ls  
abound with threats to "cut off with a shilling" sons 
who do not fulfil their fathers* expectations of them* 
"Seen in a comparative context, the English law of 
succession is characterised not only by the generosity 
with which it treats the surviving spouse in the event 
of intestacy but also by its reluctance to give her 
o r  him adequate protection in the event of the exercise 
b y  the predeceasing spouse of his or her freedom of 
testation in a manner adverse to the interests of his 
or her spouse and children"*^
The /
1 * The Scottish position (Succ,(Sc*) A ct* 1964; Heston, p*19) i s  that, in the general case subject to s*3 1 (2 ), the younger is presumed to survive the elder but that, in a husband and wife case* it is presumed that neither survived the other (s.31(1)(b) and (a) respectively)*2# Bee generally "Faraily Provision" infra*
3 *  O f *  Re I a n s  1 9 4 7  O h . 5 7 6  c i t e d  b y T f a r t y n  a t  p . 4 ,4. Otto Kahn-Freund, "Recent Legislation on Matrimonial P r o p e r t y " ,  1970 55 H.L.R.G01 (considered Jjafra,
C h a p t e r  7 )  $ a t  p . 6 0 5 *  P r o f e s s o r  K a h n - F r e u n U ^ s t a t e s  
i n  p a s s i n g ,  t h o u g h  t h e  a r t i c l e  i s  c o n c e r n e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  
w i t h  i n t e r  y i y g s  p r o b l e m s ,  t h a t  a  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  
f a j i i i l y  p r o p e r ’i^y " w o u l d  c o n t a i n  a s  a n  " i n t e g r a l  e l e m e n t "  
r e f o r m  o f  t h e  l a w  o f  f a m i l y  p r o v i s i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  m ig h t i n v o l v e  " f a r - r e a c h i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  t h e  f r e e d o m  
o f  t e s t a t i o n " ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  p e r h a p s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  a  s y s t e m  o f  c o m m u n i t y  o f  p r o p e r t y *  ( S e e  n o w  1 9 7 5  
A c t ,  i n f r a ) .  S u c h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  n o  n o v e l t y  t o  S c o t s  
l a w ,  b u W ^ E n g l a n d  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  a n d  w i t h  r e s o l u t i o n  
e s c h e w e d  a  s y s t e m  o f  f i x e d  r i g h t s  ( o f *  L * C * W . P « N o . 4 2
( 1 9 7 1 ) /
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The opposite end of t h e  spectrum. Is represented 
by systems of the Germanic family, such as those of 
Denmark and N orw ay,^ where originally succession b y  
will was excluded* "The family received the estate 
b y  law and only slowly the will was recognised as a 
result o f  the influence of the Catholic church" * The 
t r e n d  has been for the representatives at each end  t o  
d r i f t  to the middle* Thus, i n  Denmark and N orw ay, 
there is testamentary freedom, subject to restrictionP(as in Scotland ) where the deceased leaves spouse 
and/or descendants* "In these cases the right of the 
family in the old law still survives i n  the legitim 
of th e  spouse and t h e  children#"^
At the late date of 1938, change came, but Klralfy 
describes /
1 * ( 1 9 7 1 ) which at 0 * 5 6 -4 1 , and generally in Part 4,considered a system of English "legal rights", but in L*0# 1st Report on Family Property (A New Approach: 
1 9 7 3 ) an extension of the family provision rights was favoured, and the proposals of the 2nd Report (1 9 7 4 ) were implemented as the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975; Todd and Jones' Review, both infra, Ohapter 7 ) ,  retaining its natural preference foF^isoretionary remedies* The author remarks upon the restricted nature of the surviving spouse's rights in intestacy in France, and comparesthat attitude with the English attitude towards thedisinherited spouse ("vital differences" (being)"that th e  F re n c h  right is fixed b y  law and i s  not discretionary and that it must be seen in conjunction with th e  matrimonial community right*") Jo h n  G* Boss Hartyn ("The modern law of F a m ily  P r o v i s i o n " )  notes, though, that i n  mediaeval times, fixed rights were a  part of E n g l i s h  law and that this gave way to the favour s t e a d i l y  shown t o  th e  concept of t e s ta m e n ta r y  freedom# (See p.2).1* D* & N* Law, p#59, supra#2. Bee Ohapter 5*
3 *  D #  & N *  L a w  p # 3 9 #  A f o o t n o t e  a t  p * 5 9  r e l a t e s  t h a tthe term i s  t a k e n  from Scots Law, which i s  interesting* In that context i n  which i t  i s  u s e d ,  however, it i s  a comprehensive term for the indefeasible r i g h t s  of 
sp o u s e  and/or descendants*
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describes it as "modest" and terms the new right 
or duty "posthumous aliment"* One point which 
differentiates the English from  certain other systems 
(including the Scots system) is that the (discretionary) 
rights possibly available under the Inheritance (Family 
Provision) legislation may arise now also in intestacy*^
Family Provision
The Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act, 1975 repeals the 1938 Act in its 
entirety but does not alter the basic approach provided 
by that Act, x^ hich was to permit to be changed the 
provisions of a will and/or the rules of intestate 
succession so as to make "reasonable provision" for 
certain persons who are members of the deceased's 
family or dependent on him* The 1975 Act replaces 
also the M a tr im o n ia l  Causes Act, 1965$ ss* 2 6 -2 8 , xfhich 
themselves replaced certain sections of the Matrimonial 
Causes (Property mid Maintenance) Act, 1 9 5 8 , an enactment 
which contained provisions concerning orders out of the 
estate of a deceased former spouse in favour of a former 
wife or a formér husband who had not re-married, and 
"changes the old law****very sixbst anti ally, so as to 
form a new and comprehensive code of family provision 
law"*^ All is discretionary; "both the right and the 
quantxria alike are matters of judicial discretion."^
This is not a Scottish approach*
The 1958 Act applied to t e s t a c y  only, but its 
remedies wore made available in cases of Intestacy by 
the Intestates* Estates Act, 1952# Originally, 
applications /
1 * As to Scotland, see prior and/or legal rights ; Chapter 5#2, "The modern laxf of Family Provision", John G* Ross Hartyn 1978 (cited hereinafter as "Hartyn"), p*1* 5* Hartyn, p*2*
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a p p l i o a t i o n s  w ere  limited to those "by the spouse, 
i n f a n t  e o n s ,  d a u g h te r s  who h a d  n o t  b e e n  m a r r ie d  o r  
w e re  ir^ o a p a b le  o f  m a in ta in in g  th e m s e lv e s ,  an d  a d u l t  
s o n s  i n c a p a b le  o f  m a in ta in in g  th e m s e lv e s *  I n  1958 
the l i s t  was extended to include a fo rm e r  spouse who 
had not r e m a r r i e d ,^  which is an  i n t e r e s t i n g  e x te n s i o n ,  
at odds with the "clean b re a k "  theory# There i s  no 
p r o v i s i o n  for former s p o u s e s  i n  the Scots rules o f  
i n t e s t a t e  succession (( p r i o r  rights and legal rights) 
o r  testate succession (legal rights))#
I n  the latest Act, judicial powers are enlarged, 
there are anti-avoidance powers, i n  the case o f  t h e  
spouse applicant^, "reasonable provision" is n o t  l i m i t e d  
t o  /
1# Bee 1958 Act, 8*5.2# that is, a spouse m a r r ie d  to the deceased at thetime of the latterdeath: i n  the case o f  a formerspouse (and a separated spouse) the provision, i f  g r a n t e d ,  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  " r e a s o n a b le  f o r  m a in te n a n c e "  test, (Hartyn, p . 1 1 , but see also H a r ty n ,  p#22) though there is a t r a n s i t i o n a l  provision where the death 
o c c u r s  w i t h i n  12  m on ths o f  t h e  d e c r e e  o f  d i v o r c e ,  nullity or s e p a r a t io n *  and  provided that in the antecedent matrimonial proceedings no financial p r o v i s i o n  o r  property adjustment o r d e r  (Hatrimonial Causes Act, 1975, 8 8 * 2 3 ,2 4 )  had been made# However ( s * 1 5 ) ,  the court in the earlier p r o c e e d in g s , i f  it thinks j u s t  t o  do so and w ith  the agreement of t h e  parties ÿfbrder that n e i t h e r  p a r t y  s h a l l  b e  entitled to apply f o r  such a n  o rd e r*  ( s  *14%  I t  is competent for a court i n  divorce, nullity o r  separation 
p r o c e e d in g s , i f  i t  seem s to t h e  court just t o  do so  and w ith  agreement o f  the parties, to order that the surviving (separated) spouse o r  former spouse on the death o f  the predeceaser shall be p r e c lu d e d  from m aking  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  r e a s o n a b le  p r o v i s io n #  Bee i n f r a .  A reference i n  t h e  Act to a w if e  o r  h u sb a n d  S E a l l  b e  treated as including a person who i n  good faith entered i n t o  a void m a r r ia g e  with t h e  deceased 
u n l e s s  e i t h e r  t h e  m a r r ia g e  w as d i s s o l v e d  o r  a n n u l le d  d u r in g  the l i f e t i m e  of t h e  deceased, an d  the d i s s o l u t i o n  o r  a n n u lm e n t i s  r e c o g n i s e d  b y  the law  o f  E n g la n d  and  W a le s , o r  that p e r s o n  has d u r in g  t h e  lifetime o f  the d e c e a s e d  e n t e r e d  i n t o  a  l a t e r  m a r r i a g e ,  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  that the subsequent m a r r ia g e  o r  the e a r l i e r  marriage 
i s  v o id  o r  voidable# (8*25(4) and  (5))# H a r ty n  (p#10) p o i n t s  out that this means that t h e r e  could be more 
t h a n  /
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to maintenance requirements but may include a
lump sum, and property transfer (in other words,
an arrangement not dissimilar to a monetary and/
or property award on divorce) and the list of
competent applicants has been increased from spouse,
former spouse cmd child to include in addition any
person treated by the deceased as a child of the
family in relation to a marriage to which the deceased
was a party, but whose natural child the applicant is
not, and any person who immediately before the deceased's
death x\ras being maintained, wholly or partly, by the /]deceased . The last category includes those related 
by blood or affinity but not included in any of the 
foregoing /
t h a n  o n e  s p o u s e  a p p l i c a n t *  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
p o l y g a m o u s  m a r r i a g e s  a l s o ,  c l e a r l y  t h i s  c o u l d  
h a p p e n ,  a n d  i t  d i d  h a p p e n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  R e  
S e h o t a  1 9 7 8  3  A l l  E # R . 3 8 5 *  W h e r e  o b j e c t i o n  t o
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  t h e  c l a i m  w a s  
f o r  m a t r i m o n i a l  r e l i e f  a n d  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t s  o f  E n g l a n d  
w e r e  n o t  o p e n  t o  g i v e  s u c h  r e l i e f  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  
p o l y g a m o u s  m a r r i a g e  w a s  m a d e  b y  t h e  s e c o n d  w i f e ,The objection was rejected, the court taking the view that the claim was not for matrimonial relief but was a question of succession but that in any event the Hatrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act, 1972, s*1 (power to courts in England and Wales to grant matrimonial relief or to make a declaration concerning the validity of a marriage despite the fact that the marriage was entered into under a law which permits polygamy) was apt to cover the case. Where separated spouses are mentioned, the Act refers always to judicial separation# Presumably, a consensually separated spouse is a competent applicant (of* Hartyn, p*11) but on the facts his/ her claim may not be strong (see infra and Hartyn, p.20 "fossil marriages"#) Hartyn comments that there is no reason in principle why a widower applicant should be less well treated than a widow*
o*
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f o r e g o i n g  c a t e g o r i e s ,  o r  l i n k e d  o n l y  b y  t h e  f a c t  o f  
d e p e n d e n c y  «
A p p l i c a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  w i t h i n  s i x  m o n t h s  o f
t h e  t a k i n g  o u t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  
Pe s t a t e *  ”
T h e  c o u r t  m u s t  b e  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e  a 3 ? r a n g e m e n t  
o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ' s  e s t a t e  e f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  d e c e a s e d  
a n d / o r  b y  t h e  r u l e s  o f  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  d o e s  n o t  
m a k e  r e a s o n a b l e  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a n t .  02he  
t e s t  i s  o b j e c t i v e .  I f  t h e  c o u r t  d e c i d e s  t h a t  r e a s o n a b l e  
p r o v i s i o n  w a s  n o t  m a d e ,  i t  m a y  m a k e  a n y  o n e  o r  m o r e  o f  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o r d e r s ; -  a n  o r d e r  f o r  p e r i o d i c a l  p a y m e n t s  
o u t  o f  t h e  n e t  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d ,  o r  a n  o r d e r  f o r  
a  lu m p  s u m ,  o r  f o r  a  t r a n s f e r  o f  p r o p e r t y  o r  f o r  t h e  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  p r o p e r t y  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a n t ,  
o r  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o u t  o f  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  o f  
s p e c i f i e d  p r o p e r t y  a n d  t r a n s f e r  o r  s e t t l e m e n t  t h e r e o f  
o r  f o r  a n  o r d e r  v a r y i n g  a n y  a n t e - n u p t i a l  o r  p o s t - n u p t i a l  
s e t t l e m e n t  ( " i n c l u d i n g  s u c h  a  s e t t l e m e n t  made by w i l l " )  
" m a d e  o n  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  a  m a r r i a g e  t o  w h i c h  t h e  d e c e a s e d  
w a s  /
1 .  H a r t y n ,  p . 1 4 ,  H e  n o t e s  t h a t  i n  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  c a s e ,  
a  g r a n d p a r e n t ,  p a r e n t  o r  g r a n d c h i l d  m i g h t  a p p l y ,  a s  
m i g h t  a  h o u s e k e e p e r ,  o r  a  r e m a r r i e d  f o r m e r  s p o u s e  " i n  
t h e  u n l i k e l y  e v e n t  o f  h e r  s t i l l  b e i n g  a  d e p e n d a n t " ,  o r  i n d e e d  a  d e  f a c t o  s p o u s e ,  t h o u g h  i n  t h e  l a s t -  
m e n t i o n e d  c a s e  H a r t y n  c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  i n  t h e  w i f e /  
m i s t r e s s  c o m b a t ,  t h e  m i s t r e s s  m a y  f a r e  b a d l y  i f  e . g .  
t h e  w i f e  m a lc e s  u s e  o f  t h e  A c t  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  c u t  d o w n  
t h e  t e s t a m e n t a r y  p r o v i s i o n  fo 3 ?  a  m i s t r e s s .  I n  
i n t e s t a c y ,  w h e r e  t h e  m a n ' s  p r o p e r t y  p a s s e s  t o  t h e  
w i f e ,  t h e  m i s t r e s s ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  m a y  h a v e  a  
c l a i m #  Y e t  d e  f a c t o  s p o u s e s  h a v e  b e c o m e  f a v o u r e d  
m o r e  g r e a t l y  b y  t h e  l a w ,  a n d  w h o  i s  t o  s a y  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  c o h a b i t i n g  m i s t r e s s  
w i l l  n o t  b e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  w i f e ?  I n d e e d ,  i s  i t  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  b o t h  w i f e  a n d  m i s t r e s s  m i g h t  b e  
a g g r i e v e d  b y  a  w i l l  l e a v i n g  m u c h  t o  a  w o r t h y  c h a r i t y ?  
H o w  t h e n  w ould  j u s t i c e  b e  d o n e ?
2 *  8 * 4 .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  a p p l i c a t i o n  m a y  b e  a l l o w e d  w i t h
p e r m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  c o u r t *
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was one of the parties", in the last case the 
variation "being for the benefit of the surviving 
party to that marriage, or any child of that marriage, 
or any person who was treated by the deceased as a 
child of the family in relation to that marriage*
The powers given entail the giving of linked
powers# Hence, in terms of 8,2(4), the court may
order any person who holds any property forming part
of the net estate of the deceased to comply with the
payment or transfer order, and (s.2(4)(b)) may "vary
the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by
the will or the laxf relating to intestacy, or by both
the will or the law relating to intestacy, in such
manner as the court thinks fair and reasonable having
regard to the provisions of the order and all thePcircumstances of the case." The court may" confer 
on the trustees of any property which is the subject 
of an order such powers as appear to the court to be 
necessary or expedient.
Section 3 gives guidelines to help the court to 
decide whether reasonable provision has been made and, 
if not, what provision should be m ade. These ares- 
the financial needs and resources of the applicant 
and those of any other applicant and those of any 
beneficiary of the estate, any obligations and 
responsibilities owed by the deceased to the applicant 
or to any beneficiary, the size and nature of the net 
estate, any physical or mental disability of the 
applicant or of any beneficiary, and any other matter, 
including the conduct of the applicant or any other 
person, which in the c ir c u m s ta n c e s  of the c a s e ,  the 
court /
1 .  s . 2 ( 1 ) ( f '2. s#2(4)(c,
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court may consider relevant # In the case of a 
spouse or former spouse, the court shall have regard 
to the age of the applicant and the duration of the 
marriage and the contribution made hy the applicant 
to the welfare of the family of the deceased, including 
any contribution made by looking after the home or 
caring for the family. Where the applicant is a 
spouse (not being a (judicially) separated spouse) 
the court shall have regard to the provision which 
the applicant might reasonably have expected had the 
marriage been terminated by divorce rather than by 
death* In the case of children, regard shall be had 
to the child's expectations in respect of education or 
training, and of children treated as children of the 
family, whether the deceased had assumed any responsibility 
for the applicant's maintenance, and, if so, the extent 
and basis and duration of responsibility, ignorance or 
knowledge in discharging that responsibility, that the 
applicant was not his own child, and liability of any 
other party to maintain the applicant. Similarly, with 
regard to the "dependant" category, the court shall have 
regard to the extent and basis of responsibility and 
duration of discharge of responsibility*^*^
Emergency /
1* i.e. "the court shall*...have regard to the following matters, that is to say (s*5(1)(&) - (g))*2* See generally s*5*5* As to the treatment of the spouse, consider Hartyn,PP»19/22: "How far is the concept of family assets embodied in the Act?" ("partially")* "In which cases will the concept of family assets influence the Court?" "How far will the court make use of the one-third starting-point?" (only if helpful) "How relevant is conduct?" (possibly less so than under the 1958 Act, in view of or by an.alogy with the attitude to conduct adopted in the matrimonial jurisdiction*) Hartyn concludes (p.22) that there is a difference, insufficiently appreciated and not explicit in the Act* between the treatment of the spouse and that of other applicants. "The basis for surviving spouses becomes a moral obligation to leave a part, probably a substantial part, of the estate to the spouse, in contrast to the basis for other applicants, which remains an obligation to provide sufficient maintenance*"Yet'/
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Emergency aid can be given in case of need, and 
if property is available, and subject to conditions 
and further order, before the decision is made as to 
whether on order for provision under the Act should 
be made, and if so, what size it should be. The 
guidelines shall apply, so far as time permits,
An award under s.2 for periodical payments may 
be altered at a future date by the court. A lump sum 
award may be satisfied by instalment payments*
Net Estate
Nominations by the deceased in favoiir of any 
person(s) shall be taken to form part of the net estate, 
as will donationes mortis causa, but in neither case 
shall any party who has paid or transferred such propertypto such person be rendered liable for having done so*
The severable share of a deceased’s beneficial interest 
in a joint tenancy may also be treated as part of the 
net estate.
Anti-avoidance provisions
An applicant for a provision may ask the court 
to matie an order against a donee (as after explained) 
to provide such sum of money, or such property, as 
specified, if the court is satisfied that less than six 
years /
Yet the obligation surely now is more than moral; it may be enforced at law, though the chosen means of a wide judicial discretion, which may leave testator or predeceaser in his lifetime and the survivor after his death, unsure of its extent.1. s.5* Gf* in Scotland the possibility of claiming interim aliment out of the estate (0* & W. p.692).2. 8*8, Provisions of this nature (and see further infra) are interesting, when viewed against the argument that, in property matters^to strangers to the marriage all should appear straightforward*(Of. generally conflict of laws classification case of Xn re Korxfine 1921 1 Oh.345)
years tW death a f  t w  the
In te n tiw  of 4ol%aMng an Æ#plioation fo r prcwisiom 
w d or Aot$6mdT3^m^^9positlon$ #Lat f u l l  
oonBideratloa wa;$ not oy the bonofiolary o f
the diispoaitlem ("the- donee") or by any other pormoa, 
mid that t?il8 o f power by the court
fm o illta te  the miM.% of flmawlaO. proviaion fo r  the 
mpplloarnt WLder " Aot  ^ The order may he mgi&o 
whether or not ' Wneo at the date o f the order 
ho3.da any ijnterm t In the s^ald %)rop#rtyg eh a ll not 
exceed the o f  the d lapoaitiw i (or v%IW^  of the
property &t the deoeomod*$ d#mth or at o a r l lw  dlapoaal 
by the dmiee) lee#  miy oap lt#! tranafor t m  paid by 
the dowe# If$  In oouree of the ep p lloa tioa , m other 
'Dhjwtlonahle^ diapDSltiea ig; iw ealod^ the oow t may 
exeralae the same powere iJii reapeot thereof zag; la  reepeet 
o f tW  orig in a l applj.ootlom*
In deol#.h0: whether to  mzerelBe it#  powers, the 
oeurt ehmll hmr# rrc g -jrd to  the olre%%mstaaa#8 Ih which othe dl^poaltioD wns zicide, and w%y vmlAmblo oonaldoratloa'^ 
g i^voh thorefor^ the rolatlomehlp» i f  m y , of the donee 
to  tw  deoewed.^ the coaàw t end f immolai re$ouro#a of  ^
the x%nd a l l  the oth#%" eireim#t%m:oa of the oaee#'^
"DlBpoBltlon" êooB hot laolu&e my provloloa l a  a w ill ,  
any w^^dmatlon auah w  mentioned la  o r my
dona bio rx r 'tlr  o r my eppolatmmit of property
mi'do, olïl'urwiço than by w i l l ,  iJR the mcerolBo o f a 
apedial po%mr of "W t, subjoet to  tkOBO
exception#, Imoludee my of zmaey (imeludiag
the peymemt of a w dor m policy of aemwsmo#)
md my eemveyamee, w ew m oe, appointment or g i f t  of 
propfarty of any deew lp tlon , #!$th#r imdo by w% 
Inatmmemt /
■tf3vi<c.*l. SV.-H if # i. i-4'J-iW!
1* #*4U*0 ,  " v a lu ^ u ii  ^ n u i i u c r U f i  4 1* do00 r o t  ia o lm d e  m a r r ia g e  or BYpiojlBo of p (#*25(1))Lt;
9 0 6 .
/jinstrument or otherwise", but the provisions do net 
a p p l y  to a n y  disposition made before the comienoement 
of the Act (1st April, 1976),
Where the court is satisfied that the deceased 
(after commeiicem.ent of the Act) had contracted that 
money or property would be left by will or transferred 
out of his estate to any person, and the contract was 
made with intent to defeat an application under the 
Act for financial provision,^ and that full valuable 
consideration was not given by the donee, and that 
the exercise of the powers conferred would facilitate 
the making of financial provision for the applicant 
under the Act, the court may maize an order against the 
donee, if the money has been paid or the property 
transferred, 03?, if not, on order directing the personal 
representatives not to pay or transfer, or only to pay 
or transfer in accordance with the terms of the order.
The powers of the court may be exercised only to the 
extent that the court considers the value of the contract 
exceeded the value given in consideration and "the court 
shall have regard to the value of the property at the 
date of the hearing."^ In addition, the decision 
whether and in what manner to exercise the powers shall 
be taken in the light of the circumstances in which the 
contract was made, the relationship, if any, of the 
donee /
1. S .10(7).2* How is the court to be satisfied upon the point?The answer is supplied by s.12(1); the condition(that "the court shall be satisfied that") shall befulfilled "if the court is of the opinion that, on a balon.ce of probabilities, the intention of the deceased (though not necessarily his sole intention) in m.alzing the disposition or contract" was to prevent or reduce a future financial provision under the Act, unless (in a s.11 case) no consideration was given, in which case there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the intention was to defeat an application for financial provision under the Act.3* 8 .11 (5 ) .
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donee to the deceased, the conduct and financial 
resources of the donee "and all the other circumstances 
of the case."
It is a most English Act; the court, when making 
a Sft.10 or s#11 order may make such consequential 
directions as it thinks fit to give effect to the order 
"or for securing a fair adjustment of the rights of the 
persons affected thereby"*^ This must he read in 
conjunction with s.11(5) "the rights of any person to
enforce that contract or to recover damages or to obtain 
other relief for the breach thereof shall be subject to 
any adjustment made by the court under s»12(5) of this 
Act and shall survive to such extent only as is 
consistent with giving effect to the terms of that order,"
Through judicial discretion shall the solution 
be achieved.
This is not a fmniliar manner of reform in Scots 
law and it is to be hoped that, however worthy the 
cause and however attractive speed of action, it will 
not become so*
Orders against the donee, or applications made by 
him,^ may be made against or by his personal representative, 
but the powers of the court shall not extend to property 
which was part of the donee's estate, and which has been 
distributed by the personal representative, and the 
latter shall not be liable for distribution made before 
notice is received of the making of sai application on 
the ground that "he ought to have taken into account the 
possibility that such an application would be made*"^'
Special /
1 * s S» 11 (4) #2 , 8 .1 2 ( 5 ) ,5 . that is, under 8 .10(5 ); 'other objectionable disposition'«4. 8.12(4)(b).
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Special provisions are made (s.13) where orders
are made in respect of dispositions made by the
deceased to any person as a trustee: in respect of
dispositions consisting of the payment of money, the
trustee shall not be ordered to pay more than the
money and/or the value of property representing the
money or derived therefrom which is at the date of
the order in the hands of the trustee, or, in respect
of a transfer of property, the order shall not exceed
'bhe aggregate of the value at the date of the order
of so much of that property and the value of property
representing that property or derived therefrom as is
at that date in the hands of the trustee. The trustee
shall not be liable for distribution of money or
property on the ground that "he oufÿit to have taken
into account the possibility that such an application
would be made"# In such circumstances, any reference
in s.10 or s.11 to the 'donee* shall be construed as
including a reference to the trustee(s) for the time2being of the trust in question#
If the applicant was entitled to receive from the 
deceased secured periodical payments at the time of 
death, the court may discharge or vary the earlier 
order in the light of all the circumstances including 
any order proposed to be made under the 1975 Act»^
A similar power is given^^ in respect of maintenance 
agreements previously agreed between the parties to the 
marriage.
Where application is made for variation or discharge 
of a secured periodical payments order or for alteration 
of a maintenance agreement after the death of the 'debtor* 
spouse, the court shall have power to direct that the 
application /
1 . 8 .1 3 ( 2 '2. 3.15(5,3. 3.16.4 .  s . 17.
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application be deemed to have been aocompanied by an 
ap p llo a tio e  for' an order mMor tire 1979 AOt$i and 
thf^i court %bell the appropriaim powcex^  which it
would have had, had a a#2 (1979 Aot) application boon 
ma.do# ^
There ie jmrB:i:<liotion in the Ooimty Court to hear 
8*2 applioatione wliora tho valuo of tho not estate of 
t3%e &e#@R#ed a t  death  doo# not o^coeod £g*000 o r euoh 
aa bo fix ed  from to  time o rder 
of th e  boiTd Ghancollor»^' "Not oeta to" la  doflmod :Ui .
0»25 (Zat\)rp3:'0ta.ti(m S ection) mid ii; dooa n o t ajppo^ar 
that 'ostatot 1# limited, to movoablo estate, The 
fji^ anoiol of the ooimty oouz't oaoi^ ts, therefore $
low Indeed * Most ap p llea tio n e  must bo h.oard In  the  
high Court* ^ The gneo%v,0, usefu.leoo%> of the Sheriff 
Court 1# thrown Into reliefs of oourso* wile dl#ar#tiom 
1(3 eonfarrod upon the julgo:^  by thlw Act, end perhare 
thore we.cz littlo cnthealasm for the graait of a wido 
dlooretioa to that wbieh iB an. inferior court*
Wbero an order is made* the terms of tho will 
ord/or the ruloa of Intoutaoy* otherwise applicable, 
a'jiall be GUbject thorotog ordoisnAuo in fm/our of 
a fommi' Bpoum, or a judicially oo%)aratcd Bpnuao^ .shall 
terminate? except with regard to arroara% on tho re^ 
marriag;e of that and a copy of ovory or&ar #h&Il
bo filed at t3xe principal of the .S'aRd.ly Dlvlaioa,
a mcnor^m&nm of the o rd e r " s h a ll  be encloraccl oiig o r 
peraaaon tly  annoxod to^ the  probatq o r l e t t e r s  of 
ad m in is tra tio n  /
1* but not If$ in on earllor dooroo of divorce? nullity o r ju d ic ia l  separation? in  term# of #d15( l ) )  a  oubhoc^,emt (#plio&tiw %wwpootively W l  been, doclcrod inoompot&nt*^ (#*$* "net (a) "mil pjconorty ofwhich khe doooaood M d  power to <1\ pooo by hi# will#»*"; "pro%)orty" inoirC os any ohoco in  ...uLom*) ip Ohmicery'Divlmlo^i o r Family Dlvi:%ior? a# aoom#a^>proprlate* Martya? pp*4l-^.0» % . /
^  JOiTio ;^/JT, : Û e u jü J ^  Cfsru^A4 V u ^ s h ^ ù ^ r u  ^luUù^'huACü
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a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r  v r l ix o h  t h e  e s t a t e  a s  b e i n g  
a d m i n i s t e r e d # "
N o  l i a b i l i t y  s h a l l  a t t a c h  t o  t h e  p e r s o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  d e c e a s e d  if? a f t e r  t h e  p a s s i n g  
o f  s i x  m o n t h s  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  o n  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  e s t a t e  i s  f i r s t  t a l c  e n  o u t  h e  
s h a l l  h a v e  d i s t r i b u t e d  a n y  p a r t  o f  t h e  e s t a t e ,  a l t h o u g hp
r e m e d i e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t e d  e s t a t e  a s  p r e v i o u s l y  
d e s c r i b e d  a r e  a v a i l a b l e #  I t  c a n n o t  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  
t h e  p e r s o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o u g h t  t o  h a v e  t a k e n  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  A c t #  I f  
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i s  o r d e r e d  t o  m a k e  a  payment o u t  
o f  t h e  e s t a t e  f o r  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a n t - ^  
n o  l i a b i l i t y  s h a l l  a t t a c h  t o  h i m  i f  t h e  e s t a t e  i s  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  " u n l e s s  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  p a y m e n t  
h e  h a s  r e a s o n a b l e  c a u s e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  e s t a t e  
i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  # I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c o n t r a c t u a l  
a r r a n g e m e n t s  m a d e  b y  t h e  d e c e a s e d  w h i c h  t h e  p e r s o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  " h a s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e "  t h e  d e c e a s e d  
e n t e r e d  i n t o  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  d e f e a t i n g  a n  
a p p l i c a t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  A c t ?  t h e  p e r s o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
m a y  p o s t p o n e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t ?  w h a t e v e r  
i t s  t e r m s ,  u n t i l  t h e  e x p i r y  o f  s i x  m o n t h s  f r o m  t h e  
t a k i n g  o u t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  o x ‘ u n t i l  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
o f  s * 2  p r o c e e d i n g s  i f  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a  s . 2  o r d e r  i s  m a d e  
d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d # ^
A l l  /
1# 8 .1 9 .2. that is, against the donee. See supra.5# under s#5*4. (if it should transpire that in truth the estate was insufficient to meet the interim order: a#5(1): "Where##*it appears to the court - that property can be made available: Current Law Annotations to Statute, 3*5(1))#5. This authorises the personal representative to refuse to perform obligations under such a contracts it is not clear whether, if he does implement the contract within the six month period, he does so at his own risk, as is the case (s#20(1)) with regard to distribution /
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A l l  I n  a l l ,  t h i s  i s  a  v e r y  E n g l i s h  s o l u t i o n  t o  
a  p r o b l e m  e n c o t m t e r e d  b y  e v e r y  s y s t e m  o f  l a w  w h i c h  
c o n t a i n s  r u l e s  c o n c e r n i n g  f a m i l y  l a w  a n d  s u c c e s s i o n .
miVATE FINMTCIAL AGmSmENTB BETWEEN THE PARTIE8
I n  E n g l a n d ,  " s e p a r a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t s "  a r e  v a l i d ,  
" p r o v i d e d  t h e  separation h a s  a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d  o r  i s  
inevitable#" A s e p a r a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t  u s u a l l y  w i l lp
c o n t a i n  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s ,  a n d  G r e t n e y  r e l a t e s ” 
t h a t  a t  common l a w  t h e  E n g l i s h  c o u r t s  t o o k  t h e  v i e w  
t h a t  it w a s  c o n t r a  b o n o s  m o r e s  for a  w o m a n  t o  " s i g n  
a w a y  /
distribution generally of the estate* However, if the contract has been implemented, 8*11 envisages that on order may be made against the donee (transferee: in what, in this instance and generally, does the personal representative's liability consist? If the circumstances merit an award, and the award cannot be enforced by reason of actings of the personal representative within the six month period, is the latter to be liable to the applicant to the extent of the award or perhaps to an extent specified by the court in its discretion? As to general distribution (s#20(1))* the personal representative's protection arises upon the expiry of the six month period whether or not application proceedings have been set in motion# In a B#20(3)(contract) case, it would seem prudent for the personal representative to postpone payment or transfer until determination of proceedings brought within the six month period, for his statutory authorisation covers such an eventuality, and possibly it is arguable that by inference protection would not be afforded if he proceeded in the face of the prospective litigation; however the question is one for judicial interpretation perhaps of the relationship if any between s.20(1) and 8.20(3)# The reason for the six month time limit is that, after the expiry of that period, a s#2 application may be made only with permission of the court. (s#4)* However, personal representatives "should not adopt a purely negative attitude" to requests for payment within the time limit see Hartyn, pp#6/7.1* Oretney, 3rd edn*, p*367* Agreements which are purely maintenance agreements are competent.2. p.368#
away" her right of recourse to the courts to fix 
maintenance, since " T he wife's right to future 
maintenance is a matter of public concern which she 
cannot barter away#"
The courts will pay great regard to the partiee* 
own agreement, but may increase or decrease the amount 
payable if there has been a change in circumstances#
Formal expression of these principles was made in 
the Maintenance Agreements Act, 1957$ as amended by 
the 1 9 7 0  Act* ss*15'”15» Upon change of circumstances 
either party may apply to the court for a variation of 
the terms of the agreement# In general* such agreements 
should be binding as between the parties. The statutory 
provisions are concerned with written agreements ; 
regulation of oral agreements rests on common law*
A provision which seeks to oust the jurisdictionoof the court is void#*^ The court in the exercise of 
its jurisdiction has wide-ranging powers, including 
revocation as well as variation of the agreement, and 
insertion of new arrangements for the benefit of one 
of the parties thereto or "a child of the family."
%These are matters entirely within the court's discretion#^ 
If there is a maintenance agreement and each of the 
parties thereto is domiciled or resident in England and 
Wales* either party may apply to the court or a magistrates' 
court for alteration thereof*^ "Maintenance agreement" 
means /
1. M.O.A* 1 9 7 5 $ 88*54-36# See generally Gretney,
p p . 5 6 9 -3 7 1 .2# Of. So.Law Oom.Memo#No.22* 8*104 et sea and Facultyf E»tSSB» «JlMSJWSifResponse * pp.76-80.5. "If the court,...is satisfied either - that by reason of a change in the circumstances the agreement should be altered...." (s.55(2))# Such alterations (including insertion of financial arrangements) may be made "as may appear to that court" (court or magistrates* court) "to be just * having regard to all the circumstances" and if relevant, the factors mentioned in 8 .2 5 (5 ), (8.55(2)).4, s . 55#
9 1 : $
means any written agreement containing financial 
arrangements whether made during the continuance or 
after the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, or 
a separation agreement which contains no financial 
afrangements in a case whore no other written agreement/Ibetween the same parties contains such arrangements*pOretney points out that the term "financial arrangements" 
has a broad scope, and may encompass subjects such as 
use of property, maintenance and education of any child 
("whether or not a child of the family"), and rights 
and liabilities of spouses includ.ing former spouses 
rendered so by divorce or nullity*
Grounds for variation are lack of "proper financial 
arrangements" in the deed for any child of the family, 
or changes in circumstances (including changes foreseen 
by the parties) and that, by reason of a change in the 
circumstances in the light of which financial arrangements 
were made or omitted, the agreement may be a l t e r e d   ^
or there may be inserted in it financial 
arrangements*
"Apart from the normal 
case of a variation of periodical payments, this means 
that the court could vary agreements about the ownership 
and. occupation of the matrimonial home (or furniture) *
More surprisingly, it seems clear from the plain words 
of the definition that the court has power to insert a 
provision for a lump sum or other capital provision 
into an agreement, in sharp contrast to the prohibition 
on varying court orders for periodical payments in this 
way* fhis point was left open in Pace (formerly Doe) v* 
Doe" ( 1977 Pam*,18,2^), however* Even if it is held 
that /
1 .  8 , 3 4 ( 2 ) .2. p.231.3. 8.35(2).
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that such power exists the court may, in the exercise 
of its discretion, he reluctant to exercise it",
Ihe væ?iation cannot be formulated so as to/|remain in effect after the payee's re-marxdage ; 
if the agreement makes provision for continuation of 
payment after the death of either party, there is power 
to the survivor or to the deceased*s representatives 
within six months of the taking-out of representationpto apply for variation #
financial agreements in contemplation of divorce
are competent and if, after investigation, are given3effect to by the court, will be final, and, according 
to Cretney, probably will become much more common^. 
Long-term separation agreements have advantages and 
dis advant ages,
riHAiiOiAL m o v is io E  ON ION q_ir m m iA O B
OTEBR IhA N  BY DBAIE
In this sphere, one notable difference between 
English and Scots Law is that in England "fundamentally 
different codes apply" in the Superior Courts and in 
the Magistrates* Courts, At present in Scotland there 
is but one court competent to grant divorce or nullity^, 
and in the case of judicial separation, no difference 
is discernible between the approach and principles in 
use in the Oourt of .Session and in the Sheriff Courts.
OHE /
'imetsjma
1, Cretney, 5rd edn,, p,571*2. a,^6*5 ,  M in to n  1979 1 A l l  E * E .7 9 . C r e tn e y ,  p p . 5 7 5 -4 .1^-. Oretney, pp. 572-5.5. Contrast Scottish and English approaches to the subject of the financial and property consequences of nullity.6, Séparation actions are heard mainly by the Sheriff Courts* See as to procedure in each court Sc.Law Comm .Memo *N 0, 2 2 ,  2,205-208. put s e e ,  as to  S co t la n d ,  
D ivorce J u r i s d i c t i o n ,  Court Fees and Legal Aid ( S c . )  P i l l .CLb to fee
^-PtSfcrâoJS A v
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mi'; SÜF4HI0H CO'OPÆSs ordera potentially available
lühat which a Scots lawyer would term "interim 
aliment pendente lite" is available to either spouse4fr*fMmiw.«wsM*wHne.r*'gewcz3iV . *“
Upon o rd e r  o f  th e  c o u r t .
Upon grant of decree of divorce, nullity oroseparation, the court may order either spouse to make 
periodical payments, as specified in sise and duration 
by the order, to the other, or an order that either 
spouse shall "secure" such payments to the other.^ An 
order for the periodical payment of money ceases 
automatically upon the payee’s 3?e-marriage.^ *’
In terms of s*25(1)(c) of the 1973 Act, the 
court is empowex’ed to order either party in divorce, 
judicial /
1. M.O.A, 1973% 8,22.2. Ibid., 8.25(1),5# Ihns means that the payer spouse must set asidefor the purpose a suitable capital sum, which Cretney at p»187 notes will be vested usually in trustees; thus, if the payer fails to fulfil his obligations, resort can be had to this fund. Unless and until such an event occm^s, the payer remains the proprietor of the fund# Ihis is a most useful provisions contrast the unsatisfactory Scottish position concerning periodical payments (see e.g. Ohapter 4, "Enforcement of Alimentaz?y Awards"). Cretney points out that the order remains enforceable and the fund attachable by the wife in the husband’s bankruptcy (among other disastrous happenings befalling the husband). Moreover, although it might be thought inéquitable for unsecured payments to continue after the payer’s death,""%iere there is a security fund, it can then be drawn upon without doing violence to the remainder of the estate, which for example might be destined for a second wife). It may be that the seou3?ity is provided by a second mortgage on the house (Parker v.]?. 1 9 7 2  Pam.116. See Oretney, pp. 187/188).4, 1 9 7 5  Act, 8.28(1), This was not always so (thechange having been made by the 1970 Act, s#21 (1 )), and Cretney (p.188) regrets the change in the rule.
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judicial separation or nullity proceedings to pay 
to the other a lump sum, if necessary in the form
o f  ( s e c u r e d )  i n s t a l m e n t s .
Orders of periodical payments and/or of a 
lump sum may he made in favour of children or in 
favour of persons on behalf of children*
Provisions concerning the lump sum and the 
periodical payment are not mutually exclusive. Both 
may be made in one case.
VARIATION
A periodical, payment order may be varied upon 
p r o o f  o f  c h a n g e  o f  circumstancos, T h e r e  cannot be
variation of a lump sum award, except in respect of 
matters concerning the details of instalment payment,
U p o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  for v a r i a t i o n  o f  a  periodical p a y m e n t  
a w a r d ,  t h e  c o u r t  s h a l l  not m a k e  i n s t e a d  a  lump sum 
award. Where originally no capital sum award was made
(presumably irrespective of w h e t h e r  a  periodical paymentoorder was made) it is oompetenf^ for a party subsequently 
to apply to the court f o r  s u c h  an award, but O r e t n e y  
r e m a r k s ^ ,  " t h e  court will not a l l o w  t h e  declared p o l i c y  
of the Act to be outflanked in this way unless there 
are s p e c i a l  circumstances *"
To this point, there is considerable similarity 
between t h e  E n g l i s h  a n d  Scottish^ rules.
In t e r m s  of s , 2 4  of t h e  1 9 7 3  A c t ,  t h e  court, on 
g r a n t i n g  d e c r e e  o f  d i v o r c e ,  nullity, or judicial 
separation may order a transfer of property from one
p a r t y  to t h e  o t h e r  or to a  child or c h i l d r e n ,  whether 
t h e  /
1 . 8 ,25(1 ),
2 .  8 * 2 5 ( 1 ) ,5* P , 5 4 2 ,4, See Oh#kpter 5,
9 1 7
the p r o p e r t y  is in possession or in reversion, o r
to vary, o r  extinguish, o r  alter the terms of benefit
of any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial marriage settlement,
or to make a  new settlement, the terms of which the
o o u r t  w i l l  s p e c i f y *  The rem edy o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r r i n g
of specific property may be given as an alternativeior in addition to a lump sum order.
The e x e r c i s e  o f  th e  c o u r t ' s  d i s c r e t i o n  i s  t o  be  
g u id e d  b y  c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  s t a t u t o r i l y  s p e c i f i e d ,  and
p r e - 1 9 7 0  p r e c e d e n t  i s  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  t o  b e  u s e d  i nPt h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  new c r i t e r i a *  S ev en  
f a c t o r s  are s e t  down. These are : - incom e and r e s o u r c e s  
o f  the p a r t i e s ,  now and i n  the foreseeable future, 
financial needs and responsibilities of the parties 
now and i n  the foreseeable f u tu r e *  standard of l i v i n g
o f  t h e  f a m i ly  b e f o r e  brealcdown* age  o f  e a c h  p a r t n e r%an d  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m arriage ," '^  an y  p h y s i c a l  o r  m e n ta l
disability o f  either, "the contributions made b y  each 
of the parties to the w e l f a r e  of the f a m i ly ,  i n c l u d i n g  
any contribution made b y  lo o k in g  after the home o r  
o a r in g  f o r  t h e  f a m i ly ;  a n d , i n  d iv o r c e  o r  n u l l i t y ,  
the value to  either spouse of any benefit (for axasiple, 
a p e n s io n ^ )  which, by reason of the dissolution or 
n u l l i t y ,  that p a r t y  has lost the change of a c q u ir in g *
The o o u r t ,  h a v in g  h a d  r e g a r d  t o  t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  i s  
e n jo in e d  "so  to exercise those" (discretionary) "pow ers 
as to place the parties, so f a r  as i t  i s  practicable 
and, h a v in g  r e g a r d  to t h e i r  conduct, just t o  do so^, i n  
the /
1 * See O r e tn e y ,  p.280*2 .  I b i d ^ , p .2 8 4 *5* Of* uérman and Scandinavian ideas,
4 .  8 * 2 5 ( 1 ) ( f ) ,5* O re tn e y  p.304 comments that the h u s b a n d ’s  p r i v a t e  occupational pension may be the sp o u se s*  " o n ly  substantial asset" next to the matrimonial home*6* N o te  t h e  c r e e p in g  e n tro n o e  o f  'c o n d u c t*  a s  a  c r i t e r i o n .
O f. Memo*No#22, 3#1 ^  seq  and F a c u l ty  R esp o n se  pp*
5 O -5 5 # As m a t t e r s  have turned o u t  i n  E n g la n d , it appears t h a t  o n ly  "obvious and gross" m is c o n d u c t, such as to make it "repugnant to justice" to award s u p p o r t  to t h e  perpetrator t h e r e o f ,  w i l l  be taken into account, ( t h e  W a c h te l Pt^ucipCe ^ UaQ^ Ac J e ru ^
< h e^  Acis •. - O  'S La '«%U4.erU AtÆ Tuax. Cteij,
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the financial position in which they would have been 
if the marriage had not broken down and each had 
properly discharged his or her financial obligations 
and responsibilities towards the other."
Courts are not fond of permitting any judicial
habit to be regarded as a rule; hence, although one
third of the erstwhile joint income and one third of
"family assets" often will be given to the wife,?reliance cannot always be placed on this”. Certainly, 
the courts must be free to award a larger or smaller 
fraction as circumstances suggest.
In the era of the Welfare State, and of a rising
rate of divorce and re-marriage, social security
payments are important. However, the court, when
first ascertaining the parties* means, will not pay%regard to the 'social security aspect* Thus, 
although if a man's payments to his former wife are 
small, she may be entitled to supplementary benefit, 
an award will not be made for the purpose of allowing 
a man to slough off his responsibility, and to rely 
on the State.^ As to the sensitive subject of the
significance of a wife * s earning capacity, although few 
would argue that her actual earning capacity is not 
relevant, few (although perhaps more, as time progresses) 
might demand that the childless wife qualified to earn 
a /
p. TfA) • Moreover, the parties may be, as it were, pari delicto"* each being as bad as the other, in whrcE'case conduct will not impinge upon property distribution. (See Oretney, pp.194/5.)1. 8 .2 5 ( 1 ) .2. Oretney, p.195, and cases cited footnote 61.5. The Scottish judicial attitude is the same: seesupra. Chapter 4.4. Of. Aliment (Ohapter 4) and Divorce (Ohapter 5(D)? Memo.Ho.22, Part V Relationship between Public and Private Law and Faculty 'Response; Oretney, pp.258- 
2 5 2 , "Supplementary Benefit and Other Social Security Provision". 0. & W., p.590 ^  seq, pp.555-4, and pp * 562-5.
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a living must do so, in order to lessen the burden 
upon her (deserting) husband's income and/or upon 
the State. This matter has been discussed in the 
Scottish context. Attitudes are changing, and, 
as the years go on, most people will be 'married 
people* for at least some years, and most people will 
be members of the (paid) work force for many years.
In England, at present, the attitude seems to be that 
the young and able-bodied wife, relatively free of 
family responsibilities, "should not necessarily 
expect" as large an award as the older woman who has 
spent many years caring for family and home, and in 
respect of whom it may be unreasonable to expect her 
later years to be spent in paid employment. It seems 
reasonable that the courts should recognise newpphilosophies of life, and should insist, in a suitable 
case /
1. Chapter 5(1) and see Chapter 7,The philosophy of the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 (a3.beit with the addition of new statutory property regulation) and of the Divorce (Sc.) Act, 1976 seems to have been that, at least as far as dissolution of marriage (as opposed to property consequenceij is concerned, the 'innocent* party, whether or not economically weaker, may rest no longer in the safe anchorage of legally blameless conduct.2. and realities of life: however, an award in favourof a husband is still a sufficiently rare event to excite press comment - see recent Scottish case of Henderson (Glasgow Herald 6/4/79), in which a capital award 'of'''')u1900 (amount sued for being £5 0 0 0 ) against the wife was ordered. It appears that the sum awarded represented one-third of the wife's interest in the jointly owned home. The wife was aged 28, and earned £100 per week tax-free as a secretary in Qatar. The husband was aged 30, and earned £85per week as a panel beater. The wife's rent was low (£15"£20 per month). The ground of divorce was the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as evidenced by the wife's adultery.
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case, that the new woman live up to her I d e a l s ,  The 
presence or absence of children and the arrangements 
made for the care of them, must be a factor of great 
importance.
Another problem common to both jurisdictions is 
the treatment of the interests of the former spouse 
and of the mistress. I n  England, it appears that a 
spouse must take her spouse as she finds him, 
encumbered, if it so happens, by former families and 
responsibilities,^ which is the rule in Scotland, 
but that, w here  making an award to a second wife after 
dissolution of the second marriage, strict arithmeticalpaccuracy may not be appropriate. Similarly, the 
p r e s e n c e  of a mistress may be "taken into account". In 
Scotland, the mistress is despatched to oblivion and 
her existence does not (or so it is said) weigh with 
the court, although enforceability of the award surely 
must be an important, even i f  sometimes unspoken, 
consideration.
MAGISTRATES' POWERS
The magistrates* courts, originally designed to 
provide justice for the poor, still do not claim the 
attention of the more prosperous classes in the resolution 
of disputes. The magistrates* courts in their 
matrimonial jurisdiction (maintenance and custody^) deal 
with /
1 .  G .,  p . 1 9 8 .2. See 0.*s example, ibid. The author suggests (see p.198, fn.lG and cases there cited) that the new divorce legislation may operate in such a way that the claims of the %fife, and of t h e  mistress, are strengthened and weakened, respectively. I f  so, this is an example of a concept perhaps alien to the basis of the Act, yet one which such an Act may inevitably b r i n g  in its train, to ofJ^ efe the potential harshness of its liberalism*3. though s e e  extension of powers - Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates* Courts Act, 1978 (below).
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with those at the lower end of the income scale: in
consequence, "the substantive law must he viewed in 
the context of its inter-relation with the Social 
Security System."
Until 1978, the Act of principal importance was
the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates* Courts) Act,
I960* Relief was obtainable if either spouse could
prove an offence, such as desertion, adultery orP"persistent" cruelty. Hence, the matrimonial offence 
lived on in the magistrates* courts. The relief 
offered was an order for periodical payment or a 
separation order,^ but there was no power to the
magistrates to award a lump sum nor to order a secured. . 4provision.
The remedy of a financial order arising from 
"wilful" failure to maintain may be pursued in the 
High Court or in the Magistrates* Courts. Originally, 
at common law, the wife could have recourse to the 
ecclesiastical court or she could rely upon the agency 
of /
1. C., p.211*2. The adjective differentiates this ground from "the old divorce ground of cruelty" -Q&etney.3* The separation order, which has now been abolished and replaced by the protection order (s.16 below: not so called in the Act) and the exclusion order (for which either party (to a marriage) may apply (contrast 1976 Act)), was able to be obtained by a wife, but not a husband, on proof of an offence^ So long as she herself had not committed adultery which had not been condoned, connived at or "by wilfp.1 neglect or misconducu conduced to". On receipt of a separation order, the applicant was no longer bound to cohabit with the respondent, but the latter was not thereby removed from the matrimonial home, and the separation order also terminated the running of a period of desertion. (See Annotations to Statute, s.16).4. Even under the 1978 Act (q.v.), there is no power to order the latter.
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of necessity •
It seemed strange that there should he in the 
same jurisdiction two sets of courts, one applying 
the old notion o f  offence, and one applying the newpphilosophy. A different family law appeared to he 
administered b y  each. The assimilation of the two 
has now been attempted by the Domestic Proceedings 
and Magistrates* Courts Act, 1978,^ which repeals 
in its entirety the Act of 1960, and is a l e n g th y  
piece of legislation extending to 90 sections.
The points o f  greatest importance"^ ** are t h a t  lump 
sum orders may now be made b y  magistrates, to a limit 
o f  /
1 . The E n g l i s h  agency was "irrevocable" in the sense that it could not be revoked by any act of the husband ( 0 . ,  p . 2 1 8 /2 1 9 ) :  th e  Scots praeposituramay be revoked in the manner earlier explained (Chapter 4 ), but th e  wife, unless she isnot willing to adhere, does not lose h e r  r i g h t  to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries (for w h a t that right is worth) if he refuses to maintain her. (See e.g. 0. & W., pp.263-5)*In England, t h e  agency was terminated by commission by the wife of an act removing from  th e  husband his duty to  maintain (adultery, cruelty, desertion): ashas been seen, in Scots law, adultery b y  th e  wife combined with her willingness to adhere does not relieve the husband o f  his d u ty  to  aliment, if otherwise exigible.Since it was competent f o r  the courts directly t o  enforce the husband * s d u ty  in this regard, the wife's agency of necessity was abolished as an anachronism by the 1970 Act. (6., p.273)*2. It might have been a system which suited the casesand circumstances ; but see criticism, Oretney, pp.
2 1 6 /2 1 7  and  2 2 4 .3. following Law Com. (Report on Matrimonial Proceedings in Magistrates' Courts, Law Oom.Ho.77, October 1976).4. See Annotations to Statute (M.D.A.Freeman)
Yujt rutîCe J’T^ CC. fV
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of £300 î an order may be obtained to the effect that
the respondent (of either sex) shall not use violence
against the applicant or a child of the family and, if
violence has been used, or there has been a threat of
violence and the use of violence against some other
person, o r  if in contravention of an order t h e r e  has
been a threat of violence against the applicant or a
child of th e  family and ( as a general, additional,
requirement in any of these cases) there is danger of
physical injury to t h e  applicant or a c h i l d  of the
family, t h e n  t h e  court may o r d e r  th e  respondent to
leave the matrimonial home and/or prohibit the
respondent from entering the matrimonial home. T h ere
Pmay b e  "expedited orders'* in suitable cases , but in 
such a case the order shall not take effect until the 
date on which notice of the order is served on the 
respondent, or such later date as t h e  court may specify, 
and the order shall cease to have e f f e c t  on the expiry 
o f  28 days from the making of the order, or the date 
o f  commencement o f  the hearing of the application for 
an order under this section (16) of the Act, whichever 
is the earlier, A power of afreet may be attached 
(s,18) to a s.16 order if the court is satisfied that 
the respondent has physically injured the applicant or 
a child of the f a m i ly  and considers that he/she is 
likely to do so again. Where no power of a r r e s t  has 
been attached, and where the applicant for the (s,16) 
order /
————— C o u u v t  , (NJ CK C h w 'tA  f f y  M A jt )  .1, but magistrates may not make property transfer orders, not o r d e r  secured periodical payments,2, such an order being effective though no summons has been served on the respondent or none has been served within a reasonable tim e  before the hearing of th e  application o r  though the summons served requires the respondent to appear at some othertime or place* In these matters speed is important. Of. So, Law Com. Memo, No.41 ("Occupancy Rights in the Matrimonial Home and Domestic Violence" - April, 1978), Propn, 12 (2,62) and Fac. Resp. criticisms, p . 2 3 ,
924.
order considers that the other party has disobeyed 
the order, he/she may apply to a J.P. of the area 
in which either party ordinarily resides for the 
issue of a warrant for the arrest of the other party.
The application must be substantiated on oath, and 
the justice must have reasonable grounds for believing 
that the other party to the marriage has disobeyed 
the order.
In terms of s.1 of the Act, either party to a 
marriage may apply to a magistrates* court for an/jorder for financial provision (s,2 ), on the ground 
that the other has failed to provide reasonable 
maintenance for the applicant or to provide, or to 
make proper contribution towards, reasonable maintenance 
for any child of the family, or has behaved in such a 
way that the applicant cannot reasonably be expected 
to live with the respondent, or has deserted the 
applicant.
H e r e  t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  p o i n t s  o f  i m p o r t a n c e .
Either party (to a marriage) may apply for an order. 
Under the 1960 Act, a wife might be ordered to maintain 
her husband only where he could not maintain himself.
The principle of equality of duty is introduced. It 
exists now in English divorce law . It is no longer 
necessary that there had been wilful failure to maintain 
by the party against whom an order is made (i.e. that 
(he) was under a common law obligation to maintain his 
wife (the payee))
Cohabitation is not a necessary bar to application,
if /
1. that is, for periodical payments, for such termas may be specified in the order,(to the applicant and/or to the applicant for the benefit of a child of the family and/or to such child and/or to such person/s) the payment of a lump sum (not in excess 
o f  £ 3 0 0 ) .2. Galderbank v . 0 . 1976 F am. 95*
3 #  O retney, p .336.
9 2 3
i f  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  h a s  l i t t l e  c h o i c e  b u t  t o  r e m a i n  
w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t *  T h i s  s e e m s  t o  b e  o f  l è s s ; 5  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h a n  m ig h t b e  t h o u g h t  a t  f i r s t  ; t h e  
com m ents u p o n  t h e  A c t  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
w h e t h e r  c o h a b i t a t i o n  a f t e r  a n  i n c i d e n t  m e a n s  t h a t  
i t  c a n n o t  b e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  " c a n n o t  r e a s o n a b l y  
b e  e x p e c te d  t o  l i v e  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t . "  T h e  
p r o v i s i o n  ( s * 1 ( c ) )  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  e n a b l e  a  ' w i f e . . .  
t o  e s c a p e  f r o m  h e r  h u s b a n d *  «
Section 3 contains guidelines to which the court 
"shall have regard" when considering an application 
under s.2, These are:- present and future income 
and financial resources, needs and responsibilities 
of each, standard of living previously e n jo y e d  by the 
parties to the marriage, age of each party to the 
marriage and duration of the marriage, any physical 
or mental disability of either of the parties to the 
marriage, contributions made by each to the w e lf a r e  
o f  the family, "including any contribution made by 
lo o k in g  after the home or caring f o r  the family, and, 
(s.3(1)(g)), "any other matter w h ich  in the circumstances 
o f  th e  case the court may consider relevant, including, 
so far as it is just to take i t  into account, the 
conduct of each of the parties in relation to the 
marriage *" The "Wachtel principle" is to the effect 
that, quoad the 1973 Act, only "obvious and gross" 
conduct should be relevant* Possibly that lead will 
be /
1 * I t  m a y  b e  t h o u g h t  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  u r g e n tneeds of the wife today is that she should be able to insist upon receipt of a reasonable proportion of the money earned by the husband during cohabitation - or owned by the husband? Would the aim be secured maintenance or property adjustment? Of*. Chapter 7 - ’Separation of Property With Concurrent Compensation of Gains’. See also Memo#Eo.22, 2*179 and Fac*
R e s p *  p p . 4 1 / 4 2 .2. O r e tn e y ,  p *348.
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be taken; yet within the Wachtel principle there 
is room for variation of opinion as to what is 
"obvious and gross". ‘ Although conduct is relevant. 
Freeman notes that not only has adultery ceased 
to be an automatic bar to an award but it is no 
longer a ground for the making of an order.
9 2 7 .
liEGISMTION 1969 -  1978
As is well known, the Divorce Reform Act, 1969, 
introduced into English law as the new, and sole, 
ground of divorce the gi*ound that the marriage has 
b ro k e n  down irretrievably.
The court is entitled to hold that irretrievable 
breakdown has occurred if it is proved that any one, 
or more, of five factors is present. This obviates 
the need for a thorough investigation of all the 
circumstances of every marriage sought to be dissolved, 
an idea advanced by the Archbishop of Canterbury's 
Group ("Putting Asunder", 1966), and rejected subsequently 
by  the Law Commission as lengthy, expensive and 
impracticable* The prohibition*^ of the bringing of 
divorce proceedings within three years of the celebration 
of the marriage, except with judicial permission, to 
be granted o n ly  in an exceptional case, remained in 1969, 
but was repealed and replaced by a rule to similar effect 
i n  the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 (s.3). Of course, 
events which took place within the three-year period 
competently may be referred to to found an action 
thereafter (s.3(4))* The factors are merely "guidelines"^ 
by  reference to which the court may reach the decision 
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down* However, 
at least one of the facts specified must be p ro v e d .
References are to the consolidating Act of 1973*
The factors which are relevant to  the proof of 
irretrievable b reakdow n  ("The court - shall not hold 
the marriage t o  have broken down irretrievably unless 
the petitioner satisfies the court of one or more of 
the following facts...."^) are the commission o f  adultery 
by  /
1 , Passinghsm, p . 1 2 .2. i n  terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963, 8 .2 *3# P a s8Ingham , p.14.
4 .  b . 1 ( 2 ) .
9 2 8 .
by the respondent and "that the petitioner finds it 
intolerable to live with the respondent ", "that the 
respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with theprespondent ", "that the respondent has deserted the 
petitioner for a continuous period of at least two 
years, immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition", that the parties to the marriage have lived 
apart for a continuous period of at least two years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition - 
"and the respondent consents to a decree being granted", 
and that "the parties to the marriage have lived apart 
for a continuous period of five years immediately 
preceding the presentation of the petition^". Upon 
averment of one of these factors, the court must 
inquire "so far as it reasonably can" into the facts 
alleged, and if satisfied, shall grant decree of divorce 
"unless /
1. Thus, here there is a double test, but the latter point is judged on a subjective basis#2# This is an objective test, though Passingham points out (p*22) that the personal circumstances of the petitioner must be taken into account in order to find the answer in the particular case to the objective test,. Clearly this ground is to be compared with the old "offence" of "cruelty"#Passingham emphasises (p.23) that, his examples are not intended to be exhaustive.♦ The conduct must beserious,, not trivial.# Evil intent is not necessary, though it is relevant.* * old-style ' cruelty, obviously, is comprehended by this subsection (s#i(2)(b)); so too is constructive desertion (conduct such as would drive a reasonable person from the matrimonial home), sodoney or bestiality, and (Passingham, p.#23) some forms of unsoundness of mind., or perhaps since the list is not closed, modern sources of grievance such as sex-change operations or the submission by the wife to A.I.D# without consent of the husband (Of# in Scotland MacLennan v# M# 1958 S.0..103 (A.I.D» even without consent does not amount to adultery: L.Wheatley) the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1956) suggested that this should form a new ground of divorce (G. & W#, pp.4^ 1*9-450),. The subject is of increasing importance in view of modern developments such as "sperm banks")•3. s.1(2)(a) - (e).
"unless it is satisfied on all the evidence that
the marriage has not broken down irretrievably" *
The concept of decree nisi, to be followed by decree
absolute six months later is retained in the general pcase • This gives to the court the opportunity to 
reconsider the case in the light of alleged material 
facts not previously adduced: the court may confirm
the decree, making it absolute, or rescind the decree, 
or require further inquiry.^
Section 2 contains provisions which concern 
cohabitation - and possible presumption of condonation 
arising therefrom - after the discovery by the 
petitioner of adultery by the respondent"^ of occurrence 
of intolerable behaviour^* A similar rule is applied 
in the case of desertion, though the period(s) of 
cohabitation (not exceeding six months in all), which 
do not brealc the continuity, nevertheless do not "count" 
towards the total period of desertion.^ Section 2(7) 
gives a necessary measure of protection to the respondent 
in declaring that where the "two year with consent" 
(s#1(2)(d)) provision is used, the 'consenting* spouse 
(respondent) must have been given such information as 
will enable him to understand the consequences of his 
consent. (The protection is to be effected by means 
of rules of court, which must specify also "the steps 
which he" (the respondent) "must take to indicate that 
he consents to the grant of a decree")^. "Living 
together /
1 .  s . 1 (3 )  and ( 4 ) .2 . 8 . 1 ( 3 ) .3. s.9. See also s.10(2) and s.10(3) (below).4* After 5 months, that act of adultery cannot foundan action.5* a similar 6-month rule.6. 8 .2 (3 ) . In these cases, no mention is made of theelaboration - "with a view to reconciliation" - contained in the Matrimonial Causes A ct, 1963, s.1(2):  see Passingham, pp.8 /9 , Para. 19 *7* See also s . 10 (rescission of decree before it is madeabsolute, if it can be shown that "the petitioner misled the respondent (whether intentionally or unintentionally) about any matter which the respondent took into account in deciding to give his consent." (s.10(1)).
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1t o g e t h e r "  measÉ c o h a b i t a t i o n  i n  t h e  same h o u se h o ld #
S e c t i o n  4- d e a l s  w i th  " c o n v e r s io n "  o f  j u d i c i a l  
s e p a r a t i o n  i n t o  d iv o rc e #
I n  th e  c a s e  o f  t h e  " f i v e  y e a r  s e p a r a t i o n "  ( w i th  
o r  w i th o u t  c o n s e n t )  g ro u n d  o f  a c t i o n  ( 8 # 1 ( 2 ) ( e ) ) *  t h e  
r e s p o n d e n t  may o p p o se  th e  g r a n t  o f  d e c r e e  b y  a v e r r in g  
t h a t  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  g ra v e  f i n a n c i a l  
o r  o t h e r  h a r d s h ip  t o  t h e  r e e p o n d e n t ,  an d  t h a t  i t  %'zould 
i n  a l l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  b e  w rong  t o  d i s s o l v e  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  
an d  i f  t h e  c o u r t ,  u p o n  c o n a l d e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  t h e  
c i r c u m e ta n o e s ,  c o n c lu d e s  t h a t  i t  w ou ld  b e  w rong  t o  
d ia a o lv e  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  i t  s h a l l  d ia m la s  t h e  p e t i t i o n *
" F o r  th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  h a r d s h ip  s h a l l  
in c lu d e  t h e  l o s s  o f  t h e  c h a n c e  o f  a c q u i r in g  an y  b e n e f i t  
w h ic h  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  m ig h t a c q u i r e  i f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
w ere  n o t  d i s s o l v e d , "  ( s # 3 ( 5 ) ) #  " R e c o n c i l i a t i o n "  
p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  t o  be  fo u n d  i n  s#6#
"A rra n g em en ts"  made b y  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  c o n n e c t io n  
w i th  t h e  d iv o r c e  p r o c e e d in g s  b e  r e f e r r e d  b y  th e  
p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  o o u r t  (w h ic h  may h ave  made p r o v i s i o n  
b y  r u l e s  o f  c o u r t  f o r  t h i s )  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  th e  o o u r t  
may e x p r e s s  a n  o p in io n  " s h o u ld  i t  t h in k  i t  d e s i r a b l e  
t o  do s o ,  a s  t o  t h e  r e a s o n a b le n e s s  o f  t h e  a g re e m e n t 
o r  a r ra n g e m e n t and  t o  g iv e  su c h  d i r e c t i o n s ,  i f  a n y , 
i n  t h e  m a t t e r  a s  i t  t h i n k s  f i t , " ^
I n t e r v e n t i o n  /
1# B #2(G ). T hus t h e  s p o u s e s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o h a b i tth o u g h  th e y  l i v e  u n d e r  t h e  sm ie  r o o f ,  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  co n  b e  tw o h o u s e h o ld s  u n d e r  th e  sam e r o o f  (p a s s in g h a m , p . 1 7 , p a ra #  41 #)*2# T h is  seem s a  c o y  a n d  c i r c u m lo c u to r y  p r o v is io n #  O f. 8c*L.0om#Hemo*No#22, 3*104 s e q  an d  F a c .R e s p o n s e , p p *76-80# P a ss in g h a m  ( w i th  r e f e r e n o o  t o  t h e  s i m i l a r  
8*7 o f  t h e  1969  A c t)  e x p la in s  (p p # 2 9 /5 0 , p a r a s  75 a n d  76  ) t h a t  i t  a v o id s  t h e  d is a p p o in tm e n t  w h ich  ifo u ld  a r i s e  i f  t h e  p a r t i e s '  f l n m i c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  w ore s u c h  a s  t o  p l a c e  t h e  o o u r t  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  i n  w h ich  i t  m u st r e f u s e  d e c r e e  o r  r e f u s e  t o  make a  d e c r e e  a b s o lu te #  P ro p o s e d  a r ra n g e m e n ts  c an  b e  s c r u t i n i s e d  i n  a d v a n c e .I t  i s  o b v io u s ly  d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  t h e  same ju d g e  s h o u ld  c o n s id e r  t h e  a r ra n g e m e n ts  and make th e  u l t i m a t e  d e c i s i o n  on  t h e  g r a n t  o r  w i th h o ld in g  o f  d e c r e e  o f  d iv o r c e  /
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Intervention by the Queen's Proctor remains 
competent (8,8)*
W here t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  ( i n  a  "2  y e a r "  o r  "3  y e a r "  
c a s e ,  and  b e f o r e  d e c r e e  i s  made a b s o l u t e )  h a s  a p p l i e d  
f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  h i e  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  a s  i t  
w i l l  b e  a f t e r  d iv o r c e  and t h e  c o u r t ,  i n  g r a n t i n g  d e c r e e  
( n i s i ) ,  h a s  made no f i n d i n g  u pon  an y  o t h e r  m a t t e r  a p a r t  
from, t h e  f a c t  o f  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  p e r i o d  o f  s e p a r a t i o n ,  
t h e  c o u r t  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  " a l l  t h e  e ir c u m e ta n c o a "  ( a g e ,  
h e a l t h ,  c o n d u c t ( n o t e ) ,  e a r n in g  c a p a c i t y ,  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s  and  f i n a n c i a l  o b l ig a t io n a  o f  e a c h ,  an d  
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  r e s p o n d e n t  a s  h a v in g  r e g a r d  t o  
th e  d i v o r c e ,  i t  l a  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a f t e r  t h e  d e a th  o f  
t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  s h o u ld  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  d i e  f i r s t ) *  
F o llo w in g  u pon  su c h  o o n a id e r a t i o n ,  t h e  o o u r t  s h a l l  n o t  
make t h e  d e c r e e  a b s o lu te  u n le a e  i t  i s  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  
t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  s h o u ld  n o t  moke an y  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  
f o r  th e  r e s p o n d e n t ,  o r  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  
made b y  th e  p e t i t i o n e r  " l e  r e a a o n a b le  a n d  f a i r  o r  th e  
b e s t  t h a t  co n  b e  made i n  t h e  o iro u m e ta n o e a " .  D e s p i te  
th e  e n f o r c e d  c o n a i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  f a c t o r s ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  
u p o n  t o  t h e  ooui^t t o  c o n f irm  t h e  d e c r e e  n i s i  i f  i t  
a p p e a r s  " t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c ir c u m e ta n c e s  m ak ing  i t  d e s i r a b l e  
t h a t  t h e  d e c r e e  s h o u ld  b e  made a b s o lu te  i f i t h o u t  d e la y  
and  t h e  c o u r t  h a s  o b ta in e d  a  a a t lG f a o t o r y  u n d e r t a k in g  
fro m  /
d iv o r c e  ( P , ,  p*30 )#  8*7 &f th e  1969  A ct c o u ld  beu s e d  a l s o  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  j u d i c i a l  G e p a r a t io n  ( P , ,P * 5 5 , p a r a  92 ) ;  p re e u m a b ly  t h i s  i s  t r u e  o f  t h e  i d e n t i c a l l y  w orded  new 8 * 7 , b u t  i n  a n y  e v e n t  ( O r e tn e y ,  3 r d  e d n * , p # 1 3 6 ) s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  p ro v iG io n  i s  i n e f f e c t i v e *  R u le s  o f  c o u r t  w ere  m ade, b u t  w ere  r e p e a l e d  and  w ere  n o t  r e p la c e d *  P e rh a p s  t h e  s e c t i o n  w as to o  h e s i t a n t  an d  t e n t a t i v e *  " , , * t h e r e  c o u ld  be  no  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  r e f e r  a n  a g re e m e n t t o  t h e  c o u r t ,  and  t h e  c o u r t ' s  o n ly  po i^er was t o  e x p r e s s  on  o p in io n  on t h e  r e a s o n a b le n e s s  o f  th e  a g re e m e n t and  t o  g iv e  d i r e c t i o n s " *  A greem en ts may b e  m ade, b u t  " t h e r e  i s  no  e f f e c t i v e  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  p r i o r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  c o u r t* "
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from the petitioner that he will make such financial iprovision for the respondent as the court may approve." 
These provisions give an interesting "property" 
sidelight not contained in the "property" part (Part II) 
of the Act ("Financial Relief For Parties To Marriage 
And Children Of Family"). Part I concerns "Divorce, 
Nullity And Other Matrimonial Suits."
The grounds of judicial separation are that any
of the five factors specified in s.1(2) exists, hut
the court here shall not he concerned to find whether?the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The 
effect of judicial separation is that "it shall no 
longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit 
with the respondent." (s.18). Moreover ( s . 1 8 ) ,  if, 
during judicial separation, either party dies wholly 
or partially intestate, the intestate estate shall 
devolve as if the other party were then already dead*
This goes slightly further than before: previously,
and still in Scotland (Conjugal Rights (Sc.) Amendment 
Act, 1861, 8,6^) the surviving separated spouse lost 
his rights of succession only in property acquired by 
the other spouse after separation.
Part II of the Act pertains to financial matters; 
maintenance, during and after litigation, lump sums; 
lump /
1. S.10(3) and (4). See Passingham, pp.27/28, paras.67 - 70 , concerning the comparable provision -8.6 - of the 1969 Act. He contrasts these rules with the defence of grave hardship under s.4 of the 1969 Act (s.3 of the 1973 Act) in a "3 year" case, which, if sufficiently made out, will bar divorce; a reasonable and fair provision or "the best that can be made in the circumstances" will suffice to overrule the respondent’s objections and allow the court to make decree absolute.2. 8.17: the "guide-lines" become grounds - Passingham,P * 34.3* Apart from  the larger issues of matrimonial property philosophy, there is not equality of treatment of the sexes in Scots Law here. See Chapter I; Statutory Reforms.
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l u m p  su m . p a y m e n t s  m a y  b e  m a d e  t o  o r  o n  " b e h a l f  o f  
c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  f a m i l y ) ,  p r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r s  a n d/j
c r i t e r i a  f o r  m a k i n g  s u c h  a w a r d s  ,  m a i n t e n a n c e  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  n e g l e c t  t o  m a i n t a i n ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  r e ­
m a r r i a g e ,  v a r i a t i o n ,  d i s c h a r g e  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  
o r d e r s  a n d  o r d e r s  f o r  r e p a y m e n t
P a r t  I I I  c o n c e r n s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  c u s t o d y  
o f  c h i l d r e n  a n d  P a r t  I V  i s  " M i s c e l l a n e o u s  A n d  
S u p p l e m e n t a l " *  T h e  A c t  o f  1973 r e p e a l s  w h o l l y  t h e  
1969 A c t  a n d  P a r t  I o f  t h e  1970 A c t ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
c e r t a i n  /
1• See Passingham (1970 Act), Ohapter XV, p p . 2 3 -2 6 , paras. 32 - 39 ; and see Cretney*s exposition(p.284 ^  seq,) referred to above in the text, 
p p .2. The Matrimonial Homes and Property Bill ( 3 /2 /8 1 )(designed to amend two English A c ta ; it will not apply to Scotland or Northern Ireland) in clauses 7 and 8 makes certain amendments to the 1973 Act.Clause 7 inserts a new section 24A, conferring on the court power to order the sale of property of either sp o u se  where an order for financial relief, other than an order for unsecured periodical payments, is made; requirements may be attached that the property should be offered for sale to a specified purchaser or class of purchaser and that payment be made out of the proceeds of sale but any other supplementary provision may be made, as the court thinks fit; orders for sale made on divorce or n u l l i t y  shall not take effect until the decree has been made absolute; generally, the court may direct that the order, or specified provision thereof, shall not take effect until the occurrence of an event specified by the court or the expiration of a period so specified; where the proceeds of sale are to be used to secure periodical payments to a party to the marriage, the order shall cease to have effect on the death or re-marriage of that person; a new guideline is inserted into the 1973 Act, 8.23, namely that where a p a r t y  to a marriage has a beneficial interest in any p r o p e r t y ,  o r  in the proceeds of sale thereof, and a stranger to the marriage also has such interest, then, in deciding whether to exercise its powers under s.24A, it shall be the duty of the court to give that other person an opportunity to make representations with respect to the order, and any representations shall be included among the circumstances to which the c o u r t  is required to have regard. This is the usual English answer to a difficult problem; the c o u r t ,  in its discretion, shall have regard to the different interests involved. (Contrast generally Scotland - Chapter 7 - Rights o f  Third Parties)
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1c e r t a i n  o t h e r  s e c t i o n s  t h e r e o f .  T h e  L a w  R e f o r m
(Miscellaneous Provisions) A c t ,  1970 abolished actions
2for breach of promise of marriage , but regulates
property /
1, see Passingham, "The Divorce Reform Act 1969" and "The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970",See also Otto Kahn-Fretmd (1970) 33 M.L.R,601, at pp , 6 1 5  et seq, for a discussion of the background to, and analysis of, the 1970 Matrimonial Proceedings and P r o p e r ty  Act, which, the author n o t e s , was "nota new venture" (as was the Matrimonial Homes Act,
1 9 6 7 ), because " I t  presents itself as an expansion and systématisation of the - oddly named - ancillary provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act "(1965)" which deal with the financial relations between the spouses", and he takes the view that the expansion aspect thereof makes possible judicial reform of this sphere of law, and provides powers which, though r e q u i r i n g  modification perhaps, would still be appropriate in a system which had adopted some type of community rule. (p#616, m aking reference on the latter point to L.C.Report No.25, Family Law,Financial Provisions in Matrimonial Proceedings (July 1969) para.67)# At p.627 he comments on the possibilities of the property transfer order, which, unlike the (re)statement "of the powers to settle p r o p e r t y  and to vary settlements" is "a complete innovation"It is suggested that it is the discretionary to n e  of the English legislation which renders it unsuitable for conversion to "some type of community rule", and that England, by choosing the path of discretion and by building up a body of 'pragmatic* or 'justice in the individual case and otherwise unrelated* decisions, has set herself at a considerable distance from continental community ideas• See Professor Kahn-Freund*s ideas, expressed in the Josef Unger Memorial Lecture in 1971 : outwardseparation of property vis-a-vis third parties, concept of * family assets * (including matrimonial home) and presumed jointness thereof as between husband and wife, judicial variation of shares therein by matrimonial property adjustment o r d e r ,  registration by non-title- holding spouse of beneficial share in the home, legal title to furniture and other chattels in common use of both spouses to vest in both spouses jointly and restriction on disposal thereof by one without consent 
o f  the other o r  judicial consent*2. s.1(1)("no action shall l i e  in England and Wales f o r  breach of such an agreement, whatever the law applicable to the agreement" - an interesting conflict point).
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property matters between engaged couples (ss. 2  and 3 ),
and abolished actions for enticement and seduction
(s.5 ) and for damages for adultery with the plaintiff’s 2spouse •
Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act# 1976
This Act is intended to help the "battered wife".^ 
It does not apply to Scotland^ **. Injunctions against 
molestation of the other party and/or of a child 
living with the applicant are to be available from the 
county court (" W ithout prejudice to the jurisdiction 
of the High Court"), as are exclusion orders from the 
matrimonial home or part thereof or from the area in 
which the matrimonial home is situated, and orders 
requiring the other spouse to permit the applicant to 
enter and remain in the matrimonial home "whether or 
not any other relief is sopght in the proceedings#"
The potential protection extends to those who are living 
together as husband and wife*
Where an injunction is g r a n te d ,  the judge may 
attach to it a power of arrest, if actual b o d i ly  harm 
has /
1 * although it is thought that in English law no action ever lay in tort by t h e  woman herself; Rosses v .  Bhagvat Sinbjee (1891) 19 R.31» Soutar v* Paters 1912 1 8* 1 .T . I l l *2* L*R. (Mis o .P r o v e * ) Act, 1970, s.4, repealed byMatrimonial Causes Act, 1975# s#54(1)(b), Sched.3* "....the plaintiff now has an action for damages for loss of consortium o n ly  if this was due to the defendant’s breach of contract or tort" (Bromley’s Family Law, 5th edn# p.123*3. though M.D.A.Freeman, who provides the annotationsto the Act, notes that nowhere in the Act is the word "batter" found. Rather, the word "molesting"Is used, which has been liberally interpreted, to mean constant pestering (Vau^an v. V. 1975 3 AllE.R.449). Physical violence is not a requirement. 4* As to proposed solutions for Scotland, see Sc.L.Com .Memo .No .41 .  see I9 8I A ct; N ic h o ls  and Me s to n ,C hapter 3» E x c lu s io n  O rd ers.
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has been done and he considers it likely to occur 
again, and, if so, a constable may arrest without 
warrant a person whom he has reasonable cause for 
suspecting of being in breach of the injunction.
A person so arrested must be brought before a judge 
within 24 hours of the arrest. The terms of the 
section (s.2) do not comprehend suddenly-arising cases 
of (often week-end) domestic violence. The line 
between civil and criminal law and remedies seems also 
to have been muddled.
Section 3 amends and strengthens s.1(2) of the
Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 : as to occupation rights,
application may be made for court order, not only to
P"regulate" but to "prohibit, suspend or restrict" the 
exercise by either spouse of the right to occupy the 
dwelling-house, or to require "either spouse to permit 
the exercise by the other of that right". Freeman 
takes the view that " ? ery little use is made of the 
Matrimonial Homes Act
In terms of s.4, where each spouse is entitled 
to occupy a dwelling-house in which they have or at 
any time have had a matrimonial home by virtue of the 
vesting in them jointly of a legal estate or by virtue 
of a contract or by virtue of any enactment giving them 
the right to remain in occupation, either may make 
application to the court with respect to the exercise 
during the subsistence of the marriage of the right 
to occupy the dwellinghouse for an order prohibiting, 
suspending or restricting its exercise by the other or 
requiring the other to permit its exercise by the 
applicant. Freeman explains that this extends s.1(2) 
of /
1• 1967 Act - see supra,2. Contrast Tarr v* Tarr 1973 A*0.234, which this section overrules *
il - ' î
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o f  t h e  1967 A ô t, so  t h a t  i t s  o r d e r a  may a p p ly  w here  
t h e  le g a l, e a t a t e  i n  t h e  m a tr im o n ia l  home o r  fo rm e r  
m a tr im o n ia l  home i e  j o i n t l y  ow ned, o r  w here  e a o h  o f  
them  l 8  e n t i t l e d  t o  oooupy  b y  v i r t u e  o f  a  o o n t r a o t  
o r  o f  any  e n a o tm e n t ; p r e v i o u e ly ,  u n ie  a a  t h e  c a s e  
ovia. o f  d i v o r c e ,  when th e  M a tr im o n ia l  O auaee 
A o t ,  1 9 7 5 , a *24 becam e a p p l i c a b l e ,  r e e o u r e e  h a d  t o  
h e  h a d  t o  t h e  Law o f  ]P ro p e rty  A c t ,  1923$ " u n d e r
w h ic h  t h e  c o u r t  i n  i t s  d j , s c r e t io n  can  o r d e r  a  s a l e  
b u t  n o th in g  e l a e . "
I n h e r i t a n c e  ( P r o v i s io n  f o r  Fam ily  and  D épend a n te )
M h ^ s r
D o m estic  P ro c e e d in g s  an d  Ma^ i e t r a t e e ' O ourt s  A ct#
nza^
1 ,  8 * 1 (2 )  b e g i n s ,  "Bo lo n g  a s  one sp o u se  h a s  r i g h t so f  o c c u p a t io n ,# # * "
2 #  S e e  su p r a .
3#  S e e  su p r a . i
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SUGGESTIGFs FOE REFORM
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that 
the search for the optimum system of matrimonial 
property regulation is one which has heen occupying 
many minds in many jurisdictions<,
The range of choice runs f.l?om systems of fairly 
strict separation ■ through systems of separation in 
which the legisla'ture has gone far to ameliorate the 
sometimes harsh effects of separation (as in England,pand as in New Zealand and Australia 5 where perhaps 
even greater enthusiasm9 especially for detailed 
guidelines to aid the judiciary in the use of its 
discretion5 has been shorn) while restricting the 
operation of the rules to situations of "marriage 
emergency" 5 such as divorce, or marriage termination 
by death, and systems of community of acquests or, in 
the South African phrase, of profit and loss, systems 
of "deferred community" (Germany and Scandinavia, the 
latter much affected by the notion of State support 
of marriage, and non-marriage), to the system of 
community and profit and loss, the "full-blooded 
community", found in South Africa and frequently 
’contracted out of’ by persons married there. Among 
the systems studied, none prohibited the contracting 
out of the norm, though the choice of regimes was 
restricted in some cases to a few prescribed options•
In others choice was unrestricted, allowing to the 
parties the opportunity to select a regime as their 
whim /
1» A system of total separation (no duty to maintain stante matrimonio, no rights de jure to the surviving partner on death; has not been encountered. Such duties exist, of course, in Scots and English Law (though English law will not, it seems, embrace the concept of ’legal rights’, but, as always prefers the remedy of judicial discretion - see Chapter 6 , England), as they do in Italian Law, which also operates a system of separation.




It may he argued that a system of separation 
la out of date and unrealistic, in that the rules hear 
no relation to the realities. The Louisiana lawyers 
are anxious to retain their system of community if they 
can render it "sex neutral*'. France, for its new, 
post 196155 regime, has chosen to retain community, 
though of acquests only, and has "toned down" its bias 
in favour of men, as befits the new thinking, though
in the general case, the husband’s headship remains#pGermany, too, has made a new choice^ " with effect from 
1st June, 1938 (change having been prompted by 
constitutional reasons), and has made the transition 
from separation to "deferred oomraxmity" on the 
Scandinavian model, which model has boon said to be 
"the system of the future" $ Holland a%.)pears to have 
adopted an amalgamation of different concepts and rules, 
but, like France, has a history of "community property", 
not "separate property". Apart from Simdbox'g and the 
Scandinavian ideas, which are different in genus, in 
basic thinking and view ox society, only Frofessor 
Glendon has ventured to suggest that, if roles of the 
sexGS /
ovïsawc2a i^Ttaw(=i<*ï}t
1, or to select separation, which has been described (by Rene davatier) as ’not so much a system as not a system’. Contracting out of separation of property by lie ans of a marri agc-contract in England or Scotland seems now to be as rare as contracting out of community of property by means of a marriage- contract is common in South Africa. In '’outh Africa, certain effects of marriage are ’invariable’, and Biarriage*-contraote must be ante-nuptial and cancellation and variation are subject to strict regulation. Contra, a feature of community systems, whether deferred™? traditional, is the opportunity given, in qualifying circumstances, to seek early separation of property.2o the resulting system having characteristics bothof community and of separate property regimes - see Glendon, p.41.
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sexes are to become increasingly interchangeable and 
similar, a system of separate property and of financial 
independence within marriage , is the system of the 
future.
There follows a resume of the salient features 
of the various types of community system. The 
treatment accorded by each to problems and difficulties 
common to all, is of interest, and a noting of the 
solutions adopted may be helpful when attempting to 
gauge the strengths and weaknesses of our own system 
and of the suggested reforms thereof.
FEATURES OF SYSTEMS OF OOriTIUNITT OF PROPERTY A N D /O R  
P R O F IT  AND LOGS
1. One, or other, of the spouses must be caput et
princeps familiae. This person is most often the
husband, though increasingly his powers are being 2restricted. The privilege has two facets: there
is the power of administration of the common fund, and
there is the status of head of the family. In South
Africa, if marriage is in community, the latter
attribute cannot be withdrawn from the husband by%agreement of parties.''^
In /
1 a At odds with these thoughts are American trends towards financial and property dependence within non-marriage; cf. Californian decision in Marvin v. Marvin, reported in the press April, 1979*2. See 3. below.3. See Chapter 6 (S.A.)« . In England and Scotland, general attitudes are ambivalent (see "A Woman AS Place (1910-1975) " «> Ruth Adam, a book which demonstrates that, during this century, women have changed their attitudes, aptitudes, natures, and professional and/or home-making capacities, chameleon-like, to suit prevailing economic conditions This is a gentle, wry and ruminative account( contrast the tone of "Patriarchal Attitudes", Eva Figes)and the legal aspects are not highlighted.
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In any jurisdiction, a guide to that syetem’s
stance on the matter is to be found in its strictures,
or its silence, upon the question of the "duty" of1the xfife to "follow" the husband. It may be argued
that this is now an academic points economic necessity
will dictate the travels of the wife and the husband
and "who shall follow whom". It is mioatisfactory
that in foots Law the position should not be clear -
but can it be clear, and might not clarity be &?doubtful virtue in this context?"
2« One, or other, of the spouses has principal power 
of administration of the fund.
This is a feature which is undergoing change,
There may now be a requirement of joint action, or 
at least of concurrence of the spouse passive in a 
^transaction of importance' (of which almost universally 
included ax'e transactions pertaining to heritage)® The 
less fundamental approach is to hedge the adminietrator 
about /
U Consider, for example, .Belgium (Prof® G$ lateman
s u p r a #  )  : it i s  noted (p*2 5 ) that t h e  belgimi codeUfl'958 does not contain, "as do the laws of our neighbours", any such sentiment as that the husband is head of the family® "The only prerogative left to the husband is h i s  right to decide the situation of the matrimonial home, should no agreement b e  reached between the s p o u s e s ® " A s to Scotland, see 
C hapter 4»
2® See however p r o p o s a l s  concerning location ofmatrimonial home (Chapter 7)# The primary career of the marriage may no longer be clear® It is beyond the scope of t h i s  discussion to reflect upon the benefit o r  o t h e r w i s e  of this trend, but it seems reasonable to note it® On the other hand, it is not impossible that there will be seen a return to home and hearth - perhaps of m e m b e r s  o f  both sexes, if indeed there is to b e  more leisure for all® l e t  it is thought that the advance of women to equal 
p a r t n e r s h i p  with men (which they have enjoyed at various times in earlier eras, though perhaps not to the same degree) is not a movement which will be reversed®
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about with restrictions® Thus, he must act
"x^ easonably" (but the behaviour required of the husband
administrator in nineteenth century Scotland was also
BO described), and unreasonable administration of the
matrimonial assets, as by squandering, in many systems
of community is sufficient cause to have the community
brought to an end, though a judicial act to confirm
the cessation of the liueband’s power of administration
and restoration of the wife’s power may be necessary,
as in South Africa® In the case of the husband’s
illness or incapacity, the wife may be named as the
substitute of the husband as administrator of the icommunity® The "imm captains on the bridge" aim
has been pursued with greater success perhaps by
those systems which have taken a slightly differentoapproach in matters of matrimonial property law.^
3* The husband bears the primary duty to maintain®
In South Africa, although in principle each spouse
has a duty to sxipport the other, in the normal case the
husband bears the duty of supporting wife, children and %household#" As far as third parties are concerned, 
where /
1# as in France, for example#2# See the German and Scandinavian systems of deferred community# See also the highly individual Dutch approach# Even where the system is not one of deferred community, but there are exceptions t™the existing community (as biens reserves in France), the wife (or the spouses), although she will (or each will) have separate administration of these, must suffer restriction in some matters (e#g# gifts)® This is comparable perhaps with the restriction in the interests of both parties, of the separate administration stante matrimonio of property which at death, divorce or bodelning vn.ll become ooraiaunrty property under a deferred community System# A comparison, can be drawn with the French rules concerning separate property of spouses under a community system because the community has an interest in the savings frora the incomes of the separate property# (Kiralfy, p#91)*39 Halilo (4th edn#) p.llR® Of course, individualcircumstances will decide the question of which spouse shall support the other#
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w h ere  th e  m a r r ia g e  l a  o u t  o f  oom m im lty c o n t r a c t s  f o r  
h o u s e h o ld  n e o e e e a r l e s  im p o r t  j o i n t  and  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y
u p o n  th e  a p o u s e e ,  a l th o u g h  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  A f f a i r a  A o t,i1 9 5 3  a l t e r s  t h a t  l i a b i l i t y  a s  b e tw e e n  th e  ep o u sea#  
" N e c e s s a r ie s "  i s  a  w ord  w h ic h  m ust be  c o n s t r u e d  i n  
a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i f e  o f  t h e  spouses®
More may be  c o m p ris e d  u n d e r  t h e  h u s b a n d ’ s  d u ty  t o  
s u p p o r t  th a n  u n d e r  t h e  w i f e ’ s  pow er t o  p le d g e  h e r  
h u s b a n d ’ s c r e d i t  f o r  n e c e s s a r i e s #
S i m i l a r l y  i n  L o u i s i a n a ,  e a c h  sp o u so  oim s t o  th epo t h e r  a  d u ty  o f  s u p p o r t ,  b u t ,  a s  i n  o t h e r  s y s te m s ,  
i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  f a c t s ,  i t  i s  th e  h u sb a n d  who b e a r s  
t h e  p r im a ry  f i n a n c i a l  d u ty *  As f a r  a s  h e  i s  a b le  t o  
do 8 0 ,  h e  m u st p r o v id e  h i s  w if e  w i th  " a l l  t h e  c o n v e n ie n c e s  
o f  l i f e " # ^  h o w e v e r, t h e  w i f e ' s  d u ty  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
t h e  e x p e n s e s  o f  r u n n in g  t h e  home i s  r e c o g n i s e d :  i f  sh e
b r i n g s  a  d o w ry , t h e  incom e th e r e f r o m  i f i l l  b e  a l l o c a t e d  
t o  t h i s  p u r p o s e ,  b u t  no f u r t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  w i l l  b e  
dem anded o f  h e r#  I f  sh e  b r i n g s  no d o w ry , s h e  w i l l  be 
l i a b l e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  maximum o f  o f  h e r  in c o m e , 
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  i t s  si% e o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  e x c e e d s  h e r  
h u s b a n d ’s  incom e# I t  i s  o p en  t o  th e  s p o u s e s ,  i t  se e m s , 
t o  make o t h e r  arrangements w h ich  a r e  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  
t h e i r  own c a s e #  F a e c a l ,  a s  p r e v i o u s l y  n o t e d ,  a d v o c a te s  
e q u a l i t y  /
1 # The w i f e , i f  sh e  p a y s , h a s  a  r i g h t  t o  b e  r e im b u r s e d  b y  h e r  h u sb an d #  S e e  O o lo m er’s  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  " c o n t r i b u t i o n "  (b e tw e e n  t h e  s p o u s e s )  an d  o f  " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  ( t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s )  a  c r u c i a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n #  S ee  g e n e r a l l y  S o u th  A f r i c a ,  s u p r a # I f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  i s  i n  com m un ity , t h e  d e b t  b e co m es"a  com m unity  d e b t ,  a n d , w h i le  th e  m a r r ia g e  s u b s i s t s ,  t h e  h u sb a n d  i s  l i a b l e  i n  f u l l #  A f t e r  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  may su e  t h e  h u sb a n d  ( o r  h i s  e s t a t e )  i n  f u l l ,  o r  t h e  w ife  ( o r  h e r  e s t a t e )  f o r  
h a l f #  I f ,  a f t e r  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e ,  t h e  W sb a n d  p a y s  i n  f u l l ,  he  may c la im  a g a i n s t  h i s  
fo rm e r  w i f e  ( o r  h e r  e s t a t e )  f o r  h a l f #  S ee  H ah lo  ( 4 t h  e d n # ) p#1?3#2 .  L a , O i v i l  Code 1 8 ? 0 , a r t . 11?#3# I b i d # ,  A rt#  120#
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equality of burden between the opouses here, and
s u g g e s t s  that there s h o u ld  be joint and several
liability only for ordinary household expenses® For
othox' expenses of the marriage, he would render the4contracting spouse liable® He sees no good reason 
for the existence of the "50/ rule", and argues that 
the incomes "from both separate and community sources" 
of each spouse should be calculated, and that the 
spouses should be liable for household debts in the 
proportion which the income of one bears to that of 
the other® ‘
In France, contribution to household maintenance 
is demanded from each spouse according to his/her means, 
but the heavier burden, as always, falls on the husband, 
who must provide his wife with the "neceesarries of life" 
according to his ability® It will be recalled that 
Oolomer concludes that the duty to contribute would 
not extend to the capital of a non salary earning wife® 
Contribution in kind to the .maintenance of the household 
is to bo recognised®-^ Mo longer, as regards third 
parties, is the wife seen, or considered, to be pledging 
her husband’s credit® The new answer (after 1965) is 
joint and several liability for all debts of the nature 
of household expenditure which are in accordance with 
the manner of life of the parties®^
In /
1® This seems odds in marriage, the choice of contracting spouse is often a matter of convenience or accident, and the apparent method of financing a traiasaction may bear no relation to Its t r u e  funding®2o This is an interesting thought® The result as between the parties would probably be equitable® With regard to third parties, howeven?, the notion of joint and several liability is neat and satisfactory® Other systems also call upon contribution according to resources, though perhaps in less spécifie terms® (See e ® g ® France, below).
3# A rt#  2 1 4 , Oode o f  1965<,Certain transactions (e*g® h«'P contracts), h o w ev er must be entered into w ith  consent of both spouses®
S e e  a l s o  below®
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I n  t h e  G e r m a n  s y s t e m  o f  " d e f e r r e d  c o m m u n i t y " ,  
t h e  r u l e s  c o n c e r n i n g  h o u s e h o l d  p l e n i s h i n g  a n d  
e q u i p m e n t  f o r m  a n  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  o f  
t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  f r e e d o m  t o  e a c h  s p o u s e  
t o  a d m i n i s t e r  h i s / h e r  o w n  p r o p e r t y  s t a n t e  m a t r i m o n i o .
F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e r e  c a n  b e  n o  d i s p o s a l  o f  h o u s e h o l d  
a r t i c l e s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  o n e  s p o u s e  w i t h o u t  c o n s e n t  o f  
t h e  o t h e r a  ( S i m i l a r l y  i n  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  a c q u e s t s  
s y s t e m  i n  F r a n c e ,  j o i n t  c o n s e n t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  i n  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  o r  
f u r n i s h i n g s  a n d  e q u i p m e n t ) .  I t  h a s  b e e n  r i o t e d  t h a t  
t h e  n e w  G e r m a n  r e g i m e  r e t a i n e d  " t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  k e y s , "  
u n d e r  w h i c h ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  o f  s e p a r a t e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s t a n t e  m a t r i m o n i o   ^ t h e  h u s b a n d  i s  l i a b l e  -  
o n  t h e  b a s i s  s t i l l  o f  a g e n c y ,  i t  a p p e a r s  -  f o r  h i s  
w i f e ' s  ' d o m e s t i c '  d e b t s .  A  t h i r d  p a r t y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
m a y  l o o k  w i t h  c o n f i d e n c e  t o  t h e  h u s b a n d  u n l e s s  h e  h a s  
e x c l u d e d  o r  l i m i t e d  h i s  l i a b i l i t y  b y  p u b l i c  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
( i n  t h e  m a r r i a g e  s e t t l e m e n t s  r e g i s t e r )  o r  t h e  t h i r d  
p a r t y  h i m s e l f  h a s  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n ®  T h e  
l i m i t a t i o n  w i l l  b e  i n e f f e c t i v e  i n  a n y  c a s e  i f  m a d e  
w i t h o u t  " p r o p e r  r e a s o n "  o r  " i f  t h e r e  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
g r o u n d "  t h e r e f o r .  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  s u c h  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  
t h e  h u s b a n d  s h a l l  i n c u r  t h e  l i a b i l i t i e s  a n d  e n j o y  t h e4
r i g h t s ,  " e x c e p t " ,  i t  i s  s a i d  c r y p t i c a l l y ,  " w h e r e  a  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s "
( G r a n e ) ,  " u n l e s s  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n d i c a t e  a  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n c l u s i o n . "  ( F o r r e s t e r ) .  W h e r e  t h e  h u s b a n d  i s  
i n s o l v e n t ,  c r e d i t o r s  m a y  r e l y  o n  t h e  a d . d i t i o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  w i f e 0^
I n  D e n m a r k ,  a l s o ,  h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s  f o r m  a n  e x c e p t i o n  
t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  c o n c e r n i n g  d e b t s  w h i c h  i s  t h a t  
n e i t h e r  s p o u s e  s h a l l  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e b t s  o f  t h e  
o t h e r ®  W h e t h e r  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i s  i n ,  o r  o u t  o f ,  c o m m u n i t y ,  
t h e  /
1 *  1 5 5 7  B G B »  But t h e r e  i s  a change ( 1 9 ? 6 ) : b o t h  s p o u s e s  bound by
2 .  S e e  d o u b t s  a n d  q u e s t i o n s ,  G r a n e ,  p p . 1 5 4 - 1 5 6 .  c o n t r a c t
f o r  n e c e s s a r i e s , .
t h e  d e b t s  o f  o n e ,  i n  t h i s  s p h e r e ,  o b l i g e  t h e  other#
A s  i n  G ' o r m a n y ,  . f i ? . r n i t u r e  ( i n t e r  a l i a )  c a n n o t  b e ^ f trto#XK£<erflrçÿ»sp«Rti* ^
d i s p o s e d  o f  b y  o n e  spouse without c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  1other# J o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  a r i s e s  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s #  I n  H o l l a n d ,  both spouses 
a r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  i t  w e r e  a s  a g e n t s  f o r  t h e  h o u s e h o l d ' ”"
with t h e  r e s u l t  that b o t h  spouses a r e  l i a b l e  t o  t h i r d
p a r t i e s  for h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s ,  e x c e p t  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  
( s u c h  a s  i n a b i l i t y  or m i s m a n a g e m e n t )  w h e r e  t h e  c o u r t  
c o n s i d e r s  it a p p r o p r i a t e  n o t  t o  a d h e r e  t o  the g e n e r a l  
r u l e  c
T h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  h a s  b e e n  c o n c e r n e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  
w i t h  t h e  Systems o f  community. I t  h a s  b e e n  n o t e d ,  
t h o u g h ,  t h a t  E n g l a n d  h a s  a b o l i s h e d  t h e  w i f e ’ s  a g e n c y% /j
o f  necessity^ s i n c e  i t  w a s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t s  
c a n  " e n f o r c e  t h e  d u t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  d i r e c t l y "  i n  " w i l f u l  
n e g l e c t  t o  m a i n t a i n "  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  W h a t  i s  t o  b e c o m e  
of t h e  S c o t t i s h  p r a e e o s i t u r a  a n d  a g e n c y  o f  n e c e s s i t y ?  
Are t h e s e  n o t i o n s  t o  r e m a i n  unchanged?
T y p e s  . o f  C o m m u n i t y  o x  Property
I t  h a s  b e e n  s e e n  t h a t  c o m m i m i t y  m a y  c o m p r i s e  
" p r o p e r t y  a n d  p r o f i t  a n d  l o s s , "  w h i c h  m e a n s  t h a t  a l l  
property a n d  r i g h t s  o f  e a c h  s p o u s e  o w n e d  a t  marriage 
a n d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  a c q u i r e d  i s  i n c l u d e d  i n  c o m m u n i t y .  
T h u s ,  i n  i t s  m o s t  oomprehensive f o r m ,  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  
w o u l d  /
1 #  A, s i m i l a r  r u l e  o b t a i n s  i n  S w e d e n s  t h e r e ,  t h e  g o o d  
f a i t h  o f  t h e  t h i r d  party w i l l  o p e x ’a t e  t o  p r e v e n t  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  contract c o m p l a i n e d  o f  -  s e e  supra)2, W h i c h  i s  a  better approach,  i t  i s  t ( i o u g ; h t ,  t h a n ™ * ™  
t h a t  w h i c h  considers t h e  w i f e  t o  b e  the a g e n t  o f  
t h e  husband,
3 #  M a t r i m o n i a l  P r o c e e d i n g s  and P r o p e r t y  A c t ,  1 9 7 0 ,
S #41 a
4 ®  G r e t n e y ,  p , 2 1 9 # O f  c o u r s e  t h i s  i s  a  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t
r a t i o n a l e  f r o m  t h a t  w h i c h  p r o m p t e d  a  c h a n g e  f r o m  husbandly l i a b i l i t y  t o  joint a n d .  s e v e r a l  i i a b i l i t y  
f o r  h o u s e h o l d  debts.
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w o u l d  c l a i m  a l l  p r o p e r t y  o f  w h a t e v e r  n a t u r e ,  t h e  
o n l y  e x c e " ) t i o n s  b e i n g  rights o f  a  h i g h l y  specialised 
c h a r a c t e r  ( a s ,  f o r  examples, r i g h t s  o f  a  v e r y  p e r s o n a l  
n a t u r e )  o r  p r o p e r t y  c o m p e t e n t l y  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  
c o m m u n i t y  b y  t h e  w i s h  o f  t h e  j ) a r t i e s  o r  o f  a  t h i r d  
p a r t y  b e n e f a c t o r ,  t h o  r a l e s  g o v e r n i n g  e x c l u s i o n s  
b e i n g  m a d e  c l e a r ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  b y  t h e  c o m m i m i t y  s y s t e m  
i n  q u e s t i o n #
I n  s o m e  s y s t e m s  s t u d i e d ,  t h e r e  i s  community 
o n l y  o f  o r  a c q u e s t s ,  t h a t  i s ,  o f  p r o p e r t y
a c q u i r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  m a r r i a g e ,  a n d  g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u i r e n d a  
f x ' e q u e n t l y  are excluded f r o m  t h e  e v e n t u a l  c o m p u t a t i o n  
o f  a s s e t s #  I n  Louisiana, h o w e v e r ,  t h e  w i f e  h a s  t h e  
o p t i o n ,  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  t o  d i s d a i n  t h e  
community a n d  t o  i n c u r  m e r e l y  l i m i t e d  l i a b i l i t y  i n  
t h e  j o i n t  v e n t u r e  o f  m a r r i a g e #  T h e  L o u i s i a n a  w i f e  
m a y  " h e d g e  h e r  b e t s " ®  I n  F r a n c e ,  there i s  a  s e p a r a t e  
c a t e g o r y  o f  property entitled " r e s e r v e d  p r o p e r t y "  o f  
t h e  s p o u s e s  #
I n  t h e  s y s t e m s  w h i c h  h a v e  a d o p t e d  t h e  r e g i m e  o f  
deferred c o m m u n i t y ,  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t a k e n  b e t w e e n  
p r o p e r t y  earned a n d  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  t h r o u g h  g o o d  
f o r t u n e ®  T h u s ,  i n  G o x m i a n y ,  u n d e r  t h e  m a i n  s y s t e m ,  
g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  i n  t h e  u l t i m a t e  c a l c u l a t i o n ,  
a r e  t a k e n  t o  f o r m  part o f  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  s p o u s e ’ s  i n i t i a l  
property ( t h a t  i s ,  n o t  p a r t  o f  t h a t  s p o u s e ' s  " g a i n s " ) ®  
F u r t h e r ,  under t h e  r u l e s  o f  the German v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  
o p t i o n  o f  " c o m m u n i t y " ,  rights o f  a  p e r s o n a l  n a t u r e  
( n o n - a s s i g n a b l e )  a r e  e x c l u d e d  from c o m m u n i t y ,  a s  i s  
r e s e r v e d  p r o p e r t y  ( a s s e t s  e x c l u d e d  from community by 
agreement o f  the p a r t i e s ,  a n d  g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u i r e n d a ) ®
I n  /
i o  T h u s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  i m l e s s  a
t e s t a t o r  p r o v i d e s  o t h e r w i s e ,  a  b e q u e s t  t o  o n e  s p o u s e  
w i l l  f a l l  i n t o  community: t h e r e  i s  n o  g e n e r a l
d i f f e r e n c e  o f  t r e a t m e n t  o f  o n e r o u s  a n d  g r a t u i t o u s  acquirenda ,  a s  t h e r e  i s  i n  m a n y  E u r o p e a n  s y s t e m s »
9 4 8 #
I n  t h e  D a - ' i i s h  s y s t e m  o f  d e f e r r e d  c o m m u n i t y ,  
t h a t  p o s t p o n e d  c o m m u n i t y  d o e s  e n c o m p a s s ,  when i t  
e m e r g e s  from h i d i n g ,  b o t h  p r o p e r t y  a n d  p r o f i t  a n d  
l o s s #  T h e r e  i s  a  m o r e  f l e x i b l e  r u l e  h e r e ,  a t  
c o m p u t a t i o n #  S i n c e  1 9 6 4 ,  t h e  rule o f  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  
m a y  y i e l d  p l a c e  t o  a  d i v i s i o n  m o r e  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e ,  i f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  would 
h e  t o  w o r k  i n j u s t i c e ,  a n d  i f  t h e  a s s e t s  h a v e  b e e n  
obtained i n  t h e  m a i n  b y  o n e  s p o u s e  b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e ,  
o r  b y  p ; r a t u i t o ' u s  a c q u i r e n d a  d u r i n g  marriage # I n  
c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n ,  a  s p o u s e  i s  a l w a y s  e n t i t l e d  t o  a  
o n e  h a l f  s h a r e  o f  o n e r o u s  acquirenda, a n d  i t  m a y  b e  
r e c a l l e d  t h a t  P e d e r s e n  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  j u d i c i a l  
d i s c r e t i o n  seems t o  b e  c o m p e t e n t  i n  c a s e s  o f  m a r r i a g e s  
o f  s h o r t  d u r a t i o n  w h e r e  " n o  f i n a n c i a l  c o m m u n i t y  o f  a n y  
importance h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d # "  I n  S w e d e n  s i m i l a r l y ,  
there i s  n e v e r  a t  a n y  p o i n t  d u r i n g  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a  
" c o n c r e t e "  c o m m u n i t y  f u n d #  h o w e v e r ,  w h e n  t h e  c o i r i m u n i t y  
e m e r g e s ,  i t  a l s o  i s  m a d e  u p  o f  p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  a t  
marriage a n d  a c q u e s t s #  A s  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  t h e r e  m a y  
b e  e x c l u d e d  t h a t  property w h i c h  t h e  e p o u e o e  b y  marriage- 
contract d e c l a r e  s h a l l  b e  separate', a n d  g r a t u i t o u s  
a c q u i r e n d a  i s  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i f  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  s t a t e s  
e x c l u s i o n  t o  b e  his wish# R i g h t s  o f  a  highly p e r s o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r  a l s o  m a y  b e  e x c l u d e d ,  b y  r e a s o n  o f  t h e i r  nature # 
I n  H o l l a n d ,  t o o ,  t h e  c o m u m l t y ,  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  i m m e d i a t e ,  
n o t  deferred, o n e o m p a e s o s  a l l  a s s e t s  e x c e p t  t h o s e  o f  a  
s p e c i a l ,  non-assignable a n d / o r  p e r s o n a l  n a t u r e #
G o n f f i i e n c e n t i e n t  a n d  T e r m i n a t i o n  o f  Oommunity
E x c e p t  i n  t h e  s y s t e m s  o f  deferred c o m m u n i t y ,  w h e n ,  
e x  hypothesi,  r i g h t s  c r y s t a l l i s e  a n d  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  fund 
b e c o m e s  a p p a r e n t  o n l y  u p o n  t h e  h a p p e n i n g  o f  c e r t a i n  
e v e n t s ,  oommunity commences a t  marriage ,  a n d ,  i n  e v e r y  
s y s t e m  /
t h o u g h  i t  m a y  t h r o w  i t s  shadow b a c k w a r d s  : o f #
S ® A f r i c a ,  a n d  s e e  a l s o  S c o t t i s h  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u 3? y  
r u l e s  c o n c e x n i n g  c o n t r a c t s  b y  b e t r o t h e d  g i r l s #
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s y s t e m  s t u d i e d ,  c o m e s  t o  an e n d  when the m a r r i a g e  i s  
b r o u g h t  t o  an .  e n d  b y  a  j u d i c i a l  a c t *  O n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  m a r r i a g e  m a y  c o n t i n u e  t h o u g h  t h e  c o n u m i n i t y  has 
b e  e n  t  e x m i i n a t  e d  »
T h e n ,  a g a i n ,  c o m i a m i i t y  normally is d i s s o l v e d  b y  
t h e  d e a t h  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  parties, b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  a l w a y s  
s o ,  f o r  in s o m e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  t h e r e  i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  ' c o n t i n u i n g  c o m m u n i t y '  b e t w e e n  t h e  surviving s p o u s e  
a n d  t h e  heirs o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d #  This n o t i o n  r e c e i v e s  
l i t t l e  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  s e e m s  i n f r e q u e n t l y  encountered i n  
p r a c t i c e  #
I n  e v e r y  s y s t e m  c o n s i d e r e d ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s a f e g u a x ' d  
f o r  t h e  s p o u s e  whose marriage %>a r t n o r  p r o v e s  h i m s e l f  
t o  b e  a n  u n t r u s t w o r t h y  o r  i n e p t  a d m x . n i s t r a ' t o r  o f  t h o  
f u n d  (or o f  h i s / h e r  " o w n "  p r o p e r t y  s t a n t e  m a t r i m o n i o^  e£uwr;i3WA«giT?Ji6.fl>jWiK®U3.«iMïï»i*tmî»ai
i n  s y s t e m s  o f  d e f e r r e d  c o m m u n i t y  o r  e v e n  o f  b i e n s  
reserves i n  F r a n c e )  w h i c h  p r o v i d e s  a  r e m e d y  i n  c a s e s  
w h e r e  d i v o r c e  i s  n o t  t h e  w i s h  o f  t h o  p a r t i e s #  I n  
S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  a  s p o u s e  m a y  a p p l y  for b o e d e l  s c l i e i d i n g  
(  a  s e p a r a t i o n  of p r o p e r t y  w h i c h  m a y  b e  o n l y  o f  l i m i t e d  
d u r a t i o n ) & o r  i n  S w e d e n  s e e k  b o s k i l l n a d ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  
a  s i m i l a r  r e m e d y  i n  L o u i s i a n a #  I n  F r a n c e ,  w h e r e  e a c h  
p a r t n e r  r e t a i n s  power o v e r  p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  b y  h i m / h e r  
a t  m a r r i a g e ,  i n c a p a c i t y  o r  m i s m a n a g e m e n t  b y  o n e  m a y  
c a u s e  t h e  j x i d i c i a l  w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  him/her o f  1; h i s  
p o w e r  a n d  a l t h o u g h  t h e  h u s b a n d  r e t a i n s  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  
i n  g e n e r a l  a d m i n i  s  t r a t  i o n  o f  t h e  common fund, s u b j e c t  
t o  c e r t a i n  l i m i t e ,  d a n g e r o u s  maladministration t h e r e o f  
s u c h  a s  ' t o  i m p e r i l  t h e  . i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  n o n - m a n a g i n g * 
s p o u s e  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  w i f e  f o r  
t h e  h u s b a n d  a s  t h e  p a r t n e r  a d m i n i s t r a t o r ,  o r  it may 
result i n  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ®
T h e  n e e d  f o r  protection a g a i n s t  t h e  maladrAinistx*ator
i s  /
1 # a s  b y  d i v o r c e  o r  n u l l i t y #  I t  I s  f r e q u e n t l y  found
t , h a t  j u d i c i a l  s e n a r a t i o n  i n  i t s e l f  d o e s  n o t  t e r m i n a t e  
c o m m u n ity #  m  L o u i s i a n a ,  th o u g h ,  s e p a r a t i o n  a mensa e t  th o r o  
b r in g s  community to  an e n d .  se e  a l s o  Sweden.
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i s  f e l t  n o t  o n l y  i n  o r t h o d o x ,  i m i a e d i a t e l y - e f f e c t i v e  
o o m m u n i t y  s y s t e m s ®  I n  t h e  G e r m a n  a n d  S c a n d i n a v i a n  
s y s t e m s  o f  d e f e r r e d  c o m m u n i t y  o r  " c o m p e n s a t i o n  o f  
g a i n s "  c a n  h e  s e e n  a  s i m i l a r  a n x i e t y ,  a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
i n  t h e  r u l e s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  o n e  § . p o u s e  
t o  d i s p o s e  o f  h o u s e h o l d  i t e m s  o r  o f  h i s  w h o l e  p r o p e r t y ,  
w i t h o u t  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  o t h e r ®  U n d e r  t h e  " o r t h o d o x  
c o m m u n i t y "  o p t i o n  i n  G e r m a n y ,  c o m m u n i t y  m a y  b e  t e r m i n a t e d ,  
( a n t i c i p a t o r y  t e r m i n a t i o n )  i n t e r  a l i a ,  i f  o n e  s p o u s e  
c a n n o t  m a n a g e  h i s  a f f a i r s ,  o r  t h e r e  i s  a  l i k e l i h o o d  
t h a t  t h a t  s p o u s e  w i l l  p r e j u d i c e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  
o t h e r  b y  h i s  o w n  i n d e b t e d n e s s .  I n  E a s t  G e r m a n y ,  t h e  
t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  a c q u e s t s  w i l l  b e  b r o u g h t  
a b o u t  b y  d i v o r c e ,  n u l l i t y  o r  d e a t h ,  o r  b y  r e a s o n  o f  t h e  n e e d  
f o r  t h a t  s o l u t i o n  o f  a p p l i c a n t  s p o u s e  a n d  c h i l d r e n  o r  b e c a u s e  
t h e  s p o u s e s  h a v e  c e a s e d  t o  c o h a b i t  « U n d e r  D a n i s h  l a w ,  
a n  e v e n  w i d e r  s e l e c t i o n  o f  g r o u n d s  e x i s t s ,  a l l  h a v i n g  
a  b e a r i n g  u p o n  t h e  p r o p e r t y  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r :  
b e s i d e s  d e a t h  a n d  d i v o r c e ,  " u n l a w f u l  c e s s a t i o n "  o f  
c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  b a n k r u p t c y ,  o r  t h e  b e g e t t i n g  s i n c e  m a r r i a g e  
o r  t h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  a t  m a r r i a g e  o f  a n  
i l l e g i t i m a t e  c h i l d  m a y  b r i n g  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  t o  a n  e n d ®
A b u s e  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r ’ s  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  
o f  t h e  c o m m o n  f u n d  i s  a l s o  a  g r o u n d ®  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
n u l l i t y ,  t h e  r u l e s  o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n  c o m e  i n t o  e f f e c t  o n l y  
t o  a  l i m i t e d  e x t e n t ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a l l o c a t e  o n e r o u s  
a c q u i r e n d a #  B o d e l n i n g  i s  c o m p e t e n t  i n  S w e d e n  u p o n  a b u s e  
o f  t h e  p o w e r  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  ( b y  e i t h e r  s p o u s e  o f  " h i s  
o w n "  p r o p e r t y  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  p o t e n t i a l l y  t o  b e  t o  t h e/I
d e t r i m e n t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e )  o r  u p o n  d i v o r c e ,  j u d i c i a l  
s e p a r a t i o n ,  d e a t h  o r  n u l l i t y # A s  i n  D e n m a r k ,  d i v i s i o n  
i s  l i m i t e d  t o  o n e r o u s  a c q u i r e n d a  w h e n  t h e  c a s e  i s  o n e  o f  
n u l l i t y ®  I n  G e r m a n y ,  " a n t i c i p a t o r y  c o m p e n s a t i o n "  m a y  b e  
s o u g h t  /
1®  P r e m a t u r e  e n d i n g  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  i s  c a l l e d  b o s k i l l n a d .
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s o u g h t  w h e r e  o n e  s p o u s e  h a s -  b e e n  g u i l t y  o f  l a c k  o f  1 Pc o - o p e r a t i o n  oo? w o r s e  '  or w h o r e  t h e  s p o u s e s  are 
s e p a r a t e d  a n d  t h e  oiroumstances a r e  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  
claimant i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  live a p a r t  w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  
i s  not#
D e b t s
T h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  rights o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  i s  
o n e  o f  very g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  in any system o f  matrimonial 
property, whother t h e  s y s t e m  b e  d e t a i l e d  i n  i t s  r u l e s ,  
o r  ' a  system o f  n o  s y s t e m ' a s  s e p a r a t i o n  s y s t e m s  s o m e t i m e s  
ore d e s c r i b e d #
I n  s y s t e m s  o f  separation, t h e  creditor i s  a n x i o u s  
l e s t  l i e  b e  defrauded b y  " a r t i f i c i a l "  inter-spouse
t r a n s a c t i o n s # I n  s y s t e m s  o f  c o m m u n i t y ,  w h o l e  o r  p a r t i a l ,  
t h e  creditor # u a t  know w h i c h  s p o u s e  h a s  authority t o  a c t  
a n d  t o  i n c u r  d e b t s  Y ï h i o h  y j I I I  r e n d e r  l i a b l e  t h e  w h o l e  
c o m m o n  f u n d #  I t  h a s  b e e n  said t h a t ,  h o w e v e r  c o m p l e x  
and r e f i n e d  t h e  rules concerning inter-spouse l i a b i l i t y ,  
w h i c h  w i l l  a t t e m p t  presumably t o  d o  j u s t i c e  b e t w e e n  t h e m ,  
t h i r d  p a r t i e s  s h o u l d  n o t  n e e d  t o  inquire i n t o  t h e  
n i c e t i e s  t h e r e o f ,  o r  i n t o  q u e s t i o n s  o f  t i t l e  o r  d i s c u s s i o n s  
u p o n  t h e  nature of p r o p e r t y  -  a s  o o i m n o n  o r  s e p a r a t e ,
I n i t i a l  property o r  a c q u e s t ,  o n e r o u s  o r  p j r a t u i t o u s  
a c q u i s i t i o n ® ' ^  T h i s  a d m i r a b l e  a i m  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  many 
s y s t e m s  i n  j o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  d e b t ,  a n d  
in p r e s u m p t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  o w n e r s h i p ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  g o v e r n i n g  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  administer property o f  w h i c h  t h e  p a r t n e r  w h o  
p u r p o r t s  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  p o s s e s s e d #
A n o t e w o r t h y  f e a t u r e  o f  S c a n d i n a v i a n  a n d  G e r i a o n  l a w
i s  /
1 # s u c h  a s  r e f u s a l  t o  g i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  w i t h  regard t o  his/her p r o p e r t y #
2 q s u c h  a s  a t t e m p t s  t o  '’p r e j u d i c e  t h e  o t h e r ’ s  i n t e r e s t s  
b y  d i m i n i s h i n g  h i s / h e r  e s t a t e  o r  purporting t o  
d i s p o s e  o f  the w h o l e  o f  it*3* T h e  s p o u s e s  " s h o u l d  present a s  s i m p l e  a  l e g a l  posture 
a s  possible i n  the presence of t h i r d  parties" ( P a s c a l )
9 5 2
i s  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  e x c e p t  f o r  h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s ,  
o r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w h e r e  b o t h  h a v e  b e e n  i n v o l v e d  o r  
w h e r e  o n e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  h a s  t a k e n  o n  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  o t h e r  o r  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  -  n e i t h e r  s p o u s e  i s  l i a b l e  
f o r  t h e  d e b t s  o f  t h e  o t h e r #  T h e  e q u a l i s a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  
c o m e s  a t  d i v i s i o n  i n  t h e  r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  d e b t s  a n d  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  w h e n  c o m p e n s a t i o n  o f  g a i n s  i s  e f f e c t e d . ®
I n  m o s t  s y s t e m s ,  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t e d  b u t  n o n - c o n t r a c t i n g  s p o u s e  a n d  t h e  i n n o c e n t  
t h i r d  p a r t y  w i t h  w h o m  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e  h a s  c o n t r a c t e d  
i s  r e s o l v e d  b y  a  m i x t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  k n o w l e d g e ,  
a n d  o f  g o o d  f a i t h  ( o f  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y )  a n d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
i n  a  p u b l i c  r e g i s t e r  ( b y  t h e  s p o u s e s ,  o r  b y  o n e  o n  
b e h a l f  o f  t h e  o t h e r )  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s *  r i g h t s  i n  c e r t a i n  
a s s e t s #  T h e  l a t t e r  s o l u t i o n  i s  c o r m n o n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
h e r i t a g e ,  a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e ®  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i n  H o l l a n d ,  
t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  i s  t h a t  a l l  d e b t s  i n c u r r e d  b y  e i t h e r  
s p o u s e  b i n d  t h e  c o i m a u n i t y .
M e t h o d s  o f  D i v i s i o n  a t  D i s s o l u t i o n
I n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  G e r m a n y ,  a n d  S c a n d i n a v i a ,  t h e r e  
i s  t h e  s p e c i a l t y  o f  c o n t i n u i n g  c o m m u n i t y  a f t e r  d e a t h ,  
t h o u g h  t h e  c o n c e p t  d o e s  n o t  s e e m  t o  b e  h i g h l y  r e g a r d e d .
D e a t h  I n t e s t a t e
O n  d e a t h  i n t e s t a t e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  m o s t  n o t i c e a b l e  
t r e n d  i n  m a n y  s y s t e m s ,  w h e t h e r  o f  c o m m u n i t y  o r  o f  
s e p a r a t i o n ,  t o  f a v o u r  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e  a s  a g a i n s t  
a n y  o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  c l a i m a n t .  I n  G e r m a n y ,  t h e  r u l e s  
o f  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  h a v e  p r o v o k e d  c r i t i c i s m  a s  
b e i n g  o v e r - g e n e r o u s  t o  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e .  I t  i s  
c o m m o n  /
c o m m o n  for t h e  s u r v i v o r  t o  h e  g i v e n  a  p x ^ e f o r e i i t i a l  
claim t o  a  c e r t a i n  s u m  o f  m o n e y  ( o r  t o  t h o  w h o l e  o f  
t h e  e s t a t e  if loss),  o r  a  r i g h t  t o  a  c e r t a i n  p o r t i o n  
of the estate $ and possih3,y an. entitlemont to certain
a r t i c l e s  o f  t h e  other#
T o  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n t ,  the d u t i e s  which a r e  p l a c e d  
u p o n  s p o u s e s  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  with c a r e  t h e  c o m m o n  f u n d  
( c o m m u n i t y  s y s t e m s ) ,  o r  t h e i r  o w n  e s t a t e  w h i c h  w i l l  
b e c o m e  c o n m i o n  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n  ( d e f e r r e d  o o m m n i t y  s y s t e m s )  
o p e r a t e  a s  a  typo o f  restriction o n  t e s t a m e n t a r y  f r e e d o m ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  t e r m i n o l o g y  h e r e  i s  strained# W h a t  i s  
m e a n t  i s  that t h e  o p t i o n  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n  b e f o r e  
d e a t h  o f  a l l  h i s / h e r  property ( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  malcing 
o f  a  will w h i c h  i s  s i l e n t  c o n c e r n i n g ,  or l e s s  t h a n  open- 
handed^ t o w a r d s ,  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e )  i s  n o t  o p e n  t o  a  
s p o u s e  i n c l i n e d  s o  t o  d o #  U p o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  s p e c i f i c  
t e s t a m e n t a r y  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  G e r m a n ,  l a w  a p p e a r s  t o  a l l o w  
"freedom o f  t e s t a t i o n " ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o  t r u e  f r e e d o m  since 
t h e  a g g r i e v e d  s p o u s e  m a y  d e m a n d  a  b a s i c  s h a r e  i n  t h e  
o t h e r ' s  t e s t a t e  e s t a t e  w h i c h ,  I t  s e e m s ,  i s  o n e  h a l f  o f  
t h e  s h a r e  w h i c h  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  d u e  o n  i n t e s t a c y *  In 
S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  a  s p o u s e  w h o s e  p a r t n e r  h a s  d i s p o s e d  b y  w i l l  
o f  h i s / h e r  s h a r e  i n  t h e  j o i n t  e s t a t e ,  m u e t  c h o o s e  w h e t h e r  
t o  /
1 # o # g e  D e n m a r k ;  a  r i g h t  t o  p e r s o n a l  b e l o n g i n g s  a n d  
" a r t i c l e s  f o r  children’s use" : i n  G e r m a n y  there is
a  r i g h t  t o  a l l  w e d d i n g  p r e s e n t s  a n d  h o u s e h o l d  e q u i p m e n t  
I f  t h e r e  a r e  n o  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  and t o  a  
r e a s o n a b l e  s u p p l y  o f  t h e s e  i f  t h e r e  a r e  c h i l d r e n : i n
S w e d e n ,  t h e  s u r v i v o r  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  h o u s e h o l d  g o o d s  necessary for the continued occupation of tho home*In S c o t l a n d ,  o f  course# there a r e  prior rights t o  t h e  
m a t r i m o n i a l  homo, furnishings,  a n d  t o  a  m o n e y  entitlement ( S u c c e s s i o n .  ( S c # )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 ,  a s  amended) 
b u t  t h i s  i s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e s e  s u b j e c t s  f o r m e d  
p a r t  o f  t h e  estate o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d #
2 *  T h e  g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  degree o f  o p e n - h a n d e d n e s s  
r e q u i r e d  i f  r e q u i r e d  a t  a l l  i n  l a w  i s  o n e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  for t h e  matrimonial property r u l e s  o f  a n y  l e g a l  s y s t e m #
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t o  t a k e  the b e n e f i t  ( i f  a n y )  t o  h i m  o r  h e r  u n d e r  
t h e  w i l l  or t o  c l a i m  h i s / h e r  o w n  p r o p e r t y  i n  community(
D i v i s i o n  o n  O t h e r  E v e n t s
A t  d i e s o l u t i o n  o f  c o m m u n i t y ,  t h e r e  i s  a n
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  t a k e  s t o c k  a n d  t o  m a k e  c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  t o
s h a r e  t h e  g o o d  o r  b a d  f o r t u n e  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  t o
a l l o w  r e d r e s s  t o  b e  m a d e  i f ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n e  s p o u s e1h a s  m e t  community d e b t s  o u t  o f  h i s  o w n  property#o
C e r t a i n  s y s t e m s ' "  a l l o w ,  o r  e n c o u r a g e ,  b e f o r e  t h e  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  a n d  d i v i s i o n  p r o c e d u r e  i s  s e t  i n  m o t i o n ,  
a  c o n s e n s u a l  a r r a n g e m e n t  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  w h i c h  e f f e c t  
w i l l  b e  g i v e n  b y  t h e  c o u r t s  #
I n  t h e  l a w  o f  L o u i s i a n a ,  w e  s e e  a  h i g h l y  d e v e l o p e d  
b o d y  o f  r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  d i v i s i o n  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n #  There 
m a y  b e  v o l u n t a r y  p a r t i t i o n  ( t o  b e  p r e f e r r e d )  o r  j u d i c i a l  
p a r t i t i o n ,  a  lengthier p r o c e s s ,  b a s e d  u p o n  i n v e n t o r y  
( o f  common p r o p e r t y ) ,  i t e m i s a t i o n  ( o f  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  e a c h ) ,  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i n  c a s e s  o f  d o u b t  b e i n g  t h a t  
p r o p e r t y  p o s s e s s e d  b y  s p o u s e s  a t  dissolution i s  c o m m o n  
p r o p e r t y ,  a n d  r e i m b u r s e r a e n t  t o  e a c h  p a r t n e r  o f  m o n e y  
m a d e  o v e r  t o  c o m m u n i t y  s t a n t e  m a t r i m o n i o  b y  e i t h e r  spouse* 
W h e n  t h i s  a c c o u n t i n g  i s  c o m p l e t e ,  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  
r e m a i n i n g  c o m m u n i t y  a s s e t s  i s  made*
A n o t h e r  /
1 s  T h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  s y s t e m  i s  t h e  o n e  w h i c h  c o m e s  
n e a r e s t  t o  c r e a t i n g  a  oommunity o f  a l l  p r o p e r t y  
o w n e d  a t  m a r r i a g e  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  a c q u i r e d ,  b u t  
t h e r e  i s  a l w a y s  t h e  p o s s i b i i i t y  t h a t  a  b e n e f a c t o r  
a t  s o m e  t i m e  d u r i n g  t h e  m a r r i a g e  m i g h t  g r a n t  t o  o n e  spouse a  b e n e f i t  s t a t e d  t o  b e  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  c o m m u n i t y *  
I n  t h e  o t h e r  s y s t e m s  s t u d i e d ,  i t  i s  c o m p e t e n t  f o r ,  
a n d  l i k e l y  t h a t ,  e a c h  s p o u s e  w i l l  h a v e  c e r t a i n  
p r o p e r t y  o f  h i s / h e r  o w n ,  separate f r o m  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  
p r o p e r t y ,  o r  to b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s e p a r a t e  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n  
w h e n  t h e  c o i m n u n i t y  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  d e f e r r e d  r e g i m e  
b e c o m e s  e v i d e n t *
2 .  e*g* 3  * A i y i c a ,  E # Germany, S w e d e n  *
Another h i g h l y  d e v e l o p e d  system i s  t h a t  o f  
Sweden * B o d e l n i n g  i n v o l v e s  valuation o f  a s s e t s *  
a n d ,  i n  c a s e s  w h e r e  c o n s e n s u a l  p a r t i t i o n  i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e *  p a r t i t i o n  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  by t h e  B o d e l n i n g  
o v e r s e e i î w ' i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  r u l e s  o 
B o d e l n i n g  d e b t s  o f  e a c h  a r e  p a i d  o u t  o f  t h e  g i f t o r a t t s g o d s  
of each a n d  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i s  m a d e  i n  c a s e s  where -  
b r o a d l y  s p e a k i n g  -  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  o n e  o r  o t h e r  o f  t h e  
s p o u s e s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  h i s  o w n  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  a t  
t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  h i s  g i f t o r a t t s g o d s *  P e r s o n a l  e f f e c t s  
a r e  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n  a s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  
h o u s e h o l d  g o o d s ,  w h i c h  g o  t o  t h e  s u r v i v o x ’’ o r  t h e  
" i n n o c e n t "  partner i n  d i v o r c e  « T h e r e a f t e r ,  d i v i s i o n  
i s  m a d e ,  a n d  i t  i s  e f f e c t e d  u s u a l l y  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  
e q u a l  s h a r e s ,  a l t h o u g h  u n e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  m a y  b e  a g r e e d  
u p o n  a t  B o d e l n i n g  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  o r  t h e r e  m a y  b e  
d i v i s i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  p r e ^ B o d e l n i n g  m a r r i a g e  s e t t l e m e n t ,  
w h i c h  m a y  o r  m a y  n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  b i n d i n g  o n  t h e  
p a r t i e s  «
I n  Denmark t o o  t h e r e  i s  a n  opportunity a t
d i v i s i o n  f o r  c o m p e n s a t i o n  t o  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  a g g r i e v e d  
s p o u s e  i f  t h e  o t h e r  i s  s e e n  t o  h a v e  ® a b u s e d *  h i s  a s s e t s  «- 
t h a t  i s ,  w i t h o u t  g o o d  r e a s o n ,  h a s  d i m i n i s h e d  t h e m  o rp
h a s  s q u a n d e r e d  t h e m »  T h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u c h  a  p o w e r  
m i g h t  m a k e  premature d i v i s i o n  b a s e d  t h e r e o n  a  r e m e d y  
c o m i n g  t o o  l a t e  t o  b e  o f  use, a n d  a t  w h a t e v e r  p o i n t  
d i v i s i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e ,  s u c h  a  p o w e r  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  
a  n e c e s s a r y  f e a t u r e »  T h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  x m l e s  of 
d i v i s i o n  /
«pnc »TSSiiEqaft4«9*tr!Ta?s3ffl*w»^
1 e " a  c l o s i n g  o f  b o o k s , # , , " ,  i n  S x i a s m a n ^ e  w o rd s ,
2 #  T h i s  i s  a  n o t i o n  c o m m o n  t o  m a n y  s y s t e m s  o f  c o x i n i i m i t y ,  present a n d  d e f e r r e d ,  a n d  r e p r e s e n t s  a  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  
u p o n  o w n e r s h i p  a l b e i t  n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
a  s y s t e m  of c o m m u n i t y  w h i c h  i s  u n k n o w n  i n  a  s y s t e m  
o f  separation. T h u s ,  f o r  oxample,  i n  S c o t l a n d ,  
t h e r e  i s  s o m e t i m e s  d i s q u i e t  a b o u t  t h e  f r e e d o m  
e n j o y e d  b y  a  s p o u s e  d u r i n g  his l i f e t i m e  t o  a l i e n a t e  
h i s  g o o d s ,  b u t  a c k n o w l e d g e d  inability g r e a t l y  t o  
a l t e r  t h e  p o s i t i o n #
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d i v i s i o n  i s  t h a t ,  w h a t e v e r  e v e n t  p r o m p t s  d i v i s i o n ,  
e a c h  p a r t n e r  s h a l l  m a k e  o v e r  t o  t h e  o t h e r  o n e  h a l f  
o f  h i s / h e r  n e t  e s t a t e .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  t w o  
e s t a t e s  m a y  h e  m a s s e d ,  a n d  t h e  d e b t s  o f  b o t h  d e d u c t e d  
t h e r e f r o m .  O n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  n e t  s u m  p r o d u c e d  i s  
t h e n  a l l o w e d  t o  e a c h  s p o u s e ,  t h e  e f f e c t  b e i n g  t o  m e e t  
o u t  o f  t h e  w h o l e  t h e  d e b t s  o f  b o t h ,  s o  t h a t  e a c h  i s  
e n t i t l e d  t o  h a v e  m e t  h i s / h e r  d e b t s  a t  d i v i s i o n , ^
P e d e r s e n  s t i l l  f e e l s  a b l e  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  S c a n d i n a v i a n  
i d e a l  t h a t  n e i t h e r  s p o u s e  s h a l l  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e b t s  
o f  t h e  o t h e r  i s  a c h i e v e d ,  a n d  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  t h i s  t h e  
D u t c h  p o s i t i o n .
T h e  G e r m a n  r u l e s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  b e t w e e n  d i v i s i o n
o f  p r o p e r t y  a t  d e a t h  a n d  o n  o t h e r  e v e n t s .  U p o n
d i v i s i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  j o i n t  l i v e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  t h e
n o t i o n  o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n  a p p l i e s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  e a c h
s p o u s e ,  v a l u a t i o n  i s  m a d e  o f  " i n i t i a l  p r o p e r t y "  ( b e i n g
p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  a t  m a r r i a g e  a n d  a c q u e s t s )  a n d  " f i n a l
p r o p e r t y "  ( b e i n g  p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n  a n d
d i v i s i o n ) .  W h e r e  n o  i n v e n t o r y  o f  o r i g i n a l  a n d2a c q u i r e d  p r o p e r t y  h a s  b e e n  k e p t ,  p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  a t  
d i s s o l u t i o n  i s  p r e s u m e d  t o  b e  " g a i n s " .  T h e  l a r g e r  
t h e  " p i l e *  o f  g a i n s  d e e m e d  t o  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  
s t r o n g e r  p a r t y ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  w i l l  b e  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
" b e n e f i t " ^  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  w e a k e r  p a r t y ®  G r a t u i t o u s  
a c q u i s i t i o n s  a r e  a d d e d  t o  t h e  l i s t  o f  i n i t i a l  p r o p e r t y .  
G r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  a r e  d e e m e d  t o  b e  a d d e d  t o  t h e  
l i s t  o f  f i n a l  p r o p e r t y ,  f r o m  w h i c h  c o m p e n s a t i o n  w i l l  b e  
d u e  ; a  n e a t  a n d  j u s t  s o l u t i o n .  C o m p e n s a t i o n  c a n n o t  
e x c e e d  t h e  s u m  o f  f i n a l  p r o p e r t y  i n  a n y  c a s e 5 t h o u g h .
As n o t e d  e a r l i e r 5 t h e  c r e d i t o r  s p o u s e  m a y  s e e k  e v e n  
f r o m  /
d ,  S e e  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l  s u p r a  C h a p t e r  6  ( D e n m a r k ) ,
2® I f  a n  i n v e n t o r y  h a s  b e e n  k e p t 9 t h e r e  i s  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  i t s  a c c u r a c y ,
5 ,  E x  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  c o u r s e *  t h i s  i s  n o t  a  " b e n e f i t " ,  
b u t  a  r i ^ t .
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from a bona fide third party a gift or its monetary*eR(t>w«s«îv»wj»  ^  ^ " *
v a l u e *  T h e  d e b t o r  s p o u s e  m a y  plead t h a t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  
w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  g r o s s  inequity, or may p l e a d  s e t - o f f  
a s  a  d e f e n c e  or p a r t i a l  d e f e n c e ®  C o m p e n s a t i o n  i s  
e f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  m a k i n g  o v e r  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  
w e a k e r  s p o u s e  o f  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  a m o u n t  b y  w h i c h  t h e  
g a i n s  o f  h i s / h e r  p a r t n e r  e x c e e d  h i s / h e r  o w n  g a i n s  
a m a s s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  m a r r i a g e ®
3 ?ro  0  Î  (  Invent or i e  s )vW  »pt¥«iâWJ/a<,‘î'«rx^.3lSs4
E v e n  under a  s y s t e m  o f  f u l l  c o m m u n i t y  % certainA
i t e m s  o f  p r o p e r t y  o f  a  spouse m a y  b o  e x c l u d e d  « I n  
o t h e r  systems, matters t e n d  t o  b e  l e s s  c l e a r ,  a n d  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  frequently are d e a l t  w i t h  by t h e  use o f
p r o  s u m p t i o n s ®
T h e  s y s t e m  o f  j u d i c i a l  p a r t i t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  i n  
L o u i s i a n a  h a s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d *  T h e  d i v i s i o n  i s  b a s e d  
o n  a n  Inventory o f  community p r o p e r t y  a n d  an i t e m i s a t i o n  
i s  m a d e  o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h .  B o t h  l i s t s  
a r e  m a d e  u p  by a  n o t a r y *  T h e  i n v e n t o r y  i s  n o t  
c o n c l u s i v e  e v i d e n c e  o f  w h a t  i t  c o n t a i n s ,  b u t  i t  i s  
a c c o r d e d  g r e a t  r e s p e c t *  A s  i n  G e r m a n y ,  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  
i s  t h a t  a l l  property i n  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  
a t  d i s s o l u t i o n  i s  community property. G r a t u i t o u s  
acquisitions a l s o  are e x c l u d e d  f r o m  c o m m u n i t y  property, 
a s  i s  property b r o u g h t  t o  the marriage b y  t h e  s p o u s e s  
a n d  property d e r i v e d  f r o m  s u c h  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ®  T h e  
i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  of the e x i s t e n c e  
o f  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n ,  t h e  o n u s  o f  p r o o f  l i e s  o n  t h e  p a r t y  
a v e r r i n g  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  item of p r o p e r t y  f a l l s  w i t h i n  
o n e  o f  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s ®  Further,  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o  
t h e  /
1 o  T n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  ; t h e  w i f e ' s  e a r n i n g s  a r e  e x c l u d e d  
i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  M a tr im o n ia l  A f f a i r s  A c t ,  1953s i n  
F r a n c e ,  w h e r e  com m unity  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a c q u e s t s ,  
t h e  w i f e ^ B  e a r n i n g s  a r e  b i e n s  r e s e r v e s ,i»3«irM«wjs»wHr®wp*«iifesvBiwa
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t h e  p a r t i e s  h a v e  p o w e r  t o  I m p u g n  t h e  notary's i n v e n t o r y  
Eind a c c o u n t i n g ?  W h e r e  c l a i m s  o f  r e i m b u r s e m e n t  b y  a  
spouse a g a i n s t  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  a r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  ï > r o s u m p t l o n s  
o p e r a t e ,  a n d  t e n d  t o  f a v o u r  t h e  w i f e  ( n o n ^ o a p t a i n )  
a l l e g e d  c r e d i t o r  rather t h a n  t h e  husband a l l e g e d  
c r e d i t o r *
D i v i s i o n  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
n o t a r y ,  a n d  t h i s  h e  d o e s ,  u s i n g  a s  h i s  base^point t h e  
i n v e n t o r i e s ,  a s  a d j u s t e d  for debts o w e d  by t h e  community 
t o  t h e  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s *  Â c r u e m a l  
m a t t e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  
p o w e r  t o  " t r a v e r s e "  t h e  i n v e n t o r y ; L e e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t o  d i s c o u r a g e  f r i v o l o u s  o b j e c t i o n ,  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  a  
t i m e  l i m i è " a f t e r  w h i c h  c h a l l e n g o  only o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  
f r a u d  w o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d .  T h e  p a r t i t i o n  ( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
t h e  Inventory) m a y  b e  a t t a c k e d  a n d  r e d u c e d  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  
o f  " e r r o r ,  l e s i o n ,  v i o l e n c e  o r  f r a u d " »
P a s c a l  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a  w e l c o m e  c h a n g e  i n  L o u i s i a n a  
w o u l d  b e  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  t h e  p r e s u B i p t i o n  t h a t  a l l  
o b j e c t s  a r e  c o m m u n i t y  a s s e t s  u n t i l  p r o v e d  o t h e r w i s e ,  
a n d  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  r u l e  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  an 
agreement b e t w e e n  t h e  s p o u s e s  o n  t h e  p o i n t ,  a  d e c i s i o n  
w o u l d  b e  r e a c h e d  u p o n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  e v i d e n c e  u n a i d e d  o r  
u n h i n d e r e d  by p r e s u m p t i o n s  -  a  d e c i s i o n  * o n  t h e  
p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  e v i d e n c e * »  I t  i s  n o t o r i o u s ,  t h o u g h ,  
t h a t  i n  t h e s e  matters e v i d e n c e  i s  o f t e n  s p a r s e  a n d  
p r e s u m p t i o n s  m u s t  s u p p l y  t h e  l a c k ®
I n  F r a n c e ,  presumptions a r e  f o u n d  w h i c h  p e r t a i n  t o  
p o w e r s  o f  management.  I n  a  s y s t e m  w h i c h  h a s  g o n e  s o m e  
w a y  t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  h e a d s h i p  o f  t h e  f a m i l y ,  a n d  
h a s  a d o p t e d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h e  o b t a i n i n g  o f  t h e  w i f e ' s  
c o n s e n t  t o  t r a n s a c t i o n s  o f  i m p o r t a n c e ,  t h e r e  a r e  
p r e s u m p t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  of t h e  c o m m o n  
f u n d  a n d  t h e  s e p a r a t e  f u n d s ,  which f a c i l i t a t e  b u s i n e s s  
a n d  e a s e  t h e  f l o w  o f  c o m m e r c e ®  U n d e r  Dutch law, a  
t h i r d  /
959*
t h i r d  p a r t y ,  if i n  d o u b t ,  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  assume t h a t
t h e  B p o u s e  i n  possession o f  a  m o v e a b l e  is e n t i t l e d  t o  id e a l  w i t h  i t ®  T h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  F r a n c e  i s  t h a t  e a c h  
s p o u s e  h a s  p o w e r  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  a  m o v e a b l e  item i n  
h i s / h e r  possession ( t o  b o n a  f i d e  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ) ,  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  m o v e a b l e  is n o t  an a r t i c l e  o f  h o u s e h o l d  
f u r n i t u r e  o r  e x  s u a  n a t u r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  t h e  ( s e p a r a t e )<rcw«fflsa-OTBr»vri'x«Kmd ^property of t h e  other s p o u s e  * T h e  3:0 i s  f r e e d o m  t o  
e a c h ^  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  a t  a n d  b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e  
b u t  h o w  d o e s  a  s p o u s e  p r o v e  t h a t  i t e m s  o w n e d  at 
d i s s o l u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  p l a c e d  i n  t h e s e  c l a s s e s ?  A r t i c l e  
1 4 0 2  s t a t e s  t h a t  a l l  property, m o v e a b l e  o r  i m m o v e a b l e ,  
i s  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  a c q u e s t  i f  n o t  p r o v e d  t o  b e  
the s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  either* G e n e r a l l y ,  therefore, 
t h e  o n u s  of p r o o f  l i e s  o n  t h e  p a r t y  averring t h a t  the 
p r o p e r t y  i s  e x c l u d e d  from c o m m u n i t y ®  H a tatis m u t a n d i s  
t h e  s a m e  a t t i t u d e  i s  f o u n d  i n  Germany*
I n  t h e  S c a n d i n a v i a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  i n  Germany w h e r e  
t h e  g a i n s  b y  e a c h  p a r t y  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e  m u s t  b e  c a l c u l a t e d ,  
t h e r e  i s  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  n e c e s s i t y  f o r e  presumptions t o  
g o v e r n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  p r o p e r t y  s h o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  
a s  i n i t i a l  o r  f i n a l  property. T h e  n e e d  for t h e s e  r u l e s  
may b e  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s  d e p e n d i n g  upon t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e s  a d o p t e d  b y  v a r i o u s  s y s t e m s  t o  e f f e c t  
d i v i s i o n *  I n  Denmark, for e x a m p l e ,  t h e 3 ? e  w o u l d  s e e m  
t o  b e  n o  n e e d  s o  t o  c a t e g o r i s e  p r o p e r t y  a n d  h e n c e  n o  
n e e d  f o r  r u l e s  o n  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  t h e  t y p e  found i n  Germany* 
T h e  S w e d i s h  system, o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  r e q u i r e s  r u l e s
t o  s e t  a p a r t  f r o m  o t h e r  p r o p e r t y ,  p r o p e r t y  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d%
a a  G i f t o r a t t s g o d a %^  b u t  t h e s e  r u l e s  h a v e  n o  s e x i s t  b a s i s ,  
n o r  /
1. Art*1G7. 0,0,2, t h o u g h  f r e e d o m  limited i n  t h e  m a n n e r  o f  c o m m u n i t y  
s y s t e m s  ♦>- s e e  " L i m i t a t i o n s  o n  f r e e d o m  o f  a c t i o n " ,  infra*
3  e w iiT o E  i n c l u d e  g o o d s  o w n e d  a i ;  marriage and a c q u e s t s ,
t h o u g h  n o t  g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u e s t s  i f  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  w i s h e s  
s u c h  t o  b e  treated a s  separate property; o f  c o u r s e ,  
a t a n t e  m a t r i m o n i o ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  c o m m u n i t y  f u n d  t o  b e  
s e e n *
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n o r  do t h e y  a l l o w  t h e  risk of p o t e n t i a l  injustice 
a r i s i n g  f r o m  a  p e r h a p s  n e c e s s a r y  p r e s u m p t i o n ,  a n d  
h a v e  t h e  v i r t u e  o f  c e r t a i n t y *  D u r i n g  m a r r i a g e ,  each 
p a r t n e r  r e m a i n s  o w n e r  ( s i i ' b j o c t  t o  'b lie  u s u a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
i m p o s e d  b y  c o m m u n i t y  u p o n  the f r e e d o m  which b e l o n g s  
t o  o w n e r s h i p )  o f  t r u l y  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  a n d  h i s / h e r  
o m i  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  G i f t o r a t t s g o d s o  T i t l e  t o  h e r i t a g e  
s u f f i c e s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  t h e  t i t l e ™  
h o l d e r ®  M o v e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  i s  d e e m e d  t o  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  
s p o u s e  w h o  h a s  i n c u r r e d  d e b t  i n  respect o f  it, t h o u g h  
S u s s m m i  n o t e s  t h a t  t h i s  p r e s u m p t i o n  i s  r e b u t t a b l e .
H e r e ,  a s  i n  G e r m a n y  ( w h e r e  G 3?an o  I ' e m a r k s  t h a t  t h e  
I n v e n t o r y  r u l e s  f a v o u r  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  w e a k e r  partner 
b e c a u s e  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  c a n n o t  h a v e  t h o u g h t  t h e  m a k i n g  
o f  i n v e n t o r i e s  a  c o m m o n  a n d  n a t u r a l  o c c u r r e n c e ) ,  u s e  l a  
m a d e  ( t h o u g h  i n f r e q u e n t l y ,  i t  s e e m s )  o f  t h e  i n v e n t o r y ,  
w h i c h ,  i f  m a d e  i n  p r o p e r  f o r m ,  is e v i d e n c e  o f  w h a t  i t  
c o n t a i n s ,  t h o u g h  i t s  r e c o r d  m a y  b e  r e f u t e d *
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  n e i t h e r  i n  a  s y s t e m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  
n o r  i n  a  c o m m u n i t y  s y s t e m ,  t h o u g h  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s ,  
can t h e r e  b e  a  s u c c e s s f u l  r e g i m e  w i t h o u t  certain r u l e s  
a n d  presumptions c o n c e r n i n g  ownership ( a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n )  
o f  m o v e a b l e s *  O n e - f e a t u r e  o f  C o n t i n e n t a l  s y s t e m s  i s  
t h e  g r e a t e r  r e a d i n e s s  t o  t r a n s f e r  t i t l e  t o  i m m o v e a b l e  
p r o p e r t y  from o n e  s p o u s e  t o  t h e  o t h e r ,  a s  o c c a s i o n  
d e m a n d s ®  A l t h o u g h  t i t l e  i s  a c c e p t e d  a s  p r o o f  o f  
o w n e r s h i p ,  i t  s e e m s  t o  i n s p i r e  l e s s  a w e  t h a n  i t  d o e s  
i n  E n g l a n d  a n d  S c o t l a n d .  G r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  
fluidity i s  probably welcome *
H a r r i a g 8 « » 0 o n t r a c t B  A n t e - U u p t i a l  a n d  P o s t ™ ( M u p t i a l
I n  t w o  t r a d i t i o n a l  s y s t e m s ,  t h o s e  o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a  
a n d  L o u i s i a n a ,  t h o u g h  c h o i c e  o f  r e g i m e s  i s  o p e n  t o  
t h o s e  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  m a r r i a g e ,  post-nuptial d e v i a t i o n  
from t h e  s y s t e m  c h o s e n  ( o r  n o t  a v o i d e d )  i s  n o t  c o m p e t e n t * ^
It /
L e e  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t ,  w h i l e  c o n t r a c t i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  s y s t e m  i s  e x t r e m e l y  c o m m o n  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  
i t  i s  r a r e  in L o u i s i a n a  a n d  i n  F r a n c e .
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It has b.een seen that spouses in South Africa 
may exclude only the variable conséquences of marriage*
However, they may choose, within the confines of the 
invariable consequences of marriage and the limits of 
legality, morality and public policy, any regime*
They may adopt the rules of another jurisdiction, or 
they may create an individual and personal set of rules 
which meets their own needs® VMthin the South African 
system itself, they may choose a modifiod version of 
community of property alone, or community of gains 
alone, in each case being free to exclude or include 
the husband's power of adminis trat ion. Exclusion 
of that power must be expresa *
"Oontractlng^out" in France also is competent, 
but it is rare» As in South Afxdca, there are fixed 
bounds outsIda which parties cannot step, but these 
are not many* There is a great measure of freedom 
of contracts the spouses may choose, for example, 
joint management of community property or a system 
under which either may administer community property 
but consent of both is necessary for disposals, or, 
again, to revert to a system which provides that the 
husband will toko all powers of administration. They 
may adopt a species of separation of property, or a 
system similar to those in operation in Scandinavia*
Grane notes that in Germany wealthy husbands took 
the opportunity of adopting a system of separation 
before the changes effected in 1 9 5 8  came into force* /Even after 1958* however, contracting-out is competent* 
Some of the effects on the complex rules of successionQof contracting-out are mentioned above 0 "^ Ante-nuptial 
or post-nuptial changes of mind are permitted within 
the bounds imposed by "the mandatory rules of law and 
ethics"® The scheme adopted in substitution may be 
one /
1. BGB 1565(1) 2o Chapter 6,
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ono t h e  framework and details of w h lo h  a r e  specified 
in the Oo&e (that iG* the varl&nta of universalAoommmlty o r  a o p o r a t lo n )  , or one "tailor-made" for
parties * Formalities exist with regard to the
deed effecting the choice* and registration thereof 
or private knowledge of third parties of the deviations 
from the norm are necessary before thishl parties will 
be bound# little more could bo demandod in the way of 
contractual freedom* and nothing which has followed 
eeomc greatly to have weakened the German standard system#
In Denmark* the standard, system appears to suit 
the neede of the majority, though indeed, although there 
is freedom to contract out of it, there is no great 
freedom in the choice of substitute» The only options 
offered are true separation* or separation with elements 
of oommimlty# A foreign* or individual, system is not 
a competent choice^ m  Sweden, where ante-^vmptial and 
post^^nuptial settlement9 are valid, there is a similar 
lack of choice of substitute system, thouo;h* surprisingly, 
there Is great scope for alteration of the division which 
otherwise t^ould arise at Bpdolnin^* by means of pre* 
f o d e lB in g  se ttle m e n t* '^ "
Contr&cting^out is competent also in Holland, and 
here too* as in France, it has been recognised that post- 
nuptial alterations of the system chosen are permissible, 
though such must receive judicial approval# Marriage- 
contracts, ante-miptial and poet^nuptla)., are permissible 
in English and Joots law, but at present are almost 
unknown*^
S in c e  community of aequo a ta  and  oom m unlty o f  m o v o ab le s  and  a c q u e s t s  h a v e  b e e n  "rem oved  from t h e  b o o k s"  ( G r a n e , p o 1 4 6 )*  t h e y  o u a t  b e  s e l e c t o d  b y  s p e c i a l  a g re e m e n t#  
a s  b y  p r o v id in g  that a l l  p r o p e r t y  o f  ono ap o u ee  s h a l l  b e  r o g a r d e d  a s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  -  s e e  G u ssm an 's  
com m en ts, n o t e d ,  s u g r^ #3# T h is  may n o t  o lw o ^ T I o  s o ,  i f  o u r  " n o n - r u le s "  o f  matrimonial p r o p e r t y  change® fi a r r i a g e - o o n t r a o t s  in t h e  past w ere  u t i l i s e d  b y  the p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s #  ::ow, t h e  idea t e n d s  t o  b e  t r e a t e d  i n  a  l i g h t  v e in #
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Limitations on Freedom of Action
Under the full community of South Africa, the 
theory is that the spouses equally are owners of 
the property in the condominium 9 hut the husband 
is the administrator thereof® Each has a one half 
share therein. Inter vivos disposals of the shares 
in joint estate are not competent, though mortisAcausa disposals are permitted. There are certain 
restrictions upon the husband's rights of administration, 
and his power may be taken away by separation of 
property or interdict, as appropriate. The Louisiana 
husband also may find his power of administration 
removed if his conduct has been such as to merit an 
application by the wife for separation of property, 
as may the French husband. It is clear that for 
inept or fraudulent administration by the principal 
administrator there is always a remedy.
Further, where separate property is allowed to 
spouses under a community regime (as in France), the 
"free power to manage" such separate property may be ptaken away when there has been mismanagement thereof. 
Probably the restrictions are in proportion to the 
closeness of the linlc between the separate property 
(and the income thereof perhaps, which often is found 
to accrue to the community) and the prosperity of the 
community fund, a link absent, of course, in a system 
of separation which knows ho common fund.
A greater s cope  i s  given to the wife to 
participate /
1. Hahlo, p.213* (3rd edn.)2. In Denmark, maladministration of one spouse's property deleteriously affecting the other's interests will found an action for dissolution of community. If there have been "disloyal" acts, compensation is competent at division (Sweden, Denmark).
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1participate in managoraont, and this Is right.
The foregoing discussion highlights some of 
the problems common to many systems, and the solutions 
adopted to meet them®
It is not sufficient to say that the %)roblem 
would not have orison, and the (pexliaps) complex 
solution would not have bean required had the system 
been the straightforward one of separation of property, 
The view that the straightforwardness of the system 
is adequate justification for it seldom seems to be 
argued fully* Problems of matrimonial property are 
complex, Slid a simple solution is not necessarily the 
best* On the other hand, it has not been established 
that /
This is most apparent in France® Generally, the European systems do not seem to have decided yet xipon joint management® Contrast American juris­dictions such as Texas and Mexico® France appears to go as far as possible vrithout adopting joint management (while providing options which do provide for that)® For example, neither spouse may "“dispose of the matrimonial home or furniture without the other’B consent (Of ,8c®Law Com.Memo ®Ho ®41 )Similarly in. Holland, co-operative action is necessary for the purchase of certain goods (household goods) or for the entry into certain transactions (e.g® hire purchase, the sale or pledging in security of the matrimonial home or fiirniturf, contracts to guarantee a sole debtor, or the making of gifts of unusual size), in the Scandinavian systems, there are similar restrictions® For example in Germany, a spouse cannot dispose of his/her whole property or of his/ her items of household plenishing without the other's consent® In Sweden, consent of both spouses is necessary for alienations of heritage or household goods or goods necessary for the other spouse's work g 03? children's goods® In Denmark, too, joint action is necessary where the matrimonial home is concerned ®
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that a system of separation is not satisfactory*
Trends
Only a very small minority of the States of the 
United States are community systems, hut these states 
appear to he striving to malce their rules, in their 
sex-hased aspect, acceptable and constitutional, and 
show no inclination instead to embrace a regime of 
separation*
In South Africa, in family law, there are stirrings 
of reform (for example, in divorce), but perhaps because 
the greater proportion of the middle class discard the 
standard system, and because there is freedom to do so 
and ease in doing so (ante-nuptially), there appears to 
be no urgent clamour for changes in matrimonial property 
law except perhaps for the ability post-nuptially to 
change the regime*
France has modified her system by the law of July 
13, 1 9 6 5 , as has Holland, by the law of June 14, 1956* 
Germany, in June, 1958, adopted a version of a system 
established in the Scandinavian countries since the 1920s‘^, 
a system with which Sweden, the pioneer, may perhaps be 
growing tired, and which it might wish to replace, in 
whole or in part, by rules of State insurance*
East Germany in 1966 adopted a system of community 
of acquests, and this, it seems, is the approach preferred 
by the Soviet countries*
Englan.d has considered community of property, but 
ultimately may prefer its traditional answer of judicial 
discretion /
-.1» though Grane (Kiralfy, p*11?) says that a similar system has existed in Austria since 1811.
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discretion» Uîiat is the Scottish attitude to he?
EEAMND AUSTRALIA
Here too there have been many interesting recent 
developments »
New Zealand
At the time of the passing of the Matrimonial 
Property Act, 1976 (into force 1st February, 1977), it 
seems that the positioji in New Zealand law was that, 
questions of ownership of property being subject to the 
Matrimonial Property Act, 1963, much depended on the 
construction of that Act, but that the Privy Ooinicil 
decision of 1976 (Haldan.e ) suggested that a fairly 
liberal approach was permissible * Certainly, when 
the spouses came to court to seek a division of assets 
and a ruling on title (as to home and furniture), on 
dissolution of marriage, Haldane's case indicated that 
indirect contribution might be regarded as contribution.
and contribution was the basis upon which the property 
awards wen 
compared /
ore made#^ Scots law looks threadbare when
I <9 2 0 Haldane v® H» 1976 2 N*2oI,»R,715.See "The Law of Matrimonial Propox'ty in New Zealand", (P* von Badelszen) which was a paper submitted to the Fifth Gommonwealth Law Conference, Edinburgh,1977 (Developments in Family Laws Family Property) and from which the information upon the New Zealand rules has boon drawn® See also the Conference paper, "Matrimonial Property Disputes in New Zealand - Two ISxperiments" (J *i4.Priestley) « Priestly notes that under the Matrimonial Property Act, 1963, s*6(1), the court was required to consider the respective contributions of all kinds ("whether in the form of money payudents, services, prudent management or otherwise howsoever*)" of husband and wife to the property whore that property was the matrimonial home, and in the case of other property, had a discretion to consider contribution®
compared even with that pre-1976 approach*
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The new rule is that there is "a presumption 
of equality, irrebuttable (with only narrow exceptions) 
in the case of the matrimonial home and what may be 
described as "family chattels", but rebuttable in the 
case of other assets which fall within the generalgdefinition of "matrimonial p'roperty®"'"*
There is provided* therefore, a presumption of 
equal rights in all property as a starting-point for 
the division of assets on the dissolution of the 
marriage, but " T ho Act does not go so far as to 
create a "Comraimity of Property®" The property so 
treated comprises both ante-nuptial and post-nuptial 
property of each spouse® The author points out that 
the Act is concerned with the division of property on 
dissolution, not with "how the property is hold while 
the marriage subsists®" There is a lengthy list of 
those activities which are to be regarded as contributions 
of spouses/^ and a direction-'^  that monetary contributions 
are not to be regarded as of greater value than non­
monetary contributions. Hence, "a contribution to the 
marriage partnership" (and it is the notion of partnership 
which #oii Dadelssen considers to be the underlying 
principle of the Act) includes, for example, care of 
children or of aged or infirm relations (of either spouse) 
management of the household, the giving of assistance 
(material or non-mater1al) to the other partner, including 
help /
1® Gf* Professor HeGuHeston, (Fifth Commonwealth Law Conference) "Family Itroperty in Scotland" "It mayseem remarkable to those who criticise the family property provisions of English law that Scots law has virtually no family property provisions to criticise, but this is one of the areas whore Scots law is certainly not a model for anyone®"2 * Dade1s sen, ibid«3 ® von DadoIs sen,"p *401.4s s«18(1}»
5* 8 . 1 8 ( 2 ) ,
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help to gain qualifications or to carry on a business 
or occupation, the forgoing of a higher standard of 
living than would otherwise have been available, 
(generally non-material contributions) and (material 
contributions) the acquisition or creation of 
matrimonial property, including payment of money for 
these purposes, the payment of money to maintain or 
increase the value of the matrimonial property or the 
separate property of the other spouse and the performance 
of work or services in respect of the matrimonial 
property or the separate property of the other spouse *
Perhaps intentionally not first on the list, sub
subsection (o) of 8*18(1) brings in "The provision of
money, including the earning of income, for the purposes
of the marriage partnership®" The relatively loi'Zly
plaoe accorded to this "contribution" (once so highly
regarded) is a measure of the modernity of outlook;
the realistic and practical approach cannot fail to be 1noticedg
oIt is extremely interesting to find^ that, in 
adjudicating upon contribution, no account is to be 
talcen /
2.
ofo (as to itemised approach, and in tone) England;H .G.A619735 8*25* As to Scotland, even now, underour new 1976 Act (which introduced the new "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" basis into Scots law, but made only such property changes as the new rules necessarily demanded; ".,*,it would be unbelievable to anyone who did not know of the obstacles which had been placed in the way of reform that no significant alteration other than permitting a defender to apply for a property provision was made in the property consequences of divorce*" lieston Fifth Commonwealth ‘Law Conference, p®377) we have no property transfer order powers* If a party is ordered to make over a capital sum of 82,000, he must find it where he may, out of such property accepted or established as hie according to the normal rules of ownership applying between strangers*
8 , 1 6 ( 3 )#
taken of mieconduct, unlose "gross and. palpable" 
and having affected significantly the extent or 
value of the matrimonial property* This has a 
mirror in Wachtel and it has been argued at points 
throughout this discussion, especially with regardAto aliment , that conduct should be considered to 
be irrelevant in the settlement; of property disputes 
unless perhaps it has been gross and unconscionable,
A distinction Is drawn between matrimonial homeoand family chattels,^ and other matrimonial property,
In the case of the former, there is to be equal division, 
and division extends to the proceeds of the sale of 
the house whe3.?e no other house has boon bought and 
property division takes place within two years of the 
sale® If there is no home, "the Court Is to award 
each spouse an, equal share in such part of matrimonial 
property as it tliinlcs just so as to compensate for the 
absence of Interest in a matrimonial home*" Where 
the /
1* Oee Chapter 4 above, see also Memo No,22 and Faculty Response*2, "Family Chattels" comprise furniture and household equipment, motor vehicles, caravans and boats, and household pets* (8,2(1))*  ^ Priest.V (Fifth Commonwealth Law Conference) observes that "It matters not that any such chattels may be subject to a hire purchase agreement" (s»2(1))® (Where division takes place dxu?ing the currency of such an agreement, how is the outstem,ding liability to be apportioned between the (equally sharing) spouses?) Priestly considers that the definition of "matrimonial property" "is in effect a "community of gains", which includes the matrimonial home and family chattels," (although earlier he notes that since besides other indications the parties remain free to deal with property, and third party rights are not affected, the Act has not replaced a system of separation With a community system,) *
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the land held is not used wholly or principally for 
the family accosnmodation, there is equal division of 
the monetary equivalent of tlio equity in the "homestoad" «
However, the presumption of equality is rebuttable 
in c e r t a i n  instances, as, for example, w h ere  the marriage 
is of short d u r a t io n *  This question has given pause 
for thought on occasion, and the view has been expressed 
that she who marries a millionaire and lives with him 
for a year should not be entitled to a sizeable annuity 
for lifeB The Hew Zealand rule is that, where the 
marriage has subsisted for less than three years (or 
such longer period as the court may think fit), there 
shall not be equal division of ante-nuptial property 
or of gratuitous acquirenda, nor shall there be equal 
d i v i s i o n  where "the contribution of one spouse to the 
marriage partnership has clearly been disproportionately 
greater than that of the other spouse »" Division here 
is to be in accordance with contribution, which criterion 
shall apply also where "extraordinary circumstances"Arender equal sharing "repugnant to justice*" These 
exceptions seem sensible* The author wryly predicts 
that many spouses will be inclined to think that his/her 
own circumstances a r e  sufficiently extraordinary to 
render equal sharing repugnant to justice* Priestley 
remarks that "it is unclear#how much persuasion a court 
will require before it is satisfied that a spouse's 
m a r i t a l  contributions are "clearly g r e a t e r " "*
As to other matrimonial property, the equal sharing
rule is to apply, unless it is clear that the contribution
to the marriage partnership of one partner has exceeded
that of the other, in which case division shall be in
%accordance with the contribution criterion*"^ A very- 
wide /
8 / 1 4 *
2 ,  P ,3 9 5 .3* Is, then, the difference one of emphasis within the principal r u l e ?  In the case of home and c h a t t e l s ,  the (rebuttable) presuxaption is that -there will be equal d i v i s io n *  w i th  regard to other property, the contri­bution approach is to apply as an exception to the equal /
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vd.de d i s c r e t i o n  i s  g iv e n  t o  t h e  c o u r t  i n  t h e  o r d e r s  
w h io h  i t  c an  make# M o re o v e r , i t  r e m a in s  t o  b e  e e e n  
w h a t t h e  o o u r ta  w i l l  malce o f  t h e i r  p o w ers u n d e r  8 $18 
t o  a a e e s a  o o n t r ib u t i o n *  The 'c o n t r i b u t i o n '  r e f e r r e d
t o  i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  m a r r ia g e  p a r - k n e r s h ip ,  eindPn o t  t o  e a c h  a s s e t " :  i n  an y  l e g a l  sy s te m  w h ic h  w ere
t o  a d o p t  t h i s  o r  a  s i m i l a r  s y s te m , a  f a i r l y  w id e  
j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  w ou ld  r e q u i r e  t o  b e  g iv e n  i n  o r d e r  
t o  a v o id  d e c i s i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h a t  o f  S o lo m o n 's  p r e l i m i n a r y  
ju d g m en t#  T h u s , i f  i t  w as h e ld  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  w ife  an d  h u sb a n d  t o  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
v e n tu r e  h a d  b e e n  i n  t h e  r a t i o  a  d i v i s i o n  on  t h a t
b a s i s  w ou ld  b e  m ade, b u t  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
b o d y  o f  c a s e  law  h ad  b e e n  b u i l t  u p ,  and  e v e n  t h e n ,  a  
s o l i c i t o r  m ig h t f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t  t o  a  c l i e n t  
p r e s e n t  i n  h i s  o f f i c e  w h a t t h e  outcom e m ig h t  be#
R e f e r e n c e  h a s  b e e n  made t o  'm a t r im o n ia l  home and  
f a m i ly  c h a t t e l s '  and  t o  ' o t h e r '  o r  'r e m a in in g *  
m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y .  T h e re  i s  a n o th e r  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  
w h ic h  i s  t h a t  d raw n b e tw e e n  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  and  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty #  S e p a r a te  p r o p e r t y  ( s # 9 )  i s  p r o p e r t y  
w h ic h  i s  n o t  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  ( a l t h o u ^ i  v o n D a d e lsz e n  
e x p l a i n s  t h a t  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  c a n  becom e m a tr im o n ia l  
p r o p e r t y ,  a s  b y  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  o t h e r  sp o u s e  o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  t h e r e t o  su c h  t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  i t s  
v a lu e  r e s u l t s ,  o r  incom e i s  c r e a t e d :  s u c h  i n c r e a s e  i n
v a lu e  /
e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  r u l e .  P e rh a p s  t h e r e ,  t h e  l a t t e r  r u l e  i s  l e s s  fo rm a l  and  m ore s im p le  khan t h a t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  home and  c h a t t e l s #
1$ 8*33 ; o f*  'p r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r  o r d e r s '  *  S c o t la n d ,Memo#No#41 and F a c u l t y  R esp o n se#
2* I n  an y  e v e n t ,  t h e  P r iv y  O o ù n c i l ,  i n  H a ld a n e , h a d  " r e j e c t e d  t h e  " a s s e t  b y  a s s e t "  a p p ro a c h " ,  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  t h e  1963 A c t ,
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value or income would be matrimonial property# ) #
Matrimonial property (8*8) shall consist of the 
matrimonial home, whenever acquired, the family chattels 
whenever acquired, property owned jointly or in common 
in equal shareb by husband and wife, grid property owned 
immediately pre^meo^riage by either spouse, if acquired 
in contemplation of the marriage and intended for theAcommon us© and benefit of both spouses* In addition, 
there is included post-nuptial property acquired by 
either, "including property acquired for the common use 
and benefit of both the husband and wife out of property 
owned by either the husband or the wife or both of them 
before the marriage or out of the proceeds of any 
disposition of any property so owned"any income and 
gains derived from, the proceeds of disposition of, and 
any increase in the value of, any property described 
in the categories above deliminatod, any policy of 
assurance taken out by either on his/her life or the 
life of the other, whether for his/her benefit or the 
benefit of the other* but not policies fully paid up 
at marriage or policies to the proceeds of which a third 
party is beneficially entitled* whether the proceeds are 
payable on the death of the life assured or on the 
occurrence of a specified event or otherwise* any policy 
of ineurcanoe in respect of any matrimonial property* any 
pension or benefit to which either is or may become entitled, 
if the entitlement is derived* wholly or in part* from 
contributions made to the sohemo after marriage or from 
employment or office held since the marriage and all other 
property /
Is use in itself not to be a criterion? (see Professor Otto Kahn Freund'a views on 'use') Pre-marriage property long owned by one* ^ot acquired in contemplation of marriage* but used by botli %herëaf t or * does not appear to be catered for* See fn*2 below. Perhaps agreement to regard such property aa matrimonial property might be inferred.Presumably the source of the new property must not itself be such aa to be regarded as matrimonial property since otherwise this provision surely would not be necessary®
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property which the spouses have agreed shall be 
matrimonial property and any other property that 
is matrimonial property by virtue of any other 
provision of the Act or by virtue of any other Act®
Gratuitous acquirenda (other than home and 
chattels) are not included within the class of 
matrimonial property, but they may cease to be 
regarded as separate if such items, with the express 
or implied consent of the recipient spouse, have 
become so intermingled with matrimonial property as 
to mal^ e it unreasonable or impracticable to regard as 
separate property. (s.10(1))o A gift from, one spouse 
to the other (unless home or chattels) will not be 
regarded as matrimonial property unless used for theAbenefit of both spouses.
There is complete freedom to contract out of the 
new system, which means that there may be a growth in 
the use of marriage-contracts• Each party must have 
independent legal advice. In certain circumstances, 
a court may declare that an agreement shall have effectponly in part. “
The Act shall apply only during the parties* joint 
lifetimes. No equivalent procedure was provided for 
distribution of property on dissolution of marriage by 
death, and the subject continued to be regulated by 
the law of succession.
Valuation of property is to be at the date of the 
hearing, unless the court decides otherwise, and the 
shares of spouses are to be determined at the date of 
cessation /
This would appear to mean that there can be no doubt about the ownership and destination of expensive presents of jewellery. See Chapter 1,The juxtaposition of ideas tends to suggest that lack of advice rather than content of the agreement although the state of the latter may reflect the presence or absence of the former, is the legitimate source of complaint.
cessation of cohabitation, or of the h e a r i n g ,  if the 
parties still colm'bit*
Debts and C r e d i t o r s
A d ju d ic a t io n  between "innocent" spouse and 
creditor is one of the most difficult problems 
enco'antered by any system of matrimonial property* 
be it a detailed, system of comimmity o r  a casual systemAof s e p a r a t i o n .  In Hew Zealand* each spouse shall 
have /
1 *  See Chapter 2*^  'Bankruptcy* # A very recent Scottish example is McManus's Trustee v . McManus 1979 8 ,L,T, (Notes) 71 » in which the bankrupt husband's trustee successfully challenged and had reduced a "love* favour and affection" disposition by the husband to the xfife of the matrimonial home, executed on 12th December* 1963, but not registered in the General Register of Sasiiies until 4th April 1975* The trust deed for creditors was dated 24th September and registered in the Books of Council and Session on 23rd October 1975» and on 21st November 1975 the husband's estates were sequestrated, the trustee*s appointment being c o n f ir m e d  by act and warrant dated 11th February 1976» The marriage had not been very secure, and a condition of a réconciliation had been that the house be placed in the name of the wife in oïtf.ex'*, as was admitted by the wife, to provide her and the children of the marriage with security# L.O. McDonald held that the disposition was not granted for a true, just and necessary cause (though the 'true and just' criterion alone would have sufficed, if satisfied, to protect the deeds Armour v$ Learmonth 1972 3 *1 *1 *1 5 0 ) and that it must be reduced as being a gratuitous alienation to a conjunct person to the prejudice of the bantazpt'a creditors contrary to the Act 1621, 0,18* The wife had no valid irrevocable title until recording in 1975# Though ante-nuptial formal (or even informal) arrangements have a sufficient consideration in  marriage, post-nuptial arrangements (even if formal) are not protected* Agreement to continue marriage/cohabitation would not seem, therefore, to be comparable with agreement to enter
R o b e r t s o n 's  T r .  v* R , (1901) 3F» 359)* "It cannot therefore be said to have been granted for a true and just cause at l e a s t  in a question with the b a n k r u p t '8  creditors*" (L.O.HoDonald, p,72)*
h a v e  " a  p r o t e c t e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  the m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  a sA
a g a i n s t  c r e d i t o r s  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  0 1 0 , 0 0 0 ,  o r  o n e  
h a l f  o f  t h e  e q u i t y  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  i n  t h e  h o m e  
( w h i c h e v e r  i s  t h e  l e s s e r ) ,  a n d  t h i s  p r o t e c t e d  i n t e r e s t  
i s  n o t  t o  b e  l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  unsecured p e r s o n a l  d e b t sPo f  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e * " "
T h e r e  i a  p o w e r  t o  t h e  c o u r t  t o  s e t t l e  m a t r i m o n i a l  
p r o p e r t y  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  m i n o r  d e p e n d e n t  c h i l d r e n  
w h o s e  i n t e r e s t s  i t  m u s t  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t #  T h e  c o u r t  
m a y  v e s t  t h e  t e n a n c y  o f  a  h o u s e  i n  e i t h e r  s p o u s e ,  o r  
m a y  m a k e  a n  o r d e r  c o n f e r r i n g  a  r i g h t  o f  n e r a o n a l7,o c c u p a t i o n * ^
O n e  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s  w h i c h  v o n D a d e l s z e n  
m a k e s  i n  h i s  p r e l i m i n a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  A c t  i s  
t h a t  t h e  w ife , h a v i n g  ( i n  t h e  n o r m a l  c a s e )  a  c l a i m  t o  
o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  h o m e  a n d  c h a t t e l s  -  a  s t a t e  
o f  a f f a i r s  w h i c h  r e f l e c t s  p e r h a p s  a  n e w  a w a r e n e s s  o f  
h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  f a m i l y  p r o s p e r i t y  w i l l  r e c e i v e  
i n  a d d i t i o n  c r e d i t  f o r  h e r  d o m e s t i c  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  o t h e r  a s s e t s # T h eetas» a i*
a u t h o r  rn W co s n o  c o m m e n t  u p o n  t h i s  matter# I t  i s  
s u g g e s t e d ,  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o  ' d o u b l e ' o r  u n w a r r a n t e d  
b e n e f i t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  w h a t  o u g h t  t o  b e  t h e  
r e s u l t  i n  a l l  c a s e s  e x c e p t  t h o s e  w h e r e  t h e  w i f e  i s  
s l o t h f u l  /
1 *  b u t  p r e s u m a b l y  n o t  a g a i n s t  h e r i t a b l e  c r e d i t o r s ;  i n  such a  c a s e  i s  t h e  ' fam ily l a w *  r u l e  d i s p l a c e d  b y  
t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  l o a n  a g r e e m e n t ?  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  r e c o n c i l e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  B u i l d i n g  S o c i e t y  
a n d  t h e  o c c u p y i n g  s p o u s e  i n  c a s e s  where t h e  S o c i e t y ' s  
d ^  f a c t o ,  d e b t o r  h a s  d e s e r t e d  ( h i s )  s p o u s e  o r  h a s  
F a e n ’" o x S e r e d  t o  l e a v e  t h e  h o m e  o f #  M e m o * H o .4 1  a n d  
F a c u l t y  R e s p o n s e ®  W h e r e  t h e  homo i s  b e i n g  s o l d ,  
t h e r e  i s  a  g r e a t e r  c h a n c e  o f  r e a s o n a b l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
t r e a t m e n t  o f  a l l  p a r tie s ,
2 #  P #  v o n  B a d e l s z e n ,  p * 4 0 3 &
3 *  o f .  M e m o s #  H o * 2 2  a n d  4 1  a n d  F a c u l t y  R e s p o n s e  t o  
e a c h *
s l o t h f u l  a n d  h a s  m a d e  n o  e f f o r t  i n  a n y  d i r e c t i o n ,  a  
s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  u n d e r  t h e  N e w  Z e a l a n d  rules a n d  g u i d e ­
l i n e s  w o u l d  b e  n o t e d  a n d  t a k e n  i n t o  account b y  t h e  
c o u r t #
P r i e s t l y  n o t e s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  e n g r a f t i n g  u p o n  
a  common l a w  s y s t e m  a n d  u p o n  i t s  r u l e s  o f  p r o p e r t y  a  
s c h e m e  e s s e n t i a l l y  R o m a n i s t ,  a n d  E u r o p e a i i ,  a n d  s u g g e s t s  
t w o  o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  o n e  b e i n g  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  a l l i e d  w i t h  g r e a t  j u d i c i a l  
d i s c r e t i o n  ( a n  a p p r o a c h  w h i c h  m i g h t  b e  t h o u g h t  t o  b e  a  
p e c u l i a r l y  E n g l i s h  o n e ,  a n d  i n d e e d  a m o n g  P r i e s t l e y ' s  
e x a m p l e s  l i e  c i t e s  t h e  H a t x d m i o n i a l  C a u s e s  A c t ,  1 9 7 3 ,
3 * 2 4 )  o r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  " h y b r i d "  s y s t e m ,  s u c h  a s  
t h a t  o f  d e f e r r e d  community* P r i o r  t o  t h e  A c t ,  t h e  
c o u r t ' s  d i s c r e t i o n  w a s  f e t t e r e d  w h e r e  i t  c o u l d  b e  s e e n  
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  t h e m s e l v e s  h a d  entertained a  c o m m o n  
i n t e n t i o n  concerning t h e  p r o p e r t y  i n  question* T h e  
c o u r t  w a s  d i r e c t e d  a l s o  t o  i g n o r e  w r o n g f u l  c o n d u c t  
w h e n  d e c i d i n g  p r o p e r t y  q u e s t i o n s ,  u n l e s s  t h e  m i s c o n d u c t  
h a d  h a d  a  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  upon t h e  p r o p e r t y  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n ,  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  P r i e s t l e y ,  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  r e c e i v e d  d i f f e r i n g  
w e l c o m e s  from t h e  j u d g e s  a i i c l  " c o n d u c t  w a s  s t i l l  a  
l e g i t i m a t e  factor  t o  c o n s i d e r  w h e n  d e t e r m i n i n g  s u c h  
m a t t e r s  a s  t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  o r d e r ,  o r  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  
m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  * "
T h e r e  i s  n o  p r o v i s i o n  u n d e r  t h e  n e w  A c t  f o r  t h e  
a u t o m a t i c  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  r u l e s  * T h e  o n u s  i s  o n  
t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  apply t o  t h e  c o u x i *  for a n  o r d e r  r e g u l a t i n g  
p r o p e r t y  m a t t e r s *  B o t h  w r i t e r s  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  n e w  
l e g i s l a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  d i s p l a c e  t h e  p rin cip le  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  p r o p e r t y  w i t h  t h a t  o f  community, P r i e s t l e y  n o t e s  t h a t  
t h e  n e w  A c t ,  o r  O o d e ,  d o e s  n o t  a l t e r  p a r t ie s ' r i g h t s  t o  
d e a l  /
#iTpmr» w*
1 *  a l w a y s  a  d i f f i c u l t  e x e r c i s e *  r e q u i r i n g  o f  t h e  c o u r t  
s o m e  p e r c e p t i o n  a n d  p e r h a p s  a  l i t t l e  i m a g i n a t i o n *
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d e a l  with p r o p e r t y  n o r  a r e  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  
a f f e c t e d a
H a s  c o u r a g e  f a i l e d  at t h e  l a s t  m o m e n t ?  T h e  p r e ­
e x i s t i n g  H e w  Z e a l a n d  p r o v i s i o n s  s e e m  e n l i g h t e n e d ;  
p e r h a p s  t h e  most s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  o r  'reforms' 
n o w  m a d e  a r e  t h e  c u t t i n g  d o w  o f  t h e  a r e a  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
j i x d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  ( t h o u g h  t h e  w e i g h t  w h i c h  h e  a c c o r d s  
to the d i f f e r e n t  fa c to rs , e s p e c i a l l y  t o  t h a t  o f  d o m e s t i c  
work $ m a y  v a r y  s u r e l y  s t i l l )  a n d  t h e  ' f o r m a l i s i n g '  o f  
n o t i o n s  a n d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  p e r h a p s  p r e v i o u s l y  l e s s  
c o n s c i o u s l y  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  a n d  t h i s  m a y  % ) r o d u c e  a  
m o r e  u n i f o r m ,  predictable a n d  fa ir  r e s u l t ,  i n  a  s y s t e m  
w h i c h  r e m a i n s  a t  h e a r t  o n e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ®
P e r h a p s  t h i s  i s  a  f i r s t  s t e p ,  a n d  H e w  Zoaland y e t  m a y  
come t o  m a k e  a  w h o l e - h e a r t e d  c h o i c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  
s y s t e m s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  a n d  G o m m n i t y *  P r i e s t l e y ' s  
c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  " a  h y b r i d  s y s t e m ,  b e i n g  a n  
u n e a s y  a m a l g a m a t i o n  o f  d e f e r r e d  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g a i n s  a n d  
d iscretion ary j u d i c i a l  p o w e r s " * ^  O l e a r l y ,  t h o u g h ,  
m u c h  t h o u g h t  h a s  b e e n  g i v e n  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t #
T h e  s p o u s e  m u s t  make a p p l i c a t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  A c t  
f o r  a n  order* Hence the s p o u s e ' s  p r o p e r t y  entitlem ent
i s  i n c h o a t e *  T h e  b r o a d  1 9 5 3  j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  h a s  
b e e n  r e s t r i c t e d  a n d  P r i e s t l e y  i d e n t i f i e s  o n l y  f o u r  a r e a s ^  
w h e r e  /
1 # t h o u g h  i n d e e d  P r i e s t l e y  n o t e s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  th ird  
c h a n g e  i n  r u l e s  a n d / o r  a t t i t u d e  u p o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
m a t r i m o n i a l  p r o p e r t y  w i t h i n  13 y e a r s ;  b e f o r e  1965» 
H . W . I h A c t ,  1 9 5 2  e n s h r i n e d  a  s y s t e m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n ,  
u n a d u l t e r a t e d ,  b e t w e e n  1955™77* w h e n  t h e  1963 A c t  
c a m e  i n t o  f o r c e ,  there w a s  w i d e  j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n ,  
a n d  a f t e r  1 9 7 7  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  f a i r l y  v i g o r o u s  g e s t u r e  
o f  w e l c o m e  t o  n e w  w a y s  o f  t h i n k i n g  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  1975 A c t ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  r e t e n t i o n  of w h a t  i s  b a s i c a l l y  
a  s y s t e m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n *
2 ,  p * 3 9 6 ,
3 *  v i z , ,  m a r r i a g e s  o f  s h o r t  d u r a t i o n ;  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  circumstances ( t o  d e t e r m i n e  whether s u c h  e x i s t ) ;  
d e c i s i o n  u p o n  o o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  m a t r i m o n i a l  
p r o p e r t y  n o t  b e i n g  m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m o  a n d  c h a t t e l s ,  a n d  
t h e  r e s u l t a n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s u c h  p r o p e r t y #  P r e s u m a b l y  
a l s o ,  t h e r e  m a y  b e  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  c o u r t  m u s t  a d j u d i c a t e  
u p o n  a  d i s p u t e  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t y  i s  
m a t r i m o n i a l  o r  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  y e t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  
a m p l e ,  a n d  s t r i c t l y  t h i s  w o u l d  b e  a  m a t t e r  o f  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  a n d  n o t  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  u n f e t t e r e d  d i s c r e t i o n #
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w h e r e  it remains. T h e  s y s t e m  r e v e a l s  a  d e b t  to 
" d e f e r r e d  o o m m m lty "  sy s te m s*  w h i le  r e t a i n l i i g  t h e  
common law tradition of judicial diaoretion to provide 
f l e x i b i l i t y #  I t  i s  a  " p a o i c a g © " ,  and p o s s i b l y  t h i s  
i s  t h e  type o f  solution which for t h e  English lawyer 
would h o ld  the greatest appeal* This is no all™ 
embracing community system* yet$ by its liberal 
a p p r o a c h  t o  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the 
m a r r ia g e  partnership"* Its definition o f  m a tr im o n ia l  
p r o p e r ty *  its differentiation beWoen home and  chattels* 
i t  p r o d u c e s  a n  e f f e c t  o f  m o d e r n i t y ,  a f a s h i o n a b l e  g l o s s *  
S y s t e m a t i c a l l y ,  it i s  unsatisfactory.
W h eth e r p r o p e r t y  re m e d ie s  s h o u ld  h e  e x te n d e d  t o
t h o s e  participating in • s t a b l e  unions * l a  a  r e l a t e d  
question, a n d  o n e  w h i c h  i a  a t t r a c t i n g  attention, 
especially in America*^ It appears that* in the Now 
Z e a la n d  M a tr im o n ia l  P r o p e r t y  B i l l *  p r o v i s i o n  w as mad.e
f o r  /
1@ but a su rp risingly  l i m i t e d  o n e ; surely  a  s o l u t i o n  o u g h t  t o  p roffer some suggestion i n  a l l  t h e  areas in  which the s u b j e c t  I s  o f  relevance* i n c l u d i n g  r i g h t sof cred itors and r igh ts o f Bucoeeaion? Admittedly 
h o w e v er a t h e  new s t a t u t o r y  schem e i s  n o t  p u t  forward &# an a ltern ative  to the basic system of separation ,2, S ee  t h e  c e l e b r a t e d  c a s e  of Lee Marvin* i n  which b o th  
p a r t i e s  claimed t h e  victory# Another s i m i l a r  instance, i t  s e e m s *  w o u ld  be t h e  p r o p e r t y  a s p e c t  o f the Hick Jagges? (Blanca J a g g e r  divorce * In which* guoajd p r o p e r t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n *  th e  l a t t e r  appoar/ed to  h a v e  e n l i s t e d  t h e  aid o f C alifornian la w y e r  i i s i v i n  M itc h e ls o n *  who a c t e d  for the female party in  tho Leo Marvin oaoo* I t  has 
b e e n  s u g g e s t e d *  a t  p r o s e n t  llgh th earted ly , t h a t  In America* cohabitation outside m a r r ia g e  * b e in g  no  l o n g e r  able t o  b e  g u a r a n te e d  t o  h a v e  no  l e g a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  p r o p e r ty *  s h o u ld  b e  acco m p an ied *  for  
s a f e t y *  by a  non^marriage contract* a g r e e i n g  t h a t  there s h a l l  b e  n o  property consequences or t h a t  f u t u r e  
l i t i g a t i o n  o n  t h e  m a t t e r  s h a l l  be b a r r e d #
S e e  Scandinavia (C h a p te r  6 ) * a n d *  fo r  Scotland* Memo*Mo*41 and F a c u l t y  R esp o n se#
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f o r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  c o u r t  f o r  p r o p e r t y  a d j u d i c a t i o n  
b y  p a r t i e s  t o  a  d e  f a c t o  m a r r i a g e ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  
p a r t i e s  h a d  l i v e d  a s  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  
n o t  l e s s  t h a n  t w o  y e a r s  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  a n d  
t h e  c o u r t  t h o u g h t  i t  j u s t  t o  e n t e r t a i n  i t ,  a n d  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  w i t h i n  t w e l v e  m o n t h s  o f  t h e  
c e s s a t i o n  o f  c o h a b i t a t i o n  a s  m a n  a h d  w i f e .  T h e s e  
c l a u s e s  w e r e  d e l e t e d  f r o m  t h e  B i l l  f o l l o w i n g  a  c h a n g e  
o f  G o v e r n m e n t #  I n  E n g l a n d ,  a n d  i n  t h e  O o m m o n w e a l t h  
c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  t r a d i t i o n ,  s u c h  r e m e d y  a s  
m a y  b e  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  i d . s t r e s s  s e e m  t o  h a v e  b e e n  
f o u n d e d  o n  t h e  l a w  o f  t r u s t ,  t h o u g h  P i d g e o n  i d e n t i f i e s  
a  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  a p p r o a c h  b e t w e e n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s ,  
a n d  D e n n i n g ,  H . R #  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t .  P i d g e o n  a r g u e s  t h a t  
t h e  w i f e  a n d  t h e  m i s t r e s s  s h o u l d  b e  p u t  o n  a  p a r  w i t h  
o n e  a n o t h e r  a s  r e g a r d s  p r o p e r t y  d i s p u t e s ,  t h o u g h  n o t  a s  
r e g a r d s  m a i n t e n a n c e ,  p r a i s e s  t h e  ( d e l e t e d )  c l a u s e s  i n  
t h e  N e w  Z e a l a n d  B i l l ,  a n d  a d v o c a t e s  s t a t u t o r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n #  
T h e  s u b j e c t  i s  b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ;  i t  
i s  s u g g e s t e d ,  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  t h e s e  m a t t e r s  a r e  b e s t  l e f t  
a s  p r o p e r t y  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  s t r a n g e r s . " T h e r e  m u s t  b e  
a  l i m i t a t i o n  u p o n  t h e  a s s i m i l a t i o n  o f  n o n - m a r r i a g e  t o  
m a r r i a g e ,  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  b e l i e v e r s  i n  e i t h e r #  P a r t i e s  
t o  s h o r t - t e r m  l i a i s o n s  a t  l e a s t  s h o u l d  l o o k  o u t  f o r  
t h e m s e l v e s .  C h i l d r e n  h a v e  a  c l a i m  a g a i n s t  e i t h e r  p a r e n t  
f o r  s u p p o r t .  D i v o r c e  i n  S c o t l a n d  i s  n o w  e a s i e r  t o  o b t a i n .
I t  m a y  b e  t h a t  l o n g - t e r m  s t a b l e  u n i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  ' m a t r i m o n i a l *  
h o m e ,  b u t  ' r e f o r m s '  i n  m a t r i m o n i a l  p r o p e r t y  l a w  ( w h i c h  i n  
e f f e c t  u s u a l l y  m e a n  t h e  e n d o w m e n t  o f  m o r e  g e n e r o u s  
f i n a n c i a l  a n d  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  u p o n  w i v e s ,  u s u a l l y  t h e  
w e a k e r  p a r t i e s  e c o n o m i c a l l y )  a r e  t o  b e  g i v e n  i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  
o f  ( l e n g t h y )  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  m a r r i a g e  a n d  f a m i l y ,  a n d  
w h i l e  p o s s i b l y  d u e  t o  l o n g - t e r m  m i s t r e s s e s  o r  c o m m o n  l a w  
w i v e s ,  s h o u l d  b e  w i t h h e l d ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  f r o m  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
i n  s h o r t - t e r m  u n i o n s  ( l e g i t i m a t e  a s  w e l l  a s  i l l e g i t i m a t e )  
a n d  f r o m  a l l  b u t  t h e  m o s t  s t a b l e  e x t r a - m a r i t a l  h o u s e h o l d s #
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v / i ' C u )  i s  L f .  / k  A l O U *  ujU S\JiaJ.
{  f ' o L K ^ t u  S .  u s u ,
 ^ A j . c y ^  r r . t  (iSUjiM  U clù^
9 8 0
A U 3'I'E A I.I/l
U m t i l  1 9 7 6 5  t h e  r u l e e  r e g u l a t i n g  d i s s o l u t i o n  
o f  m a r r i a g e  w e r e  f a u l ' W h a s e d *  f h e  F a m i l y  l a w  A c t ?  
1 9 7 9 $ s w e p t  a w a y  " t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  p r e v i o u s  g r o u n d s  
a n d  i n t r o d u c e d  i r r e t r i e v a b l e  b r e a k d o w n  o f  m a r r i a g e ^ *  
t h o u g h  m i s c o n d u c t  m a y  s t i l l  b e  r e l e v a n t  i n  d e c i d i n g  
s u b s i d i a r y  m a t t e r s  a n d  o f  c o u r s e  i s  o f  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c u s t o d y  o f  c h i l d r e n .  H o w e v e r  " I t  d o e s  
s e e m , ® f t ,011  t h e  d e c i d e d  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  m a t r i m o n i a l  
m i s c o n d u c t  ( n o t  i n c l u d i n g  m i s c o n d u c t  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  
r a m i f i c a t i o n s )  i s  n o  l o n g e r  r e a l l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  
i s s u e s  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e  o r  p r o p e r t y  e n t i t l e m e n t " , ^  I n  
t e r m s  o f  b , 1 1 7 ( 1 ) ^  t h e  b a s i c  r u l e  i s  t h a t  e a c h  p a r t y  
t o  p r o c e e d i n g s  u n d e r  t h e  A c t  s h a l l  b e a r  h i s  o w n  c o s ts ,  
t h o u g h  ( s $ 1 1 7 ( 2 ) ) ,  t h e  c o u r t  m a y  d o  a e  i t  t h i n k s  j u s t  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c o s t s  where c i r c u m s t a n c e s  d e m a n d  s p e c i a l  
t r e a t m e n t ,  D a v i e s  a n d  F o w l e r  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  
p o w e r  i s  r a r e l y  u s e d ,
M a in te n a n c e
E a c h  p a r t y  i s  l i a b l e  t o  m a i n t a i n  c h i l d r e n  u n d e r  
t h e  a g e  o f  18, s o  f a r  a s  he/she i s  a b l e ,  a n d  o n e  p a r t y  
i s  l i a b l e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  o t h e r ,  s o  f a r  a s  r e a s o n a b l y  
a b l e  t o  d o  s o ,  " i f ,  a n d  o n l y  i f , "  t h e  o t h e r  i s  u n a b l e  
t o  s u p p o r t  h e r s e l f / h i m s e l f  a d e q u a t e l y ,  b y  r e a s o n  o f  
having t h e  c a r e  a n d  c o n t r o l  o f  a  c h i l d  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
under 18 years o ld , o r  by i n c a p a c i t y  ( p h y s i c a l  o r  
m e n t a l )  f o r  " a p p r o p r i a t e  g a i n f u l  e m p l o y m e n t  o r  f o r  a n y  
o t h e r  a d e q u a t e  r e a s o n , * , * "  ( s , 7 S ) ®  T h e  b r e a d t h  o f  
e x p r e s s i o n  a n d  a b s e n c e  o f  s e x  b i a s  a r e  noteworthy, orhe 
w o r d s  /
1,  " T h e  I m p a c t  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  F a m i l y  L a w  Act* 1 9 7 9 " » 0,F.Davies a n d  S.G,Fowler# D e v e l o p m e n t  i n  Family 
L a w  ( M a r r i a g e  a n d  D i v o r c e ; #  5 t h  C o m m o n w e a l t h  L a w  
C o n f e r e n c e ,2, T h e  a u t h o r s  s t r e s s  t h a t  a  prin cip le  e n s h r i n e d  i n  
t h e  A c t  i s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
m a r r i a g e  a n d  t h e  f a i a i l y ,5, I b id , , 'p ,556*
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w o rd s "an y  o t h e r  a d e q u a te  re& eon" o f  $ .7 2  a r e  a m p l i f i e d  
b y  8 ,7 5 ( 2 ) ,  w h ic h  p r o v id e s  a n  e x te n s iv e  l i s t  o f  r e l e v a n t  
m a t t e r s  i n  t h e  fo rm  o f  f o u r t e e n  f a c t o r s *  in c lu d in g *  f o r  
exam ple*  age  and s t a t e  o f  h e a l th *  incom e an d  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s *  e l i g i b i l i t y  f o r  p e n s io n *  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p a r ty *  d u r a t i o n  o f  th e  
m a r r ia g e  and  e x t e n t  t o  w h ic h  i t  h a s  a f f e c t e d  e a r n in g  
c a p a c i ty *  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e
c o h a b i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r e c i p i e n t  w i th  a n o th e r'Ip e rs o n *  and  t h e  l e s s  u s u a l  o r  m ore m odern g ro u n d s  o f  
( 8 * 7 5 ( 2 ) ( h ) ) *  " th e  e x t e n t  t o  w h ich  th e  paym en t o f  
m a in te n a n c e  t o  t h e  p a r t y  w hose m a in te n a n c e  i s  u n d e r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w o u ld  i n c r e a s e  t h e  e a r n in g  c a p a c i t y  o f  
t h a t  p a r t y  b y  e n a b l in g  t h a t  p a r t y  t o  u n d e r t a k e  a  c o u r s e  
o f  e d u c a t io n  o r  t r a i n i n g  o r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  h im s e l f  o r  
h e r s e l f  i n  a  b u s i n e s s  o r  o th e r w is e  to  o b t a i n  an  a d e q u a te  
incom e"*  and  ( c )  t h e  n e e d  t o  p r o t e c t  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a  
woman who w is h e s  o n ly  t o  c o n t in u e  h e r  r o l e  a s  a  w if e  
and  m o th e r*
T h ese  f o u r t e e n  f a c t o r s  e n c a p s u la t e  a  m o st i n t e r e s t i n g  
a t t i t u d e .  The c o u r t  s h a l l  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  o n ly  t h o s e  
m a t t e r s  w h ic h  t h e  s t a t u t e  s p e c i f i e s :  t h e  sc o p e  o f
d i s c r e t i o n  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  c o n s i d e r a b ly  b y  th e  num ber and  
b r e a d th  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  sh& ^l be  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t*  
and  w h ic h  o n ly  s h a l l  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  Two o f  
th o s e  f a c t o r s  a r e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  e a c h  (" a n d  
th e  p h y s i c a l  an d  m e n ta l  c a p a c i t y  o f  e a c h  o f  them  f o r  
a p p r o p r i a t e  g a i n f u l  e m p lo y m e n t" ) , and  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  n e e d s  
and  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  each*  and  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  m o st im p o r ta n t  
f a c t o r s  w e ig h in g  w i th  a  S c o ts  c o u r t .  The o t h e r s  may o r  
may n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  ju d g e  i n  m ak ing  h i s  
d e c i s i o n , ^
D a v ie s  and  F o w le r  i d e n t i f y  b o th  a  ch an g e  i n  p h i lo s o p h y
(n o  /
1 ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  p e rh a p s  i n  a l l e g e d l y  m ale ' d o m in a te d  A u s t r a l i a *2 ,  S ee  8c ,L aw  Gom*Memo,^o*22 and F a c u l t y  R e sp o n se ,
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( n o  l o n g e r  i s  t h e  w i f e  e n t i t l e d  a s  o f  r i g h t  g u a  w i f e  
t o  h e  m a i n t a i n e d ) * a n d  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  q u a n t u m  ( n o  
l o n g e r  i s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  t o  h e  t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  s t a n d a r d  
o f  l i f e  o f  t h e  m a r r ie d  p a i r *  h u t  w i l l  h e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
r a t h e r  w i t h  t h a t  w h i c h  s h e  ( o r  h e )  n e e d s *  a n d  t h a t  
w h i c h  h e  ( o r  s h e )  o m i  a f f o r d  t o  p a y ) #
I t  s e e m s  t h a t  i m p i ? i s o i m i e n t  i s  n o  l o n g e r *  c o m p e t e n t  
i n  c a s e s  o f  n o n - p a y m e n t .
W h e t h e r  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  c a n  h e  u t i l i s e d  h y  t h e  
w i f e  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  o b t a i n i n g  an  a l l o w a n c e  d u r i n g  
c o h a b i t a t i o n  i s  n o t  c l e a r #
I n  t e r m s  o f  8 * 7 9 »  t h e  c o u r t  i s  e m p o w e r e d  t o  m a k e  
s u c h  o r d e r  a s  i t  t h i a i k s  f i t  a s  r e g a r d s  p r o p e r t y  a l l o c a t i o n  
( o n  d i s s o l u t i o n *  p r e s u m a b l y ) *  h u t  m u s t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
f a c t o r s  o u t l i n e d  a b o v e  c o n c e r n i n g  m a i n t e n a n c e *  w h e r e  
r e l e v a n t ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a n y  o t h e r  o r d e r s  m a d e  u n d e r  th e  
A c t *  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a n y  p r o p o s e d  o r d e r  o n  t h e  e a r n i n g  
c a p a c i t y  o f  e i t h e r  p a r ty *  a n d  " t h e  f i n a n c i a l  o r  o t h e r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  made d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n *  
c o n s e r v a t i o n  o r  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  i n c l u d i n g  
a n y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  m a d e  i n  t h e  c a p a c i ' t y  o f  h o m e m a k e r  o r  
p a r e n t #
T h e r e  i s  n o w  a  F a m i l y  C o u r t  o f  A u s t r a l i a *  s e t  u p o
b y  t h e  A ct#  I t  i s  " a  f e d e r a l  s u p e r i o r  c o u r t  o f  r e c o r d ® " ^ " ’ 
T h e r e  i s  a  p e r i a a n e n t  b o d y  o f  c o u r t  c o u n s e l l o r s ®  A  
F a m i l y  C o u r t  s i t s  i n  e a c h  S t a t e *  a n d  i t  s e e m s  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a  g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  i n f o r m a l i t y  t h a n  i s  f o u n d  i n  o t h e r  
c o u r t s *  T h e r e  i s  a  s i n g l e  j u d g e  o f  o r i g i n a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n * 
a n d  a p p e a l  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a  F u l l  B e n c h  o f  t h r e e  j u d g e s  * 
w h e n c e  /
I 0 D a v i e s  a n d  F o w l e r *  p # 3 3 B *
2 *  " D e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  F a m i l y  L a v i i n  A u s t r a l i a " *  T h e  H o n ®
J u s t i c e  E v a t t  ( C h i e f  J u d g e *  F a m ily  C o u r t  o f  A u s t r a l i a ) ; 
M a i n  S e s s i o n  A d d r e s s *  D e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  F a m i l y  Law*
5 t h  C o m m o n w e a l t h  L a w  C o n f e r e n c e *  ' 1 9 7 7 *
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w h e n c e  f u r t h e r  a p p e a l  m a y  b e  t a k e n  t o  t h e  H i g h  C o u r t  
o f  A u s t r a l i a *  i f  p u b l i c  I n t e r e s t  i s  i n v o l v e d » T h e  
F a m i l y  C o u r t  h a s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  m a r r i a g e *  d i v o r c e  
( i n c l u d i n g  c u s t o d y  and g u a r d i a n s h i p ) *  n u l l i t y *  v a l i d i t y  
o f  m a r r i a g e  a n d  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  d i v o r c e s *  m a i n t e n a n c e  
d u r i n g  m a r r i a g e  a n d  o n  o r  a f t e r  d i v o r c e *  a n d  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s  o n  o r  a f t e r  d i v o r c e *  O n e  p r o b l e m  w h i c h  m i g h t  
o c c u r  i n  s u c h  a  s c h e m e  I s  t h a t ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a  
f u l l  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e  c o u r t  m i g h t  w i s h  t o  r u l e  u p o n  s o m e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  a  w i l l  o r  t r u s t ,  o r  u p o n  a  c r e d i t o r ' s  a c t i o n  f o r  a  
h o u s e h o l d  d e b t .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a  m o r e  w i d e l y  d r a w n  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  m i g h t  be n e c e s s a r y  -  a n d  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  
p r o p e r t y  o r  c o n t r a c t  o r  s u c c e s s i o n *  a 3 , b o i t  a r i s i n g  o u t  
o f  p r o b l e m s  o f  f a m i l y  l a w  a n d  f a m i ly  p r o p e r t y *  w h a t  
w o u l d  b e  t h e  s t a n d i n g  o f  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  F a m i l y  C o u r t ?  
P e r h a p s  a  F a m i l y  c o u r t *  o p e r a t i n g  w i t h i n  a  s y s t e m  o f  
c o m m u n i t y  w o u l d  e n j o y  a n  e x t e n s i v e  a n d  e l a s t i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
w i t h i n  t h a t  s y s t e m  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  c l e a r - c u t  r u l e s .  D a v i e s  
a n d  F o w l e r  t a k e  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  F a m i l y  C o u r t  F u l l  B e n c h  
h a s  b e c o m e  a  c o u r t  o f  r e v i e w  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  c o u r t  o f  
a p p e a l *  end t h a t  " I m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r s  o f  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e  
s e e m  t o  b e  m o r e  p e r m a n e n t l y  e x p o u n d e d  i n  t h e  H i g h  C o u r t  
o f  A u s t r a l i a " ©  T h e y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  b e  
a d v a n t a g e o u s  t o  h a v e  a  p e r m a n e n t  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l  i n  
f a m i l y  m a t t e r s *  o n  t h e  p e r s u a s i v e  b a s i s  t h a t  n e w  c o n c e p t s  
r e q u i r e  c o n s i s t e n t  a n d  d e f i n i t i v e  t r e a t m e n t © ^
k  F a m i l y  L a w  C o u n c i l  h a s  b e e n  s e t  u p  t o  k e e p  u n d e r  
r e v i e w  a n d  t o  a d v i s e  a b o u t  t h e  w o r k i n g  o f  t h e  A c t *  t h e  
w o r k i n g  o f  l e g a l  a i d  i n  f a m i l y  l i t i g a t i o n *  a n d  upon  
" a n y  o t h e r  m a t t e r  r e l a t i n g  t o  f a m i ly  l a w " ,  R e s e a r c h  
i n t o  m a r i t a l  a n d  f a m i l y  s t a b i l i t y ,  " w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  
p r o m o t i n g  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  a s  t h e  n a t u r a l  
a n d  f u n d a m e n t a l  g r o u p  u n i t  i n  s o c i e t y "  * i s  t o  b e  p r o m o t e d  
/
1. Davies and Fow ler, p*339#
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b y  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  F a m i l y  B t u d i e e ,  a l s o  s e t  u p  u n d e r  
t h e  A c t ,
" T h e r e  i s  n o  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a  Family C o u r t  w i l l  
b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  i n  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e " ,
T h e  r e a s o n  i s  a b s e n c e  o f  m o n e y *  b u t  t h e  S h e r i f f  P r i n c i p a l *  
a f t e r  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e s  o f  c o m m o n w e a l t h  &md 
A m e r i c a n  e x a m p l e s  * argued t h a t  t h e  establishment o f  a  
s y s t e m  o f  f a m i l y  c o u r t s  t o  s e r v i c e  a  p o p u l a t i o n  s o  s m a l l ,  
a n d  s o  u n e v e n l y  s p r e a d *  a s  that o f  S c o t l a n d *  might n o t  
b e  s e n s i b l e  i n  t e r m s  o f  money a n d  p e r s o n n e l *  R a t h e r  
d i d  h o  a d v o c a t e  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  a h r i e v a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
t o  i n c l u d e  d i v o r c e *  ' and s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  S h e r i f f  
O o u x t  5 with t h a t  a d d i t i o n *  w o u l d  b e c o m e  a  family c o u r t  
i n  e f f e c t *  t h o u g h  o n e  l a c k i n g  c e r t a i n  o f  t h e  t r a p p i n g s  
t h e r e o f *  s u c h  a s  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  c o u n s e l l i n g  s e r v i c e s  
and t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  l e s s  f o r m a l  a t m o s p h e r e .  In S h e r i f f  
R e i d ' s  o p i n i o n *  a  u n i f i e d  Family C o u r t  w o u l d  n o t  f i t  i n t o  
t h e  pattern o f  p o p u l a t i o n ,  o f  e x i s t i n g  c o u r t s  a n d  t h e i r  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s *  o r  o f  t h e  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s  s y s t e m .  H o w e v e r  
a t t r a c t i v e  a p p e a r s  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  F a m i l y  Court 
s y s t e m  a s  a  h a n d m a i d e n  t o  a  ( p o s s i b l e )  n e w  E i a t r i m o n i a l  
p r o p e r t y  s y s t e m  * S h e r i f f  H e l d ' s  a r g u m e n t s  a r e  p e r s u a s i v e ,  
M o r e o v e r *  t h e  e s t a b 1 i s h m e n t  o f  a  n e w  s y s t e m  o f  c o u r t s  
would b e  a n  e x p e n s i v e  e x e r c i s e *  a n  u n p o p u l a r  c a u s e  i n  a  
t i m e  o f  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  r e d u c t i o n ,  T h e  physical a n d  
p e r s o n n e l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  S h e r i f f  Courts, 
however, w o u l d  require t o  b e  i n c r e a s e d  considerably.
S h e r i f f  R e i d  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  a  s e p a r a t e  f a m i l y  c o u r t  b u i l d i n g  
w o u l d  b e  t h e  b e s t  s o l u t i o n *  a n d  p e r h a p s  h e  h a d  his o w n  
G l a s g o w  c o u r t h o u s e  i n  m i n d  w h e n  h e  O T O te  " t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  
in a  b u i l d i n g  which h o u s e s  a  b u s y  c i v i l  a n d  c r i m i n a l  c o u r t  
i s  /
T h e  l a t e  S h e r i f f  P r i n c i p a l  R o b e r t  H e l d *  Q#G* ("Scottish 
R e f o r m s  a n d  C o m m o n w e a l t h  E x a m p l e s " ,  D e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  
F a m i l y  L a w *  C o u r t s  a n d  Jurisdictions, 5th Commonwealth
L a w  C o n f e r e n c e , )
905.
Is not ooaduolvo to the oalm oonol&eratlon of emotionally ehoi'ged problems#"
P r o p e r t y
Victoria* oometlmo thought to be Victorian i%i 
outlook ae well aa in name $ nevertheleee operates a 
presumption of joint ownership of the rmtrimonial homo, 
subject to certain exceptions,
There eeeme to be no other evidenoe of any ayatem
of matrimonial pronorty atante matriaonio © .Property
transfer or&ere are competent on diaaolution, but Evatt 
notes^ that the provisions of the Act and the powers of 
the Family Court "do not extend to dlepntee between 
epoucea or to applications for a transfer ond settlement 
of property before divorce proceodinga have been coimonood" 
except that an order may be made concerning the nao or 
occupation of the matrimonial homo'", and that the courl; 
may grant an injunction concerning the property of the 
party# Family property law 1b under review in Australia# 
Will Australia follow Mew Zealand in the adoption of a 
modern, liberal# but hybrid and imaystematic 'system*?
Otatletlce mid Trends (in England and Waleo)
A r e c e n t  statistical and b oolological g u i d e  is 
t h a t  c o m p ile d  b y  J ,E .T o d d  an d  L ,H ,J o n e s ,  e n t i t l e d  
" M a tr im o n ia l  lh?operty"#-^  It le the result of a survey 
c a r r i e d  o u t  on  b o h a l f  o f  t h e  Law O o m ils s lo n  b y  t h e  S o c i a l  
S u rv e y  D i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  P o p u la t i o n  O en ew o o  a n d  
S u rv e y s  ^  waong m a r r i e d  an d  fo rm e id y  m a r r ie d  p e ro o n o  u p o n  
q u e é t io n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  f i n a n c i a l  and  p r o p e r t y  a rre n g o m o n to  
w i t h i n  m a r r i a g e ,  and  c a n v a s  s i n g  opinion on th o s e  m a t t e r s , 
The ao o p e  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  w as l i m i t e d  t o  F n g lo n d  and  W a le e , 
This is mifortimato* alnce it soeua c l e a r  t h a t  the subject 
i s  /
E v a t t ,  j ^ d , , p*528«2 .  O f. p r o p o o a la  f o r  S c o t la n d *  So,L#Com,Memo#Mo»41, 5, E.M.3.0, (1972) SBM 11 700129 0*
4- A similar survey was c a r r i e d  o u t  f o r  S . L . C . : -  A.J. Manners 
and I .  R a«ta , Fam ily  P r o p e r ty  i n  Scotland . (H.M.S.O.  1 9 8 1 ) ,
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i s  one w i th  regard to  which th ere are re g io n a l v a r i a t i o n s  
in  a tt itu d e *  and* o f  course* i n  many r e sp e c t  a and 
e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  1970 -  the laws o f England o3id S cotland  
have drawn fu r th er  a p a r t  in  m atters o f  f a m i ly  law®
The survey d e sc r ib e s  th e  p o sitio n ^  as i t  was found to  
e x i s t  in  England and Wales in  the sp rin g  o f 1971® I t  
i s  a u s e fu l re v ie w *  U n t i l  recen tly *  t h e  h a p p ily  m a r r ie d  
have been r e t ic e n t  in  co n v ersa tio n  about t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  
and f in a n c ia l  arrangements $ moreover* t h e  h ap p ily  married  
r a r e ly  f ig h t  in  court over such m a t te r s *  T his i s  not 
to  say  th a t a h a p p ily  m arried w i f e ,  non-em ployed* tmd a 
non-owner o f  c a p i t a l* would n o t  be h appier s t i l l  i f  the  
law wore to  provide h er w i t h  a guide to  her r ig h ts  in  
the m atrim onial home and property* which was both r e a d i l y  
u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , and r e a s o n a b ly  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  m ajor ity  
o f  married couples* Burveya o f the kind under d isc u ss io n  
provide a v a lu a b le  in d ic a t io n  o f  w h at i s  accep tab le  to  
th e  m ajority  a t  a g iv en  time* but t h e i r  l im ita t io n s  must 
be recogn ised* N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  i s  su ggested  s t r o n g l y  
t h a t ,  i f  a m atrim onial regime i s  d ev ise d , c o n tra c t in g ™  
out should be p erm iss ib le  «
The Home
I n  1971»  ^ o f  th o se  in terv iew ed  (base 1877 cu rr en tly  
m arried p erson s) th e  m atrim onial home in  5 2 / o f  ca se s  
Was owned or in  ooui:*se o f  b e in g  purchased by th e  spouses * 
in  4 5 %, o f  c a se s  was ren ted  ( p r i n c i p a l l y  from a lo c a l  
a u th o r ity ) , and i n  5% o f  ea se s  was provided  i n  some o th er  
manner, as a r e s u lt  o f  which the spouses were not 
r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  f in d in g  a home ( in  most in s ta n c e s , th e  
spouses were l i v i n g  w i th  r e la t io n s )#
In 8 2 / o f  ren ted  h o u ses , the te n a n c y  stood  in  the  
h u s b a n d 's  name* Among th o se  w ith  joint-nam e t e n a n c i e s *  
th e  /
3
1 * W ith in  the limits of the in q u ir y *  a s  described « 1*5: 'The design of the inquiry**2# Todd and Jones* 2*0 e;t seq (p#9)*5* 14% of t e n a n c i e s  w e r e o l n t  nam es * and 5 /  i nthe wife's nam e.
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th e  reason  fo r  th e j o in t  tenancy seems r a t h e r  to  have 
been the la n d lo r d 's  su g g estio n  than an enthusiasm  f o r  
e q u a lity  w ith in  marriage#
Among ow ner-oocu p iers, 5 2 / h eld  t h e i r  homes in/Ij o in t  names # Advice upon t h is  q u estio n  had been  
re c e iv ed  from v a r io u s  so u r c e s , most n o ta b ly , and not 
u n e x p e c te d ly ,  from a s o l i c i t o r #  57% o f  n o n -jo in t  
owners and 57% o f  j o in t  owners had re ce iv e d  advice from 
th a t s o u rc e #  Tenants o f te n  were ignorant t h a t  a j o in t  
tenancy might be p o s s ib le ,  but in  the ca se  o f  owners, 
ignorance i s  l e e s  l i k e l y ,  s in c e  a s o l i c i t o r  i n  ta k in g  
I n s tr u c t io n s  w i l l  w ish  to  d isc o v e r  th e p a r t ie s '  in te n t io n s  
in  t h i s  m atter , and w i l l  b e  afford ed  an op portu n ity  to  
a d v ise  th e  sp o u ses.
Of th e  reason s most commonly g iven  fo r  th e fa c t  
o f  j o in t  ow nership, autom atic tr a n s fe r  on death (51%) 
and b e l i e f  in  th e  jo in tn e s s  o f  marriage (30)ù') were th e  
most p o p u l a r , but i t  i s  in te r e s t in g  th a t among th o se  
where th e t i t l e  stood  in  th e  name o f  th e  husband a lo n e , 
th e g rea t m ajor ity  o f  husbands and w ives con sid ered  th a t  
th e property  belonged  to  both# A study o f  a t t i tu d e s  
among n o n -jo in t  owners rev ea led  no stron g  an tip a th y  to  
j o in t  ow nership, b u t  ra th er  an acceptance o f  th e  e x is t in g  
s i t u a t io n ,  coupled w ith  a c e r ta in  w i l l in g n e s s ,  v a r y in g  
in  degree w ith  the l ik e l ih o o d  o f removal to  another h ou se , 
to  change to  j o in t  ownership# The c o s t  o f  the change 
de'terred some#
I t  might be p o s s ib le  to  draw the t e n t a t i v e  deduction  
from th o se  f in d in g s  t h a t ,  i f  autom atic co-ow nership were 
to  come a b o u t  * r e la t iv e ly  few would w ish to  make a d if f e r e n t  
arrangement «
The Household Goode 
Here /
1# Hence, o f  th o se  s u r v e y e d , the o v e r a ll  p rop ortion  o f  m arried cou p les h o ld in g  t h e ir  homes in  j o in t  names• * -2 'tft/was 55%*
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Here, the survey's findings were presented 
u n d e r  three headings - a# the o a r ;  b# f u r n i t u r e  and 
fittings; o ,  other l a r g e  household items#
a* t h e  car
59/ of couples canvassed (all being married 
persons at the date of the survey) ovmed one car 
o r  more than one car. Of wives, 62/ thought of the 
car ae being jointly owned, 7% th o u g h t  of it as 
belonging to the wife, and 52/ thought of it as being 
the husband's# A larger proportion of h u sb a n d s  (72/) 
felt that the car w as jointly owned# The survey 
notes (2*2) that "There w a s , o v e r a l l , a strong feeling 
that the car was an asset which belonged to both 
spouses*" At 3*0, it states that "Though a couple 
may have views as to which assets belong to e a c h  and 
which are owned jointly, their v ie w s  do not always 
coincide with the legal p r i n c i p l e s  which would be  
applied in the event of a dispute between them*"
b# f u r n i t u r e  and  f i t
Over 95/ of couples considered that some, and 
perhaps even a l l ,  of the furniture was otmed jointly# 
‘In fewer than 3% of cases, did either feel that some 
furniture was In separate ownership*
When i t  i s  considered how much attention might orequire to be given''"* to the establishment of o w n e rsh ip  
of corporeal moveables, this unanimity is remarkable* 
The finding, even if accepted aa representative of 
opinion /
1* Gf* So.L*0om ,M emo,No#41 and Faculty Response*2* O f , ,  e . g . ,  O l iv e  and W ilson (pp*294/5) upon the  treatm ent o f donations from s t r a n g e r s  to  the  marriage* There i t  i s  s u g g e s te d  th a t what i s  im p o r ta n t  i s  the In te n tio n  o f the donor (which i s  o fte n  to  b e n e f it  both p a r t ie s )  r a t h e r  than the  n o tio n  ( 'r a th e r  appealin g a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l y ')  th a t  the item  b elon gs to  the spouse from whose s id e  o f  the fam ily  i t  sprang*
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opinion generally, is a two-edged weapon# First, it 
could be argued that, if this is the view taken during 
the subsistence of marriage, why should not all 
property of this kind be treated in law as jointly ow ned , 
and be divided accordingly on dissolution? Second, 
it m ig h t be said that any step to render more clear 
and equitable the rights in such items of parties 
during the marriage is u im e o o s s a r y .  On the latter 
point, however, parties in reality often are not 
generous and are self-interested and and 'equal share' 
hope o r  opinion may be a cruel misconception*
G* oth er la rg e  household item s
Under this head were placed 'consumer durables®
(for example, washing machine and refrigerator) and 
here spouses were prepared to attribute individual 
ownership *
Financial Arrangements
40% o f  cou p les h o ld in g  bank accounts (21% of  
cou p les in terv iew ed ) had a t l e a s t  one j o in t  bank 
accou n t, convenience (63%), ®jolntn.ees o f  marriage®
(34%) and advantages on the death  o f one p artner  
(22%) b ein g  th e  main reason s adduced f o r  such a 
choice*  The p r in c ip a l reason g iven  fo r  maintenance 
o f s e p a r a t e  accounts was th a t (43%) t h is  made i t  
e a s ie r  "to keep track  o f  f in a n c ia l  a f f a i r s , "
The com pilers a llow  them selves to  draw a su ggested  
co n c lu sio n  from th e co n tr a s t in g  a t t itu d e s  to  jo in t  
ownership o f th e  m atrim onial home and to  jo in t  bank 
a cco u n ts, to  th e e f f e c t  th a t jo in tn e s s  la  more p a la ta b le  
in  long-term  f in a n c ia l  a r r a n g e m e n ts  which do not come 
in to  prominence u n t i l  the end o f the m arriage, than  
i t  i s  in  m atters a f f e c t in g  "current money m atters" .
This h in ts  a t the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  a sp e c ie s  o f  d eferred  
com m unity  ra th er  than at a com m unity  o f  a cq u ests . I t  
may be th a t th e r e la t iv e  u n p op u larity  o f  j o in t  bank 
accounts may be a t tr ib u ta b le  to  a n a tu ra l d e s ir e  to  
spend aa one w ish es to  spend, and noth in g  i s  more 
n a tu ra l /
n a t u r a l  th a n  th a t  tw o p ersons may have d if f e r e n t  
n o tio n s o f  s p e n d in g  money -  and, i t  may 'be a r g u e d ,  
th o se  o f  th e w ife  may he le g it im a te ly  la r g e r -e o a le  
t h a n  th ose  o f  th e husband, upon whom the duty t o  
purrchase everyday item s and fa m ily  p resen ts  r a r e ly  
f a l l s .  Indeed , i t  would be su rp r is in g  i f  m a r r ie d  
cou p les w ere  at one In th e ir  id ea s  o f  l e v e l  o f  
spending* In  th e  pages which fo llo w , t h e  argument 
i s  p resen ted  th a t the c o -e x is te n c e  o f  j o in tr e s s  o f  
home and household goods w ith  sep a ra tio n  o f  o t h e r  
p rop erty  i s  p o s s i b l e .
Savings h e ld  in  o th er  ways (P ost O ffic e  accoun t, 
B u ild in g  S o c ie ty  account) were in  sep ara te  ownership  
in  the m ajority  o f  oases#  No doubt many were b e g u n  
when th e d ep o s ito r  was unm arried, and the same apathy  
which was found in  th e m atter o f  changing in to  jo in t  
names the t i t l e  o f  a house would be p resen t here 
perhaps * A s im ila r  p rop ortion  o f  husbands and Wives 
h e ld  such sa v in g s . In su ra n ces , o fte n  sm a ll, were 
h eld  in  sep arate  names. Although a la r g er  proportion  
(95%) o f  Ims'baMa had such in su ra n ces , a s u r p r i s i n g l y  
la r g e  p rop ortion  (65%) o f  w ives a lso  had talcen th ese  
o u t*  Insurance com panies, i t  i s  thou ght, p ress  th e ir  
arguments on th e f a m i ly  man ra th er  than upon the fam ily  
woman,^
Few cou p les had oth er  in vestm en ts such as sto ck s  
and sh a res, b u t, where th ey  e x is t e d , th ey  were r a r e ly  
in  j o in t  names, and where th ey  stood in  sep ara te  names, 
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  more stood  in  the name o f  th e  husband.
The same ap p lied  to  investm ent h e r ita g e , which was even  
more /
1 ft a l b e i t , in  nec es s ary c a s e s ,  produe ed throughdonation  from th e o th er  spouse -  see  in f r a ,2 , However, i t  should  be noted th a t t h e  TSeneTit o fthe Married Women's P o l ic ie s  o f  Assurance (S co tlan d )  
A ct* 1680, has b e e n  extended to  p o l i c i e s  taken out 
b y  m arried women or unmarried p e r s o n s  fo r  b e n e f it  o f  spouse and/or ch ild ren  by th e Married Women*s P o l ic ie s  o f  Assurance (S co tla n d ) Amendment Act@1980*
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m ore r a r o l y  found#
Only 9% had 'buainesBoa'* and theee bimlneeaea
v a r i e d  g r e a t l y  i n  a o a le *  2 0 /  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  b u o in eaB  
was owned jointly* ?4l c o n s id e r e d  that i t  was t h e  
h u sb an d * #  a lo n e *  a n d  7% o o n a ld e r e d  t h a t  i t  waa t h e  
w i f e '8  a lo n e *
O f o t h e r  I te m s  o f  c a p i t a l *  7 9 / o f  la te rv io w e o G  
c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  t h e  i te m  b e lo n g e d  t o  t h e  huaband*
I t  i s  cloGa.' t h a t  aomo o a s e s *  d o e u m e n ta ry  e v id e n c e  
was a v a i l a b l e  * and  w here  no t r a n s f e r  i s  a l l e g e d  t o  
h a v e  ta k e n  p l a c e ,  t h i s  u s u a l l y  w i l l  be  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  o w n o ra h ip *  ^]b som e® parties * b e l i e f s  h av e  b e e n  
aeaeseed, and these may bo inaoourate*^
The comment i s  m ade^ t h a t  o w n e rsh ip  i n  j o i n t  
nam es o c c u r r e d  m ore f r e q u e n t l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c u r r e n t  
b an k  a c c o u n ts  th a n  i n  t h e  oa&c o f  a n y  o t h e r  k in d  o f
f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t  d io c u s a e d *
The s t a t i s t i c s  c o n c e rn in g  e s t im a te d  v a lu e  of 
m a tr im o n ia l  home a n d  o t h e r  a s s e t s  l a  o f  l e a a  v a lu e  
i n  v ie w  o f  t h e  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r a i u o  o f  money w h ic h  
lias to k e n  place s i n c e  1971$ b u t  t h e  f i n d i n g  t h a t  " i n  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a e  a  w h o le  many m a r r ie d  c o u p le s  do n o t  
h a v e  l a r g e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s e r v e s  b e h in d  t h e i r  e v e r y  d a y  
e x p e n d i tu r e "  (2 * 5 )  i s  p r o b a b ly  a s  t r u e *  o r  m ore t r u e *  
to - d a y *  I n  t im e s  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  t o  s a v e  becom es 
I n c r e a s i n g l y  d i f f i c u l t  a n d ,  e z c o p t  p e rh a p s  when t a k i n g  
t h e  fo rm  o f  I n v e s tm e n t  I n  w o rk s  o f  a r t  o r  on  t h e  s to c k  
e x c h a n g e , i n c r e a s i n g l y  u n a t t r a c t i v e *  I t  "was fo u n d  
t h a t  w h e re  a s s e t s  o t h e r  th a n  t h e  home and  b an k  a c c o u n t  
w e re  fe w , o w n e rs h ip  o f  t h o s e  a s s e t s  u s u a l l y  was s e p a r a t e ,  
b u t  /
oci 0
thou(ÿh s e e ,  a s  t o  d e p o s i t  r e c e i p t s  an d  b an k  a c c o u n t s ,
O liv e  an d  W ils o n , p p , 304^306*th o u g h  p e r h a p s  n o t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e r e  w as a g re e m e n t b e tw e e n  t h e  s p o u s e s  on t h e  p o i n t  t a g re e m e n t a s  t o  d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  may b e  a l l  t h a t 'm a t t e r s , ond i s s o l u t i o n  o f  m a rr l  3* 2,5 (P*17),
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but, aa prosperity increased, so did the likelihood 
of finding joint ownership and mixed ownership (that 
is9 some assets held in joint, and some in separate, 
ownership)# ^
0 ontxnlbution
Opinions upon ownership of items which had 
belonged, before marriage to one spouse were considered® 
This is most interesting, for in effect the survey 
canvasses views about what should be the manner of 
treatment of itéras which often have been excluded 
from community® In general, spouses appear to have 
considered that v/hat they owned before marriage they 
brought to the marriage for the use and benefit, and 
to come under the ownership of, both partners * This 
generosity and feeling of * jointness® was less pronounced 
among those who had been married before, and the feeling 
was most strong among the wives *
"Gratuitous aoquirenda"
Here, it was found that husbands and wives had 
been equally fortunate, and that the siae of the good 
fortune in 69/ of cases was less than 6500* ?4-i' of
husbands and 64% of wives considered that the inheritance 
belonged to both spouses® Only inheritances were 
considered* Gifts were not considered# In. this case, 
the 'jointness* attitude was less marked among wives 
(a caution stemming perhaps from an economically weaker 
position, and a desire for 'her own* property in 
addition to the obligation to maintain owed by the 
husband) but, all in all, no strong case for general 
exclusion from a community property system of such 
property emerges from the findings# However, it seems 
that the question was confined to those who were parties 
to /
1 * This is a little surprising® J.t is often assumed that the greater the worldly wealth (of each), the less strong is the desire for community of property.
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to a subsisting; marriage, and was not put; to the 
group of formerly married persons»
As to earnings, which, it is thought, would 
form the bulk of 'acquests', a study of employment 
patterns among married women revealed that 85/ of 
the field had been in paid employment at some point 
during their married liv es#  Host men are able to 
make a continuing financial contribution towards the 
upkeep of the home, by moans of earnings, and most 
women are ablo to make such a contribution conjoined 
with or alternating with the contribution which they 
make in the physical xmmilng of the home, and in the 
care of the children# The result of the survey's 
inquiry was the finding that most wives felt that 
they had made a contribution towards the acquisition 
of matrimonial property, but it must be said that the 
method of eliciting a response was to suggest to wives 
vfays in  which they might have contributed, as, for 
example, by earnings, pre-marriage savings, use of 
gratuitous acquirenda, and effort in running the home# 
With the exception of the last-mentioned factor, ofAcourse, these are elements legitimately taken into 
account in the ascertainment of property rights between 
strangers # Although many wives may never before have 
thought about contribution to property in legal terms, 
it is clear that many felt that their efforts in the 
home could be regarded aa a contribution# A response 
should have been elicited from husbands on the question 
o f /
1 © O n  d i v o r c e ,  i n  E n g l a n d  ( s e e  M a t r i m o n i a l  C a u s e s  A c t ,  
1 9 7 3 ,  8 , 2 5 ( l ) ( f ) ;  s e e  a l s o  H e w  A e a l a n d ,  uu.R3:’a )  th is  
i s  o n e  o f  t h e  m a t t e r s  t o  w h i c h  t h e  c o u r t * ^ ”s l ' ia X x  h a v e  
r e g a r d  i n  m a k i n g  a n  o r d e r  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  and/or a  p r o p e r t y  a d j u s t m e n t  order; the v i t a l  question  
i s  whether t h i s  i s  a  relevant f a c t o r  w h e n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  w i t h i n  marriage, i n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  m a r r i e m e r g e n c y  a n d  w h e t h e r  i n d e e d ' ”"*' 
t i a e r e  i s  t o  b e  a n y  m a c h i n e r y  f o r  t h e  d e c x s x o n  o f  
s u c h  p o x n t s  d u r i n g  t h e  s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  a  marriage.
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of how much, if any, importance they would attach 
to contribution in the fo rm  of running the home, in 
ascertaining rights of ownership in home and contents® 
he who feathers the neat does n o t  spend his timeAsitting on it.
Among owner-ocoupiers, 85% of wives considered
that they had made some financial contribution to
acquisition o f  home and contents, a n d , among those
who did not own their ovm home, 79% of wives considered
that they had contributed financially towards the home 2and c o n t e n t s ,
The Hanagoment of the Household
Much has been written about roles in m a r r i a g e .
The Survey questioned couples about their a t t i t u d e s  
and  practices#
I n  1971, 89% o f  the wives of the marriagea studied 
purchased the food, 49% paid fuel bills, 45% paid rates, 
rent o r  mortgage, and  36% dealt with an y  s u r p l u s  
remaining. This reveals what might have been e x p e c te d  - 
namely, that most wives took upon themselves the 
responsibility of the family catering, but that other 
domestic duties were shared by the s p o u s e s .  Whose 
money did the p a y e r  use to meet the bills? At this 
point, the survey seems t o  have been concerned to find 
the executive partner (who may or may not have been 
the funding partner). H usbands who were paid In c a s h  
were more likely to e n t r u s t  paym en t of bills to the 
wife /
1 ft p e r  Sir Jocelyn Simon2ft 3*5* Opinion varied according to the asset under consideration. Thus, 72% of wives felt that, running the home* they had contributed to the acquisition of the home; 35% thought that by sodoing they had contributed to the a c q u i s i t i o n  of the car® It varied also according to the method of c o n t r i b u t i o n ;  67% considered that their earnings had helped towards the acquisition of the matrimonial homo; to the acquisition of the c a r .
wife; in other cases, often the husband will pay 
the b i l l s *
There a r e  regional variations in habit* 15/ 
of wives in the N o r th  of England received the whole 
c o n te n t s  of the h u s b a n d' pay packet, com pared  with 
2% (of wives w hose husbands receive paym ent in cash?) 
i n  London and the South-East of England®
Approximately equal support was given to the 
opposing notions that the wife should be entitled 
to savings from the housekeeping and that the s u r p l u s  
s h o u ld  b e  shared equally* A t the date of the survey, 
few persons could give a correct statement of the law*
24% of husbands and  10% o f  wives had given thought 
to the future by making a w i l l .  It is well known that 
most people are loth to make a w i l l ,  12% of husbands 
who had made wills and 22% of wives who had done so had 
been prompted to make a will because they felt that they 
had acquired sufficient property to render the exercise 
worth w h i l e , A survey b reak d o w n  of the ages of the 
testate and intestate w ould  have been helpful© Prople 
were found not to be entirely ignorant of the rules 
of intestate succession? but "Only three people, that 
is about one spouse per thousand, knew in detail the 
parts of the intestacy law s which affect the f a m ily ?  
and they all had close connection with legal work»"^
The survey then considered the responses given 
to questions of a more general, and less subjective 
n a t u r e  $
A surprisingly high proportion of spouses (91% 
of husbands5 9^f*% of w iv e s) a p p ro v e d  the i d e a  o f  joint 
ownership of the house and contents irrespective of 
which spouse had paid for them* This question was 
followed c l o s e l y  by a question designed t o  discover 
whether /
r^srs?œrar*«tj*awfi'»ipwi»
1. 5.3s p .37
whether the spouse who normally would be the beneficiary 
of the above arrangement should be obliged to take a 
secondary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for the f i n a n c i n g  of the home 
should the husband fail to do ao? and on the assumption 
that the w ife  had some money of her own. 41% of 
h u sb a n d s  and 43% of wives thought that this responsibility 
should arise© 2.7% of both husbands and  wives answered, 
" I t  depends"? a viewpoint which reflected the n o t i o n  
that conduct should be relevant©
It is interesting that even those who favoured 
the sharing of responsibilities did not express the 
view - or were not given the opportunity to express 
the view - that the responsibility should be equal, 
or that t h e  w if e  (joint owner) should be liable in so 
fax* as she is able, to contribute to m o rtg a g e  repayments 
and o t h e r  o u tg o in g s  relating to the m a tr im o n ia l  hom e,
This may reflect the practicalities of the case, for 
relatively few wives have private income and, for 
reasons of quality of life? neither husband nor wife 
may favour paid employment f o r  the wife during the 
childbearing and child-rearing years.
Among those who favoured j o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
the 'p a r t n e r s h i p *  reasoning was s t r o n g l y  h e l d .  Among
those who did not favour sharing? the "husband is the 
n a t u r a l  provider" opinion p r e v a i l e d ,  and among t h e  "It 
depends" g r o u p , the attitude that, "She should be 
r e s p o n s i b l e  if the husband is doing his best, but n o t  
if he's n o t  " w as the most p r e v a l e n t  *
As to division of property on m a r r ia g e  emergency 
(separation), the spouses independently showed a s t r o n g  
predisposition to equal sharing o f  the m a t e r i a l  items 
acquired during the m a r r ia g e  (house? o a r ,  s a v i n g s ) ,  in 
a s i t u a t i o n  in which both spouses had been employed and 
earning m oney, and this attitude was even s l i g h t l y  more 
strongly t a k e n  where the s i t u a t i o n  of working husband 
and housewife wife w as postulated. T h is  d i s p l a y s  an 
i n t e r e s t i n g  /
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in terestin g  approach, and n more generous one than
often  is ascribed to spouses in matrimonial difficulties « 
Of course, in reality? there might be more acrimony,
There must be set against the findings of such surveys 
the fact that fair-mindedness is more likely to be 
present in a situation free from emotional upset (and 
those w hose opinions were recorded here were persons 
currently married. Among the formerly married? there 
was less enthusiasm for equal shares on d isso lu tion  of 
a 'housewife* marriage, (See Infra 'Fundaraental Concepts 
of Matrimonial Property®, ) At 11,2? the survey notes 
that this group adopted a perhaps more realistic approach 
than was possible for the currently married and spouses 
in the la t te r  category were being interviewed in the 
presence of each oth er),
The group was asked about the manner in which they
considered a post-m arital legacy of £ 5 0 0  to the husband
from his grandfather should be treated» This tested
in effect English attitudes to gratuitous acQuirenda?
and 46/ of h u sb a n d s  and 59% of wives felt that the
legacy should remain with the husband, 41/ of husbands
and 29%’ of wives thought that the legacy should be shared
equally between the spouses, Similarly? questions were
posed about the destination of ante-nuptial property?
and in particu lar about a notional £200 saved by the
wife before marriage ? and retained by her after marriage®
68% of husbands and 70/ o f  wives considered that the
wife should be given that s\m  in the division of property,
26/ of husbands and 24% of wives favoured equal division'1between the spouses®
It la clear that there was a preference for the 
retention of individual rights of ownership of those 
items /
A m o n g  divorced and s e p a r a t e d  spouses, the " i n d i v i d u a l i s t  
v i e w  w a s  h e l d  e v e n  m o r e  strongly ( 1 1 , 2 ) ?  a n d  m o s t  strongly o f  a l l  a m o n g  t h e  f e m a l e s  o f  that g r o u p ®
4 -  t1
i t e m s ?  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  w h ich  
p e r t a i n e d  s o  c l e a r l y  t o  t h e  l i f e  h i s t o r y  o f  o n e  
s p o u s e ?  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  t h e  p r e v i o u s  h i s t o r y  o f  
b o th  o r  t o  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  b o t h *  A  t e n t a t i v e  
c o n c l u s i o n  m i g h t  b e  d r a w n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t ?  i f  a  
f o r m  o f  c o m m u n i t y  o f  p r o p e r t y  w e r e  t o  b e  i n t r o d u c e d ?  
p o p u l a r  o p i n i o n  w o u l d  t e n d  t o  f a v o u r  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  
f r o m  c o m m u n i t y  o f  g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u l r e n d a  a n d  -  e v e n  
m o r e  c l e a r l y  -  o f  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  a n t e - n u p t i a l l y *
I t  i s  t h o u g h t ?  h o w e v e r ?  t h a t  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  m i g h t  b e  
a b l e  t o  b e  t a k e n  b e t w e e n  p r o p e r t y  owned b y  e a c h  s p o u s e  
b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e  
o r  t h e  u s e  f o r  w h i c h  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  b o t h  w a s  
a c q u i e s c e d  i n  t h e r e a f t e r  b y  t h e  o r i g i n a l  o w n e r ?  a n d  
p r o p e r t y  o w n e d  b y  e a c h  s p o u s e  b e f o r e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  
r e t a i n e d  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  n a m e  t h e r e a f t e r ?  m a k i n g  
l i t t l e  o r  n o  " p r o p e r t y  i m p a c t " ?  a s  i t  w e r e ?  o n  t h eA
m a t e r i a l  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e #
I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t o  f i n d  t h a t  a  h i g h e r
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  f e m a l e  " f o r m e r l y  m a r r i e d "  g ro u p
Ph a d  n e v e r  b e e n  i n  p a i d  e m p l o y m e n t  * “* H e r e  t h e r e  w a s  
a n  /
A t  1 7 , 0 ?  t h e r e  i s  a  sum m ary o f  f i n d i n g s ?  a n d  o f  
s u c h  g r a t u i t o u s  a c q u l r e n d a  o r  p r e - m a r i t a l  p r o p e r t y  i s  w r i t t e n  ( p ,  1 0 '? ] " '? ' " " ' ^ l t l i o u g h  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
p e o p l e  w h o  f e l t  s u c h  p o s s e s s i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  s h a r e d  
w a s  m u c h  l o w e r  t h a n  t h a t  f o r  p r o p e r t y  w h i c h  h a d  
r e s u l t e d  f r o m  e a r n i n g s  d u r i n g  m a r r i a g e  t h e r e  w a s ?  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ?  c o n s i d e r a b l e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e s e  m o r e  
p e r s o n a l  a s s e t s  s h o u l d  b e  s h a r e d  * T h e  r e s u l t s  
a l s o  s h o w e d  s o m e  i n d i c a t i o n  h e r e  o f  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  
w h a t  w a s  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  s h o u l d  b e  s h a r e d ?  a n d  w h a t  
w a s  t h e  w i f e ' s  s h o u l d  n o t " *  G i v e n  e c o n o m i c  
i n e q u a l i t y ?  t h e r e  m a y  b o  common s e n s e  a t  t h e  r o o t  
o f  t h e  o l d  j o k e  b y  t h e  w i f e  t h a t  " W h a t ' s  y o u r s  i s  
m i n e  ? a n d  w h a t ' s  m i n e  i s  m y  o w n " #
S e e  p o s i t i o n  i n  S w e d e n  ( C h a p t e r  6 )#
T h i s  g r o u p  w a s  s m a l l  o r  a n d  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d #  
T h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  i n t e r v i e w s  w a s  6 0 0 ;  t h e  t o t a l  num ber o f  i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  p e r s o n s  t h e n  m a r r ie d  w a s  1877.
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an older average age, weighted hy the relatively 
large number of widowed persons interviewed*
It was noticeable that, when views were canvassed 
about contributions thought to have been made 
towards the home, the car and the furniture, 67% 
of widows (as opposed to 92% of divorced or separated 
women and 79% of wives) considered that they had 
contributed to the home, 40% (68%; 57%) to the car 
and 75% (82%; 85%) to the furniture * As to methods 
of contribution (to furniture, "this being the only 
kind of property that sufficient numbers of formerly 
married people had owned during marriage"), the two 
factors (all factors mentioned having been suggested 
to the interviewees) which predominated were contribution 
by effort in the home, and money earned during marriage* 
Fewer divorced or separated wives had. contributed by 
effort in the home (59%, as opposed to 65% who considered 
that they had made a contribution through earning); 53% 
of widows and of wives thought that they had contributed 
by effort in the home, but 70% (as opposed to only 46% 
of widows) wCre of the opinion that they had contributed 
tlirough earnings.
The proportion of widows who had been content to 
leave money matters to the husband was higher than in 
other categories.
The attitude towards savings from the housekeeping 
allowance did not vary greatly, though the preference 
for an equal sharing approach was slightly more marked 
among the currently married.
A less strong feeling of having contributed to 
the material assets, a relative lack of earning power 
and a relative lack of interest in money matters are 
characteristics of members of the widow category who 
belonged in the main to an older age group.
Fundamental Concepts of Matrimonial Property
Widowed and currently married persons differed 
little in the favour which they showed to the concept 
of /
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of joint ownership of the matrimonial home© There 
was lees enthusiasm among divox^ cod and separated 
spousesÎ a feeling existed that the matter should 
be determined by oontributione However, when the 
question was posed whether a wife with money should 
be obliged to continue mortgage repayments if the 
husband failed to do so, the divorced and separated 
wives were less in favour of this than were widows 
oi* wives# The divorced or separated wives revealed 
a preference for the older view that maintenance is 
a male obligation? end a distaste for the "equal 
responsibility inherent in the relationship of 
partnership which is a m a r r ia g e "  attitude# This 
seems at odds with their views concerning the m a tr im o n ia l  
home # I n  the study, the compilers rematefe upon the 
occasional inconsistency of people*
When views w ere  canvassed about division of 
property on marriage brealcdom, currently married 
persons looked more kindly on the suggestion that 
capital assets should be shared equally between the 
spouses, even where the husband alone had been in paid 
employment and the wife had been looking after the home#
Further research revealed features of the incidence 
of joint ownership of the matrimonial home®
The decade of the celebration o f  the marriage and 
the inoidonce of joint ownership were studied© This 
produced the s u r p r i s i n g  result that the lowest percentage 
of joint ow n ers  (39%) had been married in the 1970*s, 
t h e  next lo w e s t  (44%) having been m a r r ie d  in the 1 9 2 0*s  
o r  before® Of c o u rs e ?  xHxen the survey was carried o u t  ? 
the decade of the 1970 *s  w as not well a d v a n c e d  and so 
t h e  comparison may not rest on a good foundation# It 
w as suggested t h a t ,  a t  t h e  date of the s u r v e y  couples 
"had had little time to establish themselves"# There 
was nothing to indicate that, given t im e ,  both the level
1come into line with those of other couples"# On the
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1other hand, earlier in the Report ? commenting upon 
the attitudes o f  s in g le - n a m e  title holders towards 
j o i n t  ownership the compilers remark that "These 
results s u g g e s t  that it i s  very unlike].y that any 
steps will he taken to change the type of o w n e rsh ip  
except in the c i r o u m s ta n c e s  of a new purchase*" Still, 
"Once a c o u p le  have their home i n  joint names th e y  do 
not seem to change hack to single name ownership later®"
Although the h i g h e s t  proportion of joint owners 
(56%) was found among those of the highest social class 
c o n s id e r e d  ( p r o f e s s i o n a l  and managerial) no great 
Variation was found to occur fro m  class to class * For
example, 55% of the "8emi--skill©d non-manual class" 
held their homes in joint names * The Social Survey 
Division turned in surprise from the conclusion that 
"neither length of marriage nor social class are related 
to joint ownership" to view the importance of the y e a r  
in which the current home was acquired? and there 
a steep and s t e a d y  rise i n  the rate of joint ownership 
was seen *  In the 1930*8, 20% of homes were j o i n t l y  
owned* The c o r r e s p o n d in g  proportion fox* houses acquired 
in the 1 9 7 0 ' s  (that i s ,  early in the 1970®s) was 74%*
The 1960*8 proportion w as found to he 57% and so in the 
mere fifteen months of the 1970*8 w h ic h  had elapsed 
before the survey was taken? there had been a sharp rise# 
The r e s u l t s  suggested that "the num ber of couples who 
would wish to opt out of a system where joint ownership 
was the general pattern is small*" Joint ownership 
was more common among couples w here  the wife had made
some financial contribution? and later i t  was fo u n d  
that it was least common in oases w here  the wife had 
never been in paid employment during the marriage#
In addition? the increasing publicity given to the 
subject? and to remedies for the non-owner (as for 
exam ple  /
“i .  cî.'l 9 P»^2o 2. 15.0, p.84,
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example contained in the Hatrimonial Homes Act? 196?) 
may have reinforced the trend# To the factors of 
financial contribution? y e a r  of m a r r i a g e ,  num ber o f  
houses previously owned and interest in the legal Arights of spouses with regard to the matrimonial home 
was added what the Social S u rv e y  Division aptly texmied 
the "catalyst" of the solicitor who "is in a unique 
position to com m unica te  the advantages and disadvantages 
of various ty p e s  of ownership.#©#"
E n q u i r y  w a s  m a d e  I n t o  o w n e r s h i p  p a t t e r n s  i norelation to othea? assets also#'^ ’ Ho clear trends 
emerged* but we are told that of n e v e r-e m p lo y e d  wives, 
wives who have been employees? and wives who have been 
self-omployod or have worked for their husbands, 61/-?
5 W  and 53% r e s p e c t i v e l y  were partners of a marriage 
where each partner had "some" property? but no joint 
property, and that 25%* 30% and 36% respectively had 
both joint and s e p a r a t e  property# Hqw much separate 
■property did the wives have? Using the same 
categorisation of wife, and w ith  reference only to 
separate property, 13%* 19% and 47% of cases assets 
of a value b e tw e e n  £1,000 £9*999 stood in name of
the husband; in 7%* 7% and 17% assets of like value 
stood in the name of the w ife *  Perhaps even a larger 
difference b e tw e e n  the financial positions of husbands 
and wives might have been expected*
The greater material prosperity of couples of
whom the wife had been self-employed or had worked
f o r  h e r  h u sb a n d  w a s  n o t a b l e ®  S u c h  w i v e s  w e r e  fo u n d
to favour more strongly the notion that a wife should
boar part of the financial b u rd e n  if the husband was%
n o t  a b l e  t o  d o  s o ^ *  H e r e  a l s o  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a u t o m a t i c  
r i g h t s  /
1® as opposed to the factors of length of marriageand social class which wero found not to be relevant® 
2, p#85.3# Perhaps the further question should have been posed: "Regardless of the financial and other cix'cinastances of the husband, do you think that a wife should bear as much of the financial b u rd e n  of the marriage as is reasenable in the particular oaee?"
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rights of inheritance was more p o p u l a r ,
Axiioag "never-employed" wives ? though? the 
pattern of o w n e rsh ip  within marriage was not v e r y  
different# The marriage was l i k e l y  simply to he 
loss affluent. On the fundamental issues (wife's 
l i a b i l i t y  to finance the home? financial settlement 
on marriage breakdown (including treatment of 
gratuitous aqquirenda and p r e - m a r l t a l  savings) and 
x'ighte on testacy and intestacy), opinions did not 
differ according to whether the wife had or had not 
been in em ploym ent at some point during the m a r r i a g e .
Righte on Death
Views were canvassed upon the subject of rights
In intestacy and the results tabulated in a somewhat1confusing fo rm . As to spouse inheritance? the 
inference drawn by the Social S u rv e y  was that "People 
who thought that there should b e  no inheritance rights 
for spouses were more likely to favour some form of 
sharing between the wife and sons* while those who felt 
that there should be inheritance rights, or who gave 
qualified opinions? were more inclined to t h i n k  the 
wife should take it all," As far as Inheritance b y  
children was concerned? of those opposed to automatic 
rights of inheritance by children* approximately two 
thirds considered that the wife should be sole inheritor 
in intestacy* and one t h i r d  favoured the sharing o f  the 
estate b e tw e e n  wife and sons, (The f a m i ly  example 
taken in all cases was that of a mother with three adult 
sons)#
The compilers concluded that "a fairly substantial 
proportion of people felt that although children should 
not have to be included in the will? if no will was 
m ade" (in the situation envisaged) "the children should 
share /
15 .0 ,  p . 97.
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share in the estate". Is this a sweeping conclusion? 
Among those in favour of automatic inheritance rights * 
over 5 0/ felt that there should be a sharing between 
wife and sons? but 41% of husbands and 38% of wives 
thought that the wife should bo the solo inheritor#
The Social Survey Division comments * "These people 
were clearly not equating the intestacy situation to 
that of making a will," Inconsistency* they say? is 
likely where people are asked to think and respond 
quickly* the subject being a complex and unfamiliar 
one.
The Survey'a Conclusions
The first major finding was that* at 1971# among
owner-ocGupiers* a majority (5 2%) held their home in
joint names® Single-name owners displayed no great1antipathy to the idea* and it would appear to be the 
case that* as the 1970s have progressed? a greater 
number of married persons are talcing joint title to 
the matrimonial home©
Joint arrangements with regard to bank accounts 
were less common than with regard to houses* but 40% 
of couples with bank acoomrbs had at least one joint 
account © The "at least" may be significant: coxiples
who bank all their funds jointly subscribe impliedly* 
it might be thought even allowing for the complexity 
of the legal rules concerning property in bank accounts 
of /
Enthusiasm for joint ownership* and for the assuming of financial responsibility therefor by the wife* was less marked among the formerly- married group (the divorced* separated? and widowers) than among the currently married and widows (p#104).Some interviewees Intimated an intention to hold the next home in joint names: moreover* single-name ownership * it transpired* did not import an absence of an attitude of sharing* "In nine out of ten cases the spouses each thought of the home as belonging to both of them" (17*0** p.102),
1 0 0 5 *
o f  w h ic h  thoG o c o u p le s  p r o b a b ly  a ro  i g n o r a n t  -» t o  a  
m o tio n  o f  g h a r l a g  o f  m a t e r i a l  goods^  and  good and  
h a d  f o r tu n e ^  and  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  d e b ts ^  w i t h i n  m arriag e * '^  
ThoGO who h a v e  s e p a r a t e  b a n k  aoooim tG  a s  w e l l  a s  one 
j o i n t  b an k  a c c o u n t  ( m a in ta in e d  p e rh a p s  t o  oavo f o r  a  
new o a r*  o r  a  h o l id a y *  o r  some o t h e r  lu x u ry *  o r  t o  
m ee t h o u s e h o ld  b i l l s )  do  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  h o ld  t h e  same 
v iew *  o r  do  n o t  h o ld  I t  so  s t r o n g ly *  o r  f u l l y *  In d e e d *  
t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e  m ig h t b e  f o r  g e n e r a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
p r o p e r t y  i n  m a r r ia g e  * and  t h a t  w ou ld  b e  m ore t r u e *
th o o e  who m a in ta in  s e p a ra tG  b a n k
acGounta only*
The b an k  account* c o n c lu d e d  t h e  compilers* was 
a n  a r ra n g e m e n t "which h a d  t o  w ork  f o r  d a y  t o  d a y  living; 
t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  ownership o f  the home * o n  th e  other hand* 
did not affect dally living at all* but w&a & long term 
a r ra n g e m e n t t h e  importance of w h ich  m ig h t  not becom e 
a p p a r e n t  u n t i l  the e n d  of t h e  m a r r ia g e  * ** Doea tb lm  
mean that it was felt that community was a c c e p ta b l e  
o n ly  a t  d i s s o l u t i o n  and  t h a t  d u r in g  th e  s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  
m a r r ia g e  a  e em b len co  o f  s e p a r a t i o n ^  o r  a c t u a l  s e p a r a t i o n  
waa preferable?
The s u r v e y  n o te e  t h e  m ixed  v iew #  u p o n  t h e  q u e s t io n  
o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e a p o n a l b l l l t y  o f  t h e  w if e  f o r  t h e  
h o u se*  a s  c o n t r a c t e d  w i th  t h e  o v e rw h e lm in g  f a v o u r  ( n in e  
o u t  o f  t o n  h u sb a n d s  an d  w iv e s )  shown to w a rd s  t h e  
" fu n d a m e n ta l  c o n c e p t"  o f  j o i n t  o w n e rsh ip  o f  t h e  
m a t r im o n ia l  home * V iew a o n  d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  o n  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  b y  d e a th  o r  d iv o r c e  d i d  
n o t  v a r y  g r e a t l y  a c c o r d in g  t o  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  w if e  
h a d  b e e n  I n  em ploym ent d u r in g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e  
Perh& p# /
1* although possibly t h e  thought may n o t  bo  formulated consciously,2* o f*  e y e te o G  o f  " d e f e r r e d  com m unity" * o r  ( l n f % )a system of separation w i th  concurrent compencation o f  g a in s #
1 0 0 6 *
P e r h a p s  the r a t i o n a l e  i s  t h a t *  w h i l e  i t  w a s  f e l t  
t o  h e  i n h e r e n t l y  r i g h t  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d  p r o v i d e  a n d  
m a i n t a i n  t h e  h o m e  a n d  c o n t e n t s *  a  m o r e  ’ e n l i g h t e n e d *  
a t t i t u d e  s h o u l d  p r e v a i l  u p o n  d i s s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  
o f  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  a s s e t s *  n o  m a t t e r  b y  w h i c h  
p a r t n e r  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  a c q u i r e d ;  a l l  I n  a l l *  a  w i f e *  
f a v o u r i n g  c  o n e l u s  i o n  *
M o r e  a p p r o v a l  w a s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a u t o m a t i c  
r i g h t s  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  f o r  w i v e s  t h a n  f o r  c h i l d r e n *  
t h o u g h  o v e n  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  former* o n e  t h i r d  o f  
t h e  ( E n g l i s h  a n d  W e l s h )  i n t e r v i e w e e s  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  
v i e w  t h a t  a  h u s b a n d  s h o u l d  h a v e  complete freedom o f  
t e s t a t i o n *  H o w e v e r *  " o v e r  h a l f  o f  h u s b a n d s  a n d  w i v e s  
f e l t  t h a t  i f  a  m a n  m a d e  a  w i l l  t h e n  h e  s h o u l d  b o  o b l i g e d/I
t o  i n c l u d e  h i s  wife i n  i t  * * * " ,
T h e  S u r v e y  r e v e a l e d  g r e a t  i g n o r a n c e  o f  t h e  l a w  
a s  i t  a f f e c t s  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  w i t h i n  t h e  f a m i l y *
E q u a l l y *  a study of t h e  sample * w h i c h  i n c l u d e d  " m a r r i e d  
c o u p l e s  of all a g e s  a n d  r a n g e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s "  
s h o w e d  t h a t  m a n y  d o  n o t  o w n  a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  p r o p e r t y #
4 8 %  w e r e  n o t  o w n e r ^ o c o u p l e r s ;  4 7 %  d i d  n o t  h a v e  a  c u r r e n t  
bank a c c o u n t ?  2 3 %  ( p r e s u m a b l y  o f  t h e  r e m a i n d e r )  s t a t e d  
t h a t  * a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  h o u s e  or b a n k  a c c o u n t *  t h e i r  t o t a l  
a s s e t s  amounted t o  l e s s  t h a n  £ 1 0 0 *  " T h e r e  a r e  t h u s  
v e r y  f e w  p e o p l e  f o r  w h o m  d e t a i l e d  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h eo
i n t e s t a c y  l a w s  i s  n e c e s s a r y * " ^  I n  c o n s e q u e n c e *  t h e  
c o m p i l e r s  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  " I t  s e e m s  t o  f o l l o w  t h a t  c h a n g e s  
i n  the l a w  s h o u l d  be f r a m e d  i n  such a  way a s  t o  t a k e  
a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  l o w  l e v e l  o f  a s s e t s  o w n e d  by t h e  m a j o r i t y  
o f  c o u p l e s * "  T h a t  m a y  b e  t r u e  * a n d  i t  m a y  a l s o  b e  t r u e  
t h a t  t h e  b e t t e r - o f f  m a y  b e  u n a r i t h u s i a s t i c  about a u t o m a t i c  
l e g a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  m a t t e r s ®  H o w e v e r *  u n c l e a r  
r u l e s  d o  n o t  h e l p  e i t h e r  c a t e g o r y *
R u l e s  /
1  * p * 1 0 3 *  B u t  o n e  t h i r d  f e l t  t h a t  h e  s h o u l d  b o  q u i t e
f r e e  t o  e x c l u d e  her*2, p,105.
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R u le s  o f  üGotG Law p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  O w n ersh ip  o f  
C o r p o r e a l  M o v e a b l e s *  a s  t h o a o  r u l e s  a f f e c t  m a r r i e d  p e r e o n o
B e f o r e  s u g g e s t i o n s  a r e  m a d e  c o n c e r n i n g  p o s s i b l e  
r e f o r m  o f  t h e  r u l e »  o f  S o o t»  l a w  g o v e r n i n g  a p o u a & a *
f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  ( i n  t h e  w i d o o t  c e n o e ) *  a  r e v i e w  
1» g iv e n  o f  t h e  r u l e #  w h ic h  now r e g u l a t e  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n4 O
o f  d i s p u t e s  a s  t o  o w n e r s h i p  o f  c o r p o r e a l  m o v e a b l e s ,
I t  l o  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  e a r n in g s  o f  a  sp o u se*  an d  
t h e  i t e m s  o f  f u r n i t u r e  o r  p r o p e r t y  o f  a n y  k i n d  w h ic h  
h e /a h a  c U o o s e o  t o  p u r c h a s e  t h e r e w i t h *  a r e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  t h a t  s p o u s e  a l o n e *  T he p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  
r u l e *  o v e n  i n  a  s o c i e t y  i n  w h i c h  p a i d  e m p l o y m e n t  f o r  
m a r r i e d  i f c m e a  i s  b e c o m i n g  i n o r o a f j d n g l y  oo% nm on* do n o t  
r e q u i r e  r e ^ s t a t o m e n t #  T h is  s t r i c t  s y s te m  h a s  a d v a n t a g e s  
a s  w e l l  a s  d i s a d v a n t a g e s ;  m a n y  a  c r e d i t o r  m a y  f i n d  t h a t  
t h e  h o u s e h o ld  f u r n i t u r e  i s  a l l e g e d  t o  b e lo n g  t o  th e  w ife  
a n d  t h a t  a  u n i t e d  f r o n t  i s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  s t r a n g e r * ^
T he r  l i e s  c o n c e r n in g  p a r a p h e r n a l i a ^  r e m a in  v a l i d
b u t  e x c e p t  i n  c a s e s  w h e re  je w e l»  h a v e  b e e n  sh o tm re d  u p o n
t h e  w i f e ,  p u r e l y  f r o m  m o t i v e s  o f  a f f e c t i o n  a n d / o r  f o r6r e a s o n s  o f  i n v e s t m e n t *  t h i #  c a t e g o r y  o f  p r o p e r t y  i s  n o t  
o f  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e *
W h e r e  p r o p e r t y  i s  n o t  p a r a p h e r n a l  i n  n a t u r e *  a n d  
w h e re  i t  h a s  n o t  b e e n  p u r c h a s e d  o u t  o f  t h e  incom e o r
c a p i t a l  o f  t h e  s p o u s e  v ih o  c l a i m s  t o  b e  t h e  o w n e r  t h e r e o f *
/
1* 3 o e  " G o m e Q u e s t i o n s  o f  P r o p e r t y  B e t w e o n  O p o u s e s " ,
A@1^ #A nton*  1955 8#D#T, (Mews) 1 9 5 ; "The E f f e c t  o f  Marriage upon P r o p e r t y  in  3 c o ta  Law" Anton (1 9 5 6 )  M .L ,R *653* '2# As t o  h e r i t a g e , s e e  C h a p te r  
5» Oomeron v* O û th b e r ta o n  1924  o*L*T* ( 8 h , C t , )  67* p e r4n C h a p te r  1 $
5 ,  , a  w i f e ’s  c l o t h e s  and other things quae s u n t  def#m & Æ U SlSl (^iS&E2g5L2fmraZJLL_2î^^ (T%2)LdPüü2) are paraphernal ana the separate e sta te  of t h e  w if e # "  ( q u o te d  b y  A n to n , 1955)»6# Gee C h a p te r  1 ,
1 0 0 8 ,
t h e n *  l e a v i n g  a s i d e  f o r  t h e  m o m e n t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
o f  p r o o f *  i t  m a y  h e  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  
i t e m  w a s  a  p r e s e n t  t o  h i m / h e r  f r o m  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e *  
o r  f r o m  a  s t r a n g e r  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e *  I t  h a s  been s e e n  
t h a t *  i l l  t e r r a s  o f  t h e  t U V J o I h  ( S c # )  A c t *  1 9 2 0 *  
d o n a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  s p o u s e s  a r e  r e n d e r e d  i r r e v o c a b l e  
q u o a d  t h e  s p o u s e s *  b u t  r e d u c i b l e  b y  t h e  d o n o r  s p o u s e ’ s  
c r e d i t o r e  i f  m a d e  w i t h i n  a  y e a r  a n d  a  d a y  o f  t h e  d o n o r ’ s  
B 0 q u e  s t r u t i o n  *
T h e r e  i s *  h o w e v e r *  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  a g a i n s t  d o n a t i o n *  
w h i c h  o p e r a t e s  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e  and i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
husband a n d  wife, t h o u g h  t h e r e  l e s s  s t r o n g l y #  N o r m a l l y *  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  a n i m e s  d o n a n d i  a n d  p h y s i c a l  d e l l v e i y*' estUSÆ^-^iWRMni'nî^tWrtîw:# ^
m u s t  b e  f u l f i l l e d *  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  d o n a t i o n  c a n  b e  h e l d
t o  have taken p l a c e *  b u t  * a s  h a s  b e e n  n o t e d  b y  m a n y
a u t h o r s *  d e l i v e r y  m a y  b e  f o u n d  t o  b e  a n  m i ] ? e  a l l s  t i e  1r e q u i r e m e n t  w h e n  t h e  g o o d s  w h i c h  are t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
t h e  /
1 # of# C o  & W .*  pp,295^7* At p # 2 9 7 o  Professor C l i v e
o p i n e s  t h a t  i n s i s t e n c e  u p o n  d e l i v e r y  i n  t r a n s f e r s  o f  corporeal m o v e a b l e s  i n  t h e  h o m e  ( t h e  stance t a k e n  i n  
S h e a r e r  v #  C h r i s t i e  ( 1 8 4 2 )  5  D , 1 3 2  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  
c a s e s )  i s  o b s o l e t e #  " A c t u a l  d e l i v e r y  o f  c o r p o r e a l  
m o v e a b l e s *  s u c h  a s  f u r n i t u r e *  i n  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  
i s  n o t  e s s e n t i a l  t o  p a s s  p r o p e r t y  f r o m  o n e  s p o u s e  t o  
t h e  o t h e r  i f  t h e y  a r e  l i v i n g  together* A p a r t  f r o m  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s t r i k i n g  d o w n  a  shorn or s i m u l a t e d  
t r a n s f e r *  c r e d i t o r s  a r e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  t h e  l a w  o n  
g r a t u i t o u s  a l i e n a t i o n s  a n d  b y  t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  r e v o k e  
g i f t s  b e t w e e n  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  m a d e  w i t h i n  a  year and 
a  d a y  b e f o r e  t h e  d o n o r ’ s  s e q u e s t r a t i o n o "  S t i l l *  i n  a  
d i s p u t e  b e t w e e n  h u s b a n d  t-m d w i f e *  t h e  t r u e  p o s i t i o n  
w i l l  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s c e r t a i n * A t  p * 2 9 3 %  P r o f e s s o r  
O l i v e  t a k e s  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  r u l e  t h a t  t h e  
h u s h  m i d  i s  t h e  c u s t o d i e s ?  o f  t h e  w i f e  ’ s ' l l e e d s *  
N e v e r t h e l e s s *  h e  n o t o e  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  of o n ©  s p o u s e  a n d  t h e  t i t l e s  t h e r e t o  a r e  
i m m i x e d  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e #  h e n c e *  t o  
d i s c o v e r  p r o p e r t y  a l l e g e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  d o n a t e d  b y  o n e  
s p o u s e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  i n  t h e  r e p o s i t o r i e s  o f  t h e  a l l e g e d  
d o n o r  m a y  n o t  b e  f a t a l  t o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  
b e e n  a  g i f t #  A t  p , 2 9 4  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  m a t t e r s  
s u c h  a s  d o n e e ’ s  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  d e e d *  ( o r  n o t )  
c u s t o m a r y  i n t e r m i n g l i n g  (or n o t )  o f  a s s e t s  a n d  h i s t o r y  
( o r  n o t )  o f  a c t i n g  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  o t h e r  w i l l  a i d  t h e  
d e c i s i o n #  S e e  g e n e r a l l y *  a u t h o r i t i e s  d i s c u s s e d #
O l i v e  /
1 0 0 9y @
the donation in question form part of the household 
plenishing# It may he argued that the subject of 
"ovmex'Bhip of household goods" is permeated by a lack 
of recognition of the circumstances of family life#
Lot these at least belong to the married pair in equal 
shares0 On the other hand* the asset may bo identifiable 
as a wedding present from a particular donor* whose 
intention may have been* if not to benefit one partner 
only* at least that the item, in question (especially 
if of family heirloom, character) should remain in the 
ownership of one side of the family* in the event of 
subsequent divorce or séparation© Such intention may 
be found only infrequently# More often than not the 
intention will have been to benefit both* and then "it2is submitted that .joint ownership should be presumed*"
The name(s) in which money stands in a bank account 
is by no moans conclusive of the ownership of such money# 
This is a matter which may arise* for example* in the 
administration of the estate of the prredeceaser of the 
marriage partners when the interest t h e r e i n  of the 
deceased must be discovered*^ The contributions which 
made up the sum standing at credit must be ascertained* 
and /
Olive and Wilson add that* since delivery no longer is essential for a sale of goods * alleged sales of corporeal moveables between spouses must be judged rather on whether the transaction was genuine* And see Smith v* 3#’a Trs# (1884) 12 R* 186* per(Anton (1955) at p,199; C* & W., p«294)1# See suggestions made below»(Family Assets)? of* 0* & W * * p .294 and fn*92*2* Go & W *9 p#295î and see Chapter 2$ ,3* "The fact that the multiple names and the survivorship provision do no more than require the banlc to pay to the named person without settling the quo ait ion of ownership comes as something of a shock to many spouses* especially just after the death of the other"* PUG ©Heston* 5th Commonwealth Law Conference 197?5 "Developments in Family Law"* "Family Property in Scotland", Proceedings and Papers* p*375#
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and i f  the accoimt stands in the nam e of one other
than the sole or principal contributor, or jointly
w i t h  him* then " A t beat, the terms in which a deposit
'receipt or bank account may bo expressed are ovidence1of the intention of the proprietor#" './hen it is 
r e m e m b e r e d  that* in a huaband/wife c a s e ,  that which 
the wife saves may boar a relationship to the level 
of salary which her husband earns* the complexity 
and unreality o f  m a t r i m o n i a l  property matters* and the 
practical inter-dependence of husband and wife* however 
s t r o n g  /
ir?f j^rtii>)ï«TSff*n>v#<>*rtïTew?îe< r^nwi««iTSeîe^
10 0# & V/#* p«306, Heston (Family Property in ScotlandP#575) remarks that parties probably do not intend that a detailed examination shall be carried out#"They may very well intend that the appearance of both names on the account is to prove that they each own one half * but the law is reluctant to give effect to that intention® It would be an excellent idea if* in the event of dispute * a court were to presume donation by each spouse to the other of one half of the sums paid in* but it is not clear that there is authority for them to do go® That would involve the creation of a community fund, and some very difficult problems might arise* as they do In most community systems* of the extent to which this community fund was available to the creditors of either spouse for separate debts® Unfortunately it seems that a Scottish court would have no option but to embark upon such a detailed s'tudy of the account* and it does not even have the powers conferred upon an English court by section 17 of the Married Women’b Property Aet 1882"«For example * her own resources may be largely untouched by marriage* if not required to meet household expenses § her "housekeeping allowance" may be sufficiently simple to enable her to make savings therefrom - a less likely case* nowadays* and of course, strictly ( M # W A c t *  1964* s«1), the savings would belong equally to both: or* on the other hand*the level of her husband * s salary and her own circimistanceB (car© of young children) may mean that she cannot save at all® See also infra* "Separation of Property With Concurrent Compensation of Gains"#
2®
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strong their championing of the principle of separation 
of property may 'be* is emphasised© This is true of 
separate* as of joint, bank accounts; who knows by 
what effort (in paid e'mployment ox* in work in the home) 
of the one* the other is enabled to save? Who knows 
the truth about contributioxx, and what are the criteria?
Are the criteria the best which can be devised? Are 
they lacking in subtlety? It may be, though, that* 
excel)t in case of dispute, the apparent proprietor 
will be treated as the true proprietor® Indeed, if 
any person - spouse or third party has allowed money 
to lie in another’s name in a bank account, might not4donation be presumed?
Where husband and wife are concerned, adherence 
to strict rules of property ignores realities* No 
matter what ie the attitude of a married couple towards 
the topic of matrimonial property in general, in their 
marriage there will be an imd.xture of money and other 
resources* Views cm the matter may be coloured by the 
opinion held about the desirability or not of certainty 
In this area of law* Todd and Jams noted^ that "complaints 
about the present law ore that there is no clear out 
rule as to what is recognised as a contribution to the 
acquisition of property, and even if there were, in any 
given case it might involve litigation and expense to 
decide the extent of a spouse’s contribution*
In /
1 e It may be that the concepts of trust and donation, used in England rmd ncotland respectively, are an unnecessarily complex and somewhat unsuitable guide to the resolution of matrimonial property disputes*The subject is difficult and productive of uncertainty® Reference is made to the clear and succinct treatment by Olive and Wilson at pp*297«^ 306 (’Property to which there is documentary title* (Ho Transfer between spouBos)(Direct Transfers between Spouses): special reference is made to Deposit Receipts and Bank Accounts and to heritage in which neither spouse is inf eft):®2 . 1972 , 1 .1 ,
I n  1 9 5 5 , a f t e r  M a  f i r s t  su rv e y *  
w ro te  t h a t  i t  w as c l e a r  " t h a t  t h e r e  l a  l i t t l e  t r a c e
In the Scottish oats os of a "new equity" In property 
q u e s t i o n s  " b o tw eo n  h u s b a n d  a n d  w i f e  t h e  O o o t t l s h  
j u d g e s  a r e  m o r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  d e p a r t  f r o m  t h e  s t r i c t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of la w  which a r o  ooïmnoaly applied 
b e t w e e n  s t r a n g e r s *  T h e  t e n d e n c y  i s  t o  a p p r o a c h  s u c h  
q u e s t i o n s  p u r e l y  f r o m  t h e  p a t r i m o n i a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  
and to regard the matrimonial relationship of the 
p a r t i e #  a #  i r r e l e v a n t
Twenty five years have el&peed since the hope was 
expreeaed^ that the adoption of Z,.P*Coopmr*0 approach 
in B@ith*8 Trustees v# Belth^ would "do much to remove 
the jsmomallee and Injuatlo&e to bo found in this branch 
of the law*" The advantage to the îmaband normally 
brought about by strict adherence to the notion of 
separate property in the author* a opinion was 
" accentuâtod by the adhoronoe of the courlxa to precodent# 
dating from the period i\rhen the hucband on marriage 
became the proprietor of hi# wife’s moveables, and her 
curator*"
In a further article of broader eoope/ the same 
author, having advocated the courageous application of
L,P*Oaoper’e approach, wrote that "rather more than that 
is required to moke the law reflect current social, B'conceptions of the family", and urgecf that L*P,Cooper's
suggestion' that "the wider aspect of the present 
problem yet have to 'be solved by  reintroducing in 
a limited form the old conception of a communio bonorum 
80 far as relates to the common home and its maintenance" 
r e c e i v e  /
1« 3{)iae -.'ues'bions of i'ifoparty Cotwaen loouaea* 1995 -:..L,a'»(Hewej) 195 at p»199.i:
4. tl95G) 19 M,L,%, 653*5, at p*668afound in Preston v* ?., 1950 8.0*255 at p*257*
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receive serious consideration.. In early days* there
may have been a concept of community of property in
■Scots law, but the nineteenth century rules of Scots
law governing property relations of spouseb were
irreconcilable with such a concept, and of course the
aim of the Victorian legislative reforms was separation 1of property® Such consideration does not appear to 
have been given, although dissatisfaction frequently 
has been expressed about the rules, or lack of rules, 
of Scots law in this area@^
%The Oommunio Bonorum a short note^
Anton /
1 # .See generally Chapter 1? 0, & Uo, p,28G; Fraser v,Walker (1872) 10 Macpli® 837 at p,847| and Anton,"la Regime Matrimonial Legal clans les Legislations Contemporaines" (ed, Audre Ro:oast) 193? (This book provides a comparative introduction, and studies (at 1937) of very many (around 40) systems* from Australia to Yugoslavia, including loss well known systems * but its defeat now* of oourse, is its date,) "Ecosse"2 A oE®Anton, pp*115-12? (below)© In his article of 1956* Anton (at p*655) notes that there was an attem;pt to provide for Scotland a G^aratin bonoram, on French lines (Turnbull v, T*’’s’"GFe31Fors TWWTM*5895 ) 9 but that this failed. He writes*"Its failure made inevitable the eventual rejection of the community concept*"2, See e,g. Professor H,0,Heston* 5th Commonwealth Law Conference Edinburgh, 1977 "Developments in Family Laws Family Property in Scotland", "it may seem remarkable to those who criticise the family property provisions of English law that Scots law has virtually no family property provisions to criticise* butthis is one of the areas where Soots law is certainly not a model for anyone®" Proceedings and Papers* p,5?1o Certain specific areas of law which affect the property rights of husband and wife (for example * rights on divorce, on death* to savings from the housekeeping allowance) have been the subject of change since the dates of Anton’s articles*3, Anton, "Le Regime Matrimonial Legal Dans Les Legislations Contemporaines" (ed# RoUaet) 1957* "Ecosse" (above)#
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Anton directs our attention to the rapport which 
existed between the law of France and the law of 
Scotland before the Union, and in particular to the 
fact that the concept of community of goods, while 
almost unknown in England* was "usual" in Scotland®
In the author’s opinion, some system of community 
existed in .Scotland from the middle ages to the 
nineteenth century. It was a system which drew a 
clear distinction between immoveables and moveables.
Thus* the enjoyment by a husband of the heritable 
property of his wife was limited to the fruits thereof, 
and to the right of courtesy after her death provided 
that a child heard to cry had been born of the marriage. 
The corresponding right of terce (to one third of the 
liferent of the heritage of the husband) attached to 
the wife if the marriage had subsisted for one year 
and a day or if a child had been born of the marriage®
Tho moveables of the wife, which passed to the husband 
jure mariti were known to the Institutional writers as 
"the goods in communion" without comment on the infelicity 
of the phrase, Anton notes that the husband’s liability 
for* his wife’s debts was another manifestation of the 
existence of community. He sets out the rules governing 
the survivor’s rights upon the death of the predeceaeer, 
including the pre 1853 rule that the estate of the 
predeceasing wife benefit on the husband’s death to the 
extent of one half or one third of the goods lin communion’ 
(the husband’s moveable estate),^ Again, on decree of 
divorce for the husband’s adultery or desertion, the 
wife was entitled to lus reliotae*on the basis that the 
husband was notionally dead. The true basis* Anton 
suggests, was the feeling that the wife* by reason of 
the community* had an Interest in the goods, as well 
during the life as after the death of the husband®'^
However /
<>vcitecS'aT3,gaÿia8aP3saB>j a w uw8g»w w »
1® Chapter 1* p,?5, C, &, W, p.286,2, Of, C, & W , Chapter 10: Property: Historical: p * 286* and fn « 20,
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However* the hushand a p p e a re d  to enjoy many 
attributes of ownership, and the notion of oom m unity 
did not correspond to that of orthodox partnership#
T h e r e a f t e r *  Soots law became i n f lu e n c e d  more
strongly by English law, and the emphasis on community1 2 waned. Then came t h e  nineteenth century legislation ,
indicative of the movement towards emancipation but
linked also to ideas of redistribution of wealth#^
Anton remarks that th e  legislation of 1881 ^ 1920
dismantled a body of rules but put nothing in t h e i r
place® It might be said that the now rules amounted
to the establishment of a system of separation of
property* but he notes that this could h a r d l y  be so
because "such a p h r a s e  would appear to imply the
existence of a special body of law regulating the
pecuniary relations of the spouses"(duty to contribute
to household expenses, ownership of inmixed property
and related questions) and this was lacking* G e n e ra lly *
the rules which were relevant wore those which applied
between strangers* apart fi^ om rules of aliment and
legal rights on dissolution of the marriage»^
Marriage since 1920 has had in Scots law no direct 
effect on property* Each spouse remains proprietor 
o f  his/her own goods with no fetter inter vivos upon 
his/her right to dispose thereof* Alienation of 
property /
1 * Anton refers to L.Kinloch’s famous statementconcerning comiaunio bonorum contained in Fraser v@ Walker ( 187^T^%rTiaopETBg^ at p,847* which, in modern parlance* helped to ’destroy the credibility* of the Goimumio bonorum* The communion has now«gfaartnCfÆ8af*>H*i»gag,Vt.'^a»only historical curiosity starus*2* See also generally* Heston’s accounti FamilyProperty i n  Scotland: 5th Commonwealth Law Conference®5® Nevertheless, Heston (p*575l quotes L, Neville Brown* (Comparison, Reforaa and the raiiilly, to the effect that the legislation was fashioned by the draftsmen for cases of "wealth marrying wealth"*4® Anton (1956) p*656*
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property without consent, or in prejudice o f  the
other spouse’e legal rights is competent, and a
spouse is not liable for the other’s ante-nuptial
debts* The resultant ’equality*, in Anton’s view,1is purely formal*
Anton in 1957 wondered aloud whether, although 
the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce in the 
proportion 12/7 rejected the introduction of some 
form of community, if certain of its recommendations 
were implemented by legislation, this would mean that 
a community system, in disguise* had been adopted*
The proposal that spouses should have equal right to 
savings from the housekeeping allowance has bean 
implemented (M*W.P. Act, 1964) and the discussion 
concerning the matrimonial home has been taken up a n d  
continued,'^ but there has been no substantial change.
and in 1 9 7 7 ,  Professor Meston^ a r g u e d  that "what is 
clearly needed in Scotland is a system of family 
property based on sharing of acquests since the date 
of the marriage* Such a system of c o m m u n it y  of 
property would not be alien to the traditions of Scots 
law and would indeed support one of its beat traditions, 
namely using a logical principle f r o m  which to deduce 
particular consequences* At the e x p e n s e  of increased 
complexity it would r e c o g n i s e  the joint venture aspect 
of marriage by giving both spouses an equal share in 
the /
1# and see in the words of Heston (p*373)(aoknowledging Anton) "in the majority of cases the rule that each spouse keeps his or her own property means that the husband keeps his* Declaring that a wife is capable of managing and disposing of her ovm property does not give her any to manage or to dxsposo of so that equality in theory may mean injustice in practice" 
2*  S e e  e * g *  SC *b#G om *M eillO «NO *41 ? Ma.’t i ' im o n ia l  Homes (Fam i ly  
P r o t e c t i o n )  ( S c . )  A c t ,  19 8 1 .
3 *  Proceedings and P a p e r s , p # 3 7 7 «  H e makes reference to the Scandinavian/German systems of deferred community as useful models*
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t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  p r o s p o r i t y  o f  t h e  f a m i l y "
" T h e  f a c t  o f  j o i n t  t t s e  d o e s  n o t  r a i s e  a  : p r G o u m p t l o n'"Î Po f  j o i n t  o w n e rs h ip " , s h o u ld  I t  r a i s e  s u c h  a  p r o s im p t io n  %
I s  a  s y s t e m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  t h e  b e s t  
s o l u t i o n  w h ioh  wo o an  d e v i s e  t o  th e  problem o f  p r o p e r t y
rights tjlthln marriage? 3'amily law, and family property
l a w ,  is a t  a  p o i n t  o f  o h a n ^ j e  in m a n y  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ^
I t  i s  s u b m i t te d  t h a t  t h e  r u l e s  g o v e rn in g  c e r t a i n  
m a t t e r s  (prgioposltw^^,  t h e  law of banîmiptoy a o  it 
affects s p o u s e s , p r o v i s i o n  o n  death end  on  divorce $ 
a l im e n t  d u r in g  c o h a b i t a t i o n  ) c o u ld  b e  im p ro v e d  i n  a 
m anner which w ould  not in v o lv e  any  fu n d a m e n ta l  change 
in our approach t o  the general s u b j e c t  of m a tr im o n ia l  
p r o p e r t y ,  (O u r p r e s e n t  a p p ro a c h  i s  low key* th e  
difficulty 11ee i n  f i n d i n g  o u r  r u l e s  of m a tr im o n ia l  
p r o p e r t y  law  and  t h e r e a f t e r  i n  o v e rc o m in g  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
o f  p r o o f  w h ic h  a t t e n d  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n *  T he s c a r c i t y  
an d  age o f  the a u t h o r i t i e s  r e v e a l  t h e i r  r e t i r i n g  n a t u r e .  
T hey  a r e  a lm o s t  o u t  o f  s i g h t ) .  Im p ro v em en ts  c o u ld  be  
made to t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  I n  su c h  a way ao t o  leave 
the s t r u c t u r e  i n t a c t .  Where t i t l e  t o  m o v ea b le s  and t o  
t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  homo i s  c o n c e rn e d *  c h a n g e s  n o v e l  and  
s t r i k i n g  I n  n a t u r e  could b e  made. P r o b a b ly  th e  r e s u l t  
w o u l d  /
2,
0 ,  & W,* p ,2 9 4 .  A t t e n t i o n  l a  d raw n to 'The Law of H u s b a n d  and  wife I n  S c o t l a n d ' * 0 ,  & W ,, C h a p te r  10  ( 'P r o p e r t y '  ) * w h ic h  c o n ta in s  a n  e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  law  t o  J a n ,1 *  1 9 7 4 , S ee  I n  particular sum m ary of e x i s t i n g  r u l e s  g o v e rn in g  d o n a t io n  and  t r u s t  ( a n d  as to t h e  application o f  those r u l e s  to h e r i t a g e  * s e o  p ,2 9 3 ) .  T h is  book* which I s  the 
l e a d i n g  w o rk  o n  t h e  S c o ts  law  o f  h u s b a n d  an d  w ife *  n a t u r a l l y ;  s e t s  out t h e  S c o ts  r u l e s  o n  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s  o f  h u sb a n d  and w ife  * a m i  a  g r e a t  d e b t  I s  owed to I t ,  Upon that s t a te m e n t  of the e x i s t i n g  law I s  
t h e  s u g g e s te d  scheme o f  r e fo rm  fo u n d e d , o f ,  P r o f e s s o r  O tto  Kahn F re u n d *  "Matrimonial P r o p e r t y ,  Where Do We Go From  Here?" * J o s e f  U n g e r M em oria l L e c tu r e * 1 9 7 1 , (the importance o f  u s e  as a c r i t e r i o n )
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would become acceptable generally§ within a few
years, and might be well suited to popular attitudes
and customs here, but it would be wrong to attribute
to such a piecemeal solution the name o f  matrimonial
regime * On the other hand, the majority might be
better pleased with that outcome than with the effects1of ful].«'blooded reform*
However, there is also the possibility of the 
creation of a new body of rules, which perhaps shouldphave come into being in 1920, comprehoxisive in scope
so as to include all fields of law in which the property
relations of husband and wife might be expected to be
important® allowance must be ïiiade for the
attractions of novelty, the neatness of the ’clean
sweep®, the enthusiasm for full^aoale reform: the
a t t r a c t i o n  of system and cohesion is strong, but although
there is a natural popular desire for certainty, those
whom a legal system serves have a greater interest in
good and acceptable policy and satisfactory practical %results#^ Yet it is to be hoped that the choices are 
clearly /
fi jeVKTFWiWrtî*îTta«tfS4.*.ÎS
The law of England has chosen this path, while being convinced, i t  seems, that changes a3?e necessary* A somewhat haphazard and judicial discretion-dominated results j but it may work well ® See Chapter6® An excellent com pendium  of events to 1976 is to be found in "Oases and  Materials on F a m ily  Law",Peter Beago v» Alaetair Bisaett Johnson® However, a tauter framework for Scotland is suggested in the pages which follow#The removal of the last substantial re m n a n t of the oommunio bonorum might have been attended by the Creation oi a new communxo bonorum more w o rth y  of the name, but at th'ai polnW the abolition of v/hat was r i g h t l y
3# Many would say that new or am ended (e* g #  of financial support, to occupy the house, of p r o t e c t i o n  from a violent spouse) rights are needed, whatever t h e i r  theoretical foundation o r  even if t h e y  lack one# The p u r i s t  and the reformer often disagree, and  the purist r e f o r m e r  tends to be slow#
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clearly seen* The merits of each and the merits of
retention of the existing rules, require assessment*1Professor Heston suggests that p r o g r e s s  initially 
will bo limited, "beginning with special legislative 
provision for the matrimonial home # In the longer 
te rm  h o w ev er the aim of a logical and coherent system 
of community of property between spouses should be kept 
before us@"
It is proposed to set forth for consideration two 
possible schemas of reform#
l’oxfards a Hew Oommunioi
It has been seen that there are many variants of 
community of property, and that those jurisdictions 
anxious to provide a ’modern’ approach to m a tr im o n ia l  
property tend to adopt a system of (instant) comunity 
of acquests, or a deferred or participatory community, 
or, if of the A.nglo*-Am0ricai>“Oomonw0 alth t r a d i t i o n *  
to choose wide judicial discretion in the matter of 
p r o p e r t y  division on dissolution of m a rr ia g e *
It may be that whole-scale oommimity of property 
and p r o f i t  and loss on the South African model is old-* 
fashioned and e x tr e m o; without complex rules providing 
f o r  "two captains on the b r i d g e " * 03.i D u tc h  linos* ’reform* 
in this direction would be a r e t u r n  t o  the S c o t t i s h  
position before 1881* when t h e r e  existed comunion under 
the adminis13?at1on o f  the husband© The wife’s property 
became the husband’s* but if she outlived him* she 
might hope to see something of her property again© Indeed* 
before the Intestate Moveable Succession (Scotland) Act, 
1855* if the husband s u r v iv e d  th e  w i f e ,  the w i f e 's  
relations* on the h u sb a n d  * a d e a t h ,  would have a claim 
upon Iris estate* sub nom ine coimnimio bonorum*
A system of deferred coimuunity would create perhaps
the /
1 * Proceedings and P apers , p*577/8*
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the greatest confusion in the minds of those f o r  whose 
benefit it was created® In every jurisdiction in 
which it applies, it im pose#  limitations on the m anner 
in which a spouse may administer his/her "owai® property#
Sic utere tuo ut a lie n u m  non laedas is carried very far 
indeed: there must be no "disloyalty" © Each must use
his p r o p e r t y  in such a way as not unduly to diminish 
the p r o p e r t y  of the other® If this r u l e  is not respected, 
t h e  l a t t e r  at division in Sweden (Bodjlning), and in 
Denmark, may mW.ce a claim for compensation and abuse 
may even hasten division (Boaklllnad)» In addition, 
in respect of certain categories of p r o p e r t y  (commonly 
Immoveaible property and household goods, o:e in the 
case of Germany the whole p r o p e r t y  o f  the spouse), 
joint consent is necessary before action can be taken©
Such a rule entails in turn the possibility of provision 
of judicial consent to aid the spouse of an unreasonable 
person, and the existence of rules to govern the rights 
of third parties in cases where transactions requiring 
joint consent are carried out by one p a r t n e r  u n i l a t e r a l l y * ^
It is thought that such a regime would be productive 
of macertainty and frustration in Scotland* The 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon the normal rights of ownership a r e  
u n p l e a s a n t  and perhaps u n r e a l i s t i c *  B e t t e r  would be 
a system o f  retention of certain joint property in 
joint cont3?ol (or in control of one, subject to objection 
by the other and/or possible r e i n s t a t e m e n t  of the o t h e r  
as administrator), conjoined with certain separately 
held property in the sole control of each partner#
Admittedly, i n  Sweden, certain p r o p e r t y  is deemed 
to be t r u l y  separate property© Contra, the property 
oves? /
1 * But in all systems which are not systems of separation (and even in those^given the special relationship of the cohabiting separate proprietors) such problems must o c c u r*  Often proven good faith in the third party will save the transaction#
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over which care must he exorcised in the administration 
thereof is Giftorattsgods (capital at marriage and 
a o q u i r e n d a ) , T h e re  is no tangible common fund stenterw'Atî’W?4'1«WJB«3ïî^îf#
raatrimonioe Joint administration has been discarded, 
having been found to be productive of difficulties for 
spouses and third parties, although there is joint and  
several liability for household purchases*
A system of deferred com m unity , or compensation4of gains % th o u g h  advantageous in certain respects, 
would create upheaval and a n x i e t y  without giving 
immediately ascertainable benefits* Almost cex^ tai.nly 
some would find its confining freedom intolerable ©
A system of (instant) community of acquests would 
require the introduction of extremely complex and 
possibly unsatisfactory rules concerning the administration 
o f  the common fund and concerning the involved process 
of accounting at dissolution, and it may be open to more 
fundamental objections. Is it to be assumed without 
further th o u g h t  that equality of o w n e rsh ip  rights of all 
property gained onerously during marriage is a notion of 
inherent rightness? Surely it is not b e y o n d  the 
inventiveness of Scots lawyers to devise a system o f  
rules which protects t h e  interests of the homemaker wife 
without, by the blunt Instrument of com m unity , 
extinguishing all traces of independence within marriage? 
The core of an acceptable regime might be the rules that 
(a) certain items of p r o p e r t y  must be held in common, 
and that (b) adequate provision must be made for the 
e c o n o m ic a l ly  weaker party, not only in marriage e m e rg en c y , 
but throughout a peaceful marriage* there be
jointness /
In some respects, (that is in its effects, not in its rationale) this system resembles the judicial discretion solution favoured by the common law countries: ultimately the less financially securepartner receives compensation, though the amount received is obviously subject to variation ixi accordance with the views of the party exercising the discretion#
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jointaeso where interests are joint (home and children, 
food and clothing), but in the separate adventures of 
each let there be separation of property© Where the
Spouses are well disposed to each other* there is no1need for further regulation, but at divorce, in a 
suitable case, some corapensation may be necessary to 
deal fairly with the homemaker,'"
That which is proposed, therefore, is something 
of a hybrid system, an. intermediate stage between 
tinkering and overhaul, It is felt strongly that 
some degree of separation of property and separate 
administration is a desirable feature and that the 
principal reason for its falling into disfavour is not 
the concept itself, but the fact that so often the 
(separate) property has belonged to one party only, 
k transfer of such property from one partner to the 
other 8tante iiatriraonio (to become that other* s separate 
property, separately administered) might cause many to 
view such a system in a different light: would it then
be regarded as a system of comunlty or not? Here, 
however, there would not only be separate administration 
but separate ownership* There would be an ongoing, 
not a deferred compensâtion, in order to enable the 
economically weaker party to match strides with the 
increasing prosperity of the other, as a matter of right 
and not of favour; an affirmation by the law of that 
which amity might (and should) itself alone achieve, 
yot not so ample as to provide undue reward for the idle. 
Recourse to the court stante matrlmonlo would be a%necessarily available remedy®*'^
It is uncertainty, and lack of compensation for 
unequal /
1, as to provision on death, see infra® pn, iio6-iiiq2 ,  Of* g e n e r a l l y  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h T ^ j e c ^ k  and   ^
c o n c lu s io n s  d raw n by Clive & Wilson II,& W © pp« 5 2 1 ^ 3 , " P r o p o s a ls  fox* Reform"#3* Of* So.L .O om .H em o.H o.SR ; 2 ,1 8 2  ( P r o p n .3 9 ) ( 2 ,1 7 8  et sec,) and Faculty comment thereon,«f5W«s5îi
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unequal opportunity which are the true complaints 
against separation of property as a system® If each 
had equal opportunity to amass, and did so amass, 
fewer criticisms would he made® A little separation 
is a healthy thing, not least for third parties.
There is nothing wrong with separation of property, 
so long as each spouse has separate property or the 
means of acquiring it, either in truth or hy legal 
device ®
SEPARATION OP PROPERTY WITH CONCURRENT COMPENSATION 
OP GAINS
AN OUTLINE
Within this system, despite its title, certain 
items are held in common. These are the matrimonial 
home, and the ’family assets’ (to be defined)© All 
capital held at marriage by each spouse is to be 
regarded thereafter as the separate property of that 
spouse, unless, being a corporeal moveable, it becomes4a "family asset", or, being heritable, becomes the 
matrimonial home, or, being money, is used to purchase 
'family assets’, or to purchase, or help purchase, the 
matrimonial home.
Gratuitous acquirenda of each spouse will be the
separate property of that spouse unless the intention
of the donor is otherwise, or unless, being a corporeal
moveable, it is of the nature of a family asset and is
used as such, or, being money is used to purchase a
family asset, or family home, or, being heritage, is
used as the matrimonial home or, having been realised,
the proceeds of sale thereof are used for family 2purposes© In general, use of money to acquire family 
assets or to improve the existing home, or help finance 
the /
1© See in greater detail below* 2. See in greater detail tel^ w^
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t h e  p u ro h a a e  o f  a  new m a tr im o n ia l  home* s h a l l  d e p r iv e  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  ow ner o f  an y  c la im  t h a t  t h a t  w h ic h  h a e  
b e e n  a c q u i r e d  i s  h i e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty *
The incom e ( e a r n e d  and  ’u n e a rn e d * )  o f  e a c h  s p o u s e  
s h a l l  h e  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h a t  sp o u se *  h u t  
t h e r e  s h a l l  he  j o i n t  an d  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  h o u s e h o ld  
d e b ts *  The p r a e p o s i t u r a  s h a l l  b e  a b o l is h e d *  and  
l i a b i l i t y  a s  a  (c o m m e rc ia l)  p a r t n e r  b e  s u b s t i t u t e d .
E ach  sp o u s e  s h a l l  owe a  d u 'ty  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  o t h e r  
d u r in g  th e  s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  th e  m a r r ia g e *  w h ic h  d u ty *  
i f  n o t  f u l f i l l e d *  s h a l l  b e  c a p a b le  o f  q u a n t i f i o a t i o n  
(w h e th e r  o r  n o t  m a r r ia g e  ’ em ergency* i n  a n o th e r  fo rm  h e  
p r e s e n t )  b y  t h e  ( S h e r i f f )  c o u r t*  and  o f  e n fo rc e m e n t
th r o u g h  e m p lo y e r / tm c  d e d u c t io n  f o r  r e m is s io n  t o  t h e  o t h e r1sp o u se #  S im i la r ly *  s p o u s e s  may s e e k  a  d e c l a r a t o r  o f  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  a t  a n y  t im e  (w h e th e r  o r  n o t  m a r r ia g e  
’ em ergency* i n  a n y  o t h e r  fo rm  b e  p r e s e n t )  i n  t h e  F a m ily  
P r o p e r t y  C o u rt ( o r  F a m ily  C o u r t )  o f  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
S h e r i f f  C o u rt*
F o r  a l l  o t h e r  d e b ts *  e a c h  sp o u s e  s h a l l  b e  l i a b l e  
o u t  o f  h i s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s *  ^-enGe, 
th e  b a n k ru p tc y  o f  one  sp o u s e  s h a l l  a f f e c t  t h e  o t h e r  
( o n ly )  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  c r e d i t o r s  w i l l  h a v e  r i g h t  
t o  one  h a l f  o f  t h e  home an d  f t m i l y  a s s e t s *
The r i g h t s  o f  d i s p o s a l  i n t e r  v iv o s  and  m o r t i s  c a u s a  
o f  t h e  home a n d  f a m i ly  a s s e t s *  and  th e  r i g h t s  o f  t h i r d  
p a r i t i e s  t r a n s a c t i n g  w i t h  sp o u s e s *  r e q u i r e  d e t a i l e d  
e x p o s i t i o n * ^
D o n a tio n s  b e tw e e n  s p o u s e s  s h a l l  be  c o m p e te n t an d  
i r r e v o c a b l e *  ( e x c e p t*  a s  a t  p r e s e n t*  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  t h e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  d o n o r  e s t a t e  
i f i t h i n  a  y e a r  and  a  d a y  o f  g i f t )  b u t  s p o u s e s  s h o u ld  h e a r  
i n  /
1 ,  Of* Hemo*No#22* P a r t  V a n d  Fao# R esp o n se2 .  -  ^
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in mind tho concurrent compensation procedure*
Oonourront Compensation ib?oooduro (which chall be
optional)
In so far as the inoomo of one spouse ia either 
insufficient f o r  h i s / h e r  own m a in te n a n c e  and/or f a l l s  
below one third of tho income of the other* each shall 
b e  required t o  p a y  t o  t h e  o t h e r  one t h i r d  o f  his/her 
salary by cowt order and omployor/tsx; deduction ^ 
enforcement p r o c e d u r e s  if n o c c o s a ry ^  and  this sum 
shall form the pequliina of the other. In consoquenco* 
the /
1a Since parties _ choose to adopt these rules * 
e n fo rc e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e  e h o u ld  b e  a l e a a  I m p o r ta n t  issue than i t  would be I n  o t h e r  circumstances.However* the option would be chosen early* and in advance* perhaps* of marital disagreement* At the inception of the marriage* or at the introduction of the aoheme, apoueea may' contract out of the concurrent compensation procedure# This they may do formally (the action must be joint * and will be irrecevable) or informally# If the latter method ie chosen* agreement alone would be neceeaary (for the essence of such a cohome must be its uoefulnoas in a particular marriage ^ and spouse# might decide to use the scheme (or not) as oiroimatances dictated (see below))* but it would be understood that at any time either spouse could apply to the court to have the scheme and cnfoz^cem ent p r o c e d u r e s  made applicable to his caae®
T h is  t h e  c o u r t  w i th  o n ly  l i m i t e d  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  d e a l  w i th  f id o B c  w o u ld  be bound t o  do* and  so f o r  th e
d o u b tT u r*  ^ i 0 ~ ^ e t t e r  c o u r s e  i^yould be  t o  o p t  o u t  
f o r m a l ly  and  t h e n  l a t e r  v o l u n t a r i l y  t o  u s e  th e  r u l e s  i f  t h e y  Goomed t o  be  o f  h e l p .  I n f o r m a l  c o n tra c t in g ™  o u t  ( s u b j e c t  t o  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  c o u r t ,  a s  above  e x p l a in e d )_ w o u ld  b e  competent at an y  t im e , This would h a r d l y  be worthy of suoli a ziame* or of mention* how ever*  s i n c e  i t  s im p ly  w ou ld  mean a g re e m e n t n o t  t o  u s e  t h e  r u l e s  ^  a s  b e in g *  p e rh a p s *  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  
th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e #  a t  t h e  t im e  ^  an d  t h e r e  w ou ld  b e  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  a p p l i c a t i o n  b y  a  sp o u s e  t o  tho court to enforce t h o  p ro c e d u re *  sueh having becom e 
n o o e s s a r y  th r o u g h  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  t o  a d h e r e  to the rules 5 and  application to r e - e s t a b l i s h  t h e  procedure* it having boon  waived informally and proof b e in g  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  there h a d  boon no  fo rm a l  (irrevocable) contractlBg^^out® The aim should bo the creation of a achem e which i s  f l e x i b l e ^  u s e f u l  a n d  workable* It should have "teeth"* and  y e t  those opposed to its philosophy or who consider It Inapprop™ riate should bo e n t i t l e d *  at the outset* to draw b a c k  from /
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the ’housekeeping allowance* should cease to exist1in practice and the r e l e v a n t  : rules equally would
cease to he necessary © The peciilium %\rould he used^  *î>aiçrKas«rs*<si'W»#H«ï#t#^m73
by the recipient to meet personal eicpenses, and to
meet his/her ahare of the household debts© That
which is bought with peculium* so long as of a separate*
personal nature is to be regarded as separate property*
Alternatively, spouses might open a joint bank account
for pooled income* operable by either on the understanding
that the amount standing at credit at any time is to be
regarded as joint property, This would be at odds withothe philosophy of the schemewhich is that financial 
independence within marriage (whether fictional and 
* engineered* or genuine) is greatly to be preferred* as 
are separate banlc account's (even if the funds in one are 
a direct transfer from the resources of the other)* and 
that joint bank accounts should be used only for joint 
ventures of some particularity* such as the meeting of 
household debts, or the payment of a holiday*
One of the outstanding advantages of the scheme 
would bo the relative simplicity (end fairness* if the 
Initial concept of compensation is accepted) of the 
division of property on termination of the marriage, 
and another would be the certainty produced as to 
property rights during marriage©
Clearly* among those who decided not to opt out
of the procedure* these rules would take the place of 
the /
m=*cy»gr'V««<?tiv«e^,5e5iviw:ffWi=i.rieM*y
from ito Indeed* such an approach might be argued to be the most satisfactory p^ eneral approach to the subject of ’rules of matrimonliXlfroperty*, The rules should be imaginative* protective and efficient but not officious 0 
M oW ,P,A ot, 1 9 6 4 ,and* to come within it* the sum at credit of joint account would require to be regarded as voluntarily pooled peculium©
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the present rules concerning aliment.(The present 
rules of aliment (modified* as earlier suggested^) 
would remain to regulate maintenance rights and 
obligations of those who contract out of the Concurrent 
Compensation Procedure* but since the compensation 
procedure may not always work well* such parties still 
may seek aliment* and the court must make the best 
arrangement in the ciroumstancose^). Gross misconduct 
of the Wachtel type would remove the obligation to 
transfer funds as would unjuetified/unreasonable refusal 
to adhere* but generally conduct falling short of conduct 
leading to judicial separation or divorce would not 
entitle non-payment of Jlfciiliim, On voluntary separation* 
a modified compensation procedure would be agreed (recourse 
to the court being available if necessary)* as it would 
on judicial separation," In some cases - notably* 
perhaps* where there are no dependent children a 
decision that compensation should cease would be the 
fairest conclusion® On divorce* the granting of a 
periodical allowance^ should be competent* but relatively 
little in the way of capital division powers would be 
iiecessai?y* for separate property would remain separate* 
mid there should have been, by virtue of the compensation 
process* an equal chance of gathering it. The starting- 
point in the matter of division of family assets would 
be equal division,^ as it would be with regard to the 
matrimonial home* but in the latter case the court should 
be empowered to male© an order permitting occupation of 
the /
1 , Ohapter 4 (e,g® reciprocity of obligation to aliment* possibility of award of aliment during cohabitation),
2 , And see infra* Aliment,p. If the other spouse has disappeared* or wall nonco-operate* it might be more honest to revert to the term ’award of aliment’ at this stage©
4 ,  on the lines envisaged by Fac^Resp© to Hemo,No©22®5® Gonduct would be relevant; this would not beentirely a property matter, (W&chtel),
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t h e  h o u s e  by t h e  s p o u s e  h a v i n g  c u s t o d y  o f  minor
c h i l d r e n  ( i f  a p p l i c a b l e )  u n t i l  the a t t a i n m e n t  h y  t h e
c h i l d r e n  o f  m a t u r e r  y e a r s  a n d  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t1s c h o o l  e d u c a t i o n ©  I f  t h e  s c h e m e  were i n  f o r c e *  
t h e r e  w o u l d  h e  m u c h  l e s s  n e e d  o f  " a n t i - s p i t e "  p r o v i s i o n s  
a s  s e e n *  f o r  example * i n  t h e  D i v o r c e  ( G c o t l a n d )  A c t *  
1 9 7 6 * s ® 6  ( d i s p o s a l s  i n t e r  v i v o s  i n  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  o f  
d i v o r c e )  a n d  o f t e n  s a i d  t o  h e  necessary i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  d i s p o s a l s  m a d e  w i t h  t h e  a i m  of reducing t h e  f u n d  
u p o n  which t h e  s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e  m a y  c l a i m ®
T h a t  w h i c h  h a s  ' b e e n  a c q u i r e d  b y  e i t h e r  p a r t y  o u t  
o f  s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e / i n c o m e  ( o r i g i n a l l y  s e p a r a t e l y  o m i e d  
o r  e a r n e d  o r  a c q u i r e d  from t h e  o t h e r  party t h r o u g h  t h e  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  procedure), a n d  w h i c h  i e  o f  a  " n o n - f a m i l y  
a s s e t "  n a t u r e  w i l l  b e  the s e p a r a t e  e s t a t e  o f  t h a t  p a r t y  
w i t h  w h i c h  h e / s h e  m a y  deal a t  w i l ] .  ® H e  m a y  g i v e  i t  
a w a y *  s a v e  i t  o r  s q u a n d e r  i t ©  I t  i s  f e l t  t h a t  the 
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  i n s t a n t  a n d  d e f e r r e d  community s y s t e m s  
a r e  e x t r e m e l y  r e s t r i c t i v e  o f  f r e e d o m  i n  t h i s  m a t t e r  
m i d  t h a t  a  f r e e d o m  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  o n e ’ s  o w n  p r o p e r t y  i s  
a  p r i s e d  f e a t u r e  of s y s t e m s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  property* 
a n d  o n e  n o t  l i g h t l y  t o  b e  g i v e n  u p ©
B u c c e s e x o n
T h e  s u r v i v o r  w o u l d  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  
h o u s e  a n d  f a m i l y  a s s e t s *  a n d  h e n c e  w o u l d  s u c c e e d  t o  a l l  
t h e  f a m i l y  p r o p e r t y ’ i t e m s *  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  s p o u s e s  
w e r e  c o h a b i t i n g  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  d e a t h ©  O n  c e s s a t i o n  o f  
c o h a b i t a t i o n *  t h e  court s h o u l d  b e  o p e n  t o  e i t h e r  o r  
b o t h  s % ^ o u s e ( s )  t o  a p p l y  f o r  a declarator o f  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s  a n d  a  d i v i s i o n .  H e r e  a  d e g r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  
d i s c r e t i o n  w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s i t y  i n  order t o  provide t h e  
b e s t  s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  i n s t a n t  c a s e ®
"The /
I s  a  commonly found s o l u t i o n ©  A n d  s e e  M em o  No#22*
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" T h e  O o n t r a c t o r s - O u t "
I n  w h a t  m a n n e r  s h o u l d  " t h e  o o u t r a o  t o r s  « o u t " h e  
t r e a t e d ?  I t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  a  f o r m a l l y  
e x e c u t e d  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  s c h e m e  s h o u l d  
b e  i r r e v o c a b l e f i  I f *  i n  i t s  p l a c e *  a  m a r r i a g e - »  
c o n t r a c t  b e  d r a w n  u p ,  m ig h t t h e  t e r m s  b e  s u b j e c t  t o 1r e v i e w ?  I f  s o *  w h a t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  g r o u n d s  f o r  r e v i e w ?
I f  r e v i e w  w e r e  i n c o m p e t e n t  i n  g e n e r a l  o r  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e *  i t  s e e m s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t *  o n  d e a t h  o r  d i v o r c e  *
X ) s a ? t i e s ’ r i g h t s  m i g h t  b e  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  t e r m s  o f  a  
m a r r i a g e - c o n t r a c t  o r  b y  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  l a w  
( e x c l u d i n g  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o ï i  r u l e s  : c o n t r a c t o r s - o u t
c a n n o t  b e  l e f t  w i t h o u t  r u l e s )  o r  b y  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  
r u l e s ®  O n e  a n s w e r  w o u l d  b e  t o  r e n d e r  t h e  " j o i n t n e s s  
o f  h o m e  a n d  f a m i l y  a s s e t s "  r u l e  t h e  norm* t h u s  p r o v i d i n g  
a  c o m m o n  c o r e  o f  r e g u l a t i o n *  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  w h i c h  m a y  
b e  t h o u g h t  n o w  t o  b e  g a i n i n g  g e n e r a l  a c c e p t a n c e #  O t h e r  
a s s e t s  m i g h t  b e  d i v i d e d  t h e n  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
t e r m s  o f  t h e  B i a r r i a g e - c o n t r a o t * o r ,  f a i l i n g  s u c h  
r e g u l a t i o n *  o r  s p e c i a l  p r e - d i v o r c e  a g r e e m e n t *  o n  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  s t r i c t  o w n e r s h i p  o r  j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n :  i t
i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  k n o w  t h e  m i n d s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r a - o u t #
Do t h e y  w i s h  p r e - e m i n e n c e  t o  b e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  r u l e s  o f  
p r o p e r t y ?  D o  t h e y  p r e f e r  a  " s y s t e m "  o f  f r e e - r a n g i n g  
j u d i c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n ?
T h e  C o m p e n s a t i o n  S c h e m e  «> J o i n t  A c t i o n
A g r e e m e n t  w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  i m p o r t a n t  f a m i l y  a s s e t s *  a n d  i n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e #  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d *  
n e i t h e r  p a r t y  m i g h t  m edd le  w i t h  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  t h e  o t h e r #  A c c o r d i n g l y *  a c t i o n s  i n t e r - s p o u s e  f o r  
t h e f t  a n d  f r a u d  w o u l d  b e  c o m p e t e n t ,  a s  w o u l d  i n t e r ­
s p o u s e  c o n t r a c t s *  a c t i o n s  f o r  b r e a c h  o r  i m p l e m e n t  t h e r e o f ,  
a n d  a c t i o n s  i n  d e l i c t #
I t  /
T^rtirtvwijawï'ïfirtefiKî
D u r e s s *  u n d u e  i n f l u e n c e *  m i n o r i t y  a n d  l e s i o n ?
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It is hoped that such a system^ here outlined, 
and now to be explained in detail, would provide 
security, and certainty, and compensation (where 
necessary), while giving as little offence as possible 
to the protagonists of financial freedom and 
independence within marriage; freedom with regulation, 
separation with community - a concept, with accompanying 
rules, to espouse, or not, as the parties think fit*
A NEW ST S I'E M  ; SOME D E T A IL E D  SUGGESTIONS
Since the new system would contain, as a uniform 
provision for all, a rule of joint ownership of the 
matrimonial home and family assets, it is necessary 
first to consider the details of such an arrangement* 
Many problems and queries arise*
The Matrimonial Home
;ter Defined
The Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964, in dealing 
in Part II with prior rights, states that its provisions 
in this connection apply (s*8(4)) "to any dwelling house 
in which the surviving spouse of the intestate was 
ordinarily resident at the date of death of the intestate* 
If the intestate had in a dwelling house a * relevant 
interest* not exceeding £'50,000, the survivor should 
be entitled to receive the relevant interest - a sum 
equal /
When the Act was passed, the figure was £15,000; amendment wqs made by the Succession (Sc*) Act,1973, S . 1 * The furniture entitlement value was raised to £8,000, and the money right was raised to £4,000 and £8,000* Olearly the value of money these days changes rapidly, and the Act provided that the Secretary of State by statutory instrument might increase the amount(s), to talce effect in relation to the estate of any person dying after the coming into force of the order. In terms of the Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse (Scotland) Order, 1977 (s*1*1977, No.2110),(into operation 31/12/77), the financial provision awards contained in s*9 were raised to £8,000 and £16,000 respectively* Now ( 1 . 8 . 8 I . )
house  £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,  f u r n i t u r e  -  £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,  cash  -  £1 5 ,0 0 0  o r  £2 5 ,0 0 0 ;  
P r i o r  E i g h t s  o f  S u r v i v i n g  Spouse ( s o . ) Order  198I  (No. 8 0 6 . ) .
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equal to the value of the relevant interest, if the 
dwelling house forms part only of a tenancy or lease 
under which the intestate was the tenant, or the 
dwelling house forms the whole or part of subjects 
used by the intestate for carrying on a trade, 
profession or occupation, and the value of the estate 
as a whole would be likely to be substantially 
diminished if the dwelling house were disposed of 
otherwise than with the assets of the trade, profession 
or occupation", (s.8(2)). If the value of the relevant 
interest exceeds 13'0,000, then the survivor shall be 
entitled to the sum of £30,000. Further, if the 
intestate estate comprises a relevant interest in two 
or more dwelling houses, the survivor may elect to 
take one of them as his/her prior right, and election 
may competently be made within six months of the date 
of death of the intestate.
Similarly here, it is thought that spouses must 
make such arrangements as they think fit with regard 
to a second or subsequent home. The special provisions 
concerning the matrimonial home shall be limited in 
their application to that dwelling house in which the 
family resides, being a house which is owned, not 
rented® Where the matrimonial home forms part of a 
medical or veterinary surgery, bank, farm or other 
business, problems arise, as can be seen from the terms 
in which the Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964 was drafted, 
In such a case it is submitted that the rule of joint 
ownership still should apply. This would necessitate 
joint consent for sale and purchase (though judicialpconsent may be interposed (infra) ), and on breakdown 
of marriage, if the spouses could come to no amicable 
agreement, the court in msJ.cing division of the assets, 
would /
1. Bee S.L.G.Memo.41 and Faculty Response.2. Judicial consent would be given (or withheld) where one party was thought to be acting unreasonably; the interests of the business would be considered dispassionately. (ICf Acd, c.y _
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would find the best solution possible. (This would
be a case in which the court would have a discretion/)to depart from the strict 50/30 division ). If, at 
that point, ownership of the whole of the premises 
were transferred to the "business"spouse, compensation 
to the other in the form of money and/or furniture 
would require to be made.
2The Law Commission is not decisive about this 
matter of business premises. While it accepts in 
principle the justice of a co-ownership rule "provided 
that the practical difficulties in assessing separately 
the value of the living accommodation could be overcome", 
yet it considers that not all of the consequences of 
the matrimonial home trust would be practical to apply, 
and that on breakdown the court would be required to 
consider specially the needs of the "business" spouse, 
and the fact that disposal of business without living 
accommodation might be difficult.
Transfer of the majority of family assets to the 
non-business spouse as compensation (provided that they 
are sufficient in value and not an integral part of the 
house; in these cases, compensation must be sought also 
from the separate property of the business spouse) may 
be the best solution. In effect, the business spouse 
must 'buy out' the other, and that is not an uncommon 
concept*
The /
1. A wife's contribution as receptionist or book-keeper if unpaid or uncompensated might be a relevant factor at division. Where the spouses are business partners, the point may be (should be) dealt with by the termsof the partnership agreement. There would require to be discussion of the relative standing of general 'matrimonial' law, marriage contract provisions (if any) and commercial partnership agreement terms, should these conflict.2. No .42, at 1.102. NOTE; 1981 A c t ,  8 . 2 2 .  d e f i n e s  "m atr im onia l  
home" -  any h o u s e ,  c a r a v a n ,  h o u s e b o a t  o r  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e  p r o v id e d  
or made a v a i l a b l e  by one o r  bo th  s p o u s e ( s )  a s ,  or  has become,
a f a m i l y  r e s i d e n c e ,  i n c l u d i n g  g a r d e n ,  o t h e r  ground ,  or  b u i l d i n g ,  
a t t a c h e d  t o ,  and u s u a l l y  o c c u p i e d  w i t h ,  or  o t h e r w i s e  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  the  am en i ty  or c o n v e n i e n c e  o f ,  s a i d  h o u s e ,  e t c .
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The dwellinghouse, to qualify as 'the matrimonial 
home* must he the principal residence of the family: 
it matters not that there are no children, or that 
the children are adult and f o r i s f a m i l i a t e d .  Such 
circumstances will not alter the character of the home, 
though t h e y  might make a difference to the manner i n  
which the asset of the home is treated on marriage 
breakdown o r  emergency. Neither does it matter that 
one OX' both spouse(s) a r e  frequently away from home 
on business or in course of employment. The house in 
w h ic h  a merchant; seaman ®s w if e  resides is a matrimonial 
home, without a doubt. These points a r e  clear*
However, correct categorisation m u st be made of a house 
in circumstances where one spouse deserts the other, or 
the marriage breaks dow n. The house does not cease to 
be a matrimonial home i n  law, though it is no longer a 
m a tr im o n ia l  home in fact® Even if neither spouse wishes 
divorcee, it would seem that nevertheless a declarator of 
property rights and distribution of assets (perhaps 
partial) is a p p r o p r i a t e *
A houso w o u ld  be regarded as of t h e  "matrimonial 
home" character, if acquired i n  contemplation of marriage, 
or during the course of m a r r i a g o, with the intention that 
it be used as a matrimonial home, or if (at any time) 2inherited and s u b s e q u e n t ly  used as a matrimonial home*
The Bights of Parties In The ilatrimonial Home
T r a n s i t i o n a l  provisions on an  extensive scale 
would be necessary*
The established scheme, it is suggested, would 
contain /
1 e O f. B O r S k i l ln a d ,  i n f r a .2 .  eveif^ D! i Æ e r T t  e3 "^R T o r e marriage, it is t h o u g h t  * Butnot if so i n h e r i t e d ,  but not so used (of*L*C*No.42, 1.98^1#100® At 1 .1 0 0 ,  it is suggested that, for reasons of tact and not to discourage gifts, such a home should not be subject to the rules of co-ownership unless the donor made an express gift to b o th  spouses, or unless the donee agreed to share with the other spouse* If the interest of one spouse is a ' l i f e  interest* orliferent only, a recognition of joint interests isnot recommended* (1*101))#
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contain the following features: since each sp o u se
will have a pro indivieo share in the home, neithertiï3?nïai.'îx» ^
may alienate or dispose of his share mortis causa or 
inter vivos, and the share of the predeceaser will
accresoe to the s u r v i v o r .  The home, the most important 1o f  the family assets, remains the central core of the 
family's wealth, Consent of both spouses is necessary 
for the sale of the home*
It is proposed that, in t h e  case of the home and 
principal family asseta, there should be a rule of joint 
consents in transactions of great importance (and hence 
transactions concerning h e r i t a g e ) ,  the consent of each 
spouse must he obtained at the outset.
As in many of the systems studied, the remedy of 
the grant of judicial consent to a transaction would be 
available on cause shown, in cases of unreasonable 
refusal or persistent unwi1lingness to co-operate * A 
considerable measure of judicial d i s c r e t i o n  would be 
necessary hors,
oAlan Milner, writing in 1959^$ suggests that a 
petition for g r a n t  of judicial discretion might be made 
where husband and wife are living apart by agreement 
(the discretion extending to a consideration of the 
whole context of the separation), or where the owner of 
the homestead has deserted, is Insane or in prison and 
the application is for family, not simply for personal 
benefit /
1 .  The scheme is concerned with matrimonial, rather t h a n  'family* (Otto Kahn-Freund) property* Children's rights are considered where they impinge on the subject' matter ( e , g ,  aliment, succession, postponement at divorce of sale of matrimonial home) but their r i g h t s  are not the principal concern here. Moreover, substantive 'family® rights or powers to dispose of 'family* p r o p e r t y  are not advocated»
2*  "A Homestead Act for 1 England?" ( 1 9 5 9 )  2 2  MoL»R*438©
1 0 3 5
benefit, oi? where the non-owner has deserted, is insane 
or in prison. (Here the court must weigh the interest 
of the owner wishing to sell with that of the absent 
spouse in having a home to which to return). Possibly 
this would not be an exhaustive list of justifying 
circumstances «
It is conceivable that, in a career marriage, one 
spouse might rcefuse consent to the sale of one house 
and purchase of another in a different city, the change 
having been necessitated by the employment needs of ones 
in such a case, the court might be required to consider 
the cases concerning the husband's right to choose the 
matrimonial home, subject to a general test of reasonable» 
aesa, and might experience difficulty in reaching a 
decision, Ultimately the parties surely must come to 
some agreement, and, if not, it may be that a division/Iof assets on breakdown is not far distant#
Whatever may b e  the rules concerning sales and 
purchases o f  family assets, it is thought that sales 
and purchases of heritage are transactions o f  such great 
importance that joint consent must be obtained*
In the case of heritage, this means that in the 
dispositions 5 both husband and wife must dispone the 
property to the purchasers, and title to property must 
likewise be taken in joint names. It is safe practice 
for solicitors today, in d ra w in g  up missivesto offer 
to purchase from " y o u r  clients, Mr# and Mrs# X, the 
proprietors, the dv/ellinghouse known as 5s Brown Street, 
Downtown", and in this way to elicit from the agent of 
the sellers a denial or, by reason of tacit acceptance 
(and repetition?) confirmation that M r. and Mrs* X# are 
indeed the p r o p r i e t o r s *  When noting the title and 
checking the Search in the General Register of Sasines, 
formal /
1# And see "Location of Matrimonial Home", infra#
df*. (X*.~Cb , 4 - H .  4  /-d/ucA-t-ïto SciAjt sUsL u£v- f© lu ^ e ^
kjCU j^e. sUv LcLt, Lcvucj 4  61»/'«L-# >-t-#
ljtu M  ^  usnU s"X ji
/UcC. fô h ^ tJ L  VuU t^dLU
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formal oonfIrmatlon of this state of affairs as well, 
of course, of absence of outstanding charges, is p r o v id e d .
In regimes which provide for joint ownership of 
the m a tr im o n ia l  home, it is sometimes found that there 
is a rule to the effect that the viewing of the house 
and appearance of the house to he a family home is 
sufficient to 'fix® the t h i r d  party with knowledge that 
this is indeed a matrimonial home # Potential arguments 
as to bona fides and ignorance of the true state of 
affairs a r e  thereby killed before they arise.
In 'homestead® states, rules are commonly fo u n d  
t o  t h e  effect that consent must be free fro m  duress, 
undue influence and fraud, the presence of which will 
vitiate the t r a n s a c t i o n .
Milner notes that in Saskatchewan, a wife would 
appear b e f o r e  a district judge, local registrar, solicitor, 
J . P .  or N.P.% to be ex am in ed  "separately and apart", from 
hex' husband, and would acknox^ledgo that she knows her 
rights in the homestead, and that she signs the instrument 
freely and without c o m p u ls io n . Mo person who has been 
engaged i n  the conveyance may take the acknowledgment,
A requirement of t h i s  typo could cause difficulty 
or inconvenience, and yet the reason for its p r e s e n c e  
i s  abundantly clear. Would it suffice if e a c h  party 
was interviewed separately by another partner in the 
firm which is dealing with the conveyance, and was 
c a t e c h i s e d  by him to ensure that consent was given freely 
and with knowledge of the right to refuse and of all 
o t h e r  factors (including the possibility of i n t e r p o s i t i o n  
of judicial consent)?^ By such m eans the possibility 
o f  absence of true consent could not be removed, but i n  
a /
1 * Possibly b o th  parties m ig h t be required to sign a Deed of C o n s e n t, to be placed with the Titles and transferred at settlement.
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a subsequent attempted reduction of the contract on
these grounds, the fact that the proper procedure
had been complied with would be noted by the court,
together with all surrounding cireamstances (of the
marriage and of the transaction)* The protective
worth of the procedure would vary froxa case to case#
In some instances, the procedure would be a nonsense,
a formality only, and in other cases it would be a
nonsense in another and much more serious sense, in
that one party may have been browbeaten into compliance,
a fact which may never come to light if later reduction
of the transaction is not sought. It is suggested that
its true purpose would be to protect third parties.
If the procedure has been complied with, the contract
could not be reduced after the expiry of, say, a year
and a day from the date of signature of the Deed of
Consent (or Disposition, if Deeds of Consent were thought
cumbersome*). On the other hand, such a rule, seemingly
sensible, might be thought to offend against the principlePof sanctity of the public register regarding land, and 
might be considered useful only in (noiWxeritable property) 
transactions of great Importance, yet when, for example, 
a car is sold, neither buyer nor seller nor the spouse 
of either ie likely to find it necessary to consult a 
solicitor. For some transactions*^ a framework such as 
this might be beneficial, but there is the danger that 
it might be regarded as well*»meaning but cumbersome, 
ineffective or unnecessary# Except in the case of 
transactions pertaining to the home, probably written 
consent given in the presence of the third party or in 
probative writ should be sufficient as evidence of consent 
without /
1 Q y e t  t h e r e  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  t o  b e  s o m e  r e c o r d  t h a t  t h e
c o n s e n t  i r o c e d u r e  h a d  been c a r r i e d  out,
2 *  s e e  p r o v i s i o n s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  h e r i t a g e ,  i n f r a #
" T h e  f a i t h  o f  t h e  r e c o r d s  is a  v e r y  x x a p o r t a n t  
p r i n c i p l e " ,  Prof* H* M e s t o n ,  " F % a i l y  P r o p e r t y  L a w  
i n  S c o t l a n d "  ( 1 9 7 7 )  F i f t h  O o i m a o n x f e a l t h  L a w  C o n f e r e n c e  
P a p e r s ,  %) « 3 7 4  * ^  4 ^  •3* Bee " F a m i l y  A s s e t s " ,  i n f r a ®wr #  #ssat?jç:icsî;aî=i:afc«ss
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without f u r t h e r  procedure. All joint ownership/joint 
consent variations bring in their train practical 
problems difficult of solution, w h ich  is one reason 
why separation o f  p r o p e r t y  eo often appears to have 
the advantage in clarity and simplicity.
Protection of the S p o u se  t Fqir Dealing with t h e  
Third Pprty
To the outside xforld, married persons should 
present as uncomplicated as possible a view of their 
property relations® Gontraots with t h i r d  parties 
should not lightly be set aside. Ho u n n e c e s s a r y  
difficulties should be rxlaced in the way of comm erce 
and business®
Milner t h i n k s  that th e  protection of the spouse 
and of third parties a r e  not mutually exclusive aims*
He advocates a compulsory declaration of h o m e s te a d  in 
the purchase o f  a matrimonial home, i n  the disposition, 
and s i m i l a r l y  a f o r m a l  notice of abandonment of use ae 
a matrimonial home (in a separate deed if there is no 
prospect of sale, or in t h e  terms of the next disposition?) 
up to which t im e , t h e  house would be regarded as 
'homestead'* Registration as 'homestead* is an extremely 
important feature of the American 'homestead* systems 
thereafter, homestead benefits are available t o  the 
spouses, and, further, registration gives constructive 
notice to a potential purchaser of the character o f  th e  
property in question.
In England, there is much talk of beneficial 
i n t e r e s t  and m a tr im o n ia l  home trust. Law Commission 
Working P a p e r  N o#42 favoured ajuexidment of the Matrimonial 
Homes A ct* 1967, to strengthen a spouse's r i g h t s  of 
occupation, and it identified the following range of 
choices- retention of status quo (that is* dependence 
on strict rules of ownership based on financial 
contribution to acquisition and improvement, together 
with a discretion to effect transfer on other considerations 
on marriage b re a k d o w n ), discretionary rule (allowing 
judicial /
j u d i c i a l  i n t o r v o n t l o n  t o  d e te r m in e  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  s p o u s e s  
" a lo n g  b ro a d  e q u i t a b l e  l i n e s "  a t  an y  s t a g e  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e )  
and  cornow n^rsh ip*  e f f e c t e d  e i t h e r  th r o u g h  a  p re s u m p tio n  
o r  b y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a  r u l e  i n  te rm s  o f  w h ic h  e a c h  p a r t y  
w ould  r e c e i v e  a  d i r e c t  b e n e f i c i a l  I n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  home* 
b u t  ( t y p i c a l l y )  t h e  o o u r t  w ould  s t i l l  e n jo y  a  b ro a d  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o w er t o  v a r y  t h e  interests t h e r e i n  o f  
t h e  s p o u s e s  on d i v o r c e ,  n u l l i t y  o r  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n .
T h is  p r o p o s a l  s u r v i v e d  t h e  ch an g e  o f  h e a r t  i n  1973* 
when f u l l - b l o o d e d  com m unity  w as r e j e c t e d ^  Tho ' ' ' 
p r o p o s a l s  o f  t h e  Law C om m ission  (1 9 7 8 )^  recom m end t h a t  
h u sb a n d  and  w i f e  s h o u ld  b e  e q u a l  oo^ow nero  o f  th e  
m a t r im o n ia l  homo* b y  v i r t u e  o f  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  and  
I n c lu d e  a  s u g g e e te d  d r a f t  B i l l  t o  t h a t  e n d : " M a tr im o n ia l
H o m e s  ( C o - o w n e r s h i p )  B i l l " 9 I t  u r g e s  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  
M a tr im o n ia l  Homos A ct*  1 % 7  a n d  p r o v id e #  e u g g e e te d  d r a f t  
B i l l  ( " H a tr im o n ia l  H o m e s  ( R i g h t s  o f  O c c u p a t io n )  B i l l " ) .
I t  a d v o o a te e  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  of a  new scheme o f  r u l e s  
c o n c e r n in g  t h e  u a o  an d  e n jo y m e n t ( b u t  n o t * l t  aeowa* 
p r o p o s in g  fu n d a m e n ta l  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  o v m e ra h ip  
o f  th e  goods) of the h o u s e h o ld  goods« H ere  again a 
s u g g e s te d  d r a f t  B i l l  h a s  b e e n  p ro d u c e d  ( " M a tr im o n ia l  
Goode B i l l " ) .  The p r o p o s a l s  a r e  oom pem dious* w e l l  s e t  
o u t  and t h o r o u g h ly  thought o u t*  an d  d i f f e r  i n  many 
instances from the achome envisaged by the Law Com;ils8ion 
I n
S o o ts  Low g h e r i t a b l e  p r o p e r t y
D i f f i c u l t l e a  may a r i s e  w hore  one  epouao  w is h e s  t o
s e l l  th e  m at3?im onia l homo* How i s  t h e  s o l i c i t o r  f o r  
t h e  s e l l e r *  s t i l l  l e s s  t h e  s o l i c i t o r  f o r  t h e  b u y e r  t o  
know /
1 q Law Oom*Ho,86* F a m ily  Law» T h ir d  R e p o r t  on F a m ily  
P r o p e r ty *  The M a tr im o n ia l  Home (ao*»ow nersh lp  and  o c c u p a t io n  R ig h ts )  an d  H o u seh o ld  Goods*3o Sch©d®1* p ,S 7  o t  8#g*
2 , So to o  in  1982 (L .C .1 1 5 ) .
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know the marital statu# of the client* the true views 
o f  the o t h e r  s p o u s e  (If the e x i s t e n c e  o f  the l a t t e r  i s  
conceded) or t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  th e  heritage as a 
"matrimonial home" or not?
T h e  F a c u l t y  o f  I , a w ,  G l a s g o w  University* when 
considering S c o t t i s h  L a w  G o ï a m i a s i o n  Memorandum No*41 
( F a m i l y  Law s Occupancy Bights In the Matrimonial H o m o  
mid D o m e s t i c  Violence) put forward f o r  consideration 
a schem e o f  r u l e s  (including t h e  s u g g e s te d  e e ta b l lo h m e n t  
of m Matrimonial P r o p e r t y  Register) t o  h e lp  the n o n -  
ow ning  s p o u s e  in t h e s e  c ircu m e t(m cem  * and i t  i s  thought 
t h a t  t h e  same rules could h e  u s e d  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  in 
w h ic h  t h e  spouses w e re  oo^cwners* in o r d e r  to ensure 
t h a t  a l l  a c t i n g s  w ith  r e g a r d  to tho homo were a g r e e d  
between thorn* O f c o u rs e *  when t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  phase 
h a d  ru n *  many d la p o  a i t  lo n e  w o u ld  s t a n d  i n  j o i n t  nam es* 
th e r e b y  giving a w a rn in g  t o  solicitors that the p r o p e r t y  
w as l i k e l y  t o  b e  a m a tr im o n ia l  home* With consent o f  
t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  P a r t y *  r e f e r e n c e  i s  m a d e  t o  
P ao u lB y  R eoponse*  S c h e d u le  4* At p ,? 2  o f  F a c u l t y  
Response* a t e n t a t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  m a t r im o n ia l  home 
is g iv e n :  " t h e  p r i n c i p a l  accommodation p r o v id e d  b y  t h e
e p o u e e  oW,ng t h e  d u ty  t o  a l im e n t  f o r  th e  sp o u s e  w i th  
t h o  right t o  receive a l i m e n t " *
S i m i l a r l y  h o u s e s  p u r c h a s e s  w i th  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  t h a t
t h e y  should, bo u s e d  am m a tr im o n ia l  hom es s h o u ld  b o%r e g i s t e r e d  as such '(in t h e  ^Matrimonial i r o p e r t y  R e g is te r *  ) 
u p o n  m a r r ia g e  # b u t  r e g i s t r a t i o n  a t  an y  t im e  t h e r e a f t e r  
x i o ' u M  b e  c o m p e t e n t *  Upon t h e  l a v ;  a g e n t  w o u l d  l i e  the 
d u ty  of In f o r m in g  s p o u s e s  o f  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c o m p lia n c e *  
Should t h e r e  be an o v e r s i g h t  o r  failure f o r  an y  reason 
bo r e g i s t e r ,  it i s  thought that the I n n o c e n t  t h i r d  p a r t y  
s h o u ld  not b e  p r e ju d ic e d *  R a th e r  s h o u ld  a  p e c u n ia r y  
rem ed y  bo sought b y  s p o u s e  a g a i n s t  sp o u s e  o r  a g a i n s t  
solicitor.
lo p ,G 7  o t  bbqq
Z  . Lex lifl _  M  .Obu> h. 6- . / P ( U l* je u c ^  (Aul 4W- <ruH^
d ^ p C e ^ t i  Ua s^uJ  cUL Accu-a-C  ^ /h  /X
'hAcdt" c u u ^  AexW CL  ^ (X UjLCuh^ vuueuJ'c^ Um u ^  ^
( x h  iSL eU i^  e^'^ix-v.CX^'tb A\JL t S  p t ^ u c C b  ! '
1040a
T h is *iBust now be read a g a in s t  the background o f  the M atrimonial 
ÏÏOÎH0 O (F a m ily  F r o t e e t io n )  ( s o . )  A c t , 1981» w h ich  aim s to  con  f o r  r ig h t o  
o f  o c c u p a t io n  o f  th e  home upon a n o n * o n t l t le d  ep ou ae and to  p r o t e c t  
a apouso  a g a in s t  d o m e st ic  v io le n o o  b u t ,  i n  th o  purauonce o f  th o a e  a lm s , 
m ust e n t e r  th e  complex a r e a e  o f  t i t l e  and c o n v e y a n c in g  law  and p r a c t ic e #
See N ic h o ls  and Mest o n .  C h apter 6 ,
I n s te a d  o f  a d o p t in g  a  m a tr im o n ia l home n o t i c e  d e v lo o ,  i t  was 
d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  o c c u p ie r  e'pouise s h o u ld  be e n t i t l e d  t o  c o n t in u e  to  
o c c u p y , d o o p it e  d e a l in g s  by o t h e r  sp o u se  w ith  t h ir d  p a r t y .  ( 6 - 0 1 ) .
An occu p an cy  r ig h t  i s  an o v e r - r id in g  i n t e r e s t ,  p r e v a i l in g  over  
r e g i s t e r e d  i n t e r e s t s  i n  la n d  w ith o u t  r e g i s t r a t i o n  ( 6 - 0 2 ) .  A 
p r o s p e c t iv e  p u r c h a se r  m ust a -o o er ta in  th e  p o s i t i o n  r e  o ccu p an cy  r i g h t s  
by In q u ir y  o f  th e  ow ner o r  by i n q u i r i e s  e ls e v |h e r e  ( 6 -0 2  )*
B ow over, th e  n o n - e n t i t l e d  sp o u se  may c o n s e n t  t o  th e  tr a n sa c t io n ,  
o r  ( h e r )  c o n s e n t  may bo d is p e n s e d  w ith  i n  th e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  th o  c o u r t  
( s . 7 ( 3 5 ) ,  p y i n o i p a l l y  i f  th e  form er i s  a c t i n g  u n r e a s o n a b ly .
M oreover, th o  oocupaiacy r ig h t  f a l l s  i n  fa v o u r  o f  th e  bona f ld o  
p u r c h a se r  o f  th o  hom e, who m ust have made r e a s o n a b le  in q u l r ie o  and who 
h as been  shown an a f f i d a v i t  t h a t  th e r e  i s  no e n t i t l e d  sp o u se  o r  t h a t  
t h a t  sp o u se  h a s com aen tod . (T h is  w ould  be s a f e r  th a n  r e l i a n c e  on  
asBuranooQ by th e  s e l l e r  t h a t  th e  o u b jo o t  o f  s a l e  was n o t  a  m a tr im o n ia l  
homes i t  I s  p ru d en t ( 6 - 2 2 )  to  assum e t h a t  any r e s i d e n t i a l  p r o p e r ty  i s  
a  m a tr im o n ia l h o m e.) The a f f i d a v i t  sh o u ld  be made a s  n e a r  i n  d a te  a s  
p o s s ib l e  to  th e  d a te  o f  s e t t l e m e n t # end th e  docum ents m ust be produced  
a t  th e  tim e o f  d e a l in g  -  *'an in e x a c t  p h r a se " , ^ l i c h o l s  and Mes t o n ,  6 - 1 9 .^  
The p u r c h a se r  sh o u ld  i n s i s t  on  d e l iv e r y  b e fo r e  s e t t l e m e n t .
The p r o t e c t io n  w h ich  t h i s  schem e a f f o r d s  t o  th o  n o n « e n t l t l e d  sp o u se
I s  e x te n d e d  by s . 9 to  c a s e s  o f  j o i n t l y  e n t i t l e d  s p o u s e s .
Cxi5V .
A arc caa^cua. CLt^  Lu.cLy c x p p L t^ 'tZ  t'UJl
}t^  AjM, (nAytx. [tuLx. J  f \ /  UAe.
La-xJEiXa^  X^xxa^  I yh ( /} A J Cjlj
cnvwuL> , L J t ^  ( ^  ^  ÿu^fCLCX (Sy Oaa U ~ p , à ^  CxruJ^* 1-:C-U.CUScJtt CtJ^ t J^SxxUlxxt' tUSCl^L^  ^ tUjL6)xxJLx. SpfThUj^
p  Oct-'t* S  tAi .
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N ic h o ls  and Mesto n  p ro v id e  (6 -2 2 )  a t a b le  show ing good 
co n veyan cin g  p r a c t ic e  to  be u sed  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  new p r o v is io n s .
A Third partjj may be l e f t  to  buy a d i f f e r e n t  h o u se , "although  
he may be e n t i t l e d  to  be in d e m n if ie d  by th e Keeper o f  th e Land 
E e g is to r  o f  S co tla n d  i f  th e  t i t l e  s h e e t  co n ta in ed  a n o te  w hich  
w rongly s ta t e d  th a t  th e r e  were no occupancy r ig h t s  in  r e s p e c t  o f  
sp o u ses  o f  p rev io u s  p r o p r ie to r s " . ( 6 - 2 2 ) .  see  a ls o  6 - 0 2 § th e  
k eep er  may n o te  an o v e r -r id in g  i n t e r e s t  on th e  t i t l ®  s h e e t  o f  an 
i n t e r e s t  i n  lan d  r e g is t e r e d  in  th e  Lund R e g is te r  and th e  R e g is te r  
may be r e c t i f i e d  (Land R e g is tr a t io n  ( S c . )  A c t , 1979» s. s .  6 ( 4 ) and 
9 ( 4 ) * ) “ The Keeper w i l l  n o t  n o te  th e  occupancy r ig h t s  o f  th e  cu rre n t  
p r o p r ie torb  sp ou se ( im p o s s ib le ,  one would th in k ) ,  bu t w i l l  add a 
c e r t i f i c a t e  th a t  no occupancy r ig h t s  e x i s t  in  r e s p e c t  o f  sp o u ses  o f  
p rev io u s  p r o p r ie to r s .  The occupancy r i g h t s ,  b e in g  co n fe r r e d  by 
s t a t u t e ,  " there i s  no deed record ed  o r  re c o r d a b le  in th©  R e g is te r  o f  
S a sin eo  w hich w i l l  d i s c lo s e  t h e i r  e x is te n c e "  ( 6 - 0 2 ) .  See g e n e r a l ly  
N ic h o ls  and Mesto n , C hapter 6 .
T his i s  one way o f  t r y in g  to  a c h ie v e  a v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  (and  
la u d a b le )  aim . i t  i s  c e r t a in ly  th e  f i r s t  tim e any l e g i s l a t i v e  
e x e r c is e  o f  t h i s  k in d  has been a ttem p ted  in  S c o t la n d , and th e  n e c e s sa r y  
c o m p lic a t io n s  w hich i t  b r in g s  i n  t r a in  must s u r p r is e ,  and i r r i t a t e  
o c c a s io n a l ly ,  th o se  u sed  to  th e n o n -r e g u la t io n  which i s  th e  mark o f  
a system  o f  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p r o p e r ty . There i s  no sim p le  way o f  
a c h ie v in g  th e d e s ir e d  r e s u l t .  At some s t a g e ,  i t  i s  I n e v i t a b le  th a t  
th ir d  p a r t ie s  w i l l  be in v o lv e d , and th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  bona f id e  th ir d  
p a r t ie s  and o f  " innocent"  sp o u ses  must a lw ays be w eighed (and p la ce d  
i n  ord er o f  p r e fe r e n c e )  i n  any p a r t ic u la r  s i t u a t io n .  Time w i l l  t e l l  
w hether p r a c t io n e r s  can make t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  work.
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O n  d e a t h *  t o  t h e  s n r v i v o r  w o u l d  a o c x * e s c e  t h e  
£ £ £  i n d i v i s e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r  ( i f  t h e r e  h a d  
h e e n  n o  i n t e r v e n i n g  m a r i t a l  u p s e t s ' ^ ) *  a n d  t h i s  f a c t  
w o u l d  h e  n a r r a t e d  i n  t h e  n o r m a l  m a n n e r  i n  t h e  n e x t  
d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  h o u s e *
S i n c e  t h e  s p o u s e s  w o u l d  o w n  j o i n t l y *  t h e r e  c o u l d  
h e  n o  a l i e n a t i o n  i n t e r  v i v o s  o r  m o r t i s  c a u s a  o f  t h e  
p r o  i n d i v i s o  s h a r e  o f  e a c h  i n  t h e  h o m e ,  T h e  
i n f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  r u l e  c o u l d  c a u s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ®  
S a l e *  p u r c h a s e ,  l e a s e  o r  g i f t  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  t h e  c o n s e n t  
o f  b o t h ,  a n d ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  m e n t i o n e d ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  n e e d  
t o  b e  r u l e s  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a n d  r e g u l a t i n g  -  ( a )  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  j u d i c i a l  c o n s e n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  d e a d l o c k  
a n d  ( b )  a  p r o c e d u r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  c o n s e n t  w a s  
g i v e n  f r e e l y ,  a n d  s e t t i n g  u p  a  c u t - o f f  p o i n t  a f t e r  w h i c h  
i t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  c o m p e t e n t  t o  s e e k  r e d u c t i o n  o n  g r o u n d s  
o f  f r a u d ,  f o r c e  a n d  f e a r ,  o r  d u r e s s ®  T h i s  w o u l d  m e a n  
t h a t  s p e c i a l i s e d  m a t r i m o n i a l  r u l e s  w o u l d  b e  o v e r l a i d  
u p o n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  c o n t r a c t  a n d  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  a n d  s o m e  
w o u l d  r e g a r d  t h i s  a s  a  c o n f e s s i o n  o f  f a i l u r e ®  I t  d o e s  
n o t  s e e m ,  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  e v e n  a  m o d e s t  m a t r i m o n i a l  s c h e m e  
c a n  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h o u t  t h e m .
D i v o r c e  a n d  I n t e r v e n i n g  M a r i t a l  U p s e t  
D i v o r c e
O n  d i v o r c e ,  t h e  s i m p l e s t  t r e a t m e n t  w o u l d  b e  d i v i s i o n
o f  h o u s e  s a l e  p r o c e e d s  a n d  c o m m o n  a s s e t s  a n d  r e t u r n  o f2s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  t o  s e p a r a t e  o w n e r s ®
I f  t h e  h o u s e  i s  t o  b e  s o l d ,  t h e n  b y  j o i n t  c o n s e n t  
t h i s  w i l l  b e  d o n e *  ( I f ,  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  o n e  o b j e c t s ,  
c o u n s e l  m a y  p e r s u a d e  t h e  c o u r t  t o  a l l o w  w i t h h o l d i n g  o f  
c o n s e n t ,  t o  t h e  e f f e c t ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  o f  a l l o w i n g  t h e  
y o u n g e s t  /
1® S e e  b e l o w .
2 .  S e e  g e n e r a l l y ,  " D i v o r c e " ,  i n f r a .
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y o u n g e s t  c h i l d  t o  l i v e  i n  h i s  a c c u s t o m e d  h o m e  u n t i l ,
s a y ,  t h e  a g e  o f  s i x t e e n ) ^  sn lo n g  as -the 'th ird  p arty  l a t e r  r e c e iv e s  
a  d i s p o s i t i o n  g r a n t e d  b y  t w o  d i o p o î i e r a ,  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
o f  t h o  s a l e  arc n o  c o n c e r n  o f  his*
Separation, V o l u n t a r y  a n d  J u d ic ia l, Desertion# Marital
U n s e t
T h i s  l a  t h e  a r e a  i n  w h i c h  p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f i c u l t y1a r i s e s #  N e v i t t  a n d  L e v i n  remark t h a t  w h e r e  c a p i t a l
i s  t i e d  up* a  party i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  w a l k  a w a y  h u t ,
i f  a  p a r t y  s h o u l d  d i s a p p e a r *  i t  I s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t h e
c o u r t  m u s t  h e  a b l e  t o  s t a n d  in  h i s  s h o e s  a n d  g i v e  c o n s e n t
t o  n e c e s s a r y  or h i g h l y  d e s i r a b l e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t
o f  t h e  h o m o *  I n  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e *  t h o u g h ,  i t  i s
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t ,  w h e r e  c o h a b i t a t i o n  c e a s e s *  w h e t h e r  o r
not a decree o f  separation ie Bought, application may
b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  S h e r i f f  C o u r t  ( F a m i l y  D i v i s i o n )  f o rpd i v i s i o n  o f  h o m e  a n d  assets*  T h i s  r e m e d y  w o u l d  b e  
a v a i l a b l e  a l s o  i n  c a s e s  o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  d i s a g r e e m e n t  
a b o u t  property o r  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t  w h i l e  c o h a b i t a t i o n  
c o n t i n u e s  #
L o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  M a t r i m o n i a l  H o m e
T h e  p r e s e n t  S c o t t i s h  p o s i t i o n  h a s  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d ^ ,  
a n d  t h e  m a t t e r  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  in  F a c u l t y  R e s p o n d  t o  
S c o t t i s h  L a w  C o m m i s s i o n  Memorandum N o * 2 2  ( A l i m e n t  a n d  
F i n a n c i a l  P r o v i s i o n ) .
P r o f e s s o r  Kalm-^Freund  ^ c i t e s  t h o  c a s e  o f  D u n n e  v*g
D u n n e " ,  i n  w h i c h  t h o  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l  t o o k  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  
t h i s  m u s t  b e  a  m a t t e r  f o r  j o i n t  d ecision , a n d ,  f a i l i n g  
a g r e e m e n t ,  t h e  c o u r t  m u s t  d e c i d e  which s p o u s e  h a s  a c t e d  
"unreasonably /
1 « "Social P o licy  and the Matrimonial Home", ("1975) 36 M.L.R.3' 1^-5.2. akin to Bookillnad. See "Remedies", in fra .
3 .  C h a n t e r  % T r s ê r â l ? o  " s  . L . C .M e m o .« o .  54 , 9 . 1 - 1  f . —4 . (19593 at p .2 5 9 .
5 .  1 9 4 9  # .9 8 .
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"im3?ea3ona’bly’% Without entering the priority of 
c a r e e r  argument, it seems that that is the best approach. 
U n d e r  t h e  proposals now advanced, purchase of o. nevr 
h om e and sale of the old would be transactions requiring 
joint consent and permitting r e c o u r s e  to the court and 
j u d i c i a l  intervention to h e l p  cme spouse against the 
other* if the latter is hold to have been acting 
u n r e a s o n a b l y *  If matters go so far* the outlook for 
the marriage is not g o o d ,
The Financing o f  the Purchase of the Home
If the house la not owned out slight* and a Building 
Society loan is being repaid, the rules which are relevant 
i n c l u d e  t h e  rule that there shall b e  j o i n t  a n d  several 
liability for household debts, of which this is one.
Hence* if one spouse cannot pay* the Building Society 
m a y  look to the other (a proper outcome in any event, 
because the spouses will be joint o w n e r # ) *  The t w i n  
principle involved is that each spouse will have a duty 
to aliment t h e  other* A new dimension w o u ld  be the 
presence of compensation of gains* (Therefore it is 
possible that one spouse may repay the Building Society 
out of money given to (her) by the other). Ultimately, 
biological and other facts must be facedi w h i l e  joint 
financial contribution is a desirable aim appropriate 
where b o t h  spouses are earning apprmcimately equal 
s a l a r i e s  or where the n o n ^ e a r n e r  has capital* joint 
contribution cannot be a prerequisite of joint ownership 
i n  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  s p h e r e #
Urgent problems arise w h e r e  the principal earner 
departs the h o m e*  hevitt and Levin have suggested that 
local authority mortgages might be made available to 
fatherless families* enabling the wife to r e p a y  t h e  
Building Society outright and than co.miaence repayiaent of 
a now, local authority mortgage* In effect the authority 
"would undertake a new housing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " *  It 
might be that repayment should be of interest only until 
the youngest child should attain the age of sixteen* and 
thereafter /
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th e r e a f te r  c a p ita l  and in t e r e s t  could  "be repaid over
a p eriod  of* say 15*^0 years® They urge th a t the
debtor should be e n t i t l e d  to  take a lod ger  mid so molce
u se o f  th e  house as a c a p ita l  a s s e t;  one might add
th a t i f  the c a p ita l  g a in s  ta x  d is in c e n t iv e  a f fe c t in g
th e use o f a house as a business (e* g , fo r  the g iv in g
o f  music le s so n s  or as a nursery sch o o l) were removed,
the debtor might make u se o f t h i s  b en e fit*  having perhaps
l i t t l e  to  lo s e  in  the m atter o f  the income ta x  b e n e f itisometimes g iven  in  exchange»
In  th e authors' opinion, lo c a l  authorities ore the
on ly  b od ies which "could ach ieve both th e f l e x i b i l i t y  
and th e ready a v a i la b i l i t y  when required". They would 
req u ire  power to  borrow fo r  t h is  purpose. The interest 
ra te  would be the same as th a t in  force fo r  any o th er  
mortgagor and th e risk o f  f in a n c ia l  lo s s  would be sm all 
because th e rising va lu e o f the house would outstrip 
the amount ou tstan d in g  on the lo a n , and, in  d efa u lt*  
the house could be sold*
C lea r ly  th e  can vassing  o f  op in ion  among b u ild in g
s o c i e t i e s  and lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  would be n ecessary  b efore
even a t e n ta t iv e  view  could be taken o f  t h is  p la n , but
i t  p rovides a su g g estio n  o f  one way la  which th is  veryod i f f i c u l t  p r a c t ic a l  problem might be tr e a te d .^
On d ivorce or se p a r a tio n , i t  i s  l ik e l y  th a t the  
house w i l l  be so ld ; where t h i s  does not happen, and 
one "buys out" th e o th er ( in f r a ) ,  or has the use o f  the  
p rop erty , perhaps on payaient o f  com pensation, and the  
B u ild in g  S o c ie ty  has not bean rep a id , then  i t  seems th a t  
th e S o c ie ty  should be e n t i t l e d  to  look to  the two joint 
and /
1 # 1.6* i f  a p rop ortion  o f  e .g .  the r a te s  upon a houseis  , allow ed f o r  ta x , the Inland Revenue i s  b e t te rp laced  to  argue th a t th a t p r o p o r t i o n  o f the home i s  a"business"* See changes in  Finance A ct, 1980.
2o Of* e . g .  3o*L*0om*Hemo*No*41* ? ro p n # 5 0  F a o , RespoP ,6 3 ,
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a n d  a e v e r a l  d e b t o r s *  a n d  t h e  d e b t o r s  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  
c o m e  t o  s o m e  agreement b e t w e e n  t h e m s e l v e s ,  a r r a n g e d  
b y  t h e  c o u r t  i n  I t s  d i s c r e t i o n ^  ( i f  n e c e s s a r y ) * I n d e e d  
s u c h  a n  a r r a n g e m e n t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  d i v o r c e  o r  j u d i c i a l  
s e p a r a t i o n  w o u l d  c o m e  in t h e  n o r m a l  w a y  under t h e  
s c r u t i n y  o f  t h e  court * Possibly t h o  n o n - o c c u p y i n g  
s p o u s e  s h o u l d  p a y  l e s s ,  b u t  i t  m u s t  b e  r e m e m b e r e d  t h a t ,  
w h e n  repayment i s  m a d e ,  e a c h  w i l l  b e  o w n e r  o f  a  v a l u a b l e  
h e r i t a b l e  a s s e t *
I t  i s  generally believed t h a t  it is not in the 
interests o f  B u i l d i n g  S o c i e t i e s  to insist u p o n  t h e  sale 
o f  property i n  c a s e s  w h e r e  the d e b t o r s  are h a v i n g  
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  m e e t i n g  t h e  c o m m i t m e n t ,  f o r  t h e  S o c i e t y  
w i l l  b e a r  t h e  e x p e n s e s  a n d  o f  c o u r s e  m u s t  r e p a y  o u t  o f  
t h e  p r o c e e d s  o f  s a l e  t h e  b a l a n c e  r e m a i n i n g  a f t e r  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  loan* E x c e p t  i n  e x t r e m e  c a s e s  o f  
r e c a l c i t r a n c e ,  an e a s i e r  repayment s c h e m e  o f  l o n g e r  
d u r a t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  a r r a n g e d *  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a  
B u i l d i n g  S o c i e t y  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  w e l c o m e  a s  a  m o r t g a g e e  
a  w i f e  w i t h  y o u n g  c h i l d r e n  a n d  l i t t l e  e a r n i n g  c a p a c i t y ,  
a n d  m i g h t  p r e f e r  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  
a s  m o r t g a g e e ,  a s  M e v i t t  a n d  L e v i n  s u g g e s t  * I s  t h e  
family e n t i t l e d  to retain i t s  h o m e ?  If s o ,  w h o  i s  t o  
b o a r  the u l t i m a t e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ?
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A d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " f a m i l y  a s s e t s "  m u s t  b e  f o u n d *  
P r o f e s s o r  K a l m ^ - F r e t m d ' s  p r e f e r e n c e  i s  t o  h a v e  a s s e t s  
categorised according t o  t h e i r  p u r p o s e  a n d  u s e  : f a m i l y
a s s e t s  are a s s e t s  a t  a n y  t i m e  b y  consent o f  spouses 
d e d i c a t e d  t o  t h e  c o m m o n  u s e  o f  t h e  h o u s e h o l d ,  w h e t h e r  
a c q u i r e d  t h r o u g h  w o r k  or t h r i f t ,  or t h r o u g h  i n h e r i t a n c e  
o r  gift* E a r l i e r  ( i n  1 9 5 9 ) ,  h e  w r o t e ,  "It i s  i n  the 
nature o f  these a s s e t s  t h a t  husband and w i f e  should enjoy 
a n d  administer them j o i n t l y *  T h e  e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  i s  
not s o  m u c h  t h a t  they b o t h  m a y  h a v e  contributed to t h e i r  
a c q u i s i t i o n  « « . «  n o r  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  i n t e n d e d  f o r  j o i n t  
u s e  o r  c o n s u a B p t i o n  .  * * * b u t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a c t u a l l y  so 
u s e d  /
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usecU What ono may call the "oommmity element" does 
not or does not only consist in the past history or 
the future destination of such assets but in their 
present physical nature.
The matrimonial home and its contents are, as it
were, the material substratum of the matrimonial
consortium* We are here at the point where property
relations and %)ersonal relations become indistinguishable#
To divide the "family assets" is tantamount to destroying
the basis of cohabitation, and if a judge excludes either
spouse from their use by reason of the ownership vested
in the other he pronounces what in fact is the equivalent1of a separation order *.*.Joint administration,
8 0 far from being impracticable, is here inevitable in 
view of the very tmrposo of the assets involved * The 
law may insist on separation of ownership and even 
postulate separate possession in the legal sense; separate 
eiijoyment or separate administration is incompatible 
with normal married life*"
Lord Dlplook^ has stated that "This expression"
(family assets) "I understand to mean property, whether 
real or personal, which has been acquired by either 
spouse in contemplation of their marriage or during its 
subsistence and was intended for the common use and 
enjoyment of both spouses or their children, such as the 
matrimonial home, its furniture and other durable chattels* 
It does not include property acquired by either spouse 
before the marriage but not in contemplation of it"
The Law Commission^ gives a fairly wide definition - 
"Household /
1 * However, "early" division of property while cohabitation continues is an established Gommunity Property remedy, and one which here is advocated#
2 ,  1969 2 A l l  ER 385 a t  p .4 1 0 ,3* hence, it seems, perhaps placing greater emphasisupon intention than upon use (acbiml use - Kahn Freund).4* Law OomaHo.86 (Family Lawi T1ifrd” opox't on Family Pro party) (1978)@
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"Household goods" means any goods, including a vehicle, 
which are or were available for use or enjoyment in or 
in connection with any home which the spouses are 
occupying or have at any time during their marriage 
occupied ae their matrimonial home. "The court would 
have a general discretion in mating a 'use and enjoyment 
order', subject to the direction to liave regard to 
'the extent to which the goods to which the application 
relates are needed to meet the ordinary requirements of 
the applicant's daily life® (3*39)® This, together 
with the widely drawn definition of 'household goods* is 
thought by the Commission (3*40) to be sufficient to 
allow the court to do justice in tho variety of cases 
with which it will have to deal*"
In 1 9 7 0 , J , Gareth Hiller^ made a review of 
English authority upon the question whether there exists 
in England a doctrine of "fami,ly assets"* If it exists,^ 
its main features, in Hiller's opinion,are that it 
emerges only if there is no evidence of actual intention 
by the parties and in ciroumatimcee where both parties 
have contributed to the acquisition of the asset, the 
matter being considered in isolation, distinct from other 
matrimonial matters# In these circumstances only a 
presumption of equal rights of ownership therein arises 
Hiller himself appears to take the view that tho doctrine 
is loss far-reaching than may be hoped or feared. If 
it is thought that * family assets* have special 
characteristics, it may be possible, he says, to recognise 
that contributions to the acquisition thereof "may also 
bo /
1. Quotation taken from Hoc,No,41, Faculty Response, P«79, fn,2,2. "Family Assets" (19?0) 86 b,Q,R.96,3* Lord Denning's attempts to gather to the court a bold discretion having failed: "The position afterPettitt is that it is now established that in dealing with dispute# between spouses as to title to property the function of the court is to ascertain their rights and not to alter those rights" (at p#123)*
1 0 4 8
be special and in fact of a different character*"
He favours power to determine the right to individual 
items of property before breakdown but not, it acorns, 
power to adjust, nor any basic community system with 
regard to those assets during .marriage* Professor 
KaJin-Freimd * b view is that there must be property 
rules arising by virtue of tho marriage, and not by 
virtue of its failure, and that ie the approach taken 
in this discussion.
It has been soen that the Hew Zealand Matrimonial
Property A c t ,  1 9 7 6 ,  i n  8 * 8 ,  d e f i n e s  " m a t r i m o n i a l  p r o p e r t y "
as the matrimonial home and family chattels, joint
property, property acquired by either in contemplation of
tho marriage and intended for the common use and benefit
of both, all property bought after the marriage by either*
"including" (not "comprising") property acquired for
common use and benefit out of property owned by either
the husband or wife or both before the marriage or out
of the proceeds of any disposition of any property so 1owned, income and gains, including sale proceeds of all
propex'ty above described, from policies of assurance,
policies of insurance in respect of common property,
p e n s i o n  o r  o t h e r  b e n e f i t s  t o  w h i c h  c o n t r i l m t i o n B  h a v e
b e e n  m a d e  s i n c e  m a r r i a g e ,  a n y  p r o p e r t y  w h i c h  t h e  s p o u s e s
have agreed shall be matrimonial property and "(k) Any
other property that is matrimonial property by virtueo
o f  a n y  o t h e r  A c t " * ^
Here, an outline scheme has been given# It is 
suggested that property which belonged to either spouse 
before marriage, or which is acquired by gift or 
inlierltance /
It would seem that separately funded acquests are to be placed in the class of matrimonial property only if their use^  so suggests (see also 8*9(3)(6) and s*10),"'“or* of course (s*8(j)) if the spouses so agree *As to consequences of categorisation as "matrimonial property", see supra (New Zealand)
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inheritance thereafter, shall he considered to he 
separate property unless, being a corporeal moveable, 
it becomes a family asset, or, being money, it is used 
to purchase a family asset®
It is clear that the Kahn Freund 'use and purpose' 
criterion is helpful here®
Furniture and articles of household decoration are
"family assets" by this test* All furniture, paintings,
porcelain, soft furnishings, cutlery, china and household
appliances will be "family assets", unless, in any case,
1the item falls into the 'heirloom' category® That 
which is necessary for, or conducive to, the running of 
the home is likely to be regarded as a "family asset"*
The television set and the washing machine will be family 
assets, as will bedlinen, glass and silver, furniture 
(including bookshelves but excluding books^), and garden 
tools* In generalitems the principal purpose of which
is domestic will be included.
Where assets appear to be of the nature of "family 
assets", and are used as such, and are not designated 
judicially as 'separate' or 'heirloom', they will be 
family assets even though contained in a second home 
which is not jointly owned*
It can be seen that, in respect of many of the
items above listed, little controversy would arise
between well-disposed individuals who have chosen to 
marry and to run a common establishment* In dispute, 
items of value, of family history, or of particular 
use in a new establishment are those in respect of which 
the question of ownership is most likely to be keenly 
contested,
In /
1 * See below*2* See below*3* See generally infra - separate property, hybridproperty, heirlooms *
4 .  See 1981 Act .  N ic h o l s  and Mee t on. "Furniture and p l e n i s h i n g s
comprise a r t i c l e s  which are reasonab ly  n e c e s s a r y  to  enab le  the
house to be used as a fa m i ly  r e s i d e n c e . "  (T a b le s ,  c h a i r s ,  e t c .
but not  p erson a l  e f f e c t s ;  books,  p i c t u r e s ,  t e l e v i s i o n  or piano  are d o u b t f u l , ) ( 2 - 1 6 )
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In th# oaGG of valuable painting# and furniture* 
there are many po&aiblo nodes of aoqulBltlon* of whlbh 
the following perhapc a ro  th o  m oet commonly enoountorod;™
1e they may have been the eeparata property of either 
b e f o r e  m arriaG ®  * 2* t h e y  may h a v e  b e e n  bought by e i t h e r  
or both dui'ing marrlf^ igo. 3* they moy have boon acquired 
by either or both during marriage by moans of gift or 
inherltanoo (037 purohaaod with fundn thoroby aoquired)*
A joint bequest (5,) during marrliiKge oauee# few
problem#» Gwnorahip will bo dictated by the terme of 
the bequest or* falling provision* it will b^ held that 
each party has a one half share therein# Neither may 
sell without concent of the other** On dissolution o f  
the maiTiage o%* on Boakill^ad if division of all assets 
i s  w is h e d ,  t h e n ,  since p h y s i c a l  division may bo Impomaible 
or undesirable, a compensation sohamo would be neoosoary*
A bequest to o n e  ap o u n e  of an I te m  w h ic h  in i t s  n a t u r e  
is a  'family a a a e t*  w o u ld  o p e r a t e  t o  c a r r y  t h e  item i n t o  
t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t y  o to o k ,  im le a s  t h o  I n t e n t i o n  o f  
t h e  t e s ta to a ?  w as t h a t  t h e  item  b e  n o t  t r e a t e d  a e  a " f a m i ly  
Here* difficulties will arise in that a 
grandfather clock and a refrigerator may equally be 
regim xled a s  b y  th e i i*  n a t u r e  f a m i ly  a a n e t a ,  and  t h e  
s o l u t i o n  will l i e  i n  t h e  s p e c i a l  r u l e s  o f  'h e ir lo o m *gand 'oeparata p3V)perty' set out below The bewfieiazy 
s p o u s e  may s e e k  t h e  c o u r t ' s  ( n e c e s s a r y )  a p p r o v a l  t o  h a v e  
tho Item a%c3.udcd from tlM$ stock of *faAdJ,y aaaets'*
Again (1#) lihero each spouse biwght to the mgxrriago 
i t e m s  o f  v a lu e *  b e a u ty  an d  h i s t o r y  w h ic h  a t  t h e  a a n e  t im e  
wore 'faDiily in adornments to the matrimonial
/
1# As t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  g iv e n  t o  third p a r t i e #( tra n s a c tio n s  concerning corD oreal moveable#) eeo
FoGn^loii for coui't approval for Tmirlooi^  or separate 
o t a t u #  m u st b e  p u t  i n  train within, s a y ,  two y e a r #  of marriage or inheritance* as tho case may bo* If 
n o t ,  t h e  item w i l l  fall I n t o  th o  m a t r im o n ia l  p r o p e r t ystock®
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I ' l o m e ,  t î i o s G  w o u l d  b e c o m e  f a m i l y  a s s e t s »  m i l e s o  the 
owner took steps t o  exempt them from that c a t e g o r y  
a n d  i t s  e f f e c t s *  b y  h a v i j i g  them d e c l a r e d  ' h e i r l o o m *  
or ' s e p a r a t e * .
W h e r e  ( 2 a )  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  i s  b o u g h t  b y  b o t h  d u r i n g  
m a r r i a g e *  i t  s h a l l  b e c o m e  a  f a m i l y  a s s e t *  w h a t e v e r  m a y  
h a v e  b e e n  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a n d  w h e t h e r  the i t e m  i s  a  
m a c h i n e  o r  a  grand piano.
Where a n  i t e m  i s  bought b y  o n e  s p o u s e  o u t  o f  
s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  b u t  i s  o f  a  ' f a m i l y  a s s e t *  n a t u r e  
( o f  b e a u t y  a n d / o r  o f  u s e ) *  t h e n  t h i s  t o o  s h a l l  b e c o m e  
a  family a s s e t *  u n l e s s  within t h e  ( t w o  y e a r )  t i m e  l i m i t *  
t h e  p u r c h a s e r  s e e k s  ' s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y *  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ®
I n  g e n e r a l *  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s u c h  a p p l i c a t i o n s *  t h e  
c o u r t  m i g h t  l o o k  m o r e  k i n d l y  o n  'heirloom* a p p l i c a t i o n s  
a n d  l e s s  f a v o u r a b l y  o n  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  d e e m  ' s e p a r a t e  * 
t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  a  w a s h i n g - m a c h i n o .  I n  l e s s  c l e a r - c u t  
c a s e s *  t h e  g e n e r a l  s c h e m e  o f  c o m m u n i t y  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  
w o u l d  r e q u i r e  t o  b e  b o r n e  i n  m i n d *  a n d  perhaps a  fairly 
s t r o n g  c a s e  f o r  'separateness® w o u l d  need t o  b e  m a d e  o u t *  
s i n c e  o t h e r w i s e  t h e  s c h e m e  w o u l d  b e c o m e  o f  m i n i m a l  u s e ®  
( I n d e e d *  a  s e r i e s  o f  such a p p l i c a t i o n s  by a  particular 
individual might h e r a l d  B o s k i l l n a d *  a n d  i t  w o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  
i f  t h a t  r e m e d y  were s o u g h t  a s  s o o n  a s  t h e  g e n e r a l  s c h e m e  
b e g a n  t o  b e  u n w o r k a b l e  w i t h i n  a  m a r r i a g e . )  T h e  court 
w o u l d  proceed f r o m  t h e  s t a x ' t i n g - p c i n t  t h a t *  i n  a l l  b u t  
e x c e p t i o n a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s *  'family a s s e t ®  purchases a r e  
I n t e n d e d  t o  b e *  a n d  s h o u l d  b e *  f a m i l y  a s s e t s #  (An 
e v e r - a v a i l a b l e  r e m e d y  s h o u l d  b e  d e c l a r a t i o n  b y  t h e  c o u r t  
o f  t h e  c o r r e c t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  property i n  c a s e a  o f  
d o u b t . )  T h e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  c o n j u g a l  p r o s p e r i t y  
m u s t  /
1 .  P e t i t i o n  f o r  c o u r t  a p p r o v a l  f o r  heirloom o r  separate 
s t a t u e  m u s t  b e  p u t  i n  t r a i n  w i t h i n *  say, t w o  y e a r s  
o f  m a r r i a g e  or inheritance, a s  t h e  c a s e  m a y  be* I f  not, the item will f a l l  i n t o  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  p r o p e r t y  stock#
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muet be recognised* This interdependence ie seen even 
In orthodox systems of separation (for one may be enabled 
to buy ae a result of the thrift or domestic work of the 
other) and would be more strongly in evidence w here  the 
finances of one receive a 'boost* from the finances of 
t h e  other. " I n  general* use of money to acquire family 
assets or to improve the existing home, or help finance 
the purchase of a new matrimonial home, shall deprive 
the original owner of any claim that that which has been 
acquired is his separate property."^
Where wedding presents have been given* the rule 
of return to donor if no marriage takes place would remaih. 
Unless the donor wished the Item to be the property of 
one spouse only^* on marriage the presents would become 
family as 3 et a «
H y b r i d  I t e i n s
One basic difficulty is the classification of 
property which * though having the appearance of a family 
asset* is truly to be regarded as investment property, 
and was so regarded by the spouses at purchase. Professor 
Kahn^Pround writes*^ ...most assets are "ambivalent" - 
even the washing machine may be a means of production 
if the wife takes in laundry for washing," He advocates 
a system of rebuttable presumptions in eases where the 
nature ox an asset is "negative" (that is, it is unclear 
whether the Item should be classified as an 'investment' 
or 'household' itéra), and takes the view that investment 
property might become family asset property upon change 
of the family's circumstances. It is suggested that it 
may be better that a list be compiled of articles to be 
regarded /
1 .2. Mince the wish is unlikely to be given formalembodiment, application for separate, or possibly,in these circumstances, heirloom status x/ould require to be .made by tho donee spouse® Application would not be refused if the donor's intention was clear»3» Memorial Lecture (1971) P*39«
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regarded, as of tâio * family asset' nature, with power 
to either party to apply to the coiirt (a) for grexit 
of heirloom or separate proi)erty status as explained 
or (b) for a declaration (available at any time; for 
(a) there would be a time limit) of the correctAclassification of property of doubtful nature « There
is a precedent in Scots law: the Succession (Scotland)oAct, 1964^ defines "furniture and plenishings" as
including garden effects, domestic animals, plate, plated
articles, linen, china, glass, books, pictures, prints,
articles of household use and consumable stores, but
excluding any article or animal used at the date of death%of the intestate for business purposes, or moneys or 
securities for money or any heirloom, "Heirloom", in 
relation to an intestate estate means any article which 
has associations with the intestate's family of such 
nature and extent that it ought to pass to some member 
of that family other than the surviving spouse of the 
intestate
8eparate Property
The separate property of each spouse shall consist 
of 5 first, those items which have been declared to be of 
separate 03? heirloom character by the court or by the 
terme of a bequest, and, second, items which by their 
nature are not 'family assets** In the second categorytzwould be placed for example clothes, j e w e l l e r y sports 
equipment and other 'hobby* property'^ and, as Professor 
Kalm /
1 o 0 *0 » perhaps, sewing machines and power toolsfamily asset, or sonarate 'hobby* property?
2 .  8 , 8 ( G ) ( b ) .3* cfo Kahn«^Freund; "For cash there can be no presumption, Too much depends on the social and economic circumstances of each case*" (p«40)*4* 8 ,8 (6 ) (c )@5* Of* Gog», Chapter 1*Go The judicial 'declaration in case of doubt' alwayswould be available a
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Kaïm-Fre-ond points out, a professional library®
Pensions (contrast Hew Zealand) would be regarded as
s e p a r a te  property®  Though c o n t r ib u t io n s  t h e r e to  were
made during the course of the marriage, they would be
made out of funds truly or artificially separate, and
upon separation or dissolution, the pension income would
be noted as part of the general financial 'picture* of
the spouses, on which would be based decisions as to
aliment and maintenance rights and duties * 'The proceeds
of policies of insurance taken out on family assets1shall be of a family asset nature ; proceeds of policies 
on separate property shall be separate property® Possibly 
the sums will be re-invested in property of a similar 
nature to that lost or stolen®
Donations between spouses shall remain competent 
(except that it is not thought that family assets should 
be the subject of gift) and the rule of irrevocability 
would not be altered®
Into the category of separate property would fall 
rights of action in contract or delict which pertain to 
the separate property or personal rights of the married 
pursuer® Damages recovered would be separate property®
On the other hand, where the action concerned family 
assets, litigation and its financial consequences would 
be a joint responsibility® Inter-spouse litigation 
would remain competent except that matters pertaining 
to pure family asset and property questions would require 
to be dealt with according to the scheme of rights and 
remedies outlined® Damages in tort recovered by a wife 
from her husband (arising perhaps out of a car accident) 
would fall to her as separate property®
The Family Car
The family car would be regarded as a family asset,
but /
1® See Money, Investments, and Bank Accounts, infra®
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Imt a. second car, i f  bought out of separate property 
by one spouse (whether 'genuine* 03? ®a3?tificlally 
produced* separate property) would be the separate 
property of the purchasing spouse « Many new care 
are leased by companies from car hire companies on 
contract hire and given to the employee for his use* 
both for business and pleasure* Clearly here both 
spouses have the use and enjoyment of the car, and 
neither has the ownership of it# The fate of the car 
will depend upon the terms of the hire, of the employment 
and the duration of the employee spouse's association 
with the employer company, rather than upon principles 
of matrimonial property law*"^
Money and Investments 
B ^ k  Aooouiits
Money owned before marriage and money acquired 
thereafter by work, luck, gift or bequest becomes a
family asset only if the owner thereof decides to let 
it be used for the purchase of a family asset® Similarly 
the income from employment is the separate property ofpthe earning spouse* "
There is therefore every reason for tho maintenance
of separate bank accounts® There is scope for friction 
in the notion of the joint account in respect of which 
there may be unequal contribution and participation*
For this reason, only joint accounts, the contents of 
which are owned jointly (without proof presumed to be so), 
opened for farrlly 'Fdrppses would be encouraged at all, 
and even these would not be necessary® Spouses would 
have only themselves to blame if a joint account, divided 
at }3ppkillnad or separation or termination of marriage, 
is divided in a manner which they did not foresee or intend, 
Joint /
«. G f ®  M e m ooN o *415 P r o p n » 5 S ,  and Faculty Response, 
p p .8 2 -8 4 , S ee  b»C , N oe86 , 3 * 1 1 7 ,See, however, compensation scheme *
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Joint b an k  accounts would not be forbidden, but 
joint o w n e rsh ip  would be p re su m ed  and t h e r e  would be 
no room f o r  proof of contribution, where the spouses 
have chosen the family a s s e t  system g w here  they have 
not, joint b a n k  accounts would be dealt with in the 
present m a n n e r , according to contribution, but such 
p e r s o n s  are l i k e l y  to prefer s e p a r a t e  bank accounts 
in an y  event.
Ante ^nuptial investments shall b e  separate property,
and so too will be shares bought with separate property -
though the income arising may be called upon f o r
compensation purposes or to help with the running of
the household (there being joint and several liabilityof o r  household debta)^* Savings from earnings n o t  
required to meet household debts, will be placed in 
separate bank o r  ( p e r h a p s )  Building S o c i e t y  accounts, 
as convenient. Where f a m i ly  assets a r e  realised and 
t h e  proceeds not reinvested in other f a m i ly  assets o r  
lodged in joint account f o r  family p u r p o s e s ,  the sum 
should be divided and one half thereof placed in the 
bank a c c o u n t  o f  each s p o u s e, (Equally, a 'separate® 
investment might b e  realised, and the money used to 
buy a f a m i ly  asset (or 'separate® oaah used to buy such 
an asset), and here again, there would be a change in 
the character of the asset).
The 'separate property® and ' f a m i l y  assets® distinction 
will /
1* It would be better by far, it i s  submitted, for theparties to have separate a c c o u n ts  from which t h e y  may extract subis to pay into a comon household account when necessary i n  te rm s  of the joint o b l i g a t i o n  for household debts and the reciprocal obligation to aliment«2, Of course, spouses may wish to buy shares as familyInvestments (and hence family assets) and t h e  sharecertificate would be in joint names. As toa d m i n i s t r a t i o n  thereof, see below.
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will render quite unnecessary provisions common in 
systems of deferred community which exist to discourage 
'waste' of one's ot/ui assets, resulting in prejudice to 
the other's rights on dissolution® The concept of 
'disloyalty' in the use of one' own funds is, it is 
submitted, confusing, productive of uncertainty, 
undesirable and unrealistic,
Change in the Nature of an Asset
Professor Kahn-Freund has suggested that in his 
view, change of character would be possible, especially 
from 'investment' to 'family' character.
In the scheme envisaged here, it has been pointed
out already that investment or separate property might
be used to purchase family assets and thereby become
part of the matrimonial property stock, and that realised
joint property might come into (equal) separate
ownership» However, in general, 'separate*,'heirloom',
and 'family asset' status would be constant. The nature
1of an asset may be changed judicially*
Protection of Third Parties
Kahn-Freund's scheme (1971) is one for internal 
operation only* "Third parties should be protected in 
their reliance on the outward appeax’ance of things * "
(It may be thought that the greater is the incidence of 
separation of property, the happier is the creditor,) 
Eahn-Preund pleads for justice within the family, not 
for "homestead" legislation, designed to protect the 
family against its creditors. At least in relation to 
heritage, he wishes the system to operate in personam 
only. Household chattels are treated differently: 
that which is apparently joint property should be held 
to be so, and neither spouse should be able to dispose 
of such property without the concurrence of the other, 
and /
See infra, Remedies*
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and the creditor of one spouse should be entitled to 
enforce his debt against the debtor's one half share 
In the subject attached*
In the system here advanced (iisseta)^ , for 
"important transactions", joint consent shall be 
necessary (and judicial consent interposed in cases of 
u n r e a s o n a b l e , u n j u s t i f i e d  r e f u s a l  of consent)* "Im%)ortant 
transactions" must be defined* The r e m a in d e r  of the 
topic is bound  up w i th  joint and several liability in 
the matter of the household running costs, and rights 
in 'bankruptcy *
Important Transactions
Joint consent is necessary for important transactions 
in m a t t e r s  of everyday a d m i n i s t r a t io n *  w here  the act 
comes within a c r i t e r i o n  similar to that found in the 
Partnership Act, 1890* a#5 (acts for c a r r y i n g  on in the 
u s u a l  way business of the kind carried on by the firm 
/family)* joint consent c a n  be presumed* and lntô3?nal 
p r o h i b i t i o n s  on  a spouse's p o w ers  of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ^  are 
no  concern of the creditor, and will not prejudice him#
The rules of actual and ostensible a u t h o r i t y  shall a p p ly *  
an d  where* according to internal rules* a spouse 
h a b i t u a l l y  o v e r s t e p s  h i s  actual authority* a stripping 
o f  authority and return to orthodox 'housekeeping'3allov/ance' system may be necessary#^
It is n e c e s s a r y ,  therefore, to define "important 
transactions"* In Germany* w here  there is no instant 
Gommunity* married, persons nevertheless (Eire hampered in 
transacting with t h e i r  own property in that some such 
transactions must be made w i th  consent of both spouses*
A /
1. As to heritage, see2* unless made pu'blic Æowledgo (which is unlikely until Boskillnad. see Homediaa)* p* Bee Hemedioa$ At this point, it may be t h a t  somecompensation should be given by the erring to the aggrieved spouse* if p o s s i b l e  out of his 'own' 
r e s o u r c e s *
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A spouse without the other's consent may not dispose 
of his whole property, nor his items of household 
plenishing and equipment, and any purported contract 
is inchoate, and is null and void if consent is refused» 
Again, in Prance, contracts of hire-purchase must be 
entered into by both parties, but in other contracts 
third parties are entitled to assume that a party who 
has possession of a moveable is entitled to transact 
with regard to it, unless the moveable is an item os 
furniture, or by its nature might raise a query as to 
whether it was not the property of the other spouse®
Pascal (Louisiana) writes, "Being married must not 
be made an occasion for inconveniencing third persons in 
their normal dealings with husbands and wives in daily 
life"» This is a starting-point generally agreed* the 
more so in any projection for future dealings with married 
persons* because it seems likely that by the end of this 
century, there will be few people who are not, or have not 
been, married®
These things being so, it is suggested that the 
following shall be "important transactions" requiring 
joint consent ; first * hire-purchase- , and all security 
transactions, where money is advanced on the security of 
a 'family asset', and second  ^the sale, gift or loan of 
any 'family asset' exceeding, say, £400 in monetary value 
Hence for example, if a painting is sent for auction, the 
duty shall lie upon the auctioneers when it is lodged for 
sale to make all reasonable enquiries about status of 
owner, joint consent, heirloom or separate status and 
related /
lo Joint ownership of the home demands of course joint action in important transactions in respect of it - e,g* sale, purchase, security, large-scale improvement (but not small-scale, daily management transactions)*
2“ . addine a new dimension of complexity to  a s u b je c t  h ig h ly(Consumer Credit) Act ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  com plex,the sum to be 'inflation-linked' and able to be raised by Statutory Instr-ument.
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related points» If this were a formality* i t  would be 
a n o n s e n s e .  If too heavy a duty were laid upon the 
auctioneer, it would be u n w o rk a b le  and a nonsense» 
Similarly, where a valuable item appearing to be of the 
genus 'family asset® is offered for sale, gift or loan 
to a third party by a married person, the third p a r t y  
is put on hie e n q u i r y .  It i s  suggested that if an y  
of t h e  following i s  produced, the third p a r t y  should 
be justified i n  transacting with the person before him:- 
certificate of (unmarried) status^, or statement of joint 
consent (signed in the presence of the t h i r d  p a r t y  o r  
in probative form'"), ante-nuptial marriage contract 
providing for separation of assets, decree of divorce 
or separation, or decree of separation of assets 
(Boskillnad), or of withdrawal of partnership authority 
from the other partner (infra), or order of 'heirloom* 
or 'separate* status» Upon s i g h t  of one of those* the 
third party m ig h t safely p r o c e e d ;  if he should transact 
without such guarantee* he must take the possible 
consequences*^ On the other hand if necessary consent 
had not t r u l y  been given (through mental r é s e r v a t i o n  o r  
falsification of documents), t h i s  would b e  no concern o f  
the bona fid© third p a r t y ,  T h i r d ,  where there was a 
suggested sale* gift or loan of assets appearing t o  be 
family assets and amounting in aggregate to a m o n e ta ry  
value o f  £400, an "important transaction" again would be 
encountered and the ab o v e  rules would apply. Here there 
would be an attempt to protect sales of t h e  majority o r  
totality /
w«wrasi^v'9ftW=rVi'.»'^.W
1« to be obtained from the R e g i s t r a r  of Births, Marriages and Deaths* For practical reasons and ease of business transactions, few situations should r e q u i r e  reference to be made to the Registrar, And see suggestion infra t h a t  persona should be presumed to be u n m a r r ie d ,  i n  the absence of actual o r  constructrve 
k n o w led g e  of the third party that that is not so*
2# See discussion above with r e g a r d  to the obtaining o f  true consent to transactions p e r t a i n i n g  to the hom e,3» See in f e , .
10G1.
totality of t h e  family assets. Fo u r t h , t r a n s a c t i o n s
pertaining; to l a n d  and heritable property would be 
"imx>ortent transactions"* It goes a lm o s t  without 
saying that transactions concerning the home are 
important transactions. The home is also a f a m i ly  
asset and so w ould  be included also in the categories 
of transaction above mentioned, although in the foregoing 
discussion* for convenience* reference was made to "the 
matrimonial home and family assets" « In any case the 
title to the home stands in both names* and one might 
say that there* as distinct from the situation with 
regard to the family assets* there is 'formal® joint 
omiership clearly visible to the outside world and 
impoi'ting* of course* the normal consequences* Special 
suggestions are made above about a procedure which might 
be followed to try to ensure that consent of each to a 
transaction pertaining to the home was freely given®
If consent of the non^contracting spouse is 
necessary in terras of these rules* and if it has not 
been given* and if the third p a r t y  has not insisted upon 
having sight of any of the d o cu m en ts  listed above* the 
contract shall be r e d u c i b l e  at the i n s t a n c e  of the non«- 
contracting* non-consentiag spouse at any point up to 
the t r a n s f e r  of title to a subsequent bona fide third 
party® I n  o t h e r  words* the contract will be voidable.
Undoubtedly these p r o v i s i o n s  eeora c lu m sy  yet some 
such procedure is a concomitant o f  joint ownership and 
joint a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  u n l e s s  it be held that each joint 
o%fner must ®ta1^ e his chance* as regards the actings of 
the other* for the s a k e  of the smooth and s p e e d y  running 
of business mid the protection of third parties* retaining 
Miways the remedy of the seeking of BoskllXnad if the 
financial a s p e c t  o f  the marriage partnership becomes 
unworkable® Certainly* remarkably few  disputes appear 
to /
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to arise at present with regard to the* administration
of what* in a system of separation* are in effect
family assets* and it may he that* in transactions1concerning corporeal m o v e a b le s  * t h e  best c o u r s e  is 
to allow strangers to t h e  marriage to assume joint 
consent* and lot the married parties settle matters 
between themselves® However* for the sake of argument * 
a distinction Is drawn in the present rules between 
"important transactions" and "minor" femiily asset 
transactions.
"Minor' i  Family Asset T r a n s a c t i o n s
In all transactions* which a r e  not "important" 
transactions as above defined* t h e r e  shall operate in 
favour of a third party a provision similar to that 
contained in t h e  Partnership Act* 1 8 9 0 , 8 . 5 ,  Each 
m a r r ie d  person shall be vested with authority to carry 
on the 'business side® of the marriage in the u s u a l  w ay , 
unless the third p a r t y  knows that he/she has no such 
authority* The third party therefore may assume either 
that the person with whom he is dealing is a married 
[?3on with authority to transact^ w  a person not
c u r r e n t l y  married who may do as he wishes with what is 
his own. Only where a person knoim to be m a r r ie d
purports to make a contract e x t r a o r d i n a r y  in its terms%should the third party be put on his guard#^ Here alone 
would t h e  notion of c o n s t r u c t i v e  bad faith'^ '^ be used* 
allowing /
1. at least* those w here  no writing le r e q u i r e d ;  i n  the already cumbersOBie cx*edit contracts, a further complexity would be less troublesome* more easily absorbed into a schema of p a p e rw o rk , and less surprising and u n w elco m e ,2. i.e. married within t h e  sch em e, so married but sc h e m e ' s  
p r o v i s i o n #  having been terminated by Bpskillnad* m a r r ie d  
w i th  independent property r e g u l a t i o n /3 . c f # (partnership) Paterson B ro s ,  v* Gladstone (1891)18 R .4 0 3 .4. Actual k n o w led g e  would amount to actual bad faith; 
and  see i n f r a ,  'Remedies® (4).
1a l l o w i n g  t h e  a g g r i e v e d *  n o n - c o n t r a c t i n g *  n o n - c o n s e n t i n g  
s p o u s e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  c o n t r a c t  a t  a n y  t i m e  u p  t o  t h e  
t r a n s f e r  o f  t i t l e  t o  a  s u b s é q u e n t  b o n a  fide t h i r d  p a r t y ®*ertyi*i«ni;;S;ïXï«rièa‘»Cwseïÿ<ÿa.*ijl?b*i£3 '
T h e  c o n t r a c t  is v o i d a b l e ®
T h e  m a x i m  o m n i a  rite a c  s o l e m n i t o r  a c t a  
p r a e s u T i i i i n t u r e  w o u l d  a p p l y *  t o  e n t i t l e  t h e  third party t o  
a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  r u l e s  o f  i n d o o r  m a n a g e m e n t  w e r e  o r t h o d o x *  
U n l e s s  the third p a r t y  k n e w  o f  a  diminution i n  a  married 
p e r s o n ' s  o s t e n s i b l e  a u t h o r i t y  e n d o w e d  b y  marriage,  h o  
w o u l d  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  a s s u m e  t h a t  e a c h  p a r t y  h a d  f u l l  
p o w e r  t o  c a r r y  o u t  n o r m a l  p u i r c h a s e s  and s a l e s  (and t o  
m a k e  r e a s o n a b l e  g i f t s )  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  s u c h  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  a s  a r e  u s u a l  i n  t h e  r u n n i n g  o f  a  h o u s e h o l d ®  
P r o o f  o f  knowledge o f  a c t u a l  ( l e s s  e x t e n s i v e )  a u t h o r i t y  
w o u l d  f i x  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  w i t h  b a d  f a i t h *  a n d  r e n d e r  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  v o i d a b l e  «
I f  a  c o n t r a c t  i s  n o t  r e d u c e d  ( b y  r e a s o n  of d e l a y  
b y  t h e  e n t i t l e d  s p o u s e  * o r  b y  r e a s o n  o f  h i s / h e r  c h o i c e ) ,  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  m a y  b e  s o u g h t  f r o m  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  a n d / o r
t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e ®  T h e i r  liability s h a l l  b e  j o i n t  a n d
s e v e r a l ®  I f  n o  b l a m e  c a n  b e  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y ,
c o m p e n s a t i o n  m a y  b e  s o u g h t  f r o m  t h e  other s p o u s e , ^  t o  b e
f u n d e d  o u t  o f  t h e  l a t t e r ® s  s e p a r a t e  property# A c t i n g s  
b e y o n d  o s t e n s i b l e  authority might b e  r a t i f i e d  b y  t h e  
o t h e r  s p o u s e *  i n  h i s / h e r  o p t i o n #
I t  m i g h t  b e  that, to p u r c h a s e  a  f a m i l y  a s s e t ,  a  
s p o u s e  i s  u s i n g  h i s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  ( t h e r e b y  c h a n g i n g  
i t s  n a t u r e ) #  A n  a p p a r e n t l y  u n u s u a l  o r  e c c e n t r i c  
t r a n s a c t i o n  m i g h t  p u t  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  o n  enquiry * to f i n d  
t h a t  t h e  t r a n s a c t i n g  s p o u s e  w a s  merely m a k i n g  a  unilateral 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  the s t o c k  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s ®
S u c h  /
«STa^T-,STt»TPWs$« ï^JWCT.^ ztr;;9as3rti^y>
1®  l a  s u c h  o i r c u m e t a n c o e ,  in t h e o r y ,  c o n s e n t  w o u l d  b e  
n e c e s s a r y *  t h e  " m i n o r "  t r a n s a c t i o n  b e i n g  a n  unusual 
o n e ,  a n d  w o u l d  n o t  b e  f o r t h c o m i n g  i n  f a c t ,  i f  t h e  other p a r t y ' s  w i s h  i s  t o  reduce t h e  c o n t r a c t #
2 #  S e e  R e m e d i e s ,  b e l o w #
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£i‘a o h  a  s y s t e m  w o u l d  p r o t e c t  third p a r t i e s *  
p r e s e r v e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a c t i o n  i n  e v e r y d a y  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  
remove t h e  o u t m o d e d  praeposltura a n d  a c h i e v e  a  h a r m o n i o u s  
w h o l e  w i t h  t h e  r u l e s *  n e x t  o u t l i n e d *  o f  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s .
L i a b i l i ' ^  f o r  H o u s e h o l d  D e b t s ®
H e r e  t h e  m o d e l  f o l l o w e d  i s  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  
f o r  p a r t n e r s h i p  d e b t s  ( P a r t n e r s h i p  A c t ,  1 8 9 0 ,  s ® 4 ( 2 )  
a n d  8.9). T h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  husband a n d  w i f e  f o r  
h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s  (their o s t e n s i b l e  a u t h o r i t y  b e i n g  o n  a 
s # 5  b a s i s  a e  a b o v e  e x p l a d j i e d )  s h a l l  b e  j o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l ®  
Hence, a  t h i r d  p a r t y  m a y  h o l d  a s  l i a b l e  t h e  party with 
w h o m  h e  contracted; o n  f i n d i n g  ( h e r )  t o  b e  a  woman o f  
s t r a w *  h e  c a n  p u r s u e  t h e  o t h e r  f o r  t h e  w h o l e  d e b t *  a n d  
l e a v e  t h e  latter t o  seek compensation f r o m  h i s  p a r t n e r *
It can be seen that no clear line of distinction 
could be drawn in practice between household debts and 
"minor" family asset transactions. Joint and several 
liability woi\3.d be particularly attractive and appropriate 
because liability would remain the same no matter into 
which category the transaction in question was thought 
to fall.
E q u a l l y ,  d e b t s  w h i c h  p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
of e a c h  a r e  d u e  only b y  t h e  o w n e r  s p o u s e *  and n e i t h e r  h a s  
any r i g h t  t o  l o o k  t o  t h e  o t h e r  f o r  a i d .  C r e d i t o r s  can 
a t t a c h  i n  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o n l y  t h o s e  s e p a r a t e  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  
m a r r i e d  d e b t o r ,  together w i t h  h i s  h a l f  s h a r e  i n  t h e  f a m i l y  
a s s e t s  /
In m o s t  c a s e s *  i t  w o u l d  b e  h o p e d *  c o m p e n s a t i o n  would be made informally# However, (the family
c o u r t  o f  t h e )  S h e r i f f  C o u r t  c o u l d  m a k e  a n  o r d e r  f o r  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  o r  i n  e x t r e m e  c a s e s  m i g h t  o r d e r  w i t h d r a w a l ,  
p e r h a p s  temporarily^from a  s p o u s e . j  h i s  p a r t n e r s h i p  
a u t h o r i t y o  I f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  s c h e m e  w a s  n o t  t h o u g h t  
u n s u i t a b l e  in p r a c t i c e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e ,  B o s k i l l n a d  
m i g h t  b e  o r d e r e d #
a s s e t  a .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  f o ; r  p a r t n e r s h i p  d e b t s */]
a l l  t h e  family a s s e t s  a n d  all t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  e a c h  w o u l d  b e  a t t a c h a b l e #  O n e  i s  l i a b l e  i n  a l l  
o n e ' s  i>roperty for a l l  o n e ' s  d e b t s .  T h e  l i a b i l i t y  
o f  a partner la in normal clronmstan.cea unlimited, 
a n d  i n  m a r r i a g e  i t  i s  n o t  t h o u g h t  t h a t  there c o u l d  b e  
m i y  l i m i t e d  partners# E v e r t  where o n e  s p o u s e  i s  
d e p r i v e d  b y  t h e  court of h i s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a c t *  ho/she 
m u s t  a c c e p t  t h e  a c t i n g s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  r a i l e s s / u n t i l  
Boakill nad or posGibly reinstatement of his/her authority 
o r  i n d e e d  r e p l a c e m e n t  b y  t h e  c o u r t  o f  t h e  a c t i v e  b y  t h e  
p a s s i v e  p a r t n e r ®
T h e  * housekeeping a l l o w a n c e '  w o u l d  d i s a p p e a r *  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  p r a e p o s i t u r e . * t o  b e  replaced b y  a  
s y s t e m  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s *  j o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  
f o r  h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s *  reoiprooal d u t y  t o  a l i m e n t *  and 
concurrent compensation# T h e r e  w o u l d  be no •savings' 
f r o m  housekeeping, u n l e s s  t h e  parties w e r e  t o  o p e r a t e  
a  j o i n t  household a o c o i m t *  w h i c h  then w o u l d  b e  t h e  
n a t u r a l  r e p o s i t o r y  o f  a u r p l t i s  common 'housekeeping™ 
e a r m a r k e d ' f u n d s  #
Where i t  appeared t h a t *  t h o u g h  concurrent
c o m p e n s a t i o n  w a s  b e i n g  g i v e n *  and t h o u g h  i n  t h e o r y  e a c h  
spouse must t a k e  his share o f  the h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s *  y e t  
t h e  b u r d e n  w a s  f a l l i n g  more h e a v i l y  o n  o n e  t h a n  o n  t h e  
o t h e r *  a n d  l i t t l e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  w a s  b e i n g  r e c e i v e d *  a  
r e m e d y  w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y #  I t  is t h o u g h t  t h a t  o n  
application t h e  c o u r t  m i g h t  re-assess t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  
g i v e n  in t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  a n d / o r  w i t h d r a w  administrativc 
a u t h o r i t y  f r o m  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e  and/or a l l o w  B o s k i l l n a d »  
( T h i s  w o u l d  n e c e s s a r i l y  involve w i t h d r a w a l  o f  a u t h o r i t y ) .
I n  s u c h  a  c a s e *  t h e  c o u r t  m i g h t  c o n s i d e r  i t  b e a t  t o  
reinstate /
1» Jointness o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  a t  l e a s t  w o u l d  remove 
t h e  a r g u m e n t  i n  a n s i m r  t o  the S h e r i f f  O f f i c e r  
t h a t  a l l  a s s e t s  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  s p o u s e  w h o  i s  n o t  
i n  debt#
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r e i n s t a t e  t h e  duty t o  a l i m e n t , and t h a t  I n  t h e  new 
'o o m p u lao ry *  ( n o W l t h o to n d l n s  c o h a b i t a t i o n )  form *
P r o b a b l y  a  spouse should oo&ao t o  have any iliability for the antovnuptial debt# of the other#
Separate debts (not being marriage partnea^ohip/ 
household debts ) whenever inourred should not be 
attributed to the aon^debtor epouae whether or not 
he has profited by or throng the marriage, and dobta 
"running with" asoeta whloh ozi marriage become family 
a s s e t s  w o u l d  n o r m a l l y  b e e o m a  household d e b t s  c a r r y i n g  
joint and several liability#
Bankruotoy
The principle# applicable shall be that. In the 
normal eaee, where there h&a been no judicial separation 
of property, créditera, whose debts relate to family 
transactions, may attach all the fmaily assets of the 
marriage partnership, and all the separate property of 
o ao h  s p o u s e  # F o r  " s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r ty "  d e b t s , c r e d i t o r s  
may attach all the separate property of the debtor epouso 
(including, of coures, heirloome), and one half of the 
family assets#^
It follows that the solvent spoume will be affected 
to some extent by the bankruptcy of the other, yet his/ 
her own separate property shall be immune# Clearly, 
though the bankn%ptoy of one partner will affect the 
lives of the foW^ly; concurrent compoueatlon will acaso 
whether the bankrupt epouae was the donor or recipient^; 
t h e  /
1# C o n t r a s t  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n ;  HeV,P* ($ o * )  A c t , 1 8 7 7 , s»4*( h u s b a n d 's  l i a b i l i t y  o n ly )  ( C h a p te r  1 ) .  T h re  p r o v i s i o n(SCO CU & W#, P J? .2 6 > -6 ) i s  o f  l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  Im p o rtem ee  8# U n d e r t h i s  s y s te m , e a c h  ep o u ee  own® o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  t h e  f a m i ly  a s s e t s *  'H e ir lo o m s*  a r e  s e p a r a t e l y  d e a l t  w i t h ,  a n d  t h e r e  w o u ld  b e  no  o w n e rs h ip  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i te m s *3# On bankruptcy, the court would take tho property aide of the marriage in hand, and there would" be a re»* assessment* If compensation did not ooaae, the recipient (solvent) spouse would b e  regarded a e  apreferred creditor; if the donor spouse was solvent,oomponsation /
*  See S.L.C.Memo,  No.  54» 7 * 1 “ 7»2,
1 0 6 7 #
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  w o x d c i n g - o u t  o f  t h e  d u t y  t o  a l i m e n t  w i l l  
h e  c h a n g e d .
A e  a t  p r e s e n t *  d o n a tio n s  i n t e r  v i r u m  e t  i t x o r e m  
Blade w ith in  one y e a r  a n d  day o f  h a n h r u p t o y  may h e  
r e d u c e d  a t  t h e  in s ta n c e  o f  c r e d i t o r s .
W h e r e  B o s k l l l n a d  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e *  c r e d i t o r s  m a y  
a t t a c h  o n l y  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t  spouse, 
S i n c e  ( h i s )  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  noxf w i l l  include a s s e t s  
o f  t h e  f a m i l y  a s s e t  g e n u s *  i t  m i g h t  h e  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
w o u l d  h e  a e  c o n f u s i n g  a s  i t  is a t  p r e s e n t ®  A l l  t h a t  
c a n  h e  s a i d  i s  t h a t  at B o s k l l l n a d g  d i v i s i o n  o f  f a m i l y  
a s s e t s  w o u l d  h a v e  t a k e n  p l a c e *  a n d  o w n e r s h i p  w o u l d  h a v e  
b e e n  established o f  particular i t e m s  a s  e v i d e n c e d  by 
i n v e n t o r y ;  t h e r e a f t e r  p e r h a p s  p a r t i e s  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  a w a r e  
o f  s u c h  m a t t e r s *  and m i g h t  be a b l e  t o  provide accurate 
i n f o 3 ? m a t i o n  a b o u t  f u n d i n g *  a n d  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  f i i n d i n g *  
o f  assets*^ (After B o a k i l X n a d *  separateness w o u l d  rule, 
and o n l y  i f  d i v o r c e  l a t e r  o c c u r r e d  w o u l d  ' c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  
k i n d *  p e r h a p s  be a  relevant consideration, *0ontribution
in k i n d *  would b e  a t  o d d s  w i t h  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  c o n c u r r e n t  
compensation o f  g a i n e *  and, moreover, i t  m i g h t  n o t  f i n d  
f a v o u r  /
c o m p e n s a t i o n  f u n d s  would pass t o  t h e  c r e d i t o r s *  
l a y i n g  a  b u r d e n  o f  r e p a y m e n t  u p o n  t h e  s o l v e n t  s p o u s e .  
( T h a t  w h i c h  a t  bankruptcy l i e s  i n  a  s p o u s e ' s  s e p a r a t e  
b a n k  account is h i s  separate p r o p e r t y  a t t a c h a b l e  b y  
c r e d i t o r s *  e v e n  i f  l o d g e d  t h e r e  t h e  p r e v i o u s  d a y  b y  
v i r t u e  o f  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  s c h e m e ) *  I t  is sufficient 
t h a t  t h e  b a n k m p t c y  o f  o n e  t o u c h  t h e  o t h e r  a s  t o  h a l f  of t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  -  t h a t  i s ,  a s  t o  
c a p i t a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  a e  t o  i n c o m e *
1®  I f  d e s i r e d  ft t h e  inventory drawn u p  a t  B o a k i X l n a d  c o u l d  
b e  k e p t  u p  t o  d a t e ,  b y  a g r e e m e n t  o f  r n o  p a r t i e s  i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  e a c h  e n t r y *  b u t  this c o u l d  n e v e r  b e  a n  
e n f o r c e a b l e  r e q u i r e m e n t i  o n l y  t h e  punctilious or 
h i g h l y - m o t i v a t e d  w o u l d  c o m p l y ®2, i*e* g e n e r a l l y  i n  p r o p e r t y  o r  p r o p e r t y - r e l a t e demergencies d i m i n g  marriage ( i n c l u d i n g  b a n k r u p t c y )  
t h e  s t r i c t  r u l e s  o f  ownership ( s o f t e n e d  b y  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  t h e  c o B i p e n B a t i o n  d e v i c e  i f  a p p l i c a b l e )  w o u l d  a p p l y *
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f a v o u r  w i t h  t h o s e  w h o  O B c h e w e d  t h e  concurrent c o m p e n s a t i o n  
d e v i c e .  î î e v e r t h e 3 . e s a  p e r h a p s  a t  d i v o r c e *  v j h o t e v e r  t h e  
a n t e c e d e n t  o i r ^ c u m e t a n c e s  ( i n - s c h e m e *  o u t - o f ^ ^ o h e m e ,  
B o s k i l l n a d ) # s o m e  d i s c r e t i o n  should h e  g i v e n  to t h e  c o u r t  
i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  property* O n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d *  t h e  scheme i s  I n t e n d e d  t o  r e n d e r  s u c h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
u n n e c e s s a r y ,  a n d  o u t - o f - s c h e s i e  p r o t a g o n i s t s  w o u l d  b e  
l i k e l y  to c o n s i d e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  k i n d  t o  b e  a n  u n c e r t a i n  
a n d  undesirable g u i d e ®  P e r h a p s  i n d e e d  i t  i s  a  s u i t a b l e  
c r i t e r i o n  o n l y  i n  t h e  c o h a b i t i n g  p o s t - B o s k i l l n a d  s i t u a t i o n ,  
a n d  e v e n  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  o n l y  s p a r i n g l y ) .
It remains to decide whether the terms of the M.V/fP®
(SC a) A c t ,  1881* 8 * 1 ( 4 )  w o u l d  r e m a i n  a p p r o p r i a t e *  T h a t
s e c t i o n  p o s t p o n e s  ( t o  t h e  c l a i m s  o f  o t h e r  c r e d i t o r s )  t h e
c l a i m  o f  a  w i f e  w h o  h a s  l e n t  or e n t r u s t e d  m o n e y  t o  h e r
n o w  bankrupt h u s b a n d  or w h o  h a s  a l l o w e d  her f u n d s  t o  b e
x B M i x e d  w i t h  h i s .  P o s s i b l y  a  c o h a b i t i n g  s p o u s e  s h o u l d
be t a k e n  t o  a c q u i e s c e  i n  a postponed ranking i f  (she)
l e n d s ,  o r  i n m i i x e s  f u n d s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  f u l f i l l i n g  ( h e r )
d u t y  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  a n d  t o  a l i m e n t ;  i f  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  or* even m o r e  t e l l i n g ,  i f
o o " 4 i a b i t a t i o n  h a s  c e a s e d  ( w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e
' c r e d i t o r '  s p o u s e  w i l l  r e c e i v e  n o  i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t
through living in the same house as the 'debtor* spouse)
p e r h a p s  t h e r e  i e  a  stronger a r g u m e n t  i n  favour o f  treating1the spowaes aa strangers and excluding the application 
of /
T h e  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n  n o w  (and u n d e r  t h e  s c h e m e ,  i t  
i s  s u g g e s t e d ,  q u o a d  s e p a r a t e  property o f  t h e  s o l v e n t  
s p o u s e  s u b j e c t  t o  w h a t  i s  a a i d  in g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  a b o v e )  
i s  s e t  o u t  i n  t h e  1 8 8 1  Act* s * 1 ( 3 ) s  " . . . « t h e  w i f e ' s
m o v e a b l e  e s t a t e  s h a l l  n o t  b e  subject t o  arrestment* 
o r  other d i l i g e n c e  o f  t h e  l a w ,  f o r  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  
d e b t s *  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  s a i d  e s t a t e  ( e x c e p t  s u c h  corporeal moveable© as a r e  u s u a l l y  possessed w i t h o u t  
a  w r i t t e n  o r  d o c u m e n t a r y  t i t l e )  i s  i n v e s t e d *  p l a c e d *  
o r  s e c u r e d  i n .  t h e  n a m e  o f  the w i f e  h e r s e l f ,  o r  i n  
s u c h  t e r m s  as s h a l l  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  s a x i e  from t h e  e s t a t e  o f  t h e  h u s b e m d ® "
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o f  8 , 1 ( 4 )  i n  t h o s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  P e r h a p s  t h e n  s h e  
s h o u l d  h e  t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  s a m e  m a n n e r  a s  a n y  o t h e r  c r e d i t o r .
O n e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  o f  a  s p o u s e  w o u l d  b e ,  
i t  i s  t h o u g h t ,  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  
a l i m e n t  d u e  t o  h i m / h e r  b y  t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e ,  i f  t h e  l e t t e r ' s  
r e s o u r c e s  a l l o w e d .
A l i m e n t
I n  G l a s g o w  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  F a c u l t y  R e s p o n s e  t o  
S c o t t i s h  L a w  C o m m i s s i o n  M e m o r a n d u m  H o , 2 2  ( A l i m e n t  a n d  
F i n a n c i a l  P r o v i s i o n ) *  t h e  M e m o r a n d u m ' s  s u g g e s t i o n ^  t h a t  
t h e  s p o u s e s *  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  a l i m e n t  b e  r e c i p r o c a l  i s  
e n d o r s e d ,  a l t h o u g h  d o u b t  i s  e x p r e s s e d  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  t h e  
o b l i g a t i o n  e v e r  w o u l d  b e a r  e q u a l l y  o n  e a c h ,  ( I f  s o ,  
w o u l d  t h e r e  b e  a n y  n e e d  f o r  i t ? ) .  I t  w a s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  
t h e  w i f e ' s  d u t y  s h o u l d  b e  t o  m a k e  a  m o n e t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t o  t h e  r u n n i n g  o f  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  , • • « i f  a n d  i n  s o  f a r  a s  
s h e  i s  r e a s o n a b l y  a b l e  t o  d o  s o ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o np
s h o u l d  b e  ' r e c i p r o c a l *  ,  w h e r e  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  c h i l d r e n  
o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  a n d  w h e r e  b o t h  p a r t i e s  w e r e  i n  g o o d  h e a l t h  
a n d  h a d  e m p l o y m e n t  p o t e n t i a l .  I n  e f f e c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  a l l  
t h a t  i s  m e a n t  i s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  s h o u l d  s h i r k  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
t o  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  a n d  t h a t  e a c h  s h o u l d  m a k e  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n ^ ,
A  p a r t n e r s h i p  b a s i s ,  j o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y ,  a n d  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  s h o u l d  h e l p  t o  e n s u r e  t h i s .
C o m m e n t s  o n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  r u l e s  o f  a l i m e n t  w e r e  m a d e  
i n  C h a p t e r  4 ,  a n d  F a c u l t y  c o m m e n t s  w e r e  m a d e  u p o n  t h e  
S c o t t i s h  L a w  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  c h a n g e .  A m o n g  
t h e  s u b j e c t s  u p o n  w h i c h  c o m m e n t  w a s  m a d e  w e r e  r e c i p r o c i t y  
o f  o b l i g a t i o n  ( F a c u l t y  R e s p o n s e  p p @ 4 - 6 ) ,  h i e r a r c h y  o f  
l i a b i l i t y  /
1 ,  P r o p n ®  2  ( 2 . 1 3 ) ,  . ^
2 ,  e q u a l ?  W o u l ^  t h a t  b e  n e c e s s a r y ^  l o g i c a l  o r  e v e n  
p o s s i b l e ?  . S e e  # a c .  R e a p .
3 »  i n  c a s h  ( b u t  a l s o  i n  k i n d  •--» a n d  o f t e n  t h e  w i f e ' s  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  o v e r  a  l o n g  p e r i o d ,  
i n  k i n d ,  a n d ,  a t  s o m e  p o i n t s ,  a l s o  i n  c a s h ) .
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l i a b i l i t y  a n d  e n t i t l e m e n t  ( 1 6 - 1 9 ) f  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
l i a b i l i t y  ( 1 9 / 2 0 ) *  expenses o f  l i t i g a t i o n  ( 2 1 ) *  r e s o u r c e s  
o f  o b X i g a n t  ( 2 2 ^ 2 $ )  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  s u b j e c t  o f  n o n -  
p a t r i m o n i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l i a b i l i t y  ( r e l e v a n c e  o f  c o n d u c t s  
p p . 2 5 “/ J 1 )  ( i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h i c h  a  f r a m e w o r k  o f  r u l e s *  
t a l c i n g  a c c o i m t  o f  c o n d u c t ,  i s  s e t  f o r t h *  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  
a  n e w  c o n c e p t s  " g r o s s  c o n t e m p t  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e " ) *  
m e t h o d s  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  a l i m e n t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  v a r i a t i o n  
o f  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  a l i m e n t  i n  s e p a r a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t s  
(34-36)% and ' r e m e d i e s ' ( 3 8 ^ 4 1 ) ®
"Compulsory" A l i m e n t  D u r i n g  C o h a b i t a t i o n
I n  particular ( a t  p $ 4 1 ) *  t h e  F a c u l t y  r e s p o n d e d  
w i t h  e n t h u s i a s m  to t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  ( P r o p o s i t i o n  5 9 )  t h a t  
a  s p o u s e  s h o u l d  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  o b t a i n  a n d  t o  a t t e m p t  to 
e n f o r c e  a  d e c r e e  f o r  aliment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n s  the f a c t  
o f  c o h a b i t a t i o n ®  " A n  offer b y  t h e  d e f e n d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  
s u p p o r t  in k i n d  i n  t h e  h o m o  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a  d e f e n c e  t o  
s u c h  a n  a c t i o n  i f  i n  f a c t  i t  w a s  t h e  l a c k  o f  a d e q u a t e  
support w h i c h  r e n d e r e d  t h e  a c t i o n  necessary*" T h i s  
s e e m s  t o  b e  o n e  o f  t h e  a r e a s  w h e r e  r e f o r m  i s  m o s t  g r e a t l y  
t o  b e  d e s i r e d ®  W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  parties c h o o s e  t o  a v a i l  
t h e m s e l v e s  o f  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e ,  i t  i s  t h o u g h t  
t h a t  this r e m e d y  s h o u l d  b e  o p e n .  However * i t  i s  more 
l i k e l y  t o  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  w h e r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  n o t  
a f f e c t e d  by a  c o m p e n s a t i o n  s c h e m e ,  o r  w h e r e  t h e  s c h e m e  
h a s  p r o v e d  u n w o r k a b l e *  a n d  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n *  
together p e r h a p s  w i t h  separation o f  a s s e t s * ^  i s  s o u g h t .  
S t r i c t l y ,  i f  t h e  c o n c u r r e n t  c o m p e n o a t i o n  s c h e m e  i s  
w o r k i n g  c o r r e c t l y *  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  n o  n e e d  t o  s e e k  
*compulsory /
1  # C o m p e n s a t i o n  r u l e s  m a y  b e  e x p u n g e d  w i t h o u t  r e n d e r i n g  
B o  s k i l l n a d  n e c e s s a r y *  S e e  infra * 'Remedies' ® 
C o m p e n s a t i o n ,  j o r n t n e s s  of a s s e t s  a n d  p r e t e n c e  o f  
p a r t n e r s h i p  a u t h o r i t y  bear n o  n e c e s s a r y  relation t o  
e a c h  other e x c e p t  t h a t  p a r t n e r s h i p  a u t h o r i t y  w o u l d  
b e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  w h e r e  t h e r e  w a s  s e p a r a t i o n  of 
p r o p e r t y *
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1' c o n i p u X 8 o r y  * a l i m e n t  ®
H e m o r e m d i m  N o , 2 2  © a y s  n o t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  e n f o r c e m e n t  
o f  s u c h  a n  a w a r d  o f  ' c o m p u l s o r y '  a l i m e n t *  e x i g i b l e  w h i l e  
c o h a b i t a t i o n  c o n t i n u e s ®  W h e r e  t h e  o b l i g e n t  i a  p a i d  
by credit t r a n s f e r *  a i T E i n g o m o n t s  could b e  m a d e  t h r o u g h  
e m p l o y e r  a n d  b a n k ;  w h e r e  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  i s  a  t a x p a y e r *  
a  s y s t e m  o f  t a x  c r e d i t  m i g h t  b e  e v o l v e d ®  Where t h e  
a l i m e n t a r y  d e b t o r  is p a i d  w e e k l y  i n  c a s h ,  the e m p l o y e r  
w o u l d  b e  g i v e n  a c o p y  o f  extract d e c r e e  a n d  w o u l d  d e d u c t  
t h e  a i a o m i t  s p e c i f i e d ,  r e t a i n i n g  i t  f o r  c o l l e c t i o n  by 
t h e  w i f e  or h a v i n g  i t  p a i d  i n t o  h e r  s e p a r a t e  bank a c c o u n t .  
H e n c e ,  s t r a n g e r s  t o  t h e  marriage would b e  i n c o n v e n i e n c e d ,  
b u t  t h e r e  m a y  b e  n o  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  s u c h  
schemes,  W h e r e  t h e  obligant c h a n g e s  h i s  e m p l o y m e n t  
f r e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  b e e  ( m e s  a c u t e .  I t  m a y  b e  t h o u g h t  
o d d  t h a t  0 0 - h a b i t i n g  s p o u s e s  s h o u l d  n e e d  t o  m a k e  u s e  o f  
s u c h  m a c h i n e r y  b u t  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  i t s  a d o p t i o n  might 
be many* ranging from unhappiness in the home and ignorenoe 
o f  t h e  obligent*© i n c o m e  t o  h a p l e s s  i n e p t i t u d e  i n  t h e  
management o f  m o n e y .  W h e r e  t h e  s p o u s e s  a r e  n o t  cohabiting 
a n d  enforcement o f  a n  a w a r d  i s  d i f f i c u l t  ( t h e  u s u a l  
situation), p e r h a p s  t h e  recipient's r i g h t  a g a i n s t  t h e  
o b l i g a n t  s h o u l d  b e  a a s i g n e d  t o  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  S o c i a l  
S e c u r i t y *  w h i c h  then w o u J / 1  m e e t  t h e  r e c i p i e n t ' s  n e e d s ,
' C o E i x m l s o r y '  a l i m e n t  would h a v e  n o  e f f e c t  u p o n  t h e  
c e n t r a l  f a m i l y  p r o p e r t y  s c h e m e ,  I t  w o u l d  b e  a  b l u n t e r  
i n s t r u m e n t  t h a n  t h a t  o f  c o n c u r r e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n *  a n d  
w o u l d  c o n t a i n  n o  i n h o r i e n t  e q u a l i s i n g  f a c t o r *  b e i n g  
d e s i g n e d  /
S e e  supra* Concurrent C o m p e n s a t i o n  P r o c e d u r e  ( o u t l i n e ) s 
: i f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i t s e l f  h a s  b r o k e n  d o w n *  a n d  c o h a b i t a t i o n  
h a s  c e a s e d ,  a^  p a r t y  w h o  h a d  m a d e  u s e  o f  t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  scheme w o u l d  n o t *  o f  c o u r s e *  b e  p r e c l u d e d  from 
s e e k i n g  t h e  traditional r e m e d i e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  a n d  
a l i m e n t  o r  a d h e r e n c e  a n d  aliment* E a r l i e r  i t  is 
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  c o u l d  b e  t e r m e d  e i t h e r  ' m o d i f i e d  
c o m p e n o a t 1 o n  ® o r  * a l i m e n t  * ,
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deelgnod for maintenance of home and family, rathei' 
than aBsimllation of opportunity to auBass® 
property division 031 subséquent divorce might be an 
apparently more far-reaoihing exeroiae* and one having
a  l e s s  c e r t a i n  r e s u l t  t h a n  w o u l d  t h e  same p r o c e s s  
w h e r e  t h e  parties h a d  a d h e r e d  t h e ^ o u g h o u t  marriage t o  
t h e  concurrent c o m p e n s a t i o n  s y s t e m *
I n t e r - S p o u s e  a n d  O t h e r  L i t i g a t i o n
I n  a l l  m a t t e r s  a f f e c t i n g  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  i t  
i s  t h o u f d i t  t h a t  a  s u o u s e  may a u e  t h e  o t h e r  e x  c o n t r a c t u  
o r  e x  d e l i c t o ®  P r o p e r t y  (ownership) d i s p u t e s  w o u l d  
b e  a e t t l o d  b y  ( t h e  f a m i l y  c o u r t  o f )  t h e  S h e r i f f  C o u r t ,  
u s i n g  t h e  new r u l e s  h e r e  put f o r w a r d  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ®  
Contractual or d e l i c t u a l  d a m a g e s  w o u l d  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  
s e p a r a t e  f u n d s  o f  t h e  s u o e o s s f u l  s p o u s e .  E x p e n s e s  w o u l d  
b e  mot o u t  of s e p a r a t e  f u n d s ®  T h e  o u t c o m e  o f ,  a n d  
f i n a n c i a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f ,  l i t i g a t i o n ,  i n s t i g a t e d  o r  
d e f e n d e d  by a  m a r r i e d  p e r s o n  a g a i n s t  a  s t r a n g e r  t o  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  f o r m e r ' s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  
w o u l d  b e  n o  c o n c e r n  o f  h i s  s p o u s e ®  O n  t h e  other h a n d ,  
l i t i g a t i o n  b y  or a g a i n s t  a  m a r r i e d  p e r s o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
family p r o p e r t y  w o u l d  b e  o f  f a m i l y  p r o p e r t y  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  
s i n c e  t h e  c o s t  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  a  household d e b t ,  
and s u r a s  r e c e i v e d  w o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e  
a s  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t  | jenpus%  p e r h a p s  t o  b e  u s e d  t o  b u y  
f a m i l y  a s s e t s  o r  t o  b e  l o d g e d  a s  j o i n t  p r o p e r t y  in a  j o i n t  
bank account * if such e x i s t s ,  b u t  would b e  s u b j e c t  t o  
change o f  nature t h r o u g h  actings o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  in dividing 
i t  a n d  p l a c i n g  t h e  m o n e y  i n  s e p a r a t e  accounts.
G a m b l i n g  G a i n s
4
W h e r e  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  a r e  u s e d  in o r d e r  t o  enter a  
c o m p e t i t i o n  o r  l o t t e r y ,  any r e s u l t i n g  gain s h o u l d  b e  a  
family /
1 ,  ' n o  m a t t e r  w h o s o  i-ras t h e  s k i l l  o r
t h e  l u c k  i n  b r i n g i n g  s u c c e s s .
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f a m i l y  a s s e t  ( w h i c h  m a y  b e c o m e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  b y
d i v i s i o n  a n d  p a y m e n t  i n t o  s e p a r a t e  a c c o u n t s ,  a s  a b o v e
n o t e d ) ,  a n d  w h e r e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  i s  n s e d ^ *  t h e
p r i z e  s h o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y .  H o w e v e r ,
t h i s  i s  s i m p l i s t i c ,  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  m i g h t  b e  d i f f i c u l t2m a t t e r s  o f  p r o o f ,  a n d  p r e s u m a b l y  t h e  c o u r t  w o u l d  
c o n t i n u e  t o  r e f u s e  t o  e n t e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  
s n o u s i o n e s  i l u d i c v g i e *  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  s p o u s e s *  f o r t u n e s  
r e m a i n  l i n k e d ,  i n  t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  t h r o u g h  g o o d  l u c k  
( o r  t h r o u g h  a n y  o t h e r  c a u s e )  i n  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  o n e  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a n  e f f e c t  u p o n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  o r  ( t o  a  l e s s  e x t e n t ) ,  c o m p u l s o r y  a l i m e n t ,  
s c h e m e .  I n  m a n y  c a s e s ,  a  s p o u s e  w o u l d  c h o o s e  t o  
r e - i n v e s t  t h e  w i n n i n g s  i n  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  o r  t o  g i v e  t h e  
o t h e r  p a r t n e r  a  s h a r e  i n  t h e  g o o d  f o r t u n e ,  y e t ,  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  r u l e  g o v e r n i n g  g r a t u i t o u s  a c c i u i r e n d a  
s h o u l d  a p p l y ,  a n d  t h u s  w h e r e  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  h a s  b e e n  
u s e d  t o  q u a l i f y  t o  e n t e r  a  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  w i n n i n g s  
s h o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y .
W h e r e  t h e  f a m i l y  a s s e t  s c h e m e  w a s  n o t  i n  o p e r a t i o n ^ ,  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  o f  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a s c e r t a i n  
c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  w o u l d  b e  u s e d *
T h e  ^ e w  R e m e d i e s  
T h e  C o u r t
I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t  f r o m  w h i c h  t h e  n e w  
r e m e d i e s  w o u l d  b e  a v a i l a b l e  w o u l d  b e  a  n e w  c o u r t ,  t o  b e  
f o u n d  w i t h i n  t h e  S h e r i f f  C o u r t  s t r u c t u r e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
a n d  p h y s i c a l #  S h e r i f f  C o u r t s  a r e  a c c e s s i b l e ,  a n d  i t  
w o u l d  b e  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  a  r e m e d y  c o u l d  b e  s o u g h t  w i t h  
r e l a t i v e  e a s e  a n d  s p e e d ,  a n d  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  
i n c u r r i n g  /
1 ,  . ... n o  m a t t e r  w h o s e  w a s  t h e  s k i l l  o r  t h e
l u c k  i n  b r i n g i n g  s u c c e s s .
2 ,  t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  u n d e r  t h e  s c h e m e  h e r e  
e n v i s a g e d  t h a n  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s y s t e m .
3 #  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  c h o i c e ,  o r  o f  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n ,  
o r  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s .
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i n c u r r i n g  g r e a t  c o s t *
I d e a l l y  t h e r e  s h o u l d  h e  a  f a m i l y  c o u r t r o o m  w i t h i n  
e v e r y  S h e r i f f  C o u r t  b u i l d i n g  b u t  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e ,  
b e c a u s e  o f  l a c k  o f  m o n e y  f o r  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  t h i sAmay not be a f e a s ib le  suggestion®  Legal a id  would
be a v a ila b le  in  s u ita b le  ca ses  (judged by the ex ten t
o f  t h e  l i t i g a n t ' s  p r o p e r t y  ( s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  a n d
v a l u e  o f  o n e  h a l f  s h a r e  i n  f a m i l y  a s s e t s ) ) ,  a n d  t h e
c o u r t  w o u l d  b e  m a n n e d  v .  b y  a  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d
s t a f f  o f  S h e r i f f s ®  I t  m i g h t  b e  t h a t  s u c h  a  c o u r t
should be empowered to  grant d iv o rc e , but th a t i s  q u ite  2a n o t h e r  i s s u e .  T h e  r e l a t i v e  i n f o r m a l i t y  o f  t h e  F a m i l y  
C o u r t  /
l o  c f *  F i f t h  C o m m o n w e a l t h  L a w  C o n f e r e n c e  P a p e r s
D e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  F a m i l y  L a w .  C o u r t s  a n d  J u r i s d i c t i o n s *  
" S c o t t i s h  R e f o r m s  a n d  C o m m o n w e a l t h  " e x a m p l e s "* ( T h e  
l a t e )  S h e r i f f  P r i n c i p a l  R o b e r t  R e i d ,  p * 3 4 5 *
" I t  w i l l  b e  s e e n  t h a t ,  i f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  c o n s i s t o r i a l  
a c t i o n s  -  o r  i n  a c t i o n s  o f  d i v o r c e  -  w a s  c o n f e r r e d  
u p o n  S h e r i f f  C o u r t s  t h e y  c o u l d  h a v e  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
f a m i l y  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  a  f a m i l y  c o u r t  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  
w o u l d  l a c k  i t s  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  a n d  m a r r i a g e  c o u n s e l l i n g  
f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  m i g h t  f a l l  s h o r t  i n  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  
d e g r e e  o f  p r i v a c y ,  i n f o r m a l i t y  a n d  l a y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
w h i c h  a r e  c o m m o n l y  t h o u g h t  d e s i r a b l e  i n  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  
o f  f a m i l y  d i s p u t e s .  I f  t h e s e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  c o u l d  
b e  m a d e  g o o d  t h e r e  i s  m u c h  t o  b e  s a i d  f o r  a p p r o a c h i n g  
t h e  l e g a l  i d e a l  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  u n i f i e d  F a m i l y  
C o u r t  b y  t h e  c a u t i o u s  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  o u r  a n c i e n t ,  
n a t i v e  a n d  v i g o r o u s  S h e r i f f  C o u r t s  *"2* S e s u g g e s t i o n s  by L a w  S o c i e t y  a n d  R o y a l  C o m m i s s i o n  
o n  L e g a l  S e r v i c e s ;  c o n t r a ,  t h e  F a c u l t y  o f  A d v o c a t e s  
( M e m o r a n d u m ,  N o v e m b e F / ' H ^ n o )  h a s  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e t h e r  
S h e r i f f  C o u r t  d i v o r c e  w o u l d  b e  c h e a p e r  w h e n  a l l  
a s p e c t s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  u n d e r - u s e  o f  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n *  M o r e o v e r ,  m a n y  p e o p l e  p r e f e r  
t h e  ' r e l a t i v e  m i o n y m i t y ' o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  S e s s i o n *
T h e  F a c u l t y  c a l l e d  f o r  a  f u l l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  
t h e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c o n f e r r i n g  d i v o r c e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o n  t h e  S h e r i f f  C o u r t  ( G l a s g o w  H e r a l d  4 / 1 1 / 8 0 ) *
B it  see  now D ivorce J u r i s d i c t i o n ,  Court Pees and Devrai Aid ( S c . ) B i l l .
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C o u r t  m i g h t  r e n d e r  i t  ' o n s t i i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  t a k i n g  o f  s o  
fundamental a  s t e p ®  Ferhaps c h a n g e  o f  s t a t u e  s h o u l d  
r e m a i n  t h e  p r o v i n c e  o f  t h e  Gupreme Court » Many 
p r o p e r t y  m a t t e r s  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  d u r i n g  t h e  
course o f  t h e  r a a r r i a g e ,  a s  h e r ©  s u g g e s t e d ,  a n d  t h o s e  
remaining a t  d i v o r c e  m i g h t  b e  r e m i t t e d  t o  t h e  S h e r i f f ' s  
Family Court ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  b e  f a m i l i a r  already w i t h  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  circumstances a n d  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  R i a r r i a g e ®
T h e  R e m e d i e s^ 3*t‘»W~('WV-îrfA’ifïïS
T h e  S h e r i f f ' s  Family C o u r t  s h a l l  h a v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a u s e s :
(1) Declarator o f  P r o p e r t y  R i g h t s
OAt any tirne,^ ' either party may seek a ruling upon
t h e  c o r r e c t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  a n y  i t e m  a s  ' s e p a r a t e *  
property* 'heirloom* o r  f a m i l y  a s s e t ®  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
f o r  classification o f  a n t e - n u p t i a l  p r o p e r t y  a n d  p o s t ­
n u p t i a l  g r a t u i t o u s  a o q u i r e n d a  a s  * s e p a i * a t e ®  o r  'heirloom' 
t h i s  r e m e d y  w o u l d  require t o  b e  a v a i l a b l e ,  b u t  t h e  
petition p x a s t  b e  c o m m e n c e d  w i t h i n  t w o  y e a r s  o f  m a r r i a g e  
or acquisition®
M e m o r a n d u m  H o # 2 2  i n  P r o p o s i t i o n  7 0  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  
a  d e c l a r a t o r  o f  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  s p o u s e s  a n d  a n y  
o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  m a t t e r  s h o u l d  b e  a v a i l a b l e ,  b u b  s u o l i  a  
r e m e d y  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  i n t e n d e d  f o r  u s e  i n  a c t i o n s  
o f  d i v o r c e  o n l y »  T h e  F a c u l t y  s u g g e s t e d ^  t h a t  t h e  r e m e d y  
c o u l d  b e  of u s e  i n  o t h e r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  e v e n  d u r i n g  
s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  marriage a n d  c o h a b i t a t i o n ,  " a s  a  
t o u c h s t o n e  t o  r e s o l v e  d i s p u t e  i n h e r e  n o  c o n s i s t o r i a l  
r e m e d y  i s  s o u g h t ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  property r u l e s  
current ® "
(2 ) /
1 $ In a l l  instances, appeal w o u l d  b e  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
S e s s i o n ®2# S u b j e c t  t o  t h e  t w o  year t i m e  l i s m i t  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  
( b e l o w  a n d  a l s o  s e e  supra .)
3® p # 5 3 #
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(2) Shird I’arty Dealinpjs
C o n s e n t  o f  both s p o u s e s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  where a n  
" i m p o r t a n t  t r a n s a c t i o n "  i s  b e i n g  e n t e r e d  i n t o ,  b u t  
it has been seen that a third party will be protected 
i f  s o m e  e v i d e n c e  i s  produced t o  s u g g e s t  that t h e  
n o r m a l  rule d o e s  n o t  a p p l y ®  Hence, d e c r e e  o f  divorce, 
of j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n ,  o f  s a p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s ,  o r d e r  
o f  withdrawal from t h e  n o n - t r a n a a c t r l n g  partner o f  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  transact,  o r  proof o f  j u d i c i a l  f i n d i n g  
o f  t h e  ' h e i r l o o m *  or ' s e p a r a t e *  c h a r a c t e r  o f  p r o p e r t y  
w i l l  b e  s u f f i c i e n t ,  and s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  b e  p r o d u c e d  
b y  t h e  c o n t r a c t i n g - s p o u s e *  T h e  c o u r t ' s  f u n c t i o n  h e r e  
would be simply t h a t  o f  p r o v i d i n g  c o p i e s  where n e c e s s a r y ,  
e x c e p t  t h a t ,  a s  a b o v e  e x p l a i n e d ,  a  declarator may b o  
s o u g h t  i n  c a s e  o f  d o u b t  a s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n  a s s e t  
w h i c h  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  a  transaction, u n l e s s  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  o n e  t o  w h i c h  t h e  t w o - y e E i r  time l i m i t  a p p l i e s ,  
a n d  t h e  t i m e  limit h a s  expired®
à  third p a r t y  w o u l d  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  p r o c e e d i n g  i f  
t h e  o t h e r  s p o u s e  gave w r i t t e n  c o n s e n t  t o  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  
i n  h i s  p r e s e n c e ,  o r  i f  e v i d e n c e  o f  c o n s e n t  i n  p r o b a t i v e  
form w a s  p r o d u c e d ®  ( I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  a v a i l a b l e  
ih ?om  t h e  Registrar o f  B i r t h s ,  M a r r i a g e s  a n d  D e a t h s  a  
certificate t h a t  n o  c u r r e n t  m a r r i a g e  o f  t h e  t r a n s a c t o r  
a p p e a r e d  o n  t h e  R e g i s t e r ®  I n  s u c h  a  c a s e ,  w h e r e  t h e r e  
h a d  been e r r o r  in the R e g i s t r a r ' s  o f f i c e  in s e a r c h i n g ,  
o r  v j l i e r e  a  m a r r i a g e  d i d  n o t  a p p e a r  b y  r e a s o n  o f  h a v i n g  
b e e n  c e l e b r a t e d  a b r o a d ,  o r  w h e r e  f o r  a n y  o t h e r  reason 
t h e  c e r t i f i o a t e  w a s  n o t  c o r r e c t ,  c o m p e n s a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  
d u e  o n l y  between s p o u s e  a n d  s p o u s e  <. T h e  third p a r t y  
w o u l d  n o t  b e  prejudiced, and t h e  R e g i s t r a r  would n o t  b e  
l i a b l e ®  M o r e o v e r ,  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  i t  i s  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t ,  u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  f o r  d o u b t ,  a  
t h i r d  p a r t y  s h o u l d  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  r e l y  u p o n  t h e  a c c u r a c y  
of a transactor's statement as to status (e.g* unmarried; 
w i d o w s ( although h e  s h o u l d  s e e k  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  
point),  H e n c e ,  r e c o u r s e  to t h e  R e g i s t e r  w o u l d  n o t  
o f t e n  b e  h a d ;  p e r h a p s  its g r e a t e s t  u s e  w o u l d  b e  in t h e  
c a s e  /
c a s e  w h e r e  an. Important t r a n s a c t i o n  w a o  p r o p o s e d  t o  
b e  e n t e r e d  i n t o  b y  s o m e o n e  o f  marriageable a g e  w h o  
c o u l d ,  p r o d u c e  n o n e  o f  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t e s  l i s t e d  a n d  w h o ,  
h a v i n g  n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  t h i r d  pEO Zty i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
( e * g ,  i n  a  ' f a m i l y *  h o m e )  w h i c h  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  h e  w a s  
a married man* On the o t h e r i t  ma:y be that the 
b e s t  o r  m o s t  p r a c t i c a l  i s  , t o  p r o c e e d  f r om  t h e
8t§rtin^-po a stranger mgy presume the transactor
t o  b e  j m m a r r i e d ,  u n l e s s  h e  h a s  a c t u a l  k n o w l e d g e  t o  t h e
c o n t r a r y  o r  i s  f i x e d  with c o n s t r u c t i v e  k n o w l e d g e ,  o r  at 
l e a s t  w i t h  p o s s i b l e  c o n s t r u c t i v e  b a d  f a i t h ,  t h r o u g h  
h a v i n g  b e e n  p u t  o n  e n q u i r y  b y  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  ( e v e n  p e r h a p s  
b y  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  w e d d i n g  r i n g ) ®  O n l y  t h e n  s h o u l d  
t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  a s k  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  of a n y  o f  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t e s  
l i s t e d ) #
(3) Compensation
T h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  third parties and t h e  s m o o t h  
r u n n i n g  o f  b u s i n e s s  lies i n  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  intor-spouse 
c o m p e n s a t i o n »  U n l e s s  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  h a s  b e e n  f r a u d u l e n t  
o r  la%, h i s  t r a n s a c t i o n  u s u a l l y  s h o u l d  stand® Thus % 
w h e r e  a  p a r t n e r  h a s  o v e r s t e p p e d  h i s  a c t u a l  a u t h o r i t y  
and/or h a s  m i s l e d  a  s t 3?a n g e r  o f  t h e  marriage t o  t h e  
p r e j u d i c e  o f  h i s  p a r t n e r * ,  t h e  c o u r t  s h o u l d  b e  o p e n  t o  
t h e  l a t t e r  t o  s e e k  pecuniary compensation® E v e n  w h e r e  
r e d u c t i o n  remains p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  a g g r i e v e d  s p o u s e  m a y  
e l e c t  t o  t a l c e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i n s t e a d ®
( 4 )  Withdrawal a n d  Reinstatement o f  P a r t n e r ' s  A u t h o r i t y  
t o  A c t
O n  application b y  a  married p e r s o n ,  the court shall
h e a r  reasons ( o f  m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s ,  
p r o d i g a l i t y ,  f r e q u e n t  absence,  i r r a t i o n a l  or unco-operative 
b e h a v i o u r )  t o  . s u b s t a n t i a t e  a  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  i a  n o t  
f i t  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e  m a r r i e d  person's authority i n  i m p o r t a n t  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  /
Of® approach taken to "Minor" Family Asset Transactions,
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t r a n s a c t i o n s  a I f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  r e f u s e d ,  t h e
p e t it io n e r  may not r e -a p p ly  w ith in  one y ea r . I f  i t
i s  g r a n t e d ,  t h e  o t h e r  m a y  s e e k  r e i n s t a t e m e n t  a n d / o r
r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  f i r s t  m e n t i o n e d  p a r t n e r ,
h u t  t h i s  m a y  n o t  h e  d o n e  w i t h i n  o n e  y e a r  (o r  p o s s iM y  j u d i c i a ldiscretion'^
T h i s  r e m e d y  m i g h t  b e  a c c o m p a n i e d  h y  t h e  s e e k i n g  
a n d  g r a n t i n g  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s ,  h u t  t h a t  w o u l d  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  h e  t h e  c a s e .  ( O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  w o u l d  h e  a c c o m p a n i e d  a l w a y s  h y  
w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  b o t h ,  o f  t h e  p a r t n e r ' s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
a c t  -  a n d  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  p a r t n e r ' s  c o n s e n t ) .  U n l e s s  
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e ,  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
h o u s e h o l d  d e b t s  w o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  h e  j o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l ,  
a l t h o u g h  o n l y  o n e  s p o u s e  h a d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a c t  ( i n  
i m p o r t a n t  t r a n s a c t i o n s ) ,  a n d  c r e d i t o r s  w o u l d  c o n t i n u e  
t o  h e  e n t i t l e d  t o  l o o k  t o  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  a n d  a l l  s e p a r a t e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h  f o r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  d e b t s .
I t  i s  n o t  t h o u g h t  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  h e  p o s s i b l e  t o  
e n f o r c e  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  a  p e r s o n  o f  h i s  
m i n o r  t r a n s a c t i o n  a u t h o r i t y .  D e s p i t e  t h e  p r e c e d e n t  o f  
L e t t e r s  o f  I n h i b i t i o n ,  p r o v i d i n g  c o n s t r u c t i v e  n o t i c e  t o  
a l l  t r a d e r s ,  ( s u r e l y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  a n d  v e r y  i n f r e q u e n t l y  
m e t  w i t h ) ,  i t  i s  t h o u g h t  b e t t e r  t h a t  s t r a n g e r s  t o  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  s h o u l d  b e  p r o t e c t e d  u n l e s s  t h e y  h a v e  a c t u a l  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  j u d i c i a l  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  a u t h o r i t y *  T h e  
p o i n t  w i l l  a r i s e  i n  i m p o r t a n t  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  s i n c e  o n e  
s p o u s e  w i l l  a c t  a l o n e  b u t  i s  m u c h  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  a r i s e  
i n  m i n o r  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  H e n c e ,  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  m a d e  
t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  o r d e r  i n  i t s  t e r m s  w i l l  w i t h d r a w  t h e  
m a r r i e d  p e r s o n ’ s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a c t ,  s t r a n g e r s  t o  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  w i l l  n o t  b e  a f f e c t e d  h y  t h i s  e v e n t ,  e x c e p t  i n  
s o  f a r  a s  t h e y  h a v e  a c t u a l  k n o w l e d g e  o f  i t .  A  t r a d e r ,  
a w a r e  /
T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  c o h a b i t i n g  m a r r i e d  p e r s o n s  r e t a i n  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  m i n o r  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  I f  o n e  
i s  e x t r a v a g a n t ,  e x ’ i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  c a n n o t  a g r e e  o n  
l e v e l s  o f  s p e n d i n g ,  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
w i t h d r a w a l  o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  
h e  a p p r o p r i a t e o
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aware of the situation hy reason of having entered 
into an important transaction with the 'capax' snouse,fs5tr.-Sdi9i:ï^i.««ïi#rï5» '
could not then, without further enquiry@ freely trade 
in m a t t e r s  o f  minor t r a n s a c t i o n  with the o th e r #  The 
o n ly  o t h e r  i n h i b i t i o n  u p o n  a c t i n g  w ould  b e  i n  o a s e s  
where the (m in o r )  t r a n s a c t i o n  is so extraordinary in 
i t s  terms t h a t  the ordinary ( ”s ,[5 '')  authority could 
not be S a id  to apply to it, and that i s  a different 
principle %
111 effect, then, the withdrawn], of authority 
would pertain (only) to the requirement of joint consent 
for important transactions*
(5) Substitution of Judicial Consent
Withdrawal of authority would follow an established 
pattern of irrespon sib le  and/or unco-operative behaviour;
substitution of judicial consent would be available in 
cases of emergency, difficulty, isolated uxüieIpfulness 
or genuine disagreement*
Application having been made, the court may interpose
its consent to a transaction concerning the matrimonial
home or to any other important transaction* In certa in ,
non^ -contantioxiB, cases (where one partner, for example §
was abroad, and sw ift action was necessary) the procedure
would be speedy and quasi-administrative; in  others, the
whole circumstances would require to be la id  before the
court and a judicial discretion exercised* A free
discretion is advocated, but the trend now perhaps is
to give a relatively wide, but fettered, discretion* in
the form of a list of factors deemed to be relevant1subjects for consideration*
Where /
Of, e»g, M.0 .1 ,1975 , 8 ,25(1) ("It sh a ll be the dutyof the court**.to have regard to all the ciroumst one es of the case including.the following matters, that is to aay - "factors (a) (g); The Unfair Contract TermsAct 1977 CchGcl«2 ('G uidelines* for the application of the 'reasonableness* tost)(The Law of Contracts and related obligations in Scotland, David H* Walker, p.550)»
1 0 8 0 ,
Where one apouee knows that he will he absent 
for any length of tim e, and vihoro there are, for example * 
share8 the value of which laa^y fluctuate, it would he 
wise for him to grant to his wife a power of attorney 
and thereby render tîie seeking of judicial consent for 
sales and purchases unnecessary* Indeed* this should 
he standard practice in cases where consent to important 
transactions may he required speedily and may he difficult 
to obtain*
(6) Boskillnod
It may happen thaï;, though the spouses intend to 
continue cohabitation* the system of jointness (and 
concurrent compensation* if chosen) is not suited to 
th e ir  temperaments or wishes * In this case, the court 
will effect separation of all family assets except the 
matrimonial home, which will remain in joint ownershii:)# 
Division would he made on a simple basis of equal shares* 
Since many of the assets would he corporeal moveables, 
ideally division would be according to individual 
preference with money compensation if necessary# AOspouse would have separate power of administration ‘ to 
deal with his oim separate property. T it le  to property 
acquired th ereafter  would be decided in accordance with 
orthodox rules of property# The non-earning, or 
economically /
1Q Of* Scandinavian systems (Chapter 6).Hence* withdrawal of authority from both spouses (mid withdrawal of necessity for consent of both) would be ordered. There could be withdrawal of authority without Bopjo-llned* but the nature of Boslcillnad would r'eSc[ef“‘”We"'’notion of partner's aut'Eorrfy"quil't0 inappropriate. Creditors mast look to the separate property of the transacting spouse, no matter what the nature (household or personal) of the debt. As between the spouses, arguments about liability would be settled by reference to the operation w ithin  the marriage of the reciprocal duty to aliment or possible/, if applicable, to the terms and operation of a "compulsory" aliment order.
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economically weaker partner therefore would be in a 
le s s  good position than, had jo in tn ess of family assets 
continued to be the rule & Boskillnad means early 
separation of assets. It would be appropriate where 
the system of jointness proved unworkable in a particular 
marriage* Where the spouses, at marriage, were inimical 
to the system and the degree of community which it imports, 
they would "contract out" of it*  Boskillnad would beWil^TtvlrilhrSntKtWiyiy *
available at the request of both p a r tie s, or if the 
'financial* conduct of one rendered it desirable o r  
necessary, in the view of the courte
(7) "Compulsory" Aliment
An award of aliment may be made while cohabitation*7)continues^ but, as has been pointed out* this remedy 
would be intended for use where the concurrent oomponeation 
scheme was not in operation. Thereafter, petitions for 
variation would be entertained upon change of circumetanues.
Existing remedies of adherence and aliment and%separation and aliment and interim  aliment" would x*emain«
(8) Concurrent Compensation of Gains
A scheme of concurrent compensation would form 
the heart of tho new System.
Parties might choose to adopt a standard arrangement, 
or t;o make their own rules (to be ratified by the court) 
or to contract out of this most "community-influenced" 
aspect of the new rules here put forward. Whether the 
standard scheme or an individual scheme was chosen, 
enforcement and oversight of the system would lie with 
the court. P arties would be f r e e  t o  a lte r  the a r ra n g e m e n t 
by /
1. See "OontractinpydXit"5 below. However, latex*"oontraoting«"in" would be competent, one aixi of thedevice being maximum flexibility and helpfulnessin the mmmer of its use,2, giving effect to Sc^ L.Ooiii^ fiemo#Mo«22* Propn*39«3o though see comments upon "interim aliment", Chapter
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by agreement, but judicial ratification would be 
necessary if it was proposed to terminate the compensation 
process,
Concurrent compensation would bear no necessary 
relation to jointness of assets and presence of 
partnership authority* Ideally, all three would be 
present, but it is possible that a compensation scheme 
might be in operation in the context of a marriage in 
which (otherwise) there was separation of property. 
Alternatively, parties might choose to opt out of the 
compensation scheme, while retaining the notion of 
jointness of assets*
It is envisaged that an amount would be transferred 
by standing order each month from the bank account of 
the economically stronger partner, the amount having 
been agreed by parties or set by the court, taking into 
account the theoretical basis of the arrangement, namely, 
that each shall pay to the other one third of (his)
Income* It may be, of course, that the economically 
weaker spouse has no income, earned or unearned*
If termination of compensation is proposed, the 
court must accede to  the request,^ but i t  is thought 
likely that the court might consider it proper to make 
an award of "compulsory" aliment if the respective 
financial positions and earning opportunities were such 
as to suggest t h is .
On the other hand, if the parties preferred to 
revert to an informal, amicable agreement, or if the 
financial /
that is, if termination is proposed by both parties (Difficulties would be met in ascertaining whether each tmly had consented to th is  course of action) * Where termination is proposed only by one party, see infra "Oontracting-In"* This is an area where tho manner oi exercise o;t the judicial d iscretio n  would reveal the attitude of the judge towards commimity and equalisation notions* Perhaps guidelines should be provided.
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financial circumotances of recipient spouse had changed 
for the better, it would he desirable that the parties 
he released from the compensation regime. To some 
extent, the law would he attempting to create a climate 
in which the compensation device, in a form suitable 
for each individual case would bo the normal situation#
In this respect, compensation would resemble the 
'housekeeping allowance', but it would be more far- 
reaching in its effects, being designed to promote 
financial fairness, equality and independence within 
marriage#
(9) Judicial Separation
The court would entertain, in the usual way,
actions of separation. At separation ( i . e .  cessation
of cohabitation)g there would be separation of assets,
and new arrangements would be made with regard to the
1matrimonial home# The 'clean break' philosophy in 
property matters both on separation and divorce is 
favoured, but th is  might not be possible in respect of 
rights, including rights of occupation, in the matrimonial 
home and in many cases an award of maintenance (divorce) 
or aliment (separation) might be appropriate,^ It is 
quite possible that the popularity of separation as a 
remedy may decrease#
"Compulsory" aliment would cease at this time, asPwould a scheme of concurrent compensation."
(10) Divorce^  VO!trasi'sceE,rU5Cief>rCTr.<ei#lr^ i5
Divorce /
1# See juTfra, judicial powers on divorce# However, active^e ffo r ts  should be made to make a 'clean break' with regard to the house as soon as possible, 2, On cessation of cohabitation (as opposed to decree of judicial separation) concurrent compensation and "compulsory" aliment would not cease, bxit i t  would be open to either party (and presumably the payer would be the more interested to do so) to ask the court to terminate the arrangement# In these circumstances, of course, enforcement may be very difficult.
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Divorce jurisdiction would remain in the Court 
of Session exclusively.
Under the new scheme here proposed? divorce would 
be granted or refused in accordance with the rules set 
forth in the Divorce (Scotland) Act? 1976? as amended 
to take account of the new property arrangements and 
also to take account of any flaws in the 1976 Act whichpexperience has revealed," The 1976 Act changed the 
basis of divorce entitlement from fault to Irretrievable 
breakdown? in name at least? but made minimal changes 
to the treatment of property on divorce. The system 
remains that of provision of capital sum and/or periodical 
allowance to the party who (irrespective now of guilt and 
Innocence) reasonably claim such provision. There 
is no p o w e r t h e  court to order property transfers,
Tho principles upon which? under this scheme ? division 
of property would be made ? in the event of Boskillnad? 
judicial separation and divorce are later outlined.
OON'miOTlHa-IN
The standard system would comprise joint ownership
of /
1 ,  S ’u j t  f e x  jdt'ViTucx s 'h  I  ^ (jTLUxV CLcf^
dcgcut. Ai' ^ ( S ' c . ) é ’tX(- ^
2, Is a party entitled to withhold consent to a 2<-year 'separation with consent' divorce on the sole ground that the proposed financial arrangements are not entirely to his liking (there being no dissent in pri^cinlo i,e, to the severance of the marriage tie)?
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o f  t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  homo? a n d  o f  t h e  f a m i ly  a s o o to ?  and  
c o h c u r ro n b  c o m p e n s a tio n  o f  g a in s  * J o l n t n o s a  o f  home
i s  comm only fo im d  now ? a n d  i t  i s  th o  a o p e o t  o f  'co m m im ity  
o f  p r o p e r t y '  w h ic h  aroum os l e a s t  r e s e n tm e n t  among th o s e  
g e n e r a l l y  o p p o se d  t o  ch an g e ?  an d  a n x io u s  t o  r e t a i n  ae lf^^  
r e g u l a t i o n *  F o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s »  I t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  
t h e  o n l y  b a s i c  an d  ( g c m e r a l l y )  u n a l t e r a b l e  r u l e  o f  t h e  
new p r o p e r t y  system "^ s h o u ld  h e  t h a t  e p o u se e  s h a l l  b e  
j o i n t  o w n e r s  p r o  i n d r v i a o  o f  t h o  m a t r i m o n i a l  homo a o t h e r  
r u l e s  o f  t h e  new  s y s te m  may b e  c o n t r a c t o d  i n t o  ( b u t  n o t  
o u t  o f ^ )  a t  a n y  t im e  durdm g t h e  o o n t in u a n c o  o f  t h e  m a r r ia g e ,  
T h e  p r o b l e m  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  u n i l a t e r a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  o p e r a t i o n  o r  t e r m in a t io n  o f  t h e s e  r u l e s  
s h o u ld  b e  c o m p e t e n t  #
I f  u n i l a t e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ?  n o r m a l ly  to b e  a c c e d e d  
t o  b y  t h e  c o u r t ?  w e re  t o  b e  a llo w e d ?  t h e  s y s te m  w o u ld
c e a s e  i ; o  b e  " o p t i o n a l "  i n  a  t r u e  s e n s e  ; o n  t h o  o t h e r  h a n d ?  
i f  j o i n t  c o n c e n t  a lw a y s  w ae n e c e s s a r y ?  i t  m l ( ^ t  b e  a rg u e d  
t h a t  th o  r u l e s  w ou ld  o p e r a t e  o n ly  i n  tho o a s e s  w h e re  t h e r e  
w as l e a s t  n e e d  f o r  them *
The t e n t a t i v e  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  made t h a t  e i t h e r  p a r t y  
should be  e n t i t l e d  to moke application t o  the court In 
o r d e r  t h a t  I t  m ig h t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c i r c u m s ta n o e s  
o f  the p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e  m a r r ia g e  ? the onus lying on the 
a p p l i c a n t  t o  show  c a u s e  why? o n  a te m p o ra ry  o r  p e rm a n e n t 
b a s i s  /
1* a n d  w h e re  t i t l e  s t a n d s  i n  t h e  name o f  o n e  s p o u s e
o n ly ?  a t t e m p t s  o r e  b e in g  made t o  e s t a b l i s h  o c c u p a n c y  
r i g h t s  o f  t h e  non«»owning sp o u s e  an d  t o  g iv e  s t r o n g  a n c i l l a r y  p r o v i s i o n s *  ^ e e  M a tr im o n ia l  Homos (F a m ily  P r o t e c t i o n ) ( S c o t l a n d )  ' A c t , (1 9 8 1 )*2* t h a t  i s *  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  s y s te m t a s  a t  p r e s e n t  * t h e r e  w o u ld  be r u l e s  o i  t h e  g e n e r a l  la w  o f  u n i v e r s a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n  on s u c h  s u b j e c t s  o s  a l im e n t  a n d  r i g h t s  o n  d e a th  t e s t a t e  an d  i n t e s t a t e #  M o reo v er?  "c o m p u lso ry "  a l im e n t  w o u ld  b e  w o r th y  o f  i t s  nam e; a  sp o u s e  c o u ld  
n o t  b e  p r e v e n te d  a t  l e a s t  fro m  s e e k in g  s u c h  rem edy* 
H ow ever? e v e n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m a t r im o n ia l  home? 
some d e g re e  o f  f re e d o m  o f  a c t i o n  im u ld  b e  p e rm 3 ,tted *  S ee  I n f r a ?  O o n tra c tin g -^ O u t#3# S ee  Geibw? " C o n t r a c t in g  O ut"*
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basis g the marriage should he Buhject to the jointneES 
of family assets and/or conctirrent compensation 
procedure. Proof would concern matters such as tho 
earmings and earning power of each? the expenses of 
running the household and the manner in which that 
flnai).cial burden waa met? the amount of aliment (if 
any - probably 'housekeeping allowance' ) made by the 
e c o n o m ic a l ly  stronger party and the wife'a o p p o r tu n i ty ?  
if a n y , t o  amass separate p r o p e r t y .  The procedure 
would resemble closely an a p p l i c a t i o n  for "compulsory" 
a l im e n t  # A considerable degree o f  judicial discretion 
necessarily would be present.
A different solution would be a presumption that
in all m a r r i a g e s ,  parties were m a r r ie d  with jointness
of assets and with the benefit of compensation. This
would necessitate recourse to the court to ratify
contracting-out? or to hear a p p l i c a t i o n  by one party1as to why t h e r e  should be c o n tr a o t in g - ^ o u t  . The 
initiative as to action? and  the burden of proof? 
therefore would lie on the v;ould-be ' contractor-out '. 
This would be the more full-blooded approach.
Certainly? unilatex'al application for termination 
should be competent in cases where parties could not 
;reach agreement. (Where parties agree that compensation 
should cease, joint application for court approval 
(always granted unless there is evidence of fraud or 
coercion) would b© necessaary). Factors relevant for 
the /
Earlier? it has been s u b m i t te d  that w here  both parties seek termination of th e  concurrent compensation procedure the court should accede to the request but may t h i n k  it p r o p e r  to s u b s t i t u t e  an award of 'compulsory* aliment* Where only one party wishes to contraet’-out g the whole financial circumstanceB should be r e v ie w e d ,  as suggested above in the case where only one p a r t y  wishes to contract in? and r e l i a n c e  must be placed on the d i s c r e t i o n  of the court.
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the court's consideration would be variation in the
financial circumetancea of each or one pextyCiea),
unreasonable refusal o f  the economically weaker spouse
to make as good a contribution as (she) could i n  cash
ox* in kind? or extravagance? la effect? that which
would be relevant would be evidence about finance and
what might be termed 'financial conduct'» What ndght
be termed 'marital conduct® would not normally be
relevant? unless it had reached "Wachtel" or "gross1contempt of the marriage" proportions#
In all o a s e s ,  the onus would l i e  on the applicant? 
the party advocating change, to show cause why change 
s h o u ld  be made»
Enforcement
Where the compensation system was chosen expressly 
by the parties ? or was not excluded by choice of the 
p a r t i e s , as t h e  case may be, im p le m e n ta t io n  normally 
would proceed smoothly by way of transfer by order of 
the e c o n o m ic a l ly  stronger spouse from h i s  b a n k  account# 
Where compensation h a s  been ordered by the court, the 
e m p lo y e r  m alcing payment i n  c a s h ,  or the bank having 
the payer’s account, must comply with the terms of the 
extract decree p r e s e n t e d  by the payee, if i t  i s  i n  t h e i r  
power to do so, however inconvenient and time-consuming 
this may b e .  It m u st be admitted that where goodwill 
between the spouses is lacking, enforcement is likely 
to cause as many problems as occur today in the enforcement 
of awards of aliment. As has been s a i d ,  the notion of 
compensation would provide, it is hoped, a climate of 
opinion; w h ere  the payer becomes reluctant to pay, t h e  
payee might be advised temporarily to renounce (her) 
rights of compensation, and obtain a decree of alimentpwhich might be enforced through a tax credit scheme 
OX' ffy cn^ 0^ Juj^ pojL^jSA. 'X
tb .
1» Of# Memo,No#22, 5#73 and  Fac.heoponse, p#GG: factors r e l e v a n t  to entitlement to aliment#2# Gf# nomo#No»22, P a r t  V and PaCoHesponse, p* 8 2 #
1087a.
In March, 1983, the Scottish Law Commission published Consultative 
Memorandum No. 57: Matrimonial Property.
A cautious approach is taken, bearing in mind that the Scottish legal system is 
not used to systems of community, having had a system of separation of property 
for over a century. The Commission seeks views, but itself does not favour a 
system of community, or s ta tu tory  co-ownership of the home and/or the assets 
(but provides in an Appendix detailed Possible Schemes with regard to (1) co- 
ownership of the home and (2) co-ownership of household goods). Instead, minor 
reforms are suggested: presumptions of co-ownership of goods, and of funds in 
joint names, the facilita ting of co-ownership of the home (exemption from stamp 
duty on conveyances by one spouse to the other of a share in the home), the 
modernisation of the relevant s ta tu te  law on the subject, much of which is 
Victorian, and the suggestion of a remedy of distribution of property in 
circumstances other than divorce.
In view of the dates of publication of the Scottish Law Commission's proposals, 
and of final preparation of the thesis, it is not possible to make fuller reference 
to this important Memorandum.
1088
CONTRAGTING-OUT
Most cormnunity regimes permit "contracting-out" o 
Some (for example? South Africa) enforce fairly strictly 
a rule of "ante-nuptial contracting-out only".
In the scheme set out? the rules pertaining to the 
matrimonial home have been presented as standard rules 
and the remainder of the regime as optional.
Matrimonial Home
As a matter of principle? choice and freedom are
desirable attributes of any system of matrimonial
property. Is it the case? though ? that there exist
"matters of public policy beyond the reach of any1contrary agreement" ? Contra » that which may be a 
sensible rule for suburbia may be quite unsuitable for 
the great houses of the land. It is suggested that 
jointness of ownership of the home be the norm? but 
that the norm may be displaced either by the presence 
of trust provisions regulating the devolution of heritable 
property or by application to the court ? but not by 
ante-nuptial or post-nuptial marriage contract provision®
Family Assets
The three principal features of the scheme presented 
for consideration are (a) joint rights of ownership of 
the home and (b) of the family assets? and (c) concurrent 
compensation of gains. It is envisaged that (a) would 
be of wide application? (b) of us*^ cU. application and (c) 
of application where thought useful in the particular 
circumstances and? it is hoped? of (fairly) common 
application /
Professor Otto Kahn Freund (1959), p#270 (with reference to certain matters e.g. occupation of the home and use of the contents)».
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application o
However, it vroiild b e  c o m p e te n t for p a r t i e s  b y  
ante-miptial contract to exclude the operation of the 
family a s s e t s  rules# The c o r r e c t  procedure if parties 
after marriage wished to exclude these provisions would 
be to seek Boskillnad, r a t h e r  than to enter into a post-«astt»r;#t««H'strçisïîaBAW#Jiar.i!t?î**iJt£as?S'3 *
nuptial contract to that end, a course which would not 
be competent» On the o t h e r  hand ? post-nuptial 
modification o f  agreement; woixld be allowed f o r  the 
purpose, for example, of having applied to the marriage 
the ’f a m i ly  asset® provisions in whole or in part* 
'Contracting-ln', therefore, could be effected by 
agreement of parties at any time;* contracting-out' must 
bo done before marriage or by judicial order of separation 
of assets after m a r r i a g e ,
These would be  the provisions governing what the 
parties may do, i f  they w is h .  It would be necessary 
to read together with them  the rules governing what 
one party may do to force the issue if he (she) wishes.
Marriage-contraots today are rarely found. Where 
parties take trouble to draw one up, the reason is likely 
to be the existence of considerable or spectacular 
wealths It is possible that, in an atmosphere of 
heightened /
91. See eupra, 'Oontraoting-In ,2» OonsTSer% for example, Onassis-Kemiedy ante-nuptial marrlage-contract (October?? 1968), which is reputed to have contained 17:5 clauses? many non-financial in nature. The marriage contract has not been published, but hearsay suggests (The Daily E x p r e s s  22/9/77) that a transfer of nearly £2m in tax-free bonds was made to Mrs.Onasaia? that, if husband left wife ? he would give her nearly 16m for each year of their marriage and that, if sh e  left him before 5 y e a r s  of marriage had elapsed? she would receive 812m. Onaesis was to pay the rent of his wife's Haw York flat (nearly 8 6 , 0 0 0  per month) and her personal expenses ( 8 4 , 0 0 0  per m o n th ), A clothing allowance ( 8 4 , 0 0 0  p e r  month) was given? and provision of 8 5 ,0 0 0  each made for Mrs.Onassis's children, M rs. Onassis's share of her h u s b a n d’a estate amounted to 815m? after out o f  court negotiation with Onassis'e daughter. This was very much less than she might have received since it appears that u n d e r  G reek  law a widow is entitled to one quarter of her husband's assets /
lioightened a w a re n e s s  of m a tr im o n ia l  property problems 
and remedies? (or even for the salce of clarity in a 
m ore complex legal regime), there iiiight be a revival 
of interest in them? and they might become more commonly 
used# The normal rules concerning reduction of 
contracts ( f r a u d ,  error, undue influence? force and 
fear) would apply#
Oonourront Compensation of Gains
Here too reference is made to the rules which 
g o v e rn  th e  case where on© party wishes compensation to 
operate, or not to operate, and the other disagrees»
Where the parties are at one in wishing to exclude 
tho operation of compensation? t h i s  aim c a n  be achieved 
b y  the malcing of an  ante-nuptial contract containing 
s u c h  a provisions the contract may or may not contain 
a provision to exclude the family assets rules® As 
has been explained? if? after marriage? c o m p e n sa tio n  
proves unworkable or becomes u n s u i t a b l e , the p r o p e r  
course is to seek judicial approval for it to cease®
It would not be competent to try to arrange t h i s  by 
post-nuptial contract.
Hence, although there would be no general 
prohibition on p o s t - n u p t i a l  contracts? the permitted 
ambit of such contracts would be nai?row, being that of 
alteration /
assets# Onassis’a fortune? greatly r e d u c e d  b y  the end of 1 9 7 4 ? was estimated to be 8500m#How ever? a t  least in A m erica?  cohabiting couples 
a p p e a r  to be sufficiently apprehensive about the property consequences of non marriage to draw up n o n -m a r r ia g e  contracts? in order t o  ensure that neither has a claim against the other on termination of the r e l a t i o n s h i p #  They are concerned that there shall be no property consequences of non-marriage, despite t h e  efforts of the American lawyer, Marvin MitoheIson #1# Supra, Oontracting-ln®
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alteration of ante-nuptial arrangements# Basically?
the spouses would choose at marriage whether they
wished to participate in the property rules not at 1all, or in part, or wholeheartedly? and a po8t«*nuptial 
change of mind would require judicial oversight and 
approval#
The Principles Upon Which Division of Property will be 
effected? in the event of Boskillnad, Judicial Separation 
and Divorce
Division of property will be rendered necessary 
in the cases of judicial separation and divorce, and 
will be sought and granted? upon 1:;he proven imworkabi 1 it y 
of jointness, in the form of Boskillnad, where the 
marriage continues #
Boskillnad
This %'fill bo granted if sought by both parties 
or where the ("financial") conduct of one justifies the 
granting of the remedy#
Since the spouses cohabit stil],? a change in the 
rights of ownership of the matrimonial homo will be made 
only in exceptional circimatances# However division
will be made of family assets, and any concurrent 
compensation scheme will come to mi end in tho majority 
of cases, though not? of course? if the parties wish 
to have it continue nor if, in the discretion of the court? 
it is deemed desirable that it continue# (If compensation 
ceases? the court may make an award of "compulsory" 
aliment and, of course ? the reciprocal duty to aliment? 
latent if compensation is in operation? remains ready 
to revive, and will apply in all cases where there is no 
compensation or 'compulsory' aliment special arrangement)# 
There /
except in respect of the home - and even there the trust exception might apply? or special application to the court might be made @
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T h e r e  w o u l d  b e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a c t  a n d  
t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  j o i n t  a n d  s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  h o u s e h o l d  
d e b t s  *
Boskillnad or e a r l y  division o f  property w o u l d  
e f f e c t  a  return to a n .  o r t h o d o x  a y s t e m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  property f o r  t h e  s p o u s e s ®  The f a m i l y  a s s e t s  w o u l d  
b e  d i v i d e d  a n d  t o  t h i s  e n d  a n  i n v e n t o r y  w o u l d  b o  d r a m  
up. A s  e x p l a i n e d ?  m o n e y  s t a n d i n g  a t  credit i n  a  j o i n t  
a c c o u n t  w o u l d  be d i v i d e d  i n t o  e q u a l  s h a r e s ?  a n d  e q u a l  
d i v i s i o n  w o u l d  b e  m a d e  o f  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  s t o c k s  a n d  
shares or any other ’ p a p e r *  i n v e s t m e n t s #  C o r p o r e a l  
m o v e a b l e s  w o u l d  be d i v i d e d  i n  a s  e q u a l  a  manner a s  
p o s s i b l e ?  g i v e n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s u c h  property* and i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  so f a r  a s  possible w i t h  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of 
e a c h #  M o n e t a r y  c o m p e n s a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  d u e  i f  u l t i m a t e l y  
o n e  p a r t n e r  r e c e i v e d  m o r e  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r ®  S i n c e  t h e  
s p o u s e s  w o u l d  i n t e n d  t o  c o n t i n u e  c o h a b i t a t i o n ?  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  e a r l y  p r o p e r t y  s e p a r a t i o n  m i g h t  l i e  
rather i n  i t s  e f f e c t s  u p o n  t h e  ownership o f  l a t e r  
a c q u i r e d  a s s e t s  ( n o w  t o  b e  s t r i c t l y  s e p a r a t e ) ?  a n d  i n  
i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  a n y  f u t u r e  d e c r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  
s e p a r a t i o n  or d i v o r c e  (for e a r l y  d i v i s i o n  arrangements 
a s  e v i d e n c e d  b y  i n v e n t o r y  w o u l d  b e  u n l i k e l y  l a t e r  t o  b e  
d i s t u r b e d )  a n d  p e r h a p s  i n  m a n y  c a s e s  t h e  r e m e d y  w o u l d  
b e  a c c o m p a n i e d  by a  r e q u e s t  for t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  compensation 
o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  h a d  found c o m m u n i t y  t o  b e  
d i s t a s t e f u l  or u n s u i t a b l e  i n  their c a s e *
T h e  a i m  w o u l d  b e  c l a r i t y  a n d  r e l a t i v e  s i m p l i c i t y  
a t  d i v i s i o n #  E q u a l  division w o u l d  b e  m a d e ?  u n l e s s  
s p e c i a l  considerations (infra) m a d e  a  d i f f e r e n t  t r e a t m e n t  
a p p r o p r i a t e #
J u d i c i a l  S e p a r a t i o n
H e r e  s o m e  m e t h o d  m u s t  b o  f o u n d  o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h ,  
t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  home .  O n  divorce * t h o  c o m m o n e s t  
s o l u t i o n  w i l l  b e  s a l e  a n d  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o c e e d s  ? b u t  
i n  every c a s e  a c c o u n t  m u s t  b e  t a l c e n  o f  the circumstances. 
I n  /
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I n  both s e p a r a t i o n ,  a n d  d i v o r c e ,  w h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  
c h i l d r e n ,  i t  m a y  b e  b e s t  t o  l e a v e  t h e  s p o u s e  h a v i n g  
c u s t o d y  i n  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t h e  h o m e  u n t i l ?  s a y ?  t h e  
y o u n g e s t  c h i l d  h a s  a t t a i n e d  t h e  a g e  o f  s i x t e e n *  o r  
h a s  c o m p l e t e d  h i s  s c h o o l  e d u c a t i o n #  I t  might b e  
t h a t  t h e  occupying s p o u s e  w o u l d  be a b l e ?  by t h e  u s e  
o f  i n h e r i t e d  funds? o r  s a v i n g s  t o  ’buy out* t h e  o t h e r  
s p o u s e ,  b u t  i l l  m a n y  c a s e s  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  i m p o s s i b l e ®  
Division o f  s a l e  p r o c e e d s  w o u l d  c o m e  later, t h e r e f o r e ,  
and in t h e  m e a n t i m e  t h e  n o i i - o c o i i p y l n g  s p o u s e  m u s t  f i n d  
s o m e w h e r e  t o  live, 3 f t  m i g h t ;  be t h o u g h t  j u s t  t h a t  ( h i s )  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  o u t g o i n g s  s u c h  a s  r a t e s  a n d  r e p a i r s ,  
a n d  t o  m e e t  the B u i l d i n g  S o c i e t y  repayments s h o u l d  be 
r e d u c e d  o r  e x t i n g u i s h e d  d u r i %  t h e s e  y e a r s ,  b u t  t h i s  
w o u l d  h a v e  t o  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  view w h i c h  t h e  c o u r t  t o o k  
o f  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  t h i s ?  f r o m  t h e  o c c u p a n t  s p o u s e ' s  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w ?  a n d  u p o n  t h e  maintenance/aliment 
arrangements,  i f  a n y ?  w h i c h  w e r e  made* e n d  u p o n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s #  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  ? ' m a r i t a l *  c o n d u c t  
a n d  f a m i l y  o i r c i m s t a r i c e B  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  m e e t  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s #  B o t h  spouses h a v e  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  
. m a i n t e n a n c e  ( i n  a  w i d e  s e n s e )  o f  a  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r o b a b l y  
i n c r e a s i n g  r a p i d l y  i n  v a l u e .
Any f o r m  o f  c o n c u r r e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i n  use w o u l d  
c e a s e  t o  operate,  a n d  w h e r e  i t  h a d  b e e n  a b s e n t  b u t  
" c o m p u l s o r y "  a l i m e n t  p r e s e n t ?  t h e  l a t t e r  w o u l d  t e r m i n a t e  
also. A l i m e n t  after s © - p a r a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  withheld* or 
granted e n d  c a l c u l a t e d ?  in a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
s e t  o u t  i l l  M e m o r a n d u m  Ho,22 a n d  F a c u l t y  Response,
Assets w o u l d  be d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y *  u n l e s s  t h e r e  w e r e  
s p e c i a l  considerations (infra),  H o w e v e r ?  i f  B o s k i l l n a d  
h a d  t a k e n  p l a c e ?  only a s s e t s  a c q u i r e d  a f t e r  e a r l y  d i v i s i o n  
o f  assets w o u l d  r e m a i n  t o  b e  d e a l t  with* and* s i n c e  t h e  
parties /
Of, Memo,Ho,22* Propn«68.
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p a r t i e s  h a d  c h o s e n  s e p a r a t i o n *  t h o s e  a f t e r - a c q u i r e d  
a s s e t s  s h o u l d  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  o w n e r  t h e r e o f ?  a f t e r  t h e  
p e r i o d  o f  ( p r o b a b l e )  joint u s e #  U n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  
s y s t e m ?  n o  e q u a l i s a t i o n  ( i n  t h e  f o r m  of g r a n t  o f  c a p i t a lV * , i n  s e p a r a t i o ns u m  a v ? a r d )  r e  c o m p e t e n ‘1/ ?  a n a  i n  i s  n o n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t
a n y  c h a n g e  b e  m a d e  in t h i s  rule.
D i v o r c e
I  D i v o r c e  following U p o n  B o s k i l l n a d ?  J u d i c i a l  S e p a r a t i o n  
o r  i n  c a s e s  w h e r e  P r o p e r t y  M a t t e r s  h a v e  b e e n  r e g u l a t e d  
b y  H a r r i a g e - O o n t r a c t  provision
I n  o u t l i n e *  t h e  a p p r o a c h  e n v i s a g e d  i s  t h a t  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  h o m e  a s  i n  j u d i c i a l  separation* t h e r e  
c o u l d  b e  s a l e *  b u y i n g  o u t *  or r i g h t s  o f  occupation a n d  
s u b s e q u e n t  sale* t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h o  l a s t  
a r r a n g e m e n t  (compensation; outlays: d e b t s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  
t h o  h o m e )  b e i n g  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h o  court, The l u m p  
s u m  a w a r d  c o m p e t e n t  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  r u l e s  w o u l d  become 
inappropriate unless " s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s "  e x i s t e d ®  
H o w e v e r *  i n  t h o s e  c a s e s ?  a t  l e a s t  w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  n o  
marriage-Gontraot * i t  is arguable t h a t  c a p i t a l  c o m p e n s a t i o n  
i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  l u m p  s u m ,  a w a r d  a t  d i v o r c e  w o u l d  h a v e  g r e a t e r  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a n  i n  c a t e g o r y  I I  c a s e s  b e l o w *  w h e r e  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e  t h r o u g h t  m a r r i a g e .  S t r i c t l y  
s p e a k i n g 0 a s s e t s  w o u l d  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  to 
d i v i s i o n  m a d e  a t  B o s k i l l n a d  o r  j u d i c i a l  separation* a n d  
a s s e t s  a c q u i r e d  thereafter b y  m e a n s  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  s t r i c t  r u l e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y *  w h i c h  t h e  
p a r t i e s  h a v e  c h o s e n *  b u t  a  l u m p  s u m  a w a r d  m i g h t  b e  a  
h e l p f u l  e q u a l i s a t i o n  d e v i c e  a n d  s h o u l d ,  b e  a v a i l a b l e ®
T h u s *  b o t h  as t o  a l l o c a t i o n  of c o r p o r e a l  m o v e a b l e s  a n d  
a s  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  a  lump s u m  award* t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
" s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s "  w o u l d  b e  r e l e v a n t  a n d  a p p e a l  
c o u l d  b e  m a d e  t o  i t .  When * i f  e v e r *  s h o u l d  m a i n t e n a n c e  
payments /
1  » S e e  " s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " ?  b e l o w ®
1 0 9 5
p a y m e n t s  b e  a w a x ' d e d '
U p o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e ?  r e f e r e n c e  i s
m a d e  t o  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  b e  f o u n d  i n  M e m o r a n d u m  M o , 2 21a n d  F a c u l t y  R e s p o n s e *  T h e r e ?  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  d r a w n  
b e t w e e n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  s u p p o r t  a n d  q u e s t i o n s  o f  d i v i s i o n  
o f  p r o p e r t y .  I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  x u l e  
m i g h t  b e  t h a t  a f t e r  d i v o r c e ?  n e i t h e r  p a r t y  s h o u l d  o w e  
a  d u t y  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  o t h e r ?  u n l e s s  t h e  party i s  u n a b l e ?  
b y  r e a s o n  o f  a g e ?  i n f i r m i t y *  p h y s i c a l  o r  m e n t a l  i n c a p a c i t y *  
t h e  c a r e  o f  d e p e n d e n t  c h i l d r e n  ( o r  p a r e n t s ) ?  g e n e r a l  
u n f i t n e s s  for work* o r  "for a n y  othere a d e q u a t e  r e a s o n "
( e , g *  t h e  c a s e  of a n  elderly w i f e  u n t r a i n e d  f o r  w o r k )  t o  
s u p p o r t  h i m s e l f / h e r s e l f ' " ?  b u t  ? e v e n  i f  s u c h  circumstances 
e x i s t e d *  t h e  d u t y  w o u l d  n o t  a r i s e  i f  t h e  p a r t y  i n  n e e d  o f  
s u p p o r t  h a s  b e e n  g u i l t y  o f  " g r o s s  c o n t e m p t  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e " ^  
r e n d e r i n g  i t  m a n i f e s t l y  u n j u s t  f o r  t h e  c o u r t  t o  m a k e  s u c h  
a w a r d #  ( A  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  court o n  c h a n g e  o f  ( f i n a n c i a l )  
c  i r c u ï ï L S t  a n c  e  s  /
1 » Memo H o # 2 2 ?  5 * 2  e t  sec.? a n d  Fao.Resp. p . 5 2  e t  aeq*
2 *  T h e r e  seems t o  b e  a  g r o u n d s  w e  1 1  o i  opznion i n  l a v o u x '
o f  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e  e x c e p t  i n  c a s e s  v j h e r e  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r e c i p i e n t  h a s  t h e  c a r e  o f  t h e  ( y o u n g )  
c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e #  ( P a y m e n t s  m i g h t  b e  m a d e
f o r *  s a y *  a  t h r o e  y e a r  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  p e r i o d  t o
e n a b l e  t h e  (wife) to m a k e  t h e  transition i n t o  employment)  * S u g g e s t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  t h a t  t h e  
E n g l i s h  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  o v e r - g e n e r o u s  t o  f i r s t  w i v e s  
a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  t h e  e x « 4 i u s b a n d  a n d  s e c o n d  w i f e  a n d  
f a m i l y *  a n d  i t  i s  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e  3-/a w  C o m m i s s i o n  
h a s  b e e n  a s k e d  t o  c a n v a s s  o p i n i o n  a n d  p r e s e n t  a  report. 
I t  m u s t  b e  Bald, t h o u g h ?  t h a t  g i v e n  t h e  f a c t o r s  o f  lack o f  t r a i n i n g ?  a r r i v a l  a t  m i d d l e  a g e  a n d  b l e a k  
e m p l o y m e n t  p r o s p e c t s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  e v e n  f o r  t h e  
b e t t e r  p r e p a r e d  ( m a l e  o r  f e m a l e ) g a s t r l c t  " a d u l t s  m u s t  
l o o k  a f t e r  t h e m s e l v e s "  p h i l o s o p h y ?  w h e t h e r  d e s i r a b l e  
o r  n o t ?  m a y  b e  q u i t e  impracticable »3 » F a c  o H e s p  ® ? p  ® 6 6  #
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o i r c m i s t a n c e s  w a u 3 » d  b e  c o m p e t e n t )  I n  t h i s  w a y  a  
l i n k  i s  m a d e  b e t w e e n  c o n d u c t  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  ? 
b u t  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  i s  n o t  t o o  c l o s e ®  A  s i m i l a r  g u i d e  
l i n e  could b o  d r a w n  u p  in t h e  c a s e  o f  a w a r d s  o f  a l i m e n t  
a f t e r  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n ;  t h e r e ?  t h e  " c l e a n  b r e a k "  
a r g u m e n t  i s  a  l i t t l e  l e s s  s t r o n g #
W h e r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  h a v e  m a d e  t h e i r  o w n  p r o p e r t y  
a r r a n g e m e n t  a  ? b y  m a r 3 : * i a g e - c o n t r a c t  ? i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h e y  s h o u l d  b e  required t o  a b i d e  b y  t h e i r  a g r e e m e n t ?  
b u t  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  competent f o r  a  p r o v i s i o n  t o  
o u s t  t h e  c o u r t ’ s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  malce a  m a i n t e n a n c e  o r d e r ?  
i n  a c c o r d a n c e  with t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  specified# C o n t r a ?  
t h e  C o u r t  o f  C e s s i o n ?  b o t h  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 7 6  A c t  ? 
h a s  /
S e e  Div.(So*) Act* 1 9 7 6 ?  s » 5 ( 1 ) ( c )  -  p o w e r  t o  t h e  
c o u r t  t o  m a k e  o n e  or m o r e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  orders :- 
( p e r i o d i c a l  a l l o v i a n c ©  ( c a p i t a l  s u m )  ( c )  " a n  o r d e r  
v a r y i n g  t h e  terms of a n y  settlement m a d e  i n  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  
o f  o r  d u r i n g  t h e  m a r r i a g e  so f a r  a s  t a k i n g  e f f e c t  b n  
o r  a f t e r  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e "  ( " s e t t l e m e n t "  
s h a l l  i n c l u d e  policy o f  a s s u r a n c e  t o  w h i c h  H , W e * s  Pols, 
o f  A s s u r a n c e  ( S o = )  A c t ?  a s  a m e n d e d  1 9 8 0 ?  1 8 8 0 ?  b * 2  
a p p l i e s  -  8 * 5 ( 7 ) ) o  A  c a s e  r a i s i n g  ' c e r t a i n  i n t e r e s t i n g  
a n d  p e r h a p s  n o v e l  questions of l a w *  came b e f o r e  L o r d  
A l l a n b r i d g e  ? i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 8 1  ( D u n c a n  v ,  D u n c a n  1 9 8 1  
S d L . T * ( M o t e s )  4 6 ) o A  proof b e f o r e  a n s v / e r  w a s  ordered. 
P a r t i e s  i n  197*^!* i n  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  of d i v o r c e e  h a d  a g r e e d  
u p o n  a  f i n a n c i a l  settlement t o  w h i c h  L o r d  M c D o n a l d  
u p o n  g r a n t i n g  d i v o r c e  i n  D e c e m b e r ?  1 9 7 4 ?  h a d  r l n t e r p o n e d  
h i s  authority* I n  J a n u a r y ?  1 9 7 5 ?  the parties r e s u m e d  
c o h a b i t a t i o n  b u t  t h , e  h u s b a n d  c o n t i n u e d  t o  m a k e  p a y m e n t s  
u n t i l  May of t h a t  year. I n  1 9 7 6  t h e  p a r t i e s  © m i g r a t e d  
t o  A u s t r a l i a  a n d  i n  J u n e *  1 9 7 7  s e p a r a t e d  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  
O o u n s o l  f o r  t h e  w i f e  w h o  w a s  s e e k i n g  a r x ' o a r s  a l l e g e d l y  
d u e  u n d e r  t h e  m i n u t e  o f  a g r e e m e n t  a r g u e d  t h a t  s i n c e  
t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  n o  v a r i a t i o n  d i s c h a r g e  o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p r o b a t i v e  agreement* it m u s t  s t a n d  
d e s p i t e  s u b s e q u e n t  e v e n t s ;  c o u n s e l  f o r  t h e  husband 
s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  o n  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  l i v i n g  a p a r t *  a n d  o n  r e s u m p t i o n  
o f  c o h a b i t a t i o n *  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  disappeared, 
T h e  parties * j o i n t  m i n u t e  e n v i s a g e d  a  return t o  t h e  
c o u r t  for a  variation* Moreover* there w a s  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  p e r s o n a l  b a r *  i n  t h a t  t h e  pursuer by h e r  
c o n d u c t  h a d  j u s t i f i e d  t h e  d e f e n d e r  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
t h e  a g r e e m e n t  was a t  a n  e n d ,  I f o r d  A l l a n b r i d g e *  t a k i n g  
t h e  v i e w  t h a t  h e  c o u l d  n o t  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  h o l d  t h e  
d e f e n c e s  i r r e l e v a n t *  a l s o  s a i d  ' I  r e s p e c t f u l l y  a g r e e  with t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  L o r d  A v o n s i d e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
R o b s o n *  ( R o b s o n  v* R* 1 9 7 3  S » L . T , ( M o t e s ) 4 )  * t o  t h e  
e f f e c t  /
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h a s  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  a n  o r d e r  v a r y i n g  t h e  t e r m s  ( t a k i n g
e f f e c t  o n  o r  a f t e r  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r x a i a g e )
o f  a  s e t t l e m e n t  m a d e  a i i t e - r m p t i a l l y  o r  p o s t - a i u p t i a I 3 y .1T h e  S c o t t i s h  L a w  Commission h a s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  
p o w e r  s h o u l d  r e m a i n o  P e r h a p s  * t h e n *  t h e  c o u r t  s h o u l d  
r e t a i n  a  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  v a r y  t h e  terms of t h e  c o n t r a c t  
w h e x ' o  t h e y  a p p e a r  i n e q u i t a b l e  o r  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  b o t h  
p a r t i e s  a n d  t o  m a k e  t h e  s t a n d a r d  r u l e s  c o n c e r n i n g  h o m e *  
d i v i s i o n  o f  a s s e t s *  lump s u m  a w a r d s  a n d  " s p e c i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " ? a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  payimnts apply. T h e  
q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e  e m t e n t  t o  w h i c h  p a . r t l e s  s h o u l d
b o  f r e e  t o  m a k e  t h e i r  o w n  f i n a n c i a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  o np
d i v o r c e .  S o  l o n g  a s  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  n o  c o e r c i o n  t o  
e n s u r e  a g r e e m e n t ?  f r e e d o m  o f  a g r e e m e n t  s e e m s  a  d e s i r a b l e  
f e a t u r e  ? e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  r e a c h e d  m a y  b e a r  n o  
theoretical o r  philosophical r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
type o f  p r o p e r t y  arrangement by w h i c h  t h e  marriage? w h i l e  
i n  e x i s t e n c e *  h a s  b e e n  g o v e r n e d .  W h a t e v e r  t h e  ' s y s t e m ® ?  
a  /
e f f e c t  t h a t  w h e r e  parties t o  a  m a r r i a g e  h a v e  c o m e  
t o  a n  agreement t o  settle o r  discharge l i a b i l i t i e s  
t h a t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a n  e n d  o f  the m a t t e r  i n  
m a t r i m o n i a l  c a u s e s  s o  far a s  t h e  c o u r t  i s  c o n c e r n e d ®
I n  t h i s  c a s e  a  v e r y  u n u s u a l  s i t u a t i o n  arises*,#.",1, MGmo,Mo*22g 3.61, In Thomson v. T, 1981 8.L.T, 
( M o t e s )  8 1 ?  t h o  p a r t i e s  in 1 9 4 8  e n t e r e d  i n t o  a n  
a i i t o - ^ n u p t i a l  m a r r i a g e  contract w h i c h ?  i n t e r  a l i a ®  regulated their rights in each other®s"^^toF^ould 
t h e  m a r r i a g e  be d i s s o l v e d  a n d  t h o s e  p r o v i s i o n s  were
t o  b e  i n  l i e u  o f  a l l  o t h e r  3? i g h t s  a n d  c l a i m s  o t h e r w i s e  
a r i s i n g  o n  d e a t h  o r  d i s s o l u t i o n #  T h e  h u s b a n d ?  
s e e k i n g  d i v o r c e ?  concluded f o r  p a y m e n t  o f  a  c a p i t a l  
aw /j .  a n d  a  p e r i o d i c a l  allowance, ^ o r d  S t o t t  h e l d  that the m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t  d i s c h a r g e  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  
h u s b a n d  b o t h  f r o m  seeking a  financial provision a n d  
f r o m  s e e k i n g  v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  Counsel 
f o r  the husband a r g u e d  t h a t  8 , 5 ( 1 )  gave t h e  c o u r t  a n  overriding discretion t o  v a r y  a n y  t e r m s  o f  a  m a r r i a g e  
c o n t r a c t  I n c l u d i n g  a  p u r p o r t e d  d i s c h a r g e  o f  a l l  
r i g h t s  a c c r u i n g  o n  d i v o r c e .  T h e  t e r m s  w o u l d  b e  highly 
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  court in i t s  deliberations# H o w e v e r ?  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  a p p l y  f o r  v a r i a t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  s # 5 ( 1 )  
( c )  w a s  i t s e l f ?  i n  L o r d  Stott’s v i e w ?  e x c l u d e d  b y  
t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  c o n t r a c t ?  a n d  v a r i a t i o n  
w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  necessary i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  t e r m s  o f  
t h e  d i s c h a r g e  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,2, Ibid^g 3.111, Fao.Reap* pp.76-79.
1093,
a  s o l u t i o n  i s  b e i n g  s o u g h t  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  t r e a t m e n t
o f  h o m e ?  a s s e t s ?  c o m p e n s a t i o n  a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e ?  a n d  t h a t/by p a r t i e s
w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  a g r e e d  w i l l  b e  t h e  m o s t  c i v i l i s e d  a n d  
w o r k a b l e  s o l u t i o n  o
I I  /
I t  m u s t  b e  s a i d  t h a t  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  s y s t e m ?  t h e  
c o u r t  h a s  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  a n  i m a g i n a t i v e  s e t t l e m e n t ®
T h u s ,  i n  H e n d e r s o n  v *  H® ( 1 9 8 1  / S a L , T ®  ( N o t e s ) 2 5 )  ? 
w h e r e  a  h u s b a n d  p u r s u e r  c o n c l u d e d  f o r  a  c a p i t a l  
p a y m e n t  o f  L 5 * 0 0 0  a n d  w h e r e  t h e  w i f e  o p p o s e d  t h a t  
c o n c l u s i o n ,  w h i l e  n o t  o p p o s i n g  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  f o r  
d i v o r c e ,  w h e r e  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  c h i l d r e n ,  a n d  a d u l t e r y  
o f  t h e  w i f e  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  ( s h e  a t t r i b u t i n g  b r e a k d o w n  
t o  t h e  i n t o l e r a b l e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  h u s b s n d )  a n d  t h e  
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p a r a m o u r  h e l d  t o  b e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
g r o u n d  o f  b r e a k d o w n ,  L o r d  S t e w a r t  a w a r d e d  a  c a p i t a l  
sxxm o f  £ 1 , 9 0 0  i n  a l l  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s *  C o n d u c t  w a s  
t o  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  i n  a  f a i r - m i n d e d  w a y ®  T E e  
w i f e ’ s  c o n d u c t  w i t h  t h e  p a r a m o u r ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e r e  
w a s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  h a d  b e e n  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  c a u s e  o f  
b r e a l c d o w n  b u t  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l y  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d  
w a s  m o o d y  a n d  f i n a n c i a l l y  m e a n ®  T h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  
p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  ( f r e e  v a l u e  £ 1 1 , 4 0 0 )  
w a s  i n  j o i n t  n a m e s *  T h e  p u r s u e r  h a d  p r o v i d e d  t h e  
c a p i t a l  a n d  m a d e  t h e  l o a n  r e p a y m e n t s *  A t  t h e  t i m e  o f  
d i v o r c e  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n s  w e r e  c l o s e *  H i s  
w a s  t h e  b e t t e r  c a p i t a l  p o s i t i o n ,  s i n c e  h e  o w n e d  t h e  
c a r  a n d  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  h o u s e ,  b u t  s h e  h a d  m o n e y  
i n  b a n k  a c c o u n t s  a n d  a  s e c r e t a r i a l  j o b  i n  Q a t a r  w i t h  
a n  A r a b  c o m p a n y ,  a n d  h a d  t h e  b e t t e r  i n c o m e  p o s i t i o n  
a n d  w a s  n o t  r e p a y i n g  l o a n  p a y m e n t s  o n  t h e  h o u s e *
L o r d  S t e w a r t  d i d  n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d ,  b e c a u s e  
t h e  w i f e ’ s  c o n d u c t  h a d  l e d  t o  b r e a k d o w n  o f  m a r r i a g e  
a n d  b e c a u s e  h e  h a d  p a i d  t h e  c a p i t a l  s u m  o n  t h e  h o u s e ,  
w a s  e n t i t l e d  t o  h e r  s h a r e  t h e r e o f  m i n u s  a  s m i  f o r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  m a r r i a g e *
S i n c e  t h e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  y o u n g ,  c h i l d l e s s  a n d  i n  w o r k ,  
n e i t h e r  o f  t h e m  n e e d e d  t h e  h e r i t a g e  a s  a  h o m e  a n d  
s o  i t  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  s u m  o f  
m o n e y  b e l o n g i n g  t o  e a c h *  T h e i r  f i n s n c e s  h a d  b e e n  
i n t e r m i n g l e d  a n d  s o  n o t  t o o  m u c h  s t r e s s  s h o u l d  b e  
l a i d  o n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r e p a y m e n t s  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  b y  
t h e  h u s b a n d  -  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  1 9 7 6  w h e n  t h e y  s e p a r a t e d ®  
A l l  i n  a l l ,  L « S t e w a r t  t h o u g h t  a  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  w i f e ’ s  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  s h o u l d  b e  g i v e n  t o  
t h e  h u s b a n d  a n d  f i x e d  t h e  c a p i t a l  s u m  a t  1 1 , 9 0 0 *
T h i s  i s  a  m o s t  i n t e r e s t i n g  a n d  f a i r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  a  
m o d e r n  ’ c a r e e r ’ m a r r i a g e  « I n  e f f e c t  e a r n i n g s  w e r e  
s h a r e d ,  a n d  L * S t e w a r t  c o n c l u d e d  ( p ® 2 6 )  t h a t  ’ T h e  
r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  h o u s e h o l d  g o o d s  w h i c h  
t h e  p u r s u e r  h a s  r e t a i n e d  w e r e  b o u g h t  w i t h  f u n d s  w h i c h  
c a m e  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t  f r o m  t h e  d e f e n d e r ’ s  e a r n i n g s ’ -  
a  t r u t h  i n  m a n y  c a s e s ,  o n e  w o u l d  t h i n k *
1 1  1) i v o  r o e  '•■/ho  r e  t l i e   ^F l a r  a g e  b q m i  C a r r i e d  J M
3aâm:-S2!amiâ&LhJkms^_aà.Goasmzmli )
T h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  the m a t r i m o n i a l  h o m e  a n d  o f  
e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  m a i n t e n a n c e  p a y m e n t s  w o u l d  be t h e  same 
a s  that a d v o c a t e d  f o r  C a t e g o r y  I  ( n o i r - c o m r m n i t y )  o a s e s #
Family a s s e t s  w o u l d  b e  d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y #  A  l u m p  
s u m  award w o u l d  b e  m o s t  u n l i k e l y  t o  b e  g r a n t e d #  B o t h  
s t a t e m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  s u l i j o o t  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a p p e a l  
o n  t h e  g r o u n d  o f  " s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " ? b u t  ? a s  
e x p l a i n e d  a b o v e ?  m u c h  l e s s  w e i g h t  w o u l d  b o  g i v e n  t o  
t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  ® c o m m u n i t y ’ m a r r i a g e s #  T h e  
o u t s t a n d i n g  m e r i t  o f  t h e  s y s t e m ?  e s p e c i a l l y  if b o t h  
j o i n t r e s s  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  a n d  c o n c u r r e n t  c o m p o n B a t i o n  
w e r e  a d o p t e d ?  i s  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  w e a l c e x *  s p o u s e  
w o u l d  b e  p r o t e c t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  marriage f r o m  t h e  
e a r n i n g  a n d  a c q u i s i t i o n  i n e q u a l i t i e s  w h i c h  a r e  inherent 
i n  most m a r r i a g e s ®  I n  c u r r e n t  jargong compensation 
w o u l d  b e  a n  " o n g o i n g  p r o c e s s " ? a n d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  a t  
d i v o r c e  s h o u l d  b e  c l e a r e r  b e c a u s e  o f  t h a t ®  P a r t i e s  
w o u l d  participate e q u a l l y  i n  t h e  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  amassed 
a n d  i n  t h e  r i s i n g  v a l u ©  o f  t h e  h o m e  ; u n d e r  c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  
t h e r e  s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a n  a s s i m i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to a c q u i r e  ’ s e p a r a t e ®  property -  w h i c h  
s h o u l d  r e m a i n  s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y  a t  d i v o r c e .  L i t t l e  
e q u a l i s a t i o n  " t i n k o 3? i n g "  s h o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y *  A b s e n c e  
o f  p r o p e r t y  rules d u r i n g  m a r r i a g e  t e n d s  to i n c r e a s e  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o w e r s  i n  
t h e  c o u r t  o n  the d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  m a r r i a g e ,  a n d  a l s o  
I n c r e a s e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  d i s p u t e s  a b o u t  the e x t e n t  
o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e a c h o  This may involve t h e  g r a n t i n g  
o f  a  c o m m i s s i o n  a n d  d i l i g e n c e  t o  r e c o v e r  d o c u m e n t s  i f  
t h e  p a r t i e s ’ averments a b o u t  s i s e  of i n c o m e  a n d / o r  c a p i t a l
V'J
d i f f e r  g r e a t l y #  S i m i l a r l y ?  a  w i f e  (more commonly t h a n  
a  h u s b a n d )  m a y  s e e k  i n h i b i t i o n  o n  t h e  d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a  
d i v o r c e  /
A r e c e n t  e x a m p l e  i a  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  c a s e  o f  
S a v a g e  v ®  S. 1981 S.L.T,(Notes) 17*
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d i v o r c e  a c t i o n  t o  prevent s u s p e c t e d  d i s p o s a l  by t h e
husband o f  assets o t h e r w i s e  p o t e n t i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  to a1p o s s i b l e  c a p i t a l  sum award*
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a  residual p o w e r  to o r d e r  t r a n s f e r  
o f  p r o p e r t y  or t o  m a k e  a  l u m p  sum a w a r d  i f  s p e c i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w e r e  presort should b e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  
court; f o r  l e s s  f u n d a m e n t a l  reasons o f  c o n v e n i e n c e  a l s o ?  
t i l ©  c o u r t  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  o r d e r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  d i v i s i o n  
o f  p r o p e r t y  or t o  g r a n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i f  i n  t h e  ' e q u a l *  
d i v i s i o n  o f  family a s s e t s  o n e  h a s  fared b e t t e r  than t h e  
o t h e r ®  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t ?  a s  part o f  t h e  d i v o r c e  
p r o c e s s ?  the c o u r t  m i g h t  f i n d  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o n o i m o o  
a  d e c l a r a t o r  o f  property r i g h t s  *
T h e  future t r e a t m e n t  o f  h o m e  and a s s e t s  ? f a m i l y  
a n d  s e p a r a t e ,  c o u l d  b e  p r e d i c t e d  m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y  b y  
p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e i r  advisers a n d  t h o  main s u b j e c t  o f  
s p e c u l a t i o n  a n d  p o s s i b l e  d i s p u t e  w o u l d  b e  that o f  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  ? o r  i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ?  a n d  the s i s e  
i f  appropriate,  o f  a  p e r i o d i c a l  a l l o w a n c e  «
" S p e c i a l  Considerations"
T h e s e  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  r e l e v a n t  w h e r e  
t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  B o s k i l l n a d  o r  j u d i c i a l  separation* a n d  
h e n c e  there h a s  b e e n  n o  c o m p e n s a t i n g  e f f e c t  o f  j o i n t n e B s ,
A s s i s t a n c e  c a n  ’b e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  N e w  Zealand 
example * There ? t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n ,  o f  e q u a l i t y  i s  d e p a r t e d  
f r o m  i n  t w o  c a s e s ?  n a m e l y ?  marriages o f  s h o r t  d u r a t i o n  
( m a r r i a g e s  in w h i c h  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  c o h a b i t a t i o n  f o r  l o s s  
t h a n ,  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  o r  o f  l o n g e r  d u r a t i o n  i n  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  
o f  the c o u r t )  a n d  c a s é s  w h e r e  t h e r e  az'e " e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s " *  E q u a l  d i v i s i o n  i s  t o  b e  d e p a r t e d  f r o m  
who3?e " t h e  c o n t 3? i b u t l o n  o f  o n e .  s p o u s e  t o  t h e  marriage 
p a r t n e r s h i p  h a s  c l e a r l y  b e e n  greater t h a n  t h a t  of t h e  
o t h e r  spouse" ( " c o n t r i b u t i o n "  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h a t  
p r o v i s i o n  /
S ee V /ilso n  v .  \ ! , 1981 3„L /X M 01
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provision, a n d  o t h e r s  i s  n o t  l i m i t e d  t o  f i n a n c i a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n ®  Care of children, of tho e l d e r l y ,  
household m a n a g e m e n t ,  p r o v i s i o n  of m o n e y ,  performance 
o f  s e r v i c e s ,  g i v i n g  a s s i s t a n c e ,  f o r e g o i n g  a  h i g h e r  
s t a n d a r d  of l i v i n g  a r e  a l l  i n c l u d e d #  " I t  i s  e x p r e s s l y  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e x ' e  is n o  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a  m o n e t a r y  
contribution i a  o f  g r e a t e r  value t h a n  a  n o n - m o n e t a r y  
G o n  b r  i b u t i  o n "  ® M i s c o n d u c t  i s  n o t  t o  b e  t a J c e n  i n t o  
a c c o u n t ,  u n l o s s  i t  h a s  b o o n  g r o s s  a n d  p a l p a b l e  a n d  
h a s  s i g î x i f i c a i i t l y  a f f e c t e d  t h o  e x t e n t  o r  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
m a t r i m o n i a l  property) %
G i m i l a r l y ,  i n  o u r  e x a m p l e  ( C a t e g o r y  I  d i v o r c e s ) ,  
b y  m e a n s  o f  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  " s p é c i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' ' ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  weaker s p o u s e  m i g h t  
a r g u e  a  c a s e  i n  f a v o u r  of the g r a n t  o f  a  l u m p  s u m  a w a r d  
and/or t h e  transfer o f  c e r t a i n  i t e m s  o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e  
property o f :  t h e  o t h e r  i f ,  s i n c e ,  f o r  example,  e a r l y  
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  ( s h e )  h a d  b e e n  u n a b l e  for good 
r e a s o n  ( m o s t  c o m i a o n l y ,  p e r h a p s ,  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n  t h a t  
s h e  b o r e  t h e  main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  c a r e  o f  t h e  
c h i l d r e n )  t o  e a r n  m o n e y  b u t  h a d  c o n t r i b u t e d  g r e a t l y  I n  
kind t o  t h e  happy a n d  s u c c e s s f u l  running o f  t h e  h o m e #
To a  groat c i t e n t ,  t h i s  would m e a n  a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
p r e s e n t  standard S c o t t i s h  p o s i t i o n  ( s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  
a n d  l i m i t e d  d i s c r e t i o n  o n  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  m a r r i a g e ) #
I t  is p o s s i b l e  ( C a t e g o r y  X I  d i v o r c e s )  that a  s p o u s e  
might e v e n  h a v e  r e c o u r s e  t o  the " s p e c i a l ,  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s "  
argument i n  order t o  persuade t h e  c o u r t  t h a t  h i s  p a r t n e r ?  
t h r o u g j i  l a c k  o f  e f f o r t ,  h a d  g i v e n  u p  ( h e r )  r i g h t  t o  o n e  
h a l f  o f  t h e  family a s s e t s ®
I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  t h e  s ' t a r t I n g - p o I n t  s h o u l d  b e  t h a t  
parties /
1o J.M.Priestley, op*pit.
2 ® here i s  a n  intorestlng l i n k  i n  t h o u g h t  with t h e
a r g u m e n t  presented i n  this discussion ( a n d  s e e  a l s o  
F a c u l t y  Response t o  M e m o * N o * 2 2 )  t h a t  'marital* conduct should b e  r e l e v a n t  t o  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  property consequences, b u t  o n l y  i n  e x t r e m e  e a s e s *
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partiea had chosen separation or jointress and should 
b e  required t o  a d h e r e  t o  t h e i r  c l i o i c o  unless t h e  
circumstances were exceptional? b u t  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t  
m u s t  have a  discretion i n  the matter* ' i t i i  r e g a r d  
t o  the l a t t e r  p o i n t  % i t  s h o u l d  b e  s a i d  t h a t  w h i l e  i t  
i s  c o n c e d e d  t h a t  m a r i t a l  c o n d u c t  m a y  still s o m e t i m e s  
p r o p e r l y  h a v e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s ?  t h i s  s h o u l d  b e  
a  rare o c c u r r e n c e ?  a n d  m a r i t a l  c o n d u c t ?  t o  b e  r e l e v a n t ?  
w o u l d  r e q u i r e  t o  b e  o f  V / a c h i ; ; e l  ( n ; r o s s  c o n t e m p t  of t h o  
marriage) proportionso
G e n e r a l l y ?  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  "special 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s "  p r o v i s o  ( n o t  t o  b e  d e f i n e d  w i t h  g r e a t  
e x a c t i t u d e )  w o u l d  g i v e  t o  the court a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  to 
w a i v e  t h e  n o r m a l  p r o p e r t y  c o a s e q u e n c e e  i n  a b n o r m a l  
c a s e s ?  t h a t  i s ?  i n  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e y  w o u l d  b e  m a n i f e s t l y  
u n s u i t a b l e  «
miiJjiTY
W h e t h e r  t h e  m a r r i a g e  i s  v o i d  o r  v o i d a b l e ?  a n d  
whether it i s  p u t a t i v e ?  it i s  l i k e l y  n o w  (and certain
i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?  under t h e s e  p r o p o s a i s )  that t i e  h o m e
w i l l  s t a n d  i n  joint n a m e s ^  I n  a d d i t i o n ?  t h e  p a r t i e s
m a y  h a v e  c h o s e n  t o  a d o p t  j o i n t n e s s  o f  f a m i l y  a s s e t s ?
a n d  a  c o n c u r r e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  scheme * ( I f  s e p a r a t i o n
o f  p r o p e r t y  h a s  b e e n  t h e  n o r m ?  t h e n  a  c l e a n  property
b r e a k ?  a s  b e t w e e n  s t r a n g e r s ?  w i t h  n o  r e f e r e n c e  t o
s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ?  lump s in it  a w a r d s  a n d  property1transfers s e e m s  consistant with present p r a c t i c e ?  
u n d e r  w h i c h  t h e  c o u r t  I n  S c o t l a n d  m a y  n o t  o r d e r *  a  
capital s u m  o r  p e r i o d i c a l  a l l o w a n c e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a
g r a n t  o f  n u l l i t y  — -----------  o d d ?  p e r h a p s ?  i n  s o m e  ways ?
i n  t h a t  t h o  c o h a b i t a t i o n ?  t h o u g h  n o t  m a r r i a g e  i n  l a w ?  
c l o s e l y  r e s e m b l e s  m a r r i a g e  i n  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
a n d  /
1 e  " A l l  t h i n g s  r e t u r n  * h i n c  i n d o ® " *  ' l b a i r  i*4*20, 
J e o  a l t o n ,  d *  ^  W * ,  p , 2 3 3 *  A n d  c f .  M e m o . N o . 2 2 ,  
p . 2 9 5 ,
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a n d  ( p r o p e r t y )  e x p e c t a t i o n s  w i s h e s  e n d  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
p a r t i e s )  .
I / h e r e  o n e  a t  l e a s t  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  has a c t e d  i n
g o o d  f a i t h ?  a n d  w h e r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  h a v e  b e e n  l i v i n g
imder the commnnio regime ? is there any reason why
d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  s h o  did n o t  b o  made o n  the s a m e
b a s i s  a s  d i v i s i o n  o f  property i s  made i n  C a t e g o r y  I I  Pd i v o r c e s ? "
Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act, 1^7%
T h i s  A c t  r e p l a c e s  t h e  P r e s u m p t i o n  of L i f e  
L i m i t a t i o n  (Scotland) A c t ?  1891 a n d  t h e  D i v o r c e  
( S c o t l a n d )  A c t ?  1 9 3 8 %  8 , 5 «
A n y  p e r s o n  h a v i n g  a n  i n t e r e s t  (including t h e  Lord 
A d v o c a t e  for t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t )  may r a i s e  a n  a c t i o n  
o f  d e c l a r a t o r  o f  d e a t h  o f  a  p e r s o n  w h o  i s  m i s s i n g  a n d  
i s  t h o u g h t  t o  h a v e  d i e d  o r  h a s  not b e e n  k n o w n  t o  b e  
a l i v e  for a  p e r i o d  o f  a t  l e a s t  s e v e n  years * T h e  C o u r t  
o f  S e s s i o n  s h a l l  h a v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  entertain s u c h  
a c t i o n  /
1 0 M e m o  N o * 2 2  n o t e s  t h a t  s u c h  a  " m a r r i a g e "  m a y  h a v e
" e x i s t e d "  f o r  many y e a r s  a n d  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t  
m i g h t  be a b l e  t o  differentiate b e t w e e n  ‘ g e n u i n e ®  
c a s e s ?  a n d  c a s e s  w h e r e  o n e  or b o t h  d i d  n o t  a c t  i n  
g o o d  faith*2. O n e  c o g e n t  r e a s o n  i s  that t h i s  u n i o n  w a s  n o t  a  m a r r i a g e  
a n d  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  h e r e  p u t  f o r w a r d  p e r t a i n  o n l y  to 
m a r r i a g e s  ? a n d  n o t  t o  e x u r a ^ w i i a r l t a l  u n i o n s  ? s i n c e  i t  
i s  b e l i e v e d  t o  b e  in t h e  i n t e r e s t s  b o t h  o f  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n  of m a r r i a g e  a n d  the f r e e d o m  o f  p e r s o n s  so 
I n c l i n e d  t o  c o n t r a c t  o u t  o f  m a r r i a g e  ? t h a t  a  d i f f e r e n c e  
i n  l e g a l  ( i n c l u d i n g  p r o p e r t y )  c o n s e q u e n c e s  s h o u l d  exist* h o w e v e r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  n u l l i t y ?  it i s  l i k e l y  
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one* a n d  p o s s i b l y  b o t h ?  p a r t y ( l e s )  
i n t e n d e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t o  b e  t h a t  o f  m a r r i a g e  r a t h e r  
b l i a n l ï h a t  o f  e x t r a ™ * m a r i t a l  c o h a b i t a t i o n *
M e m O o N o * 2 2 ? P r o p n * 9 S  f a v o u r s  a  c o n c e s s i o n  i n  t h i s  
d i r e c t i o n  (i,e* t h a t  a  c o u r t  g r a n t i n g  a  d e c r e e  o f  
d e c l a r a t o r  o f  n u l l i t y  o f  m a r r i a g e  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  
s a m e  p o w e r s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  a s  a  
c o u r t  g r a n t i n g  a  d e c r e e  o f  d i v o r c e ) *
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a c t i o n  i;C t h e  m i s s i n g  person w a s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  S c o t l a n d  
o n  t l ' i e  d a t e  w h e n  h e  w a s  l a s t  k n o w n  t o  b e  a l i v e  o r  h a d  
b e e n  h a b i t u a l l y  r e s i d e n t  t h e r e  t h r o u g h o u t  a  p e r i o d  o f  
o n e  y e a r  e n d i n g  w i t h  t h a t  d a t e  o r  i f  t h e  pursuer i s  
t h e  spouse o f  t h a t  p e r s o n  a n d  i s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  Scotland 
a t  the d a t e  o f  r a i l i n g  t h e  a c t i o n  o r  h a s  b e e n  h a b i t u a l l y  
r e s i d e n t  i n  S c o b l a n d  f o r  o n e  y e a r  e n d i n g  with t h a t  d a t e ® ^
If t h e  c o u r t  f i n d s ?  o n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p r o b u b i l i t i o s g  
t h a t  t h e  missing p e r s o n  h a s  d i e d ?  i t  s h a l l  g r a n t  d e c r e e  
a c c o r d i n g l y ?  a n d  i n  s o  d o i n g  s h a l l  h a v e  p o w e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
"any question relating t o  a n y  interest i n  property w h i c h  
a r i s e s  a s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  d e a t h  o f  t h e  m i s s i n g  T ^ e r s o n " ? 
and may appoint a judicial factor on the estate of the 
m i s s i n g  p e r s o n ?  w h a t e v e r  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  *
W h e r e  no a p p e a l  i s  m a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  time a l l o w e d  f o r  
a p p e a l ?  o r  w h e r e  a p p e a l  w a s  m a d e  a n d  refused o r  withdrawn* 
decree s h a l l  bo c o n c l u s i v e  o f  m a t t e r s  c o n t a i n e d  t h e r e i n ?  
a n d  s h a l l  b e  e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  a n y  p e r s o n  " a n d  f o r  a l l  
p u r p o s e s  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  of a marriage t o  
w h i c h  t h e  m i s s i n g  p e r s o n  i s  a  p a r t y  a n d  t h o  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f  r i g h t s  to or in p r o p e r t y  b e l o n g i n g  t o  any p e r s o n * "
W h e r e  a  m a r r i a g e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  is dissolved, by v i r t u e  o f  
t h e  d e c r e e ?  the d i s s o l u t i o n  s h a l l  n o t  b e  invalidated b y  
t h e  l a t e r  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  t h e  m i s s i n g  p e r s o n  w a s  a l i v e  a t  
t h e  d a t e  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  d e c r e e  a s  t h e  d a t e  o f  d e a t h *
D e c r e e  i n  a n  a c t i o n  o f  d e c l a r a t o r  m a y  b e  v a r i e d  orp
r e c a l l e d ' ^  by t h e  c o u r t  w h i c h  g r a n t e d  d e c r e e ?  o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  
a t  a n y  t i m e  b y  a n y  party h a v i n g  a n  i n t e r e s t ?  b u t  t h e  
v a r i a t i o n  o r d e r  i f  m a d e  s h a l l  n o t  h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
r e v i v i n g  the m a r r i a g e  o f  t h e  m i s s i n g  p e r s o n ?  n o r  s h a l l  
it /
T h e r e  i s  jurisdiction a l s o  i n  t h e  l i o r i f f  C o u r t :  8,1(4), In a case of great importance or complexity*the D h e r i f f  may? a n d  m u s t  ? i f  s o  d i r e c t e d  b y  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  C e s s i o n  ( p o s s i b l y  o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  b y  a  p a r t y  
t o  t h o  p r o c e e d i n g s )  remit t h e  a c t i o n  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
C e s s i o n a
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i t  have e f f e c t  on p roperty  r ig h ts  acquired as a
r e s u lt  o f the d eclara tor*  However? w ith  regard to
tho la t te r ?  "the cou rt s h a l l  make such fu r tlier  order?
if any? in relation to any rights to or in any property
acquired  as a resu lt; o f  that; decree as i t  co n sid ers
fair and reasonable in. a l l  the circumstances o f  th e
case"? though not so as to  a f f e c t  income aocxuing
between the d ate o f decree and the date o f v a r ia t io n
order ? and in  any event such fui'ther order s h a l l  not
bo made i f  a p p lic a t io n  fo r  v a r ia t io n  order has been
.made outw ith  a p eriod  o f  f iv e  years from the date o f
the o r ig in a l decree, Moreover? rights of bona f id e
th ir d  p a r t ie s  s h a l l  not be a f fe c te d  by such "further 
1o rd ers"o
Vlhei'-'o decree has been granted? the court? on 
th e a p p lic a t io n  o f on alim entary c r e d ito r  o f hhe m issin g  
person or a trustee ? may them or at any time th e r e a f te r  
make an order th a t the va lu e  o f any r ig h ts  to  or in  any 
property  acquired  as a r e s u l t  o f the sa id  decree s h a l l  
not be recoverab le  by v ir tu e  o f  such a " fu rther order"@
Where a decree or a v a r ia t io n  order i s  granted,
the clerk o f court s h a l l  n o t i f y  th e  p a r t ic u la r s  th e r e o f
to  the Registrar General o f .Births? Deaths and M arriages
for Gcotland, who s h a l l  make th e  appropriate en try  in  ?the r e g i s t e r ,  '
S ec tio n  13 p rov id es th a t  i t  s h a ll  be a defence to  
a charge o f bigamy fo r  th e accused to  p ro v e  th a t  a t no 
time /
1o 8 8 ,4  and 5^  T his g iv e s  an example of the tortu ou s  provision n ecessa ry  to  ach ieve the best j u s t ic e  which can be achieved in these property questions, Discretion and s ta tu to r y  .meddling w ith  property  ru les?  and tho use o f  the d ev ice  o f  time l im it s  a l l  seem to  be requirem ents? and to g eth er  provide an in te r e s t in g  p reced en t,2 , 8 ,1 2 . T his i s  aji in te r e s t in g  example o f autom atica d m in istra tiv e  a c t io n  fo llo w in g  upon j u d ic ia l  decree  and. i t s  e x is te n c e  i s  significant in  view  o f  su g g estio n s  made e a r l ie r  e*g . M atrimonial Property  R eg is ter ; c e r t i f i c a t e  of (unmarried) s ta tu s*
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tim e w ith in  th e p eriod  o f  seven  years im m ediately  
p reced ing th e  date o f  th e  purported marriage forming 
the substance of the charge had he any reason  to  
b e lie v e  th a t his spouse was alive*
The Act removes the ch o ice  of s ta tu to r y  remedy 
which, form erly ex is ted *  A. party who would have pursued
h is  action e ith e r  under the 1391 Act or the 1938 Act?1accord ing to  his purpose ? will now sue under the 1977 
Act? whatever .his -purpose*
I t  i s  thought th a t the broad discretion given  to  
the court in  th e property asp ect here would be s u ita b le  
a lso  i f  the new r u le s  here su ggested  were in  o p era tio n « 
Tho court would apply th e  re lev a n t r u le s  o f  d ev o lu tio n  
o f  a m arried!s person®a p roperty  on death t e s t a t e  or 
in t e s t a t e  ( i n fr a) and the ca u tio u s a'nd th o u g h tfu l tone  
o f  a*5 allowing fu r th er  orders in  r e la t io n  to  property  
and taking in to  account the in t e r e s t s  o f o ther p a r t ie s?  
in  th e event of v a r ia t io n s  or r e c a l l  o f  decree and 
hedged around with p rov isos?  would, not be inappropriate®
U n less the house has a lread y  been d e a lt  w ith  
fo llo w in g  upon decree o f j u d ic ia l  .separation  (below)?  
the ru le  w i l l  be? both in  Category I and Category I I  
cases?  th a t the predeceaser^a o n e -h a lf  share theroin 
s h a l l  p ass to  th e survivor*
This means, in te r  a l i a g th a t tho p ro v is io n s  of the  
1964 Act p er ta in in g  to  the p r io r  r ig h t  to  the house 
( in  which the su rv iv o r  was o r d in a r ily  r e s id e n t  at th e  
date /
1 , Proceed ings would be in i t ia t e d  under the 1938 Act i f  the aim was to  o b ta in  a decree o f d is s o lu t io n  o f  marriageo Decree obtained  under th e  1391 Act would not have th e  e f f e c t  o f  p erm ittin g  re-'-marriage ? but was n ecessa ry  ra th er  in  con n ection  w ith  q u estio n s o f  d ev o lu tio n  o f  th e e s ta t e  o f  the m issin g  person® D ecrees were not in terch an geab le  *
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date o f death) would cea se  to  be appropriate*
In a l l  cases?  whether o f  Category I or II? a
second house would fall to th a t person to  whom i t
was d estin ed  in  th e deed or in  the w i l l  ( l e g a l  r ig h ts
1b ein g  lim ite d  now in  t h e ir  a p p lic a t io n  to  the moveable 
e s ta te  o f th e d eceased ) and i f  in te s ta c y  occurred? i t  
would devolve accord ing to  the Succession ( -c o tla n d )
Act? 1964? 8 , 2*9 which co n ta in s a l i s t  o f  e n t i t l e d  
r e la t iv e s  0 Although in  n e ith e r  Category o f  case  does 
th e Bura^ ’lv o r  appear to  fa re  so w e ll as under the p resen t  
r u le s  (by reason  o f choice of sep ara ten ess (Category I )  
or o f jo in tn e s s  (Category I I ) ) ,  i t  i s  not thought th a t  
the su rv iv in g  spouse ® s cla im  should rank h igh er in  the  
hierarchy,
^ Riiles of Cuccepsion in Cases whero there has been 
Boskillnad, J u d ic ia l  R eparation or ,;\egula t io n  o f Propert y  
Matters by Harriage-^lpntract
Where the spouses have been l iv in g  under a system  
o f separation ? i t  would be convenient to  l e t  stand? 
w ithout amendment ? tho rules concerning prior r ig h ts  
and le g a l  rights on in te s ta c y  contained  in  the ouccesBion 
(S co tlan d ) Act? 1964, and ( le g a l  r ig h t s )  a t  common law 
and to  allow  cla im s fo r  ju s  r e l i c t K a e )  on testa cy *
There i s  an o b je c t io n  to  t h i s  in  th a t the 1964 Act in  
e f f e c t  p rov id es Eilmost a community o f p rop erty  on death? 
in  the tenor and in  the p r a c t ic a l  rosuli; o f  i t s  p ro v is io n s  
e s p e c ia l ly  where tho e s ta t e  i s  small. I s  i t  r ig h t  to  
impose such a system in  a case "wlioro tho p a r t ie s  
them selves have chosen to  adopt s t r i c t  separation ?
( A t  present, t h e s e  r u l e s  s o f t e n  t h e  e f f e c t  w h i c h  a  
s t a n d a r d  s y s t e m  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  may p r o d u c e ) .  O n  t h e  
other h a n d ?  s p o u s e s  w h o  f a v o u r  s e p a r a t i o n  s h o u l d  make 
w i l l s  /
1 .  19G4 A c t ,  3 . 1 0
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w i l l s  which are in  accord w ith  th e ir  philosophy? and 
thought would req u ire  to  be g iven  as to  whether or 
not the law should a llow  f ix e d  ( le g a l )  r ig h ts  o f  
su c c e ss io n  to  th e survivor in  the e s ta te  o f the  
predeceaser*
As the law o f p r io r  r ig h t s  stands at p resen t In  
the case  vihere th e spouses have separated  thp su rv iv o r  
in  any case would have no r ig h t  to  house? fu rn itu repand p l e n i B h i n g s I n d e e d ?  the ru le s  a p p lica b le  where 
there ho.s been j u d ic ia l  sep a ra tio n  would req u ire  special 
co n sid ér a tio n  * ^
Intestacy
Where the parties cohabited? but had excluded
jo in tn e s s  o f  fa m ily  a s s e t s  mid concurrent com pensation
by siBiplo m arriage-con tract containing no o th er p ro v is io n s?
and had not made w i l l s  t h e ir  a t t itu d e  towards propertySo *£cowould be clear^ where Boskillnad had takon place.
It is suggested th a t i t  would be wrong to  a llow  a p r io r  
r ig h t  to  plenishings in  such a. case  (a ltliough  u lt im a te ly  
th ey  may f a l l  to  th e survivor) but th a t i t  would be for 
d isc u ss io n  whether th ere  should be a cash entitlement 
Legal /
1 0 but c o n tra st th e s itu ation  whore th ere  has been m erely ea r ly  sep a ra tio n  o f  a sse ts*2 p s in c e  th e spouses were not co h a b itin g  at the date  of death (see tenm  of Succ*(hc,)'A ct, 1964? 8.8(4))But see  a lso  Conjugal R ights (Sc*) Amendment Act?1861? 8 . 6 ? both s e p a r a te ly  trea ted ?  below,36 See "Judicial Separation" and "Marriage C on tracts" ?and "Eoskillnad" (b e lo w ).4o On the whole ? i t  i s  thought that? both in  Category  I and Catego]?y I I  cases?  th ere Ghould be a ‘cash® p r i o r  r i g h t  A In Category I I  ca ses  ? t h is  may be taken out o f tho deceased® s separate b u t  not h is  heirloom  p ro p e r ty *  The .same p riz ic ip le  should apply  in  Category I oaees? but i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  that? where sep a ra tio n  i s  the norm? p a r t ie s  w i l l  have taken the  t r o u b le  to  e f f e c t  th a t d if f e r e n t ia t io n .  Hence? i f  th e  execu tors f e e l  t h a t  the cash r i g h t  i s  b ein g  exacted  from property which might be regarded as heirloom? the  court would be open always (..em edies -  ( 1 ) )  to  g iv e  a r u lin g  on the p o in t (D eclarator o f Property R ig h ts) »
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L e g a l  r i g h t s  ( q . v . )  w o u l d  t h e n  b e  t a k e n *  T h e r e a f t e r ?
the a p o u s e  would t a k e  h i s / h e r  ( u n c h a n g e d )  p l a c e  i n
t h e  l i s t  o f  t h o s e  e n t i t l e d  t o  r e s i d u e ?  a s  i s  t h e  r u l e  
1a t  p r e s e n t *  It c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v o r ' s  
r i g h t s  would n o t  d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  f r o m  t h o s e  to w h i c h  
h e / s h e  a t  p r e s e n t  enjoys* despite t h e  now c o n s c i o u s  
c h o i c e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  property. I f  t h i s  i s  
u n a c c e p t a b l e  ( a n d  i n  m a n y  h a p p y  ' s e p a r a t e  p r o p e r t y *  
m a r r i a g e s  i t  w o u l d ,  n o t  b o )  pEtrtios s h o u l d  l a a k e  wills 
expressing a n d  imp1emonting t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e  «
P a u t i a l  , l u t e s t a o y
I f  i t  i s  thought r i g h t  that there s h o u l d  b e  a
c a s h  e n t i t l e m e n t  (and u h i s  w o u l d  b o  i n  sympathy with
the s u g g e s t e d  retention o f  legal rights i n  Category I
c a s e s  o f  testacy), t h e  e n t i t l e m e n t  w o u l d  b e  payable
s u b j e c t  t o  d e d u c t i o n  o f  a n y  l c g a c y ( i e s )  w h i c h  i s / a r eo
n o t  l e g a c y ( l e s )  o f  p l e n i s h i n g s ,  ( A t  p r e s e n t ' ” prior 
r i g h t s  a r e  e x i g i b l e  i n  a  p a r t i a l  i n t e s t a c y  o u t  of so 
m i i o l i  of t h e  estate as is undisposed of b y  will ? but 
a s  e x p l a i n e d  a b o v e ?  p r i o r  r i g h t s  w o u l ' l  be t h o u g h t  to 
b e  a  concept a l i e n  t o  t h o s e  c o m m i t t e d  so c l e a r l y  to 
8  e p  a r a t  i  o n  o  f  p r o p c r t y ) »
Â r u l e  o f  f i x e d  l e g a l  r i g h t s  h a s  b e e n  a  characteristic 
feature of the Moots l a w  of testate succession for a v e r y  
l o n g  t i m e ?  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  l a w  of h i g l a n d o ^  I n
t h e  s a m e  w a y  t h a t  c o i m m n i t y  d u r i n g  m a r r i a g e  w o u l d  l e s s e n  
t h e  n e e d  f o r  a  r e d r e s s i n g  o f  the b a l a n c e  a t  d i v o r c e ?  
s o  w o u l d  i t  l e s s e n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  c l a i m s  against t h e  
p r e d e c e a s i n g  s p o u s e ' s  e s t a t e ,  a n d  later (Category I I  
c a s e s )  i t  w i l l  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  i n  t h o s e  c a s e s ,  t h e  l o n g -  
h e l d  r i g h t s  o f  j u s  r e l i c t  a ©  ( 3)  )  s h o u l d  b o  a b o l i s h e d  ®
H o w e v e r  /
1, Cucc, (3c0) Act, 1964? 8,2*2, see Meston, p,27,
3 , 3 0 0  Chapter 6  ( E n g l a n d ) :  F a m i l y  Provision.
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H o w e v e r ?  s o m e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a  l o n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  ' p e r h a p s  
i s  d u e  even w h e r e  s p o u s e s  h a v e  c h o s e n  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
property? a n d  s o  i t  is s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  h e r e  l e g a l  rights 
h e  r e t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  ' / h e r e  a  l e g a c y  h a s  b e e n  
g i v e n ?  a  s p o u s e  w i l l  b e  p u t  t o  e l e c t i o n ,  e x c e p t  w h e r e  
t h e  l e g a c y  i n  f a c t  i s  a  b e q u e s t  o f  p l e n i s h i n g  I n  w h i c h  
c a s e  i t  : : ia y  b e  t a k e n  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  l e g a l  r i g h t s  *
I f  t h e  c o n c e p t  of f i x e d  r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  b e  
retained, s h o u l d  t h e r e  bo under the n e w  r u l e s  ( o r ?  
m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y ?  i n  c a s e s  where t h e  n o w  r u l e s  h a v e  b e e n  
e x c l u d e d )  a s  e x t e n s i v e  a  right a s  a t  present e x i s t s ?
W o u l d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  ( a p p l i e d  n o w  both a s  t o  p r i o r  a n d  
a s  t o  l e g a l  r i g h t s )  t h a t  m o r e  m a y  b e  o b t a i n e d  i f  t h e r e  
a r e  n o  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  r e m a i n  a p p r o p r i a t e ?
I t  i s  n o t  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  any c h a n g e  b e  m a d e  i n
t h e  r i g h t s  o f  c h i l d r e n  t o  succeed® hence ? t h e  l e g a l
r i g h t s  of children s h o u l d  r e m a i n  rights t o  o n o  t h i r d
o r  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  moveable e s t a t e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h e t h e r1o r  n o t  a  s p o u s e  s u r v i v e d ?  a n d  the p r i o r  r i g h t  o f  t h e  
s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e  w o u l d  b e  a  r i g h t  t o  a  s m a l l e r  s u m  i f  
t h e  d e c e a s e d  l e f t  c h i l d r e n * T h e  'cash* p r i o r  r i g h t  ? 
a s  now,  w o u l d  vary, therefore: i t s  s i z e  v / o u l d  r o q i i i r o
t o  b e  k e p t  i n  l i n e  with t h e  l e v e l  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,
A l t h o u g h  c h i l d r e n ’ s  l e g a l  r i g h t s  w o u l d  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  whether o r  n o t  t h e  d e c e a s e d  l e f t  a  s p o u s e  ? i n  v i e w  
o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ?  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  o f  c a s e ?  s p o u s e s  h a v e  
c h o s e n  s e p a r c a t i o n ^  t o  g i v e  t o  t h e  s u r v i v o r  a, p o t e n t i a l  
r i g h t  /
n o t  s e p a r a t e d  ( J u d i c i a l  Reparation? b e l o w )  nor? of 
c o u r s e n  d i v o r c e d *  I f  tiie marriage w a s  in f u l l  
c o m m m i t o  (Category I  c a s e ) ,  t h e  c h i l d r e n ' s  r i g h t s  
o f  l e g i t i m  w o u l d  b e  t o  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h o  m o v e a b l e  
e s t a t e ?  b e c a u s e  i n  such cases i t  i s  suggested (see 
b e l o w )  that t h e  s u r v i v o r  w o u l d  n o t  b o  e n t i t l e d  to 
IU S r o l i c t a e j i ^ *  T o  some e x t o n t  t h i s  w o u l d  offset rfren thoh r  T i^“ ’c H I l l f r € J  d i e  a d v a n t a g e  a r i s i n g  for them 
f r o m  t h o  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  th e  f a m i l y  a s s e t s  w o u l d  f a l l  to t h e  survivor.
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r i g h t  t o  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a B o r ' o  e s t a t e  s e  e r a s  
w r o n g ?  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  l e g a l  
r i g h t  o f  t h e  s p o u s e  h e  l i m i t e d  i n  a l l  o a s e s  t o  o n e  
t h i r d  o f  t h e  m o v e a b l e  estate, T h i s  proportion, i f  
chosen? would mean that some liiil;: w i t h  lus relictae(i) 
as always u n d e r s t o o d ?  w o u l d  r e m a i n ?  b u t  s o m e  m i g h t  
think that, in the circumstances, the stai:dard proportion 
o f  o n e - s i x t h  w o u l d  b o  m o r e  appropriate,
Marriage-Contracts
Harriage-contraots may contain terms which are of 
a  testamentary character, M i i U u a l  wills,  t h o u g h  rare 
ar.i(3 g e n e r a l l y  thought undesirable,  a r e  competent and 
m a y  b e  found.
I n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  a s  i t  i s  p r o v i d e d  that the r i g h t
of a child to legitim can no longer be discharged1prospectively ante-imptially ? perhaps it m ight be
provided that tho testamentary p r o v i s i o n s  of a  m a r r i a g e
contract c a n n o t  be l o s s  generous to t h e  survivor than
w o u l d  t h o  g e n e r a l  l a w  b e  to h i m  i n  a  c a s e  o f  t e s t a t e
Ps u c c e s s i o n  u n d e r  a  s y s t e m  of separation.
By this m e t h o d ,  i n  effect, a  limitation i s  placed 
on (testamentary) contractual c a p a c i t y ?  b e i n g  the same 
l i m i t a t i o n  a s  i s  p l a c e d  o n  t e s t a m e n t a r y  capacity 
(including testamentary capacity with regard to mutual
w i l l s )  -  t h a t  is,  I n  a l l  c a s e s ?  a  c l a i m  f o r  l e g a l  rights 
(to one third or perhaps to one s i x t h  of the m o v e a b l e  
e s t a t e )  i s  e x i g i b l e ,  Testamentary p r o v i s i o n s  in a  
m a r r i a g e  contract which m a y  b e  re-written by t h e  court
o n  the d e a t h  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s a r  m i g h t  b e  t h o u g h t  h a r d l y  
w o r t h y  o f  i n s e r t i o n *  T h e  p o s i t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  t h a t ,  i f  
t h e  s u r v i v o r  f e e l s  a g g r i e v e d ,  h e  s h o u l d  b e  put to h i s  
e l e c t i o n  /
1 ,  h u o c e s s i o n  ( M e , )  A c t ,  1 9 6 4 ,  b , 1 2 *
2 ,  T h e  position may bo different w i t h  r e g a r d  to 
B i a r r i a g e - c o n t x ’a c t  provisions t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  o n  
d i v o r c e ;  s e e  a b o v e ?
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e l e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  c o n t r a c t  p x ’o v x s x o n  a n d1c l a i m i n g  l e g a l  r i g h t s  *
II Rulea of Succession There Parties have lived under
t h e  8 1 a n d m x l   ^ s t e m  o f  G ir i m m i i t y  ( F a m i l y  A s s e t s  a n d  
C o n c u r r e n  b G o i ; i p e n B a t I p n )
3 i n c e  t h e  f a m i l y  a s  " . e t a  h a v e  been h e l d  j o i n t l y  
i n  t h e s e  c a s e s ?  t h o  i r a r v i v o r  automatically w o u l d  acquire 
i ^ i g h t  t o  t h o  prodecoaser's s h a r e  t h e r e i n *  ‘T h o s e  r i g h t s  
would arise e x  c o i m a i i j i i g n e ,  rather t h a n  e x  s u e  c e  s  sj . o n e ,  
H e n c e ,  the r u l e s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  h e r e  w o u l d  c o n c e r n  
p r i n c i p a l l y  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  survivor i n  t h e  s e p a r a t e  
a n d  heirloom p r o p e r t y  of the X D r e d e c e a s e r  o n  h i s  d e a t h  
testate or i n t e s t a t e *  I t  may b e  argued t h a t  what 
m a t t e r s  i s  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  provision. P e r h a p s  r i g h t s  
arising out of comiunity are adequate for M.8/her 
p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  s u p p o r t  a n d / o r  for the r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  
t h e  m a r r i a g e  relationship and/or f o r  a n y  o t h e r  r e a s o n  
f o r  which r i g h t s  o f  "succession" e x i s t *
As has b e e n  n o  b e d ?  a l l  f u r n i t u r e  a n d  p l e n i s h i n g  
used for f a m i l y  p u r p o s e s  (not declared "separate" or 
"heirloom" b y  t h e  c o u r t )  w i l l  be c a t e g o r i s e d  a s  " f a m i l y  
a s s e t s "  ( e v e n  i f  s i t u a t e d  i n  a  s e c o n d ,  'holiday® h o m e )  
a n d  h e n c e  w i l l  f a l l  t o  t h o  survivor a s  s u r v i v i n g  joint 
o w n e r  *
W h e r e  c o m m i m i t y  h a s  e x i s t e d ?  should t h e  s u r v i v o r
b e  /
A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  - but a  ^esuLt l e s s  p r e d i c t a b l e  
b y  El p a r t y  a n d  hir: a d v i s e r s  -  w o u l d  b e  f o r  t h e  
c o u r t  t o  s t u d y  t h o  contract,  a n d  t h e n  t o  apply* at tho option of tho survivor (w)io w o u l d  chooso 
b e t w e e n  t h a t  r e m e d y  a n d  t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  p r o v i s i o n ) ,  
t h e  t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  r u l e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o r  community a c c o r d i n g  t o  whether i t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  
t î x e  marriage h a d  b e e n  c a r r i e d  o n  u n d e r  s e p a r a t i o n  
o r  c o m m u n i t y È
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bo e n t i t l e d  t o  m o r e  t h a n  t h a t  t o  w h i c h  s h e  has r i g h t
b y  " m a t r i m o n i a l  p r o p e r t y  l a w "  a s  s t r i c t l y  u n d e r s t o o d ?
I t  i s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  a n  e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  m o r e  would b o
p r o p e r *  R i g h t s  of s u c c e s s i o n  m a y  be r e g a r d e d  a s  p a r t
o f  m a t r i m o n i a l  property l a w ,  w i t h o u t  w h i c h  a n  Incomplete
t r e a t m e n t  i s  g i v e n  ? a n d  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p r i n c i p l e  a n d
policy, the surviving partner of a marriage which wa#
s u b s i s t i n g  at t h e  d e a t h  o f  the p r o d e c o a s o r  s h o u l d  h a v e
a  f u r t h e r  claim. I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  while*
a s  I n  a l l  c a s e s ,  t h e  p r i o r  r i g h t  t o  t h e  h o u s e  i s
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  and, as i n  t h i n  case, t h e  p r i o r  r i g h t  to
t h e  f u r n i t u r e  i s  u n n e c e s s a r y ^ ,  i n  C a t e g o r y  I I  a s  i n
C a t e g o r y  I  c a s e s ?  t h e  survivor s h o u l d  h a v e  right t o  aP' c a s h ®  p r i o r  r i g h t ?  i n f l a t i o n - l i n l c e d " * ?  a n d  i t s  s i z e  
d e p e n d i n g  upon tho p r e s e n c e  or a b s e n c e  o f  c h i l d r e n  of 
t h e  d e c e a s e d .  I n  e f f e c t ?  t h i s  moans t h a t ?  i n  o r d e r  
t o  satisfy the c l a i m ?  r e c o u r s e  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  h a d  to 
t h e  d e c e a s e d ' s  s e p a r a t e  estate. H e i r l o o m  p r o p e r t y  
w o u l d  b e  left i n t a c t .
S u c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  f r e e  e s t a t e  w o u l d  be i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  t h e  r u 3 , s B  a t  p r e s e n t  i n  operation^, but n e i t h e r  i n  
intestacy n o r  u o s t a c y ?  i n  C a t e g o r y  I I  c a s e s  w o u l d  l e g a l  
rights be e x i g i b l e ,
Partial Intestacy
As i n  C a t e g o r y  I  c a s e s ?  t h e  c a s h  entitlement w o u l d  
b e  p a y a b l e ?  s u b j e c t  t o  d e d u c t i o n  o f  a n y  l e g a c y *  T h e r e  
would b e  n o  p r o v i s o  a s  t o  l e g a c i e s  o f  p l e n i s h i n g s ?  
b e c a u s e  i n  Category I I  c a s e s  a  l e g a c y  o f  p l e n i s h i n g s  
( u n l e s s  /
I n  C a t e g o r y  I  c a s e s ,  the prior r i g h t  t o  b h e  furniture 
i s  e x c l u d e d *  Rights t o  furniture depend, in life 
a n d  a f t e r  death, u p o n  p r o p e r t y  r u l e s *  A surviving 
s ] ' ) o u s e  m a y  become e n t i t l e d  thereto,  h o w e v e r ,  i f  h e /  
s h e  i s  e n t i t l e d  to t a k e  t h e  r e s i d u e *
3 u c o 0 3 3 .1 o I 3  ( G o . )  Act, 1973; L . B . ( M . P . ) ( S C . )  A c t ,  1 9 8 0 ,  S . A .  3* 1964 Act,
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( u n l e s s  ' s e p a r a t e ®  o r  ' h e i r l o o m *  p r o p e r t y )  w o u l d  b e  
i n c o m p e t e n t  a n d  u i m e c e s s a r y *
T e s t a c y
U n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  rules,  a  man, i f  h e  has a  
w i f e  a n d  c h i l d r e n ?  c a n  dispose f r e e l y  o f  o n l y  o n e  
third of his moveable estate*
I t  i s  proposed t h a t  i f ?  d u r i n g ;  t h e  w h o l e  o r  a  
substantial p a r t  o f  h a e  m a r r i a g e ?  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  f u l l  
c o i m r a i n i o  ( f a m i l y  a s s e t s  a n d  c o m p e n s a t i o n )  t h e n  the 
survivor s h o u l d  l o s e  h i s  e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  j u s  reliotae(l). 
T h e  s u r v i v o r  t h e r e f o r e  w o u l d  h a v e  n o  r i g h t s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  
o n  t h e  d e a t h  t e s t a t e  o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r *  ( S h e )  w o u l d  
b e  entitled t o  h o m e  a n d  a s s e t s  e x  c o n t m u n i o n e ?  b u t  t o  
n o  m o r e *
'T h e  c h i l d r e n  w o u l d  r e t a i n  t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  l e g i t i m
w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  a  right t o  o n e  h a l f  o f  tho moveable
estate, in v i e w  of the f a c t  t h a t  the s u r v i v o r  could be
t r e a t e d  a s  i f  he were n o t  i n  e x i s t e n c e ?  b e c a u s e  h e  h a s1n o  c l a i m  f o r  j u s  relicti.
Thus,  t i n -  t e s t a t o r  w o u l d  have f r e e d o m  o f  t e s t a t i o n  
over o n e  half o f  h i s  s e p a r a t e  a n d  heirloom property.
( b o  f a r  a s  possible, t h e  c l a i m  f o r  l e g i t i m  w o u l d  b e  
m o t  o u t  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ' s  s e p a r a t e  T>3?opo:i?ty  a n d  h e i r l o o m  
b e q u e s t s  r e s p e c t e d ,  but* i f  this is n o t  possible * a t  
l e a s t  the h e i r l o o m  f a l l s  t o  t h e  heirs)* T h e  s p o u s e  
w o u l d  n o t  be l o f t  d e s t i t u t e ?  and i n d e e d  r a i g j i t  b e  a m o n g  
t h o s e  f a v o u r e d  b y  t h e  will*
Compensation d u r i n g  m a r r i a g e  f a v o u r s  t h e  wife. I s  
i t  r i g h t  t h a t  t h e  husband should, r e c e i v e  ? a t  t h e  w i s h  o f  
h i s  w i f e ?  s o  l i t t l e  o n  her d e a t h  tostate? C a t e g o r y  I I  
r u l e s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  i n t e s t a t e  s u c c e s s i o n  a r e  f a i r l y  
g e n e r o u s  t o  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  spouse of e i t h e r  s e x ?  b u t  t h e  
r u l e s  /'
1 * As has been p o i n t e d  out, this lA/L/fpm- o f f s e t  t h e  disadvantage a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  fact t h a t  t h e  
c h i l d r e n  c a n  h a v e  n o  c l a i m  t o  t h e  f a m i l y  a s s e t s ®
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r u l e s  p l a c e  I n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  a  t e s t a t o r  who h a s  l i v o d  
u n d e r  f u l l  oom m in lty  t h e  pow er to  e%c].ude h i s  s p o u s e ,  
an  e v e n t u a l i t y  a g a i n s t  w h ic h  t h e  w i f e ,  d u r in g  m a r r i a g e ,  
w ou ld  h e  cush ioned®  W ere t h e  w if e  so  m inded  t o  e x c lu d e  
h e r  h u s b a n d , h e  m ig h t h e  th o u g h t  to  h e  th e  v i c t i m  o f  
t h e  s y s te m , Y e t I f  one I s  t r u e  t o  t h e  th e o r y  o f  t h e  
s y s te m , one m is t  a b id e  b y  t h i s  r e s u l t .  M o re o v e r , 
w here  s p o u s e s  c o h a b i t  I n  o o m m m lty , t h e y  a r e  n o t  l i k e l y  
t o  e x c lu d e  e a c h  o t h e r  I n  t h e i r  w i l l s *
A d i f f i c u l t y  w o u ld  a r i s e  i n  t h e  h y b r id  c a s e  w here  
t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  j o l n t n o s a  o f  a s s e t s ,  b u t  no c o m p e n sa tio n #  
P o s s i b l y  t h e  m o d if ie d  j u s  r e l l o t a e ( l ) e a r l i e r  s u g g e s te d  
I n  t h e  d l s o u s n lo n  o f  C a te g o ry  I  o a s e s  ( o f  one s i x t h  o f  
t h e  m o v eab le  e s t a t e )  w o u ld  b e  a  j u s t  com prom ise s o l u t i o n ,  
t h e r e  h a v in g  b e e n  o o m m n lty  b u t  no c o n t in u in g  c o m p e n sa tio n  
d u r in g  t h e  m a rr ia g e *  The s u r v i v o r  w ould  bo e n t i t l e d ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  t o  f a m i ly  a s s e t s ,  and  eo m ig h t b e  s a i d  i n  a l l  t o  
h a v e  b e e n  w e l l  t r e a t e d .
B o s k l l l n a d ^
W here t h e  p a r t i e s  h a d  b e g u n  t h e i r  m a r r ia g e  u n d e r  
th e  sy a tem  o f  j o i n t n e s s ,  b u t  t h e r e  hud  b e e n  e a r l y  
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  an d  p o s s i b l y  t e r m in a t io n  o f  
c o m p e n s a tio n  a l s o ,  t h e  c a s e  d o e s  n o t  d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  fro m  
t h a t  w hore t h e  p a r t i e s *  i n i t i a l  and  u n c h an g e d  c h o ic e
h a s  b o e n  t h a t  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r ty *  H e n c e , I t  I soth o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  some r u l e s  s h o u ld  a p p l y , T h e  s u r v i v o r  
w o u ld  h a v e  a  c la im  t o  l e g a l  r i g h t s  ( t o  one t h i r d  o r  
p e rh a p s  one s i x t h  o f  t h e  m o v eab le  e s t a t e )  on t e s t a c y  o r  
t o  t h e  *o&8h* p r i o r  r i g h t  on I n t e s t a c y ,  I f  o p in io n  
g e n e r a l l y  f a v o u r e d  th o  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  'c a s h *  p r i o r  
r i g h t  I n  s e p a r a t io n *  T h e re  w ou ld  b e  no r i g h t  t o  f u r n i t u r e  
and  p l e n i s h i n g s  and  a s ,  a t  B o s k l l ln o d  ( s u n r a ) , no c h an g e  
i s  /
B o s k illn & d  I s  t a k e n  t o  mean e a r l y  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  aase^G ^w ETle c o h a b i t a t i o n  c o n t i n u e s ,T h is  w ou ld  n o t  b e  so  w h e re  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  a l s o  v o l u n t a r y  s e p a r a t i o n  s e e  i n f r a #
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Is m a d ©  :Ui the ( j o i n t )  ownership of the h o m e  ? t h e  
h o m e  w o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  i n  the s a m e  w a y  a s  i n  a l l  t h e  
o t h e r  c a s e s ?  that i s ?  t h e  p r e d e c o a s e r ® s  o n e  h a l f  
s h a r e  w o u l d  a c o r e s c e  t o  t h o  s u r v i v o r *
It m i g h t  be a r g u e d  that w h e r e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  too 
has ceased? t h e r e  is a  stronger c a s e  i n  f a v o u r  of the 
e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  a  ' c a s h ®  prior r i g h t *  A g a i n ?  in 
i n i t i a l  c h o i c e  separation? t h e r e  never w o u l d  be 
compensation, except in rare cases where parties had 
chosen separation with compensation, On the other 
h a n d ?  if parties have c h o s e n  to e x c l u d e  compensation 
during t h e i r  j o i n t  l i f e t i m e s ?  w h y  s h o u l d  i t  a r i s e  and 
be e x i g i b l e  i n  t h e  form of a  r i g l i t  t o  a  lump sum after 
t h o  d e a t h  o f  o n e ?
Judicial Separation
U n d e r  t h e  e x i s t i n g  rules ? w h e r e  a  w i f e  has 
o b t a i n e d  d e c r e e  o f  j u d i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n ?  p r o p e r t y  
o.cquired by h e r  t h e r e a f t e r  d e s c e n d s  o n  h e r  d e a t h  intestate 
a s  if h e r  h u s b a n d  h a d  b e e n  d e a d  a t  her d e a t h ?  w h e t h e r  
o r  n o t  t h a t  w a s  t h e  c a s e ®  T h e  p r o v i s i o n  d e m a n d s  exact 
compliance b e f o r e  i t  w i l l  o p e r a t e ;  d e c r e e  must h a v e  
b o e n  o b t a i n e d  by a  w i f e  pursuer who m u s t  d i e  i n t e s t a t e ,
T l i e  p r o v i s i o n  w i l l  not operate if c o h a b i t a t i o n  r e s u m e s *
O l i v e  a n d  Wilson u r g e  a m e n d m e n t  of t h i s  p r o v i s i o n *
" I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  i f  a  w i f e  holding a  d e c r e e  of 
s e p a r a t i o n  inherits a  f o r t u n e  a n d  l e a v e s  i t  t o  a c h a r i t y  
by w i l l  h e r  h u s b a n d  c a n  t a k e  h i s  j u s  I f ?
h o w e v e r ?  she dies i n t e s t a t e  he cannot. T h e  p r a c t i c a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  s e p a r a t i n g  t h e  w i f e ' s  p r o p e r t y  a c q u i r e d  
a f t e r  a  s e p a r a t i o n  d e c r e e  f r o m  her p r e v i o u s l y  a c q u i r e d  
p r o p e r t y  a r e  i m m e n s e  ? a n d . t h e r e  i s  sk s t r o n g  c a s e  f o r  
a m e n d i n g  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n , " ^
U n d e r  /
1 ,  C o n j u g a l  Rights (So,) Amendment A c t ?  1861? b,6
2 ,  G ,  & W e ,  H» & W , ,  p p , 6 9 0 - 6 9 1 ,
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U n d e r  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  h e r e  p u t  f o r w a r d ?  a t  j u d i c i a l  
s e p a r a t i o n ?  t h e r e  w o u l d  b o  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  
( i n c l u d i n g ?  i f  p o s s i b l e ?  t h e n ?  and? if n o t ?  l a t e r ?  b u t  
within the joint lifetimes? a 'clean brcalc* solution
t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  d e a l i n g  i n  a  f a i r  m a n n e r  with t h e
capital a s s e t  o f  tho h o u s e )  a n d  c o h a b i t a t i o n  w o u l d
c e a s e ®  11; is by n o  m e a n s  c l e a r  that either a p o u s e
s h o u l !  h a v e  a n y  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  of ' h  e  other a f t e r
that e v e n t o  T h e  o n l y  link b e t w e e n  then ? i f  i n d e e d  t h e r e
is a n y  l i n k  ? w i l l  b e  t h e  l i n k  o f  a l i i i o n t o  L i v e s  a n d
property interests have diverged. It is thought that
i n  t h e s e  cases ? there s h o u l d  b o  right neither to a  prior
right n o r  to a  legal r i g h t s  claim. T h o  a s s o c i a t i o n  i n2i t s  property a s p e c t  as in other a s p e c t s  has ended*
G l e a r l y ?  after d i v o r c e ?  a s  now? no r i g h t s  of succession 
arise.
Change in Property Regime of IiaoiTiage
■ R u l e s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  will be a p p l i e d  t o  suit the 
t y p e  of property a r r a n g e n e n t s  used a b  t h e  d a t e  of death 
o f  t h e  p r e d e c e a s e r ï  t h a t  w i l l  b o  the g e n e r a l  rule,
However, o n  application b y  m i  a g g r i e v e d  p a r t y ?  t h e  c o u r t  
m u s t  h a v e  a  d i s c r e t i o n  w i t h i n  w h i c h  t o  act* T h i s  r a r e l y  
would, r e q u i r e  to b e  e x o r c i s e d ?  b e c a u s e ?  a l t h o u g h  f l e x i b i l i t y  
and choice arc hallmarks of the system, it is envicagod 
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t h e  l a r g e r  part, if n o t  t h e  w h o l e  duration 
o f  mo cat m a r r i a g e s  w o u l d  b e  c a r r i e d  o n  u n d e r  o n e  system.
T h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  m o s t  p e o p l e  w o u l d  b o  c l e a r ?  a n d ?  i f  
t ' l e r e  w a s  a  change of inind,  a n d  B o s l i l l n a d  w a s  m a d e ,  
t h e n  i t  is clear t h a t  t h e  parties, o n  r e f l e c t i o n ?  h a d  
o h o s e n  separation and that t h e  r u l e s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
'separate /
Which w i l l  t e r m i n a t e ?  normally, on death - 0. & W , p*202; Memo .No.22, P a r t  IV; A l i m e n t  o n  . D e a t h  of 
I d a b l e  R e l a t i v e *
. R i g h t s  o f  c h i l d r e n  w o u l d  b e  u n a f f e c t e d  -  e x c e p t  for 
t h e  b e t t e r  i n  t h a t ,  i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  l e g a l  r i g h t s ,  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s e p a r a t e d  s p o u s e  c o u l d  be i g n o r e d *
1118,
•separate property' marriages should regulate the 
succession to the estate of the predeceaeer®
Where parties had decided to adopt community? 
and soon t h e r e a f t e r  one of th e  parties died? the 
appropriate course would be leas clear. Is i t  right 
that the survivor* finding (Iiex^ self) with right to 
all the family assets* but having reaped little benefit 
from compensation (which is designed to render 
compensation on divorce and death unnecessary)* should be 
deprived of j u s  relictaa(i)? The answer in each case 
of t h i s  type must lie in the discretion o f  the c o u r t#  
Traditionally this is not a solution which has found 
favour with Scots lawyers? but in a very limited nujnber 
of cases it might be necessary to have r e c o u r s e  to it# 
Another situation which m ig h t require the exercise of 
judicial discretion would be that where there had been 
v o l u n t a r y  separations it is thought that in general 
the approach should be the same as that adopted in the 
case of judicial separation* Hence, no claim to the 
(cash) p r i o r  right n o r  to jus relictaeCl) could competently 
be made*
It is quite likely that there will have been no 
,1
made /
pformal separation o f  p r o p e r t y .  Parties will have
1 # In the general case* but see below#2, After judicial separation? separation of property? if not applicable up to that point? would be 
e s t a b l i s h e d ;  after voluntary separation* there would be factual separation of property# Parties' arrangements should be upheld# Unless a clear preference to continue com m unity  is shown* despite its artificiality w here  no common home is kept* the court would be inclined to hold that cessation of 
c o h a b i t a t i o n  and e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  s e p a r a t e  households Im p lie d  a return to? or w as evidence o f*  continuance of? a separation of p r o p e r t y  and would t r e a t  property acquired thereafter* b y  any means (inheritance* w ork* thrift) accordingly# If there is no common home * can there be any more family assets? Existing family assets are likely to have been divided* as the parties see fit#
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made their own arrangements® If a system of jointness 
had applied, the family assets will have been divided 
physically* and compensation will have terminated. Possibly 
a small sum will have been paid in name of aliment,
A more formal manner of acting may have been adopted 
with regard to the matrimonial home.
Since property matters will not have received the 
same formal treatment as occurs where the remedy of 
judicial separation is granted* the court must have 
power to clarify (perhaps by means of a declarator of 
property rights) and set forth the property rights of 
parties. Moreover* where the marriage had been carried 
on under a system of separation* and the parties had 
ceased to cohabit a short time before the death of the 
predeceaser? should the survivor be deprived of jus 
relictae(i)? Clearly there would be difficult* marginalwraamiWiwiamfTiiriri.i»! iu'm^i»wliibiiiiJ® i.n  ^  W
cases. The situation does not fall neatly into any of 
the categories identified. If jointness had been the 
system originally chosen* jointness de facto did not 
continue throughout the marriage; if there had been 
separation of property and separate habitation* at what 
point should the parties lose their potential claim to 
legal rights? It is possible that there has been factual 
separation of assets* but that compensation has been made 
though the parties have separate establishments. Such 
cases must bo dealt with by the court as it thinks fit 
in the particular circumstances.
CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made* first# to describe the 
historical origins of the provisions of Scots law which 
affect the property rights of married persons* second  ^
to state the rules applicable in areas where property 
queries arise* and third, to suggest* in outline and in 
detail* rules which might be adopted by Scots law in 
order to provide a fair but flexible* and optional* system 
of matrimonial property law® However* in all but very 
exceptional /
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exceptional cases? j o i n t  ownership of the matrimonial 
home is advocated®
The new system would display the f e a t u r e s  of
j o i n t n e s s  of ownership of home and family assets (but
not of assets of heirloom or truly separate nature)?
with freedom (and opportimity) to amass separate
p r o p e r ty *  over which t h e r e  would be complete power to
dispose inter vivos and considerable power to dispose
mortis causa# The rules of treatment of property on
divorce and death would reflect the fact that* during
the subsistence of the m a r r i a g e ,  recognition had been
given to inequality of o p p o r t u n i t y  to e a r n ,  and  an1attempt made to redress the balance#
The subject of property rights of m a r r ie d  p e r s o n s  
has been d i s c u s s e d ,  and continues to b e  discussed, in 
the civilian and in t h e  A n g lo -A m eric an  c o u n t r i e s  and  
i n  our own c o u n try #
The argument is urged here that we should avoid 
apparently h e l p f u l, short-term, changea of limited ambit 
i f  they be not accompanied by clear connection with 
i d e n t i f i a b l e  principle* It would be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
and  imcharaoteristically unsystematic to amass an array 
of well-intentioned remedies, unrelated to each other or 
to /
It could be a rg u e d  that the present rules of divorce and devolution of property at death attempt 
c o m p e n s a tio n  and that their ex cost facto nature does not m a t t e r ,  and  indeed xs natural because i n  a happy marriage? it is said, property rights do n o t  interest or concern the parties* It is submitted that their haphazard an d  uncertain nature, at least in the case of divorce? is a serious flaw and t h a t ,  w i t h i n  marriage, a degree of independence and Inter­dependence i n  property matters is a proper and worthy aim* Of# Law C om m ission  Third Report on Family Property (Law 0om#Ho#86) (1978)**#«"in our view it is a poor and incomplete kind of marital justice which is excluded from continuing marriage relationships and allowed to onorate o n ly  when those relationships end#" (0*11)*
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to any principle of law, 03? of social policy beyond 
that of general and uncritical goodwill*
There is proposed a s y s te m  of partial, or limited? 
com m unity  of property, its rules designed to try to 
remedy the flaws i n h e r e n t  in a system of separation 
which takes no account of difficulties of proof of 
ownership? mid, more I m p o r ta n t ,  of the practical 
communion of interest i n  family property matters during 
the subsistence of the mai?3?iage* Yet adult persons 
should be entitled to insist on self^regulatlon of 
property matters if they wish * It is the general law 
w h ic h  is u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .
New rules of p r o p e r t y  rights as between married 
p e r s o n s  must bring in t h e i r  t r a i n  rules concerning the 
property rights of strangers t o  the m a r r ia g e  * These
should be clear, and? as a matter of policy, should 
favour the t h i r d  party in case of doubt# A central 
core of new administrative provisions would be necessary 
to service the new system, and this s h o u ld  be accepted 
with a good grace as being the price of greater certainty 
in matrimonial p r o p e r t y  matters? or, as it m ig h t be said, 
o f  the establishment in Scots law of a body of meitxdmonial 
property rules - a Patrimonial P r o p e r ty  Law of Scotland? 
worthy of the name.
The cook  can feather the nest because he does not 
spend all his time sitting on it i that is true in fact 
and unfair in c o n s e q u e n c e s .
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